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DECISIONS 'rO BE BASED ON EVIDENCE.
DECISIONS TO BE BASED ON EVIDENCE.

[Case No. 1

_ WOOD RIVER BANK v. DODGE et al.

(55 N. W. 234. 36 Neb. 708.)

Supreme Court of Nebraska. April 26, 1893.

Error to district court, Hall county; Harri-

son, Judge.

Action by the Wood ltiver Bank against

'Freeman C. Dodge and George F. Dodge.

Defendants had judgment, and piaintiif

brings error. Reversed.

James H. W'oolley and Thompson Bros.,

WOOD RIVER BANK v. DODGE et al.
(M N. W. 234, 36 Neb. 708.)
Supreme Court of NebrMka. April 26, 1893.
Error to district court, Hall county; Harri·
son, Judge.
Action by the Wood River Banlt against
:Freeman a Dodge and George F. Dodge.
Defend11nts had judgment, and plalntllf
brlnaa error. Reversed.
.Ta.mes H. Woolley und Tbompaon Bro&,
for plaintiff Jn error. Thummel & Platt, for
defendants Jn error.

for plaintiff in error. Thummel & Platt, for

defendants in error.

MAXWELL, C. J. The plaintiff brought

-an action against the defendants to recover

»the sum of $1,884.25, with interest. To the

_petition the defendants ﬂied an answer, as

,-follows: "Comes now the above defendants,

and for answer to the petition of plaintiff

-say that they formed a limited partnership
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in the transaction of purchasing and selling

hogs, and conducted said business in the

name of Dodge Bros.; that they kept the

account with the said plaintiff in all the

transactions done, and banked with this

plaintiff as Dodge Bros. for this business;

.that Freeman C. Dodge had a personal ac-

_count with said bank, so did the said George

F. uodge, for their own personal transac-

.tion of business which had no connection

whatever with the said Dodge Bros busi-

ness; that these defendants made all de

posits done under the business in the name

of Dodge Bros., and drew on the said plain-

.tii'f all the checks on the said plaintiff bank

in the name of Dodge Bros. and none other:

that George F. Dodge did all the business

transactions for the said ﬁrm, and deposited

all the ftmds for the sale of the property.

and drew all the checks and money from

the plaintiff in the name of Dodge Bros..

and none other; that these defendants admit

they drew from the said plaintiff the said

sum of $21,993.21, and no more; they also

_'admit they deposited the sum of $20,lt)8.‘.3t;

as credited to them in the petition, and also

claim the fact to be that they paid or depos-

ited the additional sum of $7,832.47 to the

said piaintiif, which the said piaintiﬂ has neg-

lected and refused to give them credit for

as follows: On or about June 30, 1387, the

United States National Bank deposited or

paid to the plaintiff, to be placed to the

credit of Dodge Bros., the sum of $5,812.89;

that on the 1.‘-lth day of July, 1887, the said

Dodge Bros. dt'1)usii0d or paid into plaintiff

bank, to be credited to the said Dodge

Bros., the sum of $000; on September 5th,

$789.23; and September 9th, $629.65; that

the said defendants are not indebted to said

plaintiff in any sum whatever, but that the

plaintiff was indebted at the commencement

of this action on the said account the sum of

$5,812.89, which sum the defendants claim

Jll5ﬂ.\' due and wholly unpaid. Therefore

’pray judgment against said piaintiif in the

" said 911111 01 $5,812.39, over and above all

claims so_as' aforesaid mentioned in plain-

riti."s petition, with interest thereon at 7

MAXWELL, 0. J. The plaJntill' brought
an action against tbe defendants to recover
: the sum of $1,88-i.:.!a, with interest. To the
. petition the defendants filed an answer, 88
.:follows: "Comes now the above defendants,
. and for answer to the petition of pluJntlll'
, say that they formf'd a. Umited pnrlnersWp
Jn the trnnsaction of purchasing and 11elllng
bop, and conducted snld business Jn the
name of Dodge Broe.; that they kept the
account with the said plaintiff ln nll the
. transactions done, and banked with this
. plalntlll' as Dodgl' Bros. for this buslne88;
. thnt l<'reeman C. Dodge bad a. personal ac. count with Bllid bank, 110 did the said George
F. J.Jodge, for tht>ir own personal trnnsac. tlon of business which had no connection
whatever with tbe said Dodge Broe. busl.n~; that these defendants made all deposits done under the buslnesa Jn the name
of Dodge Bros., and drew on the said plain·
.tlll' all the checks on the said plaintill' bank
.Jn the name
Dodge Bros. and none other:
tpnt Gl'orge F. Dodge did all the b\llllnes~
transactions for the said llrm, and dep081ted
all the funds for the sale of the property.
and drew all the checks and money trom
the pl1tlntlll' ln the name of Dodge Bl'Oll..
·and none other; that these defendll.Dts admit
·{hey drew trow the said plalntllT the sal!I
sum of f21,003.21, and no more; they nlse
.admit tht!Y deposited the sum of $:.!0.108.21i
as credited to them in the petition, and also
claim tho fnct to be that they paid or deposited the additional sum of $7,S32.47 to the
said plalntltr, which the said plalntltr bas neglected and refused to gtve them credit tor
aa follows: On or about June 30, 1887, the
United States National Banlt deposited or
paid to the plalntill', to be placed to the
credit of Dodge Bros., the sum of ,5,812.89;
that on the 18th day of .July, 1887, the said
Dodge Bros. dl.'posited or paid into plalntlll'
bank, to be credited to the SDld Dodge
Bros., the sum of $600; on September 6th,
$789.23; and September 9th, $629.65; that
the snld defendants are not indebted to 1111ld
plalntlll' ln any sum whatever, but that the
plaintiff W88 indebted at the commencement
of this action on the said account the sum of
~.812.89, which sum the defendants claim
j118tly due and wholly unpaid. Therefore
1 pray judgment against said plaintiff In the
· llllid BWD of $5,812.89, over and above all
~ so .aa. aforesaid mentioned Jn plain·

ot

(Caae No. 1

rtlr's petition, with Interest thereon at .7
per cent. per annum from the 18th day of
Janua.ry, 1888, a.nd costs." The plaintiff filed
the following reply: "Now comes tbe nbovennmed plalntill', and for reply states: That
it denies that the Bllid defendants or either
ol them are entitled to the credit of $7,012.89,
the same IJelng the $:>,812.S9 and $1,200 mentioned ln said defendants' answer, or any
othc-r or dln<•rc-nt amount than ns mentlonro
ln the said pl11lntilr's petition, or that tlw 11a lcl
plnlntllf l'L"<"t•h·ed the said amounts, or either
Of them, ('XCept ill said petition mentioned
aud herein stated; and as further reply
sttttes that the $5,812.89 was receh·ed by
the Bllid plalntltl ln draft Jn favor of said
Dodge Bros. at the time ln said answer men·
tloned, but that the same was clalmfd by
the said Freeman C. Dodge to be his property, or mostly so, a.nd the said Freeman C.
Dodge theu und there ordered the same
placed to bis credit on his Jndlvidual account "ith the1mld bank, wblcb the said bnnlt
thPn nnd there did; tba t the same wns done
by an<.l with the knowledge and consent of
the sald George F. Dolli..-e. and was after"':\rds by Wm ratified and adopted with the
full kuowlc-dge of all of the foregoing facts;
that the plulntllr has shll'e the suld time
made and f>lfected a settlement wilh the
sald Freeman a Dodge, and by a.nd witb
tl1e const>nt of the said George F. Dod~e
allowed nnd given the said Freeman C. Dodge
·entire 1tnd tull credit for the said sum of
$5,812.S9, and that neither of snld defPndnnt1
are entitled 'to thL' S'.tltl c1'E'dlt of the said
amount on the acl'ount sued 011 In this case:
that as to the fact us to whether or not the
said dPfrml:mts are partners, or were nt the
time th~ said account was made and bU11i·
ness transacted, tbls plalntilf baa neither
knowlt'<ig•l nor information sufficient to form
a belief, and therefore denies the same, and
puts Bald defendants upon their proof.
Wherefore the said plnlntltr demands judgment against the snld defendants 88 Jn Its
petition prayed." On tlte trial of the cause
tl1e jury returned a verdict for the defend~
nots for the sum of $4,719.71, upon whlc11
jnd.t:ment was rendered.
Two errors are relied upon for a reversal
of the Judgwent-Flrst, that the verdict ls
ag:tlnst the weight of evidence; and, second, misconduct of certain jurors.
'.rile testimony ls undisputed that about the
fil'Bt of July, 1887, a large n1unber of bogs
were shipped in tbe name of Dodge Bros.
to South Omnba; that the amount realized
from these hogs was $5,812.89, which wn.s
placed to the croolt of the 'Vood River
Uank ln the L"nlted States National Banlt of
Omnlul. Up to this point there I.is no dispute.
It ls clalml'Cl. on hehnlf of plnintltr that the
ho;,,rs In question were the propl•rty of Free11.an C. Dodge, and 1•nld for by him out of
money obtained from the pluiutlff, and that
he dil'l'l'kd the plaintiff to pla<'I' the SllWP to
the credit of his wdh·ic.Iual accouut, which
wu done. Thia la denied by · the defend-

8

Case No. l]
Case No. 1]

DECISIONS TO BE BASED ON EVlDENCE.

ants. Both of the defendants testify that

the money was deposited to the credit of

Dodge Bros., and not to the credit of Free-

man. All the officers of the bank, some of

whom appear to be disinterested, testify that

the credit was given to Freeman. We also ﬁnd

that in the bank book of George Dodge with

the plaintiff, which is here in the record,

these hogs were not credited to Dodge Bros.

The otiicers of the bank testify that this

book was delivered to George Dodge a. few

weeks after the transaction; that he re

turned, and stated that he and his wife had

looked over it, and found it correct, except

an item of $20. Gcorgc denies receiving the

book until about the month of January after

the transaction. He, in effect, admits the

$20 mistake. The mode of doing business

with the bank seems to have been as fol-
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lows: When a shipment of hogs was about

to be made, the defendants would receive

credit for the supposed value of the hogs,

and were permitted to check the same out.

It appears that about the 5th of September

of that year Dodge Bros. made or were

about to make a shipment of hogs to South

Omaha, and received credit at the bank

for $600, a. duplicate deposit slip being

made. It is claimed by the plaintiff that on

the same day a second duplicate deposit for

$600 was made. The defendant George

Dodge testiﬂes, in effect, that this was a

second deposit, and that it was received

from a. second shipment of hogs. On the

other hand, the cashier testifies that original

credit was given in the morning. and the

duplicate slip given to the defendant;

that in the afternoon he came into the bunk,

and stated that he had not received a dupli-

cate in the morning, and that thereupon the

cashier issued a second duplicate slip for

$600, and wrote the abbreviated word

“dupl." instead of "triplicate" on it. The

agent of the railway company at Wood

River was called, and stated in substance

that a record was kept in his oﬂice of all

shipments made from there, and but one

car of hogs was shipped by Dodge Bros. at

the time stated, and he in effect corrobo-

rates the testimony of the cashier. 1t is

very evident, therefore, that Dodge is mis-

taken in-his testimony, and that the cashier’!

testimony on that point is correct, and the

verdict ls against the weight of evidence.

2. The aiiidavit of one of the jurors was

ﬂied in support of one of the grounds of the

motion for a new trial for the misconduct

of certain jurors. It is as follows: "P. F.

McCullough, being ﬁrst duly sworn, deposes

and says that he was a. lncmbcr of the jury

to whom the above case was tried on Febr.

15th, 1890; that during the discussion of the

case in the jury room the question came up

as to whether Freeman C. Dodge did author-

ize the Wood River Bank to place the said

$5,812.89 to his own individual credit, when

l\lr. Hollister and hlockenbergcr both

swore he did so authorize, and F. C. Dodge

DEClSIOYS TO BE BASED OY EVIDENCE.

ants. Both of the defendants testify that
the money was deposlted to the ct"e<lit of
Dodge Bros., and not to the credit of l•'rceman. All the oftlccrs of the bank, some of
whom appear to be disinterested, testlty that
the credit was given to Freeman. We also ftnd
that in the bank book of George Dodge with
the plnintltr, which ls here in the record,
these hop were not credited to Dodge Bl'Oll.
The om.cen of tile bank testify that this
book wu delivered t<• George Dodge a few
WeE'ks afte1· the transaction; that he returned, and stated that he nnd bis wife had
looked over it, and found it correct, except
an item of $:!0. George denies receiving tlle
book witll about the mont.n of January after
the transaction. He, in efl'ect, admits the
'20 mlstake. The mode of doing business
with the bank seems to have been as follows: When a shipment of hogs waa about
to be made, the defendants would receive
credlt for the supposed value of the hop,
and were permitted to check the same out.
It appears that about the 5th of September
of that year Dodge Bros. made or weJ'9
about to make a shipment of hogs to South
Omaha, and received credit at the bank
for ,600, a duplicate deposit Blip belng
made. It ls claimed by the plaintltr that on
the same day a tJeCOnd duplicate deposit for
f{IOO was made. The defendant George
Dodge testlfies, in etrect, that this was a
second deposit, and that it was received
from a second sblpment of hop. On the
other hand, the cashier testifies that original
credit was given in the morning, and the
<lnplicnte sllp given to the defendant;
that in the afternoon be came into the bank,
and stated that he bad not received a duplicate in the morning, and that thereupon the
cashier issued a second duplicate sllp for
~.
and wrote the abbreviated word
"dupL" instead of "trlpllcate" on it. The
agent of the railway company at Wood
River was called, and stated in substance
that a record was kept in his om.ce of all
sblpments made from there, and but one
car of hogs was sWp11£-d by Dodge B1·os. at
the time stated, and he in effect corroborates the testimony of the cashier. It ls
very evldent, therefore, that Dodge is mistaken in -his testimony, nod that the cashier'•
testimony on that point is correct, and the
verdlct ls against the weight of evidence.
2. The a1Hdavit of one of the jurors was
filed 1n support of one of the grounds of the
motion for a new trinl for the mlsconduct
of certain jurors. It ls as follows: "P. F.
)lcCullough, being first duly sworn, deposes
and snys that he was & member of the jury
to whom the above <.'a&e was tried on Fcbr.
15th, 1800; that durlDg the dlsc:uisslon of the
case in the jury room the que8tlon cume up
as to whctlwr l<'reemnn C. Dodge did authorize the Wood Hlver Bank to 11lace the s:ild
$;),812.89 to his own lndlvldual credit, when
~Ir.
Hollister and Hockenbergcr both
!!wore he did so authorize, and F. C. Dulli;e
swore he Wl\8 not in Wood River, Neb., on

'

July 2nd, 1887, the date of mid credit, but
was in Omaha, Neb.: that man7 of the jury were in doubt as to who was mlstaken on

this point, and 80 expn>ssed themselves; that
thereupon one C. C. Robinson, a member of
said jury, stated that he knew Mr. Hollister
and Mr. Hockenberger were mistaken as to
that point, for he wu in Omaha, Neb., and
saw the said Freeman c. Dodge there himself
on July 2, 1887, an1l he could not have been
present in Wood River, Neb., on. that day
nnd ordered said crl"dlt; that many of said
jury, and especially thls atllant, having confidence in and relying upon the statement
of said O. O. Robln11on, became satisfied that
81\ld Hollister and Hockenberger were ml&taken on this point, and 80 ma)· be mistaken
on other points, and thereupon be changed his
vote from the plalntllf's favor to and for a
verdict for thl1 1lefendant." There is alllo
an am.davit of W. H. Thompson to the same
elTect. There ls also an am.davit of J. H.
Woolley that the jury were sent out Saturday evening; that a number of them resided in the western part of the county, and
were very an.xlous to return home; that they
inquired of the ballltr the time wl>.en th"
last train would be due going west, and
having ascertained the time the verdict was
returned before that hour, and presumatily
without proper dellbe1-atlon. The counter
am.davit of Robinson is in the record as follows: "Chun C. Robinson, being sworn,
poses and sa1s that he was one of the panP.l
in the cue of the Wood River Bank of •"')·
braska against Freeman Q. Dodge anl1
George F. Dodge, which case was tried amJ
submitted to the jury on the 15th day ot
~'ebruary, 1890; that am.ant has heard reuol
the am.davit of P. F. McCullough ftled in and
attached to the inotlon in thls case for a
new trial; that the matter in said am.davit.
wherein said McCullough swore that this.
am.ant said in the jury room while delll>era ting on their verdict that be, Freeman O.
Dodge, eould not have been at Wood ltlveron the 2d day of July, as he, Chan Robinson, saw him in Omaha on that dny, ls wbol·
ly without fowidatlon, and untrue; that tlliif
am.ant did not say he saw said Dodge on the
~d day of July as aforesaid in Omaha; all
atftant did suy on this subject in tll.:i dellbl'ratlon of said jury was wholly in regard totbe evidence introduced on the trial. Alliant
further says that the jury and euch of them,
so fur as be knows and was informed, tried
all honest means to impress others dllTl'ring
with them as to tl1<>lr '·lews In the eYidt•nce
and the instructions of the eourt; that aftPr dl'llbl'ratlng seYenll hours on the matter
thpy tinally agrPed upon thPir \"l'l"tliet
brought Into court and am.ant dlcl not In.
....\' way attempt (l'XCPpt by arguuwut l to
,·ouvince others dlll'erlng wtu1 him as to
what he thought was right on the evh\rnee
i 11 the case." It will l>e observed that .\Ir.
Robinson does not make a full, unl'quivoca.1
denlnl of the charge ngulnst him. 'l'he nfll.
davit, in fact, is a skillful evasion of the

"e--
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DEClSlONS TO BE BASED ON EVIDENCE.

[Case No. 1

mutter in issue. Hls statement that what

he said was wholly in relation to the evi-

dence in the case, and that he did not in any

way attempt, except by argument, to convince

others diifering from him, tails tar short of a

denial of the charges. In Richards v. State,

(i\'eb.) 53 N. W. Rep. 1028, it was held that

I. juror will not be permitted to state to his

fellow jurors, while they are consulei-mg

their verdict, facts in the case within his

own personal knowledge. He should make

the same known during the trial, and testi-

ty as a witness in the case. It is tor the

court to say what evidence is admissible in

a case, and the adverse party may desire

to cross-examine him. In any event, it is

his duty to be governed by the evidence in-

troduced on the trial, and the instructions

of the court. Otherwise, in case 0! an er-
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roneous verdict, it would be impossible to

review the same. The judgment of the dis-

trict court is reversed, and the cause re-

manded tor further proceedings. The other

judges concur.

5

matter In llllme. Bia etatement that what
he aald was wholly In relation to the evidence lo tbe rase, and that be did uot In any
way attempt, t>xcept by argumeut, to convince
others dtt!'erlng from him, tails far short of a
denial of the charges. In Richards v. State,
(Neb.) 53 .N. W. Rep. 10'28, It was held that
a juror will not be permitted to state to bis
fellow jurors, while they are coru.11 •cmng
their verdict, facts In the caae wlthl.u hi•
own personal knowledge. He should u1:1ke
the same known during the trial, and testl-

ty as & wltnesa In the case. It ls for the
court to say what evidence 1s admlsslble In
a case, and the adverse party may desire
to cross-examine him. In any event, lt Is
bis duty to be governed by the evidence Introduced on the trial, and the Instructions
of the court. Otherwlse, In case of an erroneous verdlct, lt would be lmpoBBible to
review the same. The judgment of the dlatrlct court ls reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedlnp. The othet
ju~ea cow:ur.

RELEVANCY.

Case No. 2]
Case No. 2]

NICKERSON v. GOULD.

RELE VANCY.

l\'1(,II{I<lRSON v. GOULD.

(20 Atl. 86, 82 Me. 512.)

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. April 3,

(20 At!. 86, 82 Me. 512.)

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. April 8,
1890.

1890.

_ Exceptions from supreme judicial court,

Somerset county.

Walton & Walton, for plaintiff. D. D.

. Exceptions from supreme Judicial court,
Somerset county.
Walton & Walton, for plaintiff. D. D.
Bt,ewa,rt, for defendant. ·

Stewart, for defendan t. '

FOSTER, J. Action to recover upon a

promissory note for $500, dated February

9, 1876, payable on demand to E. B. .\'ick-

erson or bearer.

The defense was that the note was a

forgery: that the defendant never signed

it, and never had any dealings with the

alleged payee out of which this note grew

or could grow; that he never received any

money or any property of any kind from

him. except possibly a harness, and that
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was allowed on rent due the defendant.

The plain tiff, son of E. B. Nlckerson, tes-

tified that he acquired title to the note in

the fall of 1887.

The exceptions show that much evidence

was~ introduced by both parties tending

to show the transactions and the nature

of them between E. B. Nlckerson and the

defendant in the years 1875 and 1876, as

bearing upon the probability or improb-

ability of the defendant having given the

note in suit.

It was claimed on the part of the plain-

tiff that the note in suit was given to take

up a $300 note and interest, and a balance

in cash at the time sufficient to make up

the sum for which the note was given;

and that the $300 note was made up of

$40 loaned defendant to pay for a mowing-

machine, $50 cash loaned at another time,

and asuﬁicient amount at the time the

note was given to make up the $300.

It appeared in evidence that in thelatter

part of May, 1888, in response to a letter,

E. B. Nlckerson went to the deiendant’s

house. and there he and the defendant

talked over the matter of the note; that

at that interview, us the defendant and

his wife testiﬁed, the defendant said he did

not remember of ever having a dollar of

him in his life; that Nlckerson then asked

the defendant if he did not remember of

his paying him a note of $200 at the Rus-

sell House, to which the defendant replied

that he never did; that Nlckerson then

said to the defendant: “D0n’t you re-

member my paying Henry Sawyer ﬁfteen

dollars for you ? ” And to this the defend-

ant replied: “No,slr; I don’t rememberit,

and you never did."

The defendant then called the said Henry

Sawyer as 9. witness, and asked him if

Nlckerson at any time paid to him $15 for

the defendant. This item did not consti-

tute any part of the consideration of the

note in controversy.

To this inquiry, and the answer thereto,

the plaintiff's counsel objected, and the

court excluded the answer.

FOSTER, J. Action to recover upon a
promls1mry note for $500, dated February
9, 1876, payable on demand to E. B. Nlckersun or bearer.
The defense was that the note was a
forgery: that the defendant n~ver signed
It, and never had any dealings with the
allt>ged pe.yee out of which this note grew
or could grow; that be never received any
money or any property of ony kind from
him, except possibly a harness, and that
was ollowed on rent due the defendant.
'rhe plain tin, eon ot E. B. Nickerson, testified that he acquired title to the note In
the fall of 1887.
The exceptions show that much evidence
was• Introduced by both parties tendlnK
to show the tranee.ctlone and the nature
of them between E. B. Nickerson and the
defendant in the years l87:i and 1876, as
bearlnK upon the probability or improbability of the defendant having given the
note In suit.
It W&R claimed on the part of the plaintiff that the note In suit was given to take
up a $300 note and interest, and a balance
In cash at the time 11utHclent to make up
the sum for which the note was given;
and that the $300 note wa.R macte up of
$40 loaned defendant to pay for a mowlngmachlne, $rJO cash loaned at another time,
and a suftlclent amount at the time the
note was given to make up the $3110.
It appeared in evidence that In thelatter
part of May, 1888, In response to a letter,
E. B. Nickerson went to the defendant's
house. and there he and the defendant
talkffi over the matter of the nute; that
at that inter¥1ew, as the defendant and
his wife testified, the defendant said he did
not remember of ever having a dollar of
him In his life; that Nickerson then asked
the defendant If he did not remember of
hh1 paying him a note of $200 at the Russell House, to whil'h the defendant replied
that be never did; that Nickerson then
said to the defendant: "Don't you remember my paying Henry Sawyer fifteen
dollars for you?" And to thi• the defendant replied: "No, sir; I don't remember it,
and you never did."
Thedefendant then<'alled thesaid Henry
Sawyer ae a wltne'ls, and asked him If
Nlckenwn at any time paid to him $15 for
the defendant. '!'his item did not com1tltute any part of the consideration or the
note In controversy.
To this inquiry, and the answer thereto,
the phl.lntlff's counsel objected, and the
court excluded the answer.
The defendant then offered to Rhow by
the 1mme witnPBS that Nickerson never
paid him the $15 for the defendant, llnd,
olJj<'ctlon being Interposed by the counsel
for the plaintiff, the court excluded the evidence.
6

To this ruling, excluding the a.newer and
the evidence onered, the defendant duly
excepted.
After the evidence had been orJered and
excluded, the ple.lntln ca.lied E. B. Nlr.kerson, and he teRtlfled in relation to the interview at the defendant's house substan-'
tlally as related by the defendant e.nd hie
wife; but the defendant did not thereafter
recall the witness Sawyer, nor again offer
bis testimony.
·
.
. If the only bearing of the el'ldence offered
was to prove a collateral fact, It was nof
relevant, and was properly excluded. 'rhe"
question le whether It was relevant or not.
Collateral facts are not admissible. The
evidence must be relevant to the Issue;
that 111, to the facts put in contro¥ersy by
the pleadings. This rule prohibits thetrlal
of collateral leeues,-of facts not put in i11eue by the pleadlnge,-and excludes evidence of such as are Incapable of affording
any reatmnable presumption or inference
as to the prlnclpul fact or 01atter In dl11put.e. It ls oftentimes dlfHcult to decide
what le and whet le not rele\'ant. It depends somewhat upon the natnre of the
issue Involved. The rele\·ancy of evidence
of other facts, as bearing npon the prohablll t.v or non-probability of the 111Rln fact
In h11me, has been one of the most troublesome questions for the court11 to decide.
"Relevancy, "as defined bythetext-wrltersup0n evklence, "le that which conduce11
to the proof of a pPrtinent hypothesis; a
pertinent hypothesl11 tielng one which, if
eui1tal11ed, would logically Influence the issue. • • • If the h;\'pothesill Ret up for the
defense le forgery, then all facts which are
conditions of forgery are relevant. A
party, for Instance, sued on a blll sets up
forgery. To meet this hypothesis, it i11
acl1i1isslble for the plalntin to prove that
the defenclant, at the time or the making
of the blll, was trying to borrow money.
• • • Hence It IA relevant to put in evidence any circumstance which tend11 to
nrnke the propollitlon at Issue t!lther more
or les11 improbable," (1 Whart. Ev. §§ 20,
21;) and In accordance with this principle
It was held by this court, In 'l'rull v. True.
S.'i Me. 367. thnt "testimony cannot be excluded as Irrelevant which would have a
tendency. however remote, to establish
the probability or lmprobaLlllty of the
fact In controverRy." Tucker v. Peaslee.
36 N. H. 167, HIR. So In Huntsman v. Nich·
olR. 116 Ma.Rs 521, where It wa11 held that.
al though the authPntlclty of the note in
suit was the only issue, yet the buslnes11
transactions between the parties had some
bearing npon the probablllty of the indorsement ha \"'Ing actually been made by
the defendant, and were therefore athnleslble in evidence. Thie same principle is established in Eaton v. Telegraph Co., fi8
Me. 63, 67; State v. McAlllster, 24 Me. laD;
State v. Witham, 72 Me. 5.'il, 5!~7; !\iar('y v.
Barnes, 16 Gray, 161. Accorcllngly, where
the Issue is whether a certain contra.ct was
made between the parties, and the evidence ls contllctlng as to what the contract was, It has be!'n held compc~tent for
the 1lefendant to show the value or chare.cter of the property which he was to receive, as compared with that In the <"outral't claimed by the plalntiH, 1111 te111ling
to show the lmprobab11lty of the defend-

RELEVANCY.
RELEVAN CY.

[Case .\'o. 2

ant having made the contract as alleged

by the plaintiff. Upton v. Winchester, 106

Mass. 330; Norris v. Spoiford, I27 Mass.

R5; Bradbury v. Dwight. 3 Metc. 31; Par-

ker v. L‘-oburn, 10 Allen. 82.

Moreover, in cases where knowledge or

intent of the party wasa material fact,

evidence of other facts happening before

or after the transactions in issue has

been received in evidence, although they

had no direct or apparent connection with

it. Such facts, if they tend to establish

knowledge or intent, when that is mate-

rial. although apparently collateral and

foreign to the main issue, nevertheless

have a direct bearing, and are admissible.

Thus in Cook v. Moore. ll Cush. 213, 216,

BIGELOW, J ., says: “ Whenever the intent

of a party forms part of the matter in is-
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sue upon the pleadings. evidence may be

given of other acts not in issue. provided

they tend to establish the intent of the

party in doing the acts in question. " And

see Nichols v. Baker. 75 Me. 334; Jordan V.

Osgood, 109 Mass. 45?; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 53;

1 \\'hart. Ev. §§ 30-32.

Applying these principles to thequestion

before us, we think the evidence offered

was admissible.

The pleadings denied the genuineness of

the note, and all dealings with the alleged

payee out of which the note could grow,

or the receipt of any money from him.

True, the central point of the issue was

whether or not the note was a forgery.

Around this revolved other facts, intro-

duced by both parties, bearing on the

probability or improbabillty of the defend-

ant having signed the note in suit.

Such evidence was admissible as tending

to lead the mind of the jury to a correct

conclusion upon the real issue presented.

The dealings of the parties, both prior and

subsequent to the date of the note, be-

came a proper subject of inquiry in this

connection. The defendant denied that he

ever signed the note, or had any dealings

whatever with the alleged payee out of

which the note originated. He gives an

interview with Nickerson, and states what

he claims was said at that interview by

Nickerson. At the interview Nickerson vir-

tually asserted a fact, although in an in-

terrogatory form, that he had paid one

Henry Sawyer $15 for the defendant. He

asserted it as a transaction with the de-

fendant. This, the defendant claims, was

a fraudulent assertion to obtain an admis-

sion from him of what was not true in or-

der to affect the main issue before the jury.

it was, in effect, the assertion of a fact to

the defendant bearing on the issue of the

genuineness of the note, and was not coi-

lateral. Either party had a right to prove

the truth or falsehood of the assertion. If

it was not true, the defendant had a. right to

show that the statement made to him was

false; and, in support of his own testi-

ant ha vlng made the contract as allf'l(ed
by the plaintlft. Upton v. Wlnche11ter, 106
Mass. 330; Norris v. Spoftord, 127 Ma88.
80; Bradbury v. Dwight, S Mete. 81; Parker v. Coburn, 10 Allen, 82.
Moreover, In cases where knowledge or
Intent of the party was a material fa.ct,
evidence of other facts happening before
or alter the transactions In Issue has
been received In evidence, although thE>y
had nodlre<'t or apparent connection with
It. Such facts, tr they tend to establish
knowledge or Intent, when that Is material, although apparently collateral and
foreign to the main Issue, nevertheleM
have a direct bearing, and are Rdml881ble.
Thus In Cook v. Moore. 11 Cush. 213, 216,
BmF.r.ow, .J., says: .. Whenever the Intent
of a party forms part of the matter In ls1111e upon the pleadings, evidence may be
given of other acts not in Issue. provided
they tend to establish the Intent of the
party lo doing the acts In question." And
see ~lchols v. Baker. 76 Me. 334; Jordan v.
011good, l09 Mass. 457; 1 Green!. Ev.§ 58;
1 \\'hart. E\·. §§ !Jlh'i:J.
Applying these principles to theque11tlon
before ua, we think the evidence oftt>red
was admlsidble.
The pleadings dt>nled the genulueut'SI! of
the note, and all dettllngs with the alleged
payee out of which the note could grow,
or the 1-ecelpt of any money from him.
True, the central point of the issue "'aa
whether or not the note was a forgery.
Around this revolved other JactR, Introduced by both parties, bearing on the
probability or lmprobablllty of the defendant having signed the note In suit.
Such evldencewaa admlulble aa tendlq

[Cllse Xo. 2

to IE>ad the mind of the Jury to a correct
conclusion upon the real Issue presented.
The dealings of the parties, both prior and
subsequent to the date of the note, became a proper suhjf"ct of Inquiry In this
connection. The defendant denied that he
ever signed the note, or had any deallnp;s
whatever with the alleged payee out of
which the note orlginn t.et1. He gl "es an
interview with Nickerson, an cl states what ·
be claims was said at that lntervluw by
Slckerson. At the interview Nickerson virtually asserted a fact, although In an lnterrop:atory form, that be had paid one
Benr.v Sawyer $15 for the defendant. He
asserted It as a tra osactlon with the defendant. This, the defem1ant claims, was
a fr1111dulent BBRertlon to obtain an admission from him of what was not true In order to affect the main Issue before the Jury.
It was, In enect, the a11&ertlon of a fact to
the <lefendant bearing on the IBBue of the
genuineneRH of the note, and WRH not collateral. Either party had R right to prove
the truth or falsehood of the assertion. If
It wa11 not true, the defendant had a right to
s-how that the statement made to him waa
fall!lt'; and, In support of hie own teRtimony In denial of Its truth, he had a rlgh t to
call the man aa a. witness to whom Mckerson claimed he made the payment. Its
tendency In e11tnhllshlng the probability or
lmprohahillty of the main fact In contro''.ersy may have been nnnote, but It was
nevertheless admissible. lti:J weight was
for the Jury.
.
Exceptions sustained.
!

PEl"ERS,C.•T., and WALTON, VIRGIN,
EMERY, and HASKELL, JJ., concurred.
7

RXLEVANCY.

Case No. 3]
COM.YO!li"WEALTB

T.

ROBI!llSON.

Case No. 3]

(16 N. E. 462, 146 Ma.. 571.)

RELEVAN CY.

COMMONWEALTH V. ROBINSON.

Supreme Judicial Court of MaallachW!ett&
liiddleeex. .Ma7 3, 1888.

(16 N. E. 452, 146 Mass. 571.)

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

Middlesex. May 3, 1888.

Exceptions from supreme judicial court,

Middlesex county; Field and Knowlton,

Judges.

Indictment against Sarah J. Robinson for

the murder of her brother-in-law, Prince

Arthur Freeman, by poisoning. Trial in

the supreme judicial court, where the de-

Exceptions from supreme Judicial court.
Middlesex county; Field and Knowlton,
Judges.
Indictment agalut Sarah J. Robinson for
the murder of her brother-In-law, Prince
Artbnr Freeman, by poisoning. '!'rial In
the supreme Judicial court, where the defendaDt wu found guilty, and she alleged
exceptlo1111.

1
1

;
!

:
:

fendant was found guilty, and she alleged

exceptions.

Andrew J. Waterman, Atty. Gen., for the

Andrew J. Waterman, Atty. Gen., for the
Commonwealth. J. B. Goodrich and D. F.
Crane, for defendant.

1

Commonwealth. J. B. Goodrich and D. F‘.

Crane, for defendant.

C. ALLEN, J. We have given to this case

a degree of attention commensurate with its

importance. and have come to the conclusion
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that there was no error in the conduct of

the trial. While it is well settled in this

commonwealth that, on the trial of an in-

dictment. the government cannot be allowed

to prove other independent crimes, for the

purpose of showing that the defendant is

wicked enough to commit the crime on trial,

this rule does not extend so far as to ex-

clude evidence of acts or crimes which are

shown to have been committed as part of or ‘

in pursuance of the same common purpose.

Com. v. Jackson, 132 Mass. 16, 18; Uoln. v.

Blood, 141 Mass. 575, 6 N. E. 769. In such

cases there is a distinct and signiﬁcant pro-

bative effect resulting from the continuance

of the same plan or scheme, and from the

doing of other act in pursuance thereof.

it is somewhat of the nature of the acts

cially of preparations for the commission

of the crime which is the subject of the in-

dictment. If, for example, it could be shown

that a defendant had formed a settled pur-

pose to obtain certain property, which could

his purpose. But such purpose may also be

shown by circumstantial evidence. It is,

indeed, usually the case that intentions,

plans, purposes, can only be shown in this

way. Express declarations of intention, or

confessions, are comparatively rare; and

therefore all the circumstances of the de-

fendant‘s situation, conduct, speech, silence,

motives. may be considered. The plan it-

self, and the acts done in pursuance of it.

may all be proved by circumstantial evi-

dence if they are of themselves relevant and

material to the case on trial. And in such a

case it makes no dii'i'erence whether the pre-

liminary acts are criminal or not. Other-

wise the greater the criminal the greater his

immunity. Such preliminary acts are not

0. ALLEN, J. We have given to this eaee ,
a degree of attention commensurate with Its
Importance, and have come to the roncluslon
that there was no error In the conduct of
the trial. While it is well settled In this
commonwealth that, on the trial of an indictment, the sovernment cannot be allowed
to prove other independent crimes, for the
purpoae of showing that the defendant ls
wicked enough to commit the crime on trial,
this rule does not extend so far as to exclude evidence of acts or crimes which are
shown to have been committed u part of or
In pursuance of the same common purpoee.
Com. v. Jackson, 132 Mass. 16, 18; Com. T.
Blood, 141 Mass. 575, 6 N. E. 769. In such
cases there Is a distinct and significant probative effect resulting from the continuance
of the same plan or scheme, and from the
doing of other acts in pursuance thereof.
It ls somewhat of the nature of the acts
or declarations of Intention, but more especially of preparations for the comml881on
of the crime which ls the subject of the Indictment. If, for example, It could be 11hown
that a defendant had tormed a settled purpose to obtain certain property, which <.'Ould
only be got by doing several preliminary
things, th~ last of which In the order of
time was criminal, the government might
show, on bis trial for the commission of
that last, criminal act, that be bad formed
the purpose to accomplish the result of obtaining the property, and that he had done 1
all of the preliminary things which were i
nece88&ry to that end. This would be quite ·
plain If the evidence of the purpose were
dlre<-t and clear; as If a letter In the detemlant's handwriting should be discovered,
stating In terms to a confederate his purpose to obtain the property by the doing of
the several successive acts, the la8t of which
was the criminal act on trial. In such case 1
no one would question that proof might be
offered that the defendant had done all the
prellmlnary acts referred to, which were
necessary steps In the accomplishment of j

I

competent because they are criminal, but

because they are relevant to the issue on

trial; and the fact that they are criminal

does not render them irrelevant. Suppose,

for further example, one is charged with

breaking a bank, and there is evidence that

he had made preliminary examinations from

a neighboring room; the fact that his occu-

pation of such room was accomplished by a.

8

hie purpose. But such purpose ma,r also be
shown by circumstantial evldt>nce. It ls,
lnd1't'd, usually the caae that lntent1oll8,
plan8, purposes, can only be shown In this
way. Exprees declaratlou of Intention, or
confessioDB, are comparatively rare; and
therefore all the clreumstances of the defendant's situation, conduct, epeech, silence,
motives, may be considered. The plan It·
self, and the acts done In pursuance of It.
may all be proved by circumstantial evidence If they are or themtM•lves relevant and
material to the C1l8e on trial. And In such a
case It makes no difference whether the preliminary acts are criminal or not. Otherwise the greater the criminal the greater hla
Immunity. Such preliminary acts are not
l'Ompetent becaUBe they are criminal, but
because they are relevant to the lsaue on
trial; and the fact that they are criminal
does not rendPr them lrn>levant. Suppoee,
for turtlter example, one ls charged with
brt•aklng a bank, and there 18 evidence that
he had made preliminary examinatloDB from
a neighboring room; the fact that hlB occupation of such room wu aceompllahed by a
criminal breaking and entering would not
render the evidence 1.ncompetent. It la
sometimes said that such evidence may be
introduced where the several crimes form
part of one entire transaction; but It ls perhaps better to say, where they have some
connection with each other, as a part of the
same plan, or Induced by the same motive.
Prt'Cedent acta which render the commJ&.
slon of the crime charged more easy, more
safe, more certain, more effective, to produce the ultimate result which formed the
general motive and Inducement, If done with
that Intention and purpose, have such a
l'Onnectlon with the crime charged u to be
adml11&lble, though they are also of themself'es criminal. We do not understand that
this general view, stated thus, Is distinctly
controverted by the counsel for the pri~oner;
and It Is supported by a great number of
decisions, only a few of which are here
cited. Com. v. Scott, 123 Mus. 222; Com.
v. Choate, 105 llass. 451; Swan v. Com.,
104 Pa. St. 220; Ooerson v. Com., 99 Pa. St.
388; Shaffner v. Com., i2 Pa. St. 60; Mayer
v. People, 80 N. Y. 364, 375. Bee, also, Jordan v. Osgood, 109 M&88. 457. For cuBeS
where such connection was not shown, but
where the principle was recognized, see
Com. v. Jack110n, 132 Mass. 16; State v.
J..apajl'e. 57 N. H. 245, 295; People v. Sharp,
14 N. E . am, (opinion by Peckham, J.) The
ruling at the trial. therefore, wu correct,
that If evidence should be offered and admitted tending to show that the prisoner
knew, before her sister's death, of the exl11tence of the Insurance, and that It could
be transferred on the death of her sister to
herself, and made payable to herself on the
dellth ot FrN•man. and that, before her sister's death, sbe bad formed a plan or lDten-
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tion to obtain this insurance for her own

beneﬁt. and this plan or intention continued

to exist or be operative up to the time of

Freeman’s death, then that evidence might

be offered to show that her sister died of

poison. and that the prisoner administered

it, as a part of the method employed by her

to carry this plan or intention into effect, in

connection with evidence that she adminis-

tered poison to Freeman, as another part of

the same plan and with the same general

intention.

The court therefore properly held that evi-

dence of this knowledge and plan or inten-

tion on the part of the prisoner should first

be offered, that the court might judge wheth-

er it was sufiicient to warrant the introduc-

tion of evidence that the sister died of poison

administered by the prisoner. This claim and
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offer of proof on the part of the government,

and the arguments of counsel, and the said

ruling of the court thereon, were all made in

open court, in the prisoner's presence, but in

the absence of the jury. The government ac-

cordingly proceeded to introduce, with its

other evidence to the jury, certain testimony

in support of said alleged scheme or inten-

tion on the part of the prisoner, which is

stated in the bill of exceptions; and, after

said testimony had been received, it offered

evidence tending to prove the death of the

prisoner's sister by arsenic knowingly admin-

istered by the prisoner. This evidence was

objected to. on the ground that no sufiicient

evidence had been offered in proof of said ai-

letred scheme or intention, and on other

grounds; but the court overruled the objec-

tion, and admitted the evidence, subject to

the prisoner's exception. In seeking a new

trial on account of the admission of this tes-

llmony, the argument of the prisoner‘s coun-

sel, brieﬂy stated, is as follows: Preliminary

evidence must be given to show that the

acts offered to be proved were done in pur-

nuance and as a part of some plan or scheme

to accomplish the particular result. It is the

exclusive province of the court to determine

if such evidence is suﬂicient. The decision

of the court, admitting the evidence, is sub-

ject to revision in the present case; the tes-

timony upon which that decision was found-

ed having‘ been reported for the purpose. It

is not enough that there was some evidence,

but the preliminary evidence must amount to

proof. The ruling of the court did not ex-

pressly aiiirm the necessity of such proof;

that is. as we understand the argument, the

necessity of such amount or degree of proof.

And. ﬁnally, this court, upon a revision of

the preliminary evidence reported, should now

hold that it was not sufficient to warrant the

introduction of evidence to show that the

prisoner poisoned her sister, Mrs. Freeman.

The last three of these propositions are the

only ones which need an_v further attention.

A consideration of the nature of the question

which is presented to the court when it is

called upon to decide upon a preliminary ques-

Uon to obtain this Insurance for her own
benefit, and tblB plan or Intention continued
to exist or be operative up to the Ume of
Freeman's death, then that evidence might
be olrered to show that her sister died of
poliion, and that the prlaoner administered
tt, as a part of the method employed by her
to carry this plan or Intention Into effect, In
-<.'Onnectlon with evidence that she administered poison to Freeman. as another part of
the same plan and with the same general
lntentloo.
The court therefore properly held that evidence of thlB knowledge and plan or Intention on the part of the prisoner should 11.rst
be offered, that the court might judge whether It was sufllclent to warrant the Introduction Of evidence that the Bister died of poison
administered by the prisoner. This claim and
~ffer of proof on tbe part of the government,
and the arguments of counsel, and the said
rullng of the ('()Urt thereon, were all made lo
Gpen court, In the prisoner's presence, but In
the absence of the Jury. The government ac~lngly proceeded to lntrodu<-e, with Its
Gther evidence to ·the jury, certain testimony
hi support of said alleged scheme or Intention on the part of the prisoner, which ls
l!tated In the btll of ex<'eptlons; and, after
aald testimony bad been received, It olrered
evidence tending to prove the death of the
prl8ooer'11 slBter by arsenl<' knowingly administered by the prisoner. Thie evidence was
i>bJt>eted to, on the ground that no 11u1ft<•lent
evidence had been offered In proof of said alleged llCheme or Intention, and on other
xronnda; but the court overruled the objection, and admitted the evidence, subject to
the prlaoner's exception. In seeking a new
trial on account of the admlMlon of this teatlmony, the argument of the prisoner's couotlel, briefly stated, 18 as follows: Preliminary
evidence must be glv.en to 11bow that the
acts offered to be proved were done In purllU&nce and a11 a part of some plan or BCheme
to acrompllBh the particular result. It Is the
aclUlllve province of the court to determine
If such evidence ls suftlcient. The decision
~t the <'ourt, admitting the evidence, is subject to revision In the present case; the tesnmouy upon which that decision was fonnd«I having been reported for the lJUr)JURe. It
IR not enough that there was some evidence,
but the preliminary evidence must amount to
proof. The ruling ot the court did not expressly aftl.rm the neceRSlty of such proof;
that ls, as we understand the argument, the
neceatty of such amount or degree of proof.
And. finally, tbl11 court, upon a revision ot
the preliminary evidence reported, should now
hold that It was not sufficient to warrant the
Introduction of evidence to show that the
11rh10ner poisoned her sister, Mrs. Freeman.
TbP laat three of these propositions are the
<mly ones wblch need any further attention.
A conalderatlon of the nature of the question
Whleh la preaented to the court when lt ls

I
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called upon to decide upon a preliminary question of tact, In order to determine whether of·
fered evidence shall be recelYed, will show
that Its determination reac•hes no further than
merely to decide whether the evidence may
or may not go to the jury. The decision upon
thlB particular question, of the adml88lblllty
of the evldt>nce, ls ordinarily conclusive, unless the judge sees flt to rese"e or report
the question for future revision. Dole v.
Thurlow, 12 Mete. (MallS.) 157; Gorton v.
Hadsell, 9 Cush. 508, 511; O'Connor v. Hallinan, 103 M888. 547; Walker v. Curtis, 116
Mass. 98. And In this respect the rule Is the
same In criminal cases. Com. v. Hllls, 10
Cush. 580; Com. v. Mulllns, 2 Allen, 295;
Com. v. Morrell, 99 Matlll. 542; Com. v. Culver, 126 Ma118. 464; Com. v. Gray, 129 llass.
474. But where, In a case like the present,
the admissibility of testimony depend& upon
the determination of some prior fact by the
court, there Is no rule of law that, In order
to render the testimony adml8slble, such prior
fact must be establlsbed by a weight of evidence which wlll amount to a demonstration,
and shut out all doubt or question of Its existence. It Is only necessary that there.
should be so much evidence 88 to make It
proper to submit the whole evidence to the
jury. The fact of the admission of the evidence by the judge does not In a legal sense
give It any greater weight with the jury. It
does not aft'ect the burden of proof, or change
the duty of the jury lo weighing the whole
evidence. They must still be satisfied, In a
criminal case, upon the whole evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt. Ordinarily, questions of fact are exclusively for the jury, and
questions of law for the court. But when,
In order to pass upon the admi88lblllty of evidence, the determination of a preliminary
question of fact ls necessary, the court, In the
due and orderly coul'Be of the trial, must
nece1188rlly determine It, a11 far as ls necessary for that purpose, and usually without
the assistance, at that stage, of the jury. If,
under sm·h circumstances, testimony ls admitted against a party's objection, It may
often happen that he may still aak the jury
to dlsrei.,rard It.
Numerous Illustrations of the foregoing
view might be given, but a few must suffice us. In an Indictment for murder. where
the question was as to the admissibility of
certain stntemt>nts In the nature of confessions, which were objected to as having been
obtained by means of lodu<'ements, It was
held by this eourt as follows: "When a confession Is oft'erl'd in a criminal case, and the
defendant objects that be was Induced to
make It by threats or promh1es, It necessarily
devolves upon the court to dett>rmlne th!! prellmtnnry 11uestlon whether such inducements
are shown. • • • If the presiding judge
ls sntbdled thnt there were su<'l1 lndul'ements,
the <'Ollfesslon ls to be rejected; If be Is not
satisfied, the evidence ls admitted. But, If
8

..
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there is an_v conﬂict of testimony or room for

doubt, the court will submit the question to

the jury, with instructions that. if they are

satisﬁed that there were such inducements.

they shall disregard and reject the confes-

sion." (‘om. v. Piper, 120 .\iass. 190. Simi-

lar questions arise when it is objected that a

witness is not of suﬁicient capacity to testify

intelligently; or that a third person, whose

declarations or acts are oﬂfered in evidence

against a party, was not a partner, agent, or

co-conspirator, and did not stand in such a

relation as to make his declarations or acts

admissible; and in other cases. In Com. v.

Brown, 14 Gray, 419, which was an indict-

ment for causing the death of a woman by

means of an attempt to procure a miscar-

riage. the judge at the trial decided, a matter

of fact, on the preliminary question, that
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there was prima facie evidence that the de-

fendant and two other persons were jointly

acting in combination and concert, and aid-

ing and assisting each other in carrying out

a common enterprise of procuring an abor-

tion. so as to make the acts and declarations

of those two persons competent, and admitted

the evidence, and then left the question to be

determined by the jury whether they were

acting in concert with the defendant or not,

with instructions that, if so. the acts and

declarations might be considered by them;

otherwise not. This course was held by this

court to be correct, (pages 425, 426, 432;) the

court saying: “The conspiracy of the parties

was ﬁrst satisfactorily made to appear to the

court." In Com. v. Growninshield, 10 Pick.

407. a similar doctrine was held. In all such

cases, the court, in deciding to admit the of-

fered testimony, does no more than to hold

that enough has been shown to make it prop-

er to submit the testimony to the jury, leav-

ing its weight and credit for their determina-

tion. The decision of the judge does not re-

lieve the party oﬂferlng the testimony from

the necessity of establishing every material

fact to the satisfaction of the jury. See, ai-

so, Com. v. Scott, 123 Mass. 235; Com. v.

Waterman, 122 Mass. 43, 59; Com. v. Preece,

140 Mass. 276, 5 N. E. 494; Ormsby v. People,

58 N. Y. 472; Swan v. Com., 104 Pa. St. 218;

1 Green]. Ev. §§ 49, 111; Steph. Dig. Ev.

(Chase's Ed.) art. 4. In this view of the law,

it was not vnecessary that the court should

ﬁnd that the preliminary evidence amounted

to i'ull proof. beyond a reasonable doubt, that

the prisoner poisoned her sister, in pursu-

ance of a general plan or scheme in which

the poisoning oi’ Mr. Freeman was a later

step.

there la any contUct ot testimony or room for ttft<'Bte ot membership In a IJOClety, which
doubt, the court wm submit the question to pro"\'lded tor the payment of $2,000 upon hie
the jury, with lnstnI<'t1om1 that, 1t they are tlt>ath to the benefiC'lary named therein, with
satlsfted that there were such inducements. n power of suhstltutlon. His wife, who was
they shall disregard and reject the confeM- the prisoner's sister, was named as benesion." <'om. v. Piper, 120 llass. 190. Simi- ficiary. She died February 26, 1885, after an
lar questions arise when it ls objected that a lllnt'AK of ithout thret> weeks. The prisoner
wltnetcK ls not of sutn.ctent l'npaclty to testify called at Freeman's house, In South Boston,
intelllgt'ntly; or that a third person,· whose on lt'ebrnary 20th, and on February 23d went
declarations or a<:'ts are otrered 1n evidence there to take care of !>lrs. Freeman, and stayagainst a party, was not a partner, agent, or ed till her death. Immediately after Mrs..
co-conspirator, and did not stand 1n such a Fret>man'e death, Mr. Freeman, with bis two
relation as to make bis declarations or acts chlldren, wt-nt to live with the prisoner at her
admissible; and in other caset. In Com. v. house in Cambridge. One of the children died.
Brown, 14 Hruy, 41D, which was an indict- in April. On or about "!\.lay 13th, "!\Ir. Freement for causing the death of a woman by man appointed the prlsoner as heneficlary unmeans of an attempt to procure a miscar- der the certlft<'Bte of membership. He died
riage. the judire at the trial decided, as matter June 27th, after an Illness of about six days.
of tact, on the preliminary question, that trom arsenic. The prteoner on September 28,
there was prima facie evidence that the de- lS&"i, recel ved $2,000 from the society upon
femlant and two other persons were jointly said certlft<'llte. Prior to 1885 the prteoner
acting In combination and concert, and aid- was owing several hundred dollars, which
ing and assisting each other In carrying out 11he was unable to pay, and tor which she was
a common enterprbse of procuring an abor- bard preBBed by her creditors, and which she
tion, so as to make the acts and declarations paid out of the $2,000 110 received by her. As
of those two persons competent, and admitted tentUng to prove the plan or scheme on her
the evidence, and then left the question to be part to obtain this lite Insurance money
determined by the jury whether they were through the murder of Mrs. Freeman and
aC'tlng In con<'ert with the defendant or not, then of :Ur. Freeman, there was evlllenC'e to
with instructions that, If so, the acts and the etrect that, before Yrs. Freeman's death,
declarations might be considered by them; the 11rlsoner knew of the certificate of memotherwise not. Tb.ts course was held by this bership Insuring Mr. Freeman tor his wife's
court to be correct, (pages 425, 426, 432;) the benefit; that, during Mrs. Frt-eman'11 lllneBB.,
court saying: "The conspiracy of the parties the prisoner expreseed the opinion that her
was first eatlefactorlly made to appear to the sister would never recover, and said that she
<~ourt." In Com. v. Crownlnshield, 10 Pick.
(the prisoner) had had a terrible dream, and.
497, a similar doctrine was held. In all such whenever she had a dream like that, one of
cases. the court, In deciding to admit the of- the family always died; that, before as well
fered testimony, dot>S no more than to hold as after Mrs. Freeman's death, the prisoner
that enough has been shown to make It prop- expressed the wish to have Mr. Freeman,
er to submit the testimony to the jury, leav- with hie cblldren, come and Uve with her.
ing Its weight and credit for their deteJ"mlna- and asked dltrerent persons to urge him to do
tlon. The decision of the judge does not re- so; that, on the day of Mrs. Freeman's fuUeve the party otrerlng the testimony from neral, the prisoner said that Mr. Freeman's
the necessity of establishing every material sister, Mrs. Melvin, was very anxious to have
fact to the satisfaction of the jury. See, al- him live with her, and that all Mrs. :Melvin
so, Com. v. Scott, 123 .Mass. 235; Com. v. wanted was to get the insurance made over
Waterman, 122 Mase. 43, 59; Com. v. Preece, to her, but the prisoner said she (herself) had
140 Mase. 2i6, 5 N. E. 494; Ormsby v. People, the best right to It, and It was her sister's
53 N. Y. 472; Swan v. Com., 104 Pa. St. 218; request that It should be made over to her,
1 Green). Ev. H 49, 111; Stepb. Dig. Ev. and she wanted It; that 011 the same day she
(Chase's Ed.) art. 4. In this view of the law, talked with l\lr. lt'reeman about the Insurance.
tt was not ,necessary that the court should wanted to know If It was made over to her,
find that the preltmtnary evidence amounted and he said It was not, but should be; that
to full proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, that quite frequently afterwards she said she was
the prisoner )'oleoned her sister, in pursu- afraid he would not make It over to her; that
ance of a general plan or scheme In which on June 22d, the same day when he was taken
the poisoning of Mr. Jl'reeman was a later sick, (which was after 1t had been made over
step.
to her,) she sent to the society to see if the
We are further of the opinion that the pre- papers were right, In case anything happenliminary evidence which was before the court ed to Mr. Freeman, and whether she would
was sutn.clent to warrant the Introduction of get the Insurance, and to see that all a88e88evidence to show that the prisoner poisoned ment11 were paid up; that the appointment
her sister, l\lr11. Freeman. Certain tacts were for the money to be payable to her was renot in dispute. Prince Arthur Freeman, the l'ordl'd In the book11 of the AO<'lety not eal"lier
pt>r~on whom the prisoner was rbarged In the
tllan June 23d; that she alM<> l'ent over to see
Indictment with having poisoned, held a cer- about the Insurance once or twice afterwards..

We are further of the opinion that the pre-

iiminary evidence which was before the court

was sufficient to warrant the introduction of

evidence to show that the prisoner poisoned

her sister, Mrs. Freeman. Certain facts were

not in dispute. Prince Arthur Freeman, the

person whom the prisoner was charged in the

indictment with having poisoned, held a cer-

tiﬁcate of membership in a society, which

UEL1';V ANCY.
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before his death, and had an interview with ‘to tell .\ir. ‘Freeman's sister about the insur-

the secretary of the society upon the same‘ ance. This evidence certainly tended to show

subject in Mr. Freeman's presence, the day a scheme and plan, entered into before Mrs.

before his death, and was told that the pa- Freeman's death, to have the insurance mon-

pers were all right, and afterwards, when not iey made payable to the prisoner.

(Case No. :J

before hla"dl!ath, and had an lntet'Vlew with 'to ten lir. ·Freeman's sister about the Insurthe secre~ry of the society upon the s1twe ance. This evidence certalllly tended to show
subject In llr. Freeman's presence, the day a scheme and plan, entered into before llrlrs.
before hie death, and was told that tht• pa- Freeman's death, to have the tnsurance· mooper& were all right, and afterwards, when not : ey made payable to the prisoner.
in h18 pre&ence, requested the 11eeretary not
Exceptions overruled.
11

in his presence, requested the secretary not Exceptions overruled.

11
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BUDDRESS v. SOHAFER et al

(41 Pac. 43.)

BUDDRE$S V. SCHAFER et al.

(41 Pac. 43.)

Supreme Court of iVashington. July 15, 1895.

Appeal from superior court, King county:

R. Osborn, Judge.

Action by A. W. Buddress against John

Schafer and another. There was a judg-

ment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.

Atiirmed.

J. C. Whitlock and Million 8: Houser, for

appellants. A. W. Buddress, Metcalf & Ju-

Supreme Colll"t of Walhlngton. July

1~.

1890.

Appeal from superior oourt, Klug rounty;
n. Osborn, Judge.
Action by A. W. Ruddresa against John
8<'bafer and another. There was a judg·
ment for plalntltr, and defendants appeal
Atftrmed.
J. c. Whitlock and Hllllon & HoW1er, for
appellants. A. W. Buddress, Met<>alf & Ju·
rey, and Geo. H. Jones, for respondent.

rey, and Geo. H. Jones, for respondent.

GORDON, J. This action was brought by

respondent to recover the sum of $500 for

services as an attorney and counselor at law

in “prosecuting and conducting certain caus-

es in the superloqcourt of the state of Wash-

ington for the county of Island. in which

said causes said defendants (appellants) were
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plaintiffs and Henry Alexander and Kitty

Alexander were respondents.” Respondent

also claims the sum of $50 by way of ex-

penses, costs. and disbursement necessarily

incurred in the prosecution of said suit. In

his complaint it is alleged "that said serv-

ices were reasonably worth the sum of $500,

and that said defendants (appellants) prom-

ised and agreed to pay what the same were

reasonably worth.” ’l‘he answer of the ap-

pellants merely denied that the “services

were worth the sum of $500, or any sum

whatever," and for an aiiirmative defense

set up that the matter had been adjudicated

in a trial between the same parties on the

same subject-matter. There was a. verdict

for respondent in the sum of $225, and from

Judgment entered thereupon. and an order

denying a new trial, this appeal has been

taken.

Upon the trial appellants offered to show

that they had employed other attorneys to

prepare the pleadings and try the identical

causes referred to in respondent's complaint.

The proof was excluded, and this ruling is

assigned as error. The apparent object of

this testimony was to dispute the amount

and extent of plaintiff’s services. The re-

spondent contended, and the court below

held, that appellants could not, under their

answer, deny that the services were rendered

by respondent, and that appellants should be

conﬁned to the question of the value of the

services so rendered; and we think the rul-

lug was correct. it was the right of appel-

lants to have demanded a bill of particulars,

or to have required a more definite state-

ment, if the character and extent oi.‘ the

services were lndclluitely set forth ln the

complaint; but under a mere denial of the

value of the services they were not entitled

to show that the services were not rendered.

Van Dyke v. Maguire, 57 N. Y. 429. The

court committed no error in allowing re-

12

spondent to testify as to the amount expend-

ed by him for hotel and traveling expenses,

nor in limiting the cross-examination of the

witnesses Scott and Coleman, nor in the in-

GORDON, J. This action was brought by
respondent to reco\'er the sum of
for
services as an attorney and coulllf'lor at law
In "prosecuting and conducting certain <'auses In the BUperlor,court of the state of ·wm1h·
lngton for the county of Island, 1n which
said caust'll said defendants (appellants) were
plalntUrs and Henry Aleiander and Kitty
Alexander were respondents." Respondent
al8o claims the 1111m of $50 by way of expe118e8, costs. and dlshul'lleDlents neceBBllrlly
Incurred in the prosecution of said suit. In
h1B complaint It le alleged "'that said services were reasonably worth the BUID of ,:JOO,
and that said defendants (appellants) promised and agreed to pay what the same were
reasonably worth." The answer of the appellants merely denied that the "servl<'es
were worth the sum of '50(), or any sum
whatever," and for an aftl.rmatlve defense
set up that the matter bad been adjudicated
In a trial between the same parties on fbe
same subjl!<'t-matter. There wu a verdict
for respondent In the sum of $2'~. and from
Judgment enteretl thereupon, and an order
denying a new trial, this approl bas been
tuken.
Upon the trial appellants offered to show
that they bad employed other attorneys to
prepare the pleadings and try the identical
causes referred to In respondent's complaint.
The proof was excluded, and this ruling 18
assigned as error. The apparent object of
this testimony Wall to dispute the amount
and C'xtent of plalntltr's servl<'es. The respondent contended, and the court below
held, that appellants could not, under thelr
answer, deny that the services were rendered
by respondent, and that appellants should be
<'On11.oed to the question of the value of the
services so rendered; and we think the rul·
ln1t was correct. It was the right of appel·
!ants to ha\'e demanded a bill of partl<'ulars,
or to have required a more clPtlnlte statement, If the cham<'ter and extent of the
services were lncl••H11ltely set forth In the
complaint; but undt>r a mere denial of the
value of the services they were not entitled
to show that the services were not rendered.
Ynn Dyke v. llagulre, 57 N. Y. 429. The
«ourt committed no eITOr 1n allowing re12

'500

dpondent to testlf7 as to the amount expended by him for hotel and traveling expenses,
nor in llmltlng the crou-examlnatlon of the
wltnet111e11 Scott and Coleman, nor 1n the lnstrnctton given the jury concernlDg the effect to be given the testimony upon the subject of the value of professional services. We
do not think that the language of the lnstru1··
tlon was calculated to mislead the jury, and
it ls manifest from the verdict that such
could not have been its etre<'t.
Coming now to the question of former adjudication of the mattera Involved in this
rontrover11)·, It appears from the l't'COrd that
respondent bad Instituted a prior suit to n>rover the sum of '500 as attorney's fees.
That action was founded upon an exprt'llB
contract to pay said sum for said servkes.
:So other question wa11 litigated therein.
The question of the reasonable value of respondent's services, or of respondent's right
to recover such reasonable value, wu withheld from the consideration of the jury 1n the
trial of that case. Referring to this prior
suit, which was relied upon all a bar to respondent's right to recovE>r In thl11 action, the
lea1·nett coun8CI for appellants upon thE' trial
of this cause 1,elow admitted that DO evidence was otTered In the former trial to
prove what the service. were worth, but that
the only question submitted for determination was upon respondent's theory of an expre11s contract. We think the law ls well
t1ettled that a judgment In a former suit on
an expl'\188 contract 111 not a bar to the Bee·
ond suit on a quantum merult for the same
services, and to determine w!lether a former
judgment Is a bar to a subsequent action It
Is necesaary to inquire whether the same evidence would have maintained both of such
actions. 1 Freem. Judgm. I 2:>9; Kirkpatrick T. AlcF~lroy (N. J. Err. & App.) 7 Atl.
647. In Taylor v. Castle, 42 Cal. 372, the
court say: ''The cause of action ls said to
be the same where the same evidence will
support both actions; or, rathet", the judgment 1n the former action will be a bar, provided the evidence necessary to su11tsln a
judgment for the plalntltT In the present action would have authorized a judgment for
the plalntlft In the former." In 2 Bla<'k,
.Judgm. 5 726, the learned author says: "l<'or
the purpose of ascertaining the Identity of
the cause11 of action, the authorities genef"o
ally agree lo accepting the following test as
sulll<'lent: Would the same evidence support
and establish both the present and the former cause of action? If so, the former re<'OVE"ry ls a bar; If otherwise, It does not
11tancl In the way of the second action." We
have examined the error assigned by appellants In permitting respondent to explain the
reconl of the former trial, but think that no
error was committed. If, however, we were
constrained to the opposite view, the same result would follow, in view of the admlBSlon•

WHAT FACTS ABE IN ISSUE.

(Case No. 4-

WHAT FACTS ARE IN ISSUE. [Case No. -1

made by llPI!9“ant5' Qollnsel "D011 the trial 0! pearlng in the record, the Judgment will be

this case in the court below as to the pro- glﬁil-nu-(]_ ‘

comings occurring upon the trial of the for-

mer action, which resulted in a. judgment ANDERS and DUNBAR, JJ., concur.

for defendants. No substantial error ap- I-I()YT,(]_ J., dlssents,
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made by appellants' counsel upon the trial or
this ~e \n the court below 1111 to the proeel'dlngs occurring upon the trial or the former action, which resulted tu a judgment
for defendants. No substantial error ap-

pee.ring In the record, the Judgment will benftinuc<l.

.A.NDEHS and DUNBAR,
HOYT, C. J., dlssents.

JJ., concur.

C1&&e No. 5]
Case No. 5]

RELEVANOY.

.. aELEV.A.NOY.

ROBINSON CONSOLIDATll:D MIN. CO. "·
.
JOHNSON.

ROBINSON CONSOLIDATED MIN. CO. v.

JOHNSON.

(22 Pac. -159, 13 Colo. 258.)

Supreme Court of Colorado. Oct. 11, 1889.

Appeal from district court, Lake county.

The allegations of the complaint in this

action, so far as they are necessary to a cor-

rect understanding of the matters involved

in this appeal, are to the following effect:

That in 1882, William H. Johnson, appcllcc

herein, plaintiff below, entered into a ver-

bal contract with the Robinson Consoli-

dated Mining Company, defendant, a cor-

poration duly organized, to furnish, sell,

and deliver to defendant at its smelting

works, in the town of Robinson, Summit

county, Colo., 240,000 bushels of charcoal

at the stipulated price of 13 cents per bush-

el ; thatin pursuance ofsaid contract,plain-
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tiff commenced and continued to furnish,

sell, and deliver said charcoal in divers lots

.and quantities until he had so sold and de-

livered 32,000 bushels thereof to defendant,

all of which was received and accepted by

defendant at its said smelting works; that

plaintiff was ready and willing, and offered,

to deliver the balance of said charcoal ac-

cording to the terms of said contract, but

that defendant absolutely refused to receive,

accept, or pay for the same. The plaintiff,

by reason of defendant’s refusal to accept

the residue of the charcoal contracted for,

was compelled to sell the same for 11 cents

per bushel, which was the best price he could

obtain therefor. There were other ele-

mcnts of damage alleged which need not be

here stated, inasmuch as they were substan-

tially stricken out of the case before the

trial, and do not appear to have been re-

lied on. Defendant demurred to the com-

plaint on several grounds, among others.

that the complaint does notstate facts suf-

ticientto constitute a cause of action. The

demurrer was overruled. The defendant

then answered, denying speciﬁcally the al-

legations of the complaint; and the case,

being tried to the court without a jury, re-

sulted in a finding and judgment in favor

of the plaintiff for the sum of $4,000. The

defendant appeals.

Teller & Omho0d,for appellant. Patter-

son & Thomas, for appellee.

ELLlOT'1‘.J.. (after stating the facts as

above.) This was an action by a vendor

against a vendee of goods for refusal to ac-

cept and pay for the same. The complaint

alleges thu.t the plantiff entered into a con-

tract with defendant to furnish, sell, and

deliver to defendant a certain quantity of

charcoal at a certain stipulated price. But

itis nowhere alleged that defendant bought,

purchased, or agreed to accept or pay for

the same, or any pa-rt thereof. For this

reason itiscontended by appellant that the

contract as stated is unilateral; and that

the complaint is defective in substance. It

is certain that the usual form of declaring

in cases ofthis kind was not observed. The

(22 Pac. 459, 13 Colo. 258.)
Supreme Court of Colorado. Oct. 11. 1~.
Appeal from district court, Lake county.
The allegations of the complaint Jn thl1<
action, so far aK they arenecefl8arytoa correct undel'l!tandlngof the matters Involved
in this appeal, are to the following enect :
That In 1882, WOiiam H. Johnson, appellt"('
herein, plalntln below, entered Into averbal contract with the RoblnRon Consolidated Mining Company, defendant, a corporation duly organized, to furnish, sell,
and deliver to defendant at Its smelting
works, In the town of Robinson, 8ummtt
county, CoJo., 240,000 bushels of charcoal
at the stipulated price of 13 cents per bushel; that In pursuance of said contract,plalntlft commenced and continued to furnish,
sell, and deliver said charcoal In divers lots
,and quantities until he had so sold and delivered 32,000 bushels thereof to defendant,
all of which was received and accepted by
defendant at Its said smelting works; that
plalntlft was ready and willing, and onered,
to deliver the balance of said charcoal according to the terms of said contract, but
that defendant absolutely refused to l'el'elve,
accept, or pay for the ea.me. The plaintiff,
by reason of defendant's refusal to accept
the residue of the charcoal contracted for,
was compelled to sell the same for 11 centH
per bushel, which was the best price he coulfl
obtain therefor. There were other elements of damage alleged which need not be
here stated, Inasmuch as they were substantially stricken out of the case before the
trial, and do not appear to have been relied on. Defendant demurred to the com·
plaint on several grounds, among otherR,
that the complaint does not state facts sufllclenttoconstltute a cause of action. The
1lf'murrer was overruled. The defendant
then answered, denying speclflcally the allegations of the complaint; and the case,
being tried to the court without a Jury, resul ted In a finding and Judgment In favor
of the plaintiff for the sum of f4,000. The
defendant appeals.
Teller & Orahood, for appellant. Patterson & Thomas, for appellee.
ELLIOT'l'.J .• (after 1ttatlntp; tbe facts as
abo\'e,) Thia wfts an action by a vendor
against a vendee of good11 for refusal to accept and pay for the same. The comJJlaint
alleges tho.t t.he plantlff entered Into a contract with defendant to furnish, sell, and
deliver to defendant a certain quantity of
charcoal at a certain stipulated price. But
it is nowbel"t' a.Jleged that defendant bought,
pul'('hased, or a~reed to accept or pay for
the 11ame, or any part thereof. For this
reasooitlscontt>nded by appt•llant that the
contract as stated Is unilateral; and that
the complaint Is defective In substanre. It
ls certain that the usual form of dedarlng
in caRes of this kind was not observed. The
nature of the adlon requlresthatthepleadlng should be special. 2 Chit. Pl. 264; Poter. Pl. 130: 1 E14tee, l'I. & Pr. § 1375; Bent.
Sales, §§ i5.'l--71i:i.
Notwlthstnmllng forms of actions have
oo•n abolished In this state, the substantial requl11ltes of pleadings have not been
1.&.

changed. Useless ftctlona, antique phraseology, technical commencements and con.cluslons, have been swept away, but the ls.gal rlgh ts and llabilltlee of parties remain
the same; and the facts upon which these
rights and llabllttlesdepend are required to
be stated in " ordinary and concise language." Wblle particular forms of pleading are no longer essential, yet experience
teacbeti that It Is well to adhere to the ''ordinary and concise language" of approved
forms In stating causes of action as well as
grounds of defense, Jest, In departing too
far from the form, we fall to state ~he substance.
It is contended byplalntlft's counsel that
defendant cannot now be heard to object
to the complaint on the ground that It does
not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action, for the reason that he
pleaded over and went to trial. We are
aware It has been held. where an answer by
Its terms supplies the defects of a complaint
utherwlse obnoxious to a general demur.
rer, that the defective complaint Is thereby
cured. This 18 what Mr. Chitty calls "express alder." The case of Slack v. Lyon, 9
Pick. 62, Is not In point. In that ca.se, the
defendant pleaded over without dewnrrer,
and In his an11wer alleged the very facts the
omllllllon of which made the complaint defective, and, upon recovery being had In
favor of the complainant, the defendant
moved In arrest of judgment, which was
denied. In this case, defendant demurred
In the first instance, and his answer thereafter tllf'd conRists of specific denials only.
In Slack '"·Lyon, supra, a very old case 18
referred to, (Drake v. Corderoy, Cro. Car.
288,) where the complaint was defective In
substance, and the court remarked: "Had
the defendant pleaded the general lllllue, the
plaintiff could not have had judgment."
Bliss, Code Pl. § 438.
The terms of the contract, as set. out lo
the complaint, show no promlMe. undertaking, agreement, or obligation .on the part
of defendant to accept or pay for any portion of the charcoal, except that the law
Implies a promise on his part to pay for
that which he actually received. ARtosuch
portion, there le no claim that he did not
pay for It; so the ca.se does not fall under
that clau of unilateral contracts, In which
a party not bound by the terms thereof
w bile it remains e:xecu tory may nevertheless
become bound to the extent he act.-eptl! the
benefits thereof. Gordon v. Da.rnell,5 Colo.
302; Stiles v. McC'lellan,6 Colo.89; Lester v.
Jewett, 12 Barb. 502; Railway Co. v. :Mitchell, 38 Tex. 81>; !\I<." Kinley v. Watkins. 13 Ill.
140; Richardson v. Ha.rdwlck,106 U.S. 252,1
Sup. Ct. Uep. :.!13: 1 Pars. Cont. 448, note•;
SykeR v. Dixon, 9 Adol. & E. 693: Bean ,.,
Burbank, 16 Me. 458. It Is contended that
the allegation that phdntlffwaa to furnish,
sell, and deliver to defendant a certain quantity of charcoal, at a certwn stipulated
prlre, lmplleR that defendant agreed to receive and pay for such •1uantlty at the price
stated. It Is true the law Implies a promise to pay on the part of one who actually
receives goods at a. price for which the
other party has engaged to deliver; because It would be unconsciouablc that the
receiver should accept goods for which he
knew the other party expected payment,
and not render the consideration therefor.

:,1

II

...
'l.l

-·WHAT FACTS AB.E. IN ISSUEWHAT FACTS ARE. IN ISSUE-

B_\_1t there may be an engagement to deliver

lllthout the correspondng engagement to

:°°ei"9- A_D1'0n1ise is a good consideration

°"*l Dronnse ; but the law does not imply

because one pa 1-ty makes apromise that the

llrotnisee Inakes a. promise in return. ' Par-

ties are at liberty to make such contracts

as tile)’ Please. Options may be reserved

by either party to a. contract which may

render the sa Ine unila teral and incapable of

enforcement, except so far as the same may

have been voluntarily carried into effect.

it is strongly urged that the words “en-

tered into a. contract with defendant ” show

that there \v as niutuality in the contract

between the parties, and that both are

bound. These preliminary words doubtless

indicate that two parties made the con-

tract, such as it vvas; and they may induce

- expectation of mutuality in the terms orob-
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ligation of the contract thereafter to be

stated. But it does notfollowbecausetwo

parties have made a. contract that therefore

each or either are bound thereby. If mu-

tuallty of obligation necessarily resulted

from a joint making, then therecould be no

such thing as a unilateral contract, since

a contract or agreement is always the prod-

uct of two or more minds. In this connec-

tion counsel for appellee in their printed ar-

gument make use of the following quota-

tion: “A contract is an agreement between

two or more persons to do or not to do a

particular thing. The obligation of a con-

tract is found in the terms of the a

ment." This language is ascribed to Chief

Justice TANEY, who delivered the opinion

of the court in Charles River Bridge v. War-

ren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420. when, in fact, the

_ words occur in the dissenting opinion of

Mr. Justice MCLEAN. This was doubtless

aninadvertence, as the same mistake occurs

in Bou\'ier’s Law Dictionary. But as the

decision oi the case does not turn upon the

' correctness of the abstract definitions thus

announced, they may be accepted as cor-

rect. Havingmade thisquota.tion,counsel

argue that the statement that a. contract

was entered into is a. conclusion arising

from facts under the law, and is a mode of

pleading not prohibited by any system;

that the obligations of the charcoal con-

tract are to be found in its terms, and its

terms are to beiound from the evidence, and

the evidence is a statement ofthefactsfrom

which the conclusion that 1|. contractexists

has been drawn. Hanna v. Barker,6 Colo.

312, and Orman v. City of Pueblo, 8 Colo.

6 Pac. Rep. 931, are relied on to sustain

this course of reasoning. The former case

sustains the proposition that an averment

that certain par1;ies—named—entered into

an agreement in writing with certain other

parties—-named—is a sufficient avermcnt of

the delivery oi the agreement between the

parties; but neither of these cases warrant

the inference that it is not necessary to aver

in the complaint the terms of the contract

sued on so as to show the obligation rest-

Butthere may be an engagement to deliver
Without the correepondng engagement to
~ve. A pronileele a good consideration
. beeor & prom lee ; but the law does not Imply
au11e one party makeeapromleethatthe
. promleee makes a promise In return. · Partlea are at liberty to make such contracts
aa they please. Options may be re11erved
by either party to a contract which may
renderthe ea1neunllateral and Incapable of
enloreement, except eo far as the same may
have been voluntarily carried into effect.
It le strongly urged that the words "entered into a. contract with derendant" show
that there -w ae niutuality In the contract
between the parties, and that both are
bound. These preliminary wordsdoubtleHS
Indicate that two parties made the contract, such a.e It 'Was ; and they may Induce
· expectation of mutualltylnthetermsorob\\ga.tlon of the contract thereafter to be
l\tatro. But ltdoes notronowbeeauRetwo
part\esbavemadea contract that therefore
each or either are bound thereby. If mutuality of obligation necessarily resulted
from a joint mu.king, "then therecould be no
BUcb thing aa a onnateral contract, since
a contractoragreementlsalwaysthe product of two or more minds. In thlR connec•
tlon couuRel for appellee lo thelrprlnted argument make use of the foJJowlng quotation: "Acontract lean agreement between
two or more persona to do or not to do a
particular thing. The obligation of a contract ls found In the terms of the agree.
ment." Thts language ls ascribed to Uhlet
.Justice TANEY, who delivered the opinion
of the court In Charles River Brldgev. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, when, in fact, the
words occur ln the dl88entlng opinion of
Mr. Justice McLEAN. This was doubtless
an load vertence, as the same mistake occul'B
In BouYler's Law Dictionary. But as the
decision of the case does not turn upon the
correctne&R of the abstract deHnltlonR tbnB
announced, they may be accepted as correct. Havlngmade thlequota.tlon,coonseJ
argue that the statement that a. contract
was entered into ls a conclusion arising
from facts under the Jaw, and Is a mode of
pleading not prohibited by nny system ;
that the obligations of the chareoal contract are to be found ln Its terms, and Its
terms are to befound from the evidence, and
theevldence Is a statement ofthefactsfrom
which the conclusion that" contractexl1:1ts
bas been drawn. Hanna v.Barker,6 Colo.
812, and Orman v. City of Pueblo, 8 Colo.
292, 6 Pac. Rep. 931,are relied on to sustain
this course of reasoning. The former case
sustains the proposition that an avernumt
that certain parties-named-entered Into
an agreement In writing with certain other
parties-named-ts a sufftclentaverment of
the delivery of the agreement between tbe
portles; but neither of these ca11es warJ"ant
the Inference that It le not neceRSary to aver
In the complaint the terms of the contract
Rued on so as to show the obligation reMt·
Ing on the defendant as a condition to holding him liable for the breach thereof. On
the contrary, ID the former case the contract was set out in hlPC verbu In the complaint, while In the latter the comphtlntwM
not defective In substance, and th(' objection
referred to In the opinion could have been
cured by a bfll of particulars.
It te assigned tor error that the contract

attempted to be pr:f ~~ ft
[0- No. s
the contra<'t state
e 'tJ, 't 'tb
contract stated fn
9,..~o~El c-0 t7a1,,.11aoot
sale and delivery <', -~.c11>.:l>1a10 'P. 'lllnt. 'I'be
coal at defendan-t g ·"'~-UJJ bllRa',rllBfortbe
time being sy:,1t1ed "Ol- f'/t111,,,. l'.'8 ofcbart
"' worka. No
coal, the law mplfeB !~#ft; 1~e deJIJ-ery of the
ered within a ree.soD v/p
JVaa to be dellvln case of controve.ris.'V, 1:t:1.,}1fe, which time,
by the court frotn t~e I. 8 be determined
stances or the case. 2 l>a acta and rlz:cumrs. Coat. 585. The
cont ract w hich th eerIdE'lJC!'etended toe11tab.
llsh was a contract for the delivery of good
merchantable ~Un pine eoal, 2,600 lncbt'8
to the bushel, 20,000 hm1hels per month !or
12 months. It may be, Jn attemptJng to
prove the performance of a contra.ct to deliver 240,000 buehele of chareoal, where no
time for the delivery ts speclfted, that It
would be competent to show that a delivery at the rate of 20,000 bushels per month
would be a delivery within a reasonable
time. But this wu not what was undertaken tobeshown. No evidence as to what
would be a reasonable time was elicited or
offered. The evidence tended to prove an
expresR contract to deliver 20,000 boehele
a month, no more, no less, without reference to the circumstances or dlfftcultles
of the dell very bearing upon the question of reasonable time. This evidence
was objected to as lncompete.nt under
the statements of the complaint, and aR
varfantfrom ttg tlllegatfonR. Thl'I varta111~e
Is apparent. Aa a rule, where there Je
an express contract, parties cannot abandon It and resortto an Implied one; but the
contract as made must be the measure or
their respective rights and Jfabflltles. The
defendant had a right to be adrleed by the
pleadings In adYance of the trial of the substantinl terms and conditions of the contra.ct under w hlch Its liability to a Judgment
wae sought to be enforced. Hence the variance was material, and the iSBueunderthe
evidence should ha\"e been found against the
plaintiff for that reason. Steph. Pl. 118; l
Chit. I•J. 318, 319; Bliss, Code Pl. § 438 et seq. ;
Cheney v. Barber, 1 Colo. 73.
We have carefuJJy eoneldered whether or
not under se<·tlon 78of the Code, relating to
defective pleadings and variances, the erroni dlMCusRed In this opinion might be properly disregarded. The prm·lslons or the
Code are liberal In allowing, upon proper
applf<oatlon and terms, the correction of
mlRtftkes In the pleadings and proceedings
fncivll actlon11. We should not be disposed
to allow parties to take advantage of ordinary defects forthetll'Bttlme ln the appellate court. But when a party makes objection on account of a material or substantial defect. In a proper manner, and in apt
time, and the oppositeparty, lnetead or ap.
plying for let1.ve to amend, succeedK In procul"lng a ruling In his fu.vor by the trial
court, he does EIO at his peril.
In view of the foregoing conc\\1Rlone, we
do not deem tt neeessary to <llscuss at
length the other as1dgnments ot error. It
there was a contrat•t for the de\\-.:ery ot the
coal within 12 months, and the buyer actually rreelvt>d anil acce1>h..>d a \\B.Tt thcTeOt
within that JWri()(l, tbe <."ln\m tbat tbt- contract was void un11er the ~tatute ot tTauds
woul<l ef'Pm to l>P untounc:l.~. 'rbe\udgment
of the district court i s ~-.~?W\, and the
cause remanded.
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·Case No. 6)
' Case N0. 6]

RELE VANCY.

CARLTON V. PEOPLE.

(37 N. E. 244, 150 Ill. 181.)

Supreme Court of Illinois. May 5, 1894.

i-Error to circuit court, Johnson county;

A. K. \’ickers, Judge.

Indictment of Jonathan Carlton for arson.

Defendant was convicted, and he brings er-

ror. Afiirmcd.

Morris, Moore & Vankirk, for plaintiff in

error. Maurice T. Moloney, Atty. Gen.. T. J.

Scoﬁeld. M. L. Newell, and Geo. G. Gillespie,

REI.EV ANCY.

CARLTON T. PEOPLE.
(87 N. E. 244, l!W Ill 181.)
Supreme Court of Dlinola. May 5, 1894.
!.;nor to l'lrcult court, Johnson 4.'UUnty;
A. K. Vickers, Judge.
Indictment of Jonathan C&rlton for arson.
Defendant was convicted, and be brings error. Afftrmed.
Morris, Moore & Vankirk, for plaintiff ln
error. Maurice T. Moloney, Atty. Gen., T. J.
Scofield, M. L.. Newell, and Geo. G. Gilespie,
for the People.

for the People.

MAGRUDER, J. This is an indictment

against the plaintiff in error for arson. The

indictment charges him, in the usual form.

with setting ﬁre to and burning the barn of

one Rob Roy Ridenhour. The jury found

him guilty. and ﬁxed his punishment at im-

prisonment in the penitentiary for a term
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of four years. Motions for new trial and in

arrest of judgment were made and overruled.

Judgment was rendered, and sentence pro-

nounced, in accordance with "the verdict.

On the afternoon of Saturday. April 9,

1892, plaintiff in error was arrested for a

violation of a town ordinance at Vienna, in

Johnson county, by the town marshal, as-

sisted by one of the deputy sheriffs, and also

by the said Ridenhour. He was taken to

the county jail in an intoxicated condition,

having a knife in his hand and a revolver

in his pocket. He and Ridenhour each lived

in the country, about four and a half miles

from Vienna, and had ridden into town to-

, gether on the morning of that day. His ar-

rest was made with diiiicnity, and after a.

cutiie. By direction of Ridenhour his knife

and revolver were taken away from him.

While he was lying upon his back in the

hallway of the jail, his arms and feet being

held by those who arrested him, he said:

“Oh. yes, Bob Ridenhour, you live in the

country, and you will think of this, God

damn _vou. when your barn is on ﬁre." He

repeated the remark several times, varying

the expression. saying, according to one wit-

ness: “You will think of this when you

see your barn in ﬁamcs;" according to an-

other: “You will think of this when your

barn is burned. Your barn is on a high hill.

It will look well when it is burning.” He

was released from jail between 10 and 11

o'clock on the night of that same day. and

lcft town about 11 o'clock, in company with

Thomas Verhincs and Edward Hogg, cnch '

of the three riding on horseback. The plain-

tiff in error stopped on the way at the house

of a Mrs. Bridges, and obtained some match-

es. They rode togcther about a mile, when

they scpnratcd, Vcrhincs going east, and

Carlton and llogg going south. Plaintiﬁ’ in

error and Iiogg continued to ride together

about a mile further, where they separated,

the former going southeast. and the latter

going southwest. The home of Carlton was

about. 2 miles, and that of Hogg about

21,5 miles, from the point where they sep-

arated. In going to his home from this

MAGRUDER., J. Tbla la an Indictment
airalnst the plalntltr In error for arson. Tbe
Indictment charges blm, In the 118Ulll torm,
with setting ftre to and burning the barn of
one Rob Roy Ridenhour. The Jury found
him guilty, and fixed bis punishment at Im·
p1isonment In the penitentiary for a term
of four years. Motions tor new trial and In
arrest of Judgment were made and overruled.
Judgment was rendered, and sentence prO:.
nouneed, In accordance with the verdict.
On the afternoon of Satutday, April 9,
1892, plaintiff In error was arrested for a
violation of a town ordinance at Vienna, In
Jobnson county, by the town marshal, assisted by one of the deputy sherUrs, and also
by the snld Ridenhour. He was taken to
the county jail In an Intoxicated condition,
having a knife In bis band and a revolver
In bis pockt>t. He and Ridenhour each lived
lo the country, about tour and a halt miles
from Vienna, and bad ridden Into town together on the morning of that day. ms arrest was made with dlJftculty, and after a
seutDe. By direction of Ridenhour his knife
and revolver were taken away trom him.
While he was lying upon his back In the
hallway of the jail, his arms and feet being
held by those who arr1•Mted him, he said:
"Oh, yes, Bob Ridenhour, you llve In the
country, and you will think of this, God
damn you, when your barn ls on fire." He
repeated the remark several times, varying
the exp1·1•sslon. Mylng, according to one wit·
ness: "You will think of this when you
see your barn In flames;" aC"cordlng to an·
otht>r: "You will think of this when your
harn 111 hurnt'd. Your barn ls on a high hill.
It will look well when It ls burning." He
w1111 rPleased from Jail between 10 and 11
o'clock on the night of that same day, and
left town about 11 o'clock, In company with
Thomas Yerhlnes and I·~dward Hoirg, t':t<"h
of the three riding on horseback. The plain·
tltr In error stopped on the way at the house
of a Mrs. Bridges, and obtained some mntch·
es. They rode together about a mile, when
they sl'pnrated, Vt•rhln<'s going enst, and
Carlton and Hogg going south. rlaintltr In
l'rror and Hogg contlnm'<l to ride tog<"ther
about a mile further, where they separated,
the former going southeast. nnd the latter
going southwl'llt. The home of Carlton was
nhout 2 miles, and that ot Hogg about

16

21Aa miles, from the

point where they eepara ted. In going to bis home- from thlR
point, plaintiff In error would pass In sight
of Rldenhour'a house. Ridenhour'• barns
were burned that night. He 11ays that h1•
went to bed between 10 and 11 o'clock, and
that It was after midnight when he ftrst saw
the fire. On the next day-Sunday, Aprll
lOth-il.n examination was made of the
prl'ml!ll"B. Tra<"k& were found aoutb of tht-barn, In a path leading to the highway.
which ran In the general direction of th<"
house of plalntll'f In error. Mud was found
upon the fence at the corner of the fteld.
lndll'ft.tlng that someone had climbed ovE>r
the fence. The oats In the field had not
come up. An examination of the tracktt
showed that one foot had made a deeJK'r
lmpre88lon than the other. Carlton was ar·
rested on that Sunday afternoon. A mea&urt>mt>nt of the tracks showed that the-y
corresponded In length with tracks math•
by Carlton In the road on that day, and
with the shoes worn by him on that afternoon. It was proven that he was lame, and
walked with "a kind of bop." One of the
wltnessea aaya: "The toot he limped on
corresponded to the Irregular tracks In the
field." Two barns were burned, contain·
Ing com, hay, mules, and bol'Bee. The hol'SE's
eacaped, but one of the mules was burned to
death, and the corn and hay were destroyed.
Hogg says that be saw no flre when be
passed with Carlton.
The only evidence Introduced on the defense seems to baYe bad tor Its object the
proof of an allbl. The testimony tends to
show that the barns were on ftre after\ midnight, and aomewbere about 1 o'clock.
though one of the wltneeaes says be saw the
flre at 4 o'<"loek In the morning, and, when
be saw It. went to It from bis house, a bait'
mile distant, and found the barns "pretty
well all burned down." The t>vidence does
not certainly fix the hour when the plalntlfr
In error reached his home on the night of the
ftre. ms mother swore that "It was about
twelve o'clock., or near that." One of bis
sisters swore that she heard the clock strike
12, and another that she heard It strike 1.
after bis arrival.
Counsel for plalntltr In error make the ltE'D·
eral objections that there ls an absence of
evidence rt'latlve to the corpus deUctl, and
that the evidence le purely clrcoJll&tantlal.
"Tbe proof of the charge In crtmto.sl causes
ln'volvM the proof of two <ltsttnct proposl~
tlons: Flnit, that the act tt!K'}f «as done,
nnd. H<'<'ondly, tbnt It wu 8 done bl' tbe
chru·J:e1l. 1111<1 by none otber,-tn otlle-r words.
proof of the corpus delicti and ot t}le
tlty of the prisoner." 3 Greeul ~~· '
·
Here the 'l\Ct done, wbl<"h "Was to. ve prO'V~
was the burning of the barn
It ~11 8 8
required to be proyen thnt ·th<' 1.,21t'n WRR
tbnt
burned by the plalntltr In E>r
t
11 ~d
such burning WM done With f ror, 11~ tnten •
or, In the language of the 6 l'lonlo•• ~tUfullY
and mallclous1 ~" 1 St
.., .
nrr tatute,
&. c. Ai:>J>.- St. P·

\d;
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was bound fl?

facts and cirvlll 1Q"l1(.

when mnsidered 0012

other evidence e "

minds or the jury '3 1- "89. to create /11 the

759; 3 Green]. Ev. §§ 55,56. It has been

siild that in arson the corpus tlcllcti consists

not only 0! a. fact that a. building has been

burned. but also the fact that it has been

willfully tired by some responsible person.

in

as ‘,1 its """!11wrt such

of Wﬂre suﬂicicnl.

ttlou Wltlz all the

\\'inslo\v v. State, 7&3 Ala. 42. The main

tact, hovvever, vvhich is to be proven in the
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tirst place, is the burning of the building.

When that fact is established, then it is nec-

essary to show how the act was done. and

by whorn. We think that. in the ])i't'.\‘l'iil

case, the tact that the barns were but-ucd

\\‘tlB~ clearly and satisfactorily pt-oven; and

the circumstances were such as to exclude

accident or natural causes as the origin of

the ﬁre. \\-‘hen the general fact is thus

proved, a. foundation is laid for the introduc-

mm or any legal and suﬂicient evidence that

the act was committed by the accused, and

that it was done with criminal intcnt. Satn

v. State, 33 Miss. 347; Phillips v. State, 29

Ga. 105. Such evidence need not be direct

and positive, but may be circumstantial, in

its character. \Vinslow v. State, supra. In

both criminal and civil cases “a verdict

may well be founded on circumstances alonc;

and these often lead to a conclusion far more

satisfactory than direct evidence can pro-

duce." 1 Greenl. Ev. 5 1311. After a carc-

rut examination of the evidence in this casc

we are not prepared to say that t.he jury

were not warranted in ﬁnding the verdict

returned by them. Among the circumstances

which may be judicially considered as lead-

ing to important and well-grounded pre-

sumptions are "motives to crimes, declara-

tions or acts indicative oi‘. guilty conscious-

ness or intention. land] preparations for tin-

commission of crime." Wills. Circ. Ev. p.

39. It appears trom the facts above recited

that there was evidence here which tended

to show the existence of just such circum-

stances as are thus indicutcd.---1-c\'cn;:e for

arrest and imprisonment, threats that thc

\

I

barns would be burned, and halting on thc

way to obtain matches. The evidence of thc

footprints and their correspondence with thi-

defendant's feet was competent, and, though

“not by itself of any independent stremztli

is admissible with other proof as tending to

make out a case." Whart. Cr. Ev. (8th Ed.|

5 1'96. In \Vinslow v. State. supr.-1. whcrr

"he indictment was for arson. and "then-

‘ was evidence tending to show a fresh tracl:

in the lane leading from the road to tht‘

house; [and] that this track and the track oi

\!

iri9; 3 Greenl. Ev. ff 55, ·s6. It bus been
llllld tllat In urson the corpus 1l<>llctl <'omdsts
not only o.r a :ract that a building has been
burned. but also the fact that It has beeu
willfully fired by some responsible perlj(m.
ll'lnslol.v v. State, 'i\l Aln. 42. The mnlu
fac~ hov1rever, ·which Is to be proven In tllt•
first pince. is the burning ot the bulldini:.
When that fact ls e!;\t."\bllshed, then It Is nt>e·
essnry to show how the net was done. nud
hy whom.
We think that, In the pr<>:wnt
case, the fact that the barns were burned
wns. clearly and satisfactorily proven; and
the clrCUIIlstances were such as to exclude
accident or natural caulle8 ns the orl,i:ln of
the fire.
'Vhen the gen1•ral f11ct Is thus
proved, a founda tlon Is laid for thf' lutrodu<.··
tion of any legal and sutlident evldt>ncc that
the act was coIDn1ltted by the acl'UsPd, and
that lt was done with criminal lntl'nt. &un
v. State, 83 Miss. 347; Phillips v. State, 29
Ga. 105. Such evidence need not be direct
and poeltlve, but Jll'lly be clrcmnstuntlul, In
ltB cbarncter.
Winslow v. State, supra. In
both criminal and civil ca111!'11 "a v1>rdlct
may well be founded on clreumstnncPs nlont';
and these often lead to a conduslon fllr more
satisfactory than direct evidence can produce." 1 Greenl. Ev. f 136. After a careful examination of the eYldeu('{> In this cnioC'
we are not prepared to say that the jury
we1·e not warranted In finding the verdl<'t
rt•turned by them. Among the clt·curnstanct.>t<
whll·b may be judleially roosldered as leading to Important and well-grounded prl'sumptlons are "'n1otlves to crimes, declaratlons or acts lndicntlYe of guilty consclousnea or lnU.nttnn. Land] pl'('pnratlons tor tllf'
oommlBBlon of erlme." Wills. Clrc. Ev. 11.
89. It appears from the tact:JJ above reclt<'tl
that there was evidence here which tended
to show the exlsh•ncP of just sueh circumstances as are thm1 lndlt>nh•11.·- -ren•n::e for
arrest and Imprisonment, threats that th1•
barns would be burned, and halting on tbl•
way ro obtain matches. The evidence of th1•
tootprint:JJ and their correi111011deuce with th••
defendant's feet wns competent, and, thougl•
..not by Itself ot any lnd<'pt•ndent st1·1>ngth
Is admissible with other proof Ill! tendlnic t«
make out a case." \\'hurt. Cr. Nv. (8th }<}d.1
I 796. In Winslow v. State. supra. wh1•r1·
the Indictment was for arson, 11nd "'thPI'•'
was evidence tending to 11how a fresh tra1·k
In the Jane lending from tbe rond to th1·
house; [amll that this track nn!I the trnl·k ol
\he defendnnt c01·responded." It was said :
·.~l'be previous threats ot the detemlnnt, nutl
hli declnratlons In the nature ot threab1.
were, on the Bllme principle, properly ad·
mltted. While they ore not of themselvPN
convincing of guilt. from them, in com11'<."tlon with the other circumstances, If bellen'fl
by the jury, guilt may be a logical sequenc1!.''
Wbart. Cr. Ev. (8th F,d.) § ii>fl.
As to the def..use of an alibi. the bm·den
of making It out wns upon the plaintiff 111
error (Ack1>rson v. People. 124 Ill. 563, Iii
N. E. 8-17'· 11nd, In order to maintain it, he

~ <)~.

~-~ ,,,,
re &r.
wn11 bound 1"<>
·
R '11
L' Me ...o. 6
111
6
facts and cfre1J
1· t..·1'1
111 ltd
~
( f•lj
"" Sllpporf BUcb
when consldere
,.._ ~04 "" W,/!re sullJ. t t
other evidPnce LO- "<I~ c 11uettoo with anc 'f:e·
minds of tbe juJ"f ~ i-~11 ~l!le, to crea"te Jn tbe
truth ot the cbarGe ll~ &onnhle doubt of tbe
People, 107 Ill. 162; ~:/IJst 11/m. Garrity v.
Ill. 42. It cnnnot he
lll//ns v. People, 110

7

CJ

&lid t/Jut the defense

wns made out so
<'llrJ.r natl satisfactorily
as to be avalllng llJ:nfast the case made by
tht> state.
It is assigned as error tb11t the eourt refused to permit the dPft•111l1111t to pm,·e by
two witnesses that they l1ud heard Tbonms
Verhines make threats that he would burn
up eYPrythlng Rldrnhonr had. We do not
regard this ruling us t•n-oneous. Threats of
a third person, other than the prisoner
on trial, against the victim ot the crime
char,i:ed, are mere hearsay, and are inadmissible, Evidence of thl11 eharacter tends
to draw away the mlnd11 of the jury from
the point in issue, which Is the guilt or Innocence of the prlsonr1·. and to <>xelte their
prejudices nnd mislead them. 1 Greenl. Ev.
ff 51, 52; Walker v. State, 6 Tex. App. 576;
State v. Duncan, 6 Ired. 286. Such thrl'ats
ot a third perMon are Inter allos acta; they
are too remote from the Inquiry before the
jury to be rect-IYed, and have no 1.-,i:ul tend·
ency to establish thP lnnoc<>nce of the prlson1>r. Alston v. State, 63 Ala. 178; State v.
Davis, 77 N. C. 483. It is competent tor the
defPndunt to show by any ll'Jtal evldl'n<'e
,that another committed the <'rime with
which he Is charged, and that he Is innocent of any participation in it, but this cannot be shown by the admissions or confessions of· a third per11on not under oath,
which are only henrsuy. ThP proof must
connect SU<'h third person with the fact.that Is, with the perpetration of some deed
entPt'lng Into thP crime Itself. Tht>re must
be proof ot such a train of tacts and clrcumi<tances as tend clearly to point to him,
rather than to the prisoner, us the guilty
party. "Extrnjudlclal statements ot third
pt>r1101u1 <'annot be proved by heursuy. unless
sul'!1 stat<>ments were part of the re11 g1>stne."
Whart. Cr. Ev. (8th Ed.) § 2'..?5; Smith v.
Htnft'. 9 Ala. 000; Htute v. Davis. supra;
Grt>PnftPld v. Peoplt>, 1'!.-, N. Y. 'm; Thomas
v. Pl•oplt>. 67 N. Y. :.!18; Owem~by v. State,
82 Alu. U:J. 2 South. 764; Htntl' v. Hayn<>s,
71 N. C. W; Hb1>a v. State, 10 Yerg. 258;
Com. v. Chabbock, 1 Mass. 143; State v.
Johnson, ao La. Ann. 921; People v. llurphy, 4:; Cal. 137; State v. Smith, 35 Kun.
li18. 11 Pnc. 008; State v. May, 4 Dev. 328;
Wrl;.:ht v. Htntr. D YPrjl. 342.
It ls 111o1sl;.:nPtl 1111 l'l·rm· that t\1e court \nstrnctt>d thl' jnr.)' that "the ren1<onable doubt
the jury nre perm\tt<>ll to l'nh•rtu\n mu1<t \w
as to th<' in11lt of the nc.•c\U<t'I.\ on th~ w\~o\e
of thr e\·idNwe. and not o.s \() \\UY 11a,·twulur fact In the> <'fl~l'." \V c dQ not'!:'-'~''"'\ t\,,~
d trl
t tbe instruction as enoueou~. lt
lsocln n:c~ordnnce wlth t:.b e TU\t~ -wn\cb...~~
JJJ "t>er o cases. m.w.have laid down 1D a nu
1.l
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RELEVAN CY.

_at the time such offense was committed.

iins v. People. supra; Davis v. People, 114

Ill. 86. 29 N. E. 192; Leigh v. People, 113 Ill.

372; Brcssler v. People, 117 Ill. 422. 8 N. E.

(52; Hoge v. People, 117 Ill. 35, 6 N. E. 796.

There was no error in refusing the defend-

ant’s third refused instruction, because in-

structions given for the state and for the

accused required the jury to believe from

the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt,

that the defendant willfully and maliciously

burned the barn of Itidenhour.

Complaint is made that the court refused

to instruct the jury as follows: “If the jury

entertain any reasonable doubt as to wheth-

er or not the defendant was at his own

home or at the scene of the alleged offense

then it is your duty. under the law, to acquit

him." Such an instruction was held to be
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incorrect in Mullins v. People. supra. The

reasonable doubt of guilt which will acquit

the prisoner when his defense is an alibi

is the doubt which arises from a considera-

tion by the jury of all the evidence, “as well

that touching the question of the alibi as

the criminatiug evidence introduced by the

prosecution." Mullins v. People, supra. In

the case at bar, 14 instructions were given

for the state. and 18 for the defendant. The

jury was instructed in regard to the subject

of reasonable doubt in accordance with the

principles laid down by this court in Miller v.

People, 39 Ill. 457; May v. People, 60 Ill. 119;

Connaghan v. People, S8 Ill. 460; Spies v.

People. 122 Ill. 1, 12 N. E. S65, and 17 N. E.,

898. We see no reason for departing from

the views expressed in these cases. -

Counsel for plaintiff in error claim that

the trial court erred in refusing to give their

refused instruction No. 17, which is as fol-

lows: “The jury are instructed, as a mat-

ter of law. that, when a conviction for a

criminal oifense is sought on circumstantial

evidence alone. the people must not only

show, by a preponderance of evidence that

the allc,':ed facts and circumstances are true. .'

but they must be such facts and circum-

stances as are absolutely inconsistent, upon i

any reasonable hypothesis, with the inno-

ccnce of the accused, and incapable of ex- ;

‘ deuce,

planation upon any other theory than that

of the guilt of the accused; and in this case. l

if all the facts and circumstances relied on

by the people to secure a conviction can be ‘

reasonably accounted for upon any theory i

consistent with the innocence of the dei’end- '

ant, they should acquit him." in instruc- i

tion No. 13 given for the people. the court

told the jury that circumstantial evidence '

should be of such a character as to exclude 1'

every reasonable hypothesis other than that

the defendant is ,<:uilt_v.“ In instruction No. I

1 given for the defendant, the court instruct-

ed the jury that "the defendant is presumed I

to be innocent until the contrary appeared '

by the evidence, and such evidence must be

so strong and convincing as to remove every

RELEVANCY.

fins v. People, supra; Davis v. People, 114
m. 86. 29 N. E. 192; Leigh v. People, 113 m
372; Bressler v. People, 117 Ill. 422, 8 N. E.
62; Hoge v. People, 117 Ill. a;), 6 :S. E. 700.
ThE'l'e was no error In rPfuslng the d!'fendant's third refused lnstl"Uctlon, b1>cause Instructions given for thl• state and for the
accusro required the jury to believe from
the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the defendant willfully and maliciously
burned the bnrn of Ridenhour.
Complaint Is mndt• tlutt the court rl'fUSt'd
to lnstrtwt the jury as follows: "If the jury
entertain any ren11onnbl<> doubt as to whether or not the dt!fl'ndant was at his own
home or at the scene of the allegt>d offense
. at the time such offense was <.'Ommltted.
then It Is your duty, undt>r the law, to acquit
him." ~ucb an lnstruct1on was held to be
lncorrt>ct In Mullins v. Pt'Olllt>, suprn. Th<'
reasonable doubt of guilt which will acquit
the prisoner when his dt>fense Is an alibi
Is tbt> doubt which arises from a consldera·
tlon by the jury of all the evldt>nce, "as well
that toucbln~ the question of the alibi as
the crlmlnatlug evldt>nce lntrodu('('(} by tht>
prosecution." Mullins v. Pt•ople, supra. In
the case at bar, 14 Instructions were given
for the state, and 18 for the defPndant. The
jury was Instructed In r<'gnrd to the subject
of reasonable doubt In acrordnnCP with the
principles laid down by this l'ourt In Miller v.
People, 39 Ill. 457; May v. People, 00 Ill. 119;
Connaghnn v. People, 88 Ill. .JOO; Spies v.
People, 122 Ill. 1, 12 N. E . 865, and 17 N. E.,
8U8. We 8l'e no reason for departing from
tht> views expn>Ased In thesE' casPs.
Counsel for plaintiff In error claim that
th!' trial court erred In refusing to give their
refused Instruction No. 17, which Is as follows: "The jury are Instructed, as a matter of law. that, when a conviction for a
criminal otren11e Is sought on circumstantial
evldPnce alone. the people must not only
11how, by a preponderance of evldenl'l' that
the allegPd facts and circumstances are true.
but they must be such facts and clrcum·
stances as are absolutely lncomdstent, upon
any reasonable hypothesis, with the lnnocPnee of the aC'CUSed, and lnl'apable of explanation upon any other theory than that
of tht> guilt of the accused; and In this case.
If all the facts and circumstances relied on
by the people to secure a convll'tlon can be
reasonably accounted for upon any theory
consistent with the lnno('('nce of tlw dt>fendant, they shonld acquit him." In lm1trul··
tlon No. 13 given for the peoplt>, the court
told the jury that clrcumKtantlal evldt>nct•
should be of such a character as to exclude
every rt>asonable hypothl'Kls othl'r than that
the deft>ndant 111 guilt~·." In Instruction ::So.
1 glvt>n for tht> deft>ndant, the court lnstruct<.>d the jury that "the defendant ls presumed
to be Innocent until the contrary appeared
by the evldt>nce, and such evidence must be
so strong and convincing as to remove every
rt>iuionable doubt of his guilt, to the t•xclu11lon of every reasonable hypothesla of hla
18

Innocence." IrreSpectlve of the question
whether retused ln11trucUon No. 17 was right
or wrong, the deft>ml:tnt could not have been
Injured by Its refusal, In view of the giving
of plaintiff's Instruction No. 13, and defendant's Instruction Xo. 1, as above quoted,
whether the two last-named Instructions
were correct or not. A defendant cannot
complain of the refusal. of an Instruction If
Its substance ls embodied In lnstrnctlons
which are given, and, In so holding. this court
does not nl'CeBSarlly hold such given Instructions to be correct. In addition, however, to
this con11lderatlon, said Instruction :So. 17
was properly refused, because It Is so hroa'l
and swet>plng In Its terms that, If It wert>
given In every criminal case dependent upon
clrt'umstantlal evidence, It would have a
tendt>ncy to prevent, In many Instances, the
conviction of guilty parties. Gannon v. People, 121 Ill. 507, 21 N. E. a2:>; Whart. Cr.
Ev. (8th Ed.) I 10. "What circumstances
amount to proof <'RD nevt>r be matter of general deftnltJon. The legal test Is the suftlclPn<'y of the evlden<-e to 811.tlsty the understanding and ronsclenl'I' of the jury. On the
one band, absolute metaphysical and demonstrative certainty Is not essential to proof by
circumstances. n Is sumclent If they produce moral C'l'l"talnty. to the exclll81on of
every r(>flsonablt> cloubt." Starkie, Ev. I 79;
Otmer v. Pt•ople, 76 Ill. 1411. Tht> circumstances must be such as to produce a moral
certainty of guilt, and to exl'lude any other
reasonable hypothesis. Com. v. Goodwin. 14
Gray, 55; 1 Greenl. Ev. II l3a. The jury
shonld be satisfied of the 1h•fPndant's guilt
~yond a rea1«1mthle douht. and If there
be no probable hypothesis of guilt consistent,
beyond reasonable doubt, with the facts of
the case, the dt>fendant must be acquitted.
Com. v. Costley, 118 llass. 1; Whart. Cr.
Ev. (8th Ed.) f 21. In order to warrant a
conviction of crime on circumstantial evlden<'e, the clrl'ltm11tances, taken togetht>r,
should be of a <.'(mcluslve nature am.I tt>ndency, leading, on the whole. to a satisfactory ronC'lrndon, and prodtwlng, In pftect. a
reasonable and moral certainty that the accusPd, and no one else, romrulttl'l.l tbe otfense
ch:1rg1'1i. ('om. v. <~oodwln, supra. It la
dlttlcult to dt>line accurately what Is a rensoimble doubt, but all the autborlt\eB agree
' that such a doubt must be actual and substantial, as contradlstlngulshed frolll a mere
vague apprelwnslon, and must Rl'tse o\tt -~t
thP evidence Introduced. 3 Ureeul. J.')'V· (~~·''
Ed.) I 29, note a; Earl v. P('()pte- 13 }\\. 329.
· The Jury may be said to entE>rtni g. reasonable doubt when, after the entl~ c0uwar\son and consideration of all th e,,.-\di>nce,
they l'llnnot say that they fe>t•l e
11.bltl\ng
, conviction to a moral ct>rtatnty, 0~tltlle tr.~~
! of the charge. Com. v. \Vl•bst<>r ,., C"1:4b. 32
I Proof '"beyond a reasonable ll • ~ •• ts su
proof as prl'<'l1tdPB every rl'a8( ou t
]:lypoth·
l'!!ls exct•pt that which lt tt•t lDa'blC r&tllll'ort.
It Is proof "to a moral ce
ltls to
t1t11tln~.aahed f rom an a.._.iute
·~- rttllnty •.. ~d
'.[be
........
.....,•

ch

I

certai~--

~ -----

··------...

1)11u@:c'r .-mu mnrunor 1cvm1§

lwo plu-a.ses—“prooi' beyond a reasonable

doubt," and proof “to n mornl certainty"-

nresynonyznous and equivalent. "Each sig-

lliﬁes such proof as satisﬁes the judgment

two phra.sea-"proot beyond a reasonable
1loubt," and proof .. to a mornl certalnty''nre synonymous and eqnlnllent. ··Each slgnllles such proof' as satisfil'l> the judgment

or the jury as reasonable men,

and conscience of the jury as reasonable men,

and conscience

and applying their reason to the evidence be-

and applying their reason to the evidence be-

tP~
r/Y-tore them, tbU. t
£1~ ~I
t rAlle Ko. 6
committed IJy t:b e 0 0 f'~1,:J:e C'~

them as to lPa VOo~ 0 t4Q lllJt, aod

G,

! !':ts1:::::

slon possllJle."
C · l>-.
r£•1u1ooable cooc/ujudgment ot the cJ.r lllt Co 'St/f:r, supra. Tk·
firmed.
llrt Is afflrmed. Ar

o\

19

\_

‘1

>1 1/'1‘.

Q.

fore them, that £1319 (‘I-102 [awe M‘ 6

: m a b r11 6 "0 8

(ciigilxlinaaei l§aVe '10 °t "q”nrcb'”“'d 1'“ "““”

" G011; ‘>119, ' ﬂlldso szztis/i1-11

sion possible.’ ' "('11-wuable c'0uz'l”.

C'.

Judgment of the Cir wt C. CO“?/'11". supra. T110

ﬁrmed. °l"'!1salﬂz-med. A/‘

J0
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Case No. 7]
Case No. 7]

lH'll.l'lV.\.\'(‘Y.

FERRARI et ul. v. .\ll,'llll.\Y.

(25 N. E. 970. 152 Muss. 496.)

FEUUARI et al. v. lirHHA\'..
(25 N. E. 970, ta:? Mn1111. -400.)
Supreme .Judicial <·uurt of '.\J1tll8tH"hllM'ttM.
Hnffolk.

~1n-.

:!ti, 18!JO.

Supreme Judicial (‘ourt of .\lai-nmclillsetts.

Sutfolk. .\'ov. 21$, 1890.

Exceptions from superior court. Suffolk

(-ounty; James M. Barker, Judge.

Action by Annlbali Ferrari and others

against Henry Murray for a balance alleged

to he due to plaintiffs on a written oontract

for the making by them for d<~t'¢-mlant of a

granite n1onunu=ut. De-t’omlant alleged ex-

<-options.

J. L. l<Ildri1l;:v_ for plalntlt'f.~‘. S. Z. Bow-

man and W. 1". Prime, for defendant.

20

W. AI,l.E.\'. J. Tho <lofouso was a hrvaoh

of \vnrrant_v that the monument should be

free from all llu|w1'f('t-tionrl. The question

put by the deft-mlaut to the plaintlﬂfs on
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(-runs-1-:\'aminatlon. whether they knew of It

partivnlar prom-0:-in described to him of mend-

ing and oonor\allng cracks in granite, was

Immaterial. The plaiutlﬂ’s’ knowledge of a

process by which 1-rm-ks could be concealed

had no t0ll(l('.l.l(‘_\‘ to prove that (-rm-ks exist-

ed. and lt (-rm-ks did exist it was innnatvrial

whether the plaintiffs did or did not know

01' them or attempt to (‘0ll('t‘ﬂl them. A ma-

jority of the court are of oplnlon that the

entry should be, exceptions overruled.

Exceptions from Slll>"rlor court, Sulrolk
<'Ounty; James M. Barker, Judgt>.
A<'tlon by Annlball l<'errarl and othf'rs
against Henry Murray for a balan~ alleged
to be due to plalntlft'11 on a wrlttrn ront1"1lct
for the making by th<>m for 1h•ft>111hmt o( a
granJte monnmE>nt. Ut>fE'ndnnt allt•ged ex<'eptlons.
J. L . Eldrldgt>. for plnlntUfM. S. Z. Bowman and "". I•'. Prime, for defendant.
20

W. ALLI<:X. J. ThE' dl'fPnsf' was a brt>a<'h
of warranty that tbt- monument 11hould be
t'rl'e from all lmpE>rfN·tlon11. The question
put by the deft>udant to the plaintiffs on
<'l"t1SR-examlnntlon. whether they knew of a
1mrtl<•ulur pn)("eMM deNcrlbed to bJm of mt>ndlng and ron<'t'allng c·racks In granite, was
lmmatt>rlal. Thi' plnlntltfs' knowledge of a
proC'E'ss by whl<'h 1•rn<•ks could be com•ealed
had no tentlen1•y to provt> that <'r&<·k11 t>xJsted, and If c•ra1•ks did exll1t It wnM ln111111tt•rlal
whether the plalntlft's did or did not know
of them or attt>mpt to ron<'e81 them. A nu1jorlty of the C'ourt are of opinion that tile
entry should be, exceptions overruled.

FACTS 'fEXUt:\G TO PRO\'E FAcrs
.\

»§

FACTS 'i‘i~.‘\'l)l.\G T0 r1t0\'i: F.-tor-5 1’ $880

E‘ v .

FINDL.-11' BRl<I\\'l.\’G co. v. BAUER. the injury c-0111 0,. Q /‘cm M» 8

that these hooks I11

- eg Q5 8

31:11“ any igéﬂge 1> ot1omt””"'°”' "M

e or pa Q 8]’) 0 of tlze belt the

Error to circuit court, Lucas county. out and 1311 back! liq 5’ 111194 would drop

Action for personal injuries by one Bauer 1111-1-equent occurfebce at this W3, not 3,,

ti‘-'“i1\~=t the Fivdhlr Brewing Comnnnr llﬂlilienetl, the belt b¢~(._,,“'1'@11, as sometimes

FL'\\DLA. Y BREWI.XG 00. "· BAUER.
(35 N. E. 50, 50 Ohio St. ;)(IO.)
Supreme ( •ourt of Ohio. Oct. 31, 1893.
Error to circuit court, Lucas couuty.
Action :ror personal Injuries by one Bauer
&Jllllnst the 1'"ludlay Brewing Com1>any.
had
judgment, and defendant
PlalntHr
brings error.
AtHrmed.
Waite &
Snider, for plalntlJr In error.
Jumes E. Pllllod and Asbtoo H. Coldham,
for defendunt in error.

Plaintiff had judgment, and defendant ing the progress of the tine to" 10089. Dur-

hrings error. Atiirtncd. called by the plaintiif, mu *1 Wmleﬂﬂ W118

(35 .\*. 55, 50 Ohio St. 51:0.) °'-

Supreme ( ‘onrt of Ohio. Oct. 31. 1893.

If W88 clzzlmezl

_ and 5t-"ted, in answer

\\-aite & Snider, for plaintiff in error.

James E. Pilliod and Ashton H. Coldham,

for defendant in error.
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.\lll\’Si;1A1.L, J. The action below was by

an eniployé of the defendant, to recover dam-

ages for a personal injury caused. as claim-

ed, by the negligence of the defendant in

int-uisliing an unsafe appliance with which

to do the work in which he was employed.

The avermeuts are, in substance, that while

operating, by the direction of the superin-

tendent of the company, a lift,-used for the

purpose of elevating barrels and similar

packages from a lower to an upper ﬂoor, he

was injured, without fault on his part, by

one of these packages falling back upon him;

and that it resulted from the negligent and

defective construction of the appliance, of

which the defendant had notice, but of

which he had no knowledge, and could not

have had, in the exercise of ordinary care on

his part. issues were joined upon the aver-

tncnts of the petition as to the defective char-

actor of the lift, the negligence of the de-

fendant, and the averment that it happened

without fault on the part of the piaintltf. It

appcarctl that the lift or elevator consisted

of a broad, heavy, rubber belt, with certain

lateral supports and guides of timber, run-

ning nearly perpendicular against a board

the full width of the belt, and over a pulley

Just above the upper ﬂoor, and around an-

other just below the wash-room ﬂoor. To

the face of this band were attached two ets

of iron hooks or arms, which, as the band

revolved, caught the barrels on the under

side, and carried them up through an open-

ing in the ﬂoor; and as they turned on the i

upper pulley the barrels fell away by their

own weight to the ﬂoor above, and left the

hooks free to continue their downward move-

ment. The barrels to be elevated were

placed upon a. skid raised above the lower

floor, and inclined towards this revolving

hand. and the man tending the elevator roll-

ed them, one at a. time, against the band,

ready for the hooks coming around and up-

ward from the lower pulley to carry them

over the pulley above; and, as one barrel

was freeing itself from the hooks above, the

_ other set of hooks were about ready to re-

! ccive the next barrel. While the plaintiff was

lllN~HAJ..L,

11u em11loy6
Dltl'8

o~

J.

'rbe action below was by

the defendant, to recover dam·

for a. personal Injury caused, a111 <.>lalw-

ed, by the negligence of the defendant in

furn\shlug an un-fe appliance with whil•h
to do the work In which he was employed.
1'be avermentB are, in substance, that while
o()(>rutl.ng, by the direction of the superln·
tendent of the company, a lift,· used for the
purpose of ~levatlng barrels and similar
packllges from a lower to an upper floor, he
was injured, without fault on bis part, by
one of these packages falllng back upon him;
and that lt resulted from the negligent and
defective constru<..•tlon of the appliance, of
which the defendant bad notice, but of
which he had no knowledge, and could not
have bad, in the exercise of ordinary care on
hll!I part. Issues were Joined upon the averments of the petition as to the detective character of the utt, the negligence of the defendant, and the averment that it happened
w\thout fault on the part of tbe plaintiff. It
appeared that the lift or elevator conelsted
of a broad, heavy, rubber belt, with certain
lateral sup1>0rts and guides of timber, running nearly perpendicular against a board
the full width of tile belt, and over a pulley
just above the upper ftoor, and around another just below the wash-room ftoor. To
the face of this band were attached two sets
of iron hooks or arms, which, us the band
revolved, caught the barrels on the under
Bide, and carried them up through an opening ln the ftoor; and as they turned on the
upper pulley the barrels tell away by their
own weight to the floor above, and left tht>
hooks free to continue their downward movement. 1'be barrels to be elevated were
placed upon a skid raised above the lower
floor, and Inclined towards this revolving
hand, an<l the man tending the elevator rolled them, one at a time, against the band,
ready for the books coming al'ound and upward from the lower pulley to carry them
over the pulley above; and, as one barrel
was freeing Itself from the books above, the
<'tlier set of books were about ready to ret.-elve the next barrel While the plaintiff was
engaged In so placing the barrels ready to be
taken up by the books, one ot them, a bait
barrel, after being carried part way up, fell
from the books, and, striking his band, then
rest.In& on the barrel next to go up, cal18ed

.._ft' ~&o

...,;IA/
.Ji:. [l118e
' So. H
the injury c0zxi_,,,.- O~ ~Gq
that these hooJcJB' _,J. .\-...- o~
that in any 1rre.Er 't"~~. ~ It w11a <·la/med
ge h.. -~Ot ere /co a.bort, 11Dd
barrel or pac.kS
~~
lolJ or t.be belt tbe
out and fall ba.C'.JC, '4.tct t'f!' Urted would drop
infrequent occurr6ll<_>e .uat I.bis w11a Dot 11n
ha1>1lt'ned, the belt bee...,lf>belJ, 118 aometlmi!lll
Ing the progress of t4e
too looae. Darcalled by the plafntJir,
'rJa/ a wftneBB waa
lllld stated, ID a.Dswer
to a question, t.ba. t, BOl!Je time before be bad
been employed by the defendant to do the
same work, and that, wblle so employed, a
barrel fell back and Injured him. The counsel for the platntur stated that this was ottered for the sole purpose of showing the
dau~erous character of the machine, and the
defendant's knowledge of that tact, and for
no other purpose. The court then stated
that it would be received for these purposes,
J and no other, and so instructed the Jury at
I the tJme. Similar evidence as to the falling
back of barrels while the lift was being operated was given by other witnesses, to which
the defendant excepted at the time. The
Jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plalntltr, on which the court, after overrullng a
motion for a new trial, rendered Judgment.
1 '!'he Judgment having been aftlrmed by the
circuit court, this proceeding is prosecuted
to obtain a reversal of both jwlgments so
rendered.
The only question in the case is as to the
admissibility ot the evidence offered to show
that on former occasions, when the elevator
I was being operated, barrels and pac•knge11
1 tell back, and injured the persons operating
It, as in this case. It is claimed to be Incompetent on the ground that It raises collateral
Issues tending to mislead the Jury and to
surprise the opposite party, by the intro1 ductlon of evidence for which be could not
have been prepared ·by the nature of the i•
The rule relied on Is thus stated by
1 sue.
I Greenleaf: "The evidence otrered must corJ respond
with the allegations, and be conJined to the point in ie1me." Greenl. Ev. I
51. And he adds, In the following section:
"This rule excludes all evidence of 1-'0llateral
1 facts, or tho11e whl<·h nTr tnc·11pnble or 11trordlng any reusouuhle p1·t·Hmupt1011 or Inference
!' as to the principal matter of tact In di11pute." The authorities on the question are
conftlctlng. The courts of Massachusetts
and some of the other states hold that such
J evidence le not within the iBBue, but collat·
eral to it, and should be rejected. Colline v.
Dorchester, 6 Cush. 396; Aldrich v. Pelham,
1 Gray, 510; Phillips v. Town of Willow, 70
Wis. 6, 34 N. W. 73L But reason and the
weight ot authority are the other way. The
rule, as stated by Greenleaf, excludes only
those tacts "which are lncapa'tlle ot s.ttord\~g
any reasonable presumption or \nterence as
to the principal matter or tact \n d\sl.mte."
So that a tact cannot be sa\d to 'tle co\\atem\
to the Issue it, when est a b\\sn.~, \t tends to
prove or disprove the p1.·lnc\~ tact m.

;ne

I

I

I

I

d\;.;,
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CMe No.!:!]
lase No. 8]

ltEl.E\'ANCY.

pute. In this case a number of principal

facts were in dispute.

the defectiveness of the machine, and the de-

fendant’s knowledge of that fact. as well as

his negligence in the premises. if the evi-

dence objected to tended to prove either of

these facts, there was no error in its admis- t

sion. There is no rule of evidence which re-

quires that what is offered should be rele-

vant to every issue in the case; it may be

relevant to one. and irrelevant to another.

No party can, as a rule. prove his case uno

ﬂatu. He is compelled, in the nature of

things, to proceed step by step; and it not

infrequently happens that what is competent .

for one purpose is not for another. Tile

mixed character of the evidence docs not,

however, render it wholly incompetent. The

cvid-_>nec in such case is admitted with a di-
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rection from the court to the jury as to how

it is to be applied, on what issues it is to be

considered, and on what not, as was done in

this case.

as to how this lift or elevator behaved on

former occasions—that at other times, when

bellli-I Operated by other persons, barrels‘

being lifted had fallen, and injured those

0Dvl‘8tiIl£ if, or had simply fallen back, the

conditions remaining substantially the same

~—tvl1d¢‘d to Prove some vice in its con-

struction that rendered its operation dan-

RQPOIIS, and that the company knew or

should have known the tact. Inspection it-

self may llldlcate some defect in a machine,

:lﬂ‘t‘<'ﬂl1H ii“ -“a7°t.\‘ or usefulness; but, as is

most 1181111"! the case, its defective character,

whatever it may be, is more dearly observ-

ed in its operation. Experiment is the ﬁnal

and most conclusive test of its safety, as

well as of its usefulness; and the fact that

the carefulncss of the party operating the

machine may he involved in each instance

may 859011 the Welght of the evidence, but

not its adnlisﬁlbility, as such a limitation

would exclude the result of every experiment

offered in evidence, which would amount to a

reductio ad absurdum. The defectiveness

of the lift, and the company's knowledge of

it, would not. however. alone constitute

‘actionable negiiitence. The character of the

machine and the employer's knowledge be-

ing established. it still remains a question

of fact whether. under all the circumstan-

cog, n case of actionable negligence has been

made out. That which caused the danger

may have been irremediable, and it is no

violation of duty by an employer to put one

in his emvlvy at the operation of a danger-

ous mm-llille. if ﬂit‘ eniplo_\'e is i'ull_v inform-

ed as to its character, and voluntarily ac-

cepts the "mpl°5'm°11t- Whenever force is

applied T0 "'""m‘"‘l'&' there is more or less

danger to ""’=“‘ °l>(‘rating it; so that the

dllfy Of 151"’ "mpl"5"’I' towards his emDlo.‘v'é is

Hot T0 f'"'ni“l' *1 D¢’i'fectly safe machine,

but 0119 as sat‘) as (‘till be Provided in the

exercise of °"d““"‘5‘ care and prudence.

Among these were ~

REJ.E\" .AXCY.

pule. In this cue a number of prln<'lpal
tacts were In dispute. Among these were
the defectlveneu of the machine, and the defendant's knowledge of that fact, aa well ae
his negligence In the premises. If tlu• t>t"I·
dence objected to tended to prove either of
these factR, there was no error In Its admls·
slon. There Is no rule of evidence which requires that what Is otrerl>d 11houlcl be relevant to every 18HUe In the C'llae; It may be
relevant to onl'. nn<l. lrrt>le\'ant to another.
No party l'an, 88 a rule, 11r0Ye bis case uno
fiatu. He la <·om1wlled, In the natuno or
things, to pro<•t•ed step by ste11: and It not
Infrequently happens that what Is competent
for om• JIUfIIO&e Is not for nnother. The
wl:irnd C!buracter of the evidence does not,
however, render It wholly ln<'<>IDI)('tent. The
evldt•U<'C In such case Is admlttl>d with a di·
re(•tlon from the eourt to the jury as to how
it ls to be applied, on what l111ues It 111 to be
ooDBldered, and on what not, as was done lo
this (!88(>.
•
On reason, It seems plain that evidence
as to how this lift or elentor behaved on
former occaslon&-that at other times, when
being operated by other persoDB, barrels
being lifted bad fallen, and Injured those
operating It, or had simply fallen back, the
<'011dlttons remaining substantially the 11&me
-tendt>d to prove HOme vice In Its con·
stru<-tlon that rendered Its operation dan·
gerous, and that the company knew or
should have known the fact. ID&peCtlon It·
self may Indicate some defect In a machine,
alTt><•tlng lt11 Hafety or usefulneBB; but, as Is
most wmally the case, ltB de!ec.'tlve character,
whatever It may be, ls more clearly ob8erv·
ed In lte operation. Experiment ls the tlnal
and most <'On<'IU11lve test of Its safety, a8
well as of Its URefulness; and the f1u•t that
the <-arefulness of the party upemtl11g the
mac•blne may he Involved In t>ac·h lulltanee
may affect the weight of the evidence. but
not Its admlllslblllty, as such a limitation
would ex<>lude the result or every experiment
oft'.ered lo evidence, which would amount to a
reductlo ad absurdum. The defectiveness
of the lift, and the company's knowledge of
It, "·ouhl not, however, alone <>onstltute
·a ctionable negligence. The cbarB.<'ter ot the
maehlne and the employer's knowledge being eRta bllshed, It still remains a question
of f1wt whether, under all the clrcumstan·
c•es, 11 <·ase of a<>tlonable negligence has been
made· out. That which caused the danger
may have been Irremediable, and It ls no
violation of duty by an employer to put one
In his employ at the operation of a danger·
01111 mac·lllne. If th<> employ<- 111 fully Inform·
ed as to Its chara<>ter, and voluntarily ac·
eepts tbe employment. Whenever force ts
applied to ma<·hlnery there ls more or less
danger to thoHe operating It; so that the
duty of the employer towanfs his employ6 Is
not to tnrnh~b a Pt>rtec·tly HOf<> machine,
but one na safe> IL!! <-an be provld<•d In the
exercise of ordinary care and Ilrudence.
22
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Whether the employer ls negligent lo this
rc•gard does not depend solely upon the fact
that the machine Is known by him to be a
dangc>rotui a.ppllance, but whether, with su<'l1
knowh•<l!,re, be neglected to do what a peraon or ordinary c•nre <'Ould an<t would ban•
done under such circumstances. It was.
how<>¥er, Incumbent on the plaintiff, In mak·
Ing out his case, to show the dangerous
rbaracter of the machine and the com·
pany's knowledge, as well as Its negligence:
and, while the evldenee was not competent
to prove negllgeuee, It did tend, ll8 we have
shown, to prove the oth<>r facts, and ·was
therc>fore admlMlble. As Raid by the judge
delivering the opinion In Darling Y. West·
moreland, ;;2 X. H. 40:~: "The evidence to
prove several lndc>pendent proposttloDB or
distinct facts may llt> ot <lltrerent kinds, and
drawn from dllTerent sources." If evldenee
otren>d be relevant to any Issue In the case.
It 111 11dmlnlble, however Incompetent It
may be upon other lBBut>B. Commenting on
the rule that confines the evidence to facts
put In lll8ue by the pleadings, and exclude11
collateral Issues, Doe. J., In the case just
cited, says: ''This rule merely l'('(}Ulres the
evidence to be relevant. It merely excludes
what ts lrrelennt. It is a rule of reason,
and not an arbitrary or technical one, and
It does not exclude all experimental knowl·
edge." And It was there held tb.a..t, on the
question whether a pile of lumber was
likely to frighten horses, evidence ls ad·
mlBBlble to show that horses passing It were
or were not frightened by It. In :McCarragher v. Rogers, 120 N. Y. 526, 2-i N. E.
812, an action to recover damages for an
Injury swrta.lned by the platntlfr while
working at a machine In the eroploy of the
defendant, a person who had previously
been Injured while working the machine In
the C'llp&dty of the plalntil'f was uked.
"How did the Injury ()('('Ur to you?" and he
answered, "It Jumped out of the socket In
the same way." The evidence was held
to be relevant and competent as bearing
upon the qUl'fltlon of the condition of the
machinery; and the court said that, while
the decisions are not In entire harmony on
the question, 8U<'h la the rule recognized In
that state. And RO In lloree v. Railway
co., 30 lllnn. 460, 4 71, 16 N. w. 358, which
wu an action by an eruploy6 of defendant
to recover for an Injury caused by lta negligence In permitting its tracltS to be and
remain out of order, such evidence was
held competent. The court as.id: "It ls, ot
course, not competent for tbe purpose of
showing lnd<'pendent ac•tM of 11egll!l:ence, but
we think on prlnelple It Is cl"'adY admls·
slble when It tends to show tbe common
cause of these arcidents I
da.nlerous or
unsafe thing. It would :ea crtafnlY com·
iwtent to prove by an l'X.
c flt, a.t a time,
elthl•r before or after ~:rt tllcldent. wnen
the Instrument <'lahnt><l t e ac ..,.- caused \t
was In the same conclltlono
~)lell the sc-

.:t•

}~.\v.rs TE"YDl~G TO PHOVE FAO'C9 _I~ ':s~
-‘t-ident coluplained of occurred, he cxamined

and expel-inlented with it, and found it

capable of producing like results. llence

there seelns no reason for excluding ordi-

nary experience, when conﬁned within the

same limits and for

These facts are in the nature oi? experi-

ments to show the actual condition of the

instrulnent. Upon any issue as to the con-

dition or safety of any work of human con-

struction 'de-signed for practical use, evi-

dence slinxving how it has served when put

to the use for which it was designed would

seem to bear directly upon the issue. It is

son1t-times objected that this presents new

and collateral issues of which a defendant.

has no notice. In a. certain sense every

item of evidence material to the main issue

introduces a. new issue; that is, it calls for

a reply. In no other sense does it make a

new issue. Its only iniportance is that it
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bears on the main issue, and, ii‘ it docs, it

is cotnpetent." We have quoted thus fully

from the opinion in this case hec:111se it

seems to set forth clearly and fully the

reasons for the admission of such evidence,

and to answer every objection that can be

made.

cases cited above, and relied on by the plain-

titt in error, has generally been regarded as

unsound; and, for this reason, the decisions

have not generally been followed as prec-

the same purpose. -

The reasoning in the .\lassach11setts .

it is said, re

cases, the “'81

the other w:1J'-

42 111. mo, 17‘ f ,-

ton, -iii Iowa, 1'30:

vr. 214:, 251. It is 0

that illustrates, as I re Said that ‘H met

1.!’ an 9X1J9l‘1llI t .

- um r the sub . "" ’ *1"

;.'lgnCOl1€l‘lt1)V°9I'S§', ‘ JP‘ tquattor or the Issue

is "pt collateral to that 13-

ue, but is direct evulom.-e bearing upon it "

City of Aurora V. Brown, 1'.’ lli. App. 122;

Darling v. Wostmoreland, 52 N. H. 401,

Here the Mztssachllsetts cases are consider-

ed and declared unsound. City of Delphi v.

Lowery, 7-i Ind. 520, contains an elaborate

review of the cases. Cook v. New Dur-

ham (N. II.) 13 Atl. 650; Kent v. Town of

Lincoln, 32 Vt. 591; Piggot v. Railway 00.,

3 C. B. 229. As the evidence objected to

tended to prove that the lift had in it 11

vice, making it dangerous to operate, and

that the company had notice of this from

its previous behavior, there was no error in

admitting the evidence, with a direction to

the jury that it was to he conﬁned to these

purposes, and could not be considered on

the question of the defendant's negligence

in the premises. Judgment aﬂirmed.

I: 3: 94 =76; WlI£'1'(.*.

gum fllassacbusettzs

O 1, (701 0 is decidedly

Pp 11":-/we V. Powers,

y-"I '7 ( /U’ 01' Burling-

5’I'l' V. Westﬂeld, $1

~

l'o

u.i!..'

:c!dent co1u1>lalned of occurrell, hti Pxamlued l'«il'UIH by 1:'JJ ~l" "'"'
.
£Ca911 No. II
.and expcrlmentetl with it, and round It Osbo.••e v. cft...T ~ -0 ,., Of'
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to th
· 36. where
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there seems no reason for ex«luding onli- Clli'Wl!I the v.-ef.&"
Cr .. ll
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'
11f/Jo11tJ· Is dee!d-JJ
na.ry experJenc·e, when coulhu.>c.I within the tlw other "'·a>r~t:.J>
l1 or .
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same limits and !or the sume purpot1e. 4.2 Ill. ltID, 1 I
: .: <:>o,.,. ( '/Jf<'llKo p; Powers,
r: ('/ty o.t Burl/ngThese racts are In the natme of exJ.>l'rl- ton, 40 Iowa, ::t:Jb, JJ·
..., '>'"Jl •
It I& -<J{)
,.. llfkt•r v. JJ'esttleld, 31J
llll'Uts to show the actual <·omlltlon of the ' 't• .,
-~, instruruen.t.
Upon any IBHU<' us to thl' con- that Illustrates. Blil b . re said that '"a :faet
~ 811 expei·Jment, the
dition or sat'ety o! any work of humun con· coudltlon or the Sllb'.J
. f'«t-watter o:f the Issue
structlon · designed for pnl!'tical use, evl· in controversy, fs .llot <·o/JatPrnl to that h!dence shoTI.·tng how It has sei·ved wht•n 1mt sue, but ls direct el"ldc>1u_.*' lwartug upon tt."
to the use ror which It was designed woulrl City of Aurora v. Brown, l:! III. App. 12'.l;
seem to bear directly u110n the l88ue. It Is Darling v. Wt>stmo1"Pl11nd, 52 x H. 401.
sometin1es object.Pd that this presents nt•w ' Here the llnssuchusetts cases ore considerand collateral Issues of which a defendant ed and dl'<·lnred un110und. City of Delphi v.
bas no notice. In a. certain sense every Lowery, 74 Ind. ~:..>o, contains 110 elaborate
ltc>m of evldPnce material to the malu Issue review of the coses. Cook v. New DurIntroduces a new Issue; that ls, It calls for hnw (N. II.) 13 Atl. 6:'.U; I~ent v. Town of
a l"\'ply. In no other sense does it make a Un<'oln, 3'.2 Vt. 591; Piggot v. Railway Co.,
new i8H\U'.
Its only huportnnc·p Is that It 3 C. B. 229. As the evidence objected to
bears on tlu• main bisue, and, If It d()(.'s, It tended to prove thnt the lift had in It a
Is com11<•tt•nt. •• We have quoted thus fully vice, making it dangerous to opernte, and
from tlw opinion ln this <·usu !Je<·1tuse It that the company had notk-e of this from
seems to Hl't forth clearly nnd fully the its previous behavior, there was no error in
reuons for tbt.• admission of sU<"h evldeuce, admitting the evidence, with a direction to
and to nnliwer eyery objection that cun be the jury that it was to be conttued ti> these
made. 'l'be reasoning In the ~Inssaehmietts . purposes, and c-ould not be considrred on
case11 cltPd above, and relied on by the plninthe question of the defendant"s negligence
tlft In error, has generally been regardrd as In the premises. Judgnwnt am1·med.
unsound; and, for this reason, the decbdons
haw not generally been followed a11 prt-cSPEAR and BURKET, JJ., dissent.
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REI.EV ANCY.

Case No. 9)
PI.XXE i v.. JOXES.
Case No. 9]

l:'iO Atl. 702, EH Conn. 545.)
RELEVANCY.

PI.\'.\'I~11' v. JONES.

(30 Atl. T62, 64 Conn. 5-15.)

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. July

9, 11594.

Appeal from superior court, New Haven

county; Prentice, Judge.

Action by Maria W. Pinney. executrix of

the estate of Charles H. Pinney, deceased,

against Emily Jones to foreclose a mortgage.

l-‘rom a decree for plaintiff, entered on the

report of the state referee, defendant appeals.

Ruprl'lnl' Court of Errors of Conne<'ticut. July
1*, 18tM.
Appeal from superior court, New Haven
county; Prentice, .Judge.
Action by llarta W. Pinney, exec·utrlx of
the e11tate of Charles H. Pinney, de<-eased,
anln11t Emily .Jones to foreclose a mortgage.
l"rom a decree for plnlntflJ, enterPd on the
re110rt of the state referee, defendant ap1ll'als.
AIHrmed.
Y. Munger, for appellant. William ll. Wll·
llamB, for appellee.

Attirined.

V. Manger, for appellant William ll. \\‘il-

liams, for appellee.

TORRANCE, J’. This is an action brought

to foreclose a mbrtgage made to secure a note

for sixteen hundred dollars by the defendant,

lilmily Jones, to Charles H. Pinney. now do-

ceased. The defendant claimed to have paid
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upon said note to Pinney, during his life-

time, the sum of $1.500, and whether this was

true or not was the main fact in dispute be-

tween the parties. The case was tried be-

fore the Honorable Elisha Carpenter, as state

referee. For the purpose of showing her abil-

ity to make such payment. the defendant of-

fered evidence to prove, and claimed she had

proved. that at the time when she bought

the niortgaged premises, in March. 1892, she

had in her possession the sum of $1.500, in

addition to the sum of $500 which she had

paid on account of said purchase; that this

sum of $1.500 was in a package in her house;

that she moved into the house upon the mort-

gaged premises ln April, 1892. and two or

three weeks thereafter, in the presence of her

daughter Cora, who was produced as a wit-

ness. she counted said $1.500. and. after

counting the same, deducted $15 therefrom.

and placed the remainder in a tin box, and

placed the box. with the money in it. in a

jar. and sealed up the jar with putty: and

that. after leaving the jar upon a shelf to

dry for two or three days, she and her hus-

band, who was produced as a witness. hurled

this jar in the cellar near the bottom of the

stairs, covered it over, and placed a paint

barrel over the spot where the jar was

buried. \Vl1ile Mrs. Jones was upon the wit-

ness stand, her counsel offered to prove by

her that. some time within two months after

the money had been counted as aforesaid,

Mrs. Jones requested her daughter Cora to

go with her to the said place where the

money was then buried, and that thereupon

(Fora and she went to tlie spot from the sit-

lillﬂ l‘°°m above; that Mrs. Jones then and

there removed the paint barrel. and told

Cora. that the money was in a pol in the

ground. and that she wanted her to know

where it was, “for if she should die she

wanted her to know about it.” The finding

states: “It was not claimed that the earth

was removed from over the jar in which the

money was claimed to have been placed, or

that the jar or other thing, in which it is now

claimed the money then was. was so exposed

or attempted to be exposed to view. The

TORRANCE, J". This Is an action brought
to for<'«'IORe a mbrtgage made to secure a note
tor 11lxteen hundred dollars by the defendant,
Bmll;v .Jon1>11, to Charles H. Pinney. now decealled. The dPfcndnnt clalmt>d to have paid
upon said note to Pinney, during his lifetime, the sum of $1,500, and whether this was
true or not was the main fact In dispute be·
tween the parties. The case was tried before the Honorable Ell11ha Carpenter, as state
referee. For the purpose of showing her ability to make such payment. the defp111Jant offered evidence to prove, and claimed she had
proved, that at the time when she bought
tht> mortgngt>d premises, In March. 1892, she
hn<l In her possession the sum of t\1.:">llO, ID
a1hlltton to the sum of $fi00 which 11he had
paid on aC<'ount of said purt'hase; that this
111m1 of $1.i>OO was In a packag<! In her house;
that 11he moved Into the hou11e upon the mortgaged premises In Aprll, 189'.l. and two or
three week11 thereafter, In the presence of her
daughter Cora, who was producl'd as a wit·
ness. she counted said $1,500, and. after
counting the same, deducted $15 thPrPfrom.
and placed the remainder In a tin box, and
plael'd the box. with the monPy In It. In &
jar. and t!f'all'd up the jar with 1mtty: and
that. aftpr )Paving the jar upon a 11hplf to
dry for two or three days, sht' and hl•r husband, who was produced as a wltDPBR. burled
this jar In the cellar near the bottom of the
stal1'8, covered It over, and plat•ed a paint
barrel over the spot where thP jnr was
burled. While Mrs. .Jones was upon the wit·
ness stand, her coun11Pl offered to provp by
her that. some time within two months after
the money had been counted as aforesaid,
Mrs. .Jones requested her daughter Cora to
go with her to the said place where the
money was then burled, and that thereupon
Cora and she went to tlte spot from the sit.tin~ room above; that Mrs. Jones then and
there removed the paint barrel. nnd told
Cora that the monPy wa11 In a pot In the
ground, and that she wantl'd her to know
where it was, "for if she should die she
wanted her to know about It." 'I'he finding
states: "It was not claimed that the earth
was removl'd from over the jar In which the
money was claimed to have been placed, or
that the jar or other thing, 1D which it ls now
2'

clalml'd the money then was. Wll8 so exposed
or at.tempted to be exposed to view. The
plalntltr'a counsel objected t.o the admlRSlon
In evlden<'e of the convel"lllltlon betwt•i>n 1he
said Emily .Jones and her daughter Cora up·
on this occasion, and It was excluded: to
whlch ruling the defendant duly excepted."
Mrs. .Jones thereafter upon thta point testl·
fled, without objection, as follows: "Cora
went with me down cellar; went down the
('ellar steps to the left hand of the stairs,
Just as you go down. I showed her the
money. I took the paint barrel, and moved
It around like this [Illustrating], and pointed .
out to her where the money was concealed.
Then I set the barrel back on the same spot
I had removed It from. Then we went up11talrs. That she, Cora, was the only perMn,
HO far as she knew, besides her husband,
•hat ever knew or was shown where the
money was." The daughter Cora also testi·
tll'd, without objection, to her going down In
the cellar with her mother, and being shown
where thp money was concealed, substantially as her mother had done. The referee
found that said claimed payment ot $1,000
had not been made. To the report made by
the referee the defendant flied a remonstrance, setting up as the ground of tt the action of the referee In excluding the conversation aforesaid between Cora and her
mother. Be further set up therein that the
plnlntltr <'lalmPd that Mrs. Jones did not have
1111ld sum of $1,:lOO at any time after 1891, and
that her entire story with reference to the
possession of said sum was false. The plalntUr demurrl'd to the remon11trance, the court
11ustalned the demurrer, judgment was rendered for the plalntlfr, and the defendant
appeall'd.
This appeal pre~Pnts but a single question,
and that ls whether the statement made by
~Ire. Jones to her daughter was admissible.
It ls apparent that the defeu<lant obtained
the benefit of everYthlng else claimed by her
except this statement She was allowed to
testify fully to her aets and conduct In going
Into the cellar, and pointing out the place
where she <•lahned the money was concealed.
and from all this Cora understood that the
money was tht>rt' buried. She says, Indeed,
that she there showed Cora the money; but
from her own te11tlmony, and from other
parts of the record, It ts clear that all Rile
meant by this wa11 that she showed her the
place where the money was coDcealed. Essentially then, IJl this view of the matter,
all that was exduded was her statement of
her reason for having Cora know where the
money was eon<'f'alf'd; and It Is perhaps
questionable whether even on the defendant's view of the c~. the exclusion of that
was error (Russell v. I<'rlsble, 19 Conn. 205211}; and, If It was, the case might perhaps
be disposed of on the ground that the error
dld not harm the defendant. But, as we
think the evidence was rightly excluded, we
prefer to rest the declalon upon that ground,

HES GE.S'fAl.
RES GESTJE.

56 Conn. 369, '15 Atl. 371.

mther than upon the one stuzgcstcd. .-\s we

have said. what was (10110 ill the cellar was,

without objection. fully testitied to by both

llrs. Jones and Cora.

excluded: and that was, in substance, a

statement by .\Irs. Joncs that thy money was

buried there in a jar, and that she wanted

to have Cora know, for a reason then stated,

where it lay. The defendant strenuously

insisted that this statement characterized the

act oi .\l1-s. J ones in going to the cellar. and

doing what she did there, and was admis-

sible in corroboration of her claim to the

possession 01' the money, and as part of the

res gestac; and in support of these claims she

relies mainly upon the case of Card v. Foot

The general rule

is that a party cannot give in evidence his

own declarations in his own favor, made in
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the absence of the other party; but there

is one well-recognized exception to this rule,

where such declaration is part of what. for

want of a. better name, is called the “res

gestae." Kilburn v. Bennett, 3 Metc. tlilass.)

199: Stirling v. Buckingham, 46 Conn. 461.

The nature and limits of this exception are

tolerably wen deﬁned, although the applica-

tion of the rule embodied in the exception,

In particular cases. is sometimes attended

with ditiiculty. Timt rule is thus stated in

Starkie on Evidence (10th Ed., 466-687): "In

me ﬁygt place, an entry or declaration ac-

_-companying an act seems. on principles ul-

ready announced, to be admissible evidence

in an (-ages whore :1 question arises as to the

nature or quality of that act. Iiiticctl, when-

ever an entry or declaration rctim-is light

upon, or qualiﬁes, an act which is relevant

to the matter in issue, and is evidence in it-

self. it becomes admissible as part of the

res gestae. if it be contemporaneous with the

act.” According to this writer, before a

writtrn declaration made by a party in his

own favor can be admissible as part of the

res gestne. the act which it characterizes,

and of which it forms a part, must be itself

adiuissiiile in evidence in the case; and so

are the authorities. “VVhere an act done is

evidence per se. a declaration accompanying

that uct may well be evidence, if it reﬂects

li::ht upon or qualiﬁes the act. But I am

not aware of any case where the act done is,

in its own nature. irrelevant to the issue,

and where the declaration per se is inadmis-

sible. in which it has been held that the

union of the two has rendered them admissi-

ble." Coltman, J., in Wright v. Tatham, 7

Adol. & E. 361; Hotel Co. v .\ianning. 1 Ir.

R. Com. Law, 125. “Res zestac are the cir-

rumstances. facts. and declarations which

grow out oi‘ the main fact, are contemporane-

-nus with it. and scrve to illustrate its char-

acter.” Stirling v. Buckingham, 46 Conn.

461. “When the act of a party may be given

in evidence, his declarations, made at the

time. and calculated to elucidate and explain

the character and quality of the act, and so

-connected with it as to constitute one trans-

rather than upon the one 11ui:::<>><t1•11. A11 we
hare sa.Jd. what was dom• 111 th" 1't•llnr waa,
11'lthout objection, fully testified to by both
lira. Jon<'S nod Cora. ""hat wns said was
~xcluded:
o.nd that wa11, In sullstnlll't'. a
statement by :\Irs..Ton('s that tllf 1110111.'y wa~
burled there In a jar, and that 11he wunted
to have Cora know, fur a reason then 11tnted,
where It lay.
The defendant strenuously
Insisted that this statem1>nt chnracterlzl.'d the
.aet ot )!rs. .J"ont>s In going to the cellar, and
doing what she did tht're, and was admissible In corroboration of her <'lalm to the
P068e881on 0£ the money, and as part of the
res gestaE>; and In support of tht>se clalm11 she
rell.-s mainly upon the case of Card v. Foot
.:it; Conn. 309, :1.5 A ti. :n1. The general rule
Is that a party cannot give In evidence his
own declarations In bis own favor, mnd1• In
the absence of the other party; but thPre
Is one well-rPcognizcd exception to this rule,
where such declnrntion Is part of what. for
want of a. bptter name, Is called tlle "res
Jl'estae." Kilburn v. Bennett, 3 Mete. (!\lal!S.)
i911; Stirling v. Buckingham, 46 Conn. 4111.
The natur~ and limits of this exception are
tolerably well defined, although the appllca·
tlon of the rule en1bodied In the eX<'PJ>tlon,
Jn partl!'ulnr cas(•s. Is sometimes attended
with dlllknlty. That rule Is thus stated In
l':tnrkle on Evidence (10th Ed., 466-687): "'In
the flr11t place, an entry or dedaratlon ac-. ·•·ompanylug an act Sf"ems. on prlndpiPM ulready anno\tncPd, to be 111\mli111ib\P evl<h•n<'e
in nil cases where a qlwKtlou al'IMl'M ns to the
nntnre or quality of that a<·t. InllP1·d. wlwne\·t-r an entry or declarutlon rt'fll'<'t!I lhrht
upon, or qualifies, an act whll'l1 111 rl.'levunt
to the matter In Issue. and Is evldl.'nce In lt.-lf, It be('omes admissible as part of the
rps gl'l!tae, If It be contemporaneous with the
nrt." According to this writer, before a
writtl>n declaration made by a party 111 his
own farnr can be adml~lble as part of the
res gP!'ltae. the act which it characterlze11,
.and of which it forms a part, must be Itself
adml88lble In evidence In the case; and so
.a.re the authorities. "Wht>re an act doue ls
evidence per se, a. declaration accompanying
that act may well be evidence, If It refiects
light upon or qualifies t~ act But I am
not aware of any case where the act done Is,
In Its own nature. Irrelevant to the li1sue,
and where the declaration per se Is lundmlsslble. In which It has been ht'ld thut the
union of the two has rendere1l them admissible."' Coltman, J., In \Vrlght v. 'l'uthum, 7
.Adol. & E. !{61: Hotel Co. v !\Innnlng. 1 Ir.
R. Com. J,aw, 125. "Res A'f'!<tat' ure the dr-<>umictan<-t>I!. facti1. and ded11r11tlonR which
i;:row out of the main fa!'t, nre l'ontemporune·cntic with It. and serve to Illustrate Its char.acter." Stirling v. Buckingham, 46 Conn.
461. "When the act of a party may be given
ln evidence, his de1•laratlons, made at the
ttmP, and calculated to elucidate and explain
th(' character and quality of the act. and so
-<·ounected with It as to constitute one trans-

l~O

action. and so s--8
fle
[Cue .No. 9
act ltll<>lf, are ad r~ l> 1tie "'"'e c
must be a main oz:' 1'/ll<'/ 111 er1 11 .from the
tlon, nnd only
ble ns grow out o f
e
"llffoos are adm1881.
lllm1tl'ate Its <·114 z-4l{}tel". 11<'/pa/ tran.'<llf!flon,
with It. and derf'V'S 8o~ llre contemporory
from It" Lun<l v. 'I'Yl:J.g8
de1rree or credit
It follows that ff the 11
i'Ougb, 9 Cush. 38.
Ct or Mrs. Jones irrespective of the ac•coUJPa.nFJng statement
n.ot In It.self admissible In evidence, the~ ":iis:
statement was lnadmlssJbJe; snd the tact that
the act was admitted Without obJectJon does
not make the accompanyJng statement legal
evlden<'e. The question. then, Is whether what
Mrs. Jones did upon the OC<'aslon In qut>11tlon
was per se adml88ible as evidence In the
case, and we al'e clearly of the opinion that
It was not. It was olfPred and reePlv1>d us
an act tending to show that she tht>n bud
this money In her pos.-iesslon; but, rightly
considered, It was not In any proper Mense,
within the mennlni: of the rule In queRtlon,
an act or trnnimetlon at all. It Is true there
were the physkal aets of going down11tnlrs,
and over to where It was supposed the
money was burled. and the moving of the
paint barrPI, and the pointing to or othPr·
wise lndkutln~ a <'ertnln spot of earth, but
that was all. Thne Is nothing In all this
tending In the least to show that the money,
or the re<-eptacle which had contained It.
was then In the spot pointed out. For aught
that appears, all that :Mrs. Jones could then
know or say about the money was, not that
It was then there, but that she had 1mt It
there some time before, and believed It was
the1·e then; and neither she nor Cora then
knew, or could know, that the money was
then ln the possession of Mrs. Jones, or even
In existence at all. Nothing whatever was
done by either of them with, or with reference to, the money or the jar; they were
not seen, handled, nor dealt with In any
manner whatsoever. Esst>ntlally, the so<'alled "act" or "nets" of Mrs.•Tones are but
statements or declarations that she had
burled the money there some time before,
and believed It was there then.
Su11posP Mrs. Jones und her daughter hnd
remained up-stairs, and l\lrs.•To1ws hurl snlrl
to Cora: "I put the money you saw mf' <•onnt
the other day Into a tin llox, and tilt' box
Into a jnr. anrl burled the jar In the cellar to
the left hand of the stairs, just as you go
down, and put a paint barrel over the spot
where tht>y now are. I tell you this, so• that
In case of my death yon will know where to
find the money."-eould any one successfully
contend thnt icuch a stntemPut was 1u\mls~l
ble? ClPnrly not. It would be a. mere nak·
erl statenwnt or cleelnrntlou ot a \)l\St tran11netl<>11 In the party's own fnvot, and wo\\\d
clearly fall within the gE>nera\ t\l\ll ot exl'l\\·
i,;lon. But the :;mppose1l en~*'~ does not d\ttet
essPntlally from the real cn~e.-fot \u the
oue ~lrs..JonPS indicates nnd l\esct\~ fue
place where she burled the ~ou111 'l>l word~

;:1
sucb clec·1,;j>a1 i'ne!!':"tra;:J:'
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and in the other she indicates and describes

it by acts; and the result of both is but a

statement or declaration to Cora that the

money had been buried there, and that Mrs.

Jones believed it was there at that time.

That in the one case this information is con-

veyed to (fora. by words. and in the other by

acts, can make no dlﬂ.’e1-ence; in both the re-

sult is only and solely information conveyed.

The difference between an act of the kind

here claimed and the acts done in Russell _v.

Frisbie, 19 Conn. 205, and Card v. Foot, 56

Conn. 369. 15 Atl. 371. is quite obvious. in

the former case the defendant was allowed

to prove what he said to one Hcmpstcad,

when he handed to him for safe-keeping the

ship's papers, which defendant had taken

from a vessel of his in order to revoke the

authority of her captain; in the latter. the
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plaintiff was allowed to prove what she said

to Miss Lyon when she delivered to her for

safe-keeping the [):l('k:l;:e containing the

plaintiffs bonds. In both of these cases the

declarations allowed, accompanied. grew out

of, formed part of, and of course qualiﬁed

and characterized, acts which themselves

were clearly admissible to prove the then

possession and disposition of the ship's pa-

pers in the one case, and the bonds in the

other. The acts were not in effect mere dec-
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larations, but acts of possession and dliiposi-

tion in a. real and true sense. In the case

at bar this is not so. 'l‘here the socallcd

“act" is itself, in effect. but a statement or

declaration. Nothing was transacted. noth-

ing was dope, nothing was transplrlng, evi-

dent to any witness. which could conﬁrm um

declarations excluded, or by which, upon

cross-examination or otherwise, the truth of"

those declarations could be tested. “Declara-

tions accompanying: acts are a wide ﬁeld of

evidence, and to be carefull_v watched," said

Williams, J., in Queen v. Bliss, 7 Ado]. & E.

556, a good many years ago; and we think

this “ﬁeld" should still be carefully watched.

The exceptions to the general rule excluding"

statements made by one ln'his own favor

ought to be strictly limited; certainly the

scope of the exception in question ouzlit not

to be extended to a case like the one at bar.

. For the reasons given, the claimed act or acts

of Mrs. Jones were not admissible, and

should. and on objection probably would,

have been excluded. They were, however, ad-~

mitted, and of this the defendant does not,

and cannot justly, complain; but. on objec-

tion, the statement accompanying’ the claimed

act was excluded, and we think was right-

fully excluded. There is no error. The oth--

er judges concurred.

l\Dd In the other she Indicates and descrlbea 1 laratlons, but acts of possrMlon and dlsilOldtlon In a reel and true sense. In the cafft"
It b7 acts; and the result of both la but a
1tatt>mt>nt or declaration to Cora that the 1 at bar thl11 le not so. 'l'here the so-callt'tl
money had been burled there, and tha.t Mrs. 1 "a<'f' ls ltselr, In t>tr'f'Ct, but a statt>ml'nt or
declaration. Nothing was transacted, nothJont>S believed It was there at that time.
ing was dov-e, nothing wus transpiring, evl·
'.fhat in the one case this information Is con.
veyed to Cora by wonts. and in the other by dent to any wltnesR, which could confirm th&
declarations t>xclmh•d, or by which, upon
acts, can make no dU!'erence; lo both tbe recrollll-E'xnmlnatlon or otherwise, the truth ot
sult· Is only and solely information com·eyed.
those dednratlone eould be h>eted. "Declara.
The dlft'l'r<'nee between an act of the kind
tlons areompanylng acts are a wide fteld ot
here claimed and the acts done lo Rtu1ttell ,v.
e\'ldence, and to be rort>fully wakh!'d,'' snld
Frisbie, 19 Conn. 205, and Card v. Foot, M
Williams, J., in QUPl'n v. Bll88, 7 Adol. & E.
Conn. 300, 15 Atl. 371, le quite obvious. In
r,;)6, a good many Yl'DrH &,1ro; and we think
the former case the defendant was allowed
to prove what he said to one Hemp~h·ad, , this "ftt>ld" should still be carefully watched.
when be handed to him for safe-keeping the The eJ:<'t'ptlons to the general rule excluding·
ship's papers. which defendant had taken statements made by one In 'his own favorfrom a vessel of bis in order to revoke the ougbt to be strletly limited; certainly tbeauthority of her captain; lo the latter, tbe scope or the excE'ptlon In qnestion ougbt not
plalntltf was allowed to prove what she said to be extt>nd<'d to a cm1e like the one at bar.
to }flu Lyon when she dellvrred to her tor l<'or the reasons glvt>n, tht> elnlmed &<'t or act&
Mfe..keeplng the Pll<'knge 1•outnlnlng the of 1\11'8. Jones were not admissible, and
plalnl lft"K bonds. In both o! these cases the should, and on objl'<'tlon probably would.
declarntlons allowed, accompanied, grew out have been excludt>tl. Tiley were, however, adof, formed part of, and of course quallfted mitted, and of this the defendant does not,.
and characterized, acts which themselves and cannot justly, complain; but. on objt>ewere clearly adml88ible to prove the then tlon, the statement a<.>Companylng tbe claimed
poesession and disposition of the ship's pa- act wa.s excluded, aud we think was right-·
pers in the one caae, and the bonds In th'! fully es:clnded. There Is no error. The othother. The acts were not in effect mere dee. er judges concurred.
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VICKSBL-'Il'.(§ & .\l. ii. (TO. v. O'BRIEN et al.1

\1CKSBCRG & lt. H. CO.'" O'BUlE~ et al. 1

(T Sup. (ft. 118. 119 U. S. ilil.)

(7'

~l1J>.

Ct. llfl. 110 U.

~. !lit.)

Supreme Court of the United Statcs.

1886.

in error to the circuit court of the United

States for the Southern district of Missis-

slppi.

Wm. L. Nugent, E. M. Johnson, Geo. Houd-

Supreme Court of the L'nitt'U 8tnh•K, ~°'" 1,
1886.

In Prror t:o t:he circuit court ot the United
States tor the Southem district of lllssls·
sippl.

iey, and Edvv. Coeston, for plaintiff in error.

T. C. Catchings, for defendants in error.

Nov. 1,

Wm. L. Nugent, E. M. Johnson, Geo. Hoadley, and Ed-w. Coeston, tor plalntllT In error.
T. C. Catchings, :for defendants In error.

HARLAN, J. This action was brought by

Mary E. O’Brlen and her husband, John J. .

0’Brien, to recover damages sustained in

consequence of personal injuries received by

the wife in September, 1881, while a pas-

senger upon the Vicksburg & Meridian Rail-

road. '1'he declaration alleges that the com-

pany “so carelessly, negligently, and unskill-

fully constructed and maintained its railroad
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track, engine, and cars, and so carelessly.

negligently, and unskillfully conducted itself

in the management, control, and running of

the same," that the car in which Mrs. 0’Brien

was seated as a passenger was thrown from

the railroad track and overturned, whereby

she was seriously injured. There was a ver-

dict and judgment for $9,000 in favor of the

plaintiffs.

1. At the trial the plaintiffs offered to read

to the jury the deposition of a physician,

and did read the ﬁrst. second, and third inter-

rogatories propounded to him, and the an-

swers thereto. Responding to the ﬁrst and

second interrogatories, he stated. among

other things, that his attendance upon Hrs.

O'Brien commenced on the sixteenth of Sep-

tember, 1881; that he found her suffering

extreme pain, and in a very nervous condi-

tion, resulting a few hours before from a

railroad accident on defendant‘s road; that

such was the cause of her injuries he knew

from her own answers, from the statement

of her brother-in-law, and from attending

others who were on the train with her. The

third interrogatory and answer were as fol-

lows: “(3) Look on the accompanying state-

ment, dated November 26. 1881, and state if

it was written by you at the date it bears,

for what purpose it was written, and to

whom it was delivered. Does the statement

represent. substantially and correctly. .\i'.rs.

O’Brien‘s condition as it appeared when you

ﬁrst saw her, and as it continued up to No-

vember 26, 1881? Answer. I have looked up-

on the statement referred to, which was writ-

ten by myself, at Mr. O’Brien’s request. at

the date mentioned, when he was about to

take his wife away from here to his home in

HARLAN. J. This action wa11 brought by
Mary E. O'Brien and her husband, John J.
O'Brien, to recover damages sustained In
eonsl->quence o:f personal injuries recell"ed by
the wife in September, 1881, while a po11senger upon the Vicksburg & Meridian Itallroad. The de<>larntfon alleges thnt the company "so carelessly, negligently, and unskillfully constructed and maintained Its rallroa1l
track, engine, and cars, and 1;10 cnrelessly.
negligent!~·. nnd unskillfully condnctell Itself
In the management, control, aDll running of
the same," that the car In which :\lrs. O'Brien
was seated as a pnsRenger was thrown from
the railroad track and overtumed, whereby
she wae seriously Injured. There was a verdlet and judgment for $9,000 In favor of the
plaintiffs.
1. At the trial the plaintiffs oft'.ert>d to N'tld
to the jury the deposition of a physl<-lan,
and did read the first. second, and third Interrogatories propounded to him, and the an11wers thereto. Responding to the first nnd
sN•ond Interrogatories, ht> stated. among
other things, that his attendan<'e upon lir11.
O'Brien commenced on the sixteenth of September, 1881; that he found her sutrerlng
extreme po.in, and In a very nei·,·ous condition, resulting a few hours before from a
railroad a<'<'ldent on defendant'1;1 rood; that
such was the cause o! her Injuries he knew
from her own answers, from the statement
ot her brother-lo-law, and from attending
others who were on the train with her. 'fhe
third interrogatory and aDBwer were as follows: "(3) Look on the accompanying statement, dated November 26. 1881, and state lt
lt was written by yon at the datP It bears,
tor what purpose lt was written, and to
whom It was delivered. Does the statl'ment
represent, substantially and corre<'tly. )lrs.
O'Brien's condition as It appeared wbt'n you
finit MW her, and as lt rontlnned up to ~o
vember 26, 1881? Answer. I have looked upon the statement referred to, which wus written by myself, at Mr. O'Brlen'11 request. ot
the date mentioned, when he was about to
take his wife away from here to his honw in
~ew Orleans. and was lntt>nded to <'OUYI'~· nu
Idea ot how Bhe was when I was called to see
her, and what her condition was when l!ht·

New Orleans. and was intended to convey an

idea of how she was when I was called to see

her, and what her condition was when sht-

mi Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Field omit-

ﬂr

left my charge ; :1 Ii ti: 10 [flue No. 11/

ly stated her (-On‘ 1, ‘,1!’ ' ,7 ['10- 01,/Man I

The written Ft‘: - , '91) t ' m”'e"t'

t Ding [-91 [Ted . I!

terrogutory waﬂ 5“ '10" b1'et'e1-1-9,1 toe!” m:,oI.“_
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DisaentiDg opinion of Mr. Justice l•'ield omit-

ted.
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~·
12(/ I~
left my charge;
• lrlo'
tra
•4188 ..Vo. 10
ly stated her· <·OP~ el '' rt lli.)· l!i
Tiu• wrlttt>u ~tz•;i.l?i'''"'''~: ff10'::::;.~~t
terrog11tory WR 8
Jf'cJ
Pferred to Jn the /nuttuehell to hfN ~·rlil/ffo b~ f/Jl' Jrftness, and
was uddn>l!l!e<I to 1' r. 0•11'll 118 nn exhibit. It
with much detnfl. thf> 11 rfen, nnd sets forth.
received by the wJLe, lllJtJ ~~ure of the Injuries
bodily and mental COlldJt• l'lr elTe«t upon her
•011. It BIBO embodied
an expression of t b e n·Jtness' opinion 88 to
the probable length ot time within whl<'h 8 11e
might recover from her lnJm·les. Tl1e plalntltr.
beforP rending the ren111fnlng lnterrogntorle:.
nod all8wers, o!Tered to read thfe statemE>nt to
the jury as evidence. The company· objected
upon these grounds: That It was not made
by the witness under oath, and In defendant's
Pretience, 01· with Its knowledge and consent;
that It was hearsay eYldence, and therefore
wholly Incompetent; aud that, In any event,
It eonllt only be referred to by the witness to
ret'rl't1b his rerollectlon. The court overruled
the objection, and permitted the statement to
be rl•1ul lo evidence, the defendant taking an
exeeptlon thereto, which was allowed. The
remainder o! the deposition was then read to
the jury.
We are of opinion that this rullng cannot
be sustained 111100 any principle l'e<'ognlzed ln
the law of e>ldence. The authorities are uniform In hQldlng that a witness le at liberty to
examine a memorandum prepared by him, under the circumstances In which this one was,
tor the purpose of refreshing or ll88lstlng his
recollection as to the tacts stated In It. But
tlwre ure adjudged cases wbkh dt>l"lare thnt
unless prepared ln the dlschaflre of some
public· duty, or ot eome duty arising out ot the
bnslneM relations of the witness with others,
or In the regular course of his own buslnef!S,
or with the knowledge und concurrence of the
party to be charged, and for the purpose of
charging him, SU<'h a mc>mon111dnm cannot,
unde1· any clrcumatant'CS, be admitted as an
Instrument o! evidence. There are. however,
other cases to the elT~t that, where the witness states, under oath, that the memorandum was made by him presently after the
transaction to which lt relotes, tor the purpose ot perpetuating his rC(·ollectfon ot the
facts, and that he knows It was corre<'t when
(lrepnn>d, although otter rettdlng It he cannot
recall the clreumstanceM so as to state them
alone from memory. tlle paper mny be received as the best evldt>nee of which the ease
admits.
The present case does not require us to enter upon an examlnnt\on of the numeron11
authorities upon this ~r1wral sullj~·t; for It
does not op(l!'t1r hel'e but tllat at tbe time tlw
witness tE't!tlfted he hod, w\tbo\\t 1->ven loo\dn~
at his written statement, a <'\ear, d\st\nl't
recollection of every f>t'IS{'Dt\a\ fa<'\ stated In
It. If he had su<'h pretu~nt . Nl.'o\\e<•t\on. there
wns no oec('ssity whatever tor rem\\ng th.'\t
paper to the jury. Applying. t\wu, to \\le <'Ul!l~
the mOAt liberal rule anuonnc~ \u au-y ot tue
authorltl('S, tbe ruling by '"'·hk'n \\le \)la\nt\tl'.s

I
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were allowed to read the ph_vsician’s written

statement to the jury as evidence. in itself,

of the facts therein recited, was erroneous.

It is. however, claimed, in behalf of the

plaintiits that in his answers to other inter-

rogatories the physician testitied, apart from

the certiﬁcate. to the material facts embodied

in it. and that, therefore, the reading of it to

the jury could not have prejudiced the rights

of the defendant, and. for that reason. should

not be a ground of reversal. We are unable

to say that the defendant was not injuriously

ai’l'ected by the reading of the physician's cer-

tiﬁcate in evidence. it is not easy to deter-

mine what weight was given to it by the jury.

In estimating the damages to be awarded, in

view of the extent and character of the in-

juries received, the jury, for auglit that the

court can know, may have been largely con-
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trolled by its statements. 'l‘he practice of ad-

mitting the unsworn statements of witnesses.

prepared, in advance of trial, at the request

of one party, and without the knowledge of

the other party. should not be encouraged by

further departures from the established rules

ot evidence. While this court will not dis-

tu1’b a judgment for an error that did not

operate to the substantial injury of the part_v

against whom it was connnltn-d. it is well

settled that a reversal will he directed unless

it appears, beyond doubt, that the error coni-

piained of did not and could not have prej-

udiced the rights of the party. Smiths v.

Shoemaker, 17 Wall. 630, G39; Decry v. Cray,

5 \\'all. T95; Moores v. National Bank, 10-1

U. S. 630; Gilmer v. Higley, 110 U. S. 50. 3

Sup. Ct. 471.

2. At the trial below plaintiffs introduced

one Roach as a witness, who. during his ex-

amination, was asked whether he did not,

shortly after the accident, have a conversa-

tion with the engineer having charge of de-

fendant's train at the time oi’ the accident

about the rate of speed at which the train

was moving at the time.‘ To that question

the defendant objected, but its objection was

overruled. and the witness permitted to an-

swer. The witness had previously stated

that, on examination of the track after the

accident. he found a cross-tie or cross-ties

under the broken rail in n decayed condition.

liis answer to the above question was: “Be-

tween ten and thirty minutes after the acci-

dent occurred I had such a conversation with

.\l0l'gﬂIl Herbert, the engineer having charge

of the locomotive attached to the train at the

time of the accident. and he told me that the

trail! was moving at the rate of eighteen

miles an hour.” The defendant renewed its

Objection to this testiniony by a motion to

exclude it from the jury. This motion was

denied. and an exception taken. As bearing

“D011 the Dﬁlnt here raised it may be stated

that, under the evidence. it became material

-apart from the issue as to the condition of

the track—to inquire whether, at the time cf

the accident, (which occurred at a place on

the line where the rails in the track were.

ltELEV .\XCY.

wPre allowed to read the physician's written
Ktatement to the jury as evidence. In 1t11elf,
of the fac•t14 therein re<'lted, was e1T0111•ou11.
It Is. bowt•ver, dalmed, In behalf of the
111alntUTe tlwt In bis answers to other Interrogatorlt>K till' physic-I.au tfstlftell, apart from
the certltic·ate, to the material facts embodied
lo It, and that, therefore, the reading of It to
the jury could not bnve prejudlct'(l the rights
of the defendant. an<l, for that rea11<m, sboultl
not be a ground of reversal. We are unnhle
to say that the defendant wa11 not Injuriously
. nft'c>cted by the reading of the phyi<h·b111'11 l'l'rtlflcate In evidence. It le not easy to dl'termine what weight wu11 given to It by the jury.
In estlmatlng the dam11g4'8 to be awardt>d, In
view of the 01tent and chara<'ter of the InJurles received, the Jury, for aught that the
court can know, may have been largely <'OU·
trolled by its statements. The practice of ailmlttlng the unsworn statements of witnesses,
prepared, In advance of trial, at the request
of one party, and without the koowleclgc- of
the other party, should not be enc·ountgt>d by
further departul.'et!I from thP e11tabll11lwd rufos
of evidence. Whlle tble c·ourt will not ellstut'b a judgment for an error that did not
operate to the eublltflutlal Injury of the party
against whom ft wa11 1•ommlttt'll, It IK wc>ll
sPttled that a revenial will lw dh't'(·h•d uuh•RM
It appAArs, beyond doubt, thut the Prror <'OJU·
l'lalned of did not and could not have prc>J·
ucll<'t'd the rights of the party. Smithe v.
8hot>mnker, 17 Wall. u.'\o, !'>39; Dee~· v. Cray,
5 Wall. 795; Moore8 v. National Bank, 10'1
U. S. 630; Gilmer v. Higley, 110 U. S. 50, 3
Sup. Ct. 471.
2. At the trial below plalntllrs lntroclm•ed
one Roach as a wltne11B, who, during hl11 examlnatlon, was aek<'<l whether he did not,
shortly after the aec•ldeot, have a <"Onn•t'llft·
tlon with the englnt>Pr having chargl' of dPfendaot's train at the time of the a<'<·ldPnt
about the rate of speed at which th<> train
was moving at the time: To that question
the dPfendant obje<-ted, but Its objection was
overrulecl, and the wltneee pt>rmltted to an11wer. ThP wltnelll! had preYlously stated
that, on l'xamlnatlon of th1• track alter the
a<'c·ldl'ut. be found a l'ro1111·tle or Cl"Otl8-tles
nmler the broken rail In a de<'ftyed condltlt>n.
11111 au11wPr to the aboYe question wa11: "Between ten aml thirty minutl•s after tbP ac·dclent OC'CUrred I bad 11uch a convet'lllltlon with
:\Jorgan Herbert, the engineer having c•harge
of the lO<'omotlve attaehed to the train at the
tlrue of the accident. and be told me that the
traln was moving nt the rate of eighteen
miles an hour." Tlie def<>mlant renewt'll Its
objection to this tt'lltlmony by a motion to
exclude It from the jury. 'r11ls motion wa11
denh..'11, and an exct-ptlon takl'n. Ae l><'ftrlng
n11on the point here raised It may be 11tated
that, under the evidence, 1t becumP mnterlnl
-apart from tht• Issue ae to the <.'Ondltlon of
the track-to Inquire whether, at the time tf
the acC'ldent, (whlc·h occurred at a pla1·e on
the line where the rails In the trac·k were.',
28

R<'<·ordlng to some ot the l>l'OOt, materially
defective,) the tl'11Jo was ht•lng run at a 11pec!1I
ex<-eedlog l:i mllt'K uu hour. lo this vlt>w,
the dedaratloo of the euglnt"t•r may baYe
bad a dedsl.Ye Influence upon the result of
th<' trial.
'fbere can be no dispute as to the general
nllt'll governing the admlsslblllty of the declnrntlous of an agent to atrel't the principal.
Thl' uc·tM of an agent, within the scope of the
nuthorlty clell'llfttt>d to him. are deemed the
ac·t11 of the 1>rluclpal. Whatever be does In
tlw lawful exercise of that authority le lm1mtable to the prlodpal, and may be proYen
without <'lllllog the agent ae a wlt11t>11M. So,
In con11t'(1ut·nce of the relation betwt>t•n him
and the prln<'lpal, hie etatemL•nt 01· d<>claratlon le. under some circumstances, regarded
as of the nature of original evldenc.oe; "being,"
M&ye Pbllllpe, "the ultimate fact to be 11r0Yed,
and not an admleeton of some otbt•r fact."
1 Phil. f;,., :J8t. "But It wu11t be remembereel." llllYR On>enlenr, "that the Rdmlselon of
tlle agent l'annot alway11 be aKHlmllated to the
aclmie8.lon of the principal. 'The party's own
admlllldon, whenever made, may bt.• given In
I cwhle111·1• ugnln11t him; but the admission or
' 1kl'l:11111lon of hl11 u,..reut binds him only when
~ It 111 111nd1• during the continuance of the
ngeuc·y, lo regard to a tranRllctlon then de11Pndlng et dum fervet opus. It le becau11e
. It le a verbal act, and part of the res ge11tm,
; tlmt It Is a1lml.Mlble at all; and therefore It
18 not nec·1>K.qry to call the agent to prove It;
but wherever what he did Is aclml.88lble In
evidt•D<'e, there It le compt>teut to pro,·e what
' he Raid about the act while he was clolng It."
j 1 Greenl. J<;v, I 113. ThlR 1'()urt had occasion
, In Packt>t Co. v. Clough. 20 Wall. 540, to
· c•onelder this quetitlon. Referring to the ntle
· as stated by Mr. Justice Story In hlB treatise
, on Agency leectlon 134), that "where the acts
of the agent will bind the principal, there bis
repreeentntlont~. declarations, and admleslODB
reept>c•tlng the MtthJ<>ct-matter will also bind
him, If ma.de at the same tlme, and con11tltutlng part of the res geetre," the court,
s1)(•nklng hy :Mr. Justice St<>ry. said: "A cloze
nttentton to this rule, which le of unlvel'l!lll
aC\'PJ>tanc'(>, wlll solve almost every dlftt·
culty. Rut an a<'t done by an agf'nt cannot
be Yllrh•d, 11 ua1Uled, or explained, either by
bl11 d1>c•larat1ons. which amount to no more
than a mere narratlYe of a poet occurrence,
or by an lllc>lated conversation beld. or an 1!'40lah>cl a<'t done. at a later period. The reason
le that the ngent to clo the a<.'t le not autborlzt><l to narrate what he had 1louP. or bow be
luul done It. and blM clel'larntlon IK no part of
thP rt>s g<•stre."
"'e arp of 0111ulon that the d1>c·lan1tlo11 or
the engjiwi•r, llPrhert, to the wltll<'llll Rou1·h
WHK not <'<>lllpPtt>nt against the defendant for
the l>UrJKJt!e of proving th<> rate of 1111eell at
wblc-h the train was moYlng nt th<' time of
the acdclent. It le true that. In vh•w of the
engineer's expt>rlpnc•e and JJtJMltlon. 11111 ~tutc
ments under oath, as a witness, In re11pect to

I

I
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iili1illlilH’PI‘. if credited. would have inﬂuence

with the jury. Although the speed 0! the

tnlin was, in SOIIN‘ degree. subject to his con-

tml. still his authority. in that respect, did

n0tc:u'1'y wvith it authority to make declara-

lions or admissions at a subsequent time, as

In the in-‘Inner in which. on any particular

trip, or at any designated point in his route,

|ll‘illl(i pe1'f0r1n(=d his duty. ills (icclmution,

after the 11(~(-ident had hecome a completed

fart. and wvhen he was not performing the

duties of engineer. that the train, at the mo-

ment the plaintiff was injured. was being

run at the rate of 18 miles an hour. was not

explanatory of anything in which he was

then engaged. It did not accolnpauy the act

from which the injuries in question arose. it

was, in its essence, the mere narration oi‘ a

past occurrence, not a part of the res -,:cst:1~,

-simply an assertion or representation, in the
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course of conversation. as to :1 matter not

then pending, and in respect to which his nu-

thority as engineer had been fully exerted.

It is not to be deemed part of the res gt-star

simply because of the brief period inter-

vening between the accident and the making

ot the declaration. The tact remains that the

occurrence had ended when the declaration in

question was made, and the engineer was not

in the act of doing anything that could pos-

sibly atlect it If his declaration had been

made the next day after the accident, it

would scarcely be claimed that it was ad-

_ tions ot the engineI=’1'; [ff

missibic cvl1le11C'f ?1:.Z”ll,§t [awe ‘V0’ 10

yet the circuzn-4' r 5119‘.

tween lo and :51) lnjnlltebat 1; ampaux 4””

_ 8 Was made be.

rlod of time-:1 ff‘ '1 L_:b_e Q0 \"'” 8111111-r-i.uble DP-

principle, make T31 , (#1.; II 911$ 0.-umor, upgy

general rule. If t1l‘~ ('01, 1' 9X¢‘6‘1)fl'0n to the

maintained, it svill 70110;:-vii’-1'I’a1t'1¢;I1v' szoufrl In-

lc cc.-u'u-

liromblet tb- - -

puny, would have 1-"3911 -'ulmi.vs1hIc 711 l;s“I)::-

111111’ 9.3 D1111 of the 1'9-‘1 .::e.vr.-v. Without callimr

111111 as 9- \\'1T11*’~\'5,_3 P""II0sItion that will lind

11° 511PP°1'13 111 the law 01’ evidence. The cases

llﬂve gone far enough in the adinission of

the subsequent declarations of agents as evi-

dence against their principals. 'i‘hese views

are fully sustained by adjudications in the

highest courts of the states.

We deem it unnecessary to notice other ex-

ceptions taken to the action of the court be-

low.

This case was decided at the last term of

this court, and .\ir. Justice Woods concurred

in the order of reversal upon the grounds

herein stated.

For the errors indicated the judgment is

reversed, and the cause is remanded for a

new trial, and for further proceedings con--

sistent with this opinion.

.\Ir. Chief Justice WAITE, Mr. Justice

FIELD. .\ir. Justice MILLER, and .\ir. Jus-

tice BLATCHFORD, dissent.

0 0 0 1- 0 0 0

that mntter. Ir ere.lltNl, woulll ha"e tuduenc-e
with the jury. Althouicb the s1wt>d ot t!t1•
tniln was, in sonu• dl'/.:l't't'. 1mhjeet to his control. still his authority. in that respect, 11fcl
not carry "-Ith It: authority to make deelumtlons or admissions at a subsequent time, us
to the manner in which, on nnr partkulnr
trl11, or a.t auy dPSlgnated point iu his route,
hl' luul perror1nNl his 1\uty. .lls clf't•lnrn.tlon,
oftpr the nc<·ldent: had ht'<·ome a complt>t<'d
fn!'t. and "'hen he wits not perto1·mlng the

1lutles o! engineer, tl111t the t.n1.ln, nt the momt•nt the pla lnt:ftr wn1-1 lnjm't'cl, was bPlng
run nt the rn te of 18 mllt>H an hour. was uot
1•xplanatory or anything In whil'h be w•111
then eugaged. It dlcl not at·compuuy tlw uc·t
from whlcb the Injuries lu (111ei,itlo11 nrc1:1t•. lt
was, ln lts eBRen<>e, the mt>re n11m1tlon or a.
pnst ()('('Urrence, not a part of tlw res gl-i;ta•,
-><\111\lly an RRsertion or l't'presl'ntutlon. In thi>
c•oul'lll' of t•ouversa tlon, BR to 11 mutter not
then pemllug, and In respect to whll'h hlt-1 anthorlty as tmglnN>r had been fully exertt'<l.
It Is not to be deerul'<l part of the rett gl'Rtre
simply be4.'RURe of the brief period Inter·
venmg between the a<'cldent and the making
of the dedamtlon. Tht> tact remains that the
occurrence bad ended when tbP declaration In
question was mnlle, and the engineer was not
In the act of doing anything that could possibly affect lt If bls declaration had been
made the next day after the accident, It
would scarcely be claimed that It wu ad·

mlsslhle l'vlcle:nce ~~l~t
fa1Bt1 Ho. 10yet the c-i1·c·uu1.l'J t ~ JJJ
l:~ t.he l'om
twee11 Io aml :ro :6.flt:Ji 11 t~
t It wu.~~~e 1,:~
rlod Of ti111t~11ff"taZe ll(>~IJ HJ>jl/'W•io/Jle pe(Jl'lnclpll', 11111 k4.• t Ii l::; l·11~e 'lde1Jt, eunnot, upo11
g t>neral ruh•. l f t Jie f·o,,t au ezeeptlon to the
...
<4 111
umlntahu•d It n-fll 1.0110 . 'Y rlew s/Jo111<1 ,,,.
tlons ot tlJC• englne~·r, It r. JJ· that tlw dt>d:uupuuy, woultl. hu,-e lJee11 ll~/11u·olmblhle1 to, thie <-omss. •' u ts l•ehalf as p.urt of tlu.• res l;esflf!, without eullJu,:
him as a wlt1wl<l!,-ll Pl"oJ10,,,ltlu11 that will 111111
no support In the law or e\·ftleut•t•. T11e c!U!es
have gone tar enough Jn the udmisslon of
the subsequent <1ed11mUons or age11ts as evi•lt•nc·c> against tht>lr prlnclpalK. The,.e views
111-e fully susta lnl:'fl by adjmllca tJom~ In thelllghL>Rt courts ot the states.
\Ye deem It umwce881lry to notlt•e other except.Ions taken to the action of the court below.
This ease was deeidl'd ~lt the luHt term or·
this c·ourt, an!! :\Ir..Justlt•e \\-oods concurred
In till' order of revt>rsal u1xm the grounds
herein titatt>d.
1''or the er1·ol'l4 lndlt·ated the judgment ls
reversed, and the l'RU11e Is remanded tor a
new trial, and for furtbe1· I)rocet'dlngs con-·
slstent with this opinion.
:\Ir. Chief Juittlce W Al'l'E, Mr. Justice
:\lr.•Justice MILLER, and }fr. Jus-·
tlce BI...ATCHI<'ORD, dl88ent.
1~11'11,D.
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HEU.:VANCY.

Case No. 11)
Case No.11]

HELEVANCY.

OHIO & M. RY. CO. v. STEIN.

(31 N. E. 180, 32 N. E. 831. 133 Ind. 2-43.)

Supreme Oourt of Indiana. May 14, 1892.

Appeal from circuit court, Jefferson coun-

ty; W. T. Fricdiy, Judge.

Action by Williaim Stein against the Ohio

& Mississippi Railway Company to recover

for personal injuries. Verdict and judg-

ment for plaintiiif. Defendant appeals. ite-

versed.

Mc.\Iuilen, Johnston & Mc.\lullen, Ramsey,

Maxwell & Ramsey, and John )icGregor,

(Edward Barton, of counsel.) for appellant.

horbly & Ford, A. G. Smith, and Lincoln

Dixon, tor appellee.

ELI.IO'l"l‘, C. J. The appellee seeks to re-

cover damages against his employer, the ap-

pellant. for injuries alleged to have resulted

to him from the negligence of the employer
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in failing to furnish him with safe applian-

ces for use in the performance of the duty

required of him by the service in which he

- was employed. The injury resulted from

the collision of the car upon which the ap-

pellee was performing the duties of a brake-

man with another part of the same train,

which had been detached for the purpose of

making what is commonly called “a running

switch." 'l‘he car upon which the appellee

was a brakcman was a platform car. laden

with large and heavy blocks of stone, and

the appellee was at the front end of the car,

endeavoring to check it by using the brake.

Discovering that he was unable to do so,

and that a collision was inevitable, he at-

tempted to make his way to the rear of the

car, but his feet were caught between two

heavy stones and crushed. In the tirst par-

agraph of the complaint it is alleged that

the accident was caused by the negligence

of the appellant in failing to repair a cyl-

inder cock of the engine, which had been

blown out some time before the accident,

and that the failure to replace the cylinder

cock rendered it impossible for the engineer

to get that part of the train which the car

on which the appellee was standing was foi-

lowim: out of the way. and this brought on

the collision. The second paragraph of the

complaint charges that the brake on the car

“WIS l1PfH'il\'e. and substantially repeats the

nllcitations of the ﬁrst as to appellant's neg-

ligence in falling to replace or repair the

cylinder cock of the engine. The third par-

agraph is based upon the negligence of the

appellant in regard to the brake. but it also

n.lle::\*-‘I that there was some defect in the

clli-ﬁne, which was unknown to the appellee.

As no question is made upon the complaint,

we have given only a general outline of its

omo

counsel devote the principal part of their

argument arises on the ruling of the trial

court in permitting the appellee to give in

evidence the declarations of the engineer in

charge of the locomotive which was draw-

ing the train on which the appellee was act-

v. STEIN.

I

I

I

allcirations, which are full and explicit.

'l‘ll'! question to which the appellant's

co.

court In permitting the appellee to give In
evidence tbe declarations of the t>nglneer In
(31 N. E. 180, 32 N. E. M:n. ts:l Intl. 243.)
charge of the loeowotlve whl<·h was drawing the train on which tbe appellee wu act·
Supreme Oourt of Indiana. May 14, 1892.
log u a brakeman. The appellee'e counsel
Appeal from <'lrcult court, Jetfl>rBOn coun- argue with earnestneBB that PVen if there
ty; W. T. Friedly, .Tudge.
was error In admitting tbe eYldPn<•e, It wu
Action by William Stein aJCalntrt the Ohio harmless. Thia rootentlon makes it neces& lllsslsslppl Railway Company to rerover
sary to dl8J>08e of the question as to the effor personal lnjurlet1. Verdict and judg- fect of the evidence be-fore consldPrlDIC Its
ment tor plalntllr. Defendant appeals. ite- compet<>ncy, for, If lt was barmlE'fllll, thP
versed.
judgm<>nt cannot be r<>Yel'MOO for admitting
McMullen, Johnston & Mc:Mullen, Ramsey, it, although it was lnrompetent. We an.>
Maxwell & Ramsey, and John McGl't'gor, satisfied that, if the eYldence be conceded to
(Edward Barton, of counsel.) for appellant. be Incompetent. the error In admitting It
h.orbly & Ford, A. 0. 8mlth, and Lincoln was not harmless. The appellee's couneel
D.88Ume that the error wu a harmless one.
Dixon, tor appellee.
even If the lncompeteney of the evidence be
<'OD<'eded, for the rt>ason that the de<>lara·
ELI.IOTT, C. 1. The appt>llee seek& to re- tlone of the engineer were proved by Whrover damagee agalDBt hie employer, tbt> ap- nt>Mt>R called to prove that be bad made
pellant, for Injuries alleged to have resulted statements out of court contradicting tboae
to him from the negligence of tbe employer made by him on the witness stand. !'bis
In fatllng to furnish him with safe appllan- poeltlon ls untenable. '!'be wltneesee by
<'t'fl for UHt' In the performance of tht> duty
wnom the engineer was eontradlcted were
required of him by the service In which he , Impeaching wltnesees, and their testimony
waa em1>loyed. The Injury reeultro from went to hls <'redlblllty; but It did not prove,
the colllslon of the car upon whl<'h the ap- nor tend to prove, the principal fact. lmpellee was J>Prformlng the duties of a brake- peaching testimony goes only to the credlbllman with another part of the same train, lty of a wltnt•ss, and lt cannot be given 'an7
which bad \)l'('D detached for thP purpose of \ force as evldenee In proof or disproof of a
making what Is rommonly called "a running disputed fact, exeept In 80 tar as It bearB
flwltch." 'l'he <'ar upon whl<'h the appt>llee upon the credibility of the witness it tends
was a brakeman was a platform car, laden to lmpea<'h. In St>ller v. Jenkins, 07 Ind.
with large and heavy hlocks of stone, and 1 430-436, ft was Mid of Impeaching evldc.>nce
the appellee was at the front end of the car, that "such evldt-n<'e doe11 not tend to e11rnhendPavorln1C to <•heck It by using the brake. llsh the truth of the matters embr&<.'t•d In
Discovering that he wae unable to do 80, the contradictory evldenee; lt simply goes
and that a rol1111lon was Inevitable, he at- to the credlblllty of the wltneRS." Other
tempted to make his way to the rear of the eases assert a simllar doetrlne. David v.
c•ar, but his feet wel't' <'nuirht betw<>en two Hardy, 76 Ind. 272; Hicks v. Stone, 13 lllnn.
heavy stonr11 and <'n11"11P1l. In the tlrst par- 434, (GIL 3~.)
aicrn1,h of the romplalnt It le alleired that
The position assumed hy appellee's countl1r ft.<'<'ldent was <'aused by the negligence sel, that, 88 tbe tacts whl<'b the declara·
of the appellant In falling to repair a cyl- tione of the engineer t(•nded to prove were
Imler cock of the engine, which had been established by other te11tlmony, the ruling
blown out some time l>Pfore the a<'cldent, In admitting evidence of such declarations,
and that the failure to rPJllll('(' the <'yllnder even If erroneous, wae harmless, cannot be
<"<>Ck rendered It Impossible tor the engineer maintained. Tbere may be cases whrre tht>
to get that part of the train which the ear facts are 80 tully and <.•oncluslvely proven
on whl<'b the lllJI>Pllee was standing was fol- by other testimony that the appellate trl·
lowing out of the way, and this brought on bunal will not re\·el'lle the judgment b<'1·uullt'
t lw l'olll11lon. The second paragraph of the ln<'omtlPtt-nt evidence to the same fa1•ts ts
c·om11l11lnt <·barges that the brake on the car ndmlth'<l; hut this Is not 8 ueh a ease, for
wnM defe1•th·e. nod substantially repeats the
lwrt- the t•\•hlNtce was as to n meterlnl 1iolnt.
nllt>1Ct1tlons of the flnit 1U1 to appellant's nt-g- ; an•I It <'tmnot be justly said that the tacts
l1,:1•nre In falling to replaee or l'('pnlr the \ whll'!1 the del'laratlons tendl'fl to pron• w<'rt•
<·yllnder CO<'k of the enitlne. The third 1mr- I e11h1hl111hed by uncontradlcted evidence.
nirrn11b ls ba11t•d upon the ne1tllicen1·1• of the
We <'annot, It 18 evident troID what we
nppellnnt In regar<l to the brake, hut It also have said, avoid a de<'lslon of tbe prlo«lpnl
nlleg\'S that there was some defP<·t In tbe queRtlon upon the ground that. If the e\·lt•ngme, which was unknown to th1• at>I>ellt>e. deuce was ln<'ompt>tent. It was not prejudlAs no question ls made upon thr <'Omplnlnt, clal. We are required to deelde whether the
we have glvPn only a genernl outline of Its ev.ul'lll'e was l'Ompetent, l>P<'BURt' lt11 11111h•·
nllPgntlons, whleh are full nnd eXP.llC'lt.
rial character <'reates the preRum{ltlon that
'l'hP. IJlll'Ht lou to whll'11 the appellant's It was probably prejudt<'lal. 'l'lw rull.' IA
1·ouDHel devott• the l'rlnl'lpal part or their well settted that. where evidence of an In·
nritumt•nt arls1•s on the ruling of the trial fiuPntlal character ls erroneously allowed

& ll. HY.
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1° to to the jury, it will be presumed to

lure prejudic.-ed the objecting party, and,

unless this prc-.<:u1nption is rebuttcd, the

Judgment niust. be reversed. See authori-

ties cited in Elliott's Appellate Procedure, §

-">94, note 2. It is an elementary rule that

the declarations of an agent are not admis-

sible against the principal unless they were

made while the agent was conducting some

transaction for the principal. or in a matter

where the age-nt‘s act is part of the res ges-

ite. It the declarations of the appellant‘

engineer were not part of the res gcstm,

there was judicial error in permitting them

to be given in evidence. It can hardly be

aiiirmed that there is a general rule which

will tit all cases, for each case is dependent .

upon particular facts. It is. perhaps, safe

to declare that, where the declarations of

the‘ agent are made to the person whose in-
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terests are directly involved, at a place

where the transaction or occurrence hap-

pened, so near the occurrence or transaction

in point of time as to be justly and reason-

ably regarded as part of it. refer directly to

the transaction or occurrence, and are not

narratives ot the past, they are ordinarily

to be regarded as part of the res gestrc. If

the declarations are made at a diiierent

place, and are separated from the occur-

rence or transaction by such an interval of

time as requires the inference or conclusion

that they were not part of the act, transac-

tion, or occurrence. then, under all the well-

reasoned cases, they are not part of the res

gestze, and cannot be given in evidence

against the principal. There is wide diver-

sity of opinion and stubborn conﬂict as to

how great an interval of time must elapse

between the occurrence and the declarations

in order to deprive a party of the right to

give them in evidence. but we think our gen-

eral statement is supported by the weight .

of authority. The difficulty. as we have in-

dicated. is not so much in torinulating gen-

eral statements as in determining under

what phase or branch of a general rule the

particular case falls. That is here the dif-

ficulty, for, while we are satisﬁed that our

general statement is correct. we have found

it no easy task to determine under what

branch or phase of it this case belongs. The

question as to the competency of the decla-

rations ot the engineer has two branches,

for there is one branch founded on speciﬁc

objections interposed to the testimony, and

another upon a motion to strike out part of

the testimony. It will conduce to clearness

to consider each branch separately, al-

though both depend upon the effect and ap-

plication of the rule relating to the compe-

tency of evidence as part of the res gestac.

The appellee testified as a witness in his

own at-nail’, and, after giving an account of

the collision, and the manner in which he

was injured, he said: “In the mean time I

W88 getting up. I went to walk. l went

to step, and when I stepped on this foot I

i

to go to the jury, It will be presumed to
bare prejudiced the objt><·tlng party, and,
unless t:bls presumption Is rebutted, the
Judgment: must: be ren'nwd. See nuthoriIles eited In Elliott's Appellate Procedure, f
!>91, nob~ 2.
It le an elementary rule that
the declarat.Jons of an agent are not admls·
slble agahu~t. the prtuclpal unleMll t<ley were
made while t:he agent was comllJ(•tlng some
trallNlction tor ~he principal. or in a matter
where the ag(•nt e net ls part of the n-s gt'llIll!. 1f the tlPclarations of the appellant's
l'ngineer were not part of the rP11 gestre,
there was judlelal t•rror In permitting them
to be given tn evidence. It c•un hnrdly be
afll.rmed that there is a gen1>ral rule which
will fit all <·uses, ~or E>nch C'l\SE' Is dependent
upon pnrtl<•ulnr facts. It Is. perhaps, safe
to dPdnre thnt, where the llPclaratlons of
the' 11gN1t are made to thE> lM>rson whose Interests are dtreetly lnvoh·!'d, at a place
where the traneiu·tlon or OC<'nrrence haplll'netl, so near the occurrence or transaction
In point of time as to be justly and reasonauly rl'garctec\ as port of It, refer directly to
the trnnsuctlon or occurrence, and nre not
narrntlvet! of the past, they are ordinarily
to hi' rPgnrded ·as part of the res gpstre. It
the declamtlons are made at a different
pL"l<'l', am\ are septtrated from the occurn-nel' or transaction by such nn interval of
tlm1> as requires the inference or con<'luslon
that thE>y were not part of th!' net, trnnsn<'tlon. or O<'<'Urren<'e. then, undPr all thl' WPllreasoned cases, tbey are not part of the res
;:::esta>, and cannot be given In PVlden<'e
against the prln<>lpal. There IR wldP diveralty' of opinion and stubborn confll<'t 88 to
how 1,.rrent an interval of time mm1t elapse
betwee-n the oecurrenee an1l the declarations
ln order to deprive a party of the nght to
give them In evidence. hut wt• think our gent-ral statement is supported by the weight
of authority. The dltHt•ulty, 11s we huve Indlcnted. ls not so much in tormulatlng genernl statementlil as In determining nn<ln
what phase or branch of a general rule the
particular Cll8e falls. That Is here the dlfttculty, for, while we are satlsfled that our
general 11tntement Is correct. we have found
lt no easy task to determine under what
hranch or phase of it this case belong11. The
que11tlon us to the competency of the declaratlon11 of the pnglnrPr hns two branches,
for there ls one bran<'h founded on specific
ohjN•tlons lnterposl'<l to the te11thnony, and
nnothE>r upon a motion to strike out part of
tl1e h•11tlmony. It will conlln<'e to clearnt-ss
to <·ouslller each branch sep1trntely, althouich both dE>pend upon the eft'N·t nod application of the rule relating to tl1P competency of evidence as part of the res ge11tro.
ThP nppellee testlfled as a wltnrl'K In his
-0w11 "'"mlf, and, after giving nn ae<·ount of
tbe collision, and the manner In whi<'h he
was Injured, he said: "In the 11w1111 time I
was getting up. I went to wnlk. I went
to step, and when I stPpp!'d on thl11 foot I

fell. That ws.S e:;::'tt>IJ~
[Ctse .No. 11
hurt. I n>a<~bed
't/ " 4J 'tt.llJe 1 k.
that my foot vtrB-~ , 101 C'lJt the dnrk~~~J;;a
to the car and B8lJ>4 · I <'l'llWlf'd over
Mr. Brumley, tbe eD~/l.lee • About tbnt time
his tor<'h. I wt18 P'OJl.lg ~ enme to me ll'lth
anybody would ~·bell b 012 like I supposu
say11, 'That Is too bad, IJJ~, wus hurt. He
He said: 'What
was the. 1 ::'Id, ~~8;'
Didn't you understand the stgn::J:'ore;.~ul<ln 'i
you get out of the road?'" At this Jwlnt
I an objeetlon Wll8 stated, and then l'ollowI ed questions and answers. Some of the
questions, as indicated by the stenographer's
report, were interposed by Mr. llcllullen,
counsel for the appellant. 'fhe statements
. elicited by the statements addressed to the
witnesses are, ln substance, these: 1''rom
the time the collision occurred until the englnee1• came to the appellee was "not over
a minute or two." The engineer left hts
engine, and walked back to the car whert•
the appellee was. The Pnglne had "gone
down thE> tmck" betwet>n two and thrre
hun1lt·E>d ft'l't nhend of tl1t• <'nr on which the
appellee was at work, but when the enI glueer left the engine It was about a car's
1 len){th from the ear on whl<'h the nppellee
wns lnjnrt'<l. nod, as the witness ex1>ress!'d
it, "the engine was stoppPd. and the colllslon was all over," when tlw eni:"tn('('r rea<'11ed the npl>f'IIPE', who had at that time crawl·
I'd from the end of the <'ar to the center,
and was holding his foot, and moaning. It
appl'Ul'B from this evldt•uce that thr direct
eolllslon was over and th!' injury done at
the time the engineer rt-nehed the nppPllee,
but that th!' car on whh·h the appellPP waM
Rlttlng waR still at the plaee where the lnjury waR received. It :t!Ro appenrs that
therP w1111 an lntl'rn1l of tl1111>. although a
1 VPry h1·lef one, In whl<'h the Pn1-'1neer walk. ed frorn his engine to the 11.(IJll'llE'e after the
I engine had been sto11pPll. 'l'lw nppellee, as
we have 11een, estimates tlw time nt not
more than one or two mluutP8. so that,
while thl'l''e was an interval of time between
tne actual injury and the de<'lnmtlons, It
wru1 a. hrlef one; but, brief ns It wns, it was
suflt<'ient to allow the engine to travPrse a
11hort dlstanctL-a car's lPugth--from the
pince where the engine wns stopped to the
pla<•e where the ear on which the nppellee
was slttlug was standing. 'l'he statement
of the wltnl'llS that thE> engine hnd "gone
down the tn1<·k two or three lmn!\rl'd feet
from wherE' it was when the collision took
plnC'e" does not mPnn tlmt tlw \•111tlnP wa"
that far from the nppellf.>e's <'ar wlwn It Wiil\
stoppPd, hut whnt It nwnnN \!\, n11 tbe record
Khows, that th!' e nglnt> uni\ t\w ffiT on wbl.cl1
the appellee wns stntiont>l\, n\t\1ough detached, <•ommuNl \n n1ot\on for that d\11tancp after the C'ollll'lon too\I. \'\1wl', so that
the en~lnt>t>r 11\tl not wn 1k tnnt l.\\stnncl"; on
tlw Pontrnrv. h e walkt·•l ou\> \\\ll l.\\stan<•,•
hetween th~ <•tn· and t\u• ~1.W,\1"'· and t\\\\~ .
as the wltnPAH f'nys, wus u. cnY 11 \en~\\, \\"
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have, therefore, a case where there was a

very brief interval between the collision and

the declarations, and one in which the en-

gineer walked only a few feet after he stop-

ped—he had checked—his engine, back to

the car on which the injured person was sit-

ting. moaning in pain.

We have no disposition to extend the rule

respecting the competency of declarations of

:|n agent upon the ground that they consti- -

tute a part of the res gestze, for we are sat-

isfied that an enlargement of the rule would

very likely make it an instrument of evil.

But. on the other hand. an undue limitation

of the rule might often prevent a party from

availing himself of evidence to which he

was entitled, and which would aid in estab-

lishing the truth. If we can ascertain the

rule as our decisions declare it. we shall
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deem it our duty to apply it without ex-

tending or narrowing it. It is necessary to

examine the decided cases in order to ob-

tain the means of solving the vexed ques-

tion which faces us, and we begin this work

by a reference to the cases which declare

the general doctrine. One of the earliest of

Oil!‘ f'=1f~‘~P8 is that of Bland v. State, 2 Ind.

608, wherein it was said: “It has been de-

cided that it is not competent for a prisoner

indicted for murder to give in evidence his

own account of the transaction, related im-

medlately arm it occurred, though no third

person was present when the homicide was

('01I1l11mPd-" The case from which we have

quoted cites as authority for the conclusion

which it declares the case of State v. Tilly,

3 Ired. 424,- wherein it was said: “l'nless

the declarations form a part of the transac-

tion. they are not receivable in evidence.”

The case of Bland v. State, supra. has often

been cited and approved, so that the doc-

trine of that case, in so far as it asserts that

the declarations must be part of the occur-

1'9-1l('9, act, or transaction, is to be accepted

as the law of this transaction. The doctrine

of that. case. as we have stated it, is the

rrcvailinzz Oill‘. for it is Slll1('l'l0il0(l by many

able courts. state and federal. Railroad (To.

v. O'Brien. 119 U. S. 99, 7 Sup. (‘t. 118; Dur-

kee v. Railroad 00.. (59 Cal. 533--‘:31 11 l’ac.

130; State v. Poineroy, 2.5 l\'an. 34!»; Rail-

road (‘o. v. Coleman, 28 .\lich. 4-it)-446;

.\ia_ves v. State. ti-1 Miss. 329. 1 South. 733;

i~'outl|erlaud v. Railroad Co., (N. (‘.) 11 S.

Pl 189; Martin v. Railroad Co., 103 N. Y.

026, 9 N. E. 505; Waldele v. Railroad Co.,

95 N. Y. 274: Lane v. Bryant, 9 tiray, 2-iii;

Luby v. Railroad Co., 17 X. Y. liil; Wil-

lllllIlS0ll \‘. Railroad (‘o.. 144 .\iass. H8. 10

-\'- E- T9"; Railroad Co. v. Becker. 128 ill.

545, 21 N. E. 52-}; Railroad Co. v. .\lara. ‘iii ‘

Uhio St. 185; Adams v. ltnilroad (.‘o., T4 .\io.

553; Railroad Co. v. \Vonmck. $4 .-\ia. 1-iii,

4 South. 618. The general doctrine that the

declarations must be part of the act or oc-

currence is asserted without substantial di-

versity of opinion by the text writers. Ab-

bott, Tr. Ev. 51; Woods, Pr. Ev. -169; 1
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have, tht-refore, a case where there WRB a
very brlt>f Interval hetwet>n the C'Oltt11lon nncl
the de<>lamtlous, and one In wbkh the engineer wallwd only a few feet after he stopped-he bad <·becked-hie engine, back to
the car on 1\'hl<'h the Injured person was sitting, moaning In pain.
We have no lltsposltlon to extend the rulP
reepec·tlng the t'Orupetency of de<·lurntlonM of
nn agent upon the ground that tbt>y <'on1dltute a part of the res gt-ebe, for w<• are eatll'fted that an enlargement ef the rule would
'f'ery likely make It an Instrument of evil.
But, on the other band, an undue limitation
ot the rule might often prevent a party from
a valllng himself of evidence to whl<'h he
was entitled, and which would aid In e11tahltshlng the truth. It we <'an aM<·1'1"taln the
rule a11 our dt'<'IMlon11 dt><'lare It, wt> 11hall
deem It our duty to a11ply It without extending or narrowing It. It le neceMMry to
<>xamlne the de<.>lded cases In order to obtaln the means of solving the vexed que&tlon whl<'h faces us, and wt> begin thl11 work
by a reference to the <·asee whh•b dt><•lare
the general doctrine. One of the earl11>st of
our <"Mes la that of Bland v. State, 2 Ind.
608, wherein It was said: "It has bet>n declded that It ls not competent tor a prisoner
Indicted for murder to give In evldenre his
own acrount of the transaction, related lmmediately after It occurred, though no third
pereon was llresent when the homicide was
committed." Tbe caee from which we have
quoted cites as authority for the conl'luslon
which It de<•laree the case of State v. Tilly,
3 Ired. 424,· wherein lt was Bald: "t'nleRB
the dec:'laratlons form a part of the transactlon, they are not receivable In evidence."
The c•ase of Bland "· State, supra, hll8 often
bet>n <>ltt'd 1t111l approved, so th1tt the dOt'trlne of that <·a11e, In eo far as It a11serte that
the d('('laratlon11 mu11t be part of the Ot'currenre, act, or tranM&<•tlon, ls to be ac<-epted
as the law of this transa<>tlon. The dOt'trlne
ot that <'&Ill'. as we have statt>d It, Is the
prevailing on<>, tor It Is llllll<'tlont>d by many
able t'Ourts, 11tate and federal. Railroad Co.
v. O'Brlt-n, 119 U. R. 00, 7 8up. ('t. 111'1; Durkt>e Y. Ralll'Ojld Co.• 09 Cal. :l:l:J-:-,;~. 11 Pac.
130; Htatt- v. Pouwroy, 2."i Kun. :\4U; Hallrottd ('o. v. Colenulll. 28 :\llt>h. 440-446;
~!nyt>M ,., Rtatp, <H ~1188. 329, 1 South. 733;
1-"ontht-rlaud v. Railroad Co., (X. ('.) 11 S.
!<:. 18U; Martin Y. Railroad Co., 10.'J N. Y.
626, 9 N. E. 505; Wnldele v. RallroRd Co.,
95 ~. Y. 274; Lane '"· B~·1mt, o (;my, 24a;
Luby "· Railroad Co., 17 ~. Y. tat; WllHamson v. Rllllrond ('o., 144 :\lllMM. HR 10
X. E. 71l0; Railroad Co. v. Jlp1•kPr. 128 Ill.
545, 21 N. E. ;;24; Rallroncl Co. ,., llnra. :.'fl
Ohio St. 18;>; Adams v. Unllroiul Co., 74 :\lo.
r,ria; Railroad C'o. v. Wom1t<·k. SI Ala. 149,
4 South. 618. The general doctrhw that the
declarations must be part of the a<•t or occ•nrn>D<'e le asserte<l without st1bKtantlal di,•pn1lty of 011lnlon by the tt-xt wrtterM. Abhott, Tr. E\·. 51; Woods, Pr. Ev. 469; 1
32

Wbart. Ev. (3d Ed) f ZJD; Taylor, Ev. (8th.
Eng. 1'~d.) I 602; 1 Rice, Ev. 3i:i.
·we assumt-, therefore, that tht> decla.ratlon"
ot an agent or servant are not competl"nt
un)('Se they are part of the principal act, occurren<'t', or transa<'tlon. But In ascertainIng the general doctrine we do not complete
our work, tor we have still to aB<'t'rtaln and
decide whether the dC<'larnttons of the en· glnN>r can be deemed part of the occurrence
' In whl<'h the appt>llet> was Injured, and, In
order to reach a rorrert t'On<"luslon, It ls necell8ftry to examine the autborltles with some
care; not, bowe'f'er, for the purpoae of aecertalnlng the geneml rule, but tor the purj pose of ae<'E'rtalnlng what the cases decllll'&
to be part of the res gestre. In Binns v.
~tate, 5i Ind. 46, the doctrine of Bland v.
liltate was ht>ld to govern a case where the
wltnf>lle n-1wlwd the woman who had been
shot after ht> had run a dletan<'e of two or
three lnnuln'<l yards, and arrived at the
place whert> the 11hootlng WRR done a mln, nte and a half after she had l>N'n wounded.
: and tht> judgment of the court was that her
ded1tratlon11 were not part of the res ge&Ue.
A wry similar application of the rule was
I madt- In Dukes v. State, 11 Ind. 5M. The
· queMtlon arose In the case ot Railroad Co.
1 v. Hunter, 33 Ind. 335, upon this state or
1 fa<'ts: The body of the man who had been
I kllled was on the train. It bad been car1 rled to tht- town of Lane11vllle, some mllt>s
dlRtant from the place where the accident
, occurred, and the fireman of tbt> t-oglne
: Whl<'h ran over the deceased made statei menu while the body wu being removed
from the train. TheSt> statements were held
to have bef>n erront>0u11ly admitted, the court
<.'!ting, a11 authority for Its con<•luslon, J.uby
v. Railroad Co., supra; llool'e v. lleaC'bam,
10 ~. Y. 207; J..ane v. Bryant, 9 Gray, 24.i.
; The <'lllle of Railroad Co. v. Theobald, 51 Ind.
1 246, asserts tht> gt>neral doctrine that de<'i laratlons of trainmen an> Incompetent uo! lees madt> at the time of the occurrenN>; but
( It does not al!B('rt what shall b<• dl"t'med part
I of the o<'<'Urrenre, nor does the opinion achow
j how mu<·h time had elapsed l.lt'tWt>t•n tht•
, pertorman<'E' of the airent'e act and tht> tlmt•
1 of making the de<>laratloWI. The stRtt>mt-nt1&
of tht• ugt>nt whl<•h wt>rt> ht-Id rightly t>Xl'luded lo RallroRd Co. v. Wright, 80 Ind. 182.
wt-rt> madt• at a plllf'C different from whenthe lnjnry was rt><'E'lved. and 30 minutes or
ruon• 11fh•r tht• ()('c•urrem't' wbleb <'RUKt'd It.
In Rteplwmmn ,._ ~tnte. 110 Ind. :ir.R--.q72, 11
N. E. 300, thli dt><•laratlon11 ex<'lt1ded we~
mad<• nft<•r the dP<-t•alll'll bad left the plR<'t'
wh<•l"f' lw wa11 wot1mlt'd, aftl•r the ael'UMl'<I
· hRd lert tht> Mpot, and urter tht> dPN'&Ml'<l l11td
gone into a llllloon and remalnt!d for 11omc>
tlnw, eo that a very considerable Interval or
time had elapR('(l. The court ht•ld In Jone11
Y. ~tntt>, 71 Ind. 68-81. that 11tatt>ml'11t11 made
hy the lle<•eas('(l after be was Mbot, namln~
the 11ersoo who shot him, and narmtlng a
past occurrence, were not t'Ompeteot. So In
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{_ St&t8,9i Ind. 55;), the evidence was terval of filnel ﬂit‘: 91;; [

lmieﬁ be ii1'°Pe\'\Y excluded, because, as the tual injil l'.\' an‘ 9 ’l:1lhD&Q C4189 N

l1l‘\<\w9,;id’ ‘“_ was mere‘? 8. narrative of a lamnious is 1103 9° Q B Q pt 0' 11

\‘““" 5a°t‘°“' and ‘mt Dart or the res road Co- v- Buck’ subr at at '11->1 .‘?"‘Pn t1

pal t., None of the cases we nave cited declal-ations were ai-‘I. Q8 t‘ "Ir ,1, '6 30.

ly ﬁts the one before us as to the man was at the D1119 Ge Q11, W85 1'11” d"¢‘-

ilimse nder immediate discussion. In the and the (19019 "3 H0118 ‘vb bile’ as tllez-5-RM"

Wm‘ ePresem‘~‘d by such cases as Binns v. one who llﬂd taken Dvvebé ere 11 the 18.!’ the

“ms r ge °! the a°t0I'$ In the occurrence was Here there jg even aa~3‘t ; Qlaqee was bated

gigfnt’ that the declarations could not have line of causal ¢"0in:'9Qt10°1ea_l:_e the tlzliro Iva: Z},

“mm dc D1111 Of the res gesta-. \Ve sup- injury and 15119 Z‘ I111-at? Qt; and £3 done

nose it clearnthatt, where one of the prlnci- servant than Ilvas 10113 ore;-‘n the d¢l>l1g,_.,.

pal actors mgtrfil“-*"1<‘Tl0H goes from the road C0. V. Bggid "11 st: the clle ﬂgentlvct

“me where ansaction took place, what supra, it was the D11, b 01'

ﬂuently occurs cannot ordinarily be re- so essential,” and so we "1129

nbsc 1

granted as D1111 Of the res gestzle. In the class time that elapsed flftpr tga-V 59,2110! alway

M cases oi which Railroad (‘o. Y. Hunter is his engine and 1' 93911511
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a type, the declarations were made at a. appellee was sitting was no‘: car Wbempped

“W... and at u. time diﬂfercnt trom that at to break the line 01’ goalie‘. 80 es8en"'9 the

“.h~w1i the transaction took place. The case the acts together. We are sttfoll that [51 as

at our bar dlffefﬂ from those cited in essen- to the opinion that, Where 10l1gly inc" :51“

rial particillzlrs, for here the declarations

“Tire made at the time and place where the

collision occurred, and they referred to and

illustrated the event, and they were made

while all who Dilrtic-ipated in it were pres-

ent. We may therefore well adjudge that

there was no error in overruling the appel-

laut’s objections without denying the doc-

trines asserted in our cases.

The latest decision ot our court upon the

question before us is that given in the case

of Railroad Co. v. Buck. 116 ind. 566, 19

N_ E. 453. In that case the conductor of the

train on which the intestate of the plaintiﬂ

was employed as a brakeman was on the

“c-aboose" when he received notice that the

deceased had been injured while coupling

cars; that he immediately ran forward. and

fou nd the deceased under the rear end of the

S€('0lld car from the engine. The conductor,

when he took the deceased from under the

r-ar, asked, “How did this happen?" and the

41¢,-(-eased fully described the cause of the ac-

cident The court held that this testimony

was competent, and cited many cases in sup-

port of its conclusion. We think the doctrine

declared in that case decides the point here

under direct consideration against the ap-

pellant Counsel argue with plausibility that

the doctrine of the case cited does not apply

to the case before us. One of the reasons as-

signed in support of their position is that

the declarations admitted in that case were

those of the injured person. While the dec-

larations admitted in this instance were

those of the agent or servant. A @0l11I>l¢'-to

and effective answer to this argument is

that, it the declarations were, as the case re-

ferred to adjudg9B- P1111 0f the 1'9“ in-stae.

they were competent. no matter by whom

they were made. Baker v. Gausin, 76 1nd_

317; 1 Whart. Ev. (3d Ed-) §§ 259-261. Our

conclusion receives suDD0I't from the ra-

miliar rule that, where Daft 01 8 Conversa-

lion is competent, the whole is admissible,

~ _ State, 97 Ind.

ve

555, the evidence

will'!

J)o\e9
properly excluded, been use as the
btld t0~t<l• "lt was merely a. narrati~e ot a
rou~ r~sactlon, and not part o:f the res

vaat t.,,

?'lone of the cases we have cited

ll'lltee· l:Y ftts the one lw-fore us as to the
preeisE?-oJJ.der immediate discussion. In the
po\llt. rePT'?Sented by SU(•h (~a.see as Binns v.
c~
pe of the actors in the occurrence was

State ~ So that the declarations could not have
ahs~ .:n.de part of the reM gesta-. We snp-

it. clear that, where one of the prlnc1~ a.ct.ors in a transaction goes from tile
\l ~ e -«bere the transaction took place, what
~i:se\luently occurs C"annot ordinarily be regarded p.B part of the res gestt.c. In the c11188
ot cases of whkh Rall road <•o. v. Hunter le
a type. the decln.ratlous were made at a
\'bwe IUld at a time dlft'erent from that at
wh\cb the transa<•tiou took place. The case
at our bar dllJers from those cited In essential particulars, for here the declarations
were made at the tlme and place where the
colllelon occurred, and they referred to and
illustrated the event, and they were made
while all who participated in it were present. We may therefore well adjudge that
there W:IS DO erl'Or in overruling the a11pellant's objeC'tlons without denying the doctrines asserted in our cases.
The latest decision of our court upon the
question before us ls that given In the case
ot Railroad Co. v. Ruck. 116 Ind. 5ll0, 19
N. E. ~- In that case the conductor of the
train on which the lntee,itate or the plalntllr
was employed as a brakeman was on the
"caboose" when he received notice that the
deceased had been tn.tured while coupling
cars; that he Immediately ran forward. and
:found the deceased undE>r the rear end of the
second car from the engine. The conductor,
when he took the decE>niu'tl frnru under the
c>ar, asked, "How dhl this lut1111en ?" and the
deceaaed fully described the cause of the accident. The court held that this testimony
"vas competent, and cited many cases in eupport of Its conclusion. We think the doctrine
declared In that case decides the point here
undP.r direct consideration against the appellant. Counsel argue with plausibility that
the doctrine of the cnsE> dtetl does not apply
to the c·ase before us. <>ne of the re1u•ons asKigned In support of their position is that
the declarations admitted In that CllBe were
those of the injured person, while the declarations admitted in this lnstanC'e were
thoi;ie of the ap."ent or servnnt. A complete
and eft'ectlve answer to this argument le
that, It the declarations were, as the caKe referrecl to adjudges. part of the res gt•Kbe.
they were competent. no matter by whom
they were made. Baker v. Gausln, 76 Ind.
317; 1 Whart. Ev. (3d Ed.) H 259-261. Our
conclusion receives support from the familiar rule that, where part of a conversation is compc>tt>nt, the whole ls admissible,
unleBS some part of it Is excluded by other
rules of law. ·In the case before us the iD-

"oee
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road Co. v-- ;Buck, eul>l': llt ~~ .z.1,.1 ~-PP11 tb
declaratf.~.D.B ~ere l'Q,.~· 4 & lt• k,,,~ thee lie.
man W'&.S a t t:be l>J~ e
et-~ '"as 1.ll dee.
and the d.eclarLitloll8 : . '\\>~°""lJ.11~ as the.re llll!J.
one who b a d ta.kell I> e.z·e el-e hetbe IJJJ~/ebe
Here there Js eve.ti a~ I~ ~ltde t l4>as bu d
line of causal conllecti0 ~le.Q~ tbe t/uo bJll1 bl'"t,
Injury nnd tbe d~'"lltl-llt? b~ter- lllld
do.Ile~
servant Uu1n tlJel
"'°118 °-lle 1'>-~ll th l'o111:e.r
1.l.J 't.IJ:r tht> 11 dJl"ec!t
road Co. v. Buck. .Ill
supra, It was said "t•lflte-1>1-.
<'Ilse or llt o.r
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eo essential " an d Bo w
i~1~
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time that elapsed B:ftp,. tb ~~ he.re 110t lllff>a;:y.e,
hie engine and renc11ed e eng1n; 2'ie brte;
appellee was sfttln>r 'W11s flle car ,!'.~stopped
to break the Jlne Of <'OlJn,:Oot Bo esselJ~l"f! the
the acts together. We are ec.•tJolJ that baJ as
to the opinion that, lVhei-e ::iti·ollg/y lIJcIJ~nds
jured in a collhdon, au that ls eillpJoy(j ls
stopping the train and reJlevi doIJe towards
employ(! trom a dangProus Dg. tlie lnJured
part of one occurrence, but, :;:sitton forms
ltntlvely atHrmlng thls, we do ~out anthorwhere there lM such a contJnuo fflrm that,
chain of
acts and events as there was Inusth
Js case
a 11 are part o f t h e res gestse. It Is t:
'
'"
..
rue, as
a.1.r. "''h
" ai.on
says, that ''immediateness
Is
tested by closeness, not of time, but of cau11al relation." 1 Whart. Ev. (3d Ed.) .§ 262.
This conclusion we regartl a11 involvecl In the
principle thus stated In the cnse of Unllroad
Co. v. Buck: "It Is not always easy to determine when declarntlom1 lmvlug reft>rPnce
to llny act or transaction should be re<"eived
as part of the res gestre, and much difficulty
llas been experienced In the eft'ort to formulate general rules applicable to the subject. This mnC'h may ho,.·~ver, be safely
said, that deC'l:tratlo~; which are the natural emanations or outgrowths or the act
or OC'eurrt-nce In litigation, although not precisely concurrent In point of time, if they
were yet '\"oluutarlly and Mllont11neou11ly
llillde, so nearly contPmporaneuus as to be
In tlw presence ot the transaction which they
Illustrate and explain, and were made under such cirC'umetanC"es as necessarily to ex·
elude the Idea of design or deliberation,
m1111t, upon the closest principles of justlC'e,
he admissible as part of the act or transaction Itself." Our conclusion Is thllt tht-re
was no error In admitting declara tlons of the
engineer that did not refer to acts done or
matters which h11ppeued prior to the collision which C'aused Injury to the appellt>e.
The othe1· branC'h of the general question
of the romprtl>nt•y of thr declarutlons of the
englneer- thut rt>t1tlng on thP tnotlon of the
nppt-llant to strike out-requirt-s only very
brlt>f m<>ntlon. The motion asked the court
to strike out the statement of the a.ppellee
that the engineer said: "It that man last
night would have tu:cd that cylinder c0<·k.
ae I told him, you would never have been
hurt." This declaration related to the past,
83

,:;!

'

ease No.11]
Case No. 11]

RELEVANCY.

and was a narrative of what had been done

at an entirely diiferent time and place. It

was, indeed, a combination of an opinion and

a narrative of the things that had passed,

£01‘ it was a statement of the engineer's opin-

ion that ii’, on the night before. smncthing

had been done which he had then directed,

the collision could not have taken place. It

is too well settled to excuse the reference to

authorities that neither narratives or past

occurrences nor matter of opinion can be

placed before a jury by proving the decla-

rations of an agent or servant. For the er-

ror in overruling the motion to strike out the

objectionable testimony the judgment must

be reversed, and, although many other ques-

tions are discussed by counsel, we do not

deem it necessary to consider or decide them,

as they may not arise on another trial.
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On Rehearing.

(Dee. 17, 1892.)

OLDS, J. Counsel for appellee have ﬁled

a petition for rehearing in this cause. and

by a learned and able argument insist that

a rehearing should be granted. The cause

had due consideration and the questions in-

volvcd were fully considered in the original

opinion, and we deem it necessary to con-

sider but one question only presented by the

petition for rehearing; It is contended by

counsel for appellee that the question dé

cided adversely to the appellee, and for which

the judgment was reversed, was not proper-

ly presented to this court for decision; that

the competency of that portion of the testi-

mony of the plaintiﬂ' as a witness, stating

that the engineer, Brnmley, told him that,

“if that man last night had ﬁxed the cylinder

cock as I told him, you would not have been

hurt,” was only raised by a motion to strike

out; that such statement was made in an-

swer to a competent question, which elicited

other competent testimony in connection

with such incompetent testimony. After

the answer was given by the witness to the

question, counsel for appellant made a mo-

tion to strike out the incompetent part of

the answer, stating his reasons, and the

court overruled the motion, and the appel-

lant excepted. The reason for new trial re-

lating to this evidence alleges "that the

court erred in permitting the plaintiff, while

testifying as a witness in his own behalf, to

testify to the following, to wit: That after

the accident resulting in the injuries com-

plained 01', and after plaintiff had received

said injuries, he (plaintiff) asked the engi-

neer, Brumley, how this happened, [refer-

ring to the aecident.] and that said Brumley

told the plaintiif, in answer to said inquiry,

that he, Brumley, could not throw the re-

verse lever forward, and that ‘if that fellow

had ﬁxed the cylinder cock as I told him to,

this thing would not have happened.’ " And

there was no reason assigned for new trial

based on the error of the court in over-

rulingthe motion to strike out. It appears

by the record that a proper motion was

RELEVANCY.

and was a narrative of what bad been done ruling. the motion to Btrlke ont. It appears
at an entirely dlft'erent time and place. It by tht> reeonl that a proper motle>n was
was, Indeed, a combination of an opinion and made to strlkt> out this latter statement of
a narrative of the things that bad paB&ed, the wlt1wRs, which was lu the original oplu· ·
tor It was a statement of the rnglnt>er's opln- loo held to be erroneous, and an exception to
Ion that If, on the night brro1·e, 110methlng the ruling was reservl"d.. It would seem that
bad been done which he ball tbrn diJ'P<'ted, as a matter of fa<'t the trial court's attention
the colllslon could not have taken pbt('e. It was <'Rllt><l <llrectly to the question wblch
ls too well settled to ex<·u11e the refl'r(•nce to wa.a paBRe<l upon, and decided by this court.
authorities that neither narrattvl'11 of pust A motion for new trial waa made, In whieh
occurrences nor matter of opinion can be one of the reasons aselgned was error In
placed before a jury by proving the deda- admitting tble statement, together with the
rations of an agent or se1·vant. l!'or the er- statement thRt the engineer eald be rould
ror In overruling the motion to strike out the not throw the reverst> lever forward. On
objectionable testimony the ju<lgment must : appeal lo thls-l'ourt the que11tlon as to whethbe reversed, and, although many other quea- er or not tbl"Re particular statPmentR W<'l'!'
tions are discussed by counsel, we do not both or either of them coru1>t>tent was dl11deem It neces11t1ry to consider or decide them, cuesed by counBt'l, and tbe question as to
IUI they may not arise on another trial
wbetht'r the latter statement of the witness
was rompetent or not was treated as being
properly presented by the record. It would
On Rehearing.
seem quite evident from the fact that a M'P(Dec, 17, 1892.)
arate motion to strike <>ut the partl<•ular
OLDS, J. Counsel for appellee have fl.led part of the statement <>f the witness which
a petition for rehearing In this cauRe, and was held by this court to be Incompetent,
by a learned and able argument Insist that and from the motion for new trial and the
a rehearing should be granted. The C'ause dlscuselon In this court by brlt>r11 nnd orally,
had due consideration and the questions ln- that the questl<>n was treated aR In the recvoln•d were fully considered In the original ord, and the trial court passed upon the
oplnl<>n, and we deem Jt nel'el!88ry to con- question l't'Vlt>wed by this court In passing
sider but one question only presented by the upon the mothm for Dl"W trial; and, If the
petition for rehearing: It Is contended by question Is not properly l>t'fore this court,
counsel for appellee that the question d~ It ls on account ot a te<-hnl('ftl tlrfeet In the
cldesl adversely to the appellee, and tor wblch form of the motion for new trial. It Is not
the judgment was reversed, was not proper- the practice, nod It ls not lncumtit>nt on a
ly presented to this court tor declslon; that party In a motion for new trial, to set out In
tbe competency of that portion of the testi- detail a verbatim copy of the evidence admony of the plalntltr as a witness, stating mitted over obje<"tlon or offered and refused,
that the engineer, Brumley, told him tha.t, or a verbatim Rtatement of the objections
"if that man last night had fixed the cylinder made to Its lntrodu<'tlon. It Is sufftclent If
oock aa 1 told blm, y<>u would not have been the evlden<'e be referred to with such cerhurt," was only raised by a motion to lltrlke tainty as to <'llll the attention of the court to
out; that such statement was made In an- It, and to thP ruling In relation thereto, 80
swer to a competent question, which elicited that the judge <'Otdd not mistake the matter
<>tber competent testimony In connl'l'tlon and the ruling alluded to and complalne<l of
with such Incompetent testimony. After by the party filing the motl<>n. Clarie v.
the answer was given by the witness to the Bond, 20 Ind. rm6; Ball v. Balfe, 41 Ind.
questl<>n, counsel for appellant made a mo- 22'l; Meyer v. Bohlftng, 44 Ind: 241.
The motl<>n tor new trial ba11es the error
tion to strike out the incompetent part of
the answer, stating bis reason11, and the In 1)(>rmlttlng thP I>lalntltr, while tl"t\tlfylng
court overruled the moth>n, and the appel- as a wltneKR, to testify to the statements.
lant excepted. The reason for new trial re- This Is In a l'ertaln sense true. The error
lating to this evidence alleges "that the ' was In permitting the witness to testify to
court erred lo permitting the plalntUr, while the erroneouK Rtatemt>nt. but being coupled,
testlfylng as a witness In bis own bebRlt. to as it was, In on answer to a proper question,
testify to the following, to wit: That after [ with a statement that was competent, the
the accident resulting In the Injuries com- proper way to R&ve the error In nllowlng it
plained of, and after plalntUr had received to go to the jury was by a motion to strike
said Injuries, he (plalntll't) asked the engi- out the objl'l'tlonnble statement. The m<>neer, Brumley, how this happened, [refer- tlon for new trial does not point out the parring to the accident,] and that said Brumley ticular · erroneous ruling aR <·learly as It
told the plalntltr, In answer to said Inquiry, might, and possibly not as cll•arly as It
that he, Brumley, <'Ollld not throw the re- shoulc'l, but It Is not necessney to dr1•lde as to
verse le\'er forward, and that 'If thRt fellow the technical suft\clenC'y of thl' motion, for
hnd fixed the cylinder cock as I told him to, under the mlPB of this court the queRtion
this thing would not ha"e happt>nE'd.'" And was properly decided. UulP 26 of this court
there was no reason assigned for new trial proYldes, nmong oth<'r things, tllat "if a
based on the error of the court lo ovel'- statement of tact Is made b7 couueel, and
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not an

.

~-t;loned or exi>lalned by opposing
tt wUl be deemed by the court to
~· ~te." Counsel for the appellant, ID
'oe L~otll brief ln thls case, aner dlscu8811\J()t\ •(\m'88lblllty o'f all the statements of

llll 4
eetioned or explained by ()I)pQg[ng

Be ’ itteiizlllobsugsixﬂitid the court to

cont fa - _ 1‘ e appellant, in

\»ea¢c“;;pl11 b“°f in thiﬁ case, utter discuss-

uwfe adm\§8\b\1“i.V 01! all the statements of

iliﬁtnﬁ “(:53 "1 ﬂﬂﬁwel‘ to the question, con-

iiw“ y making the following statement

“W lotion ti! this particular question: “We

“"9 W there was error in refusing to strike

““g‘:ne mat sentence of Stein's evidence of

‘%‘mm\ey’B Smtement It wvas speciﬁcally re-

mwd to in the motion for a new trial, and

\s shown 0119889 76, lines 9 to 11. He said:

_“ may man last night would have ﬁxed

Hm cylinder cock as, I told him. you would

‘M mu-9 been hurt. This statement was

mt qug5(i0ll9(l or explained by counsel for

me ._\m,pilee, but, on the contrary. coun-

sel for appellee said in his brief: ‘It fol-
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lows’ it seems to us, from the weight of au-

momy and upon principle, that the court

below was right in admitting Brumic_v's

gmtement as evidence, without invoking its

discretionary power over the matter.’ And

the whole of Brumle_v’s' statement, including

the last sentence. ‘If that man last night

would have ﬁxed that cylinder cock as I told

mm, you would never have been hurt,’ was

competent evidence. Two objections were

made to this sentence: (1) That it was ut-

tered in the absence of any agent of the de-

fendant. ‘and the testimony thereof is hear-

ggy.’ (2) Not a part of the res gestae, be-

cause made wholly after the accident and

injury complained of. We have shown that

1){l.l't

‘1v:1s

:1g(’11t is 11 W

notljiﬂg 111

xxfas it

S the

| it was

that it

feudnnt ' S

need sap’

res gestzxr-

d t <1" -us u

flon(i)1asl‘ls)(<;en 1-’1'eat9(11:st1 ‘

no

Ge -.

:88 ti:

I

d

seliand ("O11-"“i(1ere a

we cannot permit pa

on a petition for rehe

urge as a 1»’l'O'“"d to!‘ thn$’, an

hearing that the riason e

tion for new trial 8 too a 12

to point out with sum Into;-In

ticular mung which was

a practice would lead to

and uncertainti’, and We

why there should be a

general rule In this 0389.

in the record or D1191‘ of 0 91?-' is

lant to excuse 001111891 for

examination 01' the record,

!ngt})~t~eSB in answer to the question. con-

the~ t:J1'

making the following statement
t1nuedaJ.ttoJ1 to this particular question: "We
In ~llt tbere was error ln retuslng to strike
111b\llbe iast sentence of Ste\ n's evidence of
oat t \eY'8 statement. It was speclftcally re~ to tn the motion for a new trial, and
le o"9'l1 on page 76, llnes 9 to 11. He said:
';:~bat inan last night would have fixed
hat cyUnder cock as I told him. you would
~ bave been hurt.' This statement wRB
not questioned or explained by counsel for
the appeUee, but, on the contrary, eounMl for appellee llllld ln his brief: 'It follows, lt seems to us, froID the weight of author\ty and upon principle, that the c'Ourt
below was rlght ln adintttlng Bromley's
statement as evidence, without Invoking its
dlseretlonary power over the matter.' .And
the whole of Brumley'& statement, including
tbe laat sentence, 'If that man last night
would bave ftxed that <.>yllnder cock aa I tl>ld
lllm, you would never have been h urt,, was
competent evidence. Two objections were
made to thls sentence: (1) That it was ut·
tered In the absence of any agent of the defendant, 'alki the testimony thereof ls hearsa;y. • (2) Not a part of the res geatse, becau.e made wholly after the accident and
1Djur.r complatned of. We have shown that

~
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4
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u~el'e() I~ ~~l!t't
lfo
fendant:•e;;s s,geat 8 a ""'o
't°l.l~~. ,.
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need say .z;aot:bf.D~ lrlo~l"t41~
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res ges1:BeTV'~ t .b~ o~ &~ ObJ ti~ ot
ed to dtscu.ss t: e q~e ~It.}>- .,.~-0.e q7;t1011.
tlon has bee.P ~~ lfl 7'o~
'""-e.Qd f11Jt/olJ e
sel, and c-oruddered 8Jld llt°"' • -<tttei- p~t
we cannot: permit '11ll'flec}~lq4ialJlJel' b 4 quea.
on a ix-tt tfon for ~.be.,_, e f:o ~ b.,. tbe'F Co111J.
urge as a ~ou.ud t'ol' t.b~~. -.';:llle liito Co11l"t,
hearing that: tbe 1~1f~ e ~~d 1111<'<'es,,,;:'1ll't
8 f<>o •eetS'.ne tlrig or 4 lllJJI'
tlon for ne'W t:rla
to potJlt out "Wlt:h 8Ullf<!le~~ro.,.ni11~ l11 tbe
tlcular ruling -wb~C,b 11>88 Certa111i 81ld r111111
j a practice wo11Jd ~d to e errolJE'O~ tbe Par.
anll uncertainty. s.nd ll>e ~dlellB Co Buc1r
1 why there should be a dep Bee 110 : ,11•011
gent>rnl rule In tb1B Clise. 7'~ rro.rn ":;::
In the record or l,rfet or COunel'e ls llot.bJIJ
Iant to excwie <'011Dsel ror ap ~el ror appe/!
examination of the rE'Cord, &nd'Pe. 1ee t'ro1D a.a
the fac·t as to wbethf'r the que:lltrovertlng
was properly presented. The
de<'fded
cases where new trials are Kra.nt e, eYen Jn
It 111 too late, after a new trlaJ e~ ts that
granted. to object that the motion 8 beent
was
no
reasonably mad e. K loster v. Elliott 12
.'J 1 d
176, 177, 24 N. E. 99. Parties mu~t be ::U~
!gent, and make their objection at a reasonable time; and after they have joined In a
discussion, and obtained a decision, they cannot l:e heard to say that the question was
not properly raised. The petition ror rehearing ls overruled.
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LAKE SHORE & M. S. RY. CO. Y. HER-

LAKE SHORE & M. S. RY. CO.

T.

RICK.

(29 N. E. 1052, 49 Ohio St. 25.)

RICK.

(29 N. E. 1052, 49 Ohio St. 25.)

Supreme Court of Ohio. Jan. 19, 1892.

Error to circuit court, Huron county.

Action by Herrick against the Lake Shore

& Michigan Southern Railway Company to

recover damages for personal injuries. From

a judgment of the circuit court reversing a.

judgment of tho common pleas, defendant

brings error. Aﬁlrmed.

John M. Lemon, for plaintiff in errors S.

A. Wildmau and G. '1‘. Stewart, for defend- .

Supreme Court of Ohio. Jan. 19, 1892.
Error to circuit court, Huron county.
Action by Herrick against the Lake Shore
& ?tllchlgan Southern Railway Company to
recover damngea for personal lnjurle111. From
a judgment of the circuit court reY<>rslng a
judgment of the common pleas, <k>fendant
brings error. Affirmed.
John M. Lemon, for plaintiff In erro• 8.
A. Wildman and G. •.r. ::!tewart, for defendant In e1·ror.

ant in error.

BRADBURY, J’. The defendant in error,

in his petition in the court of common pleas,

avei-red, among other matters, that he had t

bought of the railway company a ticket en-

titling him to travel on its railroad from Nor-
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walk to Collins, the station next east from

Norwalk, and return; that on his way to the ‘

liiwsengcr-train to take passage it was neces-

sary to cross a track of defendant on which

a west-bound passenger-train was due; that

the railway company had caused notice to

be posted on its bulletin-board there, that

this latter train was 15 minutes late, and

that defendant in error, relying on said no-

tice, was lawfully crossing said track when

said latter train, hidden from his view by

obstructions, came into the station on time,

or nearly so, and at a reckles and negligent

rate of speed, without signal by bell, whistle,

or otherwise, whereby he was injured with-

out fault on his part by being violently

struck and run upon by said train. The rail-

“'aIv"' ¢‘°"1D€lI1y by answer put in issue all

these averments of the petition, except that

the defendant in error was struck and in-

jured by the train. It also answered that

“the plaintiff was well acquainted with the

movements of trains, and the tracks and

premises where he was injured, and on said

December 8, 1881, without necessity or ex-

cuse therefor, went upon defendantls rail-

road track, and by his own negligence and

want of ordinary care directly contributed

t0 1118 i11J11ry;” which last defense was de-

ﬂied by the reply. The issues thus made up

between the parties required the plaintiff in z

the court of common pleas to prove that he

was at the station in the character of a pas-

8611381". It was also material for him to

show that he was misled and his vigilance

lulled by the statements on the bulletin-

board of the railway company that the train '

was late. He complained in the circuit

court, among other things, that the court of

common pleas had, on the trial in the latter

court, excluded from the jury certain evi-

dence that was admissible to establish his

contention in these particulars, and that in-

competent evidence had been admitted by

that court over his objection. The circuit

‘ there.

‘ he believed the train to be late.

court stated upon its journal that the ground

of its action in reversing the judgment of the

oourt stated upon lts journal that the ground

HER·

BRADBURY, J. The defendant ln error,
In bis petition ln the court of common pleas,
averred, among other matters, that he had
bought of the railway company a ticket entitling him to travel on Its rallroad from Norwalk to Collins, the station next ea.st from
Norwalk, and return; that on his way to the
passenger-train to take passage lt was necessary to cross a track of defendant on which
a west-bound passenger-train was due; that
the railway company bad caused notice to
be. posted on lts bulletin-board there, that
this latter train was 15 minutes late, and
that defendant In error, relying on said notice, was lawfully crossing said track wben
said latter trnln, hidden from his view by
obstructions, came Into the station on time,
or nearly so, and at a reckless and negligent
rate of speed, without signal by bell, whistle,
or otherwise, whereby he was Injured with·
out fault on his part by being violently
struck and run upon by said train. The ranway t'Ompany by answer put In Issue all
these averments of the petition, except that
the defendant In error was struck and Injured by the train. It also answered that
"the plalntUr was well acquolnted with the
movements of trains, and the tracks and
premises where he was Injured, and on said
December 8, 1881, without necessity or excuse therefor, went upon defendant's rail·
road trac.'k, and by his own negligence and
want of ordinary care directly contributed
to bis injury;" which last defense was denied by the reply. The Issues thus made up
between the parties required the plaintiff In
the court of common pleas to prove that he
was at the station In the character of a pasaenger. It was also material for him to
11how that he was misled and his vigilance
lulled by the statements on the bulletlnboard of the railway company that the train
was late. He complained in the circuit
court, among other things, that the court of
common pleas had, on the trial In the lattPr
court, excluded from the jury certain evidence that was admissible to establish his
contention In these particulars, and that In·
competent evidence had been admitted by
that court over his obJectlon. The clrcult
38

of Its action In rever11lng the judgment of the
court of common plPas was the rulings of
the latter court In admitting and rejecting
evidence, and that In other respects It found
no error lo the proceedings of that court.
This entry on the journal of the circuit court
excludes any Inference that the Judgment
was reversed because the verdict was
against the weight of the evidence, and
therefore the judgment of the clreuit court
I may be reviewed by this court. The blll of
exce1>tloos does not purport to contain all
the el1dence, nor even any considerable part
of It, but ls limited to that which was oft'er' ed and reJel"lPd or Immediately connected
with and explanatory of It, and that which
plalntlft' below contends was Improperly admitted. The Item of e'l"ldence fir11t excluded
from the jury, as shown by the bill of exceptions, was In the deposition of Vinton F.
Sheldon, who testified to a declaration of the
porter at the hotel, of which It appears the
plaintiff below was proprietor. The wltneSB
was asked If be was present, and lf so, what
he saw of It, etc. He answered: "I was
there. It was in the morning of the 8th of
December; I was waiting to take a train t<>
Wakeman. l\lr. Herrick sent a porter over
to seP about the train, as I wa11 11topplng at
HerrlC'k'a hot£'1 and wlahe'tl to take the train.
The porter reported the train tlftpen minutes
late." The last sentence, "The porter reported the train fifteen minutes late;• was on
motion of the railway company excludffi
from the jury, to which ruling the plalntltr
below excepted. This evidence, we think,
was competent, and should have been admitted; It was not oft'ered In proof of the fact
that the train was 15 minutes late, or even
late at all. The plalntltl' below did not contend that thP train was late; It was not his
theory of tht> aC'<'ldent; on the contrary, he
inslstPd that It came In on time, or nearly
so. That. In his \•lt>w, was the Immediate
cause of hl11 In.Jury; he acted on the suppo- ·
sltlon that thP train was late, and crossed
the railroad trat•k to enter as a passenger a.
car of another train of the aame company
going In another dlre<'tlon, be<'ause he believed It to be late. Th·e state of his belief
In this respect becomes Important upon the
question of his own contributory negligence;
his vlgllant-e had been dlsarmPd, as he contended, by Information that he bad no cause
to suspect W88 false. This It was material
that he should establish, and whatever evidence tended to that end was competent.
The report of his own meHsenger, whether
; true or false, certainly tended to show that
he believed the train to be late. Acting upi on such information, one might well attempt
to croSBarallway track without being chargeable with negligence, whereas lf he acted
heedlessly, without Inquiry, the act woul<l
be properly characterized as negligent, or
even reckless. Nor was this evidence less
competent because he had afterwards seen

I
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ice “Don the ‘bulletin-board himself.

oglmitted in the rejection of compe-

§d““““ ‘Q not cured because there was

(1 “"9" 5“'°“ge\' Evideiice to establish

‘ﬁe 9*" \l1t1‘0duced to and considered

11>“-

be tm“ 1“ the <fO\1!'i'. of common pleas

defendant in error read in eviriciice to

me jury the 1\PD08ition oi? George E. Miller,

_“.n_g a clerk at the llerrick House, an

of which U19 defendant in error was

1-ietor. In response to a question put to

this witness answered: “In the mum-

mg 3“-_ Heffick W“-1_ injured he started out,

am‘ said he was going to Collins. I asked

mm 3; 110 had his ticket. as he had one in

me mone}"(\l‘aWel'. and I looked to see if he

had “_" Upon the Inotion of the railroad

company the words “said he was going to

Collins" were ruled out, to which ruling de-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:06 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104925781
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

iemmnt in error excepted. The defendant

‘in error had averred in his petition “that he

had bought and procured of the defendant a.

ticket as a i1*\$3°!12P1' on its trains to and

from Collins, the station on said railroad

next east of said N01-walk, and at the time oi!

the occurrences hereinafter stated was cross-

ing said track nearest to said platform for

the purpose of taking passage on said eat-

ward-bound train for said Collins.” The rall-

road company had not only denied this, but

had also averted as a separate ground oi’ de-

fense that the defendant in error, "without

necessity or excuse therefor, went upon de-

tendanfs railroad track, and by his own

negligence and want of ordinary care direct-

ly contributed to said injm-_v." It therefore

became material for defendant in error to

show that he was injured while on his way

to the train that ran to Collins, tor the pur-

pose of getting on as a passenger to be car-

ried to that place. \\'as his declaration that

he “was going to Collins" competent evi-

dence oi’ that fact? That depends on wheth-

er the declaration was contemporaneous

with, and explanatory of, the act of de-

parture. One departing from home may

have in view any conceivable place, or any

conceivable purpose. as his destination or oh-

ject. The act of departure is thus in itself

of the most ambiguous character; it docs

not afford the slightest clue to the object of

the journey; it is natural and usual, accord-

ing to the mmon experience of mankind,

that the par y should say Bometlling 1'eBDe¢t-

ing his departure, 01’ an explanatory charac-

ter. Declarations thus made are a part of

the act itself. Starkie in his treatise upon

Evidence lays down the rule as follows: “In

the ﬁrst place, an entry. or declaration ac-

<.-ompanying an act seems, on Dflllﬁiples al-

,.(.,,¢|_v announced, to be admissible evidence

in all cases where 11 qlll‘-Stm" "rises as t0 the

nature or quality of that act. " " ' Such

,.Avm¢-nee is also admissible on the same

principle to show the intention with which

an not is done, where the intention is mate.

mu. Thus, on queﬂonﬂ of bankruptcy. dec-

iile not

ot:lce upon the bullettn~board hlmseH.
1be 9 cotJlmltted ln the ~lectlon ot <'OmpeEr!Ot'~<lt"n('e le not cured b~·au~ there was
tent
~d e\'en stronger evlden'-·e to establish
o\bet' ~
0->e fact introduced to and considered
the j~l'Y·
bltll~be tr\8.1 ln the court ot common pleas
~(le-fendant in error read ln evidence to
tile jUrY the dt>posltlon ot George E. lllller,
tile!» ._.ae a clerk at the 'l.l.errl<>k House, an
w 1 of whlcb the d~tendant In error was
note rtetor. 1n --.
......ponRe to a question put to
~: t.blS witness answered: "In the mom\u ~r. llerrlck was Injured he started out,
a!d said he was going to Colllns. I asked
blm
be bad hls ticket. as he had one In
the money-drawer, and I looked to see tr he
bad \t." Upon the motion of the railroad
companf the words ..said he was going to
eolllns" were ruled out, to which ruling defendant in error exce1lted. The defendant
\u error bad averred in his petition "that he
bad bought and procured of the defendant a
ticket as a passenger on Its trains to and
from Collln8, the station on said railroad
next east of said Norwalk, and at the time of
the occurrences hereinafter stated was cro88fng eald track nearest to said platform for
the purpose of taking passage on said eastward-bound train for said Colllns." The railroad company had not only denied this, but
had also averred as a separate ground of de.tense that the defendant In error, "without
neceBBlty or excuse therefor, went upon defendant's railroad track, and by his own
negligence and want of ordinary care directly contributed to said Injury." It therefore
beeame material for dt>ftmdant In error to
show that he was injured while on his way
to the train that ran to Collins, for the purpose of getting on aa a passenger to be carried to that place. Was hls declaration that
be ..was going to ColllllB" competent evidence of that fact? That depends on whether 'the declaration was contemporaneous
with, and explanatory of, the act of departure. One departing from home may
have In view any conceivable pla<'e, or any
conceivable purpose, as his destination or object. The act of dt>parture ls thus ln ltKt>lt
of the most ambiguous character; it does
not alford the slightest clue to the object of
the journey; It ls natural and usual, according to the 'l>mmon experience of mankind,
that the party should say something respecting his departure, of an explanatory character. Declarations thus made are a part of
the act Itself. Starkie in his treatise upon
Evidence Jays down tbe rule as follows: ..In
the :first place, an entry. or declaration accompanying an act seems, on principles already announced, to be admissible evidence
tn all cases where a question arises as to the
nature or quality of that· act. • • • Such
evidence Is also admissible on the same
principle to show the intention with Which
an act Is done, where the Intention ls material. Thus, on quesUons of bankruptcy, dee-

u

Jaratlon.ll!!S
n>ade by ll
wtth, or d urJrr8 t.be ,.~ ~
Ccaae
from u l s viace or ~8~ o:l" Q~l}(0· 12
constant:.IY adwltt~ ltl ~-t.l • -~ Co11telll
ture and qun1Jty or tll l>~~ 0~ e:u/Jg .bf°i-a,,.
ever an e.o t:TY or d~1,.,. ~ - °<>.t> or 'flllliJell#J.lllseir
on or quaJJLJeS a..Q ll~t ~ti~~ Iii t.be l'etJ ltl'e
the matter Jn Jssue. ltrJ """'"~ l-e11ec d~ """lla.
It becomes adrnlSSlbJe «t le ~i. Is ta lllfbt er.
tre, If It be <..-oDt':,_ll>1'o,.~11 l>~~~<1e11:ee:,,,_a11t?
• • •••
(1.0th ...,.cl.)
fleo of t.b " ltae1t,
trlne has recefved tile ~. ;a JJ-it.b et~es Ke11ln a nu111 ber oL CBl!1ea ~.Ile~~ 6 7. 1'."-t e act.
··~-....011
., 8
,.
lbl 6 l.n.
rv1i
of tb•- "'Oc11arty ls adcnJss
e..-1.el'e
"' cou
tlons at the tJz:ne, e'-1'l1t ""ell<'e bllZl llct or l"t
are also admfssJble Its 1'a:;ato,,.y' 18 dec1araa
Whetmore v. Mell, l 0 111
or t.be or tbat ac~ Insurance Co. v. Tob1.n, 3~ St. 26. 'i::'esfle."
gett '"· State, l.5 Ohio, 28:1- Oh/o St. 78.' also,
2 Ohio 8t. l"IOO; Dickson 1': ' .lfCl()l'e v ' Leg.
73. This doetrfne Js dls~u~tate, 89 OhZ,~e,
talned by the text-Wrftera,
lllld lJ:Jaln~
110'.l; Greenl. Ev. 108;) as l'VelJ hart. Ev. 2 62
by almost Innumerable adJud:S Illustrated
only a small number of Which cated cues,
ferred to, (Milne v. LelsJe~ 7
be re. ,
786; Blake v. Damon, 103 ll~ss. 1: L & N.
v. Goodspeed, 72 N. Y. 106· Lo; dAhern
Blythe, 16 Pa. St. 582; Scott 'v. Sh~I~~ ~
Grat. 891; Stephens v. McCJy, 36 Iowa 6.19·
Oolqultt v. State, 34 •rex. 550). As eve;.y In~
ten<lment favorable to the ruling of the
court of common pit-as should have been Indulged by the circuit court, and should be by
this court also, the question arises whether
the record discloses with su11lclent certainty
that the declaration excluded was made by
the defendant In error at the ttme be departed to take the train rather than upon some
other occasion when he may have left the
hotel. The bill of exceptions is meager; it
does not purport to set forth all the evidence,
or all the other proceedings bad at the trial.
All that It discloses on this subject ls as follows: "Plalntur then read in evidence to the
jury the deposition of George E. Mlller, who
testified that he was clerk of the plaintiff at
his hotel, the Herrick House, when the Bald
injury to the plalntur occurred. and, In reply
to thf' qUt>KtlOD of wbllt he then MSW, the wit·
ness said: 'In the morning Mr. Herrick was
injured he started out, and said be was going to Collins. I asked him l~ be bad his
ticket, as he had one In the money-drawer,
and I looked to see If he had It.' To which
words, 'said he was going to Collins,' the defendant objected." This witness stated, as
disclosed In another part of the bill of exceptions, that the ticket was gone when he
looked to see It Herrick had lt.
So, take the
entire bill of exceptions, It shows that the
defendant In etTor bad procured a. ticket to
Collins, and had It In the money.drawer of
his hotel; that he had taken lt out of the
drawer, and was leaving the hotel when he
made the declaration respecting his dt•stlnatlon. l<'rom these clrcumstan<.>es we think It
fair to Infer that he was at the time depart87
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lug on his proposed journey; but whether he

was or not, as there are other grounds upon

which the judgment of reversal should be

atiirmed, it is quite proper at this'tilne to de-

clare the true rule respecting this evidence.

as the death of the defendant in error in all

probability makes this declaration the only

evidence now attainable of the intent with

which he left the hotel on the morning of the

accident.

The defendant in error also read in evi-

dence the deposition of W. O. Foidger, who

testified as follows: “I was walking towards

the west end of the depot, my back to the

engine, to cross the track diagonally, when l

heard the call, and turned my head; then en-

gine was then right behind me;” being the

same by which the plaintiff was then and

there injured. And the plaintiff's attorney
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then asked the witness in said deposition,

“State whether or not you saw other persons

who were in danger of being run over by

it;" to which the witness answered. "There

were people crossing till the engine was

right there, and some one hallooed. I saw

no one hit except the piaintift';" to which

question and answer the defendant objected, '

and the court sustained the objection, and

ruled out said question and answer from the

deposition, and the same were not read in

evidence to the jury, to which ruling_ of the

court the. plaintiif then and there excepted.

The condition of the crossing at the time of

the accident was material. Was it thronged

with people or otherwise? The train might

not have been chargeable with carelessness,

even though it came into the station at a

high rate of speed, if thetlefendant in error,

alone or with only a few others, was there,

while it might be careless, or even reckless,

to dash in at the same rate among a crowd

of people, who might jostle against and im-

pede each other in their struggles to escape.

T119 question was subject to the criticism

that it called for an opinion of the witness

as to whether there were “other persons who

were in danger of being run over by it," but

the answer was free from that objection; it

was limited to matter of fact. "There were

people crossing till the engine was right

there, and some one hallooed. I saw no one

hit except the plaintiff." This answer was

competent evidence, and should have gone to

the jury; it not only tended to establish neg-

ligence in the running and management of

the train, but also had some tendency to re-

fute the charge of contributory negligence,

by establishing the existence of conditions

at the time likely to create panic and confu-

Si0l1, if, I18 claimed, the rapidly moving train

came Suddenly and unexpectedly upon the

crowd of people at the crossing, thereby

causing the choice of means of escape more

diiﬁcult and pqrplexing. The other testi-

mony excluded from the jury is not of suffi-

cient importance to require special notice;

38

most, it not all, of it was immaterial, or

RELEVANCY.

Ing on his proposed Journey; but whether he most, It not all, of tt was Immaterial, or
was or not, as there are other grounds upon came within the well-settled rules of the
whl<'h the Judgment of revenial should be book8 that exclude hearsay evidence. It
alHrmed, It Is quite proper at tbls'tlme to de- there was any that did not in Its own nature
clare the true rule respecting this evldt>m•r, fall within either of these two <·lasses, the
as the death of the defendant In error In all bill of e.iu.-eptlons Is too meagre to dlscloee
probability makes this de<>laratlon the only Its materiality, and Its exclusion therefore
evidence now attainable of the Intent with was not erroneous.
which be It>ft the hotel on the morning of the
The only remaining question relates to the
accident.
admlsslblllty of the ordinance of the village
The deft>ndant In error also read In evl· of Norwalk prescribing the maximum rate
dence the tll'llosltlon of W. 0. Foldger, who of speed at which trains DMlY be run through
testified as follows: "I was walking towards the village. The railway eowpany was not
the west rnd of the depot, my back to the charged with running Its train at this time
engine, to cross th<~ tm<'k diagonally, when I at a greater rate of speed thnn the ordinance
beard the call, and turned my head; then en- permitted; no Issue of the kind was made
gine was then right behind me;" being the up; there was not a word In any of the
1mme by wbl<'h the 1>lnlntltr was then and pleadings to indicate, even, that the village
there Injured. And the phtlntltr's attorney of Xorwalk had ever adopted an ordlnanl'l'
tlum n11kt>d the wltnel!l'I In Kllld deposition, on this subject. In what manner, therefore,
"~tute whl'ther or not you saw other pel'llODS
the ordinance could enlighten the Jury rewho we1·e In danger of being run over by specting the Issues on trial before them 18
It;" to whl<'h the wltnt·~ answered, "There not shown by an examination of the pleadwere people crossing till the engine was lngM alone. Surely the plalntltf in error
right there, and some one hallooed. I saw could not justify dashing Its train, regardno one hit excl'pt the plalntUl';" to whll'h less of <•onsequences,--lf it did so,-lnto a
question and answer the defendant objected, i crowd of people croMlng its track, because
and the <-'OUrt sustulnE'd the objel'tion, and Its rate of 11peed at the time was within the
ruled out said question and answer from the limits pre&•rll>ed by ordinance. If such use
deposition, and the same were not read In of the e\·lden<•e can be sup110sl'd to have been
evlden(•e to the jury, to which ruling of the attempted, we must presume that the court
eourt the plalntlll' then and there eicepted. 1 properly limited its operation In the charge
'l'ht• t•ondltlon of the Cl'08slng at the time of given to the Jury, or would have done so up·
the 1u·rldent was material. Was It thronged on request of the other party If made at the
with people or otherwise? The train might proper time. It was not error, howe\•er, to
not have been chargeable with l'arrlessness, admit the ordinance Ju e\•ldeuee If It was
even though It <'ame Into the station at a competent for any purpose. The pleudlngs,
high rate of speed, If the .defendant In error, as before stated, do not mention it, and the
alone or with only a few others, was there, bill of exct>ptlons Is ,·ery meager, yet enough
while It might be careless, or even rec•kless, can be gathered from it to disclose that a
to dash In at the same rate among a crowd controversy arose during the trial as to the
of people, who might jostle against and Im- rate of speed at which the train, before It
pede each other In their struggles to efl<'llpe. reached the station, passed through the vilThe question was subject to the criticism lage of Norwalk, though nothing appears to
that It callt•d for an opinion of the witness show the distance It ran within the corporate
as to whether there were "other persons who limits; the plalntlll' ·tn the common pleas
were In danger of being run over by It," but court contending that the train ran through
the answer WIUI free from that obJe<'tlon; It the village at a rate exceeding 15 miles an
was limited to matter of fact. "There were hour, the defendant, on the contrary, claim"
people crossing till the engiue was right Ing that the rate of speed was less than that.
then•, and some one hallooed. I saw no one In this connection It ls at least conceivable,
hit except the plalntltr." This answer was it not apparent, that It might have been mat·ompetent evidence, and should ha\·e gone to terial tor the railway con1pany to show that
the jury; It not only tended to establish neg- In passing through the ylllagr, and before It
ligence In the running and management of approal'hed the station near eiliugh to enathe train, but also had some tendency to re- ble Its employes to see the condition of the
fute the charge of contributory negligence, crossing, the train did not move at an unlawby establishing the existence of conditions ful rate of speed, which would render Its
at the time likely to create panic and ronfu- management and control more d1111cult when
slon, If, as claimed, the rapidly moving train the danger at the cros1ilng was discovered.
came suddenly and unexpectedly upon the We cannot Sll:f, therefore, that the court
crowd of people at the crossing, thereby erred In admitting the ordinance In evidence.
causing the cholc·e of means of escape more
Judgment atHrwed.
difficult and Pl\"Plexlng. The other testlwony excluded from the jury ls not of su11lDWIC\IAN and SPEAR, JJ., dissent from
clent lm~ortan<:e to require special notice; 1 the Judgment of afftrn1ance.
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UES GEST...ESE\"ILLE v. STA.TE.

RES GESTrE -

(80 N. E. 621, 49 Ohio St. 117 .)

SEVILLE \-. STATE_

(so N. E. o-21, 49 Ohio St. 117.)

Gnvreme (‘ourt of Ohio. 1\1;“-ch 2_ 1892

of to circuit court, Athens county

5,1 Seville was convicted of engaging

m a pr1Z°‘ﬁl=h"-~ and bﬁﬂgs error. Affirmed.

F“ 5- Gumﬂe and L- M. Jewett, tor plain-

“: in 91'1'°l'- 3- P- “Food, Pros. Atty., and

2‘) B_ Grosvenor, for the State,

w[LL1AMS' 3- _ The Dlaintiﬂ! in error, Da-

V‘.-,6 Seville W118 llldicted for a. violation of

section (>333 0f“the Itevised Statutes, which

wovgdeﬂ ﬂlllli Whoever engages as princi-

pal tn all)‘ Prize-ﬁght shall be imprisoned in

me penitentiary not more than tcn years

not lesﬂ than ("I9 Year.” The indictment

charges that on the 25th day of February,

A D, 1891, at the county of Athens. he “did

unlawi\1l1.\' engage as principal in an unlaw-

lul and premeditated tight and contention,
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commonly called a ‘prize-tight,’ with one

Arthur Majesty, and in said ﬁght the said

~ David Seville and Arthur ‘Majesty did each

the other unlawfully strike and bruise, and

attempt to strike and bruise, for and in con-

sideration of prize and reward." The trial

resulted in a conviction, which was followed

by the sentence of the court, and one of the

grounds upon which a reversal is sought is

that the indictment is defective. The spe-

ciiic objections made to the indictment are

that it falls to allege the ﬁght was in public;

- that it does not negative the existence of the

facts mentioned in the proviso of section

6890 of the Revised Statutes; and that it

contains no direct averment that the ac-

cused engaged in a prize-ﬁght.

1. in support of the ﬁrst of these objec-

tions, the case of Sullivan v. State, 67 Miss.

3-16, 7 South. 2'75. is relied on, where it was

held that an indictment drawn under the

Mississippi statute of March T, 1882. making

it “unlawful for any person to engage in

prize-ﬁgliting.” in that state, was insuﬂi-

cient, because it did not aver that the tight-

ing took place in public; the court holding

that the statute was intended to prohibit

.prize-ﬁghting of n public character only.

“Fe are not inclined to follow that decision.

'YVhile, no doubt, it was one of the purposes

oi.’ our statute to prohibit public exhibitions

of prize-ﬁghting, because they tend to incite

quarrels and breaches of the peace, it was,

we think, none the less its DIIYPOBQ t0 8119'

press all prize-ﬁghting, on account of its

brutality, and consequent danger to human

life, and its demoralizing tendencies, and

pernicious eﬁects on the pence and good

order of society; and hence we hold it is

not an essential ingredient of the crime of

eflgagmg in 3 prize-ﬁght, in this state, that

it take place in public. The term “prize-

.'ﬂglit” has no technical legal meaning, The

Century Dictlona1'Y deﬁnes it "B "11 pugills-

tic encounter or boxing match for prize or

sf‘

oe‘

ot

wa;!C'I‘, ’ ’ 3 Dd he

s~Pi:-eme Court of Ohio. l\Inr<.>h 2. l892.
• -rl-"°.- to elrcuit court. A thens county.
~ o.~id Seville was convl"ted of engaging
0..,. prize-1\gbt, and brings error. AtHrmed.

m~~

.

~- Guthrie and L. M. Jewett, for plaln~· 10 error. J. P. Wood, Pros. Atty., and
JJ. Grosvenor, for the State.

U:,

w1t...LIAMS, J .. The plaintttr in error, Da·
"d gevllle, Wll8 indicted for a violation of
· ~~tloU 6888 of the U.evlsed Statutes which
"""
:r<>vldeB t h at ..whoev.er engages as ' prlncl~ \n any prize-fight shall be Imprisoned In
the penitentiary not more than ten years
nor let!l8 than one year."
The Indictment
charges that on the 2Gth day of l•'ebruary,
A. D. 1891, at the county of Athens, he "did
unlawfully engage as prln<>ipttl In an unlawful and premeditated Hght 11n1l contenUon,
commonly called a 'prize-fight,' with one
Arthur Majesty, and In said fight the said
navld Se'l"llle and Arthur Majesty did each
the other unlawfully strike 1111d bruise, and
attempt to strike and bruise, for and In consideration of prize antl reward." The trial
reamlted In a conviction, which was followed
by the sent1>nce of the <-ourt, and one of the
~rounds upon which a reversal ls sought le
that the Indictment le defective. The specltlc objections made to the Indictment are
that It falls to allege the fight was In public;
· that It does not negative the existence of the
facts mentioned ln the proviso of section
6800 of the Revised Statutes; and that It
contains no direct averment that the accused engngt>d In a prlze-ftght.
1. In support of the first of these objectiona, the case of Sullivan v. State, 67 Miss.
346, 7 South. 27:>. le relled on, where It was
held that an Indictment drawn under the
Mississippi statute of l\larch i, 1882. making
It "unlawful for any person to engage In
prlze..tlghting," ln that state, was ln1mfll·
clent, because It did not aver that the fight·
Ing took place In public; the court holding
that the statute was lntendl'd to Ilrohibit
. prlze-tlgbtlng of a public character only.
"\\re are not Inclined to follow that dt>ehdon.
· While, no doubt, It was one of the pur1iosee
of our statute to prohibit pbblle exhibitions
of prtze.flghtlng, twcause they tend to Incite
quarrels and breaches of the peaee, It was,
we think, none the less Its purpose to sup·
press all prize-fighting, on account of Its
brutality, and consequent danger to human
·life, and its demoralizing tendencies, and
.pernicious eft'ects on the peace anti good
order of society; anti hence we hold It Is
not an essential ingredient of the crime or
engaging in a prtze-ftght, In this state, that
It take pla<!e In public. The term "prlze;ftght" has no technical legal meaning. The
CE>ntury Dictionary defines It as "11 pugllistlc encounter or boxing match for Prize or

wager,.....
and Ot.bel" l
fine It: ~1 ve 1t: Bllbs~ ~~.
[Oas
tlon.
I -t fs used lfl :tlt.14~·~~
e ltro.
nary efg:nf1Jca.tJo11 Ot" 'tll~ ll~ ~l>hel'll
rewu.rd. and Include& ft tt~t:~/he 8alJJ it•bo dE
acter :1:10-wever Co11~
ftll ~-llt llte 111 le de1J111
'
ny
~'-!<:r0
ts
·
nes11ed b y :ma.
01" h
t('>.CI .......~-Ofll l" a Pl"/. 0 rdl2. Section t.JB90 0~ ~ t"e • ~l:Jd or tbllt Ze or
makes Jt:: an otre~e
tJiel:Jt, Sleopthetber eliar-

any t-w-o

persons

to •

<:-1tl1

1'ter1

e.

lJ>Jt.

or box a t :tJst/cutte, :~ee e<l E111 ·~i:, Stlltut
sparring o r f>O.XllJg eJc:.t- e~~lJd IJ'J/~J'. l"a.J"," l'o~8
out gloves; :ror ~.b~.b IJJbJt1 K"e 111 1111" 1-0- ll1rbt
lmpriRonin!'ZJt. Ol" botb the 11• lJ•Jtb;;;. PllblJc
tains a pro,•Jso that lt .
7''- 'llafty Is
'Wltb.
8h
...,e
ll11e
exercises In anY flu/)/f
#l/J llot 8 ec>tJo11
or
letlc club, 1:r TI-"l"ltten c• R"..J·n11111,,111PPly to 11•
shall have beeD Obtain Pe1·11118810:lll or atb':
of the county or lllay0 ,. 0(1 t'rorn tb tberpror
in whi<.'h the exel"clses or the IIJua~ shenll'
second objection to the 1 a.re held·
cfpuJtty
.lJdJ t
' lllJd th
should, by proper avernien c llJeat 18 that 1:
existence of the matters cots, llegatfre the
pro\"lso. This objection 18 ntalned In this
It Is the well-settled rule ot not Well taken
Ing that It Is not necessary cijmlnuJ plead:
meot, to negative the exfste~ n an fndlctwhlch an exc-eptlon or Pro-rfsie1 or fact11 to
a statute
reIa t es, unIess the matter
of th en except
1on
.
or proviso Is descrlphv<" of the offense, 01•
qualifies the language creating ft. Hirn v.
State, 1 Ohio St. 16. J<Jnguglng In a prl7.<•·
fight, ln violation of seetlon tlR~. is a s<>parate and distinct ollense from that <l<>fiued
and punished by section 6890. and tltt> tJrovlso qunlltles the previous clauses of the latter section, but has no application to former sections.
3. Nor do we think the Indictment lacks
a direct averment that the at-<•nsed engaged
as principal In a prize-tight. The averment
that he i>ngaged as priudpal, with another,
In an unlJlwful and premtaflltated t\ght, commonly t-alletl a ..prize-tight." for a prize and
rewartl, ls sufH<'ient to n11prl1w the accused
of the nature of the accm~ntion, In this respect. The Indictment n1PetM the requlrem1>11ts of the rules of crlmlunl 11leudlng, and
appears to be drawn In aec:·ordnnce with the
forms long In use, and apprm•ed by wellknown authors. " ' ar. C1·lm. Law, 241; \Yllson's Ohio Cr. Code (3d Ed.) 105; Maxw.
Cr. Proc. 230.
4. On the trial, the state gave evidence
tending to prove that Douglas Nelson and
Emil Rosser, two citizens of Nel!<Onvllle.
about the 1st of February, 18U1, made an nrrangement with Seville, by -which the Jatti>r
agreed to engage In a fight at Nelsonville,
at a future day to be named, with a pen;on
not exceeding a specified weight, to be
chosen by them, for a prl:1;e of $200, to he
paid to the winner. The arrangement with
Seville was communicated to Majesty, who
at once agreed to engage In the fight agnlm1t
Seville, which, It was arrange d, should tnke
plal.-e at Nelsonville on the night of Febru39

::e

'::i
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2-i, 1891. Wlien the agreement was

made with Seville, he did not know the

name of his adversary, nor did he learn it,

until the day set for the ﬁght. Soon after

the details of the engagement were com-

pleted, Majesty, who resided in Toledo, went

to Nelsonvllle with his trainer, and put him-

self in training for the conﬂict. While

there, he wrote two letters to his friend

Alfred Stephens, which were directed and

mailed to him at Newark, Ohio, and which

were received by Stephens in due course of

mail. These letters were admitted in evi-

dence against the objection of the defendant,

and their admission, it is claimed, \vas error

for which the judgment should be reversed.

The letters are as follows:

"Nelsonvllle, 0., Feb’y 15, 1891. Friend

Alfred: Would like to have you come to
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Nelsonvllle. 0., where I am matched to ﬁght

Seville, of Columbus, for a purse of $200.00,

to a ﬁnish, with 2-oz. gloves. You can call

on Keere Bros., in the saloon business; they

will be down here. Do not tell them who I

am or that you know me, as I go under the

name of A. B. Tracy. Uur protection is

good, as we have a license. Come if you

possibly can. We ﬁght on Feb. 2-ith. in the

evening. Will see you all right. Am in

training here. If you come this way, stop

and see me. Yours, truly, Arthur .\iajesty.

Addres A. B. 'l‘racy."

“i\'elsonviile, 0., Feb‘y 20th, 1891. Friend

Alfred: The man 1 Illeet is Seville, of Co-

lumbus, and we ﬁght at 120 pounds for a

purse of $200.00, all to go to the winner.

Nelson and Rosser of this place are hand-

ling me. I don't anticipate any trouble in

disposing of him. John Hall. of Toledo, is

with me. You have met him before. Tick-

ets are $3.00 per head, but I will place you

all right; but do not let those people of your

town know of it. If you can, induce them

to come and see the ﬁght.

with two-ounce gloves. in a large hall. with

a seating capacity of 800 on elevated seats

around the ring, same as all ﬁrst-rate clubs.

Yours, truly, Arthur, alias A. B. Tracy."

An agreement to engage in a prize-tight is

a conspiracy to commit a crime; and the

declarations of either of the parties, written

or verbal, with reference to the common ob-

ject, or in furtherance of the criminal de-

sign, while in its prosecution, are competent

evidence against the other, although the

My

were written he and Majesty had entered

into an agreement, either personally or

through their agents, to engage in a prize-

iight, and that they were written while

ary 24, 1891. When the agreement was
made with &>\"lllf', be did not know the
name of his adwl't!tlry, nor did he lt>arn It,
untll the day set for the ftght. Soon after
the details of the engagement were completed, llajt>sty, who n-shled In Tolt>do, went
to NelR<>nvllle with his traint>r, and put himself In training for the conflict. While
there, he wrote two letters to hl11 friend
Alfred StephenK, whi<'h were dlrt><'tt>d and
malled to him at Xt>wark, Ohio, and which
were re<-elved by 8tepheDB in due t•ounie of
mali. These letters were admitted In evldenee against the ohjectlon of the defendant,
and their admission, It ls claimed, was error
for which the judgment should be reyel'8t'd.,
Tbe letters are as follows:
"Xelaonville, 0., Feb'y 15, 1891. 1''rlend
Alfred: Would Uke to have you come to
Nelsonville, 0., where I am matched to ftgbt
Seville, of Columbus, for a purse of ,200.00,
to a tlnlsh, with ~. gloves. You can call
on Keere Bros., In the saloon buslne1111; they
will be down here. Do not tell them who I
am or that you know me, as I go under the
name of A. B. Tracy. Our prote<'tlon ls
good, as we have a UcenBf'. Come if you
possibly can. We fight on l<'eb. 24th. In the
evening. Will see you all right. Am 1n
training here. If you come this way, stop
and see mP. Yours, truly, Arthur llnjesty.
Address A. B. Tracy."
"Nelaonvllle, 0., l<'eb'y 20th, 1891. 1''rlend
Alfred: The man I meet is Seville, of Columbus, and we fight at 120 pounds tor a
purse ot $200.00, all to ftO to the winner.
:Selson and Rosser of thl8 place are handUng me. I don't anticipate any trouble In
disposing of him. John Hall, of '.folf'llo, Is
with me. You haYe met him 1M>fo1~. Tickets are $3.00 1>er head, but I wlll pla<'t- you
all right; but do not let those )>eople of your
town know of It. If you <·an, llllluc·e tht>m
to come and see the fight. It Is £o a finish,
with two-ounce gloveK. In a largt> ball, with
a seating c.ap1l<'lty of 800 Oil elevated K!'lltS
around the ring, same as all first-rah• t•lubs.
Yours, truly, Arthur, alias A. B. Trat·y."
An agreement to engage In a prize-tight ts
a conspiracy to commit a crlmt>; and the
de<'lamtions of elthPr of the parties, written
or verbal, with reference to the common obje<·t, or In furtherance of the criminal design, while ln Its prosecution, are <•om11ett>nt
evldt!Dce against the other, although the
agrf'l'ml'nt was made through and by bat·k1'1'8 or other ?t'J>reKentath·t'8 of tht> 11rln<'ipals, and the latter were unknown to 1'1u·h
otlwr. The letters reft>rrPd to t•onh1lne1l
dt>t•lurntlons of thl11 cham<'tt>r; their 1mrpose
lM>lng to procure the preKelll'l' of frlt•u\111 uml
others at the ftgllt, and thus E'lll'OUragt> and
<'ontrlhute to the succeRS of the uuluwtul
entE>rprlse. The court In its charge carefully lln1lted the effect of this evidence by instructlng the jury that, beforet It could aftect the accused, the jury must tlnd, l>l•yond
a reasonable doubt, that when the letters

Majesty was engaged in preparations for

the ﬁght, and were in furtherance of it.

5. The defendant offered to prove in his

defense that there was an athletic club at

Nelsonvllle, where the pugilistic contest was

held, and that a license authorizing it had

been issued by the mayor of the Village;

and for that purpose the articles of the as-

HELI<.:Y.\XCY.
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1 were written he and llajt'tlty had entered
! Into an agreement, t>lthl•r persolllllly or
through their ageDts, to engage ln a prlzei fight, and that they were written while
Majesty was engaged In preparations for
: the fight, 11011 were ln furtherance of It.
· 5. The defendant offered to prove In his
, defense that there was an athletic club at
NelllOnYlllt>, where the pugilistic contest was
1 held, and that a license authorizing It bad
' been issued by the wayor of the villal(e;
and for that purpose the articles of the Usoclation of the club and llc.-ense of the
mayor we1-e olfered lo evidence, but exc•luded. The articles, which bear the date of
. l<'ebruary 23, 1891, state that "the underKlgnt>d dtlzens of Nelsonville intend to establl11h an athletic club for the purpose of
training in wrestling, boxing, and other athletlc t'Xt>rdse;" they prescribe the terms of
wt>mber11hlp, and designate the oftkers to be
<'hoKeu. The only evidence of the execu1 tlon of the paper was that of a witness who
testified that he drew It up, but there was
! no proof of the signatures to It, or of any
organization under the articles. The license
offered In evidence ls dated l<'ebruary 23,
18Dl, and purports to grant permission to
the Nelsonvllle Athletic Club to exhibit a
glove <'Ontest "for one day only, February
24, 18Ul.'' If the defendant bad been lndieted for a violation of section 6890, the
evldenc.-e olfered would have been competent
and material. But such a license, to a club
of the kind mentioned, ls no defense to an
indictment under section OR88. If the defendant engaged in a prize-fight, it was im, material whether a license bad been Issued
j to an athletic club for that purpose, or for
: the purpose of giving a boxing exhibition,
or not. If he did not, but simply engaged in
: a sparring or boxing exhibition, he must be
, a<'qultted though no license was obtained.
Neither the articles of the club nor license
of the mayor was competent evidence tendIng to prove that what actually occurred
constituted a sparring or boxing exhibition.
' At wost, they tended to show that the
mayor only Intended to license a boxing cxhibltlon, and that the club was authorized
to give su<'h exhibition; neither of whl<•h
facts was material In determining whether
wllat a<'tually tx.'curred waa or was not a
prize.fight.
6. The defendant called a witness who teatlfted that he bad been engaged In 52 prizetights and boxing matches altogether, and
had spent 6 year11 in acquiring the art of
boxing. He was then asked by counsel for
the defendant to state what "are the rules
that apply to a glove contest and also to &
prize-fight." An objection to the question
1 was sustained. The purpose of the question,
as stated by counsel, was to pl'Ove that hy
the rules governing prize-tights therl• 111 no
limit as to the time of the round!'. th«- romhatants are Jit•nnltted to wn•l4tll' and throw
I each other, the ttght i11 to a lillhsh, the tlght

UES GEST&
BES GES'1‘.£E.

is

.. ,.,1t i;lo\·es, and s1>lkes are worn tn
whlle the rules governing itlove
\he i;1l1 '.... require the parties to -wear .rlo\'es
~
~
<'\)utt>
10 the shoes are not allowed,
the'
gp\tes t ellds at the (,"<>nc.-lusion of a spe1·lfte1l
f'l)ntei;I 11-lld each round is Umitell ln point o!
rouB0~0 tbree minutes. The witness rurtht>r
t\me ed that he saw the combat between
test\~efendant and Majesty. and was then
tlle ed l>Y de!endant's counsel whether tt
as~
011ducted according to the rules o! a
wa• c c0ntest or those of a prlze-flght. '.l'bls
g\ovedoll WIUI objected to, and the objection
l\Ue& tned· The counsel stated they ex1wctsustn
t
~ tbe -witness o answer that it was conducted according to the ruleR of a glOl·e contest. Thereupon the ""·i tness wns handed a
<.'OUple of paper11, one of whh:h he said con-1
ta\ned tbe Qul!l•nli<berry rules, and the other
the London prl7.e ring rult>s. These 11n1.1ers
were then offered in evidence by defendant's
counl!el, but they wt•re held to be lm·ompeteut. These several rullngs of the court are
assigned for error.
The question to be determined by the
jury was whether what took place between
the defendant and Majesty, at the tlme and
place charged in the indictment, was a
prlze-ftght. The wltnes1-<t>S for the Rtah•, and
for the defense, testified In detail to what
<>ccnrred on that occasion, nnll tlwre was
but little, If any, substantial conttlct In the
testimony. It showed, beyond any doubt,
t:bat the combatants met in the ring prepared for the purpose, In pursuance of the
.agreement previously made, and fought vl-clously to a ftnlsh. They fought 17 rounds,
:and on the eighteenth Majesty was knOl'ked
n-ellng to the ropes, ancl carried away In a
duze<l and unconscious condition, and in a
few hours afterwards died from the etrect
-ot tile blows received. The post mortem
-examination dlsclosed that bis vital organs

11
in“? g‘m"esv and spikes are worn in

M 9, while the rules governing glove

tilt *"gt5 1'e‘\“"e the Parties to wvear ;.:lo\'es_.

<-wlieg 111 the 511008 are not allowed. the

spill-es ends at the conclusion of a speciﬁed

muted and each round is lirnited in point of

\‘°““ £0 three mh1\1t98- The witness further

iiileiﬂed thﬂt he Saw the combat between

‘R: degeﬂd”-“t and 1\,I11ic-sty, and was then

asked by defendant S counsel whether it

condﬂﬁted aceofding to the rules of a.

onteﬂ or those or a. prize-ﬁght. This

n was objected to, and the objection

ed. The counsel stated they expect-

witness to answer that it was con-

(mcted according to the rules of a glove con-

‘est Tpereupon the vvitness was handed a

coup“ or papers, one of which he said con-

m-med the Queonsberry rules, and the other

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:06 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104925781
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

me London prize ring rules. These papers

were then oﬂ‘.e1'ed in evidence by defendant's

cmmsel, but they were held to be int-ompe~

tent These several rulings of the court are

assigned for error.

The question to be determined by the

Jury was whether what took place between

the defendant and liriajesty, at the time and

place charged in the indictment, was a

prize-tight. The witnesses for the state. and

for the defense, testiﬁed in detail to what

occurred on that occasion, and there was

but little, it any, substantial conﬂict in the

testimony. lt showed, beyond any doubt,

that the combatants met in the ring pre-

pared for the purpose, in pursuance of the

agreement previously made, and fought vi-

ciously to’ a ﬁnish. They fought 17 rounds,

and on the eighteenth Majesty was knocked

reeling to the ropes, and carried away in a.

-dazed and unconscious condition, and in a

few hours afterwards died from the effect

of the blows received. The post mortem

-examination disclosed that his vital organs
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be had r e c e l ved.
Oll(l> El~\>~ ~C·Jc. ' lr1J1t'b 8 ' alJd
nose cut;p .blB .rnDllt.f!
e..l·~ l'-lt.l'"
lllllJ
11wollen, and : h : llbl'":~<'I ,;'·~ta b11/be bi01!:.d
neck, ar.rn, a.D dlJ0 <JJ>" "9 c·1~~ lJ& b'°llleked, hJs11
!rom bru12'1eB pro
C'~ b el-e ~ Ila;- "E-VJ alJd
describe the blO~lJ lft ~ b1 bJac}( tli1tt hl
bl~ws; and ye~ UJ> to l°llc.-1c 0 ll·11. ~lJd bJue8
say Seville's puzil81J.1llelltlJe l4slil11J a11 trie1111et1
than that udnilDlBtel°ed t
t "°ll.tJ<J. hitter
0
Majesty was carried,
llrrv~:e.IJ g;eati;::
!row the scene or the ~ bJed Y. ll'h
money waM paid 0 l'er t eolltlJc·t arid d.FJri;11
p1u-ted by the first tl"aJlJ. 0 Ser-111;, ~e Prize'
The queKtlon ~or the Ju
bo de.
whether tbls combat l\'a.s 1:J'" to dee/de
what the Queensberry. ....1 a Pr/ze-llgbt,' Was
• u ~ or
not
rules called It, nor What ll&llJe
any other
towed to such combAts hal·e 1 , those accuswas it, In plain Engllsh? A.n~ 't:n It. lVhnt
o! !act, under a proper fnstruetJ ls Question
court as to what constitutes a on from the
the jury was as competent t
prfze..tlght,
o decide
th
most experleneed boxer or prl
..as
e
Tb
ti
ze-,,g1iter.
e ques on was not one of skill or science,
to be decided upon the o:pfnJons or those
experienced Jn such practice&, or by rules
adopted for the government of aseoclatJons
of such 1>e1·sons; but one within the com. prehenslon o! the common understanding,
and the range of common knowledge, which
the jury could decide upon the facts proven,
as well as a professional puglllst. So'we
other questions are made In the record, but
they aro not of sufllclent Importance to call
for a report. We have carefully examined
the whole record, and ftnd no error for
which the judgment should be reversed.
Judgment amrmed.
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RELEVANCY.

CO~OIOXWEALTH

v. BRADJ.<"'ORD.

(126 )lau. 42.)

(.‘().\[i\IOXWEALTH v. BRADFORD.

(126 Mass. 42.)

Supremt> Judlclal Court of Ma11811<'hWM.'tt11.
Hampehlre. Nov. 18, 18i8.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

Hampshire. Nov. 18, 1878.

Exceptions from superior court, Hampshire

county; Gardner, Judge.

G. R. Train, Atty. Gen., for the Common-

Exceptions from superior court, Hampshire
county; Gardner, Judge.
C. R. Tl"aln, Atty. Gen., for the Common·
wealth. C. Delano, tor defendant.

wealth. C. Delano, for defendant.

COLT, J’. The defendant was indicted for

willfully and maliciously burning a. building

belonging to his two sons. The second count

in the indictment charges an intent thereby

to defraud the insurer. At the trial evidence

was admitted in support of the indictment,

against the defendant's objection, tending to

prove that the defendant set fire to the same

mill a few nights before, and that the lire

was then discovered and extinguished by a

neighbor.
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The evidence was competent on the ques-

tion of the intent with which the defendant

subsequently bu1'ned the building. and com-

mitted the offense for which he was then

tried. It was carefully limited to the slu-

gle purpose for which it was competent. The

unsuccessful attempt to do the same thing, a

few days before, was evidence that the burn-

ing was willful and intentional, and not the

result of accident or negligence on the part

of the defendant. It was suiiicientiy near

to the time of the commission of the offense

charged to justify the inference that the de-

fendant then had a settled purpose in regard

to it. It is a rule of criminal law that evi-

dence tending to prove a similar but distinct

offense, for the purpose of raising an infer-

ence or presumption that the accused com-

mitted the particuiar act with which he is

charged, is not admissible. But there was

no invasion of this rule in the admission of

this evidence. The intent and disposition

with which one does a particular act must be

ascertained from his acts and declarations be-

fore and at the time; and when a previous act

indicates an existing purpose, which, from

known rules of human conduct, may fairly be

presumed to continue and control the defend-

ant in the doing of the act in question, it is

admissible in evidence. In many cases it is

the only way in which criminal intent can be

proved; and the evidence is not to be reject-

ed because lt might also prove another crime

42

against the defendant. The practical limit

to its admission is that it must he suliiciently

signiﬁcant in character, and suﬂlciently near

in point of time, to afford a presumption that

the element sought to be established existed

at the time of the commission of the offense

charged. The limit is largely in the discre-

tion of the judge. and no error in law is here

apparent.

The case at liar is not distinguisluible up-

on this point from Com. v. .\l"c(‘artli_\'. iii)

Mass. 354, where, on the question of intent,

the government was permitted to show that

the defendant a few days before set tire to-

a shed, ten feet distant from the building

COLT, J. Tht> defendant was Indicted tor
willfully and ma.lll'lously burtllng a building
belonging to his two sons. The second count
In the Indictment charges an Intent thereby
to defraud tbe Insurer. At the trial evidence
was admitted In support of the Indictment,
against the defendant"s objection, tending to
prove that the defendant set ftre to the same
mlll a few nights before, and that the fire
was then discovered and extinguished by a
neighbor.
The evidence was competent on the ques·
tlon ot the Intent with which the defendant
subsequently burned the building. and committed the olrense for which he was then
tried. It was c8l"efully limited to the single purpose for which It was competent. The
unsuccessful attempt to do the same thing, a
few days before, was evidence that the burning was wtlltul and Intentional, and not the
result of accident or negligence on the part
of the defendant. It was sulttclently near
to the time of the commission of the olrense
charged to Jm1tlfy the Inference that the defendant then bad a settled purpose In regard
to It. It Is a rule of criminal law that evidence tending to prove a similar but distinct
offense, tor the purpose of raising an Infer·
ence or presum11tlon that the accused committed the partleular act with which he ls
charged, Is not admissible. But there was
no Invasion of this rule In the allmlsslon of
this evidence. The Intent and disposition
with which one does a particular afi must be
ascertained from his acts and d~lnratlons before and at the time; and when a previous act
lndlcatt>s an existing purpost>, which, from
known ntles of human conduct, may fairly be
presumed to continue and control the defend•
ant In the doing of the act In question, It ls
admissible In evlden<;e. In many <'ases It ls
the only way In which criminal Intent can be
proved; and the evidence Is not to be rejected because It might also prove another crime
42

against the defendant. The 11ra<'tlml limit
to Its admlBSlon Is that It must he sumclently
slgnlft<'Bnt In character, and 1mdi<•lently nt>tt r
In point of time, to afford a p~umptlon that
the element sought to be estabrlshed existed
at the time of the commlMBlon of the offe~l'
charged. The limit ls largely In the <lls<'r<'tlon of the judge, and no error In law Is hert.'apparent.
The caae at bar Is not distinguishable up.
on this point from Com. v. ll"cC'arthy. 111>
M888. 354, where, on the question of Intent~
the government WBB permitted to show that
the defeudant a few days before set ftre to.
a shed, ten feet distant from the bulldlD~
burned, and <'Olllle<'ted thert>wlth by a ftlght
of steps. 'rhe defendant In that <'B&e was.
the owner of the building burned. while In
this l'8se the defendant had l'Onveyed tbe
property to hie eont1, subJe<>t to his mortJCllge,
which was paid in part from the avails of tb~
ln11umm•e upon It. It Is suftlclent that underthe second count the jury In this case must
have found that the defendant willfully burned the building with lntl'nt to Injure the Insurer, and this Is enough, wheth('r he owned
the building or not; an<l besides. the l'Vidence was adml1'18lble without reft'l"t'nce to.
the alleged Intent to Injure the Insurer. See,
also. Thayer v. Thayer, 101Mass.111.
The testimony of the defent'lant taken 11t theftre Inquest was clearly admleslble. It ls objected "that a judMlll oath 11<lmlnl11tcred
when the mind Is agitated and (llsturbed by
a criminal <'harge, or by suspicion of crime~
may prevent free and voluntary mental action." But this objectl~n. It there ls anything In It, Is not sustained as a matter of'
fact, for there Is nothing In the t•1111e to show
that he was, at the time his tt>11timony wa$
gh·en, proceeded against t•rlmlu111ly. or was
then under suspicion of <'rlmt>. The tE'fltlmony was given voluntarily, aud it11 Wl'htht
must depend upon the clrcumMt11u<·e11 undt-iwhlch It was given. Com. v. King. 8 Gray,
l".01; Com. v. Reynolds, 122 Mass. ~14.
The defendant's l'onversatlon with the Insurance broker In January, In which he sug.
gested that there should be an lm·rt>at1e of'
lnsuran<'e, taken In connt'('tion with his liability on the mortlCftge note which the sons.
had agrt>f'd to assume. tended to show that
he bad a pecuniary lnterf'l!t In the Insurance~
and a motive to commit the otrense charged_
Com. v. Hudson, 97 :Mass. 565.
Exceptions overruled.
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Och 20. 1892.

E$(_ept\°n3 fmm $\1Derior court, hliddlcsex

is-

wilfdictlllem agilillélt J nines Albert 'l‘refe-

and William H. Sniith for the murder

e11eIl9~ H- Dav“ by drowning. There

M pa vefiliﬂ 01 guilty as to 'i‘refethen,and

‘M guiliy 55 t0 Smith. Defendant Trefe-

me“ 9;;c9lm‘¢1- and asked that the case be

‘W0,-@911 (0 t-hiS"court for determination.

\,“dk.t against irefethen set aside,

A, E- Pm“\““'5'» Att3'- Gem, for the Com-

mol1\\'BB1ﬂ1- 301111 D. Long and Wm. Scho-

ﬁexm for defendants.

FIELD, 9- 1- The principal exception is

to the refusal of the court to admit the testi-

mgny of Sarah L. Hubert. The exceptions
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redte that: "Sarah L. Hubert, a witness

called in behalf of the defendant, testiiied

that her business, which she advertised in

the newspapers, was that of :1 trance medi-

um; that on December 22, 1891. in the tore-

noon, after 10 o’clock, a young woman called

at her place of business in Boston for con-

sultation. There was sufficient evidence to

go to the jury of her identiﬁcation as Del-

tena J. Davis. Upon objection being made

to the testimony of this witness, counsel for

the defendants stated to the court, aside I

from the jury, that they offered to prove

by this witness that at the interview on

December 22d, the young woman aforesaid

stated to the witness that she was ﬁve

months pregnant with child, and had come

to consult as to what to do, and added later

in the interview that she was going to

drown herself. The court -refused to ad-

rnit the testimony, and the defendants duly ‘

‘ excepted." The exceptions also recite that

“the evidence offered in behalf of the com-

monwealth was wholly circumstantial, and

tended to show that on December 23, 1891.

Deltena J. Davis left her home in Everett

at about 7 o'clock in the evening. and was

last seen on the corner of Ferry street and ‘

Broadway, which is near her home in said l

Everett, at about 25 minutes of S, the same L

evening. On the 10th day of January, 1892, I

her dead body was found in the Mystic

river, a short distance below the Welling-

ton bridge, about three miles from her l

home. There were no marks of violence

on the body when found. 11°!‘ W118 there any

evidence that poison had been administered, I

nor did her clothing show any signs of

vio1ence_ 0 1 1 The physicians called in

behalf of the commonwealth testified that ,

the cause of death was drowning. and that.

from the stage which digestion had l‘ea(-l1¢=,d_

death occurred between two and One-half

and three and one-half hours after the 419-

ceased had eaten her last meal. There

was evidence that the deceased ate her sup-

, to be unworthy 01' serious (,0
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FIELD, C. J. The principal exception Is amount of evfdeD<.-P t('Ild/ It' the ki:d 11.ttorto the refusal ot tl1e eourt to admit tht' teiitl· tht'tlQ' of sukJde sl1011J<1 ~ to support ~id
tho11;.:bt by the
mony of 8arah L. Hubert. The exct•ptlons t•ourt to be Important, the
recite that: "Snrah L. llulwrt, a wlttwBB be amt-nded so as to sbo:.xc•t'J>tlous .rnlgh:
called ln behalf of the defendant, tPstlftetl this evldetlC'e was; lllld be 1 t>xactl;y w11at
that her business, which tihe nch·ertlsed In iu bis opinion. this l'l"ldence wntliuated that,
the newspapers, was that of a trnnct' medi- to he unworthy of Herfous as so l.-llight as
um; that on December 22, 18Ul. lo tbt> fore- 'Ye undt-rstnnd that by "e •J 1C'OOsJclPmtlon.
-lfPU<•t>" I 11 t
noon, after 10 o'clm•k, a young womnn 1·nllE'd t.ot'Ilt>Y genl!rnl meant dlrel•t evJd
t
•
.•
euce tendat her place of buKlne- In Boston for con- ing to prove sul<'lde. VI
ftbout consldt-rlng
sultation. There ·was sutftcleut evidence to
what remedy, ft any, ls open to the uttm·go to tbe jury of her ldentUicatlou as DPluey general In a criminal case wb~r.... tlwi·e
tena J. Davis. Upon objection being made
Is a reason to suppose that thP excPJltlon11
to the testimony of thit1 witness, counsel for 1 tuken hy the detPndant and allowe-d by the
the defendants statt>d · to the <'Ourt, as:de 1 (:ourt are not sulticlently tnll, we are of
from the jury, that they otfned to proye
opinion that In the present cHse the f1t<'b1
by this witness that at the Interview on
are such that suicide would nntnrn Uy sugDecember 22d, the youug woman aforesaid
gest lttielt as a possible explanation of the
stated to the witness that she was ftve
cunse of death. and tbnt, if lt ht' true that
months pregnant with child, and had come the direct evldPnce tending to p1·ovt> sn~c·lde
to CODllUlt as to what to do, and nd<led later
ls lnconsldern ble, yet the clrcuin11tiu1ct>s afin the Interview that she was going to forded evident·e in support of th:e theory of
drown herself. Tbe court -rt>fm;ed to ad- suicide which must be con~ldered by the
mit the testimony, and the defendants duly jury. The amendment, therefore, If It were
(>Xcepted." The ex<:'eptlons al80 recite that made, and wert- of the character suggested.
''the evidence ofl'.ered In behalf ot the l'Om· would utford no aid to the court In tletermlnmonwealtb was wholly circumstantial, and lng the qut>stJons of law raised by the extPnded to show that on December 23, HlSU. ceptions.
Df>ltena .J. Davis left her home In Evel'Ptt
A few minor suggestions of the nttomey
at about i o'clol'k in the evening, and was general mny be brleft~· disposed of. Thert>
lo.st 11een on the corner of Ferry street und ' Wll8 t'Vldt>lll't' OU tilt' pnrt of the (~OlllWOU·
Broadway, which ls near her home In Mid Wl'llltb tlmt the dt>ce1u•ed did not leave her
Everett, at about 25 minutes of 8, the 11ame home on tht• :!:!d of Ut-i·t>mht•r until 3 o'clock
e•enlng. On the 10th day of .Jammry, 18!.I:!, In the afternoon, and that she returned
her dead body was found lu the Mystic home betw(•eu 8 and II o'do<·k, and the at·
river, a short distance below the 'Velllng- torney gt-nt>1·ul argueH that .. this furnishes
ton bridge, about three miles from ht>r sultident reuson fo1· the f'X<"luidon ot the
home. There were no marks or vlolenct> evhlt>m•e'' oll'l'red "lo tht> dli,1<"retlon of the
on the body when found, nor was there any court.'' But the jury ml~ht have dlshe·
evldi>nce that poison had been admlnistt-n•d, i lle\"t'tl thll:I l'Vhlt'IU'P of tht• ("OlJ)DIOUWPlllth,
nor did her clothing Rhow any slgnti of or, if tlw~· lwli1•ved It, might also have bt'·
violence. • • • The physicians enllt-cl in lleved thut the deceased had t:he interview
behalf ot the commonwenlth testified that , with 8arah J,, Hubert In the aftPrnoon.
the cause of death was drowning, and thut, rnther than In th:e foreuoon, of Del·ember
from the stage whkh digt>Ktlon bad ren<'11ed. :!:!d. Tht' attornt>~· A"Plll'l'll l
also argues
death occurred betwe en two and one-halt "thnt tht> stntemt>ut wu11 RO remote In point
and three and one-half hounc after the de- of tlnw from tlw dil<llppeura.uce and dPath
ceaaed bad eaten her last meal. There ot Tena. Davis tbat It was Within the disWIUI evidence that the deceased ate her sup. cretion of the court to exclude It for this
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reason." When evidence of declarations of

any person is oifered for the purpose of

showing the state of mind or intention of

that person at the time the declarations

were made, the declarations undoubtedly

"may be so remote in point of time, or so

altered in import by subsequent change in

the circumstances of the maker, as to be

wholly immaterial, and wisely to be reject-

ed by the judge." It has been many times

said that “some limit must, of course, be

had in applying practically the rules which

govern the admission oi’ this evidence."

This subject is considered in Com. v. Ab-

bott, 130 Mass. 472. and in the cases there

cited. There is undoubtedly a discretion to

be exercised by the judge or judges presid-

ing at the trial in the admission or rejection

of this kind of evidence; but it is not an
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absolute discretion, and the exercise of it,

when the facts appear, may be reversed by

this court. if the declaration, evidence of

which was oifered in the present case, had

been made by the deceased two or three

years before her death, when she was not

pregnant with child, and did not know the

dcfendﬂ-Ilf, it llllght well have been held by

the presiding judges to have been of no

signiﬁcance in the case.

In the case at bar the evidence offered

was that the declaration of the deceased

was made the day before her death, and

was made in a conversation concerning her

pregnancy, which continued until her death.

The declaration, therefore, was not made

at a time remote from the time of her

death, and there had been no change of

circumstances which made it inapplicable

to the condition of the deceased at the time

of her death. It was clearly competent for

the jury t0 ﬁnd from the evidence recited

in the exceptions that, if Deltena J. Davis

had an intention to commit suicide on De-

cember '."_£d, she continued to have the same

intention on December 23d. If the evidence,

in its nature, was admissible, the court, on

the facts Stated, could not exclude it on the

gmillld that fl‘0Il1 the lapse of time 01'

chﬁlli-If‘ Of Cirvlllustance it had ceased to be

material. It ought to be said that there is

ugtliing in the 9-Xi-Pptions indicathn: that the

liresitlilli-‘.' j“‘l!~'-“'5 “‘f1\$l'd to admit the evi-

(lQ1]('(-E on the i-rrouud that it was in their

discretion to "unlit 01' 1'e.icct it. They Prob"

ably considered the question presented as

settled by the dwisioll Of this court in Com.

\-_ 109101,, 132 .\iass. 22.

The main argument of the attorney general

is: First. that it is -immaterial whether the

deceased, at °1' b9f0l‘9 the time of her death.

had or had 110i an intention to commit sui-

cide; ﬁnd’ secondly’ that, if she had such an

intention. it could "lit be proved by evidence

of her l1*’clm"‘ti°n5 that she was going to

drown l10l‘-"‘(’lf- The burden was on the com-

monwealth t° pmve beyond a reasonable

doubt that fl1P defendant killed the deceased.

and to do ""8 the iilry must be satisﬁed be-

UELEVANCY.

t"t~son." When evidence of declarations of
yond n rea1mnable doubt tl:aa t she did not kill
any person ls ottered for the purpose of herself. The nature of tll~ t·ase proved by
!!howing the state of mind or Intention of the commonwealth was sue h that It was not
that person at tire time the de..•laratlons lmpo881ble that she had <.•01111llitted 1mlclde.
wt>re made, the declarations undoubtedly It it could be shown that she actually h11d
··may be 80 remote lo point of time, or 80 an intention to commit suicide, it would be
altered lo import by subsequent change in more probable that she did In fact commit lt
the circumstances of the maker, as to be than if she bad had no such hltentlon. It It
wholly Immaterial, and wisely to be ri>je<·t- 1 l'ould be shown that during the week before
ed by the judge." It has been many tlmi>s her death she had actually attempted to
said that "some limit must, of <'Ourse, be drown her11elf, and had been prevented froin
had in applying practically the rules which doing it, it seems manifest that this fact, acgo,·ern the admil'l8ion of this evlden1·t>."' cording to the general t>xperJence or mankind,
'I'hls 1.mbject is con11ldered in Vow. v. Ab- would have some tendency to show that she
bott, 130 lla11s. 47:!. and In the <'lllleS there might have made a second attempt, and nc<:lted. There is undoubtt>dly a clh1cretion to compllshed her purpose. It may be true that
be exercl11ed by the Judg1~ or judges p1·esld- an unmarried woman, pregnant with chfld,
Ing at the trial in the admltU1lon or rejection may some time say that she wlll commit sulof this kind of evidence; but It ls not an clde when she has no serious Jntentlon of doabsolute dlB<•retlon, and the exerdlll' of it, Ing It; or, if she bas sti<>h an intention, she ·
when tire fn<·ts appe.ar, may be reversed by may not <'8rry it Into etrt'<.'t, although she
this court. It the declaration, evldt>uee of may have an opportunity; but It ls lmpoewhlch was otfE>red in the present ca11e, had slble to say that the actual existence of such
been made by the deceased two or three 110 Intention does not tend to throw some
yea.rs before her death, when she was not light upon the cause of death of such a
pregnant with child, and did not know tm• wuman when found dead under clrcumstandefendant, it might well have been ht>ld by t'eH not lm•onsJstent with the theory of sulthe presiding judges to have been of no <:Ide. It ls a question of more dltlkulty
slgnltlcance in the ca11e.
whether evidence of the declarations of the
In the case at bar the evldeutoe otfere1l deeeased can be admitted to show such an
was that the de<>lnrutlon of the dec.•eitl!t'd Intention. The argument, in short, Is that
was made the day before her death, and 11u<·h evidence ls hearsay. It ls argued that
was made In a convt•rsatlon c.-onc.-erning her such dec·laratlons are not made under the
11regnancy, which continued until her deatJl. 11an<·tlon of an oath, and tbAt there Is no opThe declaration, therefore, was not made portunlty to examine and cross-examine the
at a time n>mote from the time of ht>r per11on making them, ao as to test his sln<leath, and there had been no chan~ of cerlty and tn1thtulness, or the accuracy nn<l
c.·h·c.·umflhtm•t>H which uuult> it ina11pll<>11ble co111pletene11S with which the declarations deto the condition of the dt><-t>UMt>d at the time B<'ribe hl11 Intention or state of mind; and
of her death. It was 1·learly t.'Ompetent for that, eYen if such tlec.·larations would have
the jury to flnd from the evidence recited some moral weight In the determination of
in the exet>ptions that, if Deltena J. Du·ls the ls11ue bt'fore the court, they are not withhad an intention to commit sulellle on De- In any of the exceptions, to the exclusion of
<·ember :!'.!d, Rhe cont1nue1l to h11,·e the HSme heal'll&y, which the common law recognizes.
Intention on Decembt-r 2.'Jd. It tht> evidence,
The counsel for the dt>fendant concede
ln itlf nature, was adwlsslble, the t"tmrt, on that the declaration in this case ls not, unthe factfl stated, could not ex<'lude It on the der our decisions, admllillllble as a part of
ground that from the lapse of time or what has been called the "res gestre," alc•bangE> of circumstance it had cea11e<l to be though tht>y <>ontend that some courts have
material. It ought to be said that there ls admltte<l similar declarattona on that ground.
nothing in the exi·eptlons lndh·atlntt that the Tltt>y c•once<le thnt to make a declaration adpresldlug Jmlgt>s rt>f.n8l'd to admit tilt> <'YI- mlsslble on that ground it must accompany
1ltmce ou the ground that It WIUI in tht>lr 1 an act whlc•h, directly or Indirectly, ls reledisl'retlon to admit or rejt•1·t it. 'rhey prob- vant to the issue to be tried, and must lo
ably contddered the question (ll"(>flentt>d as some way qualify, explain, or characterize
settled by the decl11lon of this court in Com. that act, and be In a legal sense, a part of
v. I<'elch, 132 lla11S. 22..
it. They concede that it this declaration ls
The main argument or the attorney gt>nernl a part of the act of vhlltlng Sarah L. Hubert,
Is: First. that it ls bnmaterlal whether the and tends to 11how the nature or purpose of
deceased. at or before the time of ht•r death. that vl11lt, the fact of the visit ls not relehad or bad not an intention to commit sul- vant to the issue. It does not tend to show,
clde; aud, secondly, that, if she had such an dlre<•tly or lndlre<'tlY, that the defendant kllllntentlon. It could not be proved by evidence ed the' de<•ea11eil. 0~ that she killed herself.
of her t1eclara.tlons that she was going to They cont·e<le that If the evidence of this decdrowu herself. The burden was on the com- laratlon ls a1lmls11lble, it ts on acrount ot the
monwee.Ith to 1Prove beyond a reasonable nature of the de<•laratlon. and not because
doubt that the <efendant killed the decea'Je<l, It was made at this interview; and that, If
and to do thlll the Jury must be satts1led be- made to anybody else nuder the same clr44

FACTS
the existing state of mind or intention ot the

speaker or actor. The fundamental proposi-

tlon is that an intention in the mind of a per-

son can only be shown by some external man-

SlIOWING PRO.B.\.B.I...... ~

-~e. lt would have the aa~e Blgn11lcuia~tj:'J:J.ey contend that the det.•laratlon is

_.

tclence of the state ot mlnd or lnten-

e~~e deceased at the tlme she made it,
11ou~ t:. ~e Intention Which lt tends to proYe
and~ t.ertal fact. whlch, ln connectton with
la 1. ~.._ct.S proved, tends to support the the-

lllllle
ifestation, which must be some look or ap-

pearance oi! the face or body, or some act or

speech; and that proof of either or all of

these, for the sole purpose ot howing the

existing state oi‘ mind or intention, may be

inferred. For example, the exceptions recite

that on the day when the deceased disappear-

ed Tretethen called at the house of her moth-

er “about 10 in the forenoon, and was there

some time with Tena, and that Tena that

day appeared bright and cheerful, and ‘full

of smiles,’ but at times during the month

prior thereto had been depressed in spirits."

The only apparent object of this testimony

was to show that on the day she disappeared

she was happy, and. therefore, could not have

contemplated suicide. Her bright and cheer-
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ful appearance might have been real or feign-

ed, but this was for the jury. It the deceas-

ed at the same interview had said, “I was

never so happy in my life as I am to-day,"

it is contended that this declaration might he

as signiﬁcant of her state ot mind a her

cheerful appearance, and that speaking. as

an indication of what is in the mind of the

speaker, is as much an act as smiling or con-

duct generally. The only obvious distinction

between speech and conduct is that speech is

often not only an indication of the existing

state or mind or the speaker, but a State-

ment of a fact external to the mind, and 35

evidence or that it is clearly hearsay. There

is, of course, danger that a 1111'!’ may not al-

ways observe this distinction, but that has

not availed to exclude testimony which is ad-

llliSS")i(‘ for one p1l1'1>0SB and not admissible

for another, to which there is danger the jut-y

may apply It. A common instance of this is

when it ls a material fact in the case whether

K

FACT-S S}IO\VlNG PR0B.\i$J_1 [5 (J.-LU.>1<,_

ces, it would have the shine si niﬁ- a erso11 at 8 €'_9l't;“

tuintﬂﬂrfllei‘ contend that the dot-laratign is thilng. '1‘he testlznon: uh; [Case v

We‘ -idence °t the 8&8-It‘. of mind or intcn- heard 111111 S“-7' It 18 Qt * 0"-15

semi evtne deceased at \'-he time she made it though t].1iS is not 8»-1&1 - Q said H

tiono we intention which 1 .’ * -_ q-as true ‘lo. ‘Kr “'11 "elm,

at t tends to proie person sdiql - - ‘ I . llcgs u

‘““nn tefml met’ which, in connection with closes anotlner in-stance 114 Q t1; a'I'"I'tt W110

““‘ma c-ts Droved. tends to suphort the the- tiﬁed to conversation ' lye D1-,8 at n»1,,,e‘I' 121.

Mm £ uiC5de- They contend that the staie about the distll"P""“"1l1? lvltany right “ﬁst Um’

°;'(Y;§n 01' '\l1'¢t**11t‘l({!1 in the mind of a per- his connection W1‘ itfe °l' 3, tb9”:9"8e,:;cZS_

Mn’ wnenhglﬂdgglﬁrktcggs be‘ pro‘,-ed by evi- him, and luvs stiélernéls 01- his\\..-bailla Da::Z~’lz<1,,ut

“me 0£_t_lc“lm_1y when “I2: \‘\ ell as of his admissible Hes to his l__i1-,D”et11e_,. s81»da,,,,

ms‘ 31 d cannot be can) 1 person has de- ply, or his n_1')‘unm tn it-ha t- nure F; ,,.el_e 0 1,,

ceased, an “(ms were u as witness, and under the cnc I Ht)“ nus \\- S 0 make 111;-

me aedara 8 wmch Earle before the con- that he was gu D], but, tenaezilld to bilge-

mwtsy a1‘0 9 the subject of the what was said to t tnl it-as the test! to 81'0":

may _ self, evidence till!‘ be Sta "0, In any of

The evidence that declarations were made him were true. b_'-'1'lm.~;@ telzu-Hts ""17 o1'1t_

must, of course. be ot the same character a view between the ¢7¢‘<'c.»|_,,eu hat t tbmade to

the evidence that the acts were done; that is, Hubert, it‘ there was such and e 9 111te1_

both must be proved by the testimony or deceased had said that 1' interﬂe “Boss

witnesses under oath, and subject to cross- father of her child; ewden letben was, the.

examination, and in either case the examlna- ceased said this is clearly heace that the $119

“on may extend to all the circumstances admissible to prove that he S"-1 , and is no?

which tend to show the signiﬁcance of the But suppose that 11,- had bee Was the r'at1,e,.

ollle? t 8 ,pclde.

They contend that the stafe
or Intention ln the mind of a perot m1J1 bell material, can be proved by eYi·
-w of bls declaratlona as well aa of hla
\\elite particularly when that person has de~ and cannot be called as witness, and
tlli 11eeiar&tions were made before the conu!vel.'SY arose which la the subJoc>t of the
tr\a\.
'tne evidence that declara tlons were made
must, of counie, be of the same character as
the evidence that the acts were done; that Is,
both mnBt be proved by the testimony of
wltnesse& under oath, an<l subject to crossex.ammation, and In either case the examination may extend to all the ctrcumstancca
whl<'b tend to show the slgnlf:lcance of the
t\l'(·Jaratlons or ot the acta as lndicatlona ot
the e:xlsUng state of mlnd or intention of the
speaker or actor. The fundamental proposition 11 that an intention ID the mind of a person can only be shown by some external manlft>Ktatlon, which must be aome look or api>earance ot the face or body, or sowe aet or
speech; and that proof of either or all of
these, tor the sole pUl"J.>OBe of showing the
extsting state of mind or intention, may be
Inferred. For example, the exeeptlona recite
that on the day when the deceased disappeared Trefethen called at the house of her mother ..abont 10 in the forenoon, and was there
some time with Tena, and that Tena that
day appeared bright and cheerful, and ·tull
of emllee,' but at times during the month
prior thereto had been depressed in spirits."
The only apparent object of tht11 testimony
was to show that on the day she disappeared
she waa happy, and. therefore, could not have
contemplated suicide. Her bright and ebeerful a11pearance might have been real or feigned. but this WBB tor the jury. If the deceased at the same interview had said, "I waa
never eo happy In my llfe as I am to-day,"
It le contended that this declaration might be
ae aignltlcant of her eta te of mind as her
cheerful appearance, and that speaking. as
an Indication of what ls ln the mind of the
speaker, Is aa much an act as smlllng or conduct generally. The only obvious distinction
between speech and conduct la that speech 18
often llOt only an Indication of the existing
state of mind of the speaker, but a statement of a fact external to the mind, and aa
evidence of that it Is clearly ht>al"Blly. There
Is. of course, clJUlger that a jury may not always observe thla dlstinctlon, but that has
not avaJled to exclude testimony whieh is admissible tor one purpose and not admlsslble
for another, to which there la danger the Ju1-y
may apply ft. A common Instance of tbia ls
wbeD It la a material tact ln the case whether
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~BB true.
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closes ano.-.1.1er J:nsta.11~. 'l.·.l)~ ~ ~~<liiiittetl. "'bo.
titted t<> con versa t1olle
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about the dfSSPP~:b.l'Ql!ce ~It~:fl~
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hlB connectfo.D W'
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him, and hfs sllenee ol" 4 l\,>~~4 .l>~ erelJd11lJt.
admi88lble so rar ~ '11,. 1"' ~t- t tbe.r '"'~ llJJ<J
ply, or his re1JlleB t~ ll>~ L1t11'Q~lles, 1J'er.8ltid to
under the cf1-cun7R•qlJ(,•f t l\•a e to~~ OJJJ;r
that be was gulltY; bn:· te11~ 8/ifd to %t_ "ewhnt was snfd to bllJJ "'°a t:J1e t E!d to s}J JJi,
self, e\•l<l<•nce tbD t tb<! l:ft8 ~ot, i:stt~olJ~ ~;
hlm were true.
SUJJJJo11~ :tellJ"''ta a 11r1 o:r It.
view between the dt'<'«•11,.,e<1 bat at t}JIJJllde to
Hubert, If there was IJUcb lllld t/Je e flJte,..
deceased had se.fd that X'rall /1Jterviei;:.t11ess
father of her child; evldeneretben lVa.s'
ceased said this ls clearly hea~e t/Jat the de':
admissible to prove that he ~88.y, and ls not
But suppose that it had been :s the .father.
trial that the deceased knew tbenled at the
pregnant, testimony that she ba~t Bbe was
she was pregnant would ·be som Bald that
that she knew It. It, the day :e;:!1e::
death, she bad written a note, addressed to
her mother, Rtatlng her condition, and declaring her intention to drown herself, and bad
left It In her desk when she went from honll'
the following day, the adml88lbllfty ot suc·h
a letter In evidence. atter proof thnt she bad
written It, depends upon the samt> <'OllMhlerattons aa the ndm~lblllty of evldt>nee of
similar ornl deelnratlons. Sn<>h a wt ltten det·lamtlon dUl'erB from an ornl declaration only
1n thta: that writing l8 often a more deliberate act than speaking; but this aft'ects
only the weight of the evidence. It may also
be thought that speech ls a less trustworthy
Indication of what ls really in the mind ot:
the speaker than acts or appearance, but this,
It It be so, also atl'eeta the wE>lght of the evidence. Certainly, to confine the evidence t()
acts, appearance, or spee<>h which Is wholly
Involuntary, would be im1>rectl<.-able and unreasonable, for almost· every expreBSlon of
thought or feeling can lie- Mlmuln tt><l; and, although evldenee of the con·s c1ous declaratlonfl
of a perBon a11 Indications ot his state ot:
mind bas In It some of the elements of hearsay, yet lt closely resembles evidence of the
natural expressions of feeling, Which bas always been regarded In the law not as hearsay, but as original evidence,-1 Green!. Ev.
I 100, (5th Ed.;) and when the perBOn making the declarations IB dead, BU<'h e\·ldence Is
often not only the best, but the only, evldeD('e
of what was In bis mind at the time. On
prlnclple, therefore, we think it elenr that
when evidence of the de<>lnratlons of a person ls Introduced solely for tbe purpose of
showing what the state of mind or Intention
of that perBOn was at the time the declarations were made, the declnrattons are to be
regarded aa acts from which the state of
a peraon.
tb.1ng
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mind or intention may be inferred in the

same manner as from the appearance of the

person, or his behavior, or his actions gener-

ally. 1n the present case the declaration.

evidence of which was offered. contained

nothing in the nature of narrative, and was

signiﬁcant only as showing the state of mind

or intention of the deceased.

But it is argued that this is not the law,

and that it is not competent for this court

to change the established rules of evidence.

We have been shown no case exactly like

the present.- but there are decisions closely

analogous, and, while they are not uniform,

yet we think the weight of modern authority

is in favor of admitting evidence like that

offered in the present case for the purpose

stated. The latest decision on the subject is

Hillmon v. insurance C0., 145 U. S. 283'». 12
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Sup. Ct. 909, and many of the cases are

cited in the opinion. See. also. l’ur_vear v.

Com., 1 S. E. 512; Blackburn v. State,

23 Ohio St. 146; Boyd v. State. 14 Lea, 162;

Goersen v. Com., 99 Pa. St. 388; Jumpcrtz

v. People, 21 Ill. 375: Reg. v. Jess0p_ 14$ i‘oX.

Cr. Gas. 204; Com. v. Fenno, 134 Mass.

217. It is argued that the decision of the

supreme court of the I‘nited States in in-

surance Co. v. .\Iosley. 8 Wall. 397. shows

that that court is somewhat more liberal

than our decisions warrant in admitting dec-

larations as a part of the res gestaz, and that,

fl1PI‘9f0I‘9, this court will not follow the de-

cision in Hillmon v. Insurance Co., ubi su-

pra. But, without considering whether we

should follow Insurance ('0. v. Alosley on

the subject "I PPS I-Iestae, we are aware of no

diiference in the decisions of the two courts

on the admission of declarations to show the

existing condition of the mimi of the dwisi-_

ﬂllf, if we except our decision in Com. v.

Felch. ubi supra. which we will consider

hereafter. This court admits exclamations

and declarations as evidence of existing pain

in case of injuries. In the case of wills.

"P011 the issue of sanity or undue inﬂuence.

this Court 1139 alwﬁys admitted evidence of

declarations which tend to simw the mn-

dition of the mind of the testhtor, and his iii.

tention with regard to the disposition of his

Dl‘0l><*I'ty, or his fear of the person alleged to

have exercised undue inﬂuence. Shailer v.

B'.li1Sif('t1(]. 99 Mass. 112; Lewis v_ Mason,

199 M115?“ 169; May “- Bradlee, 127 Mass.

414; P039!‘ "- Baldwin, 133 Mass. 427; ‘Vood-

\\'ai-(] V, Sullivan. 152 Q1888. 470, 25 N. E.

337; pi(-kt-us \'. Davis. 13-i Mass. 252. UI)on

ﬂu 188119 “'l“’“""' ﬁler? was an intentional

gift 01' Rift (‘ﬁll-18 niortis the same rule pre-

vans, \\'11itu9.i' Y. \Vh1'cler. 116 Mass. 490;

wiiitwoii v. Vi-'inslow, 132 Mass. 307; Lane

v. Moore. 151 “ass. 87, 23 N. E. 828. In

Lane v. 31°‘_"'“ thi ¢'0urt say: “Where the

mental condition of :1 Person at a particular

time is in issue. his appearance, conduct

acts, and <1P('lﬂl'utions. after as well as be-

fore the flluﬁ 111 question, have been held

admissiblt‘ ill 9"i<1@I1€'e if sufficiently near in

BELEVANCY.

mind or intention may be Inferred ln tbe
same manner as from tbe appearance ot the
person, or bis behavior, or bis actions generally. In the present cue the declaration,
evidence ot which waa offered, contained
notWng In the nature of narrative, and was
significant only as showing the state of mlnd
or intention or the deceaS('(l.
But It Is arguPd thnt this Is not the Jaw,
and that 1t Is not <'Ompetent for tbls court
to change the e11tabll11bed rules or evlden<'E'.
We have he<•n shown no ('llKe exactly like
the present• but there are decisions closely
analogous, and. while they are not uniform,
yet we think the weight ot modern authority
la In favor of admitting evidence like that
otrered In the prest>nt •'aJIE.' tor the purpose
sta.ted. The latest decision on the subJM't IR
Hlllmon v. Insuran<'e Co., 14.'> U. R !?~. 12
Sup. Ct. 909, and many or the <'aKeB are
cited In the opinion. See, all!O. Puryear v.
Com., 1 S. E. 512; Bla<'kbum v. Rtate,
23 Ohio St. 146; Boyd v. Mtate, 14 I..ea, 1H2;
Got>r-n v. Cow., 99 Pa. Rt. 388; .Jum1K'rtz
"'· People, 21 Ill. 37;;; Reg. v. Jt>RHOp, rn ('ox,
Cr. Cas. 204; Com. v. Fenno, 134 )fall8.
217. It ls argued that tht> dt>elslon ot thP
supreme court ot the rnltPd Htate11 In Insurance Co. v. l\Iosley, 8 Wall. 39i. 11how11
that that r•ourt Is somewhat more llheml
than our d1•<·l11loDB warrant In admitting dt'<'lamtlons 011 a part of the re11 gestee, and that,
thprefore, this court wlll not follow the de<'lsion In Hlllmon v. Insurance Co., ubl supra. But, without <'ODBlderlng whether wt>
should follow Insurance Co. v. lloslt>y on
the subject of res gestie, we are aware of no
dltrerenre In the decisions of the two rourts
on the admission ot de<'laratlons to show the
existing condition of the mind of the dt'<'larant, If we exc•Ppt our dt'<'lsion In Com. v.
Felch, ubl supra, Which we wlll con11hter
hereafter. This court admits exclamations
and declarntlons as evidence ot exlatinii: Jlllln
In case ot Injuries. In the case of wllla.
upon the Issue of sanity or undue lnfluenet.>,
this court bas always admitted evidence of
declnratloos which tend to sbow the rondltlon of the mind of tht> testator, and bla Intention with regard to the dl11posltlon ot bis
property, or his fear ot the person alleged to
have exerc•il'led undue Influence. Sballer ¥.
B •mstf'a<l. 00 MaBB. 112; Lewis v. Mason,
109 Mass. 10!}; May v. Bradlee, 127 Mass.
414; Pottc>r ,•. Baldwin, la3 Mass. 427; Woodward v. ~ulllvan, 152 :\Ines. 4i0, 25 N. E.
R37; Plck(•us '" Davis, 134 Mass. 252. Upon
an Issue whether tbel'(> wns an Intentional
gift <>l' gift cau11a mortls the RBme rule prevalls. '\"\·bltney v. "Wht'\•ler, 116 Mass. 490;
Whltwt"ll v. Wln11low, 1a2 l\Iass. 307; Lane
v. Moore. lol l\laRB. 87, 23 N. E. 828. In
I.ane v. ~foorP this court say: "Where the
mental condition ot a Pel."Ron at a particular
time ls lll IR14ue, his llI>Pt>arance, conduct,
acts, and dt"<'laratlona, atter aa well as before the time In question, have been held
adml~tdl>l(> In evidence If sutllclently near In
46

point of time, and lf they a1>1war to haft' aor
tendency to show what tba t: mental condlttoii
waa. The question bas usually arisen in
cases Involving the validity or wills, but the
principle ls the same where tlJe valldlty ot a
gift Is questioned, and ~here responslblllty
tor crime ls to be detennlned." See also,
Howe v. Howe, 99 Ma88. 88. It ls to be noticed that In all these <'&sea the person, evidence ot whose declarations was admitted,
was dead at the time of the trial. In actions by the husband for seducing his wife
and alienating her affections from blm the
declarations and statements of the wlte, made
before the alleged Beduetlon, Indicating the
lltate of her affections towards her husband,
bnve uniformly been admitted upon the question ot damages. Palmer v. Crook, 7 Gray,
418; Jacol.>8 v. Wbltromb, 10 Cush. 2M. In
the lal'lt <'aae the court 11ay: "Whenever the
mt>ntal teellngs of au Individual are to be
11roved, the usual expressions of BU<'h feelings are original evidence, and often the on17
proot of them which can be had." At common law the wltt> could not be a witness In
such a calW'. Io Com. v. Abbott, ubl supra,
the detendRnt, who was not the husband.
being on trial tor the murder of a married
woman, for the purpose of showing "the exlsten<'e ot motive on the part of the husband
ot the deN'ftsed to commit the <"rime," otrered
evidence that the husband and wlte qual'N'led some years hetore the homicide; that
about six years betore the homklde tht> husband was seen entering bis own houtte with
an axe In bis hand, and that he then uttered
threats against his wlte and a man not
nnmed; and also offered to show the lllteellng ot the husband towards the wife, by
statements not In the nature ot thl"l'ftts. made
by the huRband to a wltne&11. The evlclen<'f'
otTered was confined to acts done or Rtate-ments made on or before the year 18i7. The
homi<'lde was 1D January, 18RO. The reputation of the wife for cbaRtlty betwet>n the
years 1873 and 1877 bad been bad. There
was uncontroverted evidence that from May,
1879, the reputation of the de<•eased was not
questioned, and that the husband and wife
continued to live together until her death.
The justices trying the <"ase excluded the
evidence, and the defendant excepted. In
that case this court say: "The exlsten<'e of a
criminal motive Is an element whl<'h It ls
otten neceBBary to establish In order to give
cbamcter to the acts and conduct of a party
charged with or 11uspeeted of crime. In such
case tbe conduct or declarations of a party,
both before and alter the principal taet In
Issue, are admlBSlble, provided they are suttlclently near In point of time, and sumclentlf slgnlfl<'ant of the motive or Intent to be
proved. The rules which govern human conduct are to be reasonably applied In thest>
<'Riie&, as In all other Investigations ot fft<'I .
They are to be so applied In all (•ases WhE'M'
the inquiry Is H to the mental or moral condition ot a pe~on at the time a partkular act
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The intent or disposition when

(1o1;t"1tes an element or crime, can only

;-tﬂmed= 35 811 moral qualities are,

acts and declarations "of the l,m.ty_-~

1"“ tnuriv after saying that a certain dis-

ust be left to the j\1g\~j(»es trying the

eid that it did not appear that the

me‘ L-e5 1“ exclllﬂillg the evidence offered

e of its "em°te1\e88, and of a subse-

chaﬂge in the relations of the husband

The court also say, what has been

mm many H1119!‘ in Criminal cases where it

was (:0

gténded '¢b11i_8on1e other person than

“R aegendﬂllt ¢°111l111itt‘d the crime. that “the

existence 01 in f°°“I18 BS a luotivc for the

commission of crime will not alone justify

“bmitting to I1 iury the question of tilt‘

gum of a person entertaining such feeling.
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1; becomes niatcrial only when oﬂcred in

mun“-(ion with other evidence proper to be

gubmittt-(l, showing that the person chamell

with such ill fcelinf-Z was in fact implicated

in the commission of the crime.” 'l‘here is

no intimation anywhere in the opinion that

11 the evidence had related to a time very

near the homicide, and if there had been evi-

dence implicating the husband in the com-

mission of the crime, evidence of his threats

against the wife. and of his statements show-

ing ill feeling towards her, would not have

been admitted; and the language of the

opinion implies that they would have been.

The admission of evidence of declarations in

Elmer v. Fcssenden, 151 l\-lass. 359. 24 .\'. E.

2(B. and in actions involving the question of

dolnicile,-Kilburn v. Bennett, 3 “etc. (Mass)

199.—-and in bankruptcy cases,»—Bateman v.

Bailey, 5 Term R. 512,—may perhaps be sup-

ported on the ground that the declarations

were a part of the res gestae; but, if these

cases were not decided on this ground, they

must be considered as applicable to the

present case.

It is also argued that the deceased, with

reference to the indictment, is not u party;

and the qiie.~liion whether her declarations

should be received as evidence is the same

as if they were the declarations of any other

person than the defendant, and that evidence

of a confession by a third person that he

killed tho deceased, or threats to injure the

deceased. made by him, cannot be received.

The decisions appear to he uniform that con-

fessions of third persons cannot be received

as evidence that they committed the crime,

and that the defendant did not; and this for

the plain reason that they are hearsay. They

are stri<-ti_v narratives of past transactions.

not made under oath. and are only competent

as admissions against the persons making

them. The decisions are not uniform wheth_

or evidence of threats made by third pefﬂons

to injure the deceased should be admitted or

not as evidence for the defendant. In 111051;

of the cases where the evidence of such

threats by third persons has been rejected

in trials for murder. the ﬂlrcﬁiﬂ were made

111

The lntent or dlspoaltlon, when

60t.li::..,.tee an element ot crhne, can only

nro.,t) ~ined, as all

,ecee

'oe.
!lOlll

'l'bll

mo-ra\ qualities are,

~ta and deelaratlons ·of the party.''

;!~ after saying that a certain dls-

Jl>'1St be left to tb.e Justk·es trying the
~l>~eld that lt dld not 11.Pllellr that the
rue. ~ ln excluding the evldence offered
tourt
of lta remotenesa, and of a subae~~ cbflnge ln the relations of the husband
l\:!.1.fe- Tbe court also say, what bas been
a d rnauY times ln crlmlnal <'ftses where It
w contended that MOn1e otlwr pe1"80n than
~ detendant committed the <-rlmt>, that "the
e.dste'l1ce of ll1 feeling as a 1notlvt- for the
eomm\e8lon of crime wlll not alone justify
aubmltting to a jury the question of the
pllt of a pel'80n entertaining such feeling.
lt \l(>(>ODle& material only wheu offered in
collDectlon with other evlt'.lenee proper to be
trobm\tted. showing that the pel'l1on <'hat'Ked
with sueh Ill ft-ellng was ln fact lmpllmt~d
tn tbe comml88lon of the crime." 'l'hel'e ls
no lntlmatlon anywhere In the opinion that
1f the evidence had related to a time very
uear the homlelde, and lf there bad been evl·
dence Implicating the husband In the commfSBIOD of the erlme, evidence of bJs threats
against the wife, aml ot hls statements showing lll feeling towards her, would not have
been admitted; and the lanJ..'llage of the
oplnlon Implies that they would have been.
The admlBBlon of evidence of declarations In
Elmer v. Ff'88enden, 151 Mau. :'159, :.?4 X. E.
208. and In a<'tlons tnvolvlng the qm-'Ktlon of
oomlcUe,-Kllburn v. Bennett, 31.'tletc. (Ma88.)
199,-ud In bankruptey cases,--Bateman 'I".
Balley, II Term R. 512,-may perhaps be supported on the ground that the declarations
were a part of the rea gestl2; but, If tht!se
cases were not decided on this ground, they
must be CODl'lldered as npplleable to the

!e

present case.
H 18 alllO argued that the deceased, with
ref'enmee to the Indictment, 111 not 11. party;
and the qul!l'tion whether her decl11.ratlo1U1
should be received as evidence ts the same
BB If' they were the declarations ot any other
pereon than the defendant, and that evidence
of a conteBBlon by a third person that be
killed the deceased, or threats to Injure the
decealed. made by him, cannot be received.
The deel8lons appear to be uniform that confeeslons of third peraons cannot be received
att evlden<'e that they committed the crime,
and that the defendant dld not; and this for
the plain reuon that they are hearsay. They
ore strictly nanattves of past transactions.
not made under oath, and are only competent
us adml881ons against the persons making
them. The decisions are not uniform whether evidence of threats made by third persons
to Injure the deceased should be admitted or
not aa evidence for the defendant. In moat
of the cases where the evidence of such
threats by tblrd pt>rsons has been rejected
In trlalll for murder, the threats were made
too long before the bomlcllle to be slgnUl<.-ant,

CA US.E_

w-~re _n:utde 'llllt:t~
,..,
cum1tanc~S "tJUUl tboae ~ "\>«..011.te }(.
0 • 16
ceaaed w . - s kJUe4 °.r t~~~1,,.t: ~~

or they

dence teII<I.Lllg' 1:o :ltll>lJ(.~'t-~ ~:tl~ .,,.~tterer,t
the comnafssJo.n
t.be. ftt~
~
~ tb C!Jz..
dence was re1ectecl 0 11 ~...,.;l:)"'eelJo Otber e de.
grounds.
i--~v-Jdence O:t tl! o~~ ~. 1111:el'aoria
against t:be
de~eD<f.eillt l"e~ t-~ ol" Ill/ t:be el>/
when the q uesuon ll>ae lllt~ 0 :r t1J or tb~•
ant or the deceasefl ltl1t "'"~t ~ e dec-ea8ed
and whether the derell~E> t 1/ 1el" tbe "dlJ:IJttfld
fense. 'V'fg~fns v. l">~Pl l i t ~/! lll'st 11<tere.od.
on a trial ror UJurde.r.
f~ /_;f!<l hi 11ef:_u1t,
that another person lla<l 111 clere11 8. ~
deceased. and bad Bll op.Po 'f's,·111 t IJt Prove:the murder, and was t'oulld1-t11111t;r ~""11l'cl8 tbe
the murder was colllllJJtt~ 0 iJ tbe
COllJlllJt
the murder. under Bll&lJJc-lo bear tbe ;:. "'bea
wtth a weapon whlcb lnlg::" clrculll ace or
lnstrumt>nt with wbf<•b the d t lJave bee~cee,
t"d, and that the conduc·t or
wllB kl~
tbe munler was SU<'h as to Ind~ Pel'filon arter
J
had eommltted ft, 1t WouJd 8 <·ate that he
I
den<·t> thut this person, on the
that evlmurder, had threatened to kill t~ bet'ore the
lt he could tlnd him, and &aid th: deceased
searching for him that he might ithe was
would be sllOlltlcant of an Intent to kl~l
and ought to be admitted; and we find no
well-considered case where, on this state ot
facts, such evidence bas beE'n rejected. See
State v. Beaudet, 53 Conn. rias, 4 A tl. 2:i7,
and cases elted; Holt v. State, 9 Tex. App.
071; Cluverlus v. Com., 81 Ya. 787, 82U; Walk·
er v. State, fl3 Ala. 100; Howard v. State, 23
Tex. App. 206, 5 S. W. 231; Puryear v. Com.,
ubl supra; Worth v. Railroad Co., 51 !!'ed.
171. ·ID Com. v. Felch, ubl supra, the defendant was charged with attempting to procure the mlscarrtage of Mary Ann Flnley on
July 2, 1881, by thP use of some Instrument
to the jurors unknown, In consequence of
wbleh she died on tbe same day. He con·
tended at the trial "that the operation was
performed by Macy on herself; and there
was evidence tending to show that It would
have been poBBlble tor her to perform the
operation on herself, romddered as an opera·
tlon, using for the purp<ise an ordinary lead
pencil." He offered to prove by one Hughes
"that In the month of June next preeedtng
the time of the alleged offense Mary told her
that she was pregnant by one Edward Tit·
comb, and that If Titcomb did not perform
an operation to procure a miscarriage, or get
aome one to do so, she should perform the
operation on herself with a lead pencil. It apI>earPd that said declarations neither accom·
panted nor were explanatory or any a<'t then
done by her." The e'l"ldence waa ~xeluded,
and the defendant excepted. This court, In
the opinion, tl'ellt the evidence as benrsay,
and say: "~uch evidence le generally lnad·
mlsslble. There are. however, Be¥eral exreptlone to this rul~. nnd It le eontended by the
1letendant tb11t thlM evidence n1ay properly
be brought within some one of tb@'m. The on·
ly exception 11artlc•ularl7 designated ls that re-
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lating to pedigree. This is, indeed, one of the i siding judges erred in refusing to 1'o(-Q1‘-eﬂllg

well-recognized exceptions to the general rule.

That which is technically hearsay evidence

is competent evidence upon a question of

pedigree.” An examination of the original

papers hows that one of the contentions of

the defendant was that the evidence that

Mary said that Tltcomb was the fa-tiier of the

child was some evidence in the case that he

was the father, on the ground that it was a

declaration in relation to the pedigree of the

child; and the argument was that, if Tit-

comb was the father, and the defendant was

not, it was improbable that the defendant

would attempt to procure a l1llSt':ll'l'l:l;_'P. The ‘

decision of the court that no question of pedi-

gree was involved in the case, and that for

the purpose of proving that Titcomb was the

father of the child the evidence was hearsay,
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and inadmissible, is undoubtedly correct.

But the counsel for the defendant in that

case also contended that evidence of this ,

declaration was admissible to show an inten-

tion in the mind of the deceased to perform

the operation, in connection with the evi-

dence that the operation was one which she

might have performed. There are ome pas- ‘

sages in the latter part: of the opinion which

perhaps tend to show that this argument did

110i Wholly 999808 the mind of the justice

W110 Wl‘0te it, but this particular aspect of the

evidence is certainly not considered, and no

cases are cited, and the whole discussion in

the opinion is that this point in the considera-

tion of the case might not have received the

attention It deserved. Upon 9, 1-9-exmningtion

Qf the question, we are of opinion that under

the circumstances shown in Com. v. Feich

a. part of the evidence should have been ad.

m“t"d 1'91‘ the P“1'Dose of showing the inten-

tion in the mind of the deceased, and that to

this extent that decision must be overruled.

It is not necessary, in the present case, to de-

termine wiiat limitations. if any, in practice

must be put upon the admission of this kind

of evidence. because all the limitations exist

which have ever been Suggegtgd as nones-

sm'.v- The DPYBOII making the declaration, if

one was made. is dead. She had ml ()pp()1'- ‘

tunity to commit suicide, and it was com-

iictcnt for the jury to find that she had a

motive to ¢°m"11i it; and the declaration, if

imide, was made under circiiinstauces which

exclude any suspicion of an intention to make

ovlllonce to be used at the trial. We cannot

RIIOW Whether the J\"'.V would or would not

have folllld that the deceased was the Person

W110 had the interview with the witness, or

whether ﬁle?’ W011l(l have believed the wit-

I1c-'-=- or “'he“‘°'» if "Icy did believe her, they

would have found that the deceased had real-

15' the intvllfioll which the declaration liidi-

cated. ul’ “'h"ﬂ“‘1' U18 testimony, in view of

an the g\'l(l9lll‘U, would have iiffei-ted the

minds of the _|ur_v. \\'e can onl_v say ilmt on

the facts‘ 1"*"“°d ill the exceptions the evi-

deuce cannot be_consldered as immaterial 01-

uiilmportant. We are of opinion that the pre-

RELEVANCY.

latlng to pedigree. This ls, Indeed, one of the • siding judges erred lo refuAlng to l"f'<'ei'fe this
well-recognized ex<~eptlons to the general rule. evidence, and that, for this reason, the verThat which ls teehnlcally h.earllay evidence diet against Trefethen must be set aside.
ls competent evidence upon a question ot
The remaining exceptions may be noticed,
pedigree." An examination of the original although It 18 not abeolu t:ely neeessary t()
papers shows that one of the contentions of de<'lde them. The first ex<.•eptlon Is to thethe defendant was that the evidence that refusal of the court to 1>errnlt the counsel
.Mary said that Titcomb was the father of the for t111• dc•ft•ndant to ask l 'harlt>s E. Ray,
<'hlld was some evidence In the <"aHe that he one of the Jurors, who wati under examlnawas the father, on the ground that It was a · tlon by the court UJIOU the volr dire, "to
declaration In relation to the pedigree of the what extt>nt be had n>ad H bout thl' <·ase In
chlld; and the argumt>nt was that, If Tit- the news}Hlpere." Ray was sworn as a Jucomb was the father, and the defendant was ror, an1t sat as a Juror at the trial. Tbe
not, lt was Improbable that the defemlant court read to all the jurors summoned Pub.
would attempt to 1mwm·e 11 mlHt·arrlagP. The St. c. 170, I 3:i, and chapter 214, § 7, and then
decision of the court that no 11uestlon of 1ielll- ' read a portion of what was said by Shi. w.
gree was Involved In the ease, and that for C. J., s11eaklng for the full <'OUrt In Com.
the purpose of proving that Titcomb was the v. Webster, o Cush. 296, 297, 298, viz.: ..The>
father of the child the evlden<'e was hearsay, ' statute Intends to exclude any lWreon wb()
and lnadmlselble, Is undoubtedly corre<>t. • bae made up hie mind or formed a JudgBut the counsel for the defendant In that 1 ment In advance In favor of either side. Yet
case also contended that evidence of this , the 011inlon or judgment WUbt bt' HOwethlng
declaration was admleslble to show an tnten- more than a vague lmpreselon. formed from
tlon in the mind of the deceased to perform , casual conversations with others, or from
the operation, In <.'Onnectlon with the evl- rending Imperfect, abbreviated, newepapt•r
dence that the operation was one whl<·h she re11orts. It must be such an opinion u1wn tht•
might have performed. There are some pas- · merits of the question as would be likely to
sages In the latter part of the opinion which bias or prevent a candid judgment upon a
perhaps tend to show that this argument did j full hearing of the evidence." The court alnot wholly escape the mind of the justice so read the statement made by Chapman.
who wrote It, but thla particular aRpect of the 11 C. J., speaking for the full court, In the trial
ef"ldence ls certainly not considered, and no of Samuel M. Andrews. Report of Trial of
<'llses are cited, and the whole discussion In Andrews, by Charles G. Davis, p. 8. In the
the opinion ls that this point In the ronsldera- ' present case, the court, having put to the
tlon of the case might not have received the juror Ray all the statutory quesUons, which
attention It deserved. Upon a re-examination he had answered to its satisfaction. refused
o.f the question, we are of oplnlon that under to permit the counsel for the defendant to
the circumstances shown In Com. v. Felch put the question we have quoted above. 'l'he
a part of the evidence should have been ad- statutes we have cited, as also St. 1887, c.
mlttf'd for the purpose of showing the lnten- 149, undoubtedly contemplate that other
tlon lo the mind of the deceased, and that to questions bt>sldes the Btatatory QUPl'ltlons
this extent that decision must be overruled. may be put to jurors by the <.'OUrt, or by tile
It le not necessary, ln the present <'8se, to de- parties or their attonwys under the dln-ctermlne what llmltatlons. If any, In practice tlon of the court. Pub. St. c. 170, § 35. altJO
must be put upon the admlBBlon of this kind provides that "the party objecting to the
of evlden<>e, because an the limitations exist juror may Introduce any other competent evWhl<'h have ever been suggested as ne<>es- 1dence In support of the objection." To deeary. The 1wrson making the declaration, If termlne whether a juror bas such bias or
one was wade, Is dead. She had an oppor· prejudice that be d<X"S not stand Indifferent
tunlty to commit sul<"ide, and It was eom- In the cause le often a matter of a good cleal
11etent for the Jury to find that she bad a of delicacy and dlftl<'Ulty, because persons
motive to commit It; and the declaration, lf most atre<·ted with bias or prejudice are
rnude. was made under clrcumHtan<>es which sometime!! the least sensible of It; but the
exl'lude any suspicion of an Intention to make extent to which the examination of the Ju·
e\·ltlem•e to be Used at the trial. We c·annot . ror should be carried after the statutory
kuow whether the Jury would or would not questions have been answered has been said
ha \·e round that the deceased was the person to be within the sound judgment and judiwho had the Interview with the wltuesR, or clal discretion of the trial judge or judges.
wht>thel" they would have belle\"ed the wit- Com. v. Burroughs. 145 M1uu1. 242, 13 X. E.
nt'HH, or whether, If they did l>Plleve her, they 884. It le plainly Impossible to exclude every
would have found that the dt'<'eased bad real- juror who has read lo the newspapers some
ly the lutentlon Which the de<•laratlon lndi- statement of the case, because this might
<'att'<l, or wlwtber the tet1tlwony, In view or t'X<'lude every lntelligPnt man In the counall the eYhlt>nt·e, wouhl haYe al'f('(•ted the trr It le well known. boWt'VPr. that tht•n>
mlndtt of' tht• Jury. "'e ean only !lily that on Is.~ growing tt•rnlent·1· In c..-rtaln llt'WKfJ1tf1t•rs
the fact~ re<·l~ In the exceptions the evl- to publish not onlx tl~e e,·hlt>u1·P gtveu In any
d<'n<'e caunot W considered as Immaterial or prellmlnnry hearing on a charge of crime,
unimportant.
e are of opinion that the pre- but all sorts of unverUled rumors and of
48
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'FACTS :SHOWING J?UOB~~.z..-E
FACTS s-Howmo P1<0nxBI-15 CAUSE-

(mile Ce-ﬂee of Suspected persons.

@H11“0;v1° Pracilce in 8. case. vvhich excites

like? 1v0P“1ar_mte'~'e3t may sometimes re-

ilif-‘ egtfﬁofdlnary care on the part of the

opinlons concerning the probable guilt

This rep-

the selection of jurors, if the ac-

'15 t° have an h11Dartial trial. If the

ion °t the ‘-'°“1't t1'Yil1:-‘r the case in the

of illﬁ t‘X1lmiuation of jurors, after

wtutory questions have been put and

ct°"“Y 9-‘-lswered, is absolute, we can-

not revise iii if it is DOE we cannot say, as

of 111W, 011 the soniewliut meager

smte““>11t Wliiililled in the exceptions. and

in the absence of anything indicating what

mnabie exception in pi-oving_ that the court

erred in excluding the question.

The mother of the deceased. Mrs. Davis,

tesiiiled to a conversation with the defend-
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am on the morning of December 24th, a

pan of which is as follows: “I asked him

where Tena was. He said he hadn't seen

he,-_ ~ * ' Says I, ‘Don't lie. She went

out to meet you last night on the corner of

Ferry street, and you have carried her oti.’

He said he had not. Said I, ‘You have.”'

The counsel for the defendant asked that

this be stricken out, and objected to its ad-

mission. The court overruled the request,

and admitted the testimony, and the defend-

ant excepted. There are other examples of

the admission of similar Ti‘$i.iill()Ily against

the objection of the defendant. It does not

appear that the defendant testiﬂed as a wit-

ness in his own behalf, and no question aris-

es of the admissibility of evidence to affect

his credit as a witness. The exceptions re-

cite that, “after Mrs. Davis had testlﬁed, the

commonwealth introduced a large amount of

i(*>ifilll0Iiy relating to the conduct of Trefe-

then after the disappearance of Tenn, includ-

ing statements, dz"-<-larutions. conversations,

and conduct of Trefethen with Mrs. Davis"

and other persons named, the general char-

acter of which is set out in the exceptions;

and “that at the interview with Mrs. Davis

on the morning of December 2-ith, when ac-

cused by her of '1‘ena's disappearance, he

[Trefethcn] shed tears, and was greatly ex-

cited; and also * “ “'

time-s in these interviews, during the period

between December 23d and January 10th, he

met the statements quoted in this bill, H1869

to Mrs. Davis by Tenn, and repeated to him

by Mrs. Davis or the oﬂicers, in various

qg-a§-'3’ sometimes by QXPHCHI délliill, SOIll8-

times by silence, and sometimes by eql1iV0-

cal expressions, such as ‘it must be a mis-

take,’ ‘it is all a mistake,’ ‘it must be some

other party;’ from all which evidence \he

commonwealth claimed and argued. without

objection, that these denials of his relations

with Tena, of her seduction. Of the 11~DD0lnt-

ment with her for the evening of December

23d. and his connection with her disappear.

once and death, Wm‘? f“lS°' and were made

;and hearing of 3 dﬁfemade 1

the counsel of the defendant had any rea- “

C.AUS~.

der." Z~ a. de~;::ida.nt f
[
Thie rep· and un~c-:1-..-aJV~tf: <le-tl: ~"
°""9.~0.
otljlll tt:>le practice in a CWH. whlch excites whole c<'i:& ver.
.n, lt ~~ J 4 1-~
'6
rebesi8 ~pular inte-rest may eouietimee re- in evld~iice 8~':i.,.fii8t ~t~~ t. ,.:: 'Jll>'ftb. <!l1.
gm1-t e"--t;n.ordlnary care on the part of the lt'ltsger&.id -v.
llt41~ tQ ~0 t be t/JJs 18 l21e,
qmre ~P the selection of jurors, lt the ac· E. 100. Z~ a.DY
o,r -l~,s~o& all lll~ll t.be
court 1-' to have an llnpartlal t.rlal It the the de:f'e:o.da.P"t pu 1.Q e
~
~aaa ltdlll1881,C!ed
~ tlOll Of the court trying .the C~ ln the directly o r J.ocU~tJ,. "'tcte~<..'Q~l'e~ '~ 2() OJl.
dlle'r:r of the examlnatlon of jurors. attet the crime cbB.rg~ ~ t~~t ~e tell</.'llt/oll ,,.1
mlttst.atutory que8tlons have been put and right to ba ve P~ 1.Q e e Cler. Ile 18 ; to Bbo"1'.
~t\Bfactorlly &DBWered., ls absolute, we can· said to and bY ltt:t l.lt1"/cl<•..r.i e~dllrJt hll!Jt.r
st: t re~lse lt; If lt la not, we cannot aay, aa relating to -the 88 llle 811 b flJe ; : ll.JJ tba':'1 tbe
:..tteT Of law, on the 80Inevo'i1Ut WPa.ger in his ~avor. CODl. l>'. ~ '.J~t, llJe tlllJe lVas
atatetut>Ut contained l:n the exc"ptions, aml Whesa a statezneDt le tt:I e.J>es ftbo111rb 1 111Jd
ln the 11\>lle'nce of anything lndlcatiug what and llearlog 0£ a <lerellri~~e 1;,
Gra,., 8~8
the counsel of the defendant had any re&· tends to show -tbBt he 1~t. TVhJe: PreaelJce·
10nable exception ln proving_ that the court mains silent, or .llltUce8 a lfnllt,., llll' Jr f.zoue,
erred lD exeludlng the question.
the rule of law bsB bee..n ~ eqllil'oe.1 be re.
The Dlother of the· deceased, Mra. Davie, lows: "The rule Is that ~ted to ; ; l'epJ.F,
teat\tted to a conversation wltb the defend- in the presence ot the det: 8 tatel1Jeat 48 ro1.
ant on the morning of December 24th, a no reply le made, Is not a;Zldaat, to w~:de
pa\t of wblch ls aa foll<!ws: ..I asked him him, unless it appears that ~ 1118lbJe llgaJIJ':/:
where Tena was. He e8.ld he hadn't seen to make a reply, and that the Was at Uberty
her. • • • Says I, •Don't Ile. She went made by such person, and u BtateJ:UeIJt waa
out to meet you last night on the corner of I cumetances, as naturally to ca~1er such cfr.
Fem atreet, and you have <.'ftrrled her off.' unless he lntPnds to admit ft r;r a reply,
Ile aa.ld be bad not. Said I, 'You have.'" makes a reply 'vholly or partfaJl ut ff he
The counael for the defendant asked that the truth of the facts stated, 00 ::mlttlng
thls be stricken out. and objected to its ad- ment and the reply are competent e:idS:!!!:
ml•lon. The court overruled the request, Com. v. Kenney, 12 Mete. (MaBB.) 28€1; Com.
and admitted the testllnony, and the defend- v. Galavan, 9 Allen, 271." Com. v. Brown,
ant excepted. There are other examples of 121 Mass. 69, 80. See Com. v. Dens:more, 12
the admlaslon of slmllar teKtlmony against Allen, 33:>. Com. v. Brown was an lndfctthe objection of the defendant. It does not ment for procuring the miscarriage of one
appear that the defendant teeWled as a wit· Ann Powel'll, otben\rlae ca.lled EDlma L.
ness In bis own behalf, and no question arle- Smith, and one Frances Ordway, otherwise
es of the admleslblllty of evidence to affect called Frances A. Chase. In that case one
his credit as a witness. The exceptions re- George, a police oftlcer, testltled that he
cite that, "after Mrs. Davis had teetltled, the "took the defendant into the presence of
coIDmonwealth introduced a large amount of Emma L. Smith and Frances A. Chase, and
te~tlmony relating to the conduct of Trefeasked them In the defendant's hearing and
then atter the disappearance of Tena. lnclud· presence If they knew him. Both said that
Ing Btatement.s, declarations. conversations, they knew hlm. One knew hlm as Dr. King,
and conduct of Trefethen with Mrs. Davie" tbe other knew him as Dr. Rrown. I asked
and other persons named, the general char· them If he performell an operation on them.
acter of which ls set ont In the exceptions; They said he did. The defendant asked if
and "that at the Interview with Mrs. Davie they had been operated on prevloUBlY by any
on the morning of DecemlM1r 24th, when ac- other person. They sutd, 'No,'" etc. This
cosed by her of Tena•s ttlsappearance, he te11tlmony was admitted against the objec·
[Trefethen) abed tears, and was greatly ex· 1 tton of the defendant. The full court aay:
<·lted; and also •
•
• that at various ·\ "In this case, when Emma L. Smith and
tlnlea In these interviews, during the period Frances A. Chase stated that the defend·
between December 23d and January 10th, he ant had performed an operation on them, be
met the statements quoted In this bill, made did not remain sllent, but asked them In reto Mra. Davis by Tena., and repPated to hlm ply If they bad been previously operated upby Mrs. Davis or the ofllcere, lo various 1 on by another person. The jury might Infer
waya, BOmetlmes by explicit denial, some- , from this an admlBBlon by him of the truth
times by silence, and sometimes by equlvo- : of their statements." It ls obvious that when
eal expreMlons. su<"h . as 'it mUBt be a mis- the reply of a defPndant to a statement made
take,' 'It Is all a mistake,' 'it must be some to him, wbl<'b, If true, tends directly or In·
other party;' trom all which evidence \.he directly to prove that he Is guilty of the
commonwealth claimed and argued, without crime charged, le not an une'quivoca.l aftlrma·
objection, that theere denials of bis relations tlon or denial of the truth of the statement,
with Tena. of her seduction, of the appoint- dltftc·ult 11uestlons must often arise in dement with her for the evening of December termlning whether thP reply Is ot such a
23d. and his connection with her disappear- character that It bas any tendency to show
ance and death, Wt>n> false, and Wert' made a cone<'lousness of guilt which will warrant
to protect himself a11:aim•t the charge of mur- its admlKslon as e\·ldence against him. Per·
0 9tnlona concerning the probable guilt

C!llll" oCeJlce of auspect.ed persona.
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haps a certain discretion must be left to the - a reasonable doubt that the defendant made

presiding judge or judges, in view of all the

circumstances of the case. The same is true

‘when the conduct and declarations of the

defendant are put in evidence for the pur-

pose of showing a consciousness of guilt on

his part. See Com. v. Piper, 120 Mass. 185,

189.

The exceptions in the present case do not

set out verbatim the whole conversation be-

tween Mrs. Davis and the defendant on the

morning of December 24th, and of that set

out we cannot say, as matter of law, that

some of the replies were not such as to War-

rant their admission as evidence against the

defendant. If these were admitted, the de-

fendant had the right to have the whole con-

versation on that subject put in evidence.

The logical effect of an unequivocal denial
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of guilt, if it have any effect, is in favor of

the defendant; and the admission of the

denials of the defendant, if the jury prop-

erly considered the evidence, was in favor of

the defendant. This is shown in the at-

tempt, often made by a defendant when the

government has introduced evidence of a

confession made on one occasion, to intro-

duce evidence that on other occasions he has

denied that he was guilty. While evidence

that the defendant has made false state-

ments in regard to many facts which are rel-

evant to the issue is admitted against him

a tending to show his guilt, it is not com-

petent for the government to contend that a

denial of guilt is of itself evidence against

the defendant. To argue that by the other

evidence the defendant is shown to be prob-

ably guilty, and that therefore his denial of

guilt ls false, and is additional evidence

against him. ought not to be permitted.

When a defendant in a. criminal case is

haps a certain diacretton must be left to the
presiding judgt> or judges, in view of all the
clr<'umstancea of tile case. The same la true
when the conduct and declarations of the
defendant are put In evidence for the purpose of showing a consciousness of guilt on
his part. See Com. v. Piper, 120 l\la88. llm,
189.
The exceptions In the present ca11e do not
set out verbatim the whole convel'l!atlon between Mrs. Davis and the dt>fen<lant on the
11101·1,1tng of DeC't>mber 24th, and of that set
out we cannot say, as matter of law, that
aome of the replies were not such 88 to warrant their admit111lon as evldenC'e against the
defendant. It these were admitted, the defendant had the right to have the wholt> conversatlon on that subject put lo evidence.
The logical effect of an une'qulvocal denial
of guilt, If It have any effect, la In favor of
the defendant; and the admlBBlon of the
den'lals of the defendant, If the jury properly considered the evidence, was In favor of
the defendant. This ls shown In the attem1>t, often made by a deft-ndant when the
government bas Introduced eYldence of a
confesalon made on one occasion. to Introduce evidence that on other occasions he has
denied that he was guilty. While evidence
that the defendant has made false statements to regard to many facts which are relevant to the Issue ls admitted against him
as tending to show his guilt, lt la not competent for the government to contend that a
denial of guilt ls of lb1elf evidence against
the dt>fendant. To argue that by the other
t>vidt•nce the defendant ls shown to be probably J."llllty, and that therefore hla denial of
guilt Is false, and ls additional eYldence
against him, ought not to be permitted.
When a defendant In a criminal case la
shown to have made certain false statements
of facts, and these fact8' are relevant to the
lflsue, the fact that the defendant has knowlngly made the false statemt>nts may have
some tendency to show that he ta guilty;
but the juey must ftrst be satlafted beyond

shown to have made certain false statements

of facts, and these facts are relevant to the

issue, the fact that the defendant has know-

ingly made the false statements may have

some tendency to show that he is guilty;

but the jury must ﬁrst be satisﬁed beyond i

50

the statements, and that they were false,

and that the defendant knew that they were

false, before any weight can be given to

this evidence, unless the statements of them-

selves have some tendency to show his guilt.

But when the defendant denies generally

that he is guilty, this statement cannot be

shown to be false, except by proving that

he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; and

then it is unnecessary. If there is a rea-

sonnble doubt of his guilt on all the other

evidence. the fact that he unequivocally de-

nied his guilt is not, of itself, evidence

against him; and the denial cannot be as-

sumed to be false because it has not been

proved to be false by suﬂicient evidence.

Some of the denials of the defendant in the

present case were denials of facts which

were relevant to the issue, and not a gen-

eral denial of guilt, and we do not know

RELEVANCY.

fl()

a reasonable doubt that the defendant made
the statements, and that they were falee,
and that the defendant knew that they were
false, before any weight can be given to
this evidence, unle88 the statements of themselves have some tendency to show bis guilt.
But when the defendant denies generally
that he ls guilty, this statement cannot be
shown to be false, except by proving that
he ls guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; and
then It Is unnecessary. It there ls a reaaonallle doubt of his guilt on all the other
t>vldt-n<•e, the tact that he unequivocally dt>nled his guilt ls not, of Itself, evlden<'t'
, against him; and the denial cannot be asaumt>d to be false because It bas not been
proved to be false by su1Bclent evidence.
Some of the denials of the defendant In the
present case were denials of facts which
were rt>leYant to the l•ue, and not a general denial of guilt, and we do not know
whether the evidence was not such a.a to
satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt
that these denials were knowingly false.
Rome of the evidence redted was competent
on the ground that the ronduct or replies of
tile defendant, In view of the statements
made to him, had some tendency to show
guilt on bis part. If In one conversation
some of the replies of the defendant had
some tendency to show guilt, and some were
explicit denials of guilt, we cannot say that
the defendant bas been prejudiced by the
, admission In evldt>n<'e of all that was sald
at that Interview directly or Indirectly relatlng to his guilt or Innocence lf the jury
were properly Instructed upon the appllcatlon to be made of this evidence. We cannot
presume that the court did not take paln11
properly to Instruct the jury upon the legltlmate use to be made of the evidence admltted, and warn the jury that the statements
mmle to the dt>fendant were not to be consldN'ed, In and of themselves, as any evidence
' of tht> facts stated. On this part of the cue
I the exct>ptions disclose no error of law.
i Verdict against Trefethen set aside.

I

I

I
I
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T.

MceoRKELL.

806, 134 Pa. St. 323.)

J1-iissmx v. 1\£[cCORKELL.

(36 Atl. ace, 154 Pa. St. 323.)

"'·

~elDe Court 0£ Pennsylvania. April 17,
1893.

g\\\)
Court of Peninsyivania. April 17,

1893.

Mme“ {1‘0m court of common pleas, Phil-

ade\\l\\\“ c0.unty'

ASs\\mpslt by Anna M. Jensen against

Mm, G_ B. McCorkell. From a judgment

my p\a\ntifi, defendant appeals. Aﬂirmed.

Ernest L.

A.\l\WJI.\ f~m court
a.de\\l\l.\a c0nnty.

or common pleas, Phil·

A.B&umps\t by Anna M. Jensen aga!Jlst
Jo\l.n G. 1\. McCorkell. From a judgment
foT \l~nt\tf, defendant appeals. A.dinned.
W\U\atn Gorman. 'for appellant. Ernest L.
TUBtin. for appellee.

$\\p\'\>\D e

“'“\\g\(n Gorman, tor appellant.

Tustin. for am1e1lee-

STERliET'l‘, C. J. This suit is on a note

at 90 days from Liar-ch 28, 1890, made b_v

Rodger Convery to the order of P. C. Con-

very, indorsed by him and by the defendant,

etc. it is conceded the note was duly pre-

sented to the maker at maturity and protest-
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ed for nonpayment. The only question was

whether defendant was legally notiﬁed of

the dishonor of the note. Alonzo R. Ruther-

ford. the notary by whom it was protested,

testified in substance, that on the day named

he inclosed notice of protest in an envelope

addressed to defendant, “Philadelphia Driv-

ing Park, Philadelphia," l‘is then place of

residence. in said city, and mailed the same

on that day in the Philadelphia post oﬂice.

He further testiﬂed that on the envelope in

which he sent the notice the‘w0rds “Return

to Alonzo R. Rutherford if not delivered,"

etc., were stamped, and that said lettcr was

never returned to him. It was also in evi-

dence that the then United States carrier

delivery service did not cover ‘Thilaulelphia

Driving Park," but those who resided there,

including defendant, received their n1uilmat-

ter regularly at the sub post oﬂice or station

located in that section of the city near de-

fendant's residence. The defendant denied

having received the notice of protest; and

his man of business, who was accustomed

to call at the sub post oﬂice daily, once,

tvvice, and occasionally thrice, for his em-

pl0yer's mail, and sometimes, in his absence,

opening the same, testified that he knew

nothing of the receipt of said notice. No

points for charge were submitted to the

court by either party. After referring to

plaintiffs evidence, tending to show that the

notice of protest was duly mailed to and re-

ceived by defendant, and also to defendant’s

I“(—'l)lltt'iDg testimony, the learned judge in-

gt|"l1Cted the Jury to ﬂnd, from all the evi-

deuce before them, whether or not the no-

“(.9 “'38 sent and reached defendant's place

of business, and, among other things. said:

“If it (-ame to either of them, it was a suf-

ﬁ,.i,_.nt notice, within the requirements of the

1,,“-_ if it came within a reasonable time:”

and that “the date. July 12th, which has been

mentioned in the course of the case, would

be too ]ﬂt€."

Considering the two peciiications in their

inverse order, we think dei’end:1nt unjustly

conlplajng of the court for not charging the

jury that, “under all the evidence in the

STERRETT, C. J.
This suit ls on a note
at 00 days from l\larch 28, 1800, made by
Rodger Convery to the order ot P. C. Con·
very, lndorsed by him and by the defendant,
etc. It la conce<led the oote was duly presented to the maker at maturity and protested tor nonpayment.
The only question was
whether defendant was legally notffted of
the dishonor of the note. Alonzo R. Rutherford, the notary by whom It was protested,
testified in eubstan<'e, that on the day named
he lnclosed notice of protest In an envelope
addre88ed to defl'11dnnt, "PWladelphla Driv·
Ing Park, Philadelphia," Ms tllen place ot
resldt•nc-e 1n said city, and malled the same
on that day in the Phlladelphfa post office.
He further testUled that on the en¥elope In
which he sent the notice the'words "Return
to Alonzo R. Rutherford It not d<>ll¥Pred,"
~tc., were stamped, and that said letter was
ne¥er returned to blm. It was also In e\'i·
dence that the then United States mrrler
deUvery service did not cover "Phlln<Jelphla
Driving Park," but those who resided there,
Including defendant, received their mall matt:er rPgUlarly at the sub post oftlce or station
)O<"ated In that section of the city near det'endant's residence. The defendant dt>nled
ha vlng receh·ed the notice of protest; and
bis man of business, who was accustomed
t:o call at the sub post ofllce dally. once,
twJce, and occasionally thrice, for bis employer's mall, and sometimes, In hfs absence,
opening the same, testified that be knew
nothing of the receipt of said notice. No
points for charge were submitted to the
court by either party. After referring to
plaintflr's evidence, tending to show that the
notfce ot protest was duly malled to and re~ ved by defendant, and also to defendant's
rebutting testimony, the learned judge Instructed the jury to ftnd, from all the evidence before them, whether or not the notice was aent and reached defendant's place
of businese, and, among other things, said:
"If ft came to either ot them, It was a sufdclent notice, wlthfn the 1equlrementB of the
Jaw, fL It came wlthfn a reasonable time:"
and that "the date, July 12th, which has been
menttoned In the course of the case, would
be too 1ate."
Considering the two Bpeelft<.'8tlons In their
'Inverse order, we think defendant unjustly
compJaJ.mt of the court for not charging the

[Case No. 16

jury that, "under all the evidence in the

case, their verdict should be tor the defendant." The learned judge was not requested
to ·thus Instruct the jury, and thereby with·
draw the case trom their consideration. It
such Instruction bad beeu asked, In view ot
the evidence referred to, It would have been
error to have given It.
The only other specUlcatlon le the following excerpt from the learned judge's eharge:
"The 'Lnlted States government has taken
hold of the distribution ot the malls, and, 1n
the city ot Philadelphia, letters deposited In
the mall are delivered dally; and, where there
ls upon the back of an envelope a stamp of
I the ·name of the person who sends letters,
! the letten are returned It they are not de1 livered." "Under this condition of tbfngs, I
I instruct you there Is a presumption, when
the letter ls malled to the proper addreBB
within the city, that It ls delivered 1n accordance with the direction." The plalntUr's
e¥1den<'e, as we have seen, was to the etfe<"t
that. on the day tht> note was aienonored, a
notice of protest, properly addressed to defendant, was deposited In the Philadelphia
post offtce. In due course ot mall the letter
thus deposited by the notary would be properly transmitted to the sub post offtce, In the
vicinity of defendant's residence, where he
was accustomed to regularly receive hie letters and other mall matter. The plalntltr's
evidence on that subject was sufficient to
warrant the jury In tlndlng the fact on whfcb
their verdict ls D(>('e&sarily pi-edlcated, viz.
that the letter rea<'hed Its destlnutlon-detendant's place of business or rt>sldt>nC'e-by
due co11n1e of mall, etc. As we said In Whitmore v. Insurance Co., 148 Pa. St. 405, 23
A.tl. Rep. 1131, It ls well settled that the fact
ot depositing In the post ofllee a properly addressed, prepaid letter raises a natural presumption, founded 1n rommon experience,
that It rea<>hed Its destination by due course
of mall; In other words, It le prima facle
evidence that It was received by tlle person
to whom lt was addressed; but that prlma
facle proof may be rebutted by evidence
showing It was not received. The question
ls one of fact solely for the determination of
the jury under all the evidence. Folsom v.
Cook, 115 Pa1 St. 549, 9 Atl. Rep. 93; Susquehanna M. F. Ins. Co. v. Tunkhannock Toy
Co., 97 Pa. St. 424; Huntley v. '\\"bittier, 100
Mau. 391; Briggs v. He"ey, 130 Maes. 188.
In the case at bar that presumption ls
strengthened by the undisputed evidence that
the name and add1eBS ot the notary were
stamped on the envelope covering the notice
of protest. So greatly, Indeed, does that
fact strengthen the presumption, that It becomes well-nigh conclusive. At least It would
be entitled to considerable weight ln connection with other facts and circumstances
In the <.'8Be. In view of the evidence, and
submission of the questions arising thereon to the jury, their verdict, 1n tavor of plalnwr, by necessary Implication establishes the
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facts that the notice oi! protest, properly there received by him or some one author-

addressed and maiiled to defendant, was ized to receive the same from that oﬁice.

promptly transmitted to the sub post oﬂice That is S\lﬂ1('i(-‘llt to ﬁx his liability as in-

in the vicinity of his well-known residence dorser.

at “Philadelphia Driving Park,” and was Judgment atﬂrmed.
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facts that the notl<'e ot protest, properly
addressed and mli.lled to (letendant, was
promptly transmitted to the sub post oftlce
In the vicinity of bis well-known residence
at ''Pblladelpbla Driving Park," and was
02

there received by him or aome one authorized to recelYe the same from that omce.
That ls euftklent to dx bis llablllty u in-

dorser.
Judgment amrmed.

~lMlLAR. OCCULrnE~CEs SHOWI1'G INTE.YTlO.Y, ETC. [Dase No.17
SIMILAR OCCURIEENCES SHOWING INTENTION. ETC. [Case No." 17"

e'!A..TE v. MINTON et al.

S\\“remE

(~ S. W. 808, 116 Mo. 605.)

5'!-RTE v. LZIINTON et al.-

me Court of MiBSouri. Division No. 2.
J"une 13. 1893.
A.\l\)e8l ~m circuit court, Clinton county;
Jamee. 14. Sandusky. .Tudge.
W\\\\atn E. Minton and George W. Seasho\UI were eonvlc1:ed. of forging a df't'd Lo
tbe name of a tlc-tltlous person, and they
appeal. '(leversP.d.
Ruston & Parrish, for appt>llanl8. R. F.
Walker, A.tty. Gen_, for the State.

(22 s. W. sos, 116 M0. 00.3.)

Su~tt!

(jourt of 1\Iissouri. Division No. 2.

June 13, 1893.

from circuit court, Clinton county;

lame“ -AL Saudtrsky, Judge.

W-‘“\am E. .\1inton and George W. Sea-

shoits were convicted of forging a deed in

me name of a ﬁctitious person, and they

appeap Reverse-ti.

Huston & Parrish, for appellants. R. B‘.

BURlr~SS,

Walker, Atty. Gen., for the State.

BURui-JSS, J. At the March term, 1891,

of the criminal court of Buchanan county,

Robert F. Zook, ¥Villiam E. Minton, and

George W. Scasholts were indicted for mak-

ing and forging a. false and forged deed pur-

porting to be the act of one Youngberger, a
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ﬁctitious person, to convey certain land in

Stone county, Mo., to one Rachel Cross.

The indictment is in two counts.

Zook was acquitted. Ai'ter\\'nrds a change

of venue was awarded the defendants Min-

ton and Seasholts, to the circuit court of

Clinton county, where on trial had at the

January term, 1892, of said circuit court of

Clinton county, defendants were acquitted

on the second count, and found guilty on the

ﬁrst count, in the indictment, and the pun-

ishment of each one ﬁxed at 10 years’ im-

prisonment in the penitentiary. The count

of the indictment under which defendants

were convicted, leaving out the" formal‘

parts, is as follows: “' ‘ ' did unlawful-

ly and feloniously and falsely make and

forge a certain false and forged deed, pur-

porting to be the act of one William '1‘.

Younghcrger, a ﬁctitious person, by which

a" right and interest in certain real property,

which in said deed purports to lie and be sit-

uate in the county of Stone, state of Mis-

souri, and which in said deed was described

as follows, to wit, all the east one-half of

the northeast quarter of section number

¢-l;:l1 teen, township number twenty-three,

range number twenty-four, containing eighty

9;-res, more or less, purported to be convey-

ed and transferred to one Rachel Cross,

with intent then and there and thereby to

defraud, contrary to the form of the statute

in such cases made and provided, and

against the peace and dignity of the state

of _\[is=:-=ouri." After conviction, defendants

ﬁled their motion for new trial, and in ar-

rest’ which being overruled, they appealed

to this court.

The ﬁrst contention on part of defendants

is that there is no evidence to support the

verdict. This court has so often decided

that it will not interfere with a verdict un-

less it is evident that it is the result of pas-

prejudice, or pnrﬂallty on t1|e part of

I-0;-3 that it is scarcely necessary to

rities on that point. State v, N91-

son’ 98 M0, 414, 11 S. ‘V. 997, and authorj-

ﬂeg cited; State v. Howell, 100 Mm 633, 14

sion,

J.

At the March term, 1891,

of tbe criminal court or Buc>hanan county,

sores‘

•

Robert F. 1..ook, William E. l.llnton, and
George 'w. &>asholts were Indicted for making and forging a false and forged deed purporting to be the act of one Youngberger, a
fictitious person, to C'Onvey et>rtaln land In
Stone county, Mo., to one Rachel Cross.
Tbe lndlctment la ln two counts. On a trial,
Zook was acquitted. Afti>rwnnlM a <·bange
<If venue was awarded the tlc>fl'ntlants Minton and Sensholts, to the circuit court of
Cllnton county, where on trial had at the
January tem1, 18U'.l, of said circuit court of
Clinton county, defendants were acquitted
on the second count, and round guilty on the
11.rst oount, In the Indictment, and the punishment of each one fixed at 10 years' Im·
11rtsonment In the penitentiary. The count
<>t the Indictment under which defendants
'1Vere convicted, leaving out the formal
parts, ls as follo:ws: "• • • did unlawfully and felonlousty anti falsely make and
1'orge a certain fnlt;ie nrut forged df'ed, purporting to be the act of one William T.
Y oungberger, a fl<·tltlous person, by which
a· right and Interest In certain real property,
wblcb In said deed purports to lie and be sltua1:e In the county of Stone, state of Mis·
11<>Uri, and which In said deed was descrtbed
as .t'ollows, to wit, all the east one-half of
"Lbe northeast quarter or section number
el~bteen, township number twenty.three,
range numlM>r twenty-four, containing eighty
aeres. more or lf'sR, purported to be convey.
eel and transf(•rn>d to one Ra<·bel Cros1t,
wtt:b Intent then and thPre and thereby to
de:traud, contrary to the form of the statute.
fn such cases made and provided, and
agafns1: the peace and dignity of the state
at :\flflffOUrl." After convletlon, defendants
tiled t:belr motion for new trial, and In ar·
rest. which bPtng overruled, they appealed
to this court.
The t1rst contention on part of defPndunts
ls that tbere ls no evidence to support the
verdict..
This court has 110 oftPn dt>C'ldt>d
that it will not Interfere with a vPr<llc>t un·
lf"SB It Is evident that It Is the result ot pastdon, prejudice, or partiality on the part of
the jurors that It ls scn1·ct>ly n eces!lary to
·lte authorities on that point. State v. Nel'98 Mo. 414, 11 S. W. 997, and author!: : · cited; 8tate v. Howell, 100 :Mo.~. 14

S. W. 4; State v. Glahn, 97 Mo. 679, 11 S.
W. :.mo. We are not prepared to say that
thel'e ls a total failure of evidence, or that
It Is so weak as to justify the Inference that
the verdict Is the result of passion, prejudice, or partiality. In fact the evldenc~
leaves room for little doubt, If any, of their
guilt.
The action of the trial court In admitting
evidence as to other transactions with other
parties, and In admitting In evidence other
deeds than the one described In the Indictment, and In admlt~lng proof of the declarations of the defendants with reference
thereto, ls assigned for error. There was Slutlclent foundation laid to justify the admission and statements of the defendants, as
ag11ln11t either or both, whlle their relations
existed as partners In dealing In real estate,
and the sale of lands, and the execution of
I deeds therefor, . as c>harged In the Indict·
ment. The evidence tends strongly to show
' that they were engaged In one common enterprise, selling and trading lands In the
county of Stone, in the name of :t:oungberger, enjoying the proceeds and profits arising from such transactions, and that while
thus engaged they Pntered Into a conspiracy
to defraud, by selllng lands to which tuey
nor Youngberger, In whose name the conveyances were made, so far as the evidence
tends to show, had any right or title. Alon, zo Cross, a witness for the state. testified
that he made the trade for the land described In the lndl<>tmPnt with the defendant'
Seasholts, and that Sensholts told him that
the title thereto was good, that Youngberg-·
er lived near Plattsburg, and that he traded
a good deal In lands. Dillard, also a witness
for the Rtate, stated that the defendants told
him that Youngherger lived In Stone county, l\Io., and that he went from St. Joe to
Kansas; that he traded with defendants for
a tract of land, also In Stone county; and
that the deed was signed by Youngberger;
and dellvered to him by defendant 15easholts. Charles T . Miller, another wltnesa
for the state, testltled that he made a trade
with defendant Minton for a trnc>t of land
In f:.tone c·ounty, wltll'l1 ~llnton cnui;ed to be
deeded to him (wltut>tis) by Wllllam T.
Youngberger, aud thut be got the Impression
from what Minton said that Youngberger
was a travt>llng man, and was at that time
connected with the coal business In the city.
John Howard, 11180 a witness for the state,
te1ttltlPd that he had another and still dltrerent deal for a tract of land In Stone county,
with dE"fendnnt Minton, and that he stated
to wltnesR that he would give him a good
warranty deed. a clear title, and a good abstruct; that this conversation occurred late
In the evening; that Minton said Youngberger wnR not there then, but he would make
his deed out, and that he (witness) could
come In the morning and get It, which he
did. It al110 purportl'd to have been executed by Youngberger. George How8l'd, also
63.
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a witness, testified on behalf of the state v. Bank tllio. Sup.) 3 S. W. 876, and authori-

that he had a similar transaction with de-

fendant .\iinton for land in Stone county;

that Minton caused deeds to be executed to

him in the name of Yonngberger, and stat-

ed to him that Youngberger was a banker in

_Atcnison, Kan. Similar statements were

made by defendants to other persons who

were witnesses, on different occasions, which

were contradictory, and, when taken in con-

nection with the other facts and circumstan-

ces in proof, show conclusively that there

was a conspiracy existing between the de-

fendants to defraud, and jnstlﬁed the admis-

sion of proof of the statements of the one

against the other, as long as such conspira-

cy existed. State v. Melrose, 98 Mo. 594,

12 S. W. 250.

There was no error in admitting in evi-
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dence deeds other than the one described in

the indictment. While such deeds had a

tendency to show that defendants were

guilty of other crimes than the one with

which they stand charged, and were upon

trial, they were not for that reason, alone,

inadmissible, but they were admissible for

the purpose of showing the intent with

which the act was done, being as they were

of similar character, executed, not only in

the same place, but purported to be signed

and acknowledged by the same party,

(Yonngbergen) and several of them purport-

ed to have been acknowledged before the

same notary. This subject underwent an

exnaustive review by this court in the case

of State v. Myers, 82 Mo. 558, and under the

ruling in that case the deeds were clearly

admissible for the purpose of showing guilty

knowledge on the part of defendants. State

v. Bayne, 88 Mo. 604.

The court, over the objections of the de-

fendants, allowed the jury, at the sugges-

tion of the prosecuting attorney, to compare

the signature of William '1‘. Youngberger,

as it appeared on the deed from him to

George Seasholts, and the two deeds from

him to Howard, with the signature of

Youngberger to the deed described in the in-

dictment. They were no part of the record

in the case, not admitted to be in the hand-

writing of either one of the defendants, and

clearly inadmissible for the purpose of com-

parison. “When there are other writings in

the case, conceded to be genuine, they may

be used as standards of comparison, and the

comparison may be made by the jury, with

or without the aid of experts. 1 Grecnl. Ev.

§ 578; State v. Scott, 45 Mo. 302; State v.

Tompkins, 71 Mo. 614. But, with us, such

papers can only be used when no collateral

issue can be raised concerning them. 1

lreenl. Ev. § 581: State v. Clinton, 67 Mo.

380." The signatures on the deeds, other

than the one described in the indictment,

did present collateral issues; and the jury

_ should not ha\'e been permitted to compare

the signature of Youngbcrger, on them, with

the one described in the indictment. Rose

REL.EVANCY.

a wltnell8, testified on behalf of the state
that be bad a similar transaction with defendant lilnton for land In Stone county;
tbat .Minton caused deeds to be exe<·uted to
him In the name of Youngberger, and stated to him that Youngberger was a banker In
Atcui11<>n, Kan. Similar statements were
ina..e by defendants to other persone who
were wltnee11ee, on different occasions, which
W('re contradictory, and, when taken ln connection with the other facts and clrcumstan(•es In proof, show conclusively that there
was a conspiracy existing between the defendants to defraud, and justified the admission of proof of the statements of the one
against the other, as long as such conspiracy existed. State v. Melrose, 98 Mo. 504,
12 s. w. 200.
There was no error In admitting In evl·
dence deeds other than the one described In
the Indictment. While sn<'h deeds bad a
tendency to show that defendants were
guilty of other crimes than the one with
which they stand chahted, and were upon
trial, they were not for that renson, alone,
lnadmlBBlble, but they were admissible for
the purpoae of showing the Intent with
which the act was done, being as they were
of similar character, executed, not only In
the same pla<'e, but purported to be stgned
and a<'knowledged by the same party,
(Youngberger,) and several of them purported. to have been acknowledged. before the
same notary. '.rhls subject underwent an
exuaustlve review by this court In tbe case
of State v. Myers, 82 Mo. 558, and under the
rullog In that cnse tlae deeds were clearly
admissible for the purpose of showing guilty
knowledge on the part of defendants. State
v. Bayne, 88 'Mo. 604.
The court, over the objections of tbe defendants, allowed the jury, at the suggestion of the prosecuting attorney, to compare
the signature of William T. Youngberger,
as It appenred on the deed from him to
George Seasholts, and the two deeds from
him to Boward, with the signature of
Youngberger to the deed described In the Indictment. They were no pnrt of the record
In the case, not admitted to be In the handwrl tlng of either one of the defendants, and
clearly inadmissible for the purpose of comparison. "When there are other writings In
the case, conceded. to be genuine, they may
be used. as standards of comparison, and the
comparison may be made by the jury, with
or without the aid ot experts. 1 Greenl. Ev.
S 578; btate v. Scott, 45 llo. 302; State v.
Tompkins, 71 'Mo. 614. But, with us, such
papers can only be used. when no collateral
Issue can be raised concerning them. 1
Green!. Ev. § G81; State v. Clinton, 67 'Mo.
:{80." The signatures on the deeds, other
tluin the one dN1<•rlbed In the Indictment,
<lid present collateral Issues; and the jury
. 11llould not have been pPrmltted to compare
the signature of Youngberger, on them, with
the one deserlbed in the indictment. Rose
M

v. Bank (Mo. Sop.) 3 S. W. 876, and authorities cited. It Is only when the writing offered ln evidence ls connected with the c&lle
on trial, or ls admitted. to be genuine, that
It ts the subject of comparison with the
writing In controversy, or. as In this case,
that which the defendants are charged with
having signed thf! name of some fictitious
person thereto, unlawfully.
There waa no error In permitting tbe wltnesa Eugene Spratt to testify that the name
of William T. Younguerger, signed to the
deed described In the lndl(•tment. was In the
handwriting of the defendant Seasholts.
He had already testified that he was acquainted with the handwriting of St'nsholts.
and that was all that was neceaaey in order to quality him to testify In the che, and
to give his opinion as to whether or not the
name lligned to the deed was In the handwriting of defendant Seasholtll. Fash v.
Blake, 38 Jll. 363; Clark v. Freeman, 25 Pa.
St. 133; Watson v. Brewster, 1 Pa. St. 381:
Garrells v. Alexander, 4 Esp. 37.
Nothing, however, that was said b7 either
ot the defendants after the coneplracy ended, and not In the presence of the other, was
adml881ble In evidence against the one not
making the statements or adml111lona. State
v. Mell'Ofl(>, 91'1 'Mo. 594, 12 S. W. 200; State
v. Hilderbrand, 105 Mo. 318, 16 S. W. 948:
State v. llC'Graw, 87 'Mo. 161.
The admission of the .postal card purporting to have been written by L. H. Smith.
recorder, and addressed to L. L. Martin, St.
Joseph, Mo., dated Galena, Mo., October 1.
1890, was Immaterial, hearsay, and Inadmissible for an7 purpose. Its effect could only
have been Injurious to the defendants, and
should have been excluded.
While the Instructions. or some of them.
at least, are 8Ubject to verbal criticism, tak·
en as a whole, they presented the Mlse verr
fairly to the jury, and as favorably to the
defendants as they could expect. There Is
no objection to them, when taken altogether, that would justify a reversal.
We come now to the consideration of the
sumclency of the Indictment. Section 3653,
Rev. St. l,889, under which It ls drawn, ls
as follows: '"l'he false making, forging, or
rounterfeltlng any instrument or writing,
bt>lng or purporting to be the act of another, oy which any pecuniary demand or obligation, or any right, interest, or clatm to
money, right In action, or property, shall be,
or purport to be, or intended to bt>, conveyed, transferred, created, Increased, discharged, diminished, or In any manner affected,
to which shall be am:xed a fictitious name,
or the name of any person, or pretended signature of any person, not In existence, shall
be deemed a forgery, in the same degree and
In the same manner as it the name so amxed was the name of a perff<>n In being, or
purporting to be the slgnaturt' of a person in
existence." The lndktment ls manifestly
bad, and charges no offense against the de--

•

SIM.I.LAH. OCCURHENCES SHOWING lNTENTION, ETC.
$IM1L¢\1{ OCCURRENCES SHOWING INTENTION, ETC. [Case No. 17

It does not allege that a ﬁctitious

v1‘9\E‘D<le<1 signature of any person

1:-‘\f'-IK-‘Q was affixed to the deed de-

cﬂwa in the indie-tlnent. This is absolute-

‘; “cceasafy, under the statute, unless the

gee“ E get forth according to its tenor,

mowmg we fact to he that the name OI. the

m_mm“s person vvas amxed to the deed.

“Mm when the tenor is exact and completc,

“n5 mm;-lently gives the purport, then the

pm?“-“mg clause may be rejected as sur-

p“mage_" 1 Y\’hart. Cr. Law, § 737. The

purport of the instrument necessarily ap-

pears when the instrument is set forth ac-

te
1t does not allege that a ftctltlous
fend&.D'. • 9 .-etended signature of any person
name or "l'-t~tence -was affixed to the deNI deno~~ \D the indictment. This ls absolnh'llC
e(.-ees&l"Y• under t.be statute, unless the
\y
\a set forth a.ccordlng to lts tenor,
~now\ntc t.be fact to be that the name o~ the
\\ct\Uous person ~as aftlxed to the dt't'1l.
"A.nd when thP tenor Is exnC't and compll'h',
and aum.c\ently gt,~es the purport, then the
pu\'\10rt\ng clause may be n•J.-i•t1>d 11111 111ur·
pl~·" 1 Wbart. Cr. Lew, I 737. The
put'\)Ort of the instrument necessurlly appears when the ln.Ntrument ls set !orth according to the tPnor. 2 RUBB. Crimes, (llth
}<;d.) 805; 3 Chit. Cr. Law, 10.U; State v.
Yerger, 88 M.o. 33.. While the Indictment In

:a

this <'Ilse does allege that the defendants did
unlawfully and feloniously make and forge
a <'<'rtnlu false and forged deed, purporting
to be the act of one Wiiliam T. Youngberger, a tktltlous person, It does not allege that
a fktltlous name, or the name of any person not In exlstt>nC'e, was altlxed thereto, nor
does It set out the deNI In full. We must,
thert•forf>. for the11c considt•mtlons, hold that
It does not t•hnrge the defendants with any
criminal offense. The judgment ls revtt11ed, and arn-sted, and eam1e n>manded, with
directions that the Indictment be quashed.
and d<'ft>nunnts held to answer a new Indictment to be preferred against them by the
grand jury of Buchanan county. All concur.

cording to the tenor. 2 Russ. Crimes, (9th

15¢) 305-, Chit. Cr. Law, 10-11; State v.

YQ1-get, 36 Mo. 33. While the indictment in

ieul\M\t9'

Mme Of

“gt, “S ex
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this case does allege that the defendants did

unlawfully and feloniously make and forge

a certain false and forged deed, purporting

to be the act of one William '1‘. Youngberg-

er, a fictitious person, it does not allege that

a ﬁctitious name, or the name of any per-

son not in existence, was atﬂxed thereto, nor

does it set out the deed in full. We must,

therefore. for these considerations, hold that

it does not charge the defendants with any

criminal offense. The judgment is revers-

ed, and arrested, and cause remanded, with

directions that the indictment be quashed.

and dcfenuants held to answer a new indict-

mcnt to be preferred against them by the

grand jury of Buchanan county. All con-

cur.
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(Case No. 17

•

Case No. 18)

COMMO:'l."WEALTH v. RUSSELL.

Case No. 18]

(30 N. E. 763, 156 Ma111. 196.)

RELEVANCY.

COMMONWEALTH v. RUSSELL.

(30 N. E. 763, 156 Mass. 196.)

RELEVANCY.

l:!upreme Judicial Court of Maaaacbuaett&.
l:!utrolk. April 25, 1892.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

Suﬁolk. April 25, 1892.

Exceptions from superior court, Suffolk

county; Daniel W. Bond, Judge.

Charles H. Russell was convicted of for-

gery, and excepts. Exceptions overruled.

Geo. G. Travis, for the Commonwealth.

Exceptions from superior court, Suffolk
county; Daniel W. Bond, Judge.
Charles H. RWJSell was convicted of forgery, and excepts. Exceptions overruled.
Geo. O. Travis, for the Commonwealth.
l<'rank M. Davis and Cha& F. l:!1>t>ar, tor
defendant.

Frank M. Davis and Chas. F. Spear, for

defendant.

BARKER, J. It is an established excep-

tion to the rule forbidding proof of collat-

eral facts that in prosecutions for forgery

and for uttering forged paper proof is ad-

missible, in order to show an intent to de-

fraud by the forgery, and also to show

knowledge on the part of the accused with

reference to the particular document which
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he is charged with uttering, that at or near

the time of committing the alleged offense

he had passed or had in his possession other

similar forged documents. Com. v. Miller,

3 Cush. 243, 250; Com. v. Stone, 4 Metc.

(Mass) 43, 47; Rex v. Ball, Russ. & R. 132;

Rex v. Wylie, 1 Bos. & P. (N. R.) 92; Rex

v. Smith-, 2 Car. & P. 633; Sunderland‘s

Case, and other cases, 1 Lewin, Cr. Cas.

102-104; Rex v. Whiley, 2 Leach, 983; Com.

v. White, 145 Mass. 392, 395, 14 .\'. E. 611.

The admission of such evidence is necessary,

because guilty knowledge is a fact not sus-

ceptible of proof by direct evidence, and can

rarely be shown by explicit admissions, but

only by acts and conduct. Intent to de-

fraud often suﬂlciently appears from the

circumstances of the transaction, where its

immediate and necessary effect is to de-

fraud; but there are many cases of the false

making of instruments which have no such

necessary effect, and in which the fraudu-

lent intention must be proved by other and

collateral circumstances. Although the in-

troduction of such evidence compels the de-

fendant to meet acts not charged, and may

lead the Jury to convict of one crime upon

proof of another, it is admitted when the

occasion arises. Com. v. Stone. ubl supra;

Com. v. Tuckerman, 10 Gray, 173, 206. This

doctrine is a. branch of a more general ex-

ception, which, when knowledge or intent

must be proved. allows evidence of acts

not in issue, but which tend to show such

knowledge or intent,—as in the trial of

indictments for passing counterfeit money,

(Com. v. Price, 10 Gray, 472, 476; Com. v.

Hall, 4 Allen, 302;) for obtaining goods up-

on false pretenses. (Com. v. Stone, ubi

supra;) for embezzlement, (Com. v. East-

man, 1 Cush. 216; Com. v. Miller, 3 Cush.

250; Com. v. Tucker-man, ubi supra; Com.

v. Shepard. 1 Allen, 575;) and for adultery,

(Com. v. .\[er|-lam, 14 Pick. 519, 520.) As

said by Bigelow, C. J., in Com. v. Shep-

ard, ubi supra, “it is essential to the rights

of the accused that when such evidence is

admitted it should be carefully limited and

guarded by instructions to the jury, so that

BARKER, J. It ls an establl8hed exception to the rule forbidding proof of collateral facts that in prosecutions for forgery
and for uttering forged paper proof ls adinisslble, in order to show an Intent to defraud by the forgery, and also to show
knowledge on the part of the ac<'used with
reference to the particular document whkh
he ls charged with uttering, that at or near
the time of committing the alleged QtreDSe
he had passed or had In his possession other
similar forged documents. Com. v. Miller,
3 Cush. 243, 230; Com. v. !:!tone, 4 Mete.
tM8B8.) 43, 47; Rex v. Ball, Russ. & R. 132;
Rex v. Wylie, 1 Bos. & P. (N. R.) 9'..!; Rex
v. Smith, 2 Car. & P. 633; Sunderland's
Case, o.nd other cases, 1 Lewin, Cr. Cas.
102-104; Rex v. Whiley, 2 Leach, 983; Com.
v. White, 145 Mass. 392, 395, 14 :\. E. 611.
The admission of such evidence ls necessary,
because guilty knowledge ls a fact not susceptible of proof by direct evidence, and can
rarely be shown by explicit admissions, but
only by acts and conduct. Intent to defraud often sutticlently appears from the
clrcumstanees of the transaction, where Its
Immediate and necessary etrect Is to defraud; but there are many cases of the false
making of lnstrflments which have no such
neceBBary effect, and In which the fraudulent Intention must be proved by other and
collateral circumstances. Although the Introduction of such evidence compels the defendant to meet acts not charged, and may
lead the jury to convict of one crime upon
proof of another, It Is admitted when the
occasion arh1e11. Com. v. Stone. ubl supra:
Com. v. Tu<·kerman, 10 Gray, 173, 206. This
doctrine ls a branch of a more general ex«eptlon, which, when knowledge or Intent
must be proved, allows evidence of acts
not In Issue, but which tend to show such
knowledge or lntent,-as In the trial of
Indictments for pasidng counterfeit money,
(Com. v. Price, 10 Gray, 472, 476; Com. v.
Hall, 4 Allen, 30'2;) for obtaining goods upon false pretenses, (Com. v. Stone, uhl
11upra;) for embezzlement, (Com. v. Eal!t·
man, 1 Cush. 216; Com. v. :\llller, 3 Cush.
200; Com. v. Tuckerman, ubl supra; Com.
v. Shepard, 1 Allen, 575;) and for adultery,
(Com. v. :\h•rrlam, 14 Pick. 519, 520.) As
said by Bigelow, C. J., ln Com. v. Shepard, ubl supra, "It ls essential to the rights
56

of the accused that when such evidence la
admitted it should be carefully limited and
guarded by llllltructlons to the jury, so that
Its operation and effect may be confined to
the single legitimate purpose for which It la
competent." In the <.'ll.Be at bar the defendant was tried upon an Indictment cbtlrglng
him with the forgery of a check upon a
bank, purporting to be drawn to his order
by one Andrews, and, In a second count.
with uttering the same check, knowing It to
have been forged. It was shown that when
arrested he had three other checks upon the
same bank, payable to his own order, one of
which purported to be drawn by Andrews;
ancl evidence, consisting lo part of bis own
alleged confessions, was admitted, subject
to his exception, tending to show that the
checks found upon him, and also two othe1 e
pall8ed by him about the same time as th!!
one set out In the Indictment, were forgeries. Under the principle above stated, all
the evidence excepted to was competent,
both to show his knowledge that the check
set out In the Indictment was forged, and
that his purpose In the forgery and the
uttering was to defraud. It ls to be presumed that correct and appropriate lnstru<'tlons, to enable the jury to make a proper
application of the evidence, were ~ven.
Com. v. Shepard, 1 Allen, 575, ~; Adams
v. Nantucket, 11 Allen, 203, 205.
Re&f'rVing for the present the questions
raised as to the alleged confessions, thelW
conslderatlons require us to OYerrule the
other exceptions to the admission of evidence, and also to that portion of the charge
which allowed the jury, on the question of
the defendant's Intention to defraud by the
forgery, to cooslder the fact that be hacl In
his poBSesslon at the time of his arrest other
forged checks.
2. The defendant excepted to the admf&.
slon of evidence of hie alleged confessions.
1 Before such evidence was re<"elYed, the witnesses were examined by the defendant's
counsel with reference to any Inducements
or statements made to him by the oftlcers,
and the b11l of exceptions states that lt
appeared that no Inducements were held
out. When the examination dls<'losed that
his statements related in part to the· other
checks above mentioned, the defend11J1t's
counsel objected to the admission of any
statement or confession about checks othPr
than the one mentioned in the Indictment,
' and ex<•epted to all evidence of his state. meuts as to the other checks; but, as all
! the statements were pertinent to the questlon whether the cheeks were forgeries, and
I as that question was In law pertinent to
the Issue, the evidence was competent. During the charge the court Instructed the jury
' that, If the testimony of the officers showed
that any Inducement or hope of reward
was held out to the defendant, they were
to disregard any confe11slon that might have
been testified to. At the close of the charge

i

I

SI.MILAR OCCURRENCES SHOWING INTENTION, .ETC.
SIMILAR OCCURRENCES SHOWING INTENTION, ETC. [Case N0. 18

the defendant requested the court to further

instruct the jury “that if they believed,

taking all the circumstances of the case

into consideration, that the oﬁicers held out

any inducement or hope of reward to de-

fendant if he would confess, their testimony

as to any confession or admissions which

might have been made by the defendant

must be disregarded." As there was no

evidence bearing upon this question, except

the testimony oi.’ the ofilcers, the instruction

given and that requested were the same,

in substance, and that requested was proper-

ly refused.

3. There was no evidence that Andrews

ever had an account with the bankon

which the chm-k purported to be drawn,

or any right to draw upon the bank. The

court refused to rule that for this reason

there was no evidence to warrant a c011\'i<'-
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tion, or that there was a variance between

the allegation and the proof, in that the

words “order for money" in the indictment

implied a. mandatory power in the maker of

the check, while -upon the proof it did not

appear that Andrews had any right to

command the bank to pay the check, or

any check. These requests were properly

refused. The indictment alleges the make-

ing and uttering of a false order for money

of a certain tenor. Whether, if the false

order had been genuine, it would have been

a document which the bank on which it

purported to have been drawn would have

been bound to honor, or even whether or

not there was such a bank, was not alleged

‘in the indictment, and was immaterial.

Exceptions overruled.

57

the defendant requested the court to further
Instruct the Jury "that If they bellen~d.
taking all the circumstances of the case
Into consldera tlon, that the ofth-ers held out
any lndtH'P.Dlent or hope of reward to defendant lf he would confess, their testimony
as to any conresston or admlBSlons which
might have been made by the defendant
must be disregarded." As there was no
evidence bearing ui>on this question, except
the testimony of the otneers, the Instruction
given and that requested were the same,
Ill substance, and that requested was properly refused.
3. 'fh('re was no evidence that Andrews
ever had an account with the bank· on
which tlw ehf><"k purported to be drawn,
<Jr any right to draw upon th<' bank. The
court refused to rule that for this reason

(Case No. 18

there was no evidence to warrant a ronYietlon, or that there was a nrlance between
the allegation and the proof, ln that the
words "order for money" ln the Indictment
Implied a mandatory power In the makn of
the check, while -upon the proof lt did not
appear that Andrews had any rl&"ht to
command the bank to pay the check, or
any check. These requests were properly
refused. 1'he indictment alleges the mak- ·
I.Ilg and uttering of a false order for money
of a certain tenor. Whether, If the false
order had been genuine, it would have been
a document which the bank on whil'h it
purported to have been drawn would have
been b01n1d to honor, or eyen whether or
not there was such a bank, was not alleged
'In the ln<llctment, and was imma.tel'ial.
Exceptions overruled.
57

Case No. 19)
Case No. 19]

RELEVAN CY.

RELEVANCY.

CONTINEXTAJ, IXR. CO. OF CITY OF
NEW YOitK v. IN8l'UA.'<l'E CO.
OF PENXSYLYA.'<IA.

CONTINENTAL INS. CO. OF CITY OF

NEW’ YORK v. i.\'SlTl{Al\'L‘E CO.

OF PE;\'.\'SYL\'A_\'IA.

(2 C. C. A. 535, 51 Fed. 884.)

Circuit Court of Appears, Second Circuit.

March 15, 1892.

Error to the circuit court of the United

_States 1'or the Southern district of New York.

At Law. Action by the insurance Oom-

pany of the State of Pennsylvania against

the Continental inurauce Company of the

Uity of New York to recover $33,105, with

interest. Defendant in its answer, by way

of counterclaim, demanded judgment against

plaintiﬁ for $5,252.88, with interest. Verdict

for plaintitf in the sum of $16,420.73, and mo-

tion for new trial denied. Judgment for said

amount, and for interest thereon, the whole

amounting to $18,732.20. Defendant brings
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error. Atﬂrined.

Butler, Stillman & Hubbard (Thomas H.

Hubbard and John Notman, of counsel), for

(2

c. c. A. Ci30, 511''ed. 884.)

Circuit Court of Appeal's. Second Circuit.
March lu, 1892.

Error to the 1.'ircult court of the United
States tor the ~them district of New York.
· At Law. Action by tbe Insurance Com·
paoy of the State of Pennsylvania agalDBt
tbe Conttnenlal Insurance Company of the
City of New York to re(.'OVer ~,11.JU, with
Interest. Defendant In lt11 answer, by way
of counterelalm, demanded Judgment agalDBt
plalntur for f:;,252.88, with luterest. Verdict
for plaluttrr In the nm of ,16,420.7:1, aud motion tor new trial denied. Judgment for said
amount, and tor tntereet thereon, the whole
amounting to •ts,732.20. Defendant brings
error. AtHrmed.
Butler, Stillman & Hubbard (Thomas H.
Hubbard and John Notman, ot couuMel), for
plalutltr In error. Evarts, Choate & Beaman
(Tn>atlwell Cleveland, of counsel), for defendant In error.

!

plaintiff in error. Evarts, Uhoate & Beaman

(Treadweli Cleveland, of counsel), for defend-

ant in error.

Before WALJ,ACE llDd LA.COMBE, Cir·
cult Judges.

Before WALLACE and LACUMBE, Cir-

cuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. This is a writ of error by

the defendant in the suit below to review a

judgment of the circuit court for the plaintiff

entered upon the verdict of a jury. The as-

signments of error impugn the rulings of the

trial judge in admitting evidence. and in re

fusing to instruct the jury to ﬁnd a verdict

for the defendant as to all, and especially as

to several, of the causes of action in contro-

versy. Error is also assigned of some of the

instructions given to the jury.

'i‘he complaint contains 23 counts, each of

which sets forth a different and distinct cause

of action. Each of them charges that, by the

fraudulent acts of an agent employed by both

the plaintiff and defendant, the plaintiff was

made to pay to a third party a sum of money

which should have been paid by the defend-

ant. The averments general to all are, in

substance, that in the years 1882 and 1883

one Lorenzo Dimick was the general agent

at Buffalo of the plaintiff, the defendant, and

also of the two other insurance companies

having local agents in other places, who ac-

cepted applications and issued certiﬁcates for

marine insurance; that the general agent con-

ducted at Buﬂalo the whole business of in-

land marine insurance for the several com-

panies, and, in the usual course of his busi-

ness, issued policies of insurance and effected

rcinsurances in behalf of the several com-

panics for risks accepted by him. or by the

local agents, and adjusted all losses arising in

the business by drawing drafts on the. com-

pany insuring, or paying them. and charging

the amount against its moneys in his hands.

Seventeen of the counts set forth causes of

action of a similar character, and, in effect,

allege that, after Dimick had received in-

formation of a. marine peril aﬂccting a partic-

ular risk which had been insured by the de-

PEit CURIAM. Thia la a writ of error by
the defendant In the eult below to review a
judgment of the circuit court for the plalntltr
entered upon the verdict of a jury. The asalgnment11 of error Impugn the rulings of the
trial judge In admitting evlden<.-e, and lu r&
fusing to Instruct the jury to ttud a verdict
for the defendant as to all, and espeelally as
to several, of the causes of action In controv.ersy. Error ls also assigned of l!Ome of the
Instructions glnn to the jury.
The complaint contains 23 counts, each of
which sets forth a different and distinct cause
ot action. Each ot them charges that, by the
fraudulent acts of an agent employed by both
the plalntur and defendant, the plalntur was
made to pay to a third party a sum of money
which should have been paid by the defendant. The averments general to all are, In
substance, that In the years 1882 and 1883
ODE' I.ol"l'uzo Dimick was the general agent
at Rull'alo ot the plalntur. the defendant, and
also of the two other luaurance companies
hn,·lng local agents In other places, who ac<'Pl>ted applications and IBSued eertlfteates tor
marine lnsuranee; that the general agent conducted at Bull'.alo the whole business of Inland marine Insurance for the several companies, and, In the usual course ot his business, Issued poll<'les ot Insurance and errected
reln11urances In bE>balf ot the several companies for risks accepted by him. or by the
local agents, and adjustt>d all losses arlfdng In
the buslneRs by drawing drafts on the company Insuring, or paying them, and clmrglng
the amount against Its moneys In his hands.
Seventeen ot the counts set forth <'&Uses ot
GS
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action of a similar character, and, In dectp
atlege that. after Dimick bad reeelved Information of a marine IM'rll all't>ctlng a particular risk which had been Insured by the defendant, he fraudulently shifted the ridk, or
some part ot It. upon the plalntur, by relnsurlng It in the name ot the plalntlll', and..
when loss ensued which the defendant was
In fact liable to pay, he caused the plalntift'
to pay It aa a reinsurance upon the rlllk; that
each of the payments so made was received
by the defendant, and wu obtained through
the fraudnlent acts ot Dlmlck, done with the
Intention ot cheating and defrauding theplalntur tor the benefit of the defendant.
These 17 cauaes ot action relate to dlll'.erent
risks, and Involve different voyages, dates.
and amounts. The 11.fteenth and nineteenth
counts contain similar averments, except that
the rlllkll were 11.nt lnBured by the defendant.
and, after Information ot peril or disaster was
received, Dimick substituted the plaintiff as.
the original lnBurer. Four ot the other
counts, the twentieth to the twenty-third, Inclusive, are for similar causes ot action, except that they allege that. rleka were originally Insured by the plalntitr, and had been
relnsured by the defendant. but, after news.
ot peril or disaster, the reinsurance was concealed BO as to relieve the defendant trom thewhole or part ot Its obligation. It appeared
upon the trial that separate books were kept
by Dimick for each company, In which theparticulars or tbe Insurances and reinsurances were entered; that thE' local agents
who accepted applications and Issued certificates tor Insurance transmitted reports, call·
ed "dally reports," to Dimick, specifying the
particulars ot the risks taken by them; that
the particulars ot these risks were entered in
the books kept at Buft'alo; that twice In each
week Dimick relnsured risks which had been
taken by the local agents, dlstrlbutlng theamount ot reinsurance between the several
companle11 as be saw ftt; and that reports
were torwardPd by him, showing the particulars ot risks Insured or relnaured, dally to the
defendant, and twice In each week to theotber companies. AC<'Ordlng to bis course of
buBlnesa with the plalntllr and the defendant.
be was to remit to each on the 20th ot every
mouth all moneys In his hands oelouglng to
It, and render to each a full abstract of his
business with It, Including a statement ot
1os1w11 paid and the proofs relating to the
same. The evidence authol'lzed the Jury to
ftnd that In many cases, after a risk had been
Insured by a local agent with the defendant,
or by Dimick himself, be re<>elved news of
peril, by telegram or otherwlee, and would reInsure the risk with one or wore ot the other
companies, by causing appropriate entries to
be made In the books, and, In aome cases,
would <'&Deel the orlJrlnal lnsumnce, and subMtltute one or more of thP other ('()mpanles
In the place of defendant, and, It thl:' risk
had been originally Insured with the plalntlll',
or either ot the companies other than the de-

..
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fendant, and relnsurcd in part with the de-

fendant, would cancel the reinsurance with

the llefelldflllf. and transfer it to one or more

of the other companies; that in these cases

the reports transmitted by him to the several

companies would not give any information of

the real transaction, but only of the sub-

stituted insurance; that when a loss was in-

curred in any of these cases, he would ad-

just it on the basis of the fraudulent insur-

ance or reinsurance, and obtain payment

thereof from the company or companies ap-

parently liable therefor, by drawing drafts,

or by charging the amount against funds in

his hands, thus exoneratlng the defendant to

the extent to which he had fraudulently re-

lieved it of its original obligation; and that

all this was done by means of fraudulent in-

structions by Dimlck to his clerks, by fraud-

ulent entries in his books and papers, and
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by fraudulent statements in his reports and

accounts rendered. Evidence was given by

the plaintiff upon the trial tending to prove‘

the particular frauds in suit, and also tend-

ing to prove similar frauds by Ditnick, coin-

mitted in some instances as part of the same

transaction, and in others in a different trans-

action, about the same time, by which he

shifted losses of the defendant upon one or

both of the other two companies. The theory

of the case for the plaintiff was that these

frauds were part of a deliberate system de-

vised by Ditnlck to defraud the plaintiff for

the beneﬁt of the defendant, from motives of

persgnal interest on his part. The evidence

did not show that defendant had any knowl-

edge of the fraudulent acts of Dimick.

In considering the assignments of error,

those only will be noticed which have been

relied upon at the bar, and in the brief of

the coungel fgr the plaintiff in error. As to

those which relate to the admission of evi-

dence, a few general considerations are per- t

tinent. In actions founded upon fraud,

where intent 15 a, necessary ingredient, the

largest latitude is allowed in the introduc- ‘

tion of evidence, circumstantial as well as

direct, to disclose the motive and prove the

fraud; and any evidence having a tendency

to prove the offense, though it may be slight,

is not incompetent. Such actions necessa-

rily give rise to a wide range of investlga- I

tion, for the reason that the motive of the

defendant is involved in the issue. When-

ever the necessity arises for a resort to cir-

cumstantial evidence, either from the nature

of the inquiry, or the failure of direct proof,

objections to testimony on the ground of ir- ‘

relevancy are not favored, for the reason

that the force and effect of circumstantial .

facts usually and almost necessarily depend

upon their connection with each other, and

circumstances altogether inconclusive, if

Separately considered, may, by their number

and joint operation, especially when cor-

roborated by moral coincidences, be suffi-

cient to constitute conclusive proof. Castle

v. Ballard, 23 How. 172, 187; Hubbard v.

Briggs, 31 N. Y. 518, 538; Beardsley v.

OCCURRE~CES
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fendant, and n>IDBUN'd lo part with the defendant, would ca1wel the relll8uranl·e with
the defendant, and traDBfer It to one or more
of the other CODlpanlea; that ln these caaetr
tlle reports tran&Dlltted by him to the several
companlee would not give any lnfonnatlon of
the real transaction, but only of the subltltuted Insurance; that when a 1088 was Incurred ID any o:f these caaea, be would adJWJt lt on the baJda of the fraudulent Insuranl't! or reinsurance, and obtain payment
thereof from the company or companies llPpareutlr llable therefor, by drawing drafta,
or by <>barging the amount aplDBt tund11 lD
hla bands, thus exonerating the defendant to
the extt-nt to which he had fraudulently relleved It of ltB original obligation; and that
all this was done by meam of fraudulent IDatructlOWJ by Dimick to hi• clerks, by fraudulent entries ID his books and papera, and
by fraudulent statements lo hl8 reports and
accounts rendered. Evidence was given by
tbe plalntUr upon the trial tending to prove
the particular trauda ln autt, and also tendlog to prove slml1ar frauds by Dimick, commltted lo B01De lnatancee as part of the same
tran&actlon, and ID others lo a different traDBactton. about the same time, by which be
shifted l0118e8 of tbe defendant upon one or
both of the other two companies. The theory
of the caae for the plaint!« waa that these
frauds were part of a deliberate system devlaed by Dimick to defraud tb.e plaintiff for
the beneftt of the defendant, from motives of
peraonal lnterest on his part. The evidence
did not ahow that defendant bad any kn?wledge of the fraudulent acts of Dlml<>k.
ln CODAlderlng the &88lgnments of error,
those only will be noticed which have been
relted upon at the bar, and In the brief of
the counsel for the plaintiff In error. As to
thoee which relate t.o the admiBBlon of evldenee, a few general considerations are perttnent. In actions founded upon fraud,
wht-re intent la a necessary ingredient, the
largest latitude la allowed In the lntroductlon of evidence, circumstantial as well as
direct, to disclose the motive and prove the
fraud; and any evidence having a tendency
to prove the otrense, though lt may be slight,
Is not lnrompetent. Such actions Dect>!IB&·
rlly rtve rise to a wide range of lnvestlgatlon, tor the reason that the motive of the
defendant la Involved In the IBBut-. Whenever the necessity arises for a resort to circumatantlal t-vldence, either from tht'> nature
of the Inquiry, or the failure of dlre<>t proof,
obJectloD11 to testimony on the ground of Irn.-lt-van<>y are not favored, for the reason
that the force and etrect of clrcumirtantlal
facts usually aDll almost necell8llrlly depend
upon their ronnectlon with each other, and
c-lreumatao<>eR altogether lncon<>luslve, If
aeparately conaldel't'd, may, by their number
and joint operation, t-ape<"lally when corroborated by moral colneldt-ncea, be sutnclent to constitute conclusive proof. Castle
T. Bullard~ 28 How. 172, 187; Hubbard v.

Briggs, 81 N. Y. 518, 5.18; Beardsley T.
Duntley, 69 N. Y. 577, G81.
The case of fraud la one of the few exceptlons to the gent-ral rule that other oftenses of the accused are not relevant to
establlsh the main charge; and lt la the aettied rule that, to establl11b fraud In a given
tranaal'tlon, evidence la adml8slble to show
the commlaalon of similar frauds In similar
traJUlllctlons bad with other persons about
the same time. Lincoln v. Claftlo, 7 Wall
132; Butler v. WaWDB, lB Wall. 466; In·
aurance Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U. H. 591, 6
Sup. ~'t. ff17. It was entirely competent for
the plaintiff to 11bow that, during the period
covered by the frauds lo suit, Dimick was
committing otht-r and a aeries of almllar
frauds upon the other IDBurance companlee
for the beneftt of the defendant. All the
entries made In Dlmlck'11 book.a or papers by
his clerks, pursuant to hla dlrectloDll, were
the ac•ts of Dimick. and the entries them&elves, as well aa bis Instructions, general
or special, to the clerka, were verbal act&.
and, as such, a part of the res geabe of the
transaction& which were sought to be
shown. The evidence was therefore properly admitted, which tended to show that.
lD shifting any one of the particular 108888
lo suit from the defendant to the plaintiff,
Dimick did so by relnsurlng It lD part with
the plaintiff, and in part with the other two
companies for which be was an agent; or
which tended to show that, ln Independent
transactions occurring about the same time,
be committed similar frauds, or attempted
to, upon one or both of the other two companlea; and the book.a and papers contalntog the entries by means of whkh these
\ frauds were In part effected, as well u teeI tlmony of the general and special lnatruc: tlons of Dimick to bis clerks, were compe· tent evidence. It la of no consequence
. wht-ther the evidence consisting of such
! entries was Introduced and admitted upon
• a different theory of Its competenc·y; It was
compett-nt for the reason stated. and, If It
1
also tended to corroborate wltnessea whose
credlblllty was doubtful, that circumstance
1 did not Impair lt.9 competency.
1
,
We proc-eed to notice more particularly
: some of the rulings lo admitting testimony
II which are complained of. The pages from
the Insurance registers kt-pt by Dimick contalned, It ls true, entries as to many risks
which were In no wise concerned with this
case, but no specific objection was taken on
J that ground.
The pages were ottered and
marked as exhibits, properly so, even If for
! ldentlftcatlon only, and the plaintiff proved
I and read the entries upon them relating to
I Insurances of risks takPn on vesaels which
I were the subject of the ac•tlon. To t hPse objectlon waR taken as lrumatt•rlal and lrrelevant, and In the light of that objection only
la the action of the trial judge to be reviewed. Ile cannot be held to have t-rrt'd
ln allowing the jury to see the entries aR
69
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they stood on the pages, in the absence of a

specific request that the other entries on the

page should in some way be kept from them,

and, in the absence of anything to that ef-

fect on the record, we cannot assume that

he allowed entries which so plainly had

nothing to do with the case to be read to

the jury. People v. Diinlck, 107 .\'. Y. 13,

25, 1-i N. E. 178. The entries which were

read to the Jury against the defendant’s ob-

jection were in each instance indisputably

parts of the transaction in question, which

was as much a reinsurance of the defendant

as it was an insurance in the plaintiff. The

proposition to be established was that rein-

surances of the defendant's risks were ef-

fected with the plaintiff, after notice of

disaster, to save it from loss. Dimick‘s re-

lations with the three reinsuring companies
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were such that he was able to effect rein-

surances in all of them without exciting

suspicion. The single fact that, in the case

of the Ackley. for instance, where the de-

fendant had $;i.~<,900 at risk, only the com-

paratively small sum of $2,5'>00 was rein-

sured in the plaintiff, might indicate the

mere exercise of ordinary discretion; but

simultaneous reinsurance of all the amount

at risk, (except $5,000,) in the other com-

panies, might well be persuasive to the in-

ference that he did so after the receipt of

information that led him to believe the ves-

sel was a loss, other evidence tending to

show that whenever there was no loss there

was no reinsurance. If the transaction, as

plaintiff .claimed, was an effort to shift the

burden of a known loss from the defend-

ant's shoulders, it was not completed till all

that was done by Dimick to eﬂect that ob-

ject had been accomplished.

Whether the various entries testiiied to by

the witnesses whose former perjury was

conceded did or did not corroborate their

evidence on this trial is not material on the

question of their admissibility. They were

offered, not as independent evidence, or re-

ceived as such, but were a part of the testi-

mony of the witness himself, memoranda

made by him at the time, sworn to by him-

self to have been true statements when

made, and minuting a multitude of dates,

names, ﬁgures, and values, the details of

which no witness could be expected to re-

tain in his unaided memory. As such they

were admissible in connection with his tes-

timony. Insurance Co. v. Weides, 14 Wall.

375. They were not “unproved copies of un-

proved accounts," as in Mining Co. V.

Fraser, 130 U. S. 611, 610, 9 Sup. Ct. G65.

To the refusal of the trial judge to strike

out evidence as to instructions given by Dim-

lck to deduct certain percentages from premi-

ums, no exception was taken. and it cannot

be considered here. The testiniony as to the

James Wade and the Gleniffer, not included

in this action, was offered to show knowledge

on the part of defendant's manager in New

York of Dimick‘s practice of protecting de-
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they stood on the pages, In the absence of a
specUlc request that the other entries on the
page should In some way be kept from them,
and, In the absence of anything to that effeet on the record, we cannot as1mme that
he allowed entries which so plainly bad
nothing to do with the case to be read to
the Jury. People v. Dlml<'k, 107 ~. l'.. 13,
20, 14 N. E. 178. The entries wbkh were
read to the jury against the defendant's objectlon were In each Instance Indisputably
parts of the transaction In question, wbleh
was as much a reinsurance of the defendant
as It was an lrumranre In the plaintiff. The
proposition to be establlebed was that reinsurances of the tlt>ft>ndant's risks wt>re etfected with the plaintiff, after notke of
di8118ter, to save it from losa. Dlmlt•k's relatloDB with the thl'\'e rt>lnsurlng <'Olll&>anlee
were such that be was ablP to t•lrt><.·I reinauranees in all of them without t'Xcitlng
suspicion. '.rhe sln~le fact that, In the case
ot the AcklPy, tor lnstant't', where the defendant had :i;::x,900 at risk, only the <.'Omparatlvely small sum of $2,riOO was reinsured In the plaintiff, might lndkate the
mere exercise of ordinary dlft<'retlon; but
simultaneous relneuranc.>e of all the amount
at risk, (except $5,000,) In the other companles, might well be persuasive to the infert>nce that he did so after the receipt of
lnformatlon that led him to believe the veseel was a loee, other evidence tending to
show that whenever there was no loss there
wu no reinsurance. If the traD11aetlon, aa
plalntltr .claimed, was an ell'ort to shift the
burden of. a known 1088 from the defendant's shoulders, It was not <'Ompletetl till all
tb&t waa done by Dlmlek to ell'ect that object bad been a<"t.'Ompl111hed.
Whether the various entries testified to by
the wltne!l8t's whose former perjury was
t.'Onceded did or did not corroborate their
evidence on this trial Is not material on the
question of their admissibility. They were
oll'ered, not as Independent evidence, or recelved as such, but were a part of the testtmony of the witness himself, memoranda
made by him at the time, sworn to by himself to have been true statements when
made, and minuting a multitude of dates,
names, figures, and values, the details .>f
whlch no witness could be expeetl'd to retaln In his unaided memory. As such they
were admlaslble In connection with his tell·
tlmony. Insurance Co. v. Weldes, 14 Wall.
37u. They were not "unpro\•ed copies of un11roved aecounte," as In lllnlng Co. v.
Fraser, 1:JO U. S. 611, 61D, 9 Sup. Ct. 665.
To the retuaal of the trial judge to strike
out evltlt>nce as to Instructions given by Dimlt'k to deduct certain 1iercentages from premlnms, no ex<'eptlon was taken. and It <'Ounot
be consltleretl here. The tt'!ltlwony as to the
.Tames Wade and the Glenlffer, not lnl'luded.
In tht11 a<'tlon, was offered to show knowledge
on the part of defendant's manairer In !'iew
York of Dlmlck's praetlce of prott•1·tlng de60
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fentlant by rt>lnsurance when he beard of lOBB
or peril to the property Insured. It tended to
pro,·e this Ir supplemented by further proof.
Plalntltr fallt.'d to 80 supplement It, and the
court expretlllly charged that no knowledge
Willi proved on the part of the defendant,
whl<'b Is all that was required, (Pennsylvania
Co. ,., ·noy, 102 lI. S . .fill,) eertalnly, In the
ahllt•nee of a motion to strike out, or to InI 11tn1ct the jury that all evidence as to these
h\'O veuels was to be disregarded.
The testimony as to entries tou<'blng the
<'o)'De, Jennie Matthews, Potomae, and Callfornla, vessels not In thl8 action, wu offered
to prove dates of relDBurancee which were
the subje<"t of 11ult. The dates when rein111urance was efrt>eted nowben> ap1ieared, and
It was not to be expected that any witness,
I e\·en If he remembered the fact of relnsur~
unc-es, could carry all the dates In hl11 un'I aiftl'd memory.
It was only by the position
of thP PntrlPll In the hooks, relatively to othj er entrlPB where dates were minuted, (llU<'h
• as at't'E.'ptance of original rtak, reports to the
companies, etc.,) that the wltne&11 who made
the entries was able to telltlfy that the etrectIng of the rehumrance In 188ue was on, before,
or after aome calendar date. To an extent
Mutftelent to enable him to ftx such date, It
was proper for the witness to testify from
the entries he bad himself made, and we cannot find that the testimony excoeeded that
limit. It <'Ompetent to prove the dates, as we
art> 88tlsfied It was, It was admlselble, although It also disclosed other fraudulent relnI 11urances. Dutehe&11 Co. v. Barding, 49 N. Y.·
' 321, 325.
The defendant's protection against lnferences from the other frauds, thus Incidentally
11hown, lay In a request to direct the Jury to
tllaregard them. But, as we have before
shown, It was entitled to no such direction.
The evidence was proper for the jury to con11lder as showing fraudulent acts similar to
tho11e which were the subject of complaint,
and performed at the same time. The evltlent•e showing the lines of Insurance and re[ ln11nrnn<'e which the defendant had calTled
tlurlng the year In question was relevant and
, matt•rlal Showing, as It did, a 1teneral 11ystern or t'OUrRe of buslnl'lls. the result of which
• wall that the Continental wa"' found to be rei ln1mred whPn there was a loss to be paid,
1 and not to be relnsured, however large lta
: rlsk11, wht>n there was none, It waM a tact
I from whlt•b, taken In connection with others,
It wight be fairly Inferred that theHP rNmlts
were secured, not by the t-xerl'lse ot H<Juml
judgment, nor by rare good chance. but by
fraudulent practices of the kind testified to
by Dlml<'k's accomplices.
The 0111dgnment of error based 'upon the refu11ol of th<' trial judge to direct a verdict tor
the cletenc'tant rests upon the proposition that
It did not appear by thP evlden<>e that the
defendant bad ret•elved the fruits of any of
the fraud11 committed by Dlmll'k upon the
plalntlll'. It was proyed that ln each case of

I
I
I

I

I
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-a loss upon a risk insured by the defendant,

part of which had been ostensibly reinsured

by the plaintiff, Dimick adjusted the loss,

and paid it to the assured out of funds of the

defendant in his hands, charged the whole

amount to the defendant in his account with

it, drew a draft on the plaintiff for its pro-

portion as a reinsurer, credited the proceeds

-of the draft to the defendant in his account,

and sent the plaintiff a receipt, signed by

him as agent for the defendant, acknowledg-

ing payment of the amount received. When-

ever a loss was settled he informed the de-

fendant that the transaction was closed, and

of its net loss after deducting the reinsur-

ance. by sending to it the “loss p0cket;" and

in each monthly statement he informed the

defendant that out of its funds in his hands

he had paid its whole loss by appropriating

therefrom only the amount of the net loss.
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The moneys thus received and applied by

Dilnick to pay the defendant's losses were

received by the defendant as completely, for

all practical purposes, as they would have

been if he had transmitted them to the de-

fendant, and the defendant had paid them

over to the assured in settlement of the loss.

Pratt v. Foote, 9 N. Y. 463. The law looks at

the substance of the transaction, and is quite

unconcerned about its form. The defendant

got the beneﬁt of these moneys because they

were applied to extinguish its debts to the as-

surcd, and because they increased its funds

in the hands of its own agent It is quite im-

material that the moneys were not physically

transferred by Dimick to the defendant, or

that, after Dimick received them, and had

used them to extinguish the debt of the de-

fondant, he guhseqllelltly became and remain-

ed indebted to the defendant in an amount

13;-get than the aggregate of these moneys.

Dimlck not only assumed to act in obtaining

them as agent for the defendant, but he ap-

propriated them to discharge the debts of the

(lgfendant The case is one for the applica-

tion of the rule that he who seeks to avail

himself of the advantages of the act of an-

other. after knowledge of its fraudulent char-

acter, must be held to adopt the fraud, al-

though at the time of the act he was igno-

rant of it. The doctrine is elementary, and

prevails at law as well as in equity, that a

person, though innocent himself. cannot re-

tain an advantage obtained by the fraud of

another, in the absence of some considera-

tion moving from himself.

The assignment of error founded upon the

refusal of the judge to direct the jury to ﬂnd

for the defendant as to the cause of action

for the loss of the cargo of the Manistee pro-

ceeds upon the theory that the jury were not

authorized to ﬁnd for the plaintiff upon the

uncorroborated testimony of the witness

Richard Dlmlck, who concededly had testi-

fied falsely in respect to the same facts upon

a previous occasion. There is modern au-

thority to the effect that the question of the

credibility of such a witness is entirely one

for the jury. when submitted to them under

upon a risk Insured by the defendant,
part of whleh had been oeteuslbly relnsured
by the plalntltr, Dimick adjusted the loss,
and pald it to the assured out of funds of the
defemlant In his hands, charged the whole
amount to the defendant In hle account with
It, drew a draft on the plaintiff for Its proportion 88 a relnsurer, credited the proceeds
·Of the 1lratt to the defendant In his account,
and sent the plalntltr a receipt, signed by
him as agent .for the defendant, acknowledging payment of the amount received. When·
ever a 1088 was settled he Informed the defendant that the transaction was closed, and
of Its net 1088 after deducting the relnsuranee. by sending to it the ''loss pocket;" and
ln each monthly statement he Informed the
defendant that out ot Its funds tn hle hands
he- had paid its whole 1088 by appropriating
therefrom only the amount of the net lose.
The moneys thus received and applied by
Dimick to pay the defendant's losses were
received by the defendant 88 completely, for
all practical purposes, 88 they would have
been If he bad transmitted them to the defendant, and the defendant bad paid them
over to the assured In settlement of the loss.
Pratt v. Foote, 9 N. Y. 463. The law looks at
the substance of the transaction, and ls qulte
unconcerned about Its form. The de-fendant
got the beneftt of these moneys be-<'lluee they
were applied to extinguish Its debts to the assured, and because they Increased its funds
ln the bands of Its own agent. It ls quite Immaterial that the moneys were not physically
tranBferred by Dimick to the defendant, or
that, after Dimick received them, and had
ll8ed them to extinguish the debt of the defendant, he subsequently became and remained lnde-bted to the defendant In an amount
larger than the aggregate of these moneys.
Dlmlck not only assumed to act in obtaining
them u agent for the defendant, but he appropriated them to discharge the debts of the
defendant. The case ls one for the application of the rule that he who seeks to avail
hlnu!elf of the advantages of the act of another, after knowledge of Its fraudulent char·
acter, must be beld to adopt the fraud, although at the time of the act he was lgno-
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rant of It. The doctrine ls elementary, and
prevalle at law as well aa in equity, that a
person, though Innocent himself, cannot retain an advantage obtained by the fraud of
another, tn the absence of some consideration moving from himself.
The aeelgnment of error founded upon the
refusal of the judge to direct the jury to find
for the defendant 88 to the cause of action
for the loss of the cargo of the Manistee proceetla upon the theory that tile Jury were not
authorized to find for the plaintiff upon the
uncorroboratt>d te-stlmony of the witness
Rlehard Dimick, who concededly had testl·
fled falsely In respect to the same facts upon
a previous 0<•easlon. There ls modern authority to the effect that the question of the
credlblllty of such a witness le entirely one
for the Jury, when submitted to them under
prudential Instructions. Dunn' v. People, 29
N. Y. 523, 529; People v. O'Neil, 109 N. Y.
251, 16 N. E. 68. But this assignment of error ls invalid because of the testimony of the
witness Neff. a wttnt'SS whose credlblllty was
not Impeached to the same purport 88 that of
Richard Dimick.
The assigome-nt of error, because the judge
refused to direct the jury to find a verdict for
the defendant u to the cause of action for the
loM ot. the cargo of the Nyack, proceeds upon
the ground that there was no evidence that
the plalntur paid any part of the losa. It was
not shown that Dimick had cirawn any draft
on the plaintiff for the amount of Its retnaurance upon this loss, or that the plaintiff
bad remitted the amount to him; but It dld
appear that he charged It with the amount,
and credited the defendant with a lib
amount In his caah book. As Dimick was
tht> common agent of both parties, this was
suftlclent prlma facle evidence that he bad
paid the retnsuran<oe for tbe plalntllt. It he
hRd paid it, the case was as though the plalntUf had paid It. Unleee he or the plalntUr
had paid It, the defendant would not have·
been entitled to be credited, 88 It was, for the
amount. Theo aftslJ[Dmt-nts of error thus oonslderetl are the only ones which ireem to re-;
quire dlsc·usslon.
The judgment le affirmed.
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WALLACE v. KENNELLY.

(47 N. J. Law, 242.)

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

1885.

Certlorari to court of common pleas, Hud-

son county.

Action by James Wallace against John

Kennelly for two months’ rent for October

and November, 1883, at $35 a month, under

a lease for the term of two years and ten

months from July 1, 1883. By assignment

defendant transferred the lease to Joseph

Kennelly. Judgment for defendant.

Argued February term, 1885, before DE-

PUE, VAN SYCKEL, and SCUDDI-JR, JJ.

W. B. Gilmore, for plaintiff. J. Flemming,

for defendant.

June Term,

SCUDDER, 'J. By section 174 of the dis-
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trict court act (Revision, p. 1330), from the

order, determination, or decision of the court

of common pleas an appeal may be removed

into this court by writ of certiorari, and the

writ shall remove said order or determina-

tion and the case agreed upon or settled as

therein mentioned. What the state of the

case must contain is indicated in Benedict

v. Howell, 39 N. J. Law, 221. In brief, it

must contain only enough of the facts to

enable the court on appeal to determine the

legality of the rulings in the court below.

By section 170 of the act‘ the determination

of the judge (or in cases where there is a

jury, the verdict of a jury and any judg-

ment thereupon). shall be ﬁnal and conclu-

sive between the parties upon questions of

fact, except as therein provided. The facts

most favorable to the plaintiffs or defend-

ant’s case, which are essential to support

the judgment, shall be taken as found, and

will not be weighed in this court against op-

posing evidence. Here the facts as shown

by the state of the case must, after verdict,

be most liberally construed in favor of the

defendant.

The ﬁrst objection urged is that the di-

trict judge. instead of deciding on the evi-

dence that, as there was no surrender in

writing of the lease signed by the lessor,

or by act and operation of law, under the

statute of frauds, permitted the evidence to

go to the jury, and charged: “That if a. ten-

ant and landlord verbally agree that the

lease shall end, and the leased premises are

by such agreement given up by the tenant,

and his possession of them ends, and the

landlord agrees with and accepts another

person as his tenant, who, as such tenant,

occupies the premises, and pays the rents

to the landlord. this will, in law, operate as

WALLA.CE v. KENNELLY.
would not be an endlq ot the lease or
term."
(47 N. J. Law, 242.)
The substance of the charge 1n the words
Supreme Court of New Jeree7. June Term, used by the court was, as I understand lt,
1885.
that an assignment of the lease wlth the
Certiorari to court of common pleas, Bud- verbal ronsent of the landlord. and the subaon county.
sequent acceptan<.-e of rent by him, would
Action by James Wallace against John not be a surrender of the lease In writing or
Kennelly for two months' rent for October by act and opt>ratlon of law, but that other
and November, 1883, at $35 a month, under 1 fads In the c·aee, If found by the jury, might
a lease for the term of two years and ten effect a surrenller by act and operation of
months from July 1, 1883. By aBSlgnment ! law.
defendant transferred the lease to Joseph
On demurrer to a plea In Hunt v. GardKennelly. Judgment for defendant.
ner, 89 :N. J. Law, u30, It was held that
Argued February term, 1885, before DE- I where the facts set out In the plea are that
PUE, VAN SYCKEL, and SCUDDER, JJ. ! the lease.. aHSlg1wd away bis Interest In the
W. B. Gilmore, for plaintiff. J. Flemming, ; lease, and that the lessor reee!Yed the rent
for defendant.
, from the assignee, and accepted him as his
tenant under the leaBE', these constitute no
SCUDDER, 'J. By section 174 of the di.- 1 bar· to an action of coYenant for rent on
trlct court act (Revision, p. 1330), from the ' the lease against the ~rlglnal tenant.
order, determination, or decision of the court
The utmost effect of these averments lB
of common pleas an appeal may be removed that the prlvlty of estate Is ended, but not
Into this court by writ of certiorari, and the the prh·lty of contract. There must be the
writ shall remove said order or determlna- 1 further averment that such assignee was subtlon and the case agreed upon or settled as atltuted In the i>lace of the orlglnal lessee.
therein mentioned. What the state of the with the Intent on the part of the parties
case must contain ls Indicated ln Benedict to the demise to annul lts obligations. If
v. Howell, 39 N. J. Law, 221. In brief, lt this be established by competent proof. ln
must ceutaln only enough of the ffurts to writing or by parol, then there are no more
enable the court on appeal to determine the contract relations between the parties relegallty of the rollnp 1n the court below. malnlng upon whl<'h either an action of coveBy ~ctlon 170 of the act the determination nant or debt <'an be malntalnPd. SPe cases
of the judge (or lo cases where there la a collected In notes, Woodf. Landi. & Ten. 496.
jury, the verdict of a jury and any judg- Here there ls evidence that there was an oral
ment thereuponJ, shall be final and conclu- agreement between the lessor, James Walslve between the parties upon questions of lace, and John Kennelly, the lessee; that by
fact, except as therein provided. The facts It not only was there a consent to the a.smost favorable to the plali..hfr's or defend- I slgnment of the lease by John to .Joseph
ant's case, which are essential to support 'I Kennelly, but It was also agreed that a
the judgment, shall be taken as found, and ; lease should be drawn and executed by the
will not be weighed. In this court against op- I leBBOr to Joseph, and that he should be subposlng evidence. Here the facts as shown ! stltuted u tenant, and that, although no
by the state of the case must, after verdict, ! lease was drawn, Joseph was In fact substlbe most liberally construed ln favor of the .. tuted for John, and thereupon took posses1
defendant.
alon of the premises, and paid rent for two
The first objection urged la that the dla- I succeMive months thereafter, which was actrlct judgP, Instead of deciding on the evl- ! cepted by the landlord, and receipts given to
dence th11t, as there was no auITender In : him as tenant. These tacts, lf believed by
wrltlng of the lease signed by the le88or, : the jury, are a suftlclent suITender to deteror by act and operation of law, under the mine the former tenancy. Woodf. Landl &
statute of frauds, permitted the evidence to 1 Ten. f 498; Nlckells v. Atherstone. 10 Q. B.
go to the jury. and charged: ''That If a ten- ; 944; Murray v. Shave, 2 Duer, 182; Ranant and landlord verbally agree that the I dall v. Rieb, 11 Mass. 494; Dodd v. Acklom,
lease shall end, and the leased premises are 1 6 l\Ian. & G. 672; Grlmman v. Legge, 8 Barn.
by such agreement given up by the tenant, & C. 324. A fact corroborative of such suband hla possession of them ends, and the stltuted tenancy Is found tn the second relandlord agrees with· and accepts another celpt given by the landlord, James Wallace,
person as bis tenant, who, as sueb tenant, , dated September 1, 1883, for rent up to Ococt•uples the prl•rulsPs, and pays the rents tober lat. The last sentence 1n this receipt
to the landlord, this wlll, In law, opemte as , reads, "Let for one month only." This ls not
a SUl'l'('nder by the first tenant."
I according to the term In the lease to John
The Judge also t•hargPd: "That If the land- Kennelly, but the receipt, being given to
lord or the agent assented to an assignment Joseph Kennelly for rent paid by him, must
and agreed that the lease should be aBBigu- Indicate that the term of bis tenancy Wll8
ed by John Kennelly to Joseph Kennelly, monthly, and under a new letting to blm.
and If It was actually assigned In writing,
'rhere was no error In leaving this question
pursuant to such assent, the aSBlgnmeut to the Jury on the disputed question of facts,

I

i

I

I

I

a surrender by the first tenant.”

The judge also charged: “That if the land-

lord or the agent assented to an assignment

and agreed that the lease should be assign-

ed by John Kennelly to Joseph Kennelly,

and if it was actually assigned in writing,

pursuant to such assent, the assignment

would not be an ending of the lease or
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and the defendant's testimony, it believed,

was suﬂicient to establish a surrender by

operation of lavv- The effect of such subse-

quent letting, as stated by Lord Dcnman in

Iilckclls v. Atherstone, is: “As far as the

plaintiff, the landlord, is concerned. he has

created an estate in the new tenant which

he is estopped from disputing with him, and

which is inc-unsistent with the continuance

of the defemla nt’s term."

The other reason assigned is that the judge

admitted illegal evidence in defense of the

action. There was a clause in the lease that

"this lease is upon condition that no ales or

porter shall be sold by the tenant on said

premises excepting that manufactured and

bought from the landlord, James Wallace."

This was a condition subsequent, and the

breach of it would not defeat the lease. A
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breach might subject the lessee to damages.

The judge admitted this evidence, and said

he would control it afterwards. It was clear-

ly irrelevant to show that the landlord de-

livered bad ale, which, on notice, he took

back, and sent other ale. which was no bet-

ter. If the ale was unﬁt for use, the ten-

ant might defend for that cause, if sued for

not taking it, or if he bought from others,

and sold it on the premises. For such cause

it might be a. defense in an action for breach

of the covenant, but it was no defense to

the lnndlord‘s action for rent. If admitted,

therefore, as matter of direct defense, the

error would not be cured by a subsequent

charge directing the jury to disregard it.

But there is a view in which this testimony

is relevant and admissible. There was a

dispute about the quality of the ale between

the landlord and tenant. The defendant tes-

tifies: “I notiﬁed the plaintiff the ale was

bad. and told him to send for it. He sent

for it. and took it back, and said he would

gend 3, gample package. H6 did S0, and Whili‘.

he then sent went ﬂat. I could not sell any

of the ale. No one would drink it about

there. I told plaintiff the place would not

pay, and I would give up the lease. That

the ale would not sell there. Plaintiff asked

me if I had anybody to take the place. I

told him, ‘yes,’ and asked him if he was

satisfied to do so.” He says he sent over

his brother, and the arrangement was made

with him as above stated. Stephen's Digest

of the Law of Evidence (part 1, c. 2, art. 8)

says: “Facts necessary to be known to ex-

plain or introduce a fact in issue or relevant

fact, or which support or rebut an infer-

ence suggested by a fact in issue or rele-

vant fact, etc., are relevant in so far as they

are necessary for these purposes respective-

ly.” The dealings of these parties in the

ale being the cause of complaint, and wish

to be released from the lease on- one side,

and the motive for the alleged consent and

willingness of the other to the substitution

of another tenant, brings the evidence within

the rule above stated. It tends to show how

the parties came together, and why they

and the derendant'a testimony, It believed,
was so11lclent to establish a surrender by
operation or law. The effect of auch subae~uent letting, as stated by Lord Deowan lo
Nlckells v. .A..t.herstone, la: ..As tar aa the
plalnM, the landlord, 18 concerned, he bas
-created an estate in the new tenant which
he iB estopped from dlsputlog wlth him, and
which ls ln<.·oDBistent with the continuance
ot the defendant's term."
The other reason aBSlgoed Is tha.t the judge
admitted illegal evidence lo deteDBe of the
action. There was a clause lo the le1µ1e that
'"thl8 lease ls upon coodltloo that.no alee or
porter shall be sold by the tenant on 88.ld
premises excepting that manufactured and
bought from the landlord, Jomes Wallace."
Thia was a condition sobsettueot, and the
breach of lt would not defeat the lease. A.
breach might subject the leesee to damages.
The judge admitted this evidence, and suld
be w<Juld control it afterwards. It was cle&J.'Jy lrl'elevant to show that the landlord dellvered bad ale, which, on notice, he took
back, and sent other a.le, which was no bet·
ter. It the ale was unftt for use, the teoaut might defend tor that cause, If sued tor
not taking It, or if he bought from others,
and BOid It on the preml8es. For such cause
It might be a defense in an action for breach
of the covenant, but it was no defense to
the landlord's action tor rent. It admitted,
therefol't', as matter of direct defense, the
error would not be cured by a subsequent
charge directing the jury to dlsregurd It.
But there ls a view In which this testimony
Is relevant and admlBBlble. There was a
dispute about the quality of the ale between
the landlord and tenant. The defendant testlftes: "I notified the plalotur the a.le waa
bad, and told him to send for it. He sent
for it, and took It back, and said be would
aend a. sample package. He did so, and what

[Cue No. 20

he then aent went ti.at. 1 could not sell any
of the ale. No one would drink It about
there. I told plaiotltr the place would not
pay, and I would give up the lease. That
the a.le would not sell there. Plalntur asked
me if I had anybody to take the place. I
told him, 'yes,' and asked him 1f he was
satisfted to do BO." He says be sent over
his .brother, and the arrangement was made
with blm as above stated. Stephen's Digest
of the Law of Evldeoce (part 1, c. 2, art. 8)
aays: "Facts necessary to be known to explalD or Introduce a fact lo lssue or relevant
fact, or which support or rebut an loference suggested by a fact in Issue or relevant tact, etc., are relevant lo so ta.r as they
are necessary for these purposes reepectfvely." The dee.lings of these partlee In tb.e
a.le being the l·ause of complaint, and wish
to be released from the lease on · one side,
and the motive for the a.Uesed coosent and
willingness of the other to the substitution
of another tenant, brings the evidence wlthlu
the role above stated. It tends to show how
the parties came togetht>r, and why they
acted a.e it la claimed they did, tor it appears to be the Immediate and only cause
a.sslgoed tor the change In the tenancy, and
ending the prlvity of contract, whll'h ie the
tact In IBBue. The judge said to the jury,
lo bis charge: "The delivery of bad a.le, or
ale that spoiled, would not In this l'a&e end
the lease, or be a defense. What the fa<'ts
are a.e to the quality of any a.le the plalntltr furnished to defendant, you an• to use
only to throw light upon or help you to
conclude what the parties said In :Sew York,
and agreed upon at the interview between
them about the premises.'' There was no
error In admitting the evidence and llmltlng
It to the purpose for which It was alone
relevant to the issue.
The judgment will be aftlrmed.
63
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BELL et al. T. BREWSTER et U.
(10 N. E. 679, 44: Ohio St. 690.)

Case No. 21]

RELEVANCY.

BELL et al. v. BREWSTER et al.

(10 N. E. 679, 44 Ohio St. 690.)

Supreme Court of Ohio. March 1, 1887.

Error to district court, Union county.

The original action was a suit by the plain-

tlffs below to quiet their title to certain lands

situated in L‘-nion county, and which they

claimed as the heirs at law of the person

last seized. He died in that county on Sep-

tember 11, 1873, and was then known by the

name of Robson L. Broome. The plaintiifs,

however, claimed that his right name was

Levi Brewster; that he was a son of Sea-

bury Brewster, late of Norwich, Connecticut;

that he intermarried with Lucy Waterman

on March 13, 1820, by whom he had two

sons, Richard Brewster, a plaintiff, and Sher- i

man Brewster, deceased, whose widow and

children were the other plaintitfs; that he
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afterwards abandoned his family, assumed ‘

the name of Robson L. Broome, removed to

Union county, and there resided to the time

of his death, and was possesed of a large

amount of real and personal property, the

subject of controversy. A number of rival

claims were set up to that of the piaintii'fs,— '

in one that his right name was Elisha Case;

and in another that it was George Washing-

ton Broome; and the heirs of these persons

were made parties defendant. An appeal

was taken from the judgment of the common 1

pleas court to the district court of the coun-

ty, where judgment was rendered in favor

RELEV.ANCY.

Supreme Court of Ohio. March 1, 1887.
Error to dlRtrlct court, Union county.
The original action was a suit by the plainturs below to quiet their title to certain lands
situated 1n Union county, and which they
claimed as the heirs at law of the person
last seized. He died In that county on Septeml>er 11, 1873, and was then known by the
name of Robson L. Broome. The plalnturs,
however, claimed that his right name was
Levl Brewster; that be was a son of Seabury Brewster, late of Norwich, Connecticut;
· that he Intermarried with Lucy Waterman
on March 13, 1820, by whom he had two
sons, Richard Brewster, a plaintur, and Sherman Brewster, deceased, whose widow and
children were the other plaintllfs; that be
arterwards abandoned his family, a1vmmed
the name of Robson L. Broome, removed to
Union county, and there resided to the time
of his death, and was possessed of a large
amount of real and personal property, the
subJeet of controversy. A number of rival
claims were set up to that of the plalntUrs,in one that his right name was Elisha Case;
and In another that it was George Washington Broome; and the heirs of these persons
were made parties defendant. An appeal
was taken from the Judgment of the common
pleas court to the district court of the county, where judgment was rendered In favor
of the plalntUrs below.
W. B. Loomis and O. H. Grosvenor, for
plalntift's in error. J. w. Robinson, for defendanta 1n error.

of the plaintiffs below.

W. B. Loomis and C. H. Grosvenor, for

plaintiffs in error. J. W. Robinson, for de-

fendants in error.

MINSHALL, J. The principal issue of

fact in the case was whether Levi Brewster, ‘

the ancestor of the plaintiifs, was the same

person who was known in Union county by

the name -If Robson L. Broome, and died

possessed of the property in controversy. As

tending to support the issue on their part, the

plaintiffs introduced (1) a letter purporting

to have been written by Levi Brewster in

the year 1810, from an academy in Connecti-

cut, addressed to Elisha Brewster as his

brother._ No other evidence was introduced

that it had been so written than that it had

been obtained from the family papers of

P1118118 Bl'8W$t9I‘, then deceased, \vh0 wag

the brother of Levi. Also (2) a pay-roll of

Colllilﬂlly 7. Regiment 20, in the war of 1812, '

on which one Levi Brewster app9lll’B 118 1'9-

Celptiug I0!‘ D11)’ 88 a private in said com-

pany, with evidence tending to show that he

had been a. private in the same; but he W1-

deuce was introduced to Show that he in fact

signed the roll, other than that it was pro-

duced from the archives of the government

in the war department at Washington city.

As standards of coniparisom they also hm-0-

duced (3) ¢@l'Y1liI1 books and writings, admit-

ted or duly proven to be in the genuine hand-

1 5°“ fmm P1'°D91' depositorie8-

, document purporting or proved to be 30

writing of the decedent, written by him

MINSHALL, J. The principal l88ue of
fact In the case was whether Levi Brewster,
the ancestor of the plaintiffs, was the same
person who was known in Union county by
the name .,f Robson L. Broome, and died
posseeeed of the property tu controversy. As
tending to support the Issue on their part, the
plaintUrs introduced (1) a letter purporting
to have been written by Levi Brewster in
the year 1810, from an academy in Connectlcut, addressed to Elisha Brewster as bis
brother. . No other evidence was introduced
that it had been 80 written than that it bad
been obtained from the family papers of
}o;Jisba Brewster, then deceased, who was
ti.le brother of Levi. Also (2) a pay-roll of
Company 7, Hegiment 20, In the war of 1812,
on which one I..evt Brewster appears as recelptlng for pay as a p1·lvate in said t'ompany, with evidence tending to show that he
bad been a private In the same; but no evtdence was introduced to show that he In fact
signed the roll, other than that it was produced from the archives of the government
in the war department at Washington city.
AR standards of comparison, the;\' also Introdueed (3) certain books and writings, admitted or duly proveo to be lo the geuuioe handfK

writing of the decedent, written by him
while living at Marysvllle, In Union rounty~
untler the name of Rolison L. Broome. Jo~xperts were then called, who, upon a comparison of the writings, testified that in their
opinions the letter and the signature to the
pay-roll were in the same handwriting u
were the bookR and writings that bad been
introduced u standards of comparison.
Two objections are made to the admiMiblllty of this evidence: (1) That It 1B not
shown that the letter wu written, nor that
the pay-roll was signed, by the Levi Brewster whom the plalnttl!'s elaim to hnve bet'n
their ancestor; (2) that proof of handwriting
by comparison or hands ts not com11etent forthe purpose of proving the identity or a person.
1. We do not understand, from the bill of
exceptions, that there was any serious controversy in the case as to the name of theancestor of the plalntUrs, or as to who were
his relatives. These facts, we may assume.
I were reduced to reasonable, if not absolute.
, certainty; so that this objection must be UDJ derstood as applying to the introduction of
· the letter and pay-roll for comparison with
the admitted writings of Broome, without
other evidence that the letter had beell writ1 ten, or the pay-roll signed, by Levi ::Brewster,
I the ancestor of the plaintiffs, than as before
stated. It ls true there was no direct
evidence as to who wrote the letter, or as
to who signed the pay-roll. The letter waa
written in 1810, and the pay-roll was signed
1n 1814. It would have been diftlcult., If not
impossible, to show the fact by direct testlmony, after such a lapse of time. But more
or leBB credit has always been attached to
ancient documents, without other proof of
their authenticity than that of thl'lr producdon from proper depositories. Where any
document purporting or proved to be 00
years old Is produced from Its proper custody, It ls presumed that the signature, and
every other part of such document which
purports to be in the bandw1·ttlng of any
particular person, ls 1n that person's bandwriting. Stepb. Dig. Ev. 106; Wbart. ll.'v.
I 194 et seq.; Id. 702.
This exeeptlon to the general rules of ev1I dence n-sts upon a conceded necessity lTayl.
J Ev. I l8i4), and applies not only to such lnstruments as are of a f~rmal character, such
I as wllls, bonds and other deeds. but also to
1 receipts, lette~ entries, and all other an; cient writings. 2 Phll. Ev. (10th Eng. and
1 '4th Am. Ed.) 481.
I Thus, in Bere v. Ward, on the trial of an hlsue as to the lt>ldtlmacy ot a partlt•ular per; son, a very old letter, purporting to bear the
1 signature of the beatl of the family, and
brought from among the title deeds kept at
the family seat, was admitted as gen11lne.
without further proof of handw1·itlng, by
Dallas, c. J ., and al"° by I..ortl Tenter<leu on
a &econd trial. 2 Phil. Ev., supra, note 4.
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This ruling vvas followed in Doe v. Bey-

non, 12 Adol. & E. 431, where certain old let-

ters were admitted in evidence upon the is-

sue in the case whetherthe person clalmingas

devisee of the vvritor was the person intend-

ed. They were admitted without proof of

handwriting. - or other proof of their genuine-

ness than that they found among the pa-

pers of the person to whom they had been

addressed at the time of her death.

in Bertie v. Beaumont, 2 Price, 308. an old

receipt, produced by the defendant, was ad-

mitted as evidence tending to prove a modus,

without proof of handwriting. There was

some question made as to the custody of it

having been given to a person other than the

one who produced it. Upon this the chief

baron observed: “It was not given to this

Mr. Beaumont, but to another person of the
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same name, and who, of course, occupied

lands in Buckiand, for none but an occupier

could have acquired such a receipt. That

person being of the same name with the

present defendant. there is a reasonable in-

ference that they were so connected as to

make this the propercustody; and reasonable

evidence of proper custody is all that can be

required, and is sufficient.”

In Fenwick v. Reed, 6 Madd. 7, it was rul-

ed “that a letter, appearing upon the face of

it to be written by the defendant's attorney,

upon the subject of the suit. and coming out

of the custody of the representative of his

attorney, and dated in_1T-i8, was admissible

without proof of handwriting; the contents

of a letter, like the contents of a deed. afford-

ing intrinsic evidence in its favor." The

case was determined ill 1821- A116 in “T1111?

v. Tyrwhitt, -1 Barn. & Aid. 376, it was said

1,; the court; “'1'he rule is not contined to

deeds or wills, but extends to letters and oth-

er written documents coining from the prop-

er custody. It is founded on the antiquity

of the instrument, and the great dlm°“".\',

nay, impossibility, of proving the handwrit-

ing of 3 party after such lapse of time.”

it is true that the admission of written in-

struments, without other proof of their genu-

lneness than that which arises from their age

and ¢usmdy_ opens the door to error and

fraud; but this is no more so when they are

introduced for the purpose of establishing

the identity of a person by a comparison of

hands than when introduced for any other

purpose. In commenting on the possibility

of en-or and 1|-and attending the admission oi’

ancient docunients tlS_€\’ltl9ll('E. Prof. \\'iltll‘-

ton says: "No doubt. ancient documents, as

well as modern. may be forget ." To this he

makes two replies: “in the ﬁrst place, whiic

(lO(:\1me11t_g attested by witnesses. since de-

ceased. have been forged. the fact that there

is a possibility of such falsiﬁcation is an ob-

jection to credibility. but not to competency.

In the second place. bv requiring that the

document should be taken from the proper

depository, the probability of falsiﬁcation is

wn.oos,sv.—-5

Thia ruling W"as followed ln Doe v. Bey-

non, 12 Adol. & E. 431, where certain old letters were adrnltted In e\'ldence upon the Issue In the ease whetberthe person claiming as
devlsee of the writer was the pe1·son Intended. Tbe;t· were admitted without proof of
handwriting, - or other proof of their genuinenet111 than that they found among the papel'8 of the person to whom they bad been
addreMed at the time of ber death.
In Bertie v. Beaumont, 2 Price, 308. an old
Je(•t>lpt, produc·ed by tbe defendant, was admitted a11 evidence tending to prove a mudus,
without proof of handwriting. Tbt>re was
110me question made as to the custody of it
having been given to a penion other than the
one wbo procluced It. Upon this the chief
baron observed: "It was not given to this
~Ir. Beaumont. but to another person of the
11tme name, and wbo, of course, occupied
lands In Buckland, for none but an occupier
could have acquired such a rec•elpt. 'l'hat
pel'8c>n being of the same name with the
present defendant. there ls a reasonable lnteren<'e that they were so conne<·ted as to
make this the proper .custody; and reasonable
evidence of proper <'Ustody h1 all that can be
re<)Uire<l, and ls sutHclent."
In .I<'enwlck v. Reed, tJ :\ladd. 7, It was ruled "that a Jetter. appearing upon the face or
It to be w11tten by the defendant's attorney,
upon the subject of the suit, and coming out
of the custody of the reprPsentntlve of his
attorney, and dated In 17-18, was admissible
without proof ot handwriting; the c·outents
ot a Jetter, like the contents or a deed, atronllng lntrlll8lc evidence In Its favor." The
ease was determined In 1821. And In Wynne
v. Tyrwhltt, 4 Barn. & Aid. 370, It wns 111tld
by the court: ·•The rule ls not confined to
deeds or wills. but t.>Xtends to letters and other written documents coming from the proper custody. It ls rounded on the antiquity
of the Instrument, and the great dltHculty,
nay, impossibility, of proving the haudwrlt·
Ing of a party atter sm•h lapse of time."
It 111 true that the admls1do11 of written instruments, without other proof of their genulnenes11 than that which arises from their age
and custody, opens the door to error nod
fraud; but this Is no more so when they nre
lntroclm·ed for the pur1K>ee of e11ttthlh~hlng
the Identity of a pt>rMon by a compnrhmn of
bonds than when introdm•ed for nn.r othe1·
I>Ul'Jl08e. In comnwntlng on the pot!tdhlllty
of e1Tor and fmud attending the ndmlt!t!lon of
nn<"lent documents as evldenre. Prof. \Yhnrton says: "No llouht. 'an<'lent doc~m11e11t11, ne
well as modern. may be forged.'' To this hP
n1akt>11 two replies: "In the first pince, whllP
documents atteMtt>d by wltne11ee11. sln<'e dl'ce1111ed, bave been forged, th<! fact that tht>n•
Is a possibility of such falslttcatlop ls an objection to credlblllty. but not to c·om1wte1wy.
In the second place. bv rf.'qulrlng that th!'
dO<'ument 11bould be taken from the p1·opt>r
depository, the probahlllty of talelficatlon ls
WILGUS, EV,-6
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greatly cllmlnlsbecl." 1 Whart. Ev. 5 194..
This bas been regarded as an adequate
ground for the admission of 11uch documents
In evldt>n<'e, without further proof of their
authenticity, by mOflt writers on evidence. 2
Phil. I<~v. (loth Eng. nod ~th Am. Ed.) 480.
No evidence le entlt·l'iy free from inttrmltles of some kind. An honest witness may
en· in his rec·olleetlon In what he bas 11een or
heard, or his own senses may have been deceived In what paseett under his obserYntlon,
or, on the other hand, the witness may be
dishonest, and not tell the truth. But the
posslblllty of error Is not a ground tor the
rejection of evidence In any case. It goes
to Its weight, and ls to be c·onslctered by the
jury or the court trylnir the c..'tlse.
2. It Is a well-11ettled rule 111 this state that,
where the genuineness of handwriting ls Involved, well-attested standarcl11 ot the band
of the person whose writing ls In question
tony be Introduced tor the 1mrpose of comparison with that which Is disputed; and that
this comparison may he made, not only by
persons who have seen the party write, or
have acquired a knowledge or his hand by
corresponding or tranBnctlng business with
him, but also by persons skllled In handwriting, such as are usually calle<l ·•exf>Prte."
Bmgg v. Colwt>ll, 10 Ohio St. 407; Pavey v.
Pavl'y, 30 Ohio St. 000; Calkins v; 8tnte, 14
Ohio Rt. 222.
While this ls not controvertPd, It is argued
that the letter and pay-roll should not have
been admitted for the pnrr1ol!e of compartnon
with the admitted writings of Broome upon
any evidence less certain than that required
lo the <'ftSe of standards. This ls lllogical.
The fnllac•y cont1ists In as1mmlng that the letter and pay-roll are the standards, or else that
the writing In dl11pute shall be asce1·talned
with as much certainty as that with which it
ls compared before the comparison le made.
But neither assumption Is true. The matter
to be determined by <"omparlson of hands was
whether the deceased, Broome, had written
the letter or not, and RO ns to the pny-roll;
and to require the same <·ertalnty as to who
wrote the letter or 1' 1l..'11Pd the pay-roll as ls
requlrP<l as to the standards of the party's
hnnd In question would In no wny nld the
ln11ulry, as neither could, undPr such a rult>.
be lntroduc..'l'd until SU<'h conditions hnd ht-en
complll'd with as wonhl render the lntrodn<'tlon of either wholly unnPc•es11ary. 'l'hls Is
lnconsl11tent with the prln<'lple upon which
1md1 e\"lc11•m·e he lntrmhwecl. whlrh i11 to dt>ter111l11f' the authorship of tlutt whlc·h ls nn·
known nod <ll111rnh•<I by a <'OlllJllll'hmn with
thnt whic-h ts known and 11ncl1Rp11IP11. Ilf'rP
thP known f1wtors In thl' 1·ni;!'. UR pre~eut
Pd hy thP hill of eX<'PlJtlonM, wne t Ill' wrltln;.."M of th1• clec:·1•111<t'cl. RrnomP, lntrrnhl<'e1l
nR 1<t11111lar:I:<. \\'h!'thPr hP bad wrltt<'n
tlw lt'ttl't' or sl;.:-nf'I! tlw par-roll was a f:td
to he proved: and n c·om1J(lril'lon of hancl!!
would tend, at least. to solve the question.
65
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and might reduce it to reasonable certainty;

for it is self-evident that proof that two writ-

ings are in the same hand is evidence that

they were written by the same person.

The uncertainty that may have arisen upon

a more comparison of hands, as to whether

Brooine wrote the letter or signed the pay-

roll, is not, on the competency of the evidence,

to be confused with the uncertainty there .

may have existed as to whether the one had

been written and the other signed by the an-

cestor ot the plaintiffs. It is true that, on a

question of proot',—that is to say, the weight

of evident-e,—the one is connected with and

depends upon the other; but on a question of

competency each is independent and separate.

The admissibility ot the letter and pay-roll

rest upon their antiquity, and the custody

from which each was produced; the com-
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parison of hands, upon the evidence which is

in general attached to such evidence. We are

not now considering the weight of the evi-

deuce.

record is the admissibility of that which was

received and objected to, as shown by the

bill of exceptions.

The spirit of the law of evidence permits

a resort to every reasonable source of int'or-

matlon upon a disputed question oi.‘ tact aris-

ing in a cae. Unless excluded by some

positive exception, everything relative to the

issue is regarded as admissible; and this is

extended to every hypothesis pertinent to the

issue. 1 Whart. Ev. § 20. Here the hypothe-

sis proposed by the plaintiffs below was that

the letter written from the academy by a 1

Levi Brewster, and the signature of a. person

of the same name to the pay-roll, were in the

same handwriting as were the writings in-

troduced as standards, and admitted to be in

that of the decedent. '.l‘he pertinency of this

hypothesis is apparent. If the tact were cs-

tabilshed, it would only remain to the plain-

tiffs. in order to make out their case. to show

that the Levi Brewster who wrote the letter

or signed the pay-roll was their ancester.

Hence, upon principle, the ¢0mpetency of the

evidence seems very plain.

But it is argued that I19 instance of a case

can 1* in-oduced where a comparison of hands

was resorted to for the purpose of proving

the memity 0! a person, except in what is

¢'1"“11l?(l tv be 11 very questionable one,-—

the Tichborne Case. ln the ﬁrst place, the

case Just ref8l‘l'€d to is" not regarded as one

of questionable authority by writers on the

law of evidence. 1 \viiai-i_ Ev, § 9 er 5eq_

In U19 11BX11 1111196, many instances may be

produced, other than that of Queen v. Ca-

t0l', 4 E5P- 117, in which a comparison of

hands has been resorted to for this purpose.

in (‘oni. v. \\'ebster, 5 (iusii 2g;;',_ rmcii 9‘-i-

deuce was introduced for the purpose of

sliowing that certain anonymous letters. writ-

ten ln a disguised 1111116, addressed to the city

marshal of BOSt0Il,- between the disappear-

ance of the deceased and the arrest ot’ the de-

The only question presented by the 1

RELEVANCY.

and might reduce tt to reasonable certainty;
tor It ls selt~vldent that proof that two writlugs are In the same hand ls evidence that
they were written by the same 1ierM<m.
The uncertainty that may have m·h~eu upon
a mere comparison of hands, as tu wlh•ther
Bruome wrote the letter or signed the 1myroll, ls not, on the competency ot the t•\•lden<'e,
to be contused with the uncertalnt.r thet·p
may have existed as to whether the one hnd
been written and the other 1:Jl1<ued by the an..>estot· ot the plalutllf11. It ls true that, on a
questlon ot 11roor,-that ls to say, the weight
of evldence,-tbc one ls connected with and
depends upon the othet·; but on a question of
competency each Is Independent and separate.
The adml88lblllty of the letter and pay-roll
rest upon their antiquity, and the custody
trom which each was produced; the comparlsuu of hands, upon the t•vldent't! which ls
ln general attached to such evidence. We are
not now considering the weight of the evldence. '.rhe only question pre~uted by the
record is the admissibility of that which was
recelved and objected to, us shown by the
bill of excepUons.
The spirit of the law of evidence permits
a resort to every l"t'aBOnnble Moun:e or lntormatlon upon a disputed question of fa<'t arlBIng In a case. Unless excluded by some
positive exeeptloo, everything relative to the
188ue is regudeu as adml88lble; and this ls
extenclt'<l to every hypotbeals pe11:lnent to the
188ue. 1 Whart. Ev. f 20. Here the bypotbeslls proposed by the plaintiffs below was that
the letter written from the academy by a
Levi Brewster, and the signature of a person
of the same name to tl1e pay-roll, were In the
Rame handwriting as were the writings Introduced as standards, and admitted to be In
that of the tlec.·edent. 'Ihe pertlnency of this
hyt)()the1ds Is nppnrent. It the tact were cstabllshec.l, It would only 1·emaln to the plaintltrs. In order to make out their (•ase, to show
tlmt the Levi Brewster who wrote the letter
or tJlgued the pay-roll was their ancester.
Ilen<·e, upon prln<'lple, the com1wtency of the
evldence seems very plain.
But It ls :irgued that no Instance of a case
can 1*- l>rodnced where a comparison of bands
was resorted to for the purpose of proving
the Identity of a person, exrept In what Is
elnlmetl to be a very questlounble one,thc Tlchborne Caite. In the ttrst place, the
case Just refeITed to Is· not regarded as one
ot questionable authority by writers on the
Iaw of evidence. 1 Wbart. Ev. t 9 et seq.
In the next place, many Instances may be
produced, other than that of Queen v. Cator, 4 Esp. 117, In which a com1»arlson of
bands has ~n resort~ to tor t~ls purpose.
Jn ('om. v. "ebster, u Cush. 21),1, such evl<l<>m'<' was Introduced for th(• pur1>011e of
showing that <>ertaln anonymous lt•ttf'ni, writtf'n ht a dh•irulsed hand, addressed to the city
marshal of Hoston, between the disappearnnre of the deceased and the arrest of the de66

fendant, containing various suuesttons calculated to mislead the odlcers of the law, had
been written by the defendant. 1.1le object
was to Incriminate the accused by ldentitylng
Wm with the person who wrote the anonymoUll letters. Such evidence has been recelved as ('()Olpetent for the purpose of ldentltylug the defendant In proeeeutlons tor sending
thrmtenlng letters, and In arson; also, for 11
like purpose, In BUlts tor llbeL Com. v. Web1 ster, supra, 301; 2 Greenl. Ev. I 416. Among
~ the various circumstances relied on as tendIng to show that Sir Phllllp Francis was the
author of Junius, were, as enumerated by
Prof. Wharton, that bis handwriting had rertaln marked pecullaritlee. 1 Whart. Ev. I
23. This, however, could only be detennlned
by a comparison Instituted between the wrltlop of the supposed, and the manuscript of
the real, author.
Again It is resorted to 1D a large clasa of
cases where there ls a question as to whether
, the party sued is the person who signed the
\ instrument on which sult ls brought. 1
. Greenl. Ev. § 57;;. In all such ca!M!B, lt will
i be observed, the queatlon ls not .as to the
i genulneneu of the }Nlpc:•r, but a11 tc> the ldeni tlty of the party sued with the person who
: signed and ls liable UPon It. The object ot
• olTerlng such evidence may arise In a variety
i ot forms. A writing may be In a dlsgnlsed
' hand, as in the Webeter Case, o CUsh. :!95;
or It may have been Intended as an Imitation
of that of some third person, as In the <'A8e
of a forgery; or It may be neither disguised
nor Imitated, as la aaaumed In this cue.
; Now, It ls evident that In either of the 1rst
two Instances the Uablllty to error in formi Ing an opinion, even by experts, will be greatI er than In the last one; beeause In both of
the first two Instances the writing la exeented for the expre88 purpose of deceiving,
wblle lo the latter there ball been neither dlssimulation nor forgery, and one lqleClmen ot
genuine Wl'ltlng 18 simply compared with an:
other; so that, on principle, there i11 less
room for questioning the propriety of a resort to a <'ompartson ot band& 111 the latter
than in either of the two· fonner lustancea.
The value of such evidence on a question of
pel"!lonal Identity Is strikingly Illustrated In
the case above referred to as that of TlchJ borne.
A comparison of the writings lntroduced In the <'llBe would convince any Intelllgent I>el'l!On that there was 00 truth whatever In the claim of the defendant. It dlsproves his Identity with the real Sir Robert
'flchborne. What was true In that case 1nust
be true, to a greater or less extent, In ev<!ry
Instance where a case of personal Identity ls
involved. .Tudlclal proof Is not a matter of
mere arbitrary rules. Its 11rtuciples are
drawn from the experience and observation
ot men, and should be applied as they are by
men In general. Every lawyer and judge of
experlellce wlll confirm what 18 said by llr.
l'hllltps In bis work on :&vitlence: "It m&T
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be laid do"·n ns a first pl"luclple th11t exbe laid du\v11 as a ﬁrst principle that ex- our c0u1'ts'lm.s suffered, not from too free

clusion is ,<:e11¢--1‘:|ll_\' an evil, and admission admission of evidence, but from too rigid ex-

genelﬂll_\' safe and wise;" to which he adds: clusiou." 2 Phil. Ev. (Edward’s Ed.) 623.

cluslou ls genentlly an evil, and admh11don
geneiully ea:fe and wise;" to which he adds:
"It ls certain the administration of justice in

our courts 'has sutrered, not from too free
a<lw1111!lon of evidence, but from too rigid ex·
clusion." 2 Phll. Ev. (Edward's Ed.) 628.
Judgment a1ftrmed.

“It is certain the administration of justice in Judgment aﬂlrmed.

67
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In re THOMPSON, Commissioner of Public

\Vo1-ks.

(28 N. E. 389. 127 N. Y. 463.)

In rc BYTLER.

(28 N. E. 38!). 127 N. Y. 463.)

Court of Appeals of New York. Second Divi-

sion. Oct. 6, 1891.

Appeal from supreme court, general

term, second department.

Application of Hubert O. Thompson,

commissioner of public works. etc., to ex-

tinguish certain water-rights for the use

oi the city of New York. The award of

commissioners appointed to assess dam-

ages was uﬂirmed by the special term. and

again by the general term. Claimant,

Butler. appeals. Afiirmed.

Court of Appeals of New York, St>cond Dlvlsion. Oct. 6, 18tll.

Appeal from supreme court, general
term, BeCond llepartment.
Application of Hubert 0. Thompson
commissioner of public works, Pte., to ex:
tlnglliBh certain water-rights for the ol!E'
of the city of New York. The award of
commiAsionera appointed to 1:1.ssess damages was atftrm~d by the epechtl term, And
again by the gent'ral tllrm. Claimant,
Butler, appeals. Affirmed.
William Allen Dutler and Willard Parker
Butler. for appellant. Arth11r H. Maston,
for respondent.

William Allen Butler and Willa rd Parker

Butler. for appellant. Arthur H. Maston,

for respondent.
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PARKER, J. This proceeding was

brought pursuant to the powersconferred

on the commissioner of public works of ths

city of New York by chapter-H5 ofthe La we

of 1877. and the various acts amendatory

thereof, to acquire the right to divert and

keep diverted from the Bronx river all the

water of the river north of and above the ‘

dam at Kensico. 'I‘he commissioners

awarded to the claimant, who was the

owner of a large and valuable farm

through which the river ran. damages in

the suin of $7.270. From tii9\)l‘(18l' con-

ﬁrming such report and award successive

appeals have been taken by the claimant

to this court. the latter appeal being es-

peciaily authorized by the act of 1877. But

the fact that an appeal to this court is

permitted does not bring up for review a

question of fact arising unon conﬂicting

evidence, and this court has nojurisdic-

tion to review the decision of the general

term,uniess error of law in the proceedings

he found. In rc 'l‘ho|npson. 121 N. Y. 277.

24 N. E. Rep. 472.1 That case had its ori-

gin in proceedings taken under chapter 490.

Laws18s3. but the provision permitting

an appeal to the court oi appeals is the

same as in the act authorizing the pro-

ceedings before us. and the decision cited

is therefore applicable and controlling.

Unless, then, some error of law requires a

reversal, the decision oi the general term

must stand.

The only exception to which our atten-

PARKER, J. This proceeding was
brought pursuant to the powArscouferl't'd
on thf'l commlsHloner of public worksoftha
city of New York bychapter445oftheLawe
of 1877, and the various acts ameudatory
thereof, to acquire the right to divert and
keep diverted from the Bronx river all the
wRter of the river north of and above tlle
dam at Kenslco. Thf' comrulludoners
awarded to the claluannt, who was the
owner of a large and valuable farm
through which the river ran, dllmagee In
the st1m of f7,270. From the ->rder confirming 1mcb report ancl award sm·ceaielve
1t11pe1tls have been taken by thP claimant
to this court, the latter appeal bclug especially authorized by the act of 1877. But
the fact that an appeal to this court la
11ermitted does not bring op for review a
question of fact arising anon conflicting
evidenl'e, anrl this court bu no Jurisdiction to l'f>Vlew the decision of the general
tPrm,unlees error of law lo theprm·eedlngs
hf' fouurl. In re ThnmpRon, l~l N. Y. zt7.
24 N. E. Rep. •12.1 That cue bad lte orl~ln In proceedlnga taken under chttpter 490.
' La we 1~~. but the pro\"lslon permitting
an appeal to the court of appealR ls the
aame as In the at't authorlZfng the proceedings before us. and the decision cited
111 thprefore applicable and controlllng.
lTnleHB, then, sowe error or law reqilires a
re,·el'llal, the decision ot the general term
must stand.
The only ex:!eptlon to which our attention le callPd relates to an enort on the
part or the owner to prove whet hod bet>n
Jutltl by the petitlom"r for water-rlghts np·
purtenant to a. nelii;hborln~ parcel on thl'
e1twe river. At folio 7467 the counsel for
the o\\'ner offered to prove thu t the city
of New York purchased from Robert White
thl.' rb?ht to dit"ert the waterR from 011eht1lf of the water-shed o~ the Bronx rh·er
and l',atd him the sum of ':!l,991.66 fo~
such rights, and his privileges in l'Onuec.

tion is called relates to an effort on the

part oi the owner to prove what had been

paid by the petitioner for water-rights ap-

purtenant to a neighboring parcel on the

same river. At folio 7467 the counsel for

the owner offered to prove that the city

of New York purchased from Robert White

the right to divert the waters from one-

half of the water-shed of the Bronx river,

and paid him the sum of $:21.'Jill.66 for

such rights, and his privileges in connec-

‘ This case was decided under the authority of’

Code Civil Proc. N. Y. 5 1337, which provides

thata question of fact arising upon conflicting

1 Thia case was decided under the authority of
Code Civil Proc. N. Y. § 13:-17, which provides
that a question of fact arising upon coutlieting
evidence caunot be determined upon an appeal to
the court or appeals from a tlnal Judgm<>nt. or
from an order ICl'anting or refusing a new trial
unless where special provision for the determi:
nation thereof is made by law.
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tlon with a certain mllJ upon wh1:1. t lB
known aa the" Powder-Miil Property" at
Scarsdale. 'rhe commlst1lon declined to
rule on the oner, at the same time, by Its
chairman, saying, In enect. that a ruling
would he made as the evldenl'e aibould be
presented. lo that connection no other
evidence was onered, 11nd the exception
then taken la, of courae, not available.
But, In view of the etlpula.tlon making the
P.\•ldenceas to all parcels applicable to any
other, It le claimed that this appellant ht
entitled to the beneHt of any exception
taken to the rejection of Pvldence bearing
on the question of the value of nls waterpower. We 11hall aB1Jume. without deciding, that thla claim Is wPll founded. RobPrt White wae veett'd ht fee with the riparian ownership In sucb premlBt's at tbe time
of the commenl'emeot of the proceedings
to acquire title by the city. Pending the
proceedlnp he died. Subeeque11tly, pur·
suant to an agreement wltb his hell'H. a
conn•yance was made to the city. Respectlug the manner In which tho vroof
was eou;r:ht to be mnde, .the owner onered
lo f'\"ldence the df'ed, which expreMed a
conshle1'atlon. But, for the purpose of
provln~ the price paid, It wa11 not com11etent. Mayor, etc., v. McCarthy, 10:.! N. Y.
630, 8 :N. E. Rep. 85. On& or more wltneSBes
were asked to state the sum paid, and, as.
thl' objection went solely to the compe·
tency of the evldeuce for any purpose, It
must be aSBumed that the wltneeses were
competent to answer the question. And
tbfl question, then, la, was the reJ~tlon or
the Pvidence OB to the amount paid by the
city for the WhltP water-power e1Tor for
which a reversal should be bad?
Thie question haa been presented to the
conrtsof last rPsort In several of the etatee,
but not with the same result. In Massa-chueett.a, New Hampshire. Illinois, Iowa,
and Wlaconsln It IR held that actual sales
of other similar land In the vicinity, mad&
near t.he time at which the value of the
land taken Is to be determined, are admlselblr. ns evidence for the pu1·pose or arriving attheamountofeompensatlon. Hardner v. Brookline, 127 Mau. 358; Packing,
etc., Co. v. City of C'hlcugo, 111 Ill. 6.'ll;
Town of Cherokee v. Land Co., 52 Iowa, 279,
8 N. W. Rep. 42; Railroad Co. v. Greely, 23
N. H. 242; Wa11hburn v. Railroad Co .. 55>
Wis. 364, 18 N. W. Hep. 3:.'8. While In some
of the other Jurledll'tlons, notably PennRyt.
vanla, New Jersey, Georgia, and California, It Is held that 881t'H of shnllar prop.
erty are not admissible for the purpose or
proving the value of property about to be
taken. Railroad Co. v. Hiester. 40 Pa. St.
53; Rellroart, etc.,Co. v. Bunnell.!U Pa.~t.
414; Rallrond Co. v. Zlt>mer, 124 Pa. 8t. 560,
17 Atl. Ht>p.187; Rallroa<l l'o. v. RPmmn.36
~· J. Law, 557; Rallrnnd Co. v. Pearson,
35 Cal. 247-262; Railroad <.'o. v. Keith, 53
Ga..171'. '!'he reaRonR asRlgnPd for the conclusion reached In the Clltlt'S lmct cited ure,
In the main, that tht• test In ll'gnl procf't><llngR Is, whet le the present market value
of the proptirty whlrh IH theRllhject of controversy? It mev be s110wn by th~ testl·
mony of eompetent wltnl'RRl'B, end on
~r111-1R-exnmin11 tlon, for the p11rpoHE'Of teHt·
11111: their kuowle<liite 1'('8pectlnll tbe market
\'Blue of laud in that vicinity. they muy bo
a11ked to name l:IUl'h sales of property, and

RES INTER ALH> ;_
RES lNTER ALIO 5-

thcpriceﬁ Paid therefor, as have come to

me“. attention. But _a party may not es-

mmsh the value of his land by showing"

wlmtvvas Daicl for another parcel similar-

lv situated, because it operates to give to

"he am-eelnent of the grantor and grantee

the eiiect of evidence by them that the con-

sideration for the conveyance was the

market value. witliout giving to the op-

poslte party the beneﬁt oi cross-examina-

tlon to show that one or both were mis-

taken. 1! some evidence of value, then

prima facie a case may be made out, so

iar as the question of damages is con-

cerned. by proof of a single sale, and thus

the agreement of the parties which may

have been the result of necessity or cap-

rlce would be evidence of the market value

Q1 land similarly situated, and become a.

gtandiird by which tn measure the value
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oi land in controversy. This would lead

to an attempt by the opposing party to

gho\v—F1rst. the dissimilarity of the two

parcels oi‘ land; and, second, the circum-

stances surrounding the parties which in-

duced the conveyance.—such as a sale by

one in danger of insolvency, in order to

realize money to support his business. or

a sale in any other eniergcncy which for-

bids a-grantor to wait a reasonable time

for the Iubllc to be informed of the fact

that his property is in the market: 018011

the olher hand, that the price raid was

excessive, and occasioned by the fact that

the grantee was not a resident ol the lo-

culity,nor acquainted with real values, and

was thus readily induced to pay 11- Bum

far exceeding the xnarket value. Thus

each transaction in real estate claimed to

be similarly situated might llreﬂellt “V0

side issues, which could be made the sub-

ject oi 88VllTOr0l1Q contention as the main

issue. and.’ if the transactions were nu-

|ncruus,it would result in unduly prolong‘-

ing the trial. and unnecessarily confusing

the issues, with the added disadvantage

oi rendering preparation I01‘ trill! (1itﬁC111T--

Our attention has not been called to a

case in this court where the (lllesuoll has

been passed upon in the manner here pre-

sented,but there are a number of decisions

indicating the tendency of the court to be

ﬂgiilllst proving value by evidence Of the

selling price oi slmilarproperty. In Hunt-

ington v. Attrill, 118 N. Y. 365. 23 N. E.

Relh 544, the dei'enda.nt-s ﬂttenipted t0

prove the value oi certain sea-side Pl‘0P-

'~‘~1‘tY by showing the value 01' other DMD-

erty oi the same general character situated

in dillerent places, and Judge Bl(Al)l.l<2\.,

speaking ior thc court. said: “it may be

that such evidence would have furnished

some guide ior estimate of the value ol the

property, hut might not. Such evidence

would present collateral issues. which

might. and very likcly would. illvvlve a.

variety of considerations ha vim: relation

to similarity or difference. 1111'] to all V1111-

$8298 and disadvantages 0‘ the dmerent

thepr\cef'I paid t.herefor, as ha\·e come to
their attention.
But a party ma.y not establish tbe value of hlH hrntl by Rhowlng
what was paid for another pareel 1o!lmllar1v s\tuated, beca.uRe It operates to gh·e to
the 1111:reeinent of the grantor and grant.ee
the efter.t of evidence by them that the conslderatloD fur the conveyance was the
market value, -without glvlnir to the opposite partY tbP. benefit of croRR·examlnatton to show that one or both were mistaken. lf sOJne eYldence of value, then
prfma facle a case may be made out, RO
far a.e the question of damag<'S Is concerned, by proof of a Hingle sale, and tlius
the agreement of the parties which may
ba.\"e bet>n the result of necessity or cap.
nee would be evidence of the market value
of land similarly eltnated, and bPcome a
staudard by which t•• mPHRUre the value
of land In controversy. This would lead
to an attempt by the opposing party to
sho\V-Flrst, the dissimilarity of the two
pa.reels ol hmd; an if, second, the circumstances surrounding the parties which induced the conveyence,-1mch as a 11ale by
one In danKer of Insolvency, In order to
realize monP-y to support his buRlne11s, or
a sale In any other f"tnergency which forbids a.grantor to waft a reusonahle time
for the I ubllc to be informed nf the fact
that hie property is In the market: or, on
the other hand, tha f'. the price 1>ald was
excessive, and uccusloned by the fllct that
the jl;r11ntee was not a resident of the locallty,nor acqnainted -with real values, and
w11s t.hus n,a.dlly. induced to pay o. sum
far exceeding the market \"alue. Thus
ear.h transaction in real estate clalm,d to
be similarly situated might pre11ent two
side IB1me11, which cuuld be made the 11ubJect of asvlirorous contention as the m1tln
Issue, and, If the trnnsactlons were numerous, It would result in unduly prolonglntr the trial, and unnecessarily confnslng
the Issues, with the added dlsadvantuge
of rendering preparation for trial difficult.
Our attention baa not been called to a
caae lo this court where the question has
been passed upon In the manner here preReoted, but there are a num her of decisions
Indicating the tendency of the court to be
&f!:11lnst proTlng value by evidence of the
selling price of 11lmllar proporty. In Huntington v. Attrill, 118 N. Y. 3!l5, 23 N. E.
Rep. 544, the defencle.nte attempted to
prove the value of certain sea·slcle proPerty by showing the volue of other property of tht!Rame genPral character 11ltunted
in dlnerent IJlaces and Judge IlUADI.EY,
speaking for the c'ourt. said: "It may be
that eueh e\'ldence would have furnished
1mme irulde for estimate of the value of the
JJroperty, hut mlp.ht not. 8uch evidence
wouhl p!'PBent collateral ls1mes, which
might, and very likely would, luvoll"e a
\'Orlety of conRldera t1011e ha ,·Ing rela tlon
to 11lmllarlty or difference, anrl to a1h·antages and dlsadvanta~ea or the different
propertle11 In numerom1 respects, u11 comparPtl with that In question. It lri quite
well settlecl that evidence of that character Is not admlslllble upon the que11tion of
the valoe or property lo con truversy."
Tb11 qoestloo was not neef's~arlly before
the court In Mayor, etc., v. )fr< '!'rthy, 102 N .
Y.6:~,81'\.E.Rep. 85; hutChlefJustfce
RUGER, referring to the question whether

the price ,,aid 0 11
. [Cass No. 22
tweeuindf~ldU1tltt 1e*tles
of value. s
ld: "~It #tdrv1. real estate behowuver. ~~~t k11e1.Je thJ,;kllll:~leq8,,~:V'd1 eace
\•lew eorP •' Cllt e
Price 18
e c e11r,
Blan~hard v. 7teallJ~kdence 011:.~:~:~
the defe.n <.l nn It t te oat l'o., 69 N. y 292
value of & 8UDkea 8 111Pted to sb/Jw ·the
the valne o l other 1Jt!eam-b011t b,i· provln1r
she could he com
am-bonts with which
that the f!lvldene11 vfarcd, and lt was held
Langdon v- (,'ltv ot ;,s 0 '}! competent. 11J
N. Y. 8upp. ti64, the eobJ~~~;/Sup.C~.)18
other e\•lcleoce should be pi·odu'::ci8 t hnt
tabllsh the faet BOUflht to be proven 1 ° e8866,) so that tl1e qoe11tfon ot the rel~,.~~~
of the evidence was not before the court
We are of the opinion that the value oi
property which depends upon the 1,resence or absence of Inherent qualities not
necessarily preHent or absent In other and
slmllflr property cannot be proved by
showing the price paid for snch other aud
similar property. The value of property
having a recoirntzed market value, such
as No. 1 wheat and corn, may, of coune,
be prm·en by showing the market prices;
b11t the valne of property which IH dPpend.
ent upon locality, adaptability for a particular use, as well as the use made of
property lmmedlatel;v adjoining, may not
be shown by evidence or the price paid for
similar prope1·ty. Even under the MaKHachusetts rule, a reversal "·ould not be Justified because of the extent of the discretion ve&tPd lo the juclge or offlcpr preHldlng at the trial to determine whether 11uch
evidence is admissible, depending, of course,
on various elements, such as the nearnesR
or remoteness of the time or sale; whether
the premises are far separatud; the condition of the property abont the parcel
t1old, and the u11e made of it, which may
have operated to enhance or diminish Its
selling value; the similarity of the property, not only as to description. but as to
Its 8.''allablllty for use. Chandler v. Jamaica. Pond Aquoooct Corp., \2~Mass.306;
Gardner v. Brookline, 127 Mu.ss. 358-363,
and cases cited.
.
In point of timo tbe Wh\te sale wa;:e'!
year nnd one-half p;\or to i~e ~~: Wb\te
the orferwasmade to prove 'e \n tl\e o-pwater-power was \n actual "~ateT-\>oweT
eratlon of a mm, wblle u-ieu t\\\T.~d \\\ans
ol Mr. Butler had not. been 8 rouc\\ w&t~T
\
degree whnte\'er. True, 6u-t\eT \l-ro\le~Jt.
will be diverted from the
t
\t. nu~wen\
as the White \ll'Operty. b'll ~at.e-r·\lw&.te'l:lollow that the respect\l'e 1 ~e ~~;\oT uv.e·,
are of equal value. Tbe vfl. o.P~' seT"'at.\on.
power depenus on \ls a~a.il t> ~bet.Teti.\\\ t.\\~
and, as a 1natter ot comn10 fi1' ~ 6'! 0 .u\\'J ti.~1:that at certain points a\ 01:-~
~-ot.T\&.\~\\.~e.
water-power can be tn° 1 ~ c
~p\le\ ~-a~\
cheaply made u.vn\\o.b\e toy<>. J f
).'i\.!\~o«ed·
posPs than at others. b , 14..-l p e "c\u'c\\o\\.
contention as 1:0 1:he adfll lll~
c<> tte'"e\\ ae.
denceof tt1at c:horncter c~1 tP~e o~~Te.\:.t.e;,.
we should ncce1:1Harl\y ren<:,,de>:> ~ c a e. ,,.,a .
that the nature of thee~ uc'tl ~ • 8 \~'Q'I::.~"
to >'lmlloritY 'WUH not ot II 110•,'-"~ ._-ct~ ~\\<a
as to authorize a court to \e-t-4 • -i ~J ~o-i:
ter of hi~: ~ 1 ~1ti!rre~~:~~~t~ 0 ·.~ 1'
0~1>"'':erly exerc i,.;e
f of the vr\ce
e c
to admit proo
·
c:;V
Wh\te parcf~;_nt asserts tbBt;
The appe
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RELEVA NCY.

sion reiused to award damages for the in- |

jury to the claimant's water-power, and

insists that in so doing they committed

an error in principle which may be re-

viewed in this court. After a thorough

examination of the record, and a careful

consideration of the argument in behalf oi

appellant, the conclusion is reached that

this court is not warranted in determin-

ing that an award was not made for such

damages as, in the judgment oi the com-

mission, the claimant will sustain because

of injury to his water-power. The claim-

ant owned about 358 acres oi laud, cover-

ing 4,238 ieet on the cast bank oi the

Bronx river, and about 4.636 feet upon the

west bank; and for the reduction in the

volume of water which naturally ﬂows

over this course, occasioned b.v the diver-
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sion on the part of the city, the co|nmis-

sion awarded to him $7.270. This award

was made in gross. no items being given,

and it is therefore impossible to determine

what portion of it was allowed for in-

jury to the tract because of the iesseninir

of the ﬂow of the stream, or what part oi

it was an award ior damages to the wa-

ter-power. Neither in the report nor in

the conduct oi the trial is there any indi-

cation that it was determined that the

water-power was oi no value. On the

contrary, the commission received a large '

amount of expert testimony offered by the

claimant, tending to show that the water-
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power was of considerable value. No evi-

dence in that direction was i'('jP1'l'(’ll, save

that which tended to prove the price paid

by the city for the White water-power;

and it should be assumed that they gave

to this evidence such weight as it was en-

titled to. Claimant's experts, it is true.

testiﬂed that the water-power alone was

of fur greater value than the entire

amount of the award, but, on the other

hand, the evidence on the part of the city

tended to show that it had little or no

value. in making their appraisal they

were not required to adopt the estimate

oi clai1nant‘s experts, but were manifest-

ly called upon to base their award upon

all the information obtained,“not only

from the evidence produced before them.

but froln their view oi the real estate.”

in re Thompson, 121 N. Y. 277, 24 N. E.

Rep. 472. This we are bound to assume.

in the light afforded by the record, was

done. Our attention is called to the ex-

pressions of opinion. both at special and

general term. to the effect that the water-

powerhas no apparent value. But it does

not follow that such was the determina-

tion oi the commissioners; nor can itbe

assumed, because of the opinion of the

judges sitting in review, that the commis-

sion entertained the same view. There

are no other questions requiring consid-

eration. The order should be aﬂirmed.

HELEVAYCY.

11iun refm1ed to u ward damageH for the Injury to the claimant's water-power, and
Insist" that tu 110 doing they committed
an erru1· In principle which may be reYiewed In this court. After a thorough
examination of the record, and a cureful
consideration of the argument lu behalf of
appellant, the conclusion ls reached that
this court Is not warranted In determln·
Ing that an award waK not made for such
damages as, In the Judgment of the corumill11ion, the claimant will sustain because
of Injury to his water-power. The claimant owued abont 358 acreR of land, coverhlg 4,238 feet on the east bank of the
Bronx river, aud about 4,636 feet upon the
wPBt bank; and for the reduction In the
volume of water which naturally flows
over this course, occa.aioned by the diversion on the part of the city, the commls·
Ilion awarded to him t7.:nO. This award
was modi> In gross. no Items being given,
nod it is therefore lmpos1:1lble to determine
what portion of ft. was nllowecl for In·
jury to the tract he<'ause of the les11enlnir
of the flow of the stream, or what part of
It was an award for damages to the water-power. Neither In the report nor In
the conduct of the trial le there any indication that It was determined that the
water-power was of no value. On the
contrary, tbe comml1:1slon received a large
amount of expert testimony offered hy the
duhnant, tending to show that the water70

power wm1 of conslderahle value. No evidence In that dlrt'rtlon wnH rP)rd1•d, 1>11\"I'
that which tended tu 111·0\'e tbe )lrlce paid
by the city for the White water-power;
enc! It 11hould be assumed that they gave
to thie evidence such weight as It was entitled to. Claimant's expert11, ft le troe,
testified that the water-power alone wu11
or for greater value than the entire
amount of the award, but, on the otlJPr
IJRnd, the evhlence on the part oft hr l'ity
tPnrled to Hhow tlmt It had ltttle or no
,·nlue. In making their ap11ralHul they
were nut required to adopt the e11tlmate
of elnl11111ut"11 expertH, hut were man1ff'tltly l'!llled uµon to base their award upon
all thl' Information <'htnlned, "not only
from the evidence produced before them.
but from their view of the real estate."
In re Thompson, 121 N. Y. '1:17, 24 N. E.
RP.p. 4i2. 1'hls we at•e bound to aBBuwe.
In the light afforded by the record, was
dom•. Our a ttentlo;1 i11 called to thee:.:pre11Hlons of opinion. lioth at epel"iul tmd
general term, to tl1P l'ffect thot the wntnpowerhas no apparent value. But It doee
not follow tbet such wa.s the determln1ttlon of the eomml11slonel"8; nor can It be
ussnmed, because of the opinion of the
judgeK sitting In review, that the commlsHlon en tertalned the Httme \"lcw. 1'here
are no other questions l"ef1ulrlng eon1:1lderatlon. The order should be affirmed.
All concur.

~,-~CT.~ POSSIBI..Y CON~ECTED .AS CAUSE:
F _.;(;'r.>- POSSIBLY coxxscrnn AS CAUSI3

COLUM~IA.
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.AND ER
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~U}l.

&

P. S. R. CO. v. HAW·

'rl:IOR~E.

Ct. :'.>91, 144

u. s. 20'2.)

BIA & P. s. R. co. v. HAW-

COLUM Tnonxn.

(12 Sup. Ct. 591, 14-1 U. S. ‘_’U’Z.l

Supreme Court of the United States. April 4,

1892.

1n error to the supreme court of the ter-

mo;-y of Vvashington.

Action by \Villard C. Hawthorne against

the Columbia & Puget Sound Railroad Com-

pany for damages for a personal injury.

Verdict and judgnient for plaintiff, which

was aﬂirined in the supreme court of the ter-

ritory. Defendant brings error. Reversed.

statement b_v Mr. Justice GR.-\Y:_

This was an action brought in a district

(.0111-t of the territory of YVashington against

,1 Q01-p0i‘ati0I1 owning a saw-mill, by a man

employed in operating a machine therein,
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called 11 “trimmer,” to recover damages for

me defendant‘s negligence in providing an

unsafe and defective lnacllinc, whereby one

of the pulleys, over Whicli ran the belt trans-

mining power to the saw, fell upon and in-

jured the plaintiﬁ. The defendant denied

any negligence on its part, and averred neg-

ligence on the part of the Dl11iIl’£hT-

At the trial, the plaintiff introduced evi-

dence tending to sl10\v that the pulley,

weighing about 50 pounds, revolved around

a stationa1'_v shaft made of 811$-Pipe, With

nothing to hold the pulley 011 but 11 common <

cap or nut screwed on the end Of the nine,

and its thread running in the -‘lame \\'ﬂ.\' ﬂﬂ

the pulley, and liable to be unscrewed hi‘

the working of the pulley; that the hut ht?-

came unscrewed, and cznne oﬂ’, $0 that the

pulley fell upon and greatly inillred the

plaintiff; and that if the nut had been Pl'°D-

erly put on, with a bolt through the shaft, i

the accident could not have lial>D9h9d-

The plaintiffs counsel

whether there had been nn.\' @h"1h~'9 in thi‘

machinery since thg acv:(1911t-

the following colloquy took Place:

Defendant's counsel: “VV9 Ohllect t° that-

The rule is well understood, and as 370111‘ holl-

or has already given it in other cases, thﬂt H

person is not bound to furnish the best

known machinery, but to furnish machinery

reasonably safe. It is not =1 'l\19sﬂ°h as to

what we have done with the machinery in

the last few years or niontlis sinﬁe the ac-

cident occurred, but what was the condition

then."

The Court; “The rule is quite well settled,

1 think’ that where an accident occurs

through defwtive machinery or defective ﬁx.

mi-es or the mm-nine itself, if that is shown

to be true, then a change, repair, 0'1- gubstitu. ,

tion of something else for the defective ina-

chinery is admissible as showing or tending

to show the fact.

settled."

Defendant’s counsel: “I tl1oro118'hl.i' 00110111"

with the court as to the rule.”

Plaintiffs counsel: “We PP°P°Se t° Sh°“'

‘ 3 Wash. T. 353, 19 Pac. 25.

Supreme Court of the United ~t11tes. April 4,

1892.

l
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t~l~

Defl'n~!~ur">- -t; "B co11n~e1:

-c:..vr..
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!,t la admfssfble• .,

<'l'Jltlo11.
"E
lf'~ wOJ Bllve
The Cou 1·t:
·'t<'ept.
an er.
T'he witness thell " 1011 Bl/owed"
B Bin ..lls1
.
been change
<'e th Vere<1 that there had
they consfst:ed In l>llttJ e ace/dent, and that
ehatt, and gs.wnion lJ ng a rod through the
rod to keep t1ie lllllle:y Uts on the end or the
some pl11nks vnde1·1Jea:bon, and Jn putting uv
them from -ralllng d
the JJulleys to keer>
own. To the admission
ot the evidence ot each or these changes 1111
exception was taken by the defendant and
allowed by the Judge.
At the close of all the evidence for the
I plaiutlft' (which Jt is unnecPssnry to state)
the defendant moved ".for n judgment of
nonsuit, on the ground that the plalntltr
· luul fnllc>d to prove a sulf:lefent cause for the
: jurr;" nrnl nn exception to the overrnJfng
I of this motion was taken by the rl.-fendnnt
i anll allowed by the court.
, TltP <1Pft>11iln11t tlwu lntro(lueed t•\'ldPnce,
: arnl the <·ase was argued by counsel, and
I submitted by the court to the jury, who retnrnP(l a ¥erdlct ot $10,000 for tbe plalntlft'.
upon which judgment was 1'E'mlered. The
defendant appenled to the supreme <•om1: of
1 the teITitory, which affirmecl the judgmPnt.
j 3 Wash. T. 3':>3, 19 Pac. ~-.. The defendant
/ sued out this writ of eITor.
1

0

In err()r to the supreme court of the territory of Washington.
Action by "'lllard C. Hawthorne against
the Columbia & Puget Sound Rallroull Company for damages for a personal Injury.
verdict and judgn1ent for plnlnti!T, which
was atnrmed in the supreme court of the territory. Defemlnnt l>rlng11 ert"Ol'. Reyersed.
statement by :\Ir. Ju~tice <:RAY:.
This was an action. brought in a district
c·ont't of the ten·ito.ry of ·wa11hington against
a corporation owning a saw-mill, by a man
employed in ope1u ting a machine therelu,
called a "trimmer," to i•ecover damages for
the defendant's neglfgence in pro¥idlng an
unsafe and defective nu1chlue, whereby oue
ot the pulleys, over which ran the belt trnnM·
mlttlng power to the saw, ft>ll upon 11nll iujured the l>lnintlft'.
Tile cleft>ndnnt <lenll'd
nny negligence on Its part, and averred neg·
llgence on the part of the plnintl!T.
At the trial, the plnintifT introduced evl(lence tending to sho"· that the pulley,
weighing about GO poun<ls, revolved around
a stationary shaft made of gas-pipe, with
nothing to hold the pulley on but a common
A. H. Holmes, tor plalntltr In error. Johu
cnp or nut screwed on the ettd ot the pipe,
B. Allen, for defendant in error.
and its thread running In the snme wnr 1u1
the pulley, nnd llahlf> to be umw1·ewed hy
the working of the lJUllt·~- ; that the nut be·
Mr. Jm~tice GRAY, after stating the fuetR
came unecrew<'<l, and c:une oil', 110 that the In the foregoing language, delivered the opinpulley fell upon nnd greatly injured the ion of the com·t.
plalntifl; and that if the nut luul been prop·
Tbe question of the suftleiency of the evierly put on, with a bolt through the shaft, dence for the plalntitT to sn11port bis action
1 cannot be considered by this court.
It bas
the accident coultl not hnve huppened.
The plil.lntltrs counsel ni:-ked n wltuesM repentedly been declrled tbat a request tor a.
whether there had beeu au~· change In thP rnllng that u1xm the pvldence introduced tbe
machinery since thil ncc;dent. Thereupon plulntiff Is not entltlecl to recover cannot be
1ruule by the defendant as a matter of rlgbt,_
the following colloquy took place:
\,
b
whole evidence,
I
Defendant's counsel: "'Ve object to that. unless at the elORe of t e
\
ot tb.e
The rule Is ·well understood, and as your hon· and that if the d(•fP11d11nt, nt thet.c ~\ug b.\S
or has already given it in other cases, that a plnlntlft"s m·lde1i<."e, and witl1°'-'.o. Ts"l."l.cb. a ru\'.,
person is not bound to furnish the best own l'l.l&'. re<1m•sts aml ls i·i>f'-~~=ned to-r \'Tl'Cl"r·
kuown machinery, but to fnt'lliHh machinery Ing, thl' refusal enuuot be ns~;;t; -u. s. '10\.l, ~
reaS<>nably safe. It ls not n •1uestion as to Rail way Co. v. <.~\umu\ngs, l. ~ _ craulla\, 1:-v.
,\.·hat we have done with the mnchlnery In Sup. Ct. 493; lusurauce 0?· ~\'\T°?'~ ~~o"\l·
4..~"t. ~-~~W C\.
tile last few years or months 1dnce the ac· U. S. 527, 7 Sup. Ct. 685, .
cldent occun'ed, but whnt was the conditlon llat·es, 123 U. S. 710, S SUP· ~93· '-' ~ ·
ertson v. Perkins, 129 U ·
d \\\ \o 'l)l.e
then."
r~..,e \\\. \\}.e 1111\.The Court: ''The rule is quite well settled, 279.
The only other except\oD ~.... ~e~
e~
I think, that where an nedtli>nt occurs
~11e.t. tb.\~ ~
through defective machinery or clefl't>tlve fix- i admission of evidence ot c\111
ti~
:e.en\\~ ~ ~"·
tures or the machine itself, If tl!nt Is shown ; chlnl'rY after the acc\dent.
~e co'-'''\!>~ \~e
to be true, then n change, repair, or HnbHtltu- · It ":ns argued for tbe 11\tl\ll
tlon of something else for the deftocth·e ma- \ ceptlon was not open to file pi~ cD''y\. o:\\eo'I.'\'-°"
t;Pe ~ ~ ~ ~ ~:~<'.\% \o
chinery ls admissible as showing or teu<llug cause It bad been wah·ed
:\'\'S' c\e~"t
to show the fact. I think that ls 11ulte wen \ Ing after the first 'l"Ul\ng 0 1• "'"' ~e
I RU1l•1I'<'t "l tho-oug\1\'·~ cone'' ~.,..e· _.,.1•0 ~ L-"~\\~e
~u~
settled."
1
•
•
l
••
Ast'lum\11~
t
.-o e
~e\\"
...i.
Defendant's counsel: "I thoroughly coucur as to the ru e.
1 oo ~ ... ~,:\.e•
be accurutely reportell, it ~ \e ~ e
:...
·~ ..
wltb the court as to the rule."
Plaintltr's counsel: "We pro}>Ose to show wbctber they re1'.er to U1e n~o i:P
•f subsequent changes, or
cb:inges."
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tioned just before, as to the degree of care

required of the defendant. That they were

not understood, either by the counsel or by

the court. as waiving the objection to evl- ‘

dence of subsequent changes, is shown by

the plaintiff's counsel thereupon sa_ving. “\‘\'e

propose to show changes," and by the court

ruling them to be admissible, and allowing

an exception to this ruling, and immediately

afterwards allowing two other exceptions to

evidence on the same subject. And the

question of the admissibility of this testimo-

ny was considered and decided by the su-

preme court of the territory. 3 Wash. T.

353, 364, 19 Pac. 25.

This writ of error, therefore, directly pre-

sents for the decision of this court the ques-

tion whether, in an action for injuries caused

by a machine alleged to be negligently con-
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structed, a subsequent alteration or repair

of the machine by the defendant is compe-

tent evidcnce of negligence in its original

construction. »

Upon this question there has been some

difference of opinion in the courts of the sev-

eral states; but it is now settled, Upon much

consideration, by the decisions of the highest

courts of most of the states in which the

question has arisen. that the evidence is in-

competent. because the taking of such pre-

cautions against the future is not to be con-

strued as an admission of responsibility for

the past. has no legitimate tendency to prove

that the defendant had been negligent be-

fore the accident happened, and is calculated

to distract the minds of the jury from the

real issue, and to create a prejudice against

the defendant. Morse v. Railway Co.. 30

Minn. 465, 16 N. W’. 358; Corcoran v. Peeks- ‘

kill, 108 N. Y. 151. 15 N. E. 309: Nalley v.

Carpet Co., 51 Conn. 524; Ely v. Railway

Co., 77 Mo. 34; Railway Co. v. Hennessey, ;

75 Tex. 155. 12 S. W’. 608; Railroad Co. v.

Clem, 123 ind. 15, 23 N. E. 965; Hodges v.

Percival, 132 Ill. 53. 23 N. E. 423: Lombard

v. Village of East Tawas. 86 Mich. 14. -i8 N. t

W. 947; Shinners v. Proprietors, 154 Mass.

168, 2s N. E. 10. '

As was pointed out by the court in the

last case, the decision in Readman v. Con-

way, 126 Mass. 374, 377, cited by this plain-

tiff. has no bearing upon this question, but

simply held that in an action for injuries

from a defect in a platform. brought against

the owners of the land, who defended on

the ground that the duty of keeping the plat-

form in repair belonged to their tenants, and

not to themselves. the defendants‘ acts in

making general repairs of the platform after

the accident “were in the nature of admis- '

sions that it was their dut_v to keep the

platform in repair, and were therefore com-

petent."

72

The only states, so far as we are informed,

in which subsequent changes are held to be

evidence of prior negligence. are Pennsylva-

nia and Kansas. the dccisions in which are
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tloned just before, as to the degree of care
required of thP dPfPndant. That they were
not urult•t'Mtood, Plther by the t-oumwl or by
the court. as waiving the objection to evidence of subsequt>nt changes, Is shown by
the pla111tltf'11 eounsel thereupon saying. "We
propoeP to show changes," and by thP eourt
ruling them to be admissible, and allowing
an exc·l'ptlon to this ruling, and Immediately
atterwurds allowing two other excPptlons to
evldenc·e on the same eubjec-t. And the
question of the adrnl88lblllty of this testimony was consldt>red and decldt'd by the supreme court of the territory. 3 Wash. T.
!J53, 364, 19 Pac. 25.
This writ of error, therefore, directly presents for the decision of this court the question whether, In an action tor Injuries cauBe(l
by a machine alleged to be negligently constructed, a subsequent alteration or repair
of the machine by the defendant Is competent e\"ldPnce of nPgllgence In Its original
conetru<'tlon.
Upon this question there has been some
dlfrereuce of opinion lo the courts of the several states; but It Is now :iettled, upon mu<'h
consideration, by the decisions of the highest
courts of most of the states In whl<'h the
question has arisen. that the evlden<>e is Incompetent. bt><'ause the taking of sueb pre<~autlons agulnst tht> future ls not to be construed as an admission of responsibility for
the past, has no legitimate tendem·y to prove
that the defendant had been negllg<•nt before the accident ha11pened, and ls calculatt'd
to distract the minds ot the jury from the
real Issue, and to create a prejudice against
the defendant. Morse v. Railway Co., 30
Minn. 465, 16 N. W. 358; Corcoran v. Peekskill, 108 N. Y. 151, 15 N. E. 309; Nalley v.
Carpet Co., 51 C-0nu. 524; Ely v. Railway
Co., 77 Mo. 34; Railway Co. v. Hennessey,
75 Tex. 15:>. 12 8. W. 608; Railroad Co. v.
Clem, 1:?3 Ind. 15, 23 N. E. 9f,;'i; Hodges v.
Percival, 132 Ill. 5.'-l. 23 N'. E. 423: Lombard
v. Village of East Tawas, 86 l\ll<'h. 14, 48 X.
W. 947; Shinners v. Pt'Oprletors, 154 l\lass.
168, 28 N. E. 10.
.
As was pointed out by the <>ourt In the
last case, the decision In Readman v. Conway, 126 Mass. 374, 377, <>lted by this plalnrnr, has no bearing upon this question, but
simply held that in an action for Injuries
from a defect In a platform, brought against
the owners of the land, who defended on
the ground that the duty of kPeplng the platform In repair belonged to their tenants, and
not to themselves, the defendants' acts In
making general repairs of the platform after
the accident "were In the nature ot admissions that It was their duty to keep the
platform ln repair, and were therefore compt>tent."
72

I

The only states, 80 far as we are Informed,
In which subsequent changes are held to be
evldt.>n<.-e of prior negligence. are Pennsylvai nia and Kan88s, the 1ll•<'lslons in which are
supported by no satisfactory reasons. 'McKee v. Bidwell, 74 Pa. 8t. 218, 225, and cases
cited; Railway Co. v. Weaver, 3:) Kan. 412,
11 Pac. 408.
The true rule and the reasons for It were
well expre8fled In .Morse v. Railway Co.,
above cited, In which llr. Justice Mitchell,
delivering the unanimous opinion of the supreme court of Mlnne110ta, after referring to
earlier oplnlons of the Bl!me court the other
way, said: "But. on mature reftectlon, we
have concluded that evidence of this kind
ought not to be aclmlttt'd under any clrcum1 stan<•es. and that the rule heretofore adopted
by this rourt ls on principle wron1t; not tor
the reason given by some rourts, that the
1
acts of the employ@e In making such repairs
1 are not admissible against their principals,
but upon the broader ground that such acts
a1l'ord no legitimate basis tor construing
such an act as an admission of previous negle<"t of duty. A person may have exercised
all the care which the law required, and
yet, In the light of his new experience, aftt>r
an 1mex1iectt>d accident has occurred, and as
a measure of extreme caution, he may adopt
additional safeguards. The more careful a
Pf'l'Son Is, the mo~ reir;ard he bas for the
lives of otht>rs, the more ltkt>ly he would be
to do so; and It would seem unjust that he
could not do 80 without being liable to have
SU<'h R<'ts construt'd as an admlBSlon of prior
nt>gllgen<'e. ·we think such a rule puts an
unfah' Interpretation upon human conduct,
and virtually holds out an Inducement for
<·ontlnued negllgenC'e." 30 Minn. 465, 468.
ThP same rule appears to be well settled In
: England. In a case ln whl<'h It was amrm' ed ln- the c-ourt of excbequt>r, Baron Bramwell snld: "Pt'Ople do not furnish evidence
1 against themselves simply by adopting a
! new plan In order to prevent the recurrence
of an acC'ldent. I think that a proposition to
the contrary would be barbarous. It would
be, a11 I have often bad OC'C!lslon to tell Juries, to bold that, because the world gets
wiser as It gets older, tben>fore lt was foolish before." Hart v. Railway, 21 Law T.
I (X. S.) 261, 21i3.
1
As the lnrompetent evidence admitted
1
against the d<>fendant's exception bore upon one of the prlnelpal Issues on trial, and
1
, tended to })rejudl<'e the jury against the defenclant, and It cannot be known bow much
the jury were lnftuenced by it, Its admission
requires that the judgment be reversed, and
the case remanded to the supreme court of
the state of Washington, with directions to
set aside the verdict and to order a new trial.

I
I

I
I
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-QOUTHERN KAN. RY. CO. V. ROBBINS.

('23 Pac. 113, 43 Knii. 145.)

$upren1e Court of Kansas. Feb. 8, 1890.

Error from district court, Franklin coun-

ty; A. W. Bmnson, Judge.

George R. Peck, A. A. Hurd, and Robert

Dunlap. for plaintiff in error. H. P. Welsh

and John W. Deford, for ilefeniliiiit in error.

JOH.\'S'l‘()N,'J. On June 30. 1886. John

F. Patterson was employed in the service of

the Southern Kansas Railway Company, as a

pzisseiiger conductor. At that time" a Sun-

day-Scliool assembly was in session at Otta-

wa, and the railway company were running

(*‘\'0lll‘Sl0ll trains from several points in the

state to that place. On the morning of the

day mentioned Patterson went from Ottawa

to Lawrence in charge of a passenger train,

where it was loaded with excursionists bound
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for the assembly at Ottawa. On the return

trip he stopped at Baldwin City, where there

were a number of pcople intending to join

the excursion to Ottawa, and, being short of

passenger cars to accommodate them, the

company had placed two cabooses and a box-

car, temporarily arranged for passengers, on

a siile track, and directed Patterson to at-

tach them to the rear of his train, for the

use of passengers. There is testimony to the

ellect that Patterson was directed to place

the cars in his train in the same order that

they were staiidiii;,'.—lii'st a caboose. then

the box-car, and then another caboose; and

this was the order in which they were at-

tached to the train. After the train left

Baldwin City, Patterson proceeded to collect

fares, beginning at the front, and passing

towards the rear, of the train. When he had

completed taking fares in the ﬁrst caboose,

he passed out of the reardoor, and proceeded"

to climb over the box-car. in an effort to

reach the other caboose, in which there were

passengers. There were no doors in the

ends of the car, nor any platforms on the

ends of the same, and the only way to get

over the car was to cliinh up a. ladder on the

side and near the corner of the car, made of

iron rods, called “lizind-liolds” or “rungs,”

which were screwed to the side and top of

the car. These rods were about a foot

apart, and extended out from the side of the

C31‘ about three inches. While he was in the

act of ascending this ladder, the train was

running at a rapid rate. and just as it passed

overs bridge he in some way fell from the

car. and was fatally injure-I. The witnesses

who saw the occurrence state that he had '~

nearly reached the top of the car, when he

appeared to grasp with one hand for a rung

which should have been upon the top of the

car, but probably W8-8 Ml. and at the seine

time let go his hold upon the top H1118 ‘"1 the

side of the car with the other hand, when he

reeled back, and fell from the train. He was

found lying in the angle of two braces of the

bridge. his skull fractiired, and his left leg

broken. He was unconscious when f°"11<1-

. dicular ladder in

~UTHFlRN

KA:X. RY. CO. v. ROBBINS.
(23 Pac. 113, 43 Knu. H;J.)
Su11n>mr Court of KanR811. 1'\•b. 8, 1890.
Error from district court, Franklin coun-

ty; A.

w.

HENSON,

Judge.

GerJl'gB R. P(:ck, A . ...t. Hurd, and Robert

Dtmlap, for plaintiff in error. H.P. Welsh
and Juh1i W. Deful'd, for d~ft'nclant in error.

JOHNSTON. 'J. On .June 30, H~86. John
}'.Patterson wHS employt'<l In the service of
the SouLhero Kansas Railway Company, as a
passenger conductol'. At that time· a Sunday-School assembly was in session at Ottawa, and the rail way company were running
e~cul'!lion trains from se\·eral poinbl in the
atllle to that place. On the morning of the
d11y mentioned P11ttl'rson went from Ottawa
to Lawrence in charge of a passenger train,
where it was loadetl with excursionists bound
for the assemuly at Ottawa. On the return
trip he stopped at Baldwin City, where there
were a number of people Intending to join
the excursion to Ottawa, and, being shol'tof
p11Ssenger cars to accommodate them, the
company had placed two cabooses and a boxciu, temporarily arranged for passengers, on
a siile track, and dirl'cte<l Plltterson to attach them to the rear of his train, for the
use of passengers. There i~ t-eslimony to the
~liect that l:'attt'rson was dirncted to place
the ca~ in hiR train in thl' same order that
they were stanillng.-flrst a caboose, then
the box-car, anJ then another cabo011e; and
this Wll8 the order in which they were attached to the train. After the train left
Baldwin City, Patterson proceeded to collect
fares, beginning at the front, and passing
towards the rear, or the train. When he had
completed talcing fares in the flrst caboose,
he pnssed out of the rear door, and proceeded·
·to climb over the box-car, in an effort to
reach the other caboose, in which there were
passengers. '.rhere were no doors in the
ends of the car, nor any platforms on the
-ends of the same, and the only wuy to 1ret
over the car was to climb up a lmlder on the
Rid11 and near the corner of the car, made of
iron rocls, called "hand-holds" or "rungs,"
wliicb were screwed to the side and top ot
the car.
These rods were about a foot
apart., and extended out frnm the side of the
car about three inches. Whil~ he was in th.,,
act or ascending this ladder, the train was
running at a rapid rate, and just as it passpd
over a l>ridge he in some way fell from the
car, and was fatally injured. The witnt'sses
who saw the occurrt'nce state that he had
nearl1 real' heel the top of the car, when he
.appeared to grasp with one band for a l'Ung
which should have been upon the top of the
~ar, but probably was not, and at the sa1ne
time Jet go his hold upon the top rung on the
s1dP. of the car with the other l1and, when he
ret>led back, and feU from the train. He was
fo11111l lying in the an,!fle of two braces of the
\•rhJ~e. his skull fractured, and his left leg
broi.;eo. He wu unconscious when found,
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and remained so until h~s deat/J, w/Jic/J uccune<l the day of the aCCldent. This action
is brought by the representative of the deceased, to recover damage& for the benetJt ot
the widow and child, it being alleged that
his life was Jost in consequt>uce of the negli·
genC'e of the railway company. The company alleged and contended that Pattt>rson was
guilty of negligt'nce contributing Lo the accident. The plaintiff pre\·aiieu, 11nd l'ecovered a judgment for $5,500.
Errors are assigned here upon the rulings
of the court in admitting evi1lence. The depoeitlon of a witness was rel'el\"ed tbat was
not taken in the exact place stated in the nctice. The notice named the office of Winslow P. Hyatt, Colorado stl'eet, Pasadena,
I..os Angeles county, Cal:• as the place of taking the deposition; but, as he had moved
about a block away on another stret-t, the n~
tary met the plaintiff's attorney at that pl~Lce
at the proper time. and adjourned the taking
of the deposition to another office, on another street in Pasadena, and there the deposition was continued, completed, sealed upf
and properly addressed. In the afternoon °
that day the 11ttorney for the defendant was
•
.
h d be n done,
found, and tnformed what . ~
~
then
nnd, by consent., the deposttwn ~,~ d and
opened, and the witness was rec11 f'y •rhe
·
cross-exam med
by def en d ant' s a ttot"ne
t.ue· de~ocon rt properly refused to suppri:r- 0~ at 3~~
sition. Tht1 taking of a depo~' ;, ~·~\.\ce~,t\\
other place than that stated in t\'4' ~ \.& &\.~e \~
the absence of the opposing riart;17~t. &\'.'1 \\.Ye
cient objection to the deposition• 1._. ~\; ~ y,.'I. ""~~
re~ulal'ity was cured by the vo ~~el'• ~" \~
pearance of the defendant's coll~~- .,_,."f.e~
plare where the deposition was
~I!!""~ ~" \.\.,e
his participation in the proceeJ\~, ~~'!>\t'\~e
impo1·tant that the deposition sbotl &' ~f 0~e\0 0~
at the place mentioned in the not.i~
..--..o'-'\ee 0 t
notice is only give_n to furnish t.ll~ "'~ \.~e~\eP"
party an opportunity to appear, an el ... ~ 4'
theappearancewaivesadefectintl•
~ i i 'XJ)'l!-•
the irregularity of a change iu tb":,_,.,._,. ~
~e-~
taking the deposition. None of j ~ - _., ,.., ~o?'
tions to the deposition can be sustfl- ~~
-A- i \ •S\'0
A witness was asked, an1\ o'fJe ~ , ... :¥,\\,e
tlon was pel'mitted to state. whet.1•
~,, .. ~
1\1\'
ceased was a careful nnd skillful , • 'l~ ~ ..,,.:w°'
man. This was clearly "rrone<7; ~
~~
'-\el\
question wht-thet· Patt~rson exer~•• ~ • , ~ .,-. a,o\)
care in thill particular instance
~ p
74\ 1••
portant issue. It was alkged tha 0 , - 6 11
? l
,11 •
guilty of negligence, and it was c0
-£- s-•
J ' \1,
that the aMt>nce of the hand-hold o ~ J
~ ,,,._ "J _J 1e
of the car was an obvious danger, K
~ ., ~ ~ J "f'J
ent to any one, ancl that to a~cend. ~t"> I &~
~ ...
dicular ladtler in I.he micnner in wh1c: c-1 ~ ~ i;;

"e

w«,

!.-

0
:r;~~t~:~ riif~~~= ;;~~~~;r i~~~~:,:~~:
·-~.Z,~; :;~
n;:r

j

the top of the car, "\; .~s.
~are was ~ ~
01sue of his waut of ~.r!1i:un~h testin101'"!~-. C::e~
the jury, and t~ere . conduct at the t.~
7 •
J ~
mittetl concern mg Ins re eye-witness'='~ ~ , - ._-~
the injury. The~el ~!scribed the man r• c ~ ~V
eut who at the tna tl
ladder. and t;ber
which be ascended
ie

Case No. 24]
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which he exercised at the time the accident

occurred; and hence there was no necessity

nor propriety in admitting the opinion of an

expert as to whether he was generallya care-

ful and skillful man. The determination of

whether he was exercising due care when he

fell from the car does not depend upon the

care c\‘erciSed by him at other times, or l

whether he was usually careful in the per-

formance of his duties as a railroad man, but

does depend upon his conduct at the time of

the accident. The witness who gave the tes-

timony was a conductor on the same railroad,

had been acquainted with him fora year, and

claimed to have the means of knowing as to

whether he was a careful railroad man, and

his testimony may have had much weight

with thejury in determining that the deceased

was in the exercise of due care. With the
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evidence before them as to the care he used

at the time, the jury could determine better

than any expert whether or not he was neg-

ligent; and the fact that he was generally 1

careful would be unavailing if the testimony i

showed that his negligence in this instance 1

contributed to the injury. Testimony of this

character is no more admissible than an offer

by the railroad company to show his want of

care at the time of the accident by proving

that he was pegligeiit at other times, or gen-

erally careless. Exceptions are made in some

cases where there are no eye-witnesses of

the accident, and better evidence cannot be

obtained as to whether the injured person

exercised due care; but all the authorities

hold such testimony to be inadmissible where

the testimony of persons who witnessed the

accident is available. Bryant v. Railroad

Co., 56 Vt. 710; Dunham v. Racklifl’, 71 Me.

345; Hays v. Millar, 77 Pa. St. 238; Tenney p

v. Tattle, 1 Allen, 185; McDonald v. Savoy, 4

110 Mass. 49; Chase v. Railroad Co., 19 V

Amer. & Eng. R. Gas. 356; Morris v. Town

of East Haven, 41 Conn. 252; Baldwin v.

Railroad Co., 4 Gray. 333; Railroad Co. v.

Roach, 64 Ga. 635; Railroad Co. v. Clark,

108 Ill. 113; Elliot v. Railroad Co., 41 N. W. '

Rep. 758: 1 Greenl. Ev. § 84. Neither was

the testimony introduced in regard to how

railroad men should and do ascend the ladder

of a box-car relevant nor competent. The ,

practice followed by others throws no light l

on the care used by Patterson in this case. -

it is not claimed that the opinions of experts ‘~

74

are necessary in the case, and to allow testi-

mony as to how others climbed the ladder

would be to create collateral issues as to the

prudence of their conduct, and to unneces-

sarily protract the trial. The question of

whether Patterson was guilty of such negli-

gence as would preclude a recovery was an

issue before the jury, and the practice or

usage of others would not tend to prove care

on his part, and such testimony should not

have been received. Railroad O0. v. Clark,

supra; Lawrence v. Hudson, 12 Heisk. 671;

Railroad C0. v. Moranda, 108 Ill. 576; Rail-

RELEVANCY.

which he exer<:ised at the time the accident
occurred; and hence there was no necessity
nor propriety in admitting the opinion of an
expert as to whether be was generally a careful and skillful man. The determination of
whethe1· he was exercising due care when he
fell from the car does not depend upon the
care exercised by him Kt other times, or
whether he was usually careful in the pe1·formance of hi~ duties as a 1·ai!road man, but
does depend upon his conduct at the time of
th1, 1tcci•ll'nt. The witness who gave the testimony was a conductor on the same railroad,
had been ac'l nainted with him for a year, and
claimed to have the mea11a of knowing aa to
whether ho was a carefttl railroad man, and
his testimony ·ruay have had much weight
with the jury in determining that the deceased
was in the exercise uf due care. With the
evidence before them as to the care he used
at the time, the jury could determine better
than any expert whether or not he was negligent; and the fact tlutt he was generally
careful would be unavailing if the testinlllny
showe1l that his negligence in this instltnce
contributed to the injury. 'festimony ot this
character is no more admissilJle than an offer
by lhe railroad company to show his w1mt of
car~ at the time of the accident by proving
that he was ,negligt>nt at other times, or generally careless. Exceptions are made in some
cases where the1·e are no eye-witnesses of
the accident, and better eviden1·e cunnot be
obtained as to whether the injured 11erson
exercised due care; but all the authorities
hold such teslirnony to be inadmissible where
the t't'Stimony of persons who witnesst>d the
accident is availalJle. Bryant v. Railroad
Co., 56 Vt. 710; Dunham v. RacklilT, 71 Me.
:J45; Hays v. Millar, 77 Pa. St. 238; Tenney
v. Tuttle, l Allen, 185; McDonald v. Savoy,
110 Mass. 49; Chasti v . Hailroad Co.. 19
Amer. & Eng. H. Cas. 356; Monis v. Town
of .E ast Haven, 41 Conn. 252; Baldwin v.
Hailr<md Co., 4 Gray, 333; Hailroad Co. v.
Hoach, 64 Ga. 635; Railroad Co. v. Clark,
lOt! Ill. 113; Elliot v. Hnilroad Co., 41 N. W.
Uep. 758; 1 Greenl. Ev. ~ 84. Nt>ither was
the testimony introduced in regard to how
railroad men should and do ascend the ladder
of a box-ear relevant nor competent. The
practice followed by others throws no light
on the care used by Patte1son in this cMe.
It is not claimed that the opinions of experts
74.

are necessary in the ease, and to allow testimony as to how others climhed the laddt>r
would be to c1·eate collateral issues as to the
prudence of their con1lnct, and to unnecessarily protract the trial. The question of
whether Patterson was guilty of such neglig1'n\!e as would preclude a recovery was an
issue berore the jury, and the practice 01·
U'lage of others would not tend to prnve care
on his part, and such teslimony should not
have been received. RailroBd Co. v. Clark,
supra; Lawrence v. Hudson, 12 Heisk. 671;.
Railroad Co. v. Mor11nda, 108 Ill. 576; Railwav Co. v. Evansich, 61 Tex. 3; Un·ant v.
Uailroad Co., supra; Balley v. Northampton
Co., 107 .Mass. 496; Koons v. Hailroad Co., 65·
Mo. 592; Crocker v. Schureman, 7 Mo. App.
31"18; Cleveland v. Steam-Boat Co., 5 Hun,.
523; Lawson, Usnges & Cust. 328.
To account for the fall, a witness, who was.
not present at the time, gave the following
testimony: "Qttestion. You say you ha\"e
passed over this road a. great many times?
Answer. I have. Q. And over this bridge?A. Yes, sir. Q. Now, can you state to the
jury, under the circumstances which surrounded Mr. Patterson there, whether 01·
not there was any cauBe why be should have
ascended that car with great 11peed and haste.
and, if so, what that cause was? Explain to·
the jury. A. Well, the way that man started
in to go up the side of the car, he couldn't see·
the bridge when he sta1·ted; and at the speed
the train Wll8 running, and him climbing upthe side of the car, IJy the time the engine
strnck the bridge, he would be towards the
top, 11nd, when he heard the thundering noise
that the engine makes when it sti·ikes a
bridge. he hurried to get on top of the car."
This te11timony was given over the objection
of the plaintiff in error. The witness was theconc.luctor of another train, who was far
away when Patterson fell from the box-car.
lie did not know and could not st11te whether
Patterson could see the bridge when he started to ascend the ladder, nor how far he had
ascended when the bridge was reached; neither was he competent to state what causes
ope1·ated on the mind of Patterson that led
him to ascend the ladder with great speed
and haste. The admission ot the Incompetent testimony was error, for which the judgment will be reversed, and the cause remand·
ed for a new trial; all the justices concurring.

EVIDEYCE OF CH·AHACTER-WHEY' ADMissr».C.l?.

{CIUB No. 25

EVIDENCE or CI~l'AltACTER—WHEN ADMISSIBLE‘. [Cm M, 25

NORFOLK & ‘V. R. CO. V. IIOOYER.

(29 Ail- 99-}, T9 hid. 253.)

C0“?! of Appeals of Maryland. June 19, 1894.

Allpeai from circuit court, Washington

county,

Action by William Hoover against the Nor-

folk & Western Railroad Company for per-

-*'°l1ﬂ1 injuries. Judgment for plaintiff, and

tit-fondant appeals. Reversed.

Ahmed before ROBINSON, c. J., and BRY-

A.\. BRISCOE. 1HcSHl<}RRY, FOWLER,

ROBERTS, PAGE, and BOYD, J-T.

'Hy. Kyd. Douglass, for appellant. M. L.

heedy and VV. C. Griﬁith, for appeliee.

:-\ORFOLK & W. R. CO. "· HOOYEU.
(2U Atl. 004, 79 Md. 253.)
Court of Appeals of Maryland. June 19, 1894.
ApPeal troni
circuit court, Washington

rounty.
Action by Willlani Hoover against the NOl'folk & Western Railroad Company tor per'"llla.I Injuries. Judgment tor plaintiff, and
ll<>fPndant appeals. Re"Versed.
Argued before ROBINSON, C. J., 11n1l BRY·
A."i, BRISCOE, McSHJ<rnRY, FOWLER,
UOBERTS, PA.GE, and BOYD, JJ.
Hy. Kyd. Douglass, tor a11r11•ll11nt. M. L.
Keedy and W. 0. Grltllth, for appellee.

McSi-IERRY, J. This is an action brought

10 recover damages for personal injuries re-

(‘9iV0d b_v the uppellee, an employe of the

Norfolk & \Vestern Railroad Company, as the

result 01' alleged negligence on the part of his

fellow servant. The verdict and judgment
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were in his favor, and the company has ap-

pealed. In the record there are three bills of

exception. upon wvhich the questions to be

considered arise. Two of these exceptions

were reversed by the appellant, and one by

the appellce. '

It appears that in May, 1891, an extra

train of loaded freight cars was started from

Shenandoah, Va., about 11:30 p. m., to run

through to Hagcrstown, Md. The crew con-

sisted of a conductor, an engineman, a ﬁre-

man, a ﬂagman, and two hrakemen. Hoo-

ver, the appeilee, was the engincman. As the

train proceeded northward, it descended some

heavy grades, and the engineman noticed

that its speed was not kept under proper

control by the brakemen. At Luray the

train laid over for an hour, and the engine-

man requested the brakemen not to let him

down the hills so rapidly, as the night was

quite foggy. After leaving Luray. they as-

cended the grade to Vaughn's Summit, turn-

ing the point at a speed of about 10 miles an

hour. Immediately upon passing the sum-

mit the appellcc shut oi! the steam, so that

the train might descend by gravity alone,

without aid from the engine. When about a

train's length over the hill, he discovered that

the train was increasing its speed, and he ap-

plied the tank brake; but, this producing no

effect, he blew for brakes, turned on the

driver brakes, and applied sand to the track.

This not checking the train, he again blew

for brakes, and reversed his engine. He re-

peatcd his signals for brakes at least once,

and probably twice. afterwards. but they

seem not to have been heeded by the brake-

inen, for the train moved rapidly onward

down the grade. The packing blew out ot

the cylinder, andvthis caused the train to

plunge forward, throwing the appellcc back

‘into the tender. At this jllncture they were

mpidly approaching, and were only $01118 10

or 12 car lengths distant from, Possum Hol-

low, which is crossed 119011 8. trestle 75 01' 80

feet high. The appellee -saw that a collision

with another freight train 8tan(11ng_ 01- mm»-

lng very slowly northward, on the 3.933,.‘

was imminent and unavoidable, nml, to save

McSHEHRY, J. This ls an action brought
to recover da iunges for personal Injuries rePelved by the uppellee, an employll of the
~orfolk & "'eRtern Railroad Company, as the
result of nlle,;ed negligence on the part of his
fellow ser"Vant.
The verdict and judgment
were In his fa""or, and the company has ap(tffiled. In the record there are three bills of
•·xl't'ptlon. u11on 'vhlch the questions to be
1·onslderl•d arll«'. Two of these exceptions
were rewrae<l by the appellant, and one by
the appellee.
·
It appears that in :May, 1891, an extra
train of loaded freight cars was started from
Shenandoah, Va., about 11:30 p. m., to run
through to Hagerstown, Md. The crew con~lsted ot a conductor, an englneman, a fireman, a 'flagman, and two brakemen. Hoorer, the appellee, was the englm.'lnan. As the
train proceeded northward, It descended some
heavy grades, and the engtneman noticed
that Its speed was not kept under proper
rontrol by the brakemen. At Lurny the
train laid over tor an hour, and the engineman requested the brakemen not to let him
down the hills so rapidly, as the night was
c1ulte foggy. After leaving J,urny. they ascended the grade to Vaughn's Summit, turning the point at a speed of about 10 miles an
hour. Immediately upon passing the summit the appellee shut otr the steam. so that
the train might descend by gravity alone,
without aid trom the engine. When about a
traln's length over the hill, he discovered that
the train was Increasing Its speed, and he a.pplled the tank brake; but, this producing no
Ptrect, he blew tor brakes, turned on the
driver brakes, and applied sand to the track.
This not checking the train, he again ble"'
for brakes, and reversed his engine. He l"epea ted his sljl'D8ls for brnkes at leaAt once,
and probably twice, afterwards, but they
seem not to ba"Ve been heeded by the brakemen, tor the train moved rapidly 01rn•ard
down the grade. The packing blew out o:r
the cylinder, and this caused the train to
plunge forward, throwing the appellce back
Into the tender. At this juncture tlley were
rapidly at>proachlng, and were only some 10
or 12 car lengths distant from, Possum Hollow, which 18 crossed upon a trestle 75 or 80

feet high. The appellee SIJ. lt' that a cofilslon
with another freight train Btandlng, or moving very slowly northward, on the trestle,
was Imminent and unavoidable, and, to save
himself, jumped from bis engine, and received the injuries tor which he has brought
the pending suit. There was evidence offered tending to prove that Huyett, one or
the brakemen, had ooen drinking that night
before the accident happened; and, within 30
minutes prior to the collision, his breath gave
unmistakable e"Vldence ot It. In this state of
the proof, a witness was asked whether he
knew the general reputation of Huyett and
Reese, the two brakemen, for· sobriety for one
or two years before the accident and following that, and, If so, to state what that reputation was. To thlfl que11tlon ·and the evidence sought to be ellcltetl ·t hereby, the appellant objected, but the court permitted the
question to be asked and answered, and this .
ruling forms the subject of the tlrst exception.
It has been repeatedly held by thlB court.
and Is the settled and establlshed doctrine of
Maryland that In actions of this cbnmcter.
where a ~ervant sues his master tor ln:Jnrtes
telloW
rl'sultlng from the negllgence o t ast prove
serYant, the plalutllT, to succeed, mu renovr
not only that some negll~nce of th~at t\\C
ser"Vant caused the Injury, but also \\g~nce.
master bad himself been guilty of pe~1'.. te\\o"1"
either in the selection of the negll~e'~e.ta\n\:~
servant In the tlrst Instance, or \t\i£P'·e ~:,,g'\~
him in his sen·lce afterwards. )
1:. t'\: ~V"-i:t
\ '\
gence on the part of a fellow servi\1 >0 e~ot \n-~
resulting in Injury, wlll not sumcc t: ~ ~e#>
the action, because the master doc·¢"~e\'...;i~n~~
eure one employ(! against the carel~ ~.p-3- ~e~another; but he owes to each ot n\~ ~ ~ ~ o'the duty of lll!lng re11sonab\c care j. .t7,.-...\. ~ ~~
tlon in the seleetlon of N>mpetent rel
~"' ~o'P' :te'
ants, and ln the r<'tentlon ln h\s ~
~~ ~ ~ ~e
none but those who are. Tr he doe~.~~v~--c-0 '\:e~'\.
form this duty, and an. injury ls <1c
1-"- ~ :te·
by the negligence of an lncon~peten t: J. V ~ c,fJ.. \~
less servant, the master ls respon11\V ~ ~ ~~ \'IY
Injured employ(!, not for the mere ~· ~ ~p e ~~
act or omlselon of the incon~petent ~~., _.:.
~ ~i
less servant, but for his own neizll ~
#_ ""7 ~ l>'1
not dlscharizlnA' bls own duty t.owar<'J.~~~ ~ its
jured servant. As this nep;l\gence of
~
p
ter must be proved, it mny be proved e#
~ .,
J.t·
other fact,-elther by direct evidE>nc V • ~ ~~1' ll'
the proof of clrcumstnnc<-s :from ~<~
1'-" ~e _
existence may, as a conclusion of .c:;. LP
~cCt
fairly and reasonably ln:ferred. Tba .....,..... ~~ ;i-.£1
eul•Ss on the part of a rnllroad emp\0- ~
~
tJ.
ders him an Incompetent. servnnt will~~..: .. .~P,;1~J~
ly be disputed· nor can I t be que!ltfo1 ~ ._.._
~ ~
a master wh~ knoW'in1dY e1nploys ·i_-e '~rO
W'lng
bis
habits,
~
-...
servant, or who, k no
n of 9 '
~
..,..-him In his service, W, 0?~d o~d':::y~ot· o~e-,:~~
less and wnnton brc.u~
m loyll in h i 8
~· ~
the public, but to e,; e1y e ipn tbe re<.-01·<-•, -J-J__.._
- ~ #I~
Ice. 'fhe1·e ls no e"•ldeUCP
tl n that p\tlie:a:

\\

\t»

e.,,

:J....

ve

._

has there been a sugge~a~~nu of the
conductor, flreroaJJ.. or

~

'tr'&:'

r,ase No. 25)
Case No. 25]
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was negligent or incompetent. The negli-

gence which directly caused the accident is

attributed solely to the hrakemen; and the

appellant's negligence, which, as it is claim-

ed, ﬁxes its liability. lies in its employment

of, or continuing to retain in its service. these

dissipated or iniemperate hrakemen. But,

as we have stated, it was necessary for the

_..aintiff to show, not only their employment,

but that the company had not used due and

ordinary care in selecting them. There was

no direct evidence adduced to show the ab-

sence of such care; but the question except-

ed to, and the evidence elicited in response

to it, were designed to show by indirect or

circumstantial evidence that the company had

not used the degree of care and caution in

the selection of these hrakemen that its duty

imperatively required it to use. So the ques-
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tion is, can you ﬁx upon the master a failure

to use due care in selecting careful servants

by showing such notorious or general reputa-

tion respecting the servant’s uniltuess or in-

competency as that the master could not,

without negligence on his part, have been ig-

norant of it when he employed the servant?

About this there ought to be no difficulty. If

the servant’s general reputation before em-

ployment is so notorious as to unfitness as

that it must have been known to the master

but for his (the master's) negligence in not

informing himself,—li' he could have been

ignorant of it only because he failed to mnke

investigation,—then it is obvious that he had

not used the care and caution which the law

demands of him in selecting his employes.

Hence “the servant's general reputation for

unﬁtness may be sufficient to overcome the

presumption that the master used due care

in his selection, even though actual knowl-

edge of such reputation for unfltness on the

master’s part is not shown.” Wood, Mast.

& Serv. § 420. In Davis v. Railroad Co.,

20 Mich. 112. Cooley, J., speaking for the

court, adopts the case of Gihnan v. Railroad

Co., 13 Allen, 433, which puts upon the em-

ployer the responsibility of negligently em-

ploying an unﬂt person. generally known and

reputed to be such, notwithstanding the em-

ployer may in fact have been ignorant of

such uniitness. Continuing. he said: “The

ignorance itself is negligence in a case in

which any proper inquiry would have ob-

tained the necessary information, and where

the duty to inquire was plainly imperative.”

So, in Hilts v. Railway, 55 Mich. 437. 21 N.

W. 878, where a track hand was killed by an

engine backing rapidly along a switch, and

the engineman was drunk, the court said:

"When. however, as in this case, it is shown

that the accident occurred through the negli-

gent act of the servant, who was in an intoxi-

cated condition, and when it is shown. fur-

ther, that'he was in the habit of drinking in-

toxicating liquors to excess, and such habit

had extended over a. period of nine months

while in defendant’s employ, and no actual

knowledg," or notice ever reached any supe-

BEI.E\" ANCY. ·

was negligent or Incompetent. The nPgllgence which directly caused the accident Is
attributed solely to the brakemen; and the
a1>pellllnt's negligence, which, as It Is claimed, fixes Its llablllty, lies In Its employment
ot, or continuing to retain In Its servkt•, these
dissipated or lntt>mperate brakemen. But,
as we have stated, It waa n~Sdllcy tor the
..•alntUr to show, not only their employment,
Lmt that the company had not used due and
ordinary care In selecting them. There was
no direct evidence adduced to show the ab11ence of BUch care; but the question exceptt'd to, and the evidence elicited In response
to lt, were designed to 11bow by Indirect or
clrcum11tantlal evidence that the company bad
not used the degree of care and <'8.utlon ln
the selretlon of these brakemen that Its duty
Imperatively required It to use. Ro the question ls, can you fix upon the master a failure
to use due care in seleetlng careful servants
by showing such notorioUB or general reputation respecting the servant's unfitness or Incompetency as that the master could not,
without negligence on bis part, have been Ignorant of ft wbt>n he employed the servant?
About this there ought to be no dlfticulty. It
the servant's gent>ral reputation before employment ts so notorious as to unfitnf'llS as
that it must have been known to the master
but for bis (the master"s) Dt>gllgence In not
tnronnlD.Jt blmself,-lf be could have bt'E'n
Ignorant of lt only because be failed to mnke
lnvestlgntlon,-then lt Is obvious that he had
not used the care and caution which the law
demnnds of hlm in selecting his em11loy~s.
Hence "the servant's general reputation for
unfitness may be suftlclent to overcome the
presumption that the master used due care
in his selection. even though actual knowledge of such reputation for unfitness on the
master's part ts not shown." Wood, Mast.
& Serv. t 420. In Davis v. Railroad Co.,
20 Mich. 112, Coolt>y, J., speaking for the
court, adopts the case of Gilman v. Railroad
Oo•• 13 Allen, 433, which puts upon the employer the responsibility of negligently employing an unfit person, generally known and
reputed to be such, notwithstanding the employer may In fact have been Ignorant of
such unfitness. Continuing. he said: ''The
Ignorance Itself Is negllgt>nce In a case In
which any proper Inquiry would have obtalnro the nece!lllllry lnformntlon, and where
the duty to inquire was plainly Imperative."
So, In Hilts v. Railway, w lllch. 437. 21 N.
W. 818, where a track band was killed by an
engine backing rapidly along a switch, and
the engtneman was drunk, the court 11ald:
"Wht>n, however, as In this case, It Is shown
that the accident occurred through the negllKent act of the S('rvant, who was In an lntoxt<'Rted condition, and when ft Is shown. fur·
ther. that· he was In the habit of <lrlnklng In·
toxtmting liquors to excess, and such habit
had exteodPd o\·er a period of nine monthM
while In defendant's employ, and no Rl'tual
knowledge or notice ever reached any 11upe76

rlor officer of the engineer, we think the jury
may be justlfled In concluding from such evidence that the defendant was negligent In
falling to leam such habit, and In retaining
tbe engineer In Its employment." See, also,
Gilman v. Railroad Co., 13 Allen, 433; Wright
v. Railroad Co., 25 N. Y. 566; Railroad Co. v.
Sulllrnn, Cl3 Ill. !.>oo; Chapman v. Railway
Oo., rm N Y. 579. Tbt> evidence olfered and
admitted hsd no relation to specific or Isolated acts of Dt>gll~nce. These, unless
brought home to the knowledge ot the IIUlSter, would not have been admissible as refle<"tlog on the que11tlon of the master's care.
Elevator Co. v. :Xeal, 65 :Md. 438, 5 Atl. 338.
\Ve think, for th~ reasons we have given and
upon the authorities we have cited, there was
no error committed In allowing the question
excepted to In the first bill ot exceptions to
be put nod answered.
Under the ruling, quite a number of witnesses testified to Huyett's general reputation for Intemperance, extending from a
pel'fod long anterior to his employment by the
appellant, up to and after the accident. One
witness, Eyler, gave evidence as to ReE'Se's
general reputation. Wlth respect to Huyett,
the evidence, If <'redlted by th~ jury, showed
a general rPputntton, covering many years,
unlnterrupt1•1lly, and of such a notorious
character that a Jory might well have Inferred It was known to the master when
Huyett was employed, or else that the ma.<(ter
failed to know It only becausl' of neglecting
to make proper Inquiry. There was consequently evidence legally sufticlent to go to
the jury upon the subject of the company's
negligence; and therefore there was no error
lo rejecting the appellant's ftrst and fifth
prayers, which sought to take the case from
the consideration of the Jury, nor In rejecting
Its fourth prayer, which sought to exclude
this evldt>nce from the case.
'l'here was error In rejecting the second
1
prayer of the appellant. It asked the court
to say to the jury that, lf the Injury to the
plalntlll' was caUBed by the Intoxication or
negligence ot the brakemen, or either of
them; that the brakemen were employed by
Shull, the train dispatcher, and were sent out
by him on the train In question; and, further,
that Shull was guilty of negligence In sending
out these brakt>men, or either of them, on
the traln,-"yet the Jury are further Instructed that Shull and the plalntlll' were coemploy~s of the defendant In the sending out
or said brakemen, and the defendant Is not
res1>0nslble to the plalntlft' for the neglect or
want of care of the snld Shull, unless they
shull further find that there was negligence
on the part of the defendant In the employmt>nt of Shull; and there Is nole~ally sutficlmt
evldt•DC'l' In the cause from wh11:h the Jury
cau l!o find." :'\ow, whether Shull was a
d1•1mty master, or vice principal, or only a
fellow serrnnt of the plalntUT. Is a question of
law to be dt•tPrmlned by the court, tf the
facts be undisputed or conceded. Yates v.

- ---1
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I
IP01: Go., 60 hid. 2, 16 Atl. 280. Shull was

8 mere dispatcher of trains, with power to

employ and discharge ﬂagnien and brakenien,

and having general charge of the trainmen of

tile ﬁrst division ot the road, and the move-

ment of trains thereon. He was employed

bl’ the division superintendent. who had the

general management of the division. The en-

Kinsmen and iircinen are also under the in-

Siructious of the division superintendent.

This is all the evidence (and it is entirely un-

disputed) to show that Shull was a vice prin-

cipal, and not a fellow servant. In Wonder's

Case, -‘$2. Md. 418, the general rule was iaid

down that all who serve the same master,

work under the same control, derive au-

thority and colupensation from the same

source, and are engaged in the same general

business, though it may be in diﬂerent grades

and departments oil it, are fellow servants,
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each taking the risk of the other's negligence.

In that case, a brakeman, who was injured

while using a defective brake, was held to

be a fellow servant with the mechanics in the

shops, the inspector of machinery and rolling

stock, and the superintendent of the move-

ment of trains. And so in State v. Malster,

57 .\id. 287, it was held that a superintendent

or manager is a fellow servant, within the

rule which exonerates the master. In Ele-

vator Co. v. Neal, 65 Md. 438, 5 Atl. 338. the

captain of a steam tug owned by the com-

pany was held to be a fellow servant of ii

laborer who was injured in the company's

service. This court said in that case: “Nor

is the liability of the master enlarged or made

ditlerent by the fact that the servant who has

suffered the injury occupied a grade in the

common service interior to that of the serv-

ant whose misconduct caused the injury com-

piaine(l of.” And in Yates v. Iron Co., 69

Md. 370, 16 Atl. 280, the authorities were all

reviewed, and it was held that the chief man-

ager or the carbon works, who hired and dis-

charged the hands, kept their time, etc., was

only a fellow servant of a laborer who was

injured while operating the machinoi-y. 1\Iay-

or, etc., v. War, 77 Md. 593, 27 Atl. 85. In

the face of these decisions, it is impossible

to treat Shull as anything more than a fol.

low servant. The maiiagenient of the (11-

vision upon which he was train dispatclu-r

was not committed to him. He was a sub-

ordinate, appointed by the superintendent;

and though he had charge of the tl'1liilll‘|(_1];)_

and of the movement of trains on his (11-

vision. and could employ and discliiirge ﬂ21g_

iuen and brakeinen, it is far from D0111 g

shown that the master had relinquished 1111

supervision of the work on that division. ii nd

intrusted its direction, as well as the procur_-

in;: of materials and niachinei-_v and other in_

striinientalitics necessary for the SO1‘\'i@(‘~- to

his judgment and discretion. The eniriiiemun

and ﬁreman were not employed by him, but

by the division superintendent; and, if The

[.'1‘tl(]L‘ of his position W-"8 Superior t0 iiliit Of

the engineuian, that fact did not niuiie ililu

a vice principal as respf-‘ﬁts the Mtge;-_

Iron Co., 00 l\fd. 38:.?, 16 Atl. 280. Shull WllS
a lllere dlspatcher of trnlns, with power to
employ and discharge :flagmen and brakemen,
and having general charge of the trainmen of
the first dlvlslon of the road, and the movement of trains thereon. He was employed
by the division superintendent, who had the
general management of the division. The engfnt>men ana Hrt~men are also under the Instructions ot the division 11uperlntendent.
This Is all the evidence (and It Is entirely un·
disputed) to show that Shull was a vice principal, and not a i"ellow servant. In Wonder's
Case, 32 Md. 418, the general rule was laid
down that all who sern! the same ml\ster,
work under the same control, derive authority and co1npensation from the same
source, and are engaged in the same general
bustness, though lt may be In different grades
and departments ot It, are fellow servants,
each taking the risk of the other's negligence.
In that case, a brakeman, who was Injured
while .using a defective brake, was held to
be a fellow servant with the mPChanlcs In the
Bho)JIJ, the Inspector of machinery and rolling
stock, and the superintendent of the movement of trains. And so In State v. Malster,
57 Md. 287, It was held that a superintendent
or manager ls a fellow servant, within the
rule which exonerates the master. In Elevator Co. v. Neal, 65 Md. 438, 5 Atl. 338, the
captain of a steam tug owned by the company was held to be a fellow servant of a
laborer who was injured In the company's
eernce. This court &'lid In that case: "Xor
18 the liability of ~be master enlarged or made
dill'erent by the fact that the servant who has
sulfered the Injury occupied a grade In the
common service Inferior to that of the servant whose misconduct caused the Injury complained of." And In Yates v. Iron Co., 69
Md. 370, 16 AtL 280, the authorities were all
reviewed, and It was held that the chief manager of the carbon works, who hired and discharged the hands, kept their time, etc., was
only a fellow servant of a lalJorE>r who was
Injured whlle operating the machinery. May.
or, etc., v. War, 77 lid. 503, 27 Atl. 85. In
the face of these decisions, It ls Impossible
to treat Shull as anythln.I:' mor+> than a fellow servant. The management of the dlvh1ion upon which he was trnln dls1latelH•r
wns not committed to him. He was a subordinate, appointed by the superintendc-n t.
nnd though h+> had charge of the trulrunc_•~
and of the movement of trains on his division. and could employ and disehar~P flagmen and brakemen, It Is fnr from hl•ing
shown that the master had relin1]l1lshf.'d u u
supNvlslon of the work on that division, aud
intrnstcd Its dlr'ectlon, as well aR the procurinr:- of materials and mnchlnt>ry and otller hlstrumentulltles necessary for the 1wrvicc, to
his judgment and discretion. The en~hwmu.n
and :fireman were not employed by him, but
by the division superintendent; and, If the
1-'l"nde of bis position w:ti1 superior to tl111t of
the englneman, that fact did not wake llil.U

a vice principal as resp4."cts the latter. They
were both engaged In the same common
work, employed by tbe Bame a,i:-ent of the
common master, and were performing duties
pertaining to the same general business; and,
unless the whole cunent of the :\faryland decisions Is to be reversed, they were fellow
I
servants of the railroad company, upon the
e\·itlence now bt•fore us. If this be so, then.
t
e\·pn It Shull bud been negligent In sending
out these brakemen, and If that negligence
caused the Injury sued for, still the plalntlt'I'
could not re<..'O\"er, unless the company had
not used due care In the selection of Shull,
and of this there was not a purtlcle of evi·
dence offered.
The appellant's sixth prayer was properly
rejected. There was no nece11slty to prove
that the company had been lncorpomted.
That fo:ct was averred In the declaration, and
was not denied by the pleas, and under sec·
tion 108, art. 75, of the Code, must be taken to
be admitted.
This brings us to the prayers pre!!ented by
the appt>llee. Under a local law of \V1111111n·-.
ton cowity (11ectlons 69, 70, art. 22, Code Pub.
· · nr tlw
Lot·~ Laws), we are requll•t>d to <·on::11 11 ~ ha"'
\
~ected prayers of the p!aintitT, lf h~e de\
excepted; and this he has done. BY t ·nnted
fendant's exception, the plalntlff:!i ~-ayers
prayers and the defendant's reject:
;\tl.\nt\ft·s
are brought before us. By the
ns t~~T
exception, his rejected prayers, as~en'-e.t\ t\tf..•defendant's granted ones, are pr--· 9\11\'~0 no\
\
review. Tbe court granted u1e ~~e~\:."o- "'\'."
tlrst. seventh, and eighth prayers. e'~~c~s\'>';!'n
understand that the seventh and i)'- 0 :\ 0
seriously questioned. Without
~
~"'""'"
them, we need only say they &$~
~· 0 ec~
to substantial objection.
.e'pu{ t\e~~\¥
The appellee's first prnyer, bowe~
P~ 0~\)).:0~
not to hnve been granted. It wtl~
'-'"~e
lo the argument thnt there was
..t?"' p v1 :\ 9-'to support some of the hypotheses ~ _.
•-:>o ~
ed, but !18 no special exceptton bt e~~
~t>· ~e'I:
that objection, and signed nncl seal ._~ '~e--= \"0-c:
judge, appears In the record. we ti.~/~·
'V\''
liberty to consider it. Albc_•rt v.
• ~ _, ..,_.~> &J\\\·'
Md. a:H. 7 Atl. 697. The prayer, ~~
j:l(}S•
ting forth the facts. proc.-eds: "T~ • ~ ,.. ~ - '? ,_ s"'
\O
said Injury to the plaint\ ff 'vas cnu..;'--"
~ j ~· o<
want of N'uinary skill nnd experlen~._... ~ ~~ll('l"
er unfitness on the part o:t' the otll
p
• ~ cC·
or nny of them. In char~e of f'nid _._~;;.
~.. ~•:J1ed
manage and connnC't the sa1ne, by • 0 ~ ~,., < ~ t
the Intemperate i,\tnte or conclltlon 'fl.:f.~+ .-t;l1• t.'
of them." th<' plalntltT using due c.
~ ~
~~i,J"
" the plalntlfl' ls ('J1t\tlt•1l to T(•('oTer. ~C
-f; }Je
the jury further tlnd :t'r()tn the evidO~I ~ 'J. ~_,.
• ,,.;1 ,
th~ dpfpmlant illd not lll"P r<>m•ou~
'-7~~.,.. ._
-~
In tilt> st>lcl'tiuu and e 111ploymen . r-~
--- :11-- ,.,. ..
hr:tkPlllt'll or otlu•r hands or t•nl1plo~ 1(• ~~1-" ~..-71"
~
&
1 . t ·fl' in con.duet ni:: s~
1.wd with the P ni~ I tile injury resnlt<..·c.• c.-L~ •"I. LI
thnt Is to say,
bv the lntemi1t•r.ti :l'.'1
~ :#-.,
m·~llgence cnus~d d-s the defPnllnn. t °" ._-~
~
nny of the train 111nf'·1li1.."'<l to use due c~ ~
~~
be linltlP. If It hn~
.er ~ t.he emplo~~6
-#
the seketl<!n of e1tll

1
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RELEVANCY.

that train, even though that particular em-

ployé, thus carelessly selected, had been guil-

ty of no negligence, and had in no way occa-

sioned the accident. Consequently, if the

jury thought the injury was caused by the

drunkenness of the brakemen, and that the

company had not used due care in the selec-

tion of the ﬁreman, the company would be

liable, notwithstanding the fact that the tire-

man had been guilty of no negligence, and

had in no way produced or helped to produce

the injury. Thus, the negligence of one serv-

ant, and the independent negligence of the

master in employing some other servant, who

had no connection with the accident, estab-

lished. under this instruction, the plaintiffs

right to recover. This is not the law. On

the contrary, it is the negligence of a fellow

servant, and the additional negligence of the
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master in employing that servant. whose neg-

ligence actually caused the injury. which

must concur before a plaintiff can recover in

a case of this character. The instruction

therefore announced an obviously erroneous

proposition. and was calculated to mislead

the jury, because there was evidence before

them from which they might have inferred

that due care had not been used in the selec-

tion of the ﬁreman, though there was no evi-

dence from which they could have found

that the tlreman was responsible for the ac-

cident. The instruction should have clearly

restricted the negligence of the defendant in

selecting the plaintiff's fellow servants to the

selection of such of them as by their incompe-

tency. growing out of their intemperance, ac-

tually caused the injury.

The appellee’s second, third, fourth, and

ﬂtth prayers were properly rejected. There

was no legally sufficient evidence adduced to

support them, or the several hypotheses as-

sumed in them; and, it they had been free

from other objections, this one was sutiicient

to justify the court in refusing to grant them.

There remains the appellant’s third prayer,

which the court granted, but we think erro-

neously gramed. It told the jury, in sub-

stance, that unless the brakeman Huyett

was drunk at the time of the accident, and

his negligence, by reason of such drunken-

ness, produced or contributed to the accident.

the evidence of general reputation as to his

intemperance was not relevant, and could

not be considered by the jury, “unless such

reputation was brought home 10 the knowl-

edge of the defendant before the acc.'denl;”

and there is no such evidence of such knowl-

edge. Had the prayer omitted the words

italicized, it would have been correct, but

those words superadded a condition which

is manifestly inaccurate. Now, it is obvious

that if Huyett was not drunk and was not

negligent when the accident happened. and

therefore did not cause or contribute to it.

the evidence of his general reputation for in-

temperance was wholly irrelevant, even

though that reputation nad been brought

home to the knowledge of the appellant be-

BELEVA...'1\fCY.

that train, even though that particular employ6, thus careleesly selected, bad been guilty of no negligence, and bad In no way occasioned the accident. Consequently, if the
Jury thought the Injury wu caused by the
drunkenness of the brakemen, and that the
company hnd not used due care In the selection ot the fireman, the company would be
liable, notwlthetnndlng the fact that the flreIDlln bnd been guilty of no negligence, and
bnd ln no way produced or helped to produce
the injury. Thus, the negligence of one servant, and the independent negligence of the
master ln employing some other servant, who
had no connection with the accident, establlsbed, undei· thla Instruction, the plalntlf!'s
right to recover. Tbl8 18 not the law. On
the contrary, lt la the negligence of a fellow
servant, and the additional negll!l'ence of the
master In employing that servant, whose negligence actually caused the Injury, which
must concur bt>fore a plalntlf! can recover ln
a case of this character. The Instruction
therefore announced an obviously erroneous
proposition. and waa calculated to ml&ll'lld
the jury, bet'llwie there waa evidence before
them from which they might have interred
that due care bnd not been used ln the selection of the fireman, though there was no evidence from which they could have found
that the fireman was responsible for the :wcldent. The IDMtructlon should have clenl'ly
restricted the negligence of the defendant In
selecting the plalntl1!'11 fellow servants to the
selection of such of them 811 by their Incompetency. growing out of their intemperance, actually caused the Injury.
The appellee's second, third, fourth, and
dfth pmyers were properly rejected. There
was no legally suftlclent evidence adduced to
support them, or the several hypothe&e111 n~11wned In them; and, If they had been ft•ee
from other objections, this one was suftl<"lt>nt
to justify the court In refusing to grant them.
There remains the appellant's third prnyt>r,
whl<>h the court granted, but we think erro-

11

neously graroted. It told the jury, In substance, that unleea the brakeman Huyett
was drunk at the time of the accident, and
bla negligence, by reason at such dnmkenneu, produced or contributed. to the accident.
the evidence of general reputation as to bla
Intemperance was not relevant, and could
not be con1ldered by the jury. "unltu nck
r1putation
brt11.1gkt k011U to t1u k1UN'l«Jge of t1u defmdant before tkl acc:dent; •
and there la no such evidence of such knowledge. Had the prnyer omitted the word.>1
ltallclzed, lt would bnve been correct, but
those words supemdcled a t.'Ondltlon which
ls manifestly Inaccurate. Now, It la obvious
that If Huyett wns not drunk and was not
negligent when the accident happPned, and
therefore did not cause or contribute to It.
the evidence of hls general repututlon for Intemperance WIUI wholly irrelevant. even
though that reputation nad been brought
home to the knowledge of the appellant }>('fore the accident. becawie, If he did not occaal.oo the Injury by his negligence, the fact
that the master bad knowledge of hls bad
reputation would In no way have made the
master llable for an Injury not caused by
Huyett at all. In other words, the master's
knowledF of Huyett's bad reputation had
nothing whatever to do with the case It H07ett did not cause or contribute to the accident; and If Huyett did, by his intemperance, caUHe the 11cctdent, then It WBA Immaterial whether the master bad knowledge of
his bad reputation or not. J>t.t'alL"t>. rui ah-endy
stntecl, the master w11a nt>gllgt>nt In not knowing It. So, In either view of the question, the
prayer was wrong, because of the addition of
the words Indicated.
For the e1T0r ln granting the appellee's
first Instruction and the appellant's third. and
for the error ln rejeetlng the appellant's aecond prayer, the judgment must be reversed.
and a new trial be ordered. Judgment ~
versed, with eoets above and below, and new
trial a warded.
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ANDERSON v. FETZER et al.

A.NDERSON v. FETZER et al.

the phtinttff ts entitled to Judgment against
the defendants for "the lfum of $411.04 for
posts. and 1.1ul<1 sum Of $1,962.24 for ties,
less the sum of $1.600, advanced as afol'!'eald, to-wit: for the sum of $173.27, with
interest from }'ellruary 11, 1883, amounting
In the whole to $180.48, with costs, and
judgment was ordered to be entered then'on accordingly. From the judgment 110
entered the defendants bring this appeal.
Harniltou & Bach11s, ( T11ri1er & Timlin,
of counsel,) for appt>llnnts. O. E. & Y. V.
Dreutzer, for respondent.

'(44 N. W. 838, 7;; Wis. 562.)

'(44 N. \V. S38, 75 Wis. 562.)

sllllreine Court of \Visc-onsiii. Jan. 28, 1890.

‘ Appeal from circuit court. Door county;

banuiii. D. HASTINGS, Jr.. Judge.

This action is to recover $411.02, being

the proceeds of 6.603 cedar posts sold by

the defendants on commission for the

Plaintiff. T he defendants con nter-clai med ,

and alleged. in effect, that January 27, 1887,

the plaintiff entered into a contract in

yritiiig with the defendants as follows:

Received of Youngs & Fetzerfive hundred

dollars on account of ties now on hand on

Harris dock, at Bay View, Door county.

Said Youngs & Fetzer is to advance E. N.

Anderson at the rate of 18 cents on each

good cedar tie bought by him, said ties to

be owned by said Youngs & Fetzer; and
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when shipped all proﬁts on said ties to be

equally’ divided between Youngs & Fetzer

and said E N. Anderson, said Youngs &.

Fetzer to furnish above amount on each

good tie, and said Anderson to do all nec-

essary labor in buying, shipping, etc., to

offset the use of money furnished by said

Youngs & Fetzer. There isupto date 3.625

cedar ties on above dock. E. N. ANDER-

so.\". Bay View. Jamim-y 27th, 1887. Ac-

cepted. YOUNGS & FETZER.” That under

said contract the defendants advanced

iiioncys to the plaintiff on said ties, as

therein mentioned. and also on said posts

indiscriminately, to the aniount of $1,800.

The plaintiff replied to the counter-claim,

and denied each and every allegation there-

of. A jury being waived bythe pa1'ties,the

cause was tried by the court, and at the

conclusion the court found, as matters of

fact: (1) That, during the year 1887, the

defendants were copartners, doing busi-

ness in Door county, Wis.: (2) that Janu-

ary 27, 1887, the plaintiff and defendants

entered into the written contract of which

a copy is given above: (3) that prior to

March 18, 1887, the defendants had ad-

vanced to the plaintiff nndersaid contract

the sum of $900, and said plaintiff had

bought for said defendants about 6,000

ties, including culls; (4) that March 18,

1887. said plaintiff had on hand, belonging

to himself, about 6,000 cedar posts; (5)

that on March 18. 1887, the plaintiff was in

great need of funds to meet an obligation

to a third party then

der said contract, and posts at an &(1\’a,n¢e

of one-half centeach over the price paid ior '

them by the plaintiff; (6) that pursuant to

said agreement the plaintiff delivered to the

defendant 6,603 cedar posts of four different

sizes and prices. and which, at the in-i(;@,,

agreed upon for them, amountecl tn

$411.04: (7) that the plaintiff plll‘Cllt\ﬂ(>|']

and delivered to the defendants, under

said written contract. 7,568 good ties,

amounting. at the contract pi'ice_ of $319

each, to $1,362.24: (3) that no [H'0ﬁ'fB Wei-e

realized on the sale of said ties; (9) that

Supreme Court of \Visconsiu.

Jan. 28, 1890.

Appeal from circuit court, Door county;
HAMUEL D. HASTING!!, Jr .. Jud~!'.
This actton ts to recover $411.02, being
the proceeds of 6,603 cedar po!!!tl! sold by
the defendants on commtselou for the
plaintiff. Thedefendantscounter-clnlmr<l,
nnd allegf'cl. in effect, thut January 27, 1887,
the plaintiff entered Into a contract in
writing with the defendunte as follows:
"Recelvt>d of Youngs & Fetlerftve hundred
CASSODAY, J ., (after etatingthefacts ae
dolla.re on account of ties now on hand on abovr.) It 18 claimed thnt the trial court
Harrie dock, at Bay View, Door county. found a balance due the plnlnttft on the
Said Youngs & Fetzer le to aclvance 1'~. N. counter-claim of the defenclante, and not
Anderson at the rate of 18 cents on each upon the plo.lntlff'e cause of action. The
good cedar tie bought by him, said tics to compalnt was for the proceeds of cedar
be owned by said Younge & Fetzer; and
poets, 88 stated. The counter-claims were
when shipped all profits on said ties to be for advances and payments made on acequally dl vtded between YoungK & Fetzer count of the tlesund fence poets lndlscrlmand 11atd E N. Anderson, said YoungK & lnately. The trial court round, In efft>et,
Fetzer to furnish abo\•e amount on each that the $900 was o.dvanced upon the tleH.
good tie, and said Anderson to do all nee- and the $7W on ties and posts, and ~bat
eeeary labor in buying, shipping, etc., to the proceeds of the ties and po11t11 received
olfllet the use of monry furnished by said bythedefendant~fromthephtlnttnamf73°Jg
Youngs & Fetzer. Thrre ts up to date 3.625 ed, In theaggrrgate, to $1,773.~.
we
i:e<lar ties on above dock. E . N. ANDER- In excess of the moneys eo ad vane f tbe 1s0
so:s. Bay Vle-w, Januery 27th, 1887. Ac- cannot hold that the mere form ·ecovercepted. You:->os & FETZER." That under sues precluded the plaintiff from 1 on acsald contract thA defendant.a advanced Ing the true balance in hte fav~.~ \t -we."
moneys to the plaintiff on said ties, 1U1 count of both ties and posts. 8~t c\o.\'[l\e<\
therein mentioned, and also on said posts considerably less than theamou
et ;0u·
tndlscrlmtne.tel~-. to the a.mount of $1,800.
In thecomplalnt.
-t.\\e <\ ~o'""
·rhe plaintiff replled to thr count.er-elatm,
The princlt>al contention of to "'~i~~""•
and dented each and every allegation there- nn te ts that the evidence ta.Off -t;o ~~e 9\s.lr;'t'
of. A Jury being waived by the 11artles, the the seventh tlndlng of facli, e.e p:'f '-"'•~~"-"et\
cause was tried by the court, and at the her of "good ties" purchnsecl iJ:p.1-;e.c'~ei:e\"
conclusion the court found, ae matters of tlff,an<l delivered to the l\eteJl ci:-t:.~ee
t\'\~~
fact: (1) That, during the year 1887, the thewrtttencontractsetforth.
-c:;.iJ •!i\'\ei:e 1'\~
defendants were copartnere. doing buel- that a large per cent. of the e
0,~·~-0"''
neu In Door county, Wis.: (2) that Janu- mentioned were culls, 01· re\eC~~ • ~ /5- -00 ~er
ary ZT, 1887, the plaintiff and defendants not pass tmipectton In <:'h\cs.n ~-:/: "-~
ent.ered Into the written contract of which WWI understood they "'1'ere to
~~·
o\\- 'O!~
a copy ts gt ven above: (3) that 1>rior to were in fact sold by Wm. mt'
~ ~ ~ ~ 0 'V
March 18, 1887, the defendants had ad- a.e ugents tor and on acco·uuil
/...,._ p-~
~ o\
vanced to the plaintiff undersald contract femlirnts.
~.,Je \~""'0-~e
the sum of $000, and said plaintiff bad
The evtden~e · principally re\t
~ p.·"1' ~ ~c\\
bought for ea.Id defendants about 6,000 the defendants to prove that : )
~
~..c; (,\\I> ~'IP
ties, Including culls; (4) that March 18, \cent. of the ties thue dellvere ~~~ _.\'\C~ \:\·
181$7, said plaintiff had on hand, belonging "good cedar ties," -within the~-;;£
L./~~ ~0-\\'"
to himself, about 6,000 cedar posts; (5) the contract. le a written eta.te .-_#"-7~ -.~J'~ t\e'!
that on March 18, 1887, the plalntlffwae tn by Wm. Ripley & Sons. ot a ca. ,_ ~
0 \S°'''
great need of funds to meet an obllgatton ; ties thereln1mld to have arrived'!'."~~~---6~ \ tlle
to a third party then pressing him, and : April 18, 1887, by the VeRHel ..... -,.;;~
~:;. 0 i\ts
-Obtained from thedefendanb1 a ·furtherad- l Smith,onaccouutofthede'fenda..p.~ ~ ~~••'e o.!i·
vance of $700, to be repaid In ~ood ties, un- i other such stnt{>men t in a.de hy t; "J ~ ~~ ~~ ~11 ~i\•
dersaid contract,und postH atan a<h·a.nce 1 therein said to have arrived J~._.~
•
: '0 t\\'
of one-bulf cente.ach over the price paid for . by the vesHel Eliza. Day• on acee-t;;
~~ ~, O ed
themb~·theplalnttff; (6)thatpursnunt to 1 defend1mts. Neither ?f -~~~n
~ ~~;f~jf~ell
aaldagreementtheplalntlffdelivererltothe were sworn to, nor ' e r1
ieY ~
-1 t; \O
defe11dant6,608cedarpo1.1tHorfourdlff~·rent 1 Neither or the fir1n of 'Vm. Rt~,7 ••
~:II~ >.ci.1 1
sises and priceH and which at the JlrlceH 1 nor uny one tn their employ,
e ~ .....,.
c~_,c
8'{reed upon for them, ~mountPrl
1:n ; er J1l•r11on. teHUfled to the fact.!}peJ:._
ef'lCI
$411.04: (7) tha.t the plulntftr purchaHerl fneltherorthose sta.t.eni1e~~s. wb"i~
~< pt:
and delh·ered to the defrncluntH, nn<Ier contract contains ll'\t 1 e';ldence- '-.._ :l~~J•""
11ald written contract, 7,56H good tieH, make such Htntem_en ~nts of t:J=-.e 1 ,. ~ ,-_,_._. 7 1
8monntlng, at the contract price of $.18 etatrments made b~ cft~iHsible in -.::;
-. , ~ ~4:~
each, to Sl,362.24: (8) that no profits "VVere ants were no ntore n.
Kt.a tcmen "t:"f"4 - •
,, I --1:/ i L
realized on the sale of said ties; (ll) that half thnn their <>'"~~ul iience V\~e~~... •-.
-t. -~
the plaintiff 11ald the Kum of ...
•a:J for dock- w·ere 1111'1'(' hen
u ':::
- • ~, -_ ,.
.., :.-. ~
_..,
d rHU.Y
'l'he• clefPn• l nn t s
, ._....
8ge on said cedar posts, but it doPR not
erlv rejPcte ·
"tnnclnrd for g~
a"6. .z -. •
"ppear that he "\\·a11 anthorlzN1 or requ<"~t- thi1t tl1t·re wnFI no "'~bether a gh~ey1 a<.-7 .._~
ed to do so by said deft>ndnntR. AH con- In ('l1kni.to; tltu t "inspection there
•lustone of Jaw the court ttmltJ · (1) That
ty of ties pnel'eu

o'!1

\"l\

t;

r--

I

I

"'e.

Case No. :.!6]
Case No. 26]

RELEVANCY.

depended very much upon the supply nnd

demand; that at times perfectly good ties

were classed as inferior in that market, and

at other times the reverse: that a good

tie in Door county meant a tie of certain

dimensions and sound. Their proofs fail

to show that the ties delivered fell below

that standard. They were not kept sepa-

rately in Chicago, but piled in with others.

The written contract states that there

were 3,625 on the dock at the time it was

made. The defendants saw them at the

S0

time. There is evidence to the effect that

when the advances were made, March 18,

1887, there were some 6,000 ties on the

dock, open to the inspection of the defend-

ants: that all the bad ties were thrown

out before shipment; and that the plain-
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tiff delivered thenumber of good ties found

by the court. Upon the evidence in the

record, we would not he lustiﬁed in dis-

turbing the seventh, nor any, of the ﬁnd-

ings of the trial court. 'I‘he judgment of

the circuit court is affirmed.

RELEVANCY.

depended very much upon the supply and
demand; that at tlml'ff perfectly good ties
wereclaeeed as tnferlorln that market, and
nt other times the reverse: that a good
tte In Door county meant a tie of ct'rtaln
dlmenslone ancl sound. Their proofH fall
to show that the ties dellvered fell below
that standard. They were not kept separately In Chicago, but plied ln with others.
The written contract states that there
wen' 8,625 on the dock at the time It was
mad.,_ The defendants saw them at the
so

time. There IR evidence to the elft>Ct that
when the advanct'R were made. March 18,
lAAi, there were some 6,000 ties on the
do<·k, open to the lIIBpectlon of the defendants: that all the bad th'H were thrown
out before shipment: and that the plaintiff delh·ered the number of good ties found
by the court. Cpon the e\·ldenee ln the
re<•ord, we would not be Justified in disturbing the seventh, nor any, of the flndln~ of the trial court. The judgment of
the circuit court la affirmed.

HEARSAY

GE~ElULLY

EXCI.UDED.

[Case No. 2'1

HEARSAY GEN ERA LLY EXCLUD El).

[Case No. 27

OSKALIP et 8.]. V. GADSDEN.

(52 N. ‘V. 718, 35 Neb. 7.)

supreme Court of Nebraska. June 11, 1892.

Error to district court, Douglas county;

Olarkson, Judge.

Action by Clemens Oskamp and others

llgninst James Gadsden for damages for the

alleged breach of a contract to deliver a

quantity of hay. Verdict and judgment for

defendant. Plaintiffs bring error. Aiiirmed.

Isaac Adams. for plaintiiis in error. Rich-

mond & Legge, for defendant in error.

NORVAL, J. Plaintitfs in error brought

suit in the court below to recover damages

for the alleged breach of contract by the

defendant in his refusing to deliver a quan-

tity of hay claimed to have been purchased

by them from him. The jury returned a

verdict for defendant, upon which judgment
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was entered.

In 1888 plaintiffs were engaged in the city

of Omaha in the ﬂour, teed, grain, and hay

business. Defendant resided at Schuyler,

and had about 150 tons of hay which he de-

sired to sell. Prior to the middle of April

of that year plaintiﬂs and defendant had

some correspondence about the purchase and

sale of this hay, but no contract was en-

tered into at that time.

called at the telephone om“. 1,, Schuyler’

and requested the op€I‘1lt°l' to call up plain-

tiffs, as he desired to talk to them. Plain-

tlﬂs have a telephone In their oﬂice, and

Mr. Haines, one of the ﬁrm, answered the

call, but, owing to the condition of the at-

mosphere, the line was not working well. so

that the parties were unable to communicate

directly with each other. 'i‘he telephone

operator at Fremont, an intermediate sta-

tion between Omaha and Schuyler, proposed

to and did transmit defendant's message to

plaintiffs, and repeated their answer to the

defendant. The entire conversation was

carried on through the assistance of the

operator at Fremont. she repeating the mes-

. sage of each party. It is agreed that a con-

tract was entered into at that time by tele-

phone, but there is a conﬂict in the evidence

as to its terms. The plaintiffs introduced

testimony tending to show that defendant

sold his entire lot of hay at $8.25 per ton on

track in Omaha, to be shipped two 0&1‘

loads per day. On the other hand, the testi-

mony oi? the defendant goes to show that

plaintiffs’ proposition contained in their let‘

. (1-

. ter of May 2d was not accepted by dew“

On May 1, 1888, de- ,

tendant sent the following letter to plain- i

tih's: “Oskamp, Haines & Co., Omaha, Ne-

braska—Gentlemen :

pressed hay now? Mine is still for sale, it I

can get as much as others are getting. 1

would rather close out the entire amount at

once it I can ﬂnd a. eustomer, and will give

the use of my barn till July 1-ith, it buyer

wants to speculate. There is scarcely any

hay left here. Some on the prairie will not

OSKAMP et al. .,, GADSDE~.
called nt the teleph1>ne O/llce Jn Schuyler,
and reque11ted the opentto1• to cull up plain(52 N. W. 718, 35 Neb. 7.)
Snpreme Court of Nebraska. June 11, 1892. tiffs, as he desired to talk to them. Plaintiffs have a telephone Jn their otHce, and
Error to district court, Douglas county; Mr. Haines, one of the firm, answered the
Clarkson, .Judge.
call, but, owing to the condition of the atAction by Clemens Oekamp and others mosphere, the line was not working well, llO
against James Gadsden for damages for the , that the parties were unable to communicate
alleged breach of a contract to deliver a directly with each other. The telephone
quantity of bay. Verdict and judgment for operator at l<'remont, an Intermediate stadefendant. Plaintiffs b1'1ng error. Attlrmed. tion between Omaha and Schuyler, proposed
I1111ac Adams, for plaintiffs In error. Rich- to and did transmit defendant's me881lge to
plaintiffs, and repeated their answer to the
mond & Legge, for defendant In error.
defendant. The entire conversation was
NORVAL. J.
Plaintiffs In error brought carried on through the assistance of the
suit In the <..>ourt below to recove1· damages operator at Fremont, she repeating the mestor the alleged breach of contract by the sage of each party. It le ugreed that a con·'
defendant In his refusing to deliver a quan- tract was entered Into at that time by teletlty of hay claimed to have been purchased phone, but there le a condlct ln the evidence
by them from him. The jury returned a ' as to Its terms. The plaintiffs Introduced
verdict for defendant, upon which judgment testimony tending to show that defendant
was entered.
sold hie entire lot of hay at $8.2:i 1ier ton on
In 1888 plalntUl's were enl{llged In the city track ln Omaha, to be shlp11ed two car
of Omaha In the flour, feed, gmln, and hay 1 loads per day. On the other baud, the testlbuslneee. Defendant resided at ~ebuyler, mony of the deff'ullant goes to show that
and had about 150 tons of hay whkll be de- plaintiffs' proposition t·ontnlned ln their le~
alred to sell. Prior to the middle of April ter of May 2d wnH not 1u·cepted by defen ~
of that year plalntUrs and defendant bud ant, but that the t·ontnwt was for only twre
some correspondenC"e about the purchase und • car loads. Two eur loalls of haY on~t ~~b
sale of this bay. but no contract was en- shipped to and n•t·elved by plliintUI · 0 cnon
tered Into at that time. On May 1, 1888, de- arequently defendant brought ~: t.v<O c~:~
fPndant sent the following letter to plain· against plaintiffs to recover for -reco.;e~ ut.
tilrs: "Osknmp. Haines & Co., Omaha, ~e- loads of bay, In which GndsdeP :)~n\!.~e
bra1:1kn--Oentlemen: \\'hut Is your price for the full amount claimed, wh\Cp
\O e!I¥"
pressed hay now? Mine ls still for sale, If I
plaintiffs In error have lmld. .-.-t.\~~e ~~~
can get as much as others are getting. I
'.fhe burden was upon the \llf\\ -I'- ~):~e \'O:"'u~
would rather close out the entire amount at tablh~h the contract and breacb ~
0 1>--s' ~ 'l.'f:>e
ont.'e If I can find a eustomer, and will gh·e substantially as alleged by theJJl·\
,_j§. 0
~9-"'.l
the use of my barn till July 14th, If buyer passed upon the conftktinJt test ,._.. "-~~ ~e
wants to speculate. There Is scnrcely any by the verdict found that the tC' '7 ~ ..,-., 1> ·>). V"'~i,
hay left here. 8ome on the prairie will not contract respe<•tlng the qunn.t\ty
".,. ,.-. s:t-\"'"'"\¢1}~
be hauled this eea8<m on at•1·ount or bottoms sold were as elnlmed by the (\eft'J..• ~ 7 -. \.">e ~
being ('O\'ered with water. Yours, truly, are satlstled that there la not ~t. ~ ..,,
~\V
.James Gadsden." In answer to the above, pondemnce of the evldenc-e ln tl1e ~
.P.~ \~e
plaintiffs wrote defendant as follows: favor as to justify us ln disturb\!>
~~ \.~ \\,c .
"Omaha, May 2d, 1888. Mr.•James Gadsden, : Ing.
._, ~• 'F-~C :\~\\'
Schuyler, Neb.-Dear Sir: Answt>rlng ;\'ours 1 Error is aBBlgnNl bt•(•nuMe th" t~
~.....9 ~\~·
of the let, the market St>ems to be glutted • ted the testimony of tlu~ deft.~udt\11 t::.- P " >'.f~'..{
now with hay. Have bought some at $7.75 : convt"rsatlon over the t:Plephone ~-t:: --~ ,,,;:Jr -t:;;.; (l
on track since we bought that of yourl'I. It ; witness and Mr. Haines, one of .
~
~ JJ-,t,''\
you want to sell now, and wean hm!lness, tl!Ts. as repeated over the w\r(> .,:.__ -'1J- ~·~~ :\S
we will give you $8.2:; per ton on track here, . Cummings, the tt-lt>phone opertth7 -C::. f ,_~, ~~·' i,111\
It Jt Is all lJke the care we had; but we <lo . mont. It ls couh•nded tbnt the te~
.,,_._s. ~ " · S l\
not leave this ofl'er open longer than Sa.tur- the wltne11s of what the operator -L?".,.. -16~.
~e'"
day, but we prefer acceptance by wire, as to him 11s the conversu. tlon pro~~ ....... ~ • _ '--- .;::;. · · ,.
we are figuring upon 800 tons at a t11fle bet- being 1mld hy Mr. Haines la ln·d,-~ -C. ~ 11-- _,,_
t · U~a t
ter price, 11UlllJ1le car now coming, uud, I t hearsn~·. The qUPRtion thus prPS'-"
·-~ ._.~~ I'. J1.l:.
we get that nil, have got to crowd the n1ar- new one to this court, and th<>re are~~
~
~J JI•··
ket here. Have about 140 tons bought now. decided <'HllE'H whl<'l• uh.l us in our 10
. _ , , '#
,.-.:•~
and would not want yours at any prieP with tlou. But upon priueiph.• it ~wPJllH !t~
,.~- 114:~
that large lot. \Ve would not take the risks thP tP>1tl111ony is eonipPtl'nt .. nncl.•1 ·
~~
4 J 4: · It
I .
__.
- of your baman b our, and you cou I u,, s 11
1 I>
slon ,.I olu t e d no rule of 1evulen<
of ni.wnc·~
~
~ .:all tu1 fast as you please, having storage :for . admhuliblP on the J.trounl tlle U"PU. t
e7 , - . 6 • - · ;:-.:.
..-"" tons. Our f u 11 s t orage cnpacItY h ere I s ,, 01wmtor a t rL• H• •1uont• i.tln~
'\YRS
...
- r4
5uu
dl'femlu
11 t
_ ~ -6 ~ -. • • 1
l,000 tons. Now, about weights, you can
fendnnt In co111nnin c.:t ·
th~
nd slle '\YtlS n 1so
J-=
~ ,_..-ha\·e any one weigh I t here after test I n~ out· I sage to Haines. 11
r reportlu~ JJ. • · ~
....
rrack S<·ale, or
wlll pay you by the bale.
agent In trammiittin~ d~t. . The bOol'
~~
Oskamp & Haines." On :Uay 7th defendant
awer thereto to defen

••">

1

r

s•

:J·•

we

WILGUB,BY.......

I

.z• _..__

Caae No. 27]
Case No. 27]

RELEVANCY.

evidence, as well as the adjudicated cases,

lay down the rule that the statements of an

agent within the line of his authority are ad-

missible in evidence against his principal.

Likewise, it has been held that, where a

conversation is carried on between persons

or dii'ferent nationalities through an inter-

preter, the statement made by the latter at

the time the conversation occurred as to

what was then said by the parties is coin-

petent evidence, and may be proven by call-

ing persons who were present and heard it.

This is too well ettled to require the cita-

tion of authorities.

stronger "easons for holding the statement

made by the operator and testified to by de-

fendant is admissible than in the case of an

interpreter. Both Haines and defendant

heard and understood the operator at Fre-
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mont, and knew what she was aying, or at ,

least could have done so. Each knew

whether his message was being correctly

repeated to the other by the operator. Not

so where persons converse through an in-

terprctcr. If the testimony objected to was

incompetent, and hearsay, then the testi- '

mony of Haines, relating to the same con-

versation, should, for the same reason, have

been excluded. He did not hear what de- '

fendant said, but testiiied to what the oper-

ator reported as having been said. The

operator at Fremont was not the agent of

the defendant alone, but she was plaintiffs’

agent in repeating their answer to defend-

ant's message. That conversations held

through the medium of telephone are admis-

sible as evidence in proper cases cannot be

doubted. Such have been the holdings of

the courts in cases where the question has I

been before them. In a criminal case—Peo-

ple v. Ward, 3 N. Y. Cr. R. 483—lt was held

that, where a witness testiﬂes that he con-

versed with a particular person over the

telephone, and recognized his voice, it was

competent for him to state the communica-

tion which he made. In Wolfe v. Railway

Co., 97 Mo. 473, 11 S. W. 49, it was ruled

that if the voice is not identiﬁed or recog-

nized,- but the conversation is held through

a telephone kept in a business house or of-

82

I tlce, it is admissible;

There are certainly ;

the effect or weight

of such evidence, when admitted, to be de-

termined by the jury. See Printing Co. v.

Stahl, 23 Mo. App. 451.

A case quite analogous to the one at bar

is Sullivan v. Kuykendall, 82 Ky. 483. In

that case the partie did not have conversa-

tion directly with each other over the tele-

phone, but conversation was conducted by

1 an operator in charge of a public telephone

station at one end of the linc. It was held

that the conversation was admissible in evi-

dence, and that it was competent for the

person receiving the message to state what

; the operator at the time reported as being

RELEVANCY.

evidence, as well aa the adjudicated casea, flee, It 18 adml88lble; the effect or weight
lay down the rule that the statements of an of 11uch evidence, when admitted, to be deagent within the line of his authority are ad- termlned by the jury. See Printing Co. v.
ml11Slble In evidence against bis principal. Stahl, 23 Mo. App. 451.
Likewise, It has been held that, where a
A case quite analogous to the one at bl1.r
con\·ersatlon ls carried on between persons ls Sullivan v. Kuykendall, 82 Ky. 483. In
of different nationalities through an Inter- that case the parties did not have conversapreter, the statement made by the latter at tlon directly with each other over the telethe time the conversation occurred as to phone, but conversation was conducted by
what was then said by the parties ls com· an opt>mtor In char..,-e of a public telephone
petent evJdence, and may be proven by call· station at one end of the line. It was held
lng persons who were present and beard lt. that the conversation was admissible In evlTbls ls too well settled to require the clta- dence, and that It was competent for the
tlon of authorities. There are certainly person n><>elvlng the me&Bage to state what
stronger '"e&Sons for holding the statement • the operator at the time reported as being
made by the operator and testified to by de- said by the sender. The court In the oplnfendant ls admlBSJble than In the <·ase of an Ion say: "Whell one l8 using the telephone,
Interpreter. Both Haines and defendant It be knows that he ls talking to the operaheard and understood the operator at Fre- tor, be al80 knows that he ls making him an
moot, and knew what she was saying, or at agent to repeat what be ls saying to anleast could have doue so. Each knew other party; and In such a case certainly
whether hl8 message was being correctly the statements of the opemtor are comperepeated to the other by the operator. Not tent, being the declarations of the agent,
80 where persons converse through an Inand made during the progress of the transterpreter. If the testimony objected to was action. If he ls Ignorant whether he ls
Incompetent, and hearsay, then the testi- talking to the person with whom be wishes
mony of Haloes, relating to the same con- to communlcate or with the operator, or
versatlon, should, tor the same reason, have even any third party, yet be does It wlth the
been excludt.'<I. He did not hear what de- expectation and Intention on his part that,
fendant Bald, but testified to what the oper- In case he ls not talking with the one fOI'
at.or repor.ted as having been said. The I whom the Information ls Intended, It will be
operator at Il'remont was not the agent of j communicated to that person; and he therethe defendant alone, but she waa plaintiffs' I by makes the person receiving It his agent
agent In repeating their answer to defend- 1 to communicate what he may have said.
ant's me888ge. That convel'll8.tlons held This should certainly be the rule as to an
through the medium ot telephone are admla- J operator, because a person using a telephone
sible as evidence In proper cases cannot be knows that there ls one at each station.
doubted. Such have been the boldlng11 of whose business It ls to 80 act; and we think
the com-ts In cases where the question bas I that the neceesltles of a ,;rowing business
been bet01-e them. In a criminal case-Peo- require this rule, and that It Is sanctioned
pie v. Ward, 3 N. Y. Cr. R. 483-lt was held by the known rules of evidence." Our conthat, where a wltne88 testifies that he con- cluslon 18 that the court did not err ln adversed with a particular person over the witting the testimony of the defendant.
telephone, and recognized hie voice, It was
It 18 clalnied that the court erred In re.
competent for him to state the comruunlca- fusing certain Instructions requested by
tlon which he made. In Wolfe v. Railway plalnttff, but, as they rnllll' the same quesOo., 97 Mo. 473, 11 S. W. 49, It was ruled tlon we have been considering, the objecthat If the voice 18 not Identified or recog- tlons will be overruled without further com.med,. but the conversation ls held through ; ment. The judgment below is afftrmed.
a telephone kept In a business house or of· : The other judges concur.
82

AD.MIBSIONS.

[Cue No. SS

ADMISSIONS.

[Case N0. 28

PROCTOR V. OLD COLONY R. C0.

(28 N. E. 13, 154 Mass. 251.)

Supi-cine Judicial Court of Massuchiietta.

Barnstable. June 29, 1891.

Exceptions from superior court, Barn-

stubie county : ROBERT C. PITMAN, Judge.

Action by Joseph L. Proctor against

the Old (‘oloiiy Railroad L‘-ompany for

damages for i-ietting back fresh water up-

on his premises. ’l‘he evidence tended to

show that \Vh9ll the road was built the

waters of a creek were discharged from

the premises by a stone culvert. After-

wards the culvert was filled, and a drum

substituted. Defendant offered evidence

tending to showthat the change had been

made at the request of plaintiffs grantor.

'l‘he plaintiff testified that he had had

numerous conversations with the ofiicers
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oftiiecoinpany as to his damages. He l

was then asked the following questions:

“(l) Whether or not, at any time, any l

denial of iiahility has been made by de-

fendant or any of its officers. (2) Whether K

or not, in these interviews, the officers

ever referred to any agreement by you or

your graiitor about handling the water

through a drum. (3) When did you ﬁrst

hPi1l'.li at all, that the company denied

liability"! (4) \\'liether or not the coni-

pziny or its oﬂicers ever denied your right

to have a culvert at this point.” The

court excluded these questions on the

ground that the conversations, and not

the inferences or understanding of plain-

tiff.wcre adniissible. Plaintiff also offered

to prove that when he called on the pres-

ident of the company about his claim he

was referred to Judge Harriman, the

president saying. “ We want to leave it to ‘

our attorney. Judge Harriman,” and that

after examining plaintiffs books and evi-

dence Judge I-Iarrimau stated that acer-

tain sum of money was due plaintiff.

The court refused this offer. Afterwards

PROCTOR T. OLD COLONY R. CO.
(28 N. E. 18, lM Mau. ~1.)
Supreme J"udlcial Court of MAAMl\l'husetta.
Barnstable. June 29, 1891.

Exr.eptlons from superior court, Barnatuble conn ty; ROBERT c. PITM.\S, Judge.
Action by J naeph L. Proctor ngatnst
the Old Colony Railroad Company for
damage11 for Hetttnir: back fresh water upon bis premlseH. 'fhe evtclence tended to
•how that when the ru1td wu built the
"'atel'B of a cn>ek were d18charge<I from
the premises by a stone culvert. Afterwards the col vert was filled, and a drum
aulultltuted.
Defendant offered evidence
tending to show that the chnnge had been
made at the request of plaintiff's grantor.
The plalntlft testified that he bad had
numeroua con versatton11 with thP olHcent
or the compan.v as to bis damaget1. He
was then asked the following que11tlons:
•(I) WhPther or not, at nny time, any
denial of Hahllity ha11 been made by defendant or any of ttB oftlcera. (2) Whether
or not, In these Interviews, the ofHeere
ever referred to any agreement by you or
your grftntor at.bout handling the water
tbrongb a drum. (8) When did you llrat
b1>ar, If at all. thut the coir.pany denied
llublllty•t (4J "'bether or nut the company or tta omce.1'8 ever denletl your rlir:ht
to hove a colvert at thlR point." The
wort exclul1ed these questions on the
around that the eonveraattons, and not
the lnftirencea or understanding of platntllf, were admlsatble. Plaintiff also offered
to provt1 that when he called on the pres.
ldAot of tbe company about bis claim he
wu referred to Judge Harriman, the
preatdent sayln1t. "We want to leave It to
our attorney.Judge Harriman," and that
after examining phdnttff's books and evidence Judge Ht.trrlmau stated that acertain sum or money was due plaintiff.
The court refused this oner. Aftfarwarda
the defendant's snperlratPndent testified
that the company a11d plRlntlff had ngreec:1
to refpr the claim to JudgP Harri mun;
and after the tetttlmooy was closed ph,lntllf formally offered to show tht11 agreemeot, which cooslst.ed of letters, but the
court excluded It as not rebutting. '.rhere
waa a verlltet and Judgment for drfenclant, and plaintiff briuA'tl exceptions.
Cbarlet1 F. <Jb11mber/11y11e, for plllln ttrr.
J. H. Beatoa, Jr., and C. F'. Choat~. Jr.,
for defendant.

the defendant's superintendent testified l

that the company and plaintiff had agreed

to refer the claim to Judge Harriiiinn;

and after the testimony was closed plain-

tiff formally offered to show this agree-

ment, which consisted of letters. but the

court excluded it as not rebutting. There

was a verdict and judgnicnt for defend-

ant, and plaintiff brings exceptions.

Charles F. Ghnnibcrlayrle, for plain tiff.

J. H. Benton, Jr., and G. F. Clwate, J1-,,

for defendant.

C. ALLEN,J. The plaintiff testified that

he had numerous interviews with thy

president, general manager, and division

superintendent of the defendant company

concerning his damages caused by the

setting back of the waters of Bridge Creek

upon his premises. and then sumrht to

allow that in the discussions which took

place between him and them they did not

deny the defendant’s liability for damages,

There was no obiection on the g_'r0und

C. ALLEN,J. Tbeplalntlrtteatlfled t'bat
be had numerous totervlewa with tbe
president, general 1naoager, and division
auperloteodeot of tbe defo1ulaut compuoy
concemlu.,; hla damages cauR~d by the
setting back of the waters of Bridge creek
upon bis premises, nnd then sou11;bt to
show tbnt In the d18em1stooR whlr.h took
J>lare between him and them they did not
deny the defendant's liability for damages.
There was no obJectluo on the ground
that these omcers were not authorlzP.d t;o
Rpeak for the defendant u11on the subJect,
but the court excluded the q ueetlone on
the ir:round that the convPrsRUons, and
nut the fnferenceti or unrll'rittancltng of tho
plofnttrf, were adrulsMible. It tot.-ems to u 8
tbat this wu too narrow a \•leW of the

matter. If, In poln-t' ot laet, tbe dPfendant's officers, In dlscuss/111r t/Je plalntltl's
claim for damagee with him, dld not d~ny
the defendant's llal>Ufty for damsJ{eB, the
oml1n1lon to make su~b denial might be
con11ldered by the Jory. It woultl be In
tbe nature of an admlicsloo, subject, of
coul'l!e, to be explained, bot competent
and proper to bl' laid before t!1e Jury.
Thia fa not like cases where a party la so
situated that no lnferem·e c&n be drawn
from his Rllence, when a statement 111
made In his pre11Pnce. l'om. v. Kenney, 12
Mete. (Ma118.) 235; Com. v. Harvey, l Gray,
487. If a party la so situated that be ta
not called upon to say anything, aud doett'
not say anything, his silence, undP.r such
clreumataneea, la not to be taken as fur·
nlshlng imy ground for an Inference that be
thProby made any admlHlon. But in the
rHBP at bar there was evidence tending to
Rhow that the plnlnttn had presented to
the defendant's officers a claim for damage11, and tbat the matter wfta under dis·
cusHlon at dltterent Interviews. If, under
the8l' clrcum11tance1t, they made no denial
of the defl'ndant'R llnblllty whtle dlscm1sln11: the subject. the f1act of such omission
ml~ht pru1>erly be conslden>d by thA 0 [{i
It doPB not amount to an estoppel. u ton
ts evidence as bearlnir upon tbe q 11
18
to be determined. It Is conduc,,
such
In th" nature of an aclmlssfon. T9 roadedl11cusslon the defendant's oft\~ -we• not
no pretense that the defendan oreY• 1"11 ~
llehle. Pareon11 v. Martin, 11. ~"'·<r1:.~•·
l'ray v. StehblnH, 141 Mass. 21!; 1,"\6 ~-o. '-"
N. E. Rt>p. 824: Hayes v. Kl'lle~~\e'\~~'"'''
31)(). It ls somewhat Jlke an
~ t 0 ao • 0 ·
tutlfy, or to produce book11, O
~~ C:\'e-o.~-o.
explunatloU8, when l'Rllec\ 0~ ~ U~\.¥>:'\\ ~·
Whltue~ v. Buyley, 4 Allen,
'j.'7~<.~~"'~e~~
v. GleaMon, 125 YaHB. 166, 176~~
~\c"- 6 0 \\
v. Slehols, 116 Mat18. 521.; MC 4'~#>\o"""e""
O'NIPl, 113 MaBS. 92; Elc\rhlge j ~ C: ~ '.: ;\,o<fl
115 Mas11. 410. The preRhUnf;
~ c) ~~ ~e·
1ieal't1 to have excluded the· q'1 i '-!-c ~&.-.e rt\'\~~\
thP~round that the con,•ersnt~~..,-'le·8 'O~-oe
selve11, when testified to. vi ...,., ,._?~' 'I)\\> \\.
whttber or not the oefendant.'e*.~~ ~ve~ ;,\'nled that the defendant was 1...,,f ~; __,,~~e 0 o\
would beso If there were a.,.... ___ ....-#-,..to"~\\"\
conversation, the whole ol wl\l~ ~~ P ~~ &,\given. But, where there haV
:.r-~ u 0 0~0t
ml'rous Interview& with dlfteren:; ~ _,.,..,
"\\\t$•
la not to be supposed that tb e~ ~ .::. P
t\\0
evP.ry conversation can be g\\f'
~-- ~ l \ t\10
such c&Be the plalntlll ought.,~ ._ .., ,..,.-~e ~~i
10 ,ved to testify. once for all. <7~ ~ • ~ l
\llll'
at any tlmewaa there a denla\
~'-' 4 ~
11s.
1'he practical qUAStloD Is. ho• V~
__.. .JI""'~. -(;JO ot\
reRult be reacbect of gettlng ,.e~
~.
t\l
Jurv the fact that no such t~e.-~ JI
, 11':.\~
made" JtseemB to OS• under ~-~ ""-' 4; 1• e
stances presented by the blll of e~
p.-T t,\1
the platntln ought to havfll bee ~ .. .,,~"evct
to answer the tlt"fft, sE"<"ond.h• ·-:.
_l:J ""1'f't'!
queatlunK whleb were put to .,..~ .
-t:l1•
counsel. so a1:1 to be able to pre~be_.-e:;:-~""' ,,c1
Jury distinctly bls1 c~n!-;~ ~~~~lltY _
,...,, "'J0
bad be<tn any den 8
er to ca 11
C,,. .,-•,... ., v
ofcounie entirely prop atlous· l:>..:.S
~~.I: ,1
whole of all the con v:~s t:bet e;,er'-~ ~-~ J '- :
tt Is not to be :;0 i:g~~,Jntnt1n tih<-' ....
e-~ c .I~
can be repeate •
k -the .ieneral q
.. ~~ ~ •
8 d
been allowed
Tht-> third <-J a.e
Z.
0
which was exc ti ~ui supporting t: ~
, ts only sl.:nlfleaD

J
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. Case No. 28]

RELEVA:'.llCY.

ainination oi the premises made by him.

view, and of itself alone would properly
be eiccluded.
The plalntllr, In pottln~ In bis case In
chief, oftered to show certain 11tatemente
by Jurtge HarrlmRD ae the result of an examiuatiun nf the premlee.. made by him.
Tbls el'ldence wae p1·operly exrluded. It
would nut follow from the plaintlrf'11 offer
of proof that Judge Harriman wae r&

This evidence was properly excluded. It

84

Case No. 28]

RELEVAN CY.

view, and ofitseli alone would properly

be excluded.

The plaintlli, in putting in his casein

chief. ofiered to show certain statements

by Judge Harriman as the result oi an ex-

would notiollow from the plaintiffs oﬂer

ol proof that Judge Harriman was re-

84

Ierred to in such a way as to constitute

him an agent for the defendant, with

authority to make admissions or prom-

ises to the plaintill. Rosenbury v. Angeil.

6 Mich. 508. The subsequent more iormal

offer after the close oi the defendants case

might properly be excluded. in the discre-

tion oi the court, as too late. Exceptions
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sustained.

ft>rred te In each a way ae to con11tltute
him an agent for the defendant, with
authority to make admlselons ur promIRew to the plalntllr. RoRenbury v. Angell.
6 Mich. 501l. 'rhtJ 1mbeequent more formal
offer after the cloHtJ of the d~fendant's caee
might properly be excluded, In the dlacretlon of the court, a11 too late. Exceptions
suetalned.

A.DMISSlONS.

[Ca8 No. 29

ADMISSIONS.

[Case No. 29

MCLEOD et al. Y. SWAIN.

McLEOD et al. "'· SWAIN.
(13 S. E. 315, 87 Ga. 156.)

(13 S. E. 315. 87 Ga. 156.)

Supreme Court of Georgia.

April 20, 1891.

supreme Court of Georgia. April 20, 1891.

Error iroln superior court, Emanuel

i’-Ulmtyz James K. Hines, Judge.

Williams & Brannen, Saiiold & Warren.

ﬁnd Rogers & Potter, for plaintiffs in er-

ror. Tsviggs & Verdery and H. R. Daniel,

Error fro1n superior court, Emanuel
r.oonty: Jftrne>R K. Hinllll, Judge.
Williams & Brannen, Saftold & Warren,
llDd Rogera &
Pnttn, for plelntlftM In erfror. Twlgga & Vl.'rdery and H. R. Daniel,
or defendant In error.

'01‘ defendant in error.

LUMPKll\' . J.

action oi ejectment against McLeod ct al.

for the recovery of a tract oi land in

Eluannel county. The evidence was con-

tllcting. and sufficient to sustain a verdict

ior either side. 'l‘he jury found for the

plaintiff. After Mrs. Swain had proved

by her own testimony that a. certain Mrs.

Wiggins, who at one timd was in posses-

sion oi the land and remained in posses-
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sion for many years, until her death, was

her tenant. the court. over defendants‘ ob-

jection, admitted prooi oi declarations

made by Mrs. Wiggins, while in possession

oi the land, to the effect that she held it as

the tenant of pla.intiii,nnd that it was

the land oi’ plaintiff. The only question

oi law nresen ted in this case for our deter-

mination is whether or not this testimony

was properly admitted. rsection 3776 oi the

Code declares that “ the declarations and

entries oi n person, since deceased, against

his interest, and not made with a view to

bending litigation, are admissible in evi-

dence in any case. ” It was contended in

the argument that such declarations

should be received only against the de-

clarant. and those in privity with or

claiming under him; but this view does

notseem to be sustained by the authorities.

It was held in the case oi Peaceable v.

Watson,-4 Taunt. 16, that“the declara-

tions oi a deceased occupier oi land oi

whom hc held the land are evidence oi the

seisin oi that person;" and in Davies v.

Pierce. 2 Term R. 53. that "declarations

by tenants are admissible evidence after

Mrs. Swain brought an V

their death to show that 8 certain plcce 0!‘

land is parcel oi the 99 ta te which they oc-

cupied." In both these cases the declara-

tions admitted were made by persons not

in privity with any oi’ the parties _t0 the

record, nor did any oi such parties In any

way claim title through or under the de-

clarnnts. Again: “S_‘tatements oi a de-

ceased occupier touching his title are ad-

missible in evidence_gcneraliy. without rei-

erence to the ]')i1l"tl(.'l'i’l8l“ effect tl1e__vl1}1a2_}_

Droduce in _the cause. Larne v. Nico i. "1

E. C. L. 701. See, also, l§arr_\ v. Bcbh _n.--

ton, 4 Term R. 514. We hnd the fullu\\'1n;:

in 1 Taylor, Ev. § 684: “Under the head oi

declarations against proprietary interest

may be classed the statements made by

persons while in possession oi land. ex-

planatory oi the character oi their posses-

sion; and it is now well settled that such’

declarations, if made in disparagement ot

LUMPKIJ\". J. Mre. Swain brouwht an
11ctiou of ejectmeut al{alnst McLel)li et itl.
for the l'ef'o,·ery of a tract of land in
1-;1uanuel coun~y. The evidence was co11fllrth1g, and auftl~lent to eu11taln a \"erlllct
for either side. The Jury found for the
plaintiff. After Mrs. 8waln h•id proved
by her own testimony that a certain Mr8 •
WlgglnH, who at one tlmd was in posse11llion or the land and n>malned In po11l!ee1lon for many yea1·e, until her death, wn 11
her tenant. the court, over defendants' objection, all mltted proof of del·laratione
made by M1"tl. Wiggins, while In posMeKt!lon
of the land, to the effect that ehe held It ae
the tetltint of pla.lntlff, and that It was
the land of plelotltt. The only question
of law prel!leD ted In this caee for our dett'r·
mlnatlon le whether or not tbll! teetlmuny
WBHproperly admitted . .t3El<'tlon 3776of the
Code declares tba t "the declarations and
entrlee of n 1>eraon, efnce deceased, a,;alnet
his tntereMt, and not made with a view to
oendlng litigation. ani adml88lhle In evl·
dence In any case." It wae contt:'nded In
the argument thnt such declarations
11hould be racelved only agalnHt the de·
clarant, and those In prlvlty with or
claiming under him; but this view does
noteeem to be Roe talned by the authorities.
It wae held In the case of Peaceable v.
Watson, 4 •raunt. 16, that .. the declare·
tlon11 of a deceased occupier of land or
whom he held the land are evidence of the
11ellln of that pen1011;" and In Davies v.
Pierce, 2 •rerm R. 53, that "deel11ratlone
by tenants are admleslble evidence after

their death to ehow f;hSt a certs.Ju pler.e ol '
land le pareel of the efftate which thev occupied." In both theHB cases the deciaratloue admitted were made by persons not
In prll"lty with any of thf' parties to the
record, nor dltl any of eoch partiea1 fn any
way clahn title through or under the declarant11. Again: "Statement11 of a de·
ceased occupier touching hie title are ad·
mleelble In evidence generally, without reference to the particular flnect they mu~·
produce In the cau11e." Carne v. Nicoll, 2i
E. C. L. 707. See, ·a leo, Barry v. BE>hhlnii;ton, 4 Term R. 514. We flud the fulluwi11;.:fn 1 Taylor, Ev.§ 684: "Under the bead or
declaratloue against proprietary Interest
may be clae11ed the etatemente made by
perMoue while fn po118eHHlon of lancl, explanatory of the character of their po1Jsee11lon ; and It fat now well settled that euch
declnratluue, If made In dltiparagement of
the declarant's title, are receivable, not
only as original udwlselona agnlnet himself and all penione who claim title
through him, but aleo as evidence for or
against strangers. Whether In this latter
ev~nt they are admleMlbll:l In the life-time
of the cJeclarant, or only In cuee whTr~
his death can be proved, Is a point wh c
doe!' not appeRr to have been dletlnct:Y
deelded. In moet of the cal!les where.!~~
evldPnce hae been received, tbe dec;~!ast..
was dead: but on two occa11tons, at.be dethe evidence was admitted, thoug~80 \aY•
clarant wu living." WhartaP 8 ce \s e.dt
down the rule that such evtder~\P8• ~~n
mls1!lble, not only against
c 0 {1lcie.
etra ngt'rs. "The reason for t r-ff1lt' e~e"~
slon le that poeseselon Implies. P _,t~~e!O"" ~~an absolute interf'st, and an)'
P '(°(.·
'\.
which would tend to limit it .!:-t~~-t:et\ ~oo
tereet le self-dls11ervlng.'" 2 Y" .c; P
-ce '\.\.0 o., .
§ 1156. 'rile ea me p11ncl ple \8 tJ~ 4li!'.,,...-c'\,.\l~o~.
Orl't.'nl. l<~v. § 109, and the 8~ ~j ~ e "t'\...
for the adml11elblllty of tmch d~- e ~~~(\ ~~"
le there given. These authorl ~
~f/t>-0:dantly euittnln the correctness 0
__., ' - '
ti>
lnJC made by the court be\o~; .,.....
Jadgmentle therefore afftrmed. .,
affirmed.

v;;,e

RELEVANCY.

Caae No. 30]
Case No. 30]

RELEVANCY.

HILLS v. LUDWIG.

(24 N. E. 596, 46 Ohio St. 373.)

Supreme Court of Ohio. March 26, 1889.

Error to circuit court.Crawford county.

Ejectment by Solomon Ludwig against

Jededlah Hiilsfor a strip of land bounding

plaintiff's tract on the east. Besides a.

general denial, the answer set up the 2]-

year statute of limitations, and alleged

additional defenses, as follows: “ (3) That

in 1860, the location oi the true lines between

the lands _of plaintiff and the adjoining

tracts not being ascertained, a surve_v was

had by agreement between plaintiff and

defendant’s grantors. and a dividing line

established,which has eversincebeen recog-

nized by the owners of the lands; (i) that

defendant owns lands both on the east

and on the west sides of plaintiff's lands;
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that the lines on both sides of plaintiff‘s

land wereestablished as stated in the third

defense; and that the quantity of land cut

off by the new line from the east side of

plaintiffs land was compensated by the

strip thus added on the west side, where-

by plaintiff received as much land as his‘

deed called for." The judgment of the

court of common pleas in favor of plaintiff

was affirmed by the circuit court, and de-

fendant briu s error.

S. R. Hart s nnd Ii. Blakford, for plain-

tiff in error. I"i1m-_\', Ia‘.-iron & Bennett and

W. Z. Du vis, for defendant in error.

BRADBURY, J. The lands oiLudwig lie

west. and those of ilills cast, of the ms-

puted line; and this line was originally

identical with that between sections 5 and

6, in which the lands lie. This section line

had been the subject of dispute between

adjoining proprietors for many years prior

to 1860. Early in that year, an agrcemen

was made between a number of iand-own-

ers in those sections for a survey of this

line. which survey. pursuant thereto, was

made in March, 1860, by Horace Martin,

the then county surveyor. At the same

time. and as part of the same plan, the

north and south middle line of section 6

was surveyed. By this survey both lines

were located further west than they were

before, so that Ludwig gained thereby on

the west substantially the quantity of

land he lost on the east. Soon thereafter

Ludwig, Hills‘ grantor, and some other

adjoining owners began to occupy and

improve their lauds according to the new

line, which was called the “ Martin Linc, ”

though with considerable dissatisfaction

and some litigation between certain of the

adjoining proprietors respecting it. Soon

after this line was established. Hills pur-

chased lands lying east oi and adjoining

those of Ludwig, and also a tract adjoin-

ing Ludwig on the west; both of which

he has continued to occupy and improve

ever since, up to the Martin line. Twenty

years and 10 months elapsed from the time

Ludwig went out of possession of the

Hiiia took a btll or except1ona, wntch exhibits, among othe™· the fa.et above
etatect: It also dlll<.'Joeee certain exceptlontt takt>n by Hms to the rulings of the
Supreme Court of Ohio. March 26, 1889.
trial conrt In admitting and rejecting eviError to ch-cult court,Crewford county. dence, and to charging and refusing to
EJectmtmt by Solomon Ludwig against charge the Jury certain propositions of
Jedediah Hills for a strip of land bounding lnw. Th~ Juclgmeut was affirmed by the
plaintiff's tract on the ea11t. Be11ldes a. circuit court, whereupon the defeated
general denial, the an1:1wer set up the 21· party brought the case here for review.
Some of the lntereRtlog questions aryear statute of llmltatlonR, and alleged
additional defenses, aR follows: "(3) That gued by counsel for plaintiff In error are
In 1860, the loco.ti on or tht> tn1e lines bet ween not preRented by the record In a way to
the la.nd11 .of pla.tntlft and the udjolntng enablethlRl'ourt to review them upon their
tract& not being ascertalrwd, a. Rurvt'~· was merits. This ls notably tho l'Me with rebad by agreement betw1.,"l'n plalntlft and 111pect to two Important quPHtlonR, aldefendant's grantors, and a dividing line lucled to by counet'I for plalntltt, In hl11
eetabllsh<:!d, which ha.se,·erslnce been r<>cog- brlt'f,-thftt of t'Rtop11t>I, and that relnttng
nlzed by the owners of the landR; (I) that to the rejection of thl' C'\'hlence of Mllllron,
defendant owns lands both on th<' l'aHt rettpectlna,; the acts amt al1111l11Slons of the
and on the west Rldeff of plntnttff's lands; plalnttn lwlow, Ludwig.
The CJUt'lltlon of estopJH!I Is raiKt'<l by the
that the lines on both aides of platntlff'a
land were established as eta ted In the third fourth defense. That <lefl'nse, (llalntlff In
defense; and that the quantity of land cut l'rror cla.lms, set11 forth facts which e11top
otr by the new Jtne from the ea11t 11lde of Ludwig from &stlf'rtlng his title to the
plaintiff's land was compensated by the JamlR In dl11pute: or, at least, that hf'
Rtrlp th1111 added on the west side, where- ought not to be permitted to do so, e\"'eo
hv plaintiff recehed &H lllll<'h land as hla · ff hP waH honeKtly mlstnken In 11upp0Rlng
df>t•d calll'd for." The Judgment of the the lfartln line to be the true ont'. until he
con rt of <~ommon pleBK In favor of plaintiff firRt offered to yield up co Hills the equivwa11 R.IHrme1l bv thl' circuit court, and de- alent therefor, whkh be still holds on thf't
west 11lde of bl11 farm; encl there la evifendu n t brlngs err•1r.
S. R. Harris r.nd If. Blnkford, for pJaln- dence tending to l"l!tabllsh thlR defen11e. It
tlft In error. F"i11i1-y, f,'utor1 &- Rennf!t't and Is n gra Vl' 11uestlon whether Lnd wig l'an
be peru1lt tffi t.o n>1rndtate the Mm·tln line
ll'. Z. Davis, for defendant In error.
on one side of hie land, where It cutR a
strip from his farm, and cling to it on the
BRADBURY, J. The laodsofLudwlp lle 1 other slcle, where It gives him a Rtrlp of
w~t. und those of HlllR east, of the ll1Kland thatothnwlBt' would helon){ to HlllK.
puted line; and this line was originally The court said nothlnir to the jnr.v on thlK
Identical wttb that between sections 5 and Qll<'Mtlon thnt IR applll'nble to the f1u•t11 a11
6. lo which the Ja11d11 lie. This stietlon line Hlllsclalmtttht'm to be, and therelsnothl11g
had been the subject of dispute between In the record to Rhow wht-ther It wnK conadjoining proprietors for many years prior sidered by the Jury or not. Thltt omiK11lon.
to 1860. Early to that year, an agrt'ement 11tandlug a.Jone, does not conKtituh~ t•rror
was mnde between a number of land-own- for which the judgment will be r{•venied
ers lo tho11c sections for a aurve,v or tbla h;r thlH court. Taft v. Wlldmnn, 15 Ohio.
llne. whleh aurvey, pul'l!uant thereto, wa11 12:1: .JoneR \".Ohlo,20 Ohlo8t.34; Schryver
made In March, 1860, by Horace Martin, v. llawkee, 22 Ohio, 308: Smith v. Railway
the then county surveyor. At the same Co., 23 Ohio St. 10. The defendant below,
time, and as part of the same plan, the however, did request inatructlono on this
north and aouth middle line of section 6 point which the court refused to glve to
was surveyed. By tbts survey both lines the Jury; but these inatructlons, whlle
were located further west than they were fairly applicable to a state of facts testibefore, so that Ludwig gained thereby on fied to by Hills, were not. at least, folly
the west substantially the quantity or appllc1tble to the fact& plea.tied by Hllls In
land he loHt on the eaBt. Soon thereafter hltt fourth defense. and for thnt reason the
Lurlwlg, Hills' grantor, and some other refusal was not error. lo addition to tbls,
adjoining owners began to occupy and Hills, when he requested the char,re on
Improve their lands according to the new this poln t, also l°t'q ue1:1ted the court to give
line, which was ca.lied the" Martin Line," to the jury eight other 11roposlttone of
though with considerable dtssatlHfactlon law, some of which, bt'lng unsound, were
and 1mme litigation between certain of the properly refused; while others, containing
adjoining proprietors respecting It. Soon 11ound legal propo11ltlons, should ha \'e
after this line wa11 established. HllJs pur- been glven to the Jury If presented by themchased lands lying east or and adjoining seln~s. All, howevt:'r, were refused; but
ttwse of Ludwl'1:, and also a tract adjoin- the exception thereto being general, lt
ing Ludwig on the west: both of which fatle(l to point out to the court the error
be has continued to occupy and Improve of which complaint ls now made, and for
ever slnct', up to the Martin line. Twenty that l'<'R11on error cannot be predicated on
years and 10 months elapaed from the time this aetlon of the trial court. Railway v.
Ludwig went out of possession of the ProhRt, :JO Ohio St.104; Everett v. Sumner,
lands tn dispute until this action was be- 32 Ohio St. 562: Powers v. RR.llwa.y Co.,33
gun, and more than 22 years elapsed be- Ohio St. 429. It remains apparent, howfore the amended petition was flied. The en~r. that thecourt did not lm1truct tbejury
trial reHultcd In a n•rdict un<l Judgment on thlH point, notwlthatandlng Its attenfor Ludwig for th!' recovery of all the tion was called to theurntter. Though done
lands dl'SCrllJed In bis amended petition. through the medium of an Instruction, It
86
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(24 N. E. 596, 46 Ohio St. 878.)

0

.AD.MISSIONS.
ADMISSIONS.

[Case No. 30

was not error to refuse to give it to the ju ry ;

and it may be said that the record raises

the question whether it is error for the

court to fail to give instructions on a

question involved in the trial, when, by

any means, its attention is directed to it.

The record. however. does not disclose

that this question was made to the trial

court on the motion for a. new trial, or to

the circuit court on error; and there is

nothing in this case that calls for us to

disregard the general rule that errors not

assigned in thecourt below will not he con-

sidered here. Levi v. Daniels. 22 Ohio St.,

38. The rule applies with special emphasis

to the case at bar, for the additional rea-

son that that omission is not especially

assigned in this court. of error, but is in-

sisted on in argument only, as an error
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appearing on the face of the record. We

therefore hold that the question is not

properly before us for review.

Respecting the evidence of the witness

Milllron, it may be said that while. as a.

general proposition of law, the pertinent

acts and admissions of a partv are com-

petent evidence against him, yet, unless

they are offered at the proper time, it is

within the discretion of thecourt to admit

or reject them, and, unless the record dis-

closes an abuse of discretion. its action

will not be reviewed on error. Webb v.

Stn.te.i?9 Ohio St., 351. If.ou the trial, Mil-

llron’s evidence was competent at all, it

was evidence in chief for the defendant,

Hills. He did not offer it then, and, with-

out explaining the omission, offered it in

rebu1;ta]_ Under these circumstances, the

"Won oi the trial court in rejecting the

evidence does not appear to be erroneous.

Then-ialcourt admitted in evidence, over

the Objection of Hills. the record of an ac-

tion brought in 1865 by Rufus Page against

ﬂlP[)|ninﬂff below. Ludwig. This action

related to the north and south line. before

referred to, that divided section 6 into half

B90tiong_a,n(1 which was run and estab-

llshed 9,1; the same time. and was part of

the scheme of the 1\fa.rtin survey. If that

line had been placed too far west by the

Elam“ gm-vev. then the line in dispute had

been also pfacefj the same distance too

im-west_ This record shows that Page,

"Iltler whom Hills claimed title. alleged

that the mmdie line of section 6 was too

far “'(\ﬂt‘ and that he prevailed in the ac-

tion, Now thig allegation and adjudica-

tion 1 to the ears of the jury could

"Qt bgeiltlhlehigwise than Dreiudicial to Hills;

and,“ 1 etent evidence, is error to

his D,-e;,,'('1ci§:l plt is not merely an admis-

sion, but 3, g\\‘()1']1 statement, made by one

llﬂflcr whom Hills claims title, that ihe

line ig not where Hills claims it to be,

1\'0w,1|1t had been 1I1ﬂ_(1°“'hm*P9geowne(l

the laudy especially if it 1‘(-ilﬂiféd 1'0 the ﬁne

M the land Hills afterward" bought. it

would have been admissible against; H“]s_

~asnoterl'Ortorerusetoglvelttothejury;

and It may be said that the record ral;it•H
the quef!tlon whether It Is error for tile
court to fall to give lnetructlone on a
question Involved In the trial, when, by
any means, Its attention ts directed to it.
The record, however, does not disclose
that this question .WAH made to the trial
court on the motion for a new trial, or to
thP circuit court on error; and there IH
nothing In this case that calls for us to
dlert>gard the general rule that errors not
&ll8lgned In thecourt below will not be coneidered here.. Levi v. Danleh•. 2'..? Ohio 8t.,
38. The rule appllea with Hpt>clu.1 emphasis
to the case at bar, for the acldltlonul reaeon that that omiHHlon IH not especially
ae.slirned in this court of error, but Is InMisted on fn argument only, as an error
appearlng on the face or the J't>Cord. We
therefore hold that the question le not
properly before us for review.
RPllpectlng the evidence of the :wltneBB
Milliron, It may b~ euid that while, as a
general proposition of law, the pertinent
acts and a.dml.r-;elone of a partv are competent evidence against him, yet, unless
tbe,v al'P. otrered at the propt•r time, It le
within the discretion of the court. to aclmlt
or l'f!ject them, and, unless t':le record <lierloeee an abuse of dlRcretlon, Its action
will not he re\·iffwetl on error. WPbh v.
State,29 Ohio St., 351. If.on the trial, Milllron's e\•ltlence was compl'tE'nt at all, It
was evidence in chief for the defc>ndnnt,
Hiiis. He did not offer It then, und, without explaining the omlRHion, offered It In
rebuttal. (Tnder these clrcumHt·llllCE'8, the
action ot the trial court In rejecting the
evidence does not nppear to he erroneous.
Tbetrfalcourt ad mltted In evidence, over
the ohjectlon of H Ille, the record of an actlon hronl!,'h t in 1~65 by Ru rm~ Pal!,'e against
thp plnlntlrr below. Ludwlji;. This action
related to the north and south line,. before
referred to, that divided section 6 Into half
sections and which was run ancl et1tabllBhed at the 8 ame time, and was part or
the scheme of the l\1artln survPy. If thnt
lint> had been placed too far weRt by the
Martin Rurl·ev then the line In dlApute bad
heeu allm pla~·ed the same rll14tance too
far west. This record shows that Page,
llhr!er whom Hille claimed title, alll'j!;erl
t11at the middle line of sect.Ion 6 wns too
far wi•Rt and that be prevnllerl In the actlou. N~w this allegation and adjudl~atlou coming to the en rs ?f the Jury could
notbeotherwiee than Prt'JUdlclnl to lllllH;
l\Dd, if lncom~tP.nt eYlrlence, ts error to
his prejudice. It ts not merely un a!lmlHRion, but a. sworn statement, made by one
nnderwhom Hille claims title, that the
line 18 not where Hiiie claims It to be.
Now,tllthad beE>nma.dewhllePageowned
the land eepeclallY If It related to the Jlne
ol the l~nd Hille afterwards bought, ft
would have been admfsslhle against
But tble was not t:be CBBe; Jt related t;o
otherlanda und was madeafter Hiils had
acquired bl~ title. page, at the time, had
no iutereet In this Ja~d of HJlls, 8 Dd could
not, by any act, adlJJJBBtlonilnf state111e1Jt.
8•
make evidence agalnfl
It was
therefore error to admit the rec:brd 111 erl8
ilence. For the sarJJe dreLl1H<:p ;1 e agreement between Pa/le an
u " g, lllJd tlle

Hills.)
j
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record of the action between L<1dwlg and
1''rey, were lncom~tt>nt evidence, and
their admission erroneous.
'fhe defendant below specially excepted
to certain propositions contained In the
charge of the court. These charges -are
properlybefore us rorreview,andwlll now
be considered. Hills excepted to the rule
la.Id down by the conrt reRpeetlng the
method of retracing the line between sectlons 5 and 6. This was an Important que&tlon In the trial court, and might have
been declHlve. in view of the evidence then
addured; but we have no aBsurance that
the evidence at the next trial wlll be the
ea.me that It was at the last In this respect.
This le a species of evidence peculiarly Jiable to change. A new line. run even by
the same surveyor, upon the same prlnclple, may vary considerably from the
former lfne run by him, according to the
method approved by the court below.
New cornet"!! may be found, or new lfnes
run, or new factH discovered, that would
reml!'r the view this court might tnkP
wholly Inapplicable; and, beRklee, the other prlnclple11 laid down by the court are
lkely to be decisive of the rlgh ts of tlwse
pRrtlPR. The court chnrged the Jury that
the contract or ajl:reemt!nt by which a
boundary line could be eHtnbllRhed must
he one" that would transfer the title or
right of poBRPHHlon to defendant, Hills."
The second ch1m1e of the RyllnbuA In Boho
v. Richmond, 25 Ohio St., 115, reads: "The
fixing of a boundary line by parol Is no~
within the operation of the stat~~eb~t
frttuds. No estate Is thereby create< • tbe
where the boundary line IH flxe1\ \ blll'; ot
parties, they hold up to It l.Jy v 1" ~t ·nw
their title-deeds, and not by v\ rtueo\ t,\\0
parol transfer." The lan11;uage toe\'-''"~
charge Is calculated to impress nt to u.dwith the belief that an agreerl'e ~uy,t \l~\
jnst and Hettie the boundary UPe \"\~\\\.
one sufficient to transfer title o~pae\'e~\\t
possession by Its lnhf'rent force.. p'1'\'.~~ :\:.l\l.s
ent of the a<:ts of the part\eS
~~\: ~~ aethereto. ThlR ls C'ontrnry to t~~~-t. ~ ~vo\\
above· quottld. Hills d\cl not r vv -q:\\e"t">·
fense upon the agmement alone.•__..
C e\\&ol'.~
It and the actf.1 of the 11<1lo\n\rJ~- ~ 3e\e1'
done pursuant thereto~ und -t;:t-.i-. e '
~-\..
ouii;bt to haw heen as broad 8.11 t: -i
~ 'l~~\\l\
In this particular.
.._ . ~·
t'"'l\
The court nlso chara;ed the j ~
~'--°'' \'~'"'
"when the line bct"\veen ownc~- ~ -__.e \l ,e1\\.
cnnnot with <·et·tn\nty be as;icert~ t $-~~c:.~.,,,\
Hnhl ownPt"R, In the""'"""'" of th1R,ll~£" ~ _
~ "'o _
nn•I eHt11hllHh a 1\n(', Rtwh nn ~-"i" ~.s ._ \"' \1\,
RettlPH thl' line." l t iH chtimeil ~-.... .._. -: ,,..,,, o~\\
ment thut the 1lelen<ln.nt heloW 'I
-ti- ,;\\\11
prejudlcPd by this charge, even :I ~ ~ ~ ;i,l\.\'
correct, becauKe no ev\dence was _.-. ~-? - ;i,l\ 1
trial which tended to prove
agreement. To th\~ e\n\m \t m11--._.- ~ ,
~\'
that what the pa.rue~ -t ·· tb\R sll~ c:1l _
.._-.a~
und did waH before t\u1 \\\TY ·
:ll'---«:::-"
competent for them to detern' ._7 ~
7 <.
their object vvnM \n eaus\ng \tt~~---!-? ....__.;;
Ludwig c1ahnm1. tll.e\r pur\)O~e ~~ ~ ~
certain the true \\ne; t\\l\t ll~e ' 4 -::..- -~ •
that they ho.<l done so~ tnat ea.t-te-t:.
bl'tter for n1a.n:v yea.\"8 t\\el" ~\~
~
~
tltl\t when he d\Mco,·e~d t\'~\\\a•
~
enfleavored t o corre\:t \t. \°\lo~"'
other band. clahned tl\e \l\l

&-

c;-

..-; ,. .:

ar...-.---

-=---- .._._.
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RELEV AN CY.

survey was not to ﬂnd the true line, but

to adjust and settle one which had long

been the subject of contention, and about

which there was then a dispute. This be-

ing the issue. the court, we think, placed

the right oi adjoining proprietors to ad-

just and settle disputed boundaries on too

narrow a basis. It is not essential that

the disputed boundary line be incapable

oi ascertainment; but ii’ it has been the

subject oi dispute and contention, and

the parties. with the view to settle the

dispute, agree upon and settle a line be-

tween their land, it is a ﬁnality, and can-

not be disturbed, though they afterwards

learn that the true line could have been

iound. Avery’s Lessee v. Baum‘s Heirs,

Wright. 576; Walker v. Lessee oi Devlin, 2

BELEV ANCY.

survey was not to find the true line, but
to adjust and flettle one whkh had long
been the subject or contenttori, and about
which there was then a dls1mte. Thlfl being the lsaoe, tbP court, we think, pJaeed
the right of adjoining proprletol'R to adjust and settle dlefuted boundaries on too
narrow a basts. t Is not eKHentlol that
the disputed boundary line be Incapable
of ascertainment; hut If It bas been the
subject of Jlspute and contention, and
the parties, with the view to settle the
dispute, Agree upon and settle a line between their land, It Is a flnallty, and cannot be disturbed, though they afterwards
Jeam that the true line coold have been
found. Avery•11 l.eeaee v. Baum's Hell'B,
Wright, 576; Walker v. Lessee of De\"llo, 2
Ohio Ht., 593. This view Is eotlrelyconelstent with the p.rtnelple that where adjoining;
proprietors, n attt-mptlnll to find th!' trne
line between them, by mistake ftx opon an
incorrect one, they may repudlat.e tbe

spurious line at any time before the stat.
ate of limitation has run.
The court further charged the Jury that
•this action was commenced on January
11, 1R81. It Is conceded that Wftll 20 years
and 10 months after the plalntlft went out
of the poMeesloo of the premises; the~
fore tbestatute of limitations does not apply." Thie stntement Ignores the fact
that part of the lands sou.cht to be recot'flred wel'f' not dPt11r.rlbecl In the orfJ[lnat
petition. Over 22 years bad lo fact elapsed
from tho time plalntlft below went out or
posHes11lon before he Hied bis amended pe.
tftlon, so that, as to the land then for the
flnt time Included. the statute of limitations bad attached, and defendant's title
made perfect by lapse of time, unless the
amendment bad a retroactive operation,
Rnd went back, by relation, to the original petition. Thia propoeltlon, we think,
Is not supported by either reason or authority. Judgment revel'lled.

88

Ohio h‘t., 593. This view is entirely consist-
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ent with the rinciple that whereadloining

proprietors, n attempting to ﬁnd the true

line between them, by mistake ﬁx upon an

incorrect one, they may repudiate the

88

spurious line at any time beiore the stat-

ute oi limitation has run.

The court further charged the jury that

“this action was commenced on January

11. 1881. It is conceded that was 20 years

and 10 months alter the piaintlﬂ went out

oi the possession oi the premises; there-

iore the statute oi limitations does not ap-

ply." This statement ignores the fact

that part oi the lands sought to be recor-

ered were not described in the original

petition. Over 22 years had in fact elapsed

from the time plaintiff below went out oi

possession heiore he liled his amended pe-

tition, so that, as to the land then for the

ﬁrst time included. the statute oi limita-

tions had attached, and deiendant’s title

made perfect by lapse of time, unless the

amendment had a retroactive operation,

and went back, by relation, to the orig-

inal petition. This proposition, we think.

is not supported by either reason or au-

thority. Judgment reversed.
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S.\II'l"H et al. v. BOYER ct ni.

(45 N. W. 265, 29 Neb. 76.)

Supreme Court of Nebraska. March 11. 1890.

Error to district court, Red Willow

county; Cocanns, Judge.

R. .lI. Snavely and E. M. Bartlett, ior

plaintiffs in error. G. M. Lambertsou, Rit-

SMITH et al. v. ·BOYER et al.
(45 X. W. 265, 29 Neb. 76.)
8upreme Court of Nebra11ka. Marcil 11, 1890.

Error to district court, Red Willow
eoonty; CoCRRAN, Judge.
R. M. Saavel.v and E. M. Bartlett, for
plaintiffs In error. G. M. La.mbPrtsou, Rittenhouse .t ~tarr, and H. W. Keyes, for ,1efendantR In error.

tenlmuse & btarr, and H. W. Keyes,ior \le'

iendants in error.

MAXWEl.L.J. On the 2-iihoi Septem-

ber, 1887, the defendants executed and de-

livered to ihe First National Bank oi Indi-

anolu and L. J . Holland a chattel morti.'.uge

upon “ all our general stock oi merchandise,

consisting oi dry goods, groceries, boots

and shoes. hats & cups,crockery,clothing.

notions,jewelry, saic. and show-cases, ﬁxt-

ures, and all our other goods and mer-

chandise contained in the brick building,
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store-houses, and basement, situate on lot

6. block 33, in the town oi Indianola, Ne-

braska. Also our books and book-ac-

countg held and owing to us.the said ﬁrm

oi Boyer & Davidson, on account oi our

business in said store above na.med.”—to

secure the payment oi $5336.46. oi which

su|n $2,000 is alleged to have been due the

bank,and the remainder to Holland. The

exact value oi the property mortgaged

does nut appear. but there is testimony

that the goods were oi the value oi about

$12,000, while the amount due on the ac-

counts is not shown. On the 26th day oi

September, 1387, the plaintiiis commenced

an in-tion by attachment against the de-

iendnngs; the grounds thereior, as stated

in the nrudavit for an attachment, being

"that the defend an ts have sold, assigned,

and disposed of their property with the

iraudnn;-nt intent to_ cheat and defraud

their creditors, and hinder and delay them

in the collection of their debts, and are

about to sen, assign, and dispose oi their

property with the iraudulent intent to

(‘heat and defraud their creditors, and

|,i,,(|..,. and delay them in the collection oi

their d,.bts_ and that they are about to

Q-(,nm.t their property into money ior the

placing it beyond the reach oi

_ ;l arereibout t‘o sell, as-

mgnyand dis ose 0 a pa 0 the r proper-

ty with meg: to deiraud their creditors,

and have sold, as:-5igned,and disposed oi a

part 0! prQI)0l't)' “Flth intent to

dmaud their creditors. “Upon this aﬂi-

dam being ﬂied. and a like ntiidavit ior

,_.,,,.mBhment, and an order oi the court

.,bt,mw/G’ part of the debt not then being

due‘ a Wm; of at gachment was’issued and

.1.-11,-Q,-9.1 to the sheriii at“ 8 0 clock P. M.

(,1 ,.,,,m day, and returned, not being able

to come at the property oi Boyer and D9,.

vmaomor James J. Boyer or Charles B.

Dlivldson mem hers oi said ﬂrm. claimed to

be in the possession °f.L' J‘ H0]-land»-L W -

Doing, the 1~‘i1'|-it Natl Bank’ 9150. NO-

tice was served "P0" tge perpmlﬁ gar"

uished. naming them’ an ¢.-re“¥""'|s H1811!

MAXWEl~L,J. On the 2-ltbof Sept11mber, 11'187, the defeudHnbi exeentell an1l delivered to tbe 1~1r11t National Bank of lndi·
anola and L. J. Holland a chattel mort&ra~

upon" all uur general atoek of merebamlhie,
l'onRIRtlnJt of dry 1roods, groceries, boots
and Mhoes. hate & caps,crockery,clothlnir.
notions, Jewelry, eafo. and tihow-eal!e8, fh::turee, and all our other goods and mer~handlee contained lo the brick building,
titore-bouees, and ba&eement, tiltuate on lot
~. block 33, In the town of Indianola, Nebraska. Also our book11 and book-aceounts held and owing to us, the eaid firm
of Boyer & Daf'irlson, on account of oar
business In said store above named. "-to
8t'(·ure the payment of fi).336.46, of which
sum •2.000 Js alleged to ha\'e been doe the
bank, and the remainder to H1Jll&nd. The
exact valul• of the property mortguged
does not appear, but tht\re 111 testlo1ouy
that the goods were of the vaJue of about
f12,000, while the amount due on the acfounts ls not shown. On the 26th day of
Sept.ember 1887, 1:he plalntlfts commenced
an action 'by attachment against the defendants; the srouudH therefor, as stated
In the atHda vi t for an 11.ttachmeot, belnK
"that the def111ndantll have sold, aeslgned,
and disposed of their property wl th the
fraudulent Intent to cheat and defraud
their creditors. and binder and delay them
in the eollectloD of their debts, 11.od are
about to sell, assign, and dlapoi..e of their
property with the fraudulent Intent to
rbeat and defl'aud their creditors, and
hinder and delay them lo the collection of
their debts and "that they are about to
fonvert their property Into money for the
purp011e of placing It beyond the reach of
their creditor&, and are about to sell, astllgn and dispose of a part of their property with Intent to defraud their creditol'll,
and have sold asstiroed, and disposed of a
part of their property with the Intent to
dl'fraud t."lelr creditors." Upon thi11 atlldavlt belug ftled. and a like afHdavlt for
garnishment and a.n order of the court
obtained part of the 11ebt not then being
due a wrlt of at tacbment was Issued a.ud
dell~ered to the sherlft. at 8 o'clock P. M.
of said day and returned, "not being ahle
to come at •tbe property of Boyer and Da.'1daou or J amett J. Boyer or Charlf>8 .B.
Davld~on members of said llrm, claJmE>d to
be in the poHHE'eslon of,L. J. Ho~and,J. w.
Dolan the .First Nat I Bank, et.c. Notice W&S aerved Upon tbe persons garnlshe<J naming 1:bem, and requfrb1g them
to apiiear and answer, etc. Tl1e dl'fendanta ftled a motJoJJ, sup~orte~ by aflfdE&tita, t.o dissolve the atrac meo 0 Poa su 1.>lltanttally two grounds, v-I•., lrl"E>l?uJarlt-y
In Procurtn the 1Jame, llDd because t a c
wa.s
trU•· t1::mJ!~~1/.,,m,e_ntoppo-

grounds uiJ'n which
iranted were CJD

ll4l

(Cue No. 81

sitlon toand in 111upport of thea.ttaebment
werethereopon 61ed,and on the final bearIn&' the attachment w88 dll!Charged, and
the garnl&bet'8 release1l. 'J'he dl88olutlon
of the attachment 18 now asalgned for er. ror.
It l'eems to beeonceded bytbe attorneys
for the plaintiff that the claim of the national bank Is bona tide, and probably
that of Holland. The chattel mortgage
seems to haYe been procured through the
Instrumentality of the latter. A debtor In
falling circumstances maypayoneor more
of bl8 credltora, provided he deliver him
no more than sumeieot to pay the debt.
In Elwood v. May, 24 Neb. 875, 88 N. W.
Rep. 793, it is said: "A cre~ltor may obtain from a lall}ng deb~or pa.ymeut in lull
of Ide claim, and be will not be chargeable, upon that gronod alone, of seeking
to defraud other credltot'll. Neither wlll
the fact that the claim ls paid in goods or
no greater value than the amount of the
claim of lteell establish the fraudulent
character of the transaction. S\l far as
the testimony dl.l!closes, the df'fendants In
error were pH-id In goods of value not exceeding the amount of their clalmsagalnet
Cramer." To the same effect, Rothell v.
Orlmes, 22 Neb. 528, 85 N. W. Rep. 892; Leffel v. Srhermerhoro, 18 Neb. a42, 14 N. W.
Rep. 418; Shelly v. Heater, 17 Neb. 505, 23
N. W. Rep. 621. The case ol Grimes \"".
Farrington, 19 Neb. 49, 26 N. W. Rep. 61~.
Is not In conflict with these decltdon11, the
exact value of the goods mortJl:age~ n~!
being shown. The highest est\ma.eet.be
that ca&e was about "$14,000, wb\ld not
debtR aecured excet-ded $9,000. ~~ dse\\ tot'
appear that the proprrty wo~be debt.a•
more than the amount of
'f\gbt. w
While a boa& tlde creditor b&B rg'\\t. t.O t.~
aeeure his l'lalm, yet he bas no :,t.oT. ~\\~oe
up all the property of his de 46 \n "''\~e\"
all of such property greatly eSC'~; \no~~the amount of the debt aecui---uat.e i\:al\a
words, while he may take ade4 p\na~~ \1\

rityforhi&ownclatm.hecanno:;~~\\,\e.e\n:

delay, II not defraud, other
-p"f ~ ~ac g
the collection of their cla\ln_. -.,P~b\\l\~~~e
the debtor's property beyond __,, t.\\e.'V 'VO
If he do so, he viola.tee the la~ ~~"\\e~e.-d
fraudulent conveyances. The f ~ $>e"'\v. e.\)"
18 a creditor does not g\ve ht~
~
-t;
ae"U\.~1'.
tie op property of the debtorn O ~:: e:-,c ae'\lt.0 tlt
for his own security. a.nd pre....-~
0
\lt0 ~
plication to the payment ot O ~ ,,._ -~\'-~""
owing by the debtor; and, If ~
~ p\\t. t\\e
assign him all b\a property ._ <
-ti&'\~ :set'
1rrouly inadequate debt, otbeJ
.-~'1\'1eeee
ha\"e good cause 'to comp\a\_..~
~e.~e,e
transfer ls fraudulent a.a to
--:--,,:::;.~ :'i \•
eaee at bar the delendanta bll ~ ~ ~
._-\t.. ~
'lll their pTopel.-ty to the u>p ~--._.,,.~ e"' .
Such property 1.8 shown to e'~ ~
£>~
greatly i.c.. execas ot adequate
~~~ ~~
the debts, and prfrna fucle tb
......-....-:;- ~~,
eleqt to Justify an a.ttacnmen\-c:;.
_. ~~
grd'und11 epec\t\ecl. \n the aft\dll-q ~ 1li- ~~
.Frnud can rarely be pTo"ed :ls_.....-~ ~ ~
I dence, and ln 1nost eases nee t_.~
~
: be shown by tacts and c\'!"CU'1180 1l'e -~
~
! amongtboKe which tna;(ne t>T p.~~~~ ~
I himself are the dec\arnt\0118e.n \~ ~
~1
I the llebtoi- ~· h\\e c\a.\m\n~t"t.e ~~.... •
...,..
the property 'W'b\ch he asse, ~· ~
.::?
J veyell. Tl!_US l n Ca.m\)be\ ~e 0
· Neb. 596. 3U N. W. Rep. S'i••

th:;

r.-

I

C1.,e .So. 31]
Case No. 31]

RELE VAN CY.

Conn, C. J.. quoting from Carney v. (‘ar-

ney. 7 Baxt. says: “As a general rule,

the declarations oi a party made after he

has parted with his interest in the subject-

matter of litigation cannot be received to

disparage the title or right of a party ac-

quired in good faith previous to the time

of making such declarations. But this

very just and reasonable principle must be

taken as inapplicable to cases of fraudu-

lent sales of property. If, for example, a

conveyance is made absolute on its face,

and the vendor continues to retain pos-

session of the property as before. this be-

ing prlma fucie evidence of fraud, a cred-

itor impeaehing such conveyance on the

ground of fraud may be admitted to prove

the declarations of the vendor. thus re-

taining the possession in relation to the
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ownership, or the character of his posses-

sion of the property.”

A number of statements made b_v lio_v<-r,

and acts done by him, shortly after the

attachment was levied. and while he still

claimed an interest in the proptrty, that

tend to support the charge that the trans-

fer was made to defeat certain oi his cred-

itors, are shown by the record. while the

sheriff in an affidavit states “tlmt on the

\i9th day of October. 1887. I had suhptrnas

put into my hands by J. H. Berge. of In-

dianoia, a notarypublic, in the above-en-

titled cases, and also in behalf of Nave &

Mc(‘0rd in their claim against Boyer 8:

Davidson, to subpoena said James J. Boyer

in all of said cases. and (‘has. B. Davidson

and Matilda Davidson and others in said

above-entitled ca.ses,to appear before said

notary public, and give their depositions

in said cases, respectively, on the 21st and

22d days of ()ctober, 1887. as shown by

my returns on said subpoenas, and that

said subpd-nas were received on the 19th

of October, 1887. That about the time

said subpmnas were received, said James

J. Boyer was here in town, but I made

diligent search for him, and could not ﬂnd

him anywhere. His wife had already gone

away. I went to his house on the lilth

and on the 20th and on the 21st of October,

1887. and knocked at the door, and it was

locked. After some talking of some per-

sons in the house, and after some little

time, L. J. Holland came to the door, and,

on being asked where Boyer was, said he

was not there. and did not know where

he was, and that L. J . Holland was the only

one to be seen in the house, although affi-

ant did not search the house. I searched

diligently ill the country and in this town

for said James J. Boyer, but could not

find him. I learned that he had been seen

90

riding his trotting horse across into Kan-

sas since I received said subpoenas. I have

good reasons to believe that the said

James J. Boyer knew that said subpoenas

were in my hands before he left, and that

RELEVANCY.

Coon, C. J .. quoting from Camey v. C'itr- rldlns hie trottln,r: horse acl'Oll8 Into 'Kanney. 7 Bax t. 2>!4. Rays: "As a general mle, sae smce I received eafd aubp12na11. I havtthe declarations of a party madt> aftt>r he good reasons to belleve that the 1ald
hRB partt>d with bis In tert'llt In tht> Rubjt~t. James J. Boyer knew that Hid 11ubpcl!nB1L
matter of Utlgatlon eoooot be rt>C·elved to were In my hands before he left, and that
dl111>arage the title or right of a party ac- he &ecreted hlmRelf,and lddawayfrom me,
quired In good faith 11revloaM to the tlwe and absconded In to the Htate of K a.nsas. to
of making such dechtratlon11. But this avoid the service of said subprenu, and to
very Just and reasonable prloclpfo must be avoid gl vlng his tt'tltlmony In the above-entaken a11 Inapplicable to c&BeH of framlu- tltlNI and above-mentioned cases. That
lent sales of property. It, for example, a Maid 1-fatllda Da.,•hleon left on the train on
conveyance le made absolute on Its face, the v.-ry81lmedaythateald euhpamaswere
and the vendor continues to retain l>Oll- plac~l In my hands to take her de1mslaeeslon of the property aR before. this be- tlone, and us I am Informed went to Dening prlma farle evidence of fraud, a cl"f'd- ver. The saltl James J. Boyer said to me,
ltor Impeaching such conveyance on the about the time I was serving t;he execuground of fraud may be admitted to prove tion on said oats heretofore mentioned,
the declarations of the vendor. thus re- that I would not get his horse, referring
taining the po88e811lon In relation to the to the trotting horse which I had had orownership, or the character of his pos11es- det"M to Ht>rve execution against; that I
alon of the property. "
thou~ht I was pretty shar1>. bot I would
A number of statements made by Ho.n•r,
not K<'t thft horse. He knew whett It was,
and acts done by him, shortly after the but I would not get It. and hP would not
attachment was levied, and while be i;t.lll tell rue where It wM. I waM told that
claimed an Interest In the prop< rty, that 1mme one was seen driving tha.t h0t11ethat
ten<l to support the charge that the trans- evening, out WPHt of town. Went out to
fer was made t-0 defeat certain of hlM errd- Steve LyonH' pince, but, not ftndtng the
ltors. are shown by the record, while the hoM!e there, came bark. Met said Jame&
eberlft In an affldavlt etatt'fl "tlwt on the J Boyer In thP road nhout a mile out of
, 19th day of October, 1887, J had eubptl'nas town, and hP Mknlked oft tn the weeds tr>
put Into my hande by J . H. Berge, of In- kf't'p me from knowing who he was. I
dianola, a notary.public, In the above~n searched diligently for the horse, but could
tltled cases, and ahm In behalf of Ntwc &
not find him. I verily believe, and ha'l"l'
McCord In their <.:!aim against Boyer & good reasom1 to believe, that be was hidDa vJdson, to subpama said James J. Boyer ing away, Bl'<'retlng, and concealing said
In all of said ca11ee, and Ch1t11. B. DavldHon honie to pre\'Pnt me from ser\'lng the exand l!atllda Davidson and othel'B In said ecu tlon agtllnRt It, and to prevent his cl"Pdabove-entitled cases, to appear before said ttors from appropriating It to the paynotary puhllc, and give their depositions ment of their demands, and that be has
In Auld roses, rl'tlpectlvely, on the 2ltit and removed 11ald animal out of thls11tate with
2"ld 1lays of October, 18R7, 88 shown by Intent to k•'<'P me from ~rvlng said execumy returns on said subpamas, and that tion at that time In my hands." These
said subpn.•nas were received on the 19th statement11 n.re not denied by Boyer.
of October, 1887. That about the time
In the affidavits of the defendants for
said subprenas were reeelved, said Jamee the dl88olutlon of the attachment they
J. Boyer w&.B here In town, but I made swear to thP honesty of their Intentions.
diligent search for him, and could not find ThlH statement would have had much
him anywhere. His wife had already gone ~renter weight tfthey had<'ome lntoeourt.
away. I went to hie house on the l!lth and made a full and detalletl statement of
and on the 20th a.nd on the 21st of Oc tolmr, their business, and the 888ets stlll In their
1887. a.nd knocked at the door, a.od It was hands, If any.
locked. After 1mme talking of some )JerHad they done 110, perhaps It would
sons In the house, and after some little ha ,.e been unneceHHa.ry to sw~ar to a ml're
tlmP, L. J. Holland came to the door, and, conclusion, and the latter ts entitled to
on helng nKked where Boyer w111.1, Kaid he hut little weight. The evidence fully suswas not therl>, and did not know where tains the grounds for the attachment, and
be was, and that L. J. Holland wtts the only the court erred In dlscha.rglng it.
one to be seen In the house, although aftiThe Judgment of the district court Is rean t did not search the house. I 11curched versed, the attachment reinstated, and
dlllgen tly in the country and In this town the cause remanded for further proceedfor sold .Jamee J. Boyer, but could not ings. Reversed and remanded. The other
find him. I learned that he ha.rl been seen Judges concur.
90

ADMISSIONS.
ADM iSSi ONS.

[Case ' No. 32

IDAHO FORWARDING CO v. FlRE1\iA.\"S

FUND INQ CO.

(29 Pac. 826, 8 Utah, 41.)

Supreme Court of Utah. April 1. 1892.

Appeal from district court, Weber county;

James A. Miner, Justice.

Action by the ldaho Forwarding (‘ompany

against the Fireman's Fund Insurance Com- -

puny on an alleged contract of lire insur-

ance. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant

appeals. Reversed.

Bennett, Marshall & Bradley, for appel-

lant. _A. R. Heywood, for respondent.

ZANE, C. J. The respondent alleged in

its complaint that on the 1st day oi.’ Febru-

9-1'1’, 1889, in consideration of $46.20 paid as

premium, its stock of goods at Hailey, Idaho,

was insured in the sum of $2,000 by ‘appel-

lant, for one year from the 13th day of the
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same month, and that on the 2d day of the

following July the goods were destroyed

by ﬁre. The plaintiiif relies upon a con-

tract in praesenti, not a contract to there-

after insure. Albert Kiesel, who had an

interest in plaintiffs business, and was man-

tiger thereof, testiﬂed that-B. M. Mallory, the

agent of both parties, said to h-im about the

last of January or the ﬁrst of February,

1889, that $5,000 of the insurance would ex-

pire; that witness told him to renew the

insurance, and that he said he would; that i

the poll;-leg of the North British & Mercan-

tile and F“-en1an’s Fund and Commercial

Union were about to expire; that Mallory

said he would reinsure him in the Fireman's

Fund for $2,000.

Mercantile for $1,000, and in the Commercial

Union for $2,000, \Vitness also said that the

insurance was to be for one year, and that

the premium wvas to be $2.20 per $100. B.

i.l_ _\[,,“m.y, the agent of both plaintiff and

defendant, testiﬂed that, soon after his em- i

pioyment as bookkeﬁperv Albert Kiesel, man-

age; Qt the plaintiﬂ’, instructed him to re-

new an policies upon expiration, and to keep

the amount of insurance to $14,500, and. to

my premiums 64) days after issuance of

policies; that he was under the impression

that the lapsed policies had been renewed;

that his intention was to renew them, but

he negligently had allowed them to lapse;

than as (ﬂshier of the plaintiff. he was an-

ti10|-mid to use its funds I0 pay premiums,

and was dlrected by plaintiffs IIl1lllil,L‘.'Pl' to

do so, am 11, keep the insurance to $14,500.

The pl-emlwn was n0t Dﬂid, but‘ was tender-

cti six days after the 5t°¢'k 01' E°°d8 had been

consumed by ﬁre.

The proof is that -‘fallow Who vvns

cashier of the P19-mtm’ and who Wits all-

thorized and instrllﬂi-’<’d "Y its "“"1llge1' to

have its stock of goods insured, and ‘Vho

was also the agent of the (l(.*f(>I|(I;|ur' al1(1

authorized to H13-kle ('0l1f1.ac_ts of gurance and to issue policies. Iieg-Ieote (1 to

do as he was instructed, fwd What be In-omis-

in the North British 8:‘

1 178; Myers v. Insurance Co., 121

_ tii‘i.' contends that he did.

[Case No. 3<?

IDAHO FORWARDING CO v. FIRE~lA..'\'S
FUND INS. CO.
(29 Pac. 826, 8 \:tab, 41.)
Supl'('me Court of Utah. April 1. 1892.
Appeal from district court, Weber county;
James A. ll.lner, Justice.
Action by the Idaho l~orwardlng ( 'om1111ny
agalDBt the J<'ireman·s J<'und Insura1wi> ComIJllny on nn allt>ged contract of tire lnsuranct>. .Judgment tor plaintiff. Defendant
appeals. Reversed.
Bennett, .Marshall & Bradley, tor appellant .A. R. Heywood, for respondent.

ed plaintiff's manager be would do. He had
a.n Impression, as he said, that the pl'Operty was Insured, and negle<'ted to Issue the
polll'y. He was authorb1ed to appropriate
plalntllf's money, In his hnncls us Its rosbler,
to the payment of the premium. hut neglected to do that. If he had done so, he would
have al'ted as l>lalntl!T's agent In so doing.
At the time ot the conversation, nbout the
1st of February, relied upon to establish
the contract de<•lared on, lnsurmwe then on
the property to be renewed lmd not expired.
It did not expire until the t:3th dny of that
month. It was the duty of linllory, under the Instructions of plaintift''s manager,
ZANE, C. J. The respondent alleged in to continue the risk n!ter the olcl policy exits complaint that on the lat day of Febru- pired by relnsurlng, but the t~\·ldenee shows
ary, 1889, in consideration of $!6.20 pald as that he negle<"ted to do this. For thP fnllpremlum, Its stock of goods at Halley, Idaho, ure to follow plaintiff's orders the tl1•f1•mlwas Jnsured In the sum of $2,000 by appel- ant cannot be held responslhh•. It 111 1111Iant, f<>r one year from the 13th day of the parent that llnllory failed to mnkl' till' eonl!Bme month, and that on the 2d day of the tract that he was authorized 111111 hu~truet
tolloWfng July the goods were destroyed ed- by plaintift' to make. An agreement to
by fire. The plaintltr relies upon a con- make a contn1et at a future dny Is not the
tract Jn pnesenti, not a contract to there- equivalent of the one to be mn<lt>, or of 11.
after Jnsure. Albert Kiesel, who had an present contract, though all the terms to
lllterest Jn pJaJntilf"s buslneBB, and was man- be put in the latter are agre1•d upon. If
ager thereof, testified that ·B. ll. Mallory, the one of the parties to the tln1t ngreenwnt
agent of both parties, said to him about the refuses to bind himself when the ttuw
last ot January or the first ot February, comes, the court may compel n s11t>dfiP pPr1880, that $5,000 o~ the Insurance would ex- formance of It, It from the fncts It would
Plre; that witness told him to renew the be equitable to do so; and If p!'rfonnn.nce
Insurance, and tllat he said he would; that Is deert>l'd a jmlgtnent may he enter~~ ~~
the policies or the North British & Mercau- the same c1uit• for the amount found f nnY
Ille and I<'lreman's Fund and Commercial due the pl11l11tltr on the contract. \ teTlU"•
Union were about: to expin•; that llallory 111nount Is tlwn due the plalntitI l>Y \t~t e\t\\el"
l!llld he would reinsure him In the Fh-emun·s or an nl"tlon 11111y be i11stitutPll on \t Y>Y -t\'''
J.'und for $2,000. in the :Xorth British & party refuses to comply with \t..
~ t.\''-'
- .1wwa
\-nMercantlle for $1,000, and in the Commercial language usPd on thP lst of l· "' . \\,e \'\t\. e
Union tor $2,000"Vitness also ,j)ald that the , defendant did not ui,;s11111e tl1e ri t-4~~ \\'u~n.1te
Insurance "·as t:o be for one year, an<l that tllf contends that he llhl.
iW'C '-0
the prt-wlum ·was to be $2.20 per $I<IO. B. had ref!'rt•nce to lnsurunce th~,,-._•t
)\n.\U'll. llnllory, the agent of both plaintiff and made.
~ .co'"\'11 ~o'
defeudant, testified tbat, soon after his emThe plalntllf has set up 1.11 1••·:_.-~(.'~ \""""''C:
ployll).e nt as bo<>kkeeper, Albert Kiesel, n1an- a contract In pIWsentl. Tbls a•~-.. - ,,,.,,.,._,....
"'· \,u~ ~0,,...
ager of the plalntltr, 1nstructed him to re- for specific pertormnnce. Tayl
p- •· CP"' o''
\\\.
new all polic•ies upon expiration, and to keep unet• Co. 47 " "Is. 3HH 2 .,., "1'.
.1-e
~ .
'!"
.:
'
.i..'"'i.
H '
---~ -40•" ,\\\.':°';-\·
the amount of Insurance to $14,500, and. to N. \\. ;:,84; Sargent v. lnsnrt._....- ~ :i..S • ·~.\~·.
!Jlly Pl"emhtnis 60 days after IBRunnce of N. Y. 620; Dinning v. lnsuruncC
~.,_#':. :~ :.
policies; that be was under the lmpl"l.'tislon 414; Markey v. lnsurnnl~e cod
';:!!"' ~ _ '5~'\w'·
that the lapsed policies had been r1mewed; ; li8; llyers v. Iusurnuce Co., 12j..
~• .._-\''.· ·;,\"i'-·
that his Intention was to renew them, but · O'Ht>llly v. Col"pOrnt\on. 101 N".
~ - -!.,,.- -" ''." ~ '"''
he negligently bad allowed them to lapse; I N'. E. ;;os. Connnerl"inl ~ul\ounl ~ y~ ._,~-i: \!''~
that, as msbier of the plnintilf, lie w11t1 au- : Co. v. Union ~lut. lus. Co., 1~ -C:::::""' JC.-~ i\'~'°'~,,.:•
thorlzl'd to use tts fundA to 1:11y premiums. \ elted by counsel for re~ponde~ ..:- -,r
and was directed by pll1fntl.tf s mtUUJJ!°Pl" to ' equity l'DUs<> to cu1uplete the EJ$l'°' • ~
-«:.
.,t~
~n·
do so, and to keep t b P I usnrance to :fi14,a0ll.
forman<'e of a contract to make ,~
~ ~
4:.-- i; t
The premlq,JD '\11."&S not paid, but"' wus fon<ft!r- The <·ourt \u that. case be\t\ tl•·-i.• "..,,. -tl ..~ \'
ed six days after the stock ot goods Ji.ad been for the s1w<•lt\c })ert'.ormance of t ~ - - --.. _?~ ~\.'
consumed by tlreshould be u1u.\uta\ned, and it ~ ~
,_ ~._ :1.1'
The proof ts that Jfallory, l\"ho w·:1s admitted that dPfenl\ants woulL~<
-C::
~,
cashier of the pJa.Jntflf, and Who lVas au- as for a totul loss on t\1e -po\\cS pc:Jl.
~·
tborlzed and Instructed fly Its ll1un11Ki>l" t:o conformity vvit:h the couttact. P. t'~•-shave Its stock o~ goods Insured, :1n<1 who
11mount ·waM then pn)'ab\e, aud t~~e-' ~
:11
was nlso the agent ot the defP1Jrl11nt a n d
ther quc>Rtion. remu'ixU.'l\ to \JC.,_~£>._-..--_.!:.
authorized by Jt to wake contracts ~t lLiwas proper to d ...~ .... ,.,,~ \\W \)u.'J :i. '->._-. ...-surance and to Jssue policies, lleg/f'C'ted t<>
money 'vhl<·h 'voul'\ \1a\"C ,,e•·~.:-~ do as he w88 Instructed, and what he JJl'OwlE/6the policy tr l t hu.d bl.~n \t!>~

·rl••• . .

,,e ''

I
i

..... . .,.

Case No. 82]
Case No. 32]

BELEVANCY.

born v. insurance Co., 16 Gray, 44s, and

Putnam v. insurance Co., 123 Mass. 3'.’-1,

relied upon by respondent's counsel, it was

held that the evidence tended to show that

tl1e risk was to commence at the time the

contracts sued on were made. The facts of

these cases are not analogous to the case in

hand. in them the insurers assumed the

risk by the contracts sued on.

After the witness Albert Kiesel bad nar-

rated the conversation between himself and

Mallory on the 1st day of February, plain-

tilY‘s counsel propounded this question:

"Now, if you know, how long was the in-

surance to be?" To which counsel for de-

fendant objected on the ground that the

conclusion of the witness was called for,

and not the language used, or the substance

of it. The objection was overruled by the
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court, and defendant excepted. This rul-

ing is assigned as error. The intentions of

the parties to contracts must be ascertained

from the language used in them, or in mak-

ing them, in the light of the surrounding

circumstances, and this rule applies to the

interpretation of verbal contracts as well as

to written ones. It \vas improper to call

for the conclusion of the witness as to the

term of the insurance, or as to the premium

to be paid. Those facts should have been

found from the language used by the con-

tractors. They could not be ascertained

from the inferences and conclusions of the

witness.

\Vitnesses were pernilttedp over the ob-

jections ot defendant’s counsel. to testify

to admissions of the agent. Mallory. made

long after the alleged contract was made,

to the effect that the property was insured-

To the ruling of the court in overruling such

objections the counsel for the defendant ex-

cepted, and assigns the same as error. A

witness may testify to the language of an

BELEV.\NCY.

born v. Insurance Co., 16 Grn,r, 4-1.'4, anll

Putnam v. Inaurance Co., 123 Mus. 3:!4,
relled upon by re11pondenfs counsel, It watt
held that the evidence tended to show that
the risk was to commenre at the ttme the
<·ontra<·ts stwd on wen> mnde. The f1wt11 of
these <'lll1t'S are not analogous to the <·nse ln
hand. In them the Insurers &1111tmwd the
risk by the contracts sued on.
After the wltnt>SK Albf'rt KIPl!t'l had narrated the ronversatlon between hlm8f'l! aml
Mallory on the 1st day of February, plalntUl"s counsel propounded this <1ue.-t1011:
":Sow, lf you know, how long was tht> Insurance to be?" To whl<•h <'Ounsel for defendant objected on the ground that the
conclusion of the witness WR.II called !or,
and not the language used, or the s11l)llta11<-e
ot tt. The objection was overruled h,r the
rourt, and defendant exl'epted. This ruling la ll88lgned as error. The Intentions ot
the parties to contracts must be aS<.'t'rtitlnt><l
from the language used ln thew, or ln waking them, In the light of the surrounding
circumstances, and thlB rule a1111ll<•11 to the
Interpretation of verbal contra<·ts as well as
to written ones. It was lm11n1pt•r to call
for the con<"luslon of the wltne1111 1111 to the
term of the lnsurau<-e, or as to the premium
to be paid. Those facts should have been
found fron1 the lanJCUage used by the <'<>ntra<'tol'll. They could not bf' as<'f'rtalned
from the lnferenC'eS and ron<'lusloDB ot the
wltneaa.
Wltne88e8 were permitted, · over the objections of defendant's rounsel, to tt-stlty
to adm1881ons of the 111:ent, Mallory. made
long after the alleged contract was wade,
to the effect that the property was Insured.
To the nutng of the rourt in overruling such
objectloDB the couDBel for the defendant excepted, and assigns the same as error. A
witness may testify to the language of an
agent in making aa oral contnu·t, h<'<·nutte
such language la within the agent'& authority. Being authorized to make the rontl"llet.
· his language lo making It ls authorized by
the principal. But authority to make &
9'J .

<'Ontnu·t does not em1>0wer the agent at a
1ubsequent time to admit nway his prtn<'lpal's rlghtM. Thl" 1tdmh11doll8 of an agent
al"t' adwl111Jlble BO far a11 tht> principal hlul
authorized them to be wnde, and no further. Greenlt-af says: "But It must be remembered that the adml881on of the agent
eannot always be a88lmUated to the admission of the principal. The party's own
admlRHlon, whenever ·made, may be given
ln el'ldt>n<-e against him; but the admlaslon
or dedaratlon of his agent blndtt him only
wh1•11 It ls wade doling the continuance of
the ageney ln regard to a transaction then
<lependlng, et dum fervet opus. It le be<·auee It Is a verbal act, and part of the ree
gt>Btll', that It la admlsslble at all; and therefore It ls not nece888ry to call the agent
hlm111•lf to prove it." 1 Hreenl. Ev. I 113.
Tht• <-ourt Mid In the <'&Be of Railroad Co.
v. O'Brh•n, UH U. S. 00, 7 Hu11. Ct. 118: "Referring to the rult> as statl'<I by Mr. Justice
8tory In hb1 treatise on .A~n<'y, (eectlon
134,) that, ·where the acts of the agent will
hind the prlnelpal, tbt>re his re11rt'tlentatlons,
declarations, and admi88lon1 ree1iectlng the
subject-matter will also bind hlw, if made
at the samt> time. and constituting a part of
the res Kt'llta•.' The rourt. speaking by Mr.
Justlre Strong, said: 'A <'lose attention to
this rule. whl<·h Is of unlvel'll81 8(-ceptnn<'f'.
will solve almost every dltDcult,r. But an
act done by an agent cannot be varied,
quall,ded, or explained either by his declarations, whl<'h amount to no more than a mere
narratl\'e of a past oceurren<'P, or by an
Isolated ronvel'IVl.tlon held. or an Isolated &<'t
done, at a later period. The reason Is that
the agent to do the act Is not authorized te
narrate what he had done, or bow be had
done It, and hie deC'laratlon la no part of the
res geetJP..' " 14'or the l'EeBOne above Indicated the rourt IA of the opinion that the judgment of the court below should be revertled,
and that a new trial should be granted.

ANDERSON and BLACKBURN, JJ., concur.

agent in making an oral contract. because

such language is within the agent's author-

ity. Bcing authorized to make the contract.

his language in making it is authorized by

the principal. But authority to make a

Q2 .

contract does not empower the agent at a.

subsequent time to admit away his prin-

cipal‘s rights. The admissions of an agent

are admissible so far as lllc principal has

authorized them to be made, and no fur-

ther. Greenleaf says: "But it must be re-

membered that the admission of the agent

cannot always be assimilated to the ad-

mission of the principal. The party's own

admission. whenever lnade, may be given

in evidence against him; but the admission

or declaration of his agent binds him only

\\‘hcll it is made during the continuance of

the agency in regard to a transaction then

depending. et dum tervet opus. It is be-

cause it is a verbal act, and part of the res

gestm, that it is admissible at all; and there-

fore it is not necessary to call the agent

himself to prove it." 1 Greenl. Ev. Q 113.

•

ADMISSIONS.
OVER v. SCIIIFFLDiG.

ADMISSIONS.

(26 N. E. 91, 102 Ind. 191.)

[Case No. 33

OVER v. SCIIIFFLING.

(26 N. E. 91. 102 Ind. 191.)

S“m-Qynq Court of Indiana. April 24. 1897».

Appeal from circuit court, Marlon coun-

tyh. Dailey and G. IV. IVinpcun_r, for ap-

llant. S. Cla_i'poul_ IV. A. Ken-ham,und

Supreme Court of J:ndiana.

April 24. 1R8!'>.

Appeal 'from circuit court, Marlon county.
H. Dalley and G. "JV. 'Wlnpenn.r, for ap.
peUant.
B. F.

S. Claypool. lV. A. Ketd1am,and
for appeUee.

Wa~ts.

B, F. ii/‘atts, for appellee.

ELLIOTT, J. The coin plaint of the ap-

pellee alleges that the a |>peilantmalicious-

iy published a libel; that clielihelcius nutm-

ter was contained in a letter wr ttcn >y

the latter to a corporation called the“ En-

¢au‘stic '1‘lle Company, ’]’ by ;Vh%_l:1 ﬂ}ett"l>-

lee was then cmp oyec . Ic e cr.

‘rinitting the date. address, signature, and

formal part, is as follows : “ Mr. Schiﬁiiml

owes me on work dune on your dies, ctc..

$33. If you would consent to retain such

amount out ofany ninney due him from
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yomlct me know by return nlall. lfS‘0\1 Wm

not consent to do so. I shall have to file a

mechanic's lien on the goods. Hcgot them

of me by lying, First he said he would

bring an order h-Om you, ’1‘hen, he would

my cash for them before he took them

away. He thcn watched his chances, and

took them when the furern an was not in,

and now TGIUHUQ avlnen 1;, ” It is also al-

leged that the f,’ ' euee wu's dismissed

from the service cgjfptlie corporation to

whom the lett r ' B addressed, and he

deinanded spa,-lg] :13] gen9l'al damages.

he language 0; the letter charges the

ﬂﬂilrllee with | .| ubtained D"°i>9l‘l.V

bi’ ('0l‘rupt a, §mdim§ DIIUSIZ nieans. It is

not necessar ni sd ‘I’ tn constitute even

verbal mandy’ n or! e 1093 libel, that the

charge that er: muc .1; or criminal act was

committed sh u)lri-gp naade in direct terms.

eqnestion im ( I‘: cases is, what mean-

ing did the 1 n sue n1 r)]()\'el1 convey to

the mind ,,,“‘{§§“§§,-Heoli to. wvhoin it was

llfllll-ngsed -I smpr V jenkins, 97 Ind. 430.

put in writil1$’~' ‘Vin Often constitute

Rtitntp ‘vhichv ll SDUk(’1'l- ‘iv

- - r.

very deal: t iunable sin n de-

received

den-stooqand read the ‘at ta; h a rged the up-

ould not con-

th t the xv vi tel‘ .

pellee 1 *1 - 1 the propeity

by fr-av‘: th h‘“’m5 °bta‘aI_]r?:1_ thus under-

qulent means.

stood the languagewa

t e v. Brames.

.1?!‘ wasnot a D1’

he informal’-\:_’€_d

pose for - as vomntee- "eyed to the ap-

pe|]e0,s 9:‘) high it was cons

1' r the benefit

of the Wribl 93'9" ‘vas so‘e‘§‘:t0intcn.led to

beneﬁt t

e1‘-ﬁn“ “rag nﬂivlnil him. in

W0-"er t ui-pose. infor-

a nil 79" gig gs-otecticin against

(1 ubtedlylibel-

‘?3}‘,"‘ 3. l6l.

ELLIOTT, .T. The complaint of the appeUee allegee that the a J>pellttnt mallelouely published a libel; that t;bellheloa11 mlltter watJ contained In a Jetter written by

tbe latter to a corpora "tlon called the" Encaosttc '.l'lle Company. " by whom the "Ppl'llee was then eni1tloyed. The letter,
omitting the date, addreH&, 1dp:nature, and
formal port, Is as followa:
~Jr. &hlftlln~
owes me on work done on your dlt'ff, etc.'.,
'33. If ;you would coneen t: to l"f'taln Ruch
amount out of any DJ ouey d ne him from
you, let me know by re1:urn nut II. II you will
notcoD&t>ntto«1oso I shall havetofllPa
mechanic's Jlt>non th~ goods. Hep:otthem
of me by lying. FiMtt: Ile Maid he would
bring an order from you.
Then, he would
ll&Y cash for them before he took them
away. He then watched his chancefl, and
took them whpn tile foreman was not In,
anduowrefua..11 pavment;.'' .Itlsalitoalleged that the ap(>ellee
W"llA dlsmlRHed
from the serf'lce of the corporation to
whom thp letter wae addreMMed, and be
del!11lndt>d special and general damagea.
'1 he language of the lfitt: ter charges the
appl'llee " ' Ith having obtained property
by corrupt and dlAlionest n1eonR. It ls
not neceeeary In orde .. t o constitute even
verbal aJander much 1088 libel, that the
~harire that a l.~)rropt o r crtmtnal at•t wtt11
committed Fihooldbe made In dla"f'Ct termR.
The QDPRtlon In such caset'I ts. what meaning did the Ian
e~ployed convey to
the mind of tfoaKerM<>D to -whom It was
ad1ll'f'llsed?
ie pe :Jenkins, 97 Ind. 430.
Word11 Put lns~n~~l v.;
1 orten constitute
a libel Whl
wr 0 ~
wut1ld not cooRtltut;
ch, H s1mken.
We think It
very de:~\1h=:~~~ :~~;~~~·te offll'ers who
1'Ctllvf'd anc1
d tb \ett:er must have understool) ~h rea
e rtter charged the oppellee With at thew
tne•l the property
by fraoa
having obtn
<l
thus unrlerstood, th:~ent means, a.~ndoubtedly llbelouR. Hakeangua~ewa95 Jnd. 161.
Theletter "V. Brames. r·l~Uegedcommonl·
cation. Tb ~asnot a l\on \ t i>roft'Mites to
contain 'VW'" e lnforma
ed end the purJIOlle for~ Gs volunteer n ~eyed to the apJJellec'a eru hleh It was colelY for tbe benetlt
of the w,./~loyer waB s:;: not lnten.Jed to
heneftt the- er, and web • Jith·lni;r him, In
good faith
~mployer J~Bt pUl'JlOHf', lnformatton n~~.a ncl for a.btl! protection against
a knavt11 h
t-c..ary for
Theap 1>:~•·V"ant.
doced Sumuel Shue,
and aftel' 11 1Q.nt tnt~~D cxamlnPd In chief,
and ha<t b •e bad
-e.s:iunlned at great
lenarth, an<} ~n crosFt se of the redln..Ct ex!'mlnatton ~ t: the <- 1~.iked this qut>stlon:
State "IVb 9 ••e was
t you reported thrRe
!art.a In ~~"t:.her or 0 tbls matter to i\lr.
0 ton being: made, the
Over." tJ e.-enr.e
connsel n:.l>o.~ obJect -ta tf"ment: "We offt>r
to show l:h~Ql@t t:hl& ~tnt-MR cummunlcutPd
au thewe .~"'t: t;blff ..~r over before the 15th
-~t;e to~
•
06

.;,n

f

[Case No. 3.'J

day of JoOP., the day tbe letter was written.,, In our opinion the offer was too
genf'rnl. for we do not bellen It wa11 the
duty of the triul court to examine the
mass or testimony to . determine what
facts we~ competent. On the contrary,
we think it was counsel's duty to speclllcally stat.- the facts which they expected
to 8how that tJ1e wltn"88 communicated
to their client. There were some facts
stated tu the testimony of the wltnet48
thnt It would not have been proper to
communicate to the appellant, and the
court was not bound to analyse the ttllltl·
mony, and 11lft out the competent from
the Incompetent. 'fhlM 11bould have been
done by the question and offer of ~be counsel.
The appellee testlfled that he was direct.
ed by tbe appelluut to his foreman, Mr.
Cox, and thereupon the court permitted
the apJ>ellee to testify what was said to
him by tba foreman. Io this there was no
error. Whe1-ea party dlrel'ts anuthPr to a
third person for Information or directions, he ls hound by tile statements of
such third person.
Our caees decide that, where the Intent
with which en act Is done hecomes mat&rlal, It ls proper to ask what It was. Clty
of Columbus v. Dahn, 86 Ind. 330; Greer v.
State, 58 Ind. 420; White v. State, 53 Ind.
595, (vlde page 596;) ~hockey v. Mill11, 71
Ind.~; Parrish v. Thurston, 87 Ind. 487,
(vlde page 440.) We think that the question uked the appellee, and objecte<l to by
the appellant, Is fairly within the principle llt..oelurrd In thetie cases. It Is corupotent In many cases, 11ucb as cases of fraud
and the like, to ask a pRrty a dll'el.·t question, ond we think this ls an analogous
Cll&e. 80, too, where a negative \s tu be
proved, It Is often competent to ask~ d~rect question. The rea11on for tblS ls t b
by proving ufflrmatlve facts to· esta\>~~'!in<l
neirutl\'e conclusion, too much g;:i-t.\ll>e
wonld be gone over, and too 111'.,ct owi~
conMumed. Another reason \s 1"ll ~\\S \tn.a1-e some c:aites Whl're It ls prnct\Ci',e8'"' '-l~,.
possible to exclude every bypot ~~~\:e.
a l'ourse or atttrmatlve questions.
e 0 ll-""
the law ts a practical selenee,
times permits a direct qm.'st\on
~
~ \."n
ewer upon a negative pro1>os\t\0 1 }~,..f4 'C.~
were conceded thllt the court e e
''\\ ,
permitting the appellre to \uqult" .~~ _ .. ,.:-~
the aggregate amount In vn\ue -c:;l~j. \
that had been made by tbe Encuus.1
-C:: •
l'ompan;v, within a deRlgnet••d {)C1f< 7 f"",,.. ._. J...
avalluble error was con11ll\tted. j~
-£.
:
reaRon thllt the groun<lH of o~~ -C
were not spec:lftcally
stated. v 0 '
~ '-'
think no error was co1n1u\tted, f fft ~ •
reason that the testhnony ten<led toe~
•
the umonnt of the special damn~
f;: •
talned by the uppellee.
orfJ ., .
The t•oort refuse<l to gtve tbP. ~ J • r
structlon asked by the R 1>pe\lant, c,. i.{- J
reads thus: "'l'he delcn\lant In Utl~0 te ? 11
by hie onswer, al11nlts that hew uH. l ._
letter whil'h Is alleJJ:<:>d to be U~ie\ore rt'~ 1
soys that the 11tate111ents tbeieo~\ ll adtJ' •
By this nnswer the clef'endan
Yt nil rJ ~ ·
no
·he wrote the Jet t:er .• be does
1 tt
~
1ere\lY •
that plaintiff was clul~~;;e~t tbe 1~n1·1• 1:~
that he was In the e•Bl~ t th"' bur<len b• t:l.JI
tlcTlleCompan)o"·
~ "tbatbew1111ID
~
the plulutUf to sbo

a

'!i>il \\ \'\.
,7'

C;1se No. 33]
Case No. 33]

RELEVANCY.

employ oi the Encaustic Tile Company;

and that he lost said employment by rea-

so'n of said letter, and that he has been

damaged.” It is settled by many cases

that, unless the instruction as prayed is

correct in terms, the court is not bound

to amend or modify it, but may rightfully

refuse it. Goodwin v. State, 96 ind. 550,

and authorities cited. This instruction

was not correct in terms, for the answer,

by not directly controverting the allega-

tion of the complaint, that the appellee

was employed by the Encaustic Tile Com- -

pany, admitted it, for the failure to deny

is an admission of the truth oi a. material

allegation. The general scope and tenor

of the answer ﬁled by the appellant is

that of a pica of jnstiﬁcution, and it is by

it general scope and tenor that it must
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be judged, and not by fragmentary state-

ments cast into it. Kimble v. Christie, 55

Ind. 140; Neideier v. Chastaln, 71 Ind. 363;

Mescall v. Tully, 91 Ind. 96; Telegraph

Co. v. Reed. 96 Ind. 195, (vlde authorities

cited page 198:) Cottrell v. Insurance Co.,

97 Ind. 311; City of Logansport v. Uhl, 99

ind. 531. A plea of justiﬂcatlon proceeds,

and can only rightfully proceed. on the

theory that all the material averments of

the complaint are admitted, and this is

the theory of the answer before us, and it

would therefore have been error to in-

struct the jury that it controverted one of

the substantive and materlalaverments (Iii V

sai i

the complaint. What we have

proves that the court below did not err in

Instructing that the answer admitted

that the appellee was in the employment

of the Encaustic Tile Company, and that

he was discharged from it. It is true that

mere allegations oi value are not admit-

ted by afailure to controvert them. but

allegations of material facts are. and the

employment and discharge of the appellee

were material facts.

The third instruction given by the court

reads thus: "The answer. among other

things, charges and says that the plaintiff

went into the shop where the dies were

while the defendant’s iorcmun was absent

from the shop. and, without the knowl-

edge or consent of the defendant, or his

foreman, took and carried said dies away

from the shop and custody of the defend-

ant. On this point, I instruct you that

if the plaintiff called or sent for the dies,

and if he or the person whom he sent

found at the defendant's shop any one

there in charge of the shop who delivered

the goods or dies to the plaintiff. or to

any one sent by him for the dies. the law

will presume that, as between the public

and the defendant, the person so deliver-

iug

dies. whether as between him and the de-

fendant hc had authority or not; and if

the plaintiff simply went for or sent after

RELEVANCY.

employ of the Encauatlc Tile Company;
and that he lost said employment by reasob or said letter, and that be has been
damftged." It ls settled by many caHe&
that, uole88 the Instruction as prayed ls
correct in terms, the court is not l>ound
to amend or modify it, but may rightfully
refus~ it. Goodwin v. State, 96 Ind. 650,
and authorities cited. Thie Instruction
was not correct In terms, for the answer,
by not directly controverting the allegation or th~ complaint, thllt the appellee
was employed by the Encaustlc Tile Company, admitted It, for the failure to deny
Is an admission of the truth or a material
allegation. 'l'he general scope und tenor
of the answer fll(•d hy the appellant la
that of n plea of J1111tiHcntlon, nnd It la by
Its general scope aod tenor thllt It must
be Ju<lged, and not by fragmentary litatements cast Into it. Kimble v. Christle, 65
Ind. 140; Neldefer v. Chastuln, 71 Ind. 363;
.Me11call v. 'l'ully, 91 Ind. 96; Telegraph
Co. v. Reed, 96 Ind. 195, ( vlde authorities
cited pagt> 198;) Cottrell v. Insurance Co.,
97 Ind. an; City of Logansport V- Uhl, 90
Ind. 531. A plea or justlftcatlon proceeds,
and can only rightfully proceed, on the
theory that all the mnterinl averments or
the comphdnt are admitted, and this ls
the theory of the answer before us, and It
would therefore have been error to Instruct the Jury that It contru\'erted ••ne of
the eubstnnth·eand materlala,·ermenu of
the complaint. What we lrnve &aid
11rot'es that the rourt below did not era· In
lnstrm·tlng that the answer admitted
thnt the appellee was in the employment
of the Encaustlc Tile Company, l\nd that
he was discharged from It. It ls true that
mere all~o.tlontt or value are not admitted by a failure to controvert them, but
allegations of material fnct11 are. and the
employment.anrl discharge of the appellee
were material fncbJ.
The third lm1tructlon given by the court
reads thus: "'The anHwer, a moug other
things, charges antl says that the plain tin
went into the shop where the dle11 were
while the defendant's forcmun was absent
from the shop, and, without the knowledge ur con11ent of the defendant, or hie
foreman, took and carried said dies away
from the shop and custody of the delendant. On this point, I Instruct you that
If the plaintiff callt•d or sent for the dll'B,
end If he or the person whom he eent
found at the delendent'K Hhop any one
there In charge of the shop who df'livered
the ~oods or dies to the plalntlrr. or to
an~· one sent by him for the dies, the law
\Ylll presume that, aH between the public
and the dcfendl\nt, the pPrson 110 clt>liverlng the c1lei,i harl authoai L.r to dell\'er the
dieH. whether as between him and the def(•ntlnnt he had uuthorlty or not; and If
the plaintiff 11imply went for or Rent after
the dies, noel got them from a pe~on so In
rhurge Of the defen<laut'R !ihOp, the pJalntlrf dhl not get the dies awa;\' without the
knowlNlge of the defendant, within the
menning of the lnw, en•n though both the
defendant und his reicular foreman were
al>Hent from the shop ut the time the <lies
were taken 11 way. But If the t,lu lntlrr
watehed his ('hance11 and availecl himself of
an opportunity tu go for or senu uftt>r the
dh'fl while the foreman was lll>sent, for thu
9'

purpose of irettlng poeseSRlon without fll'llt
paying for the dies, then thnt portim• 11f
the letter 11 pro\•ed true. On the other
band, If the plaintiff did not so wat<'h his
chances to get the dle11 away, but took.
the dies a way with the consent of any one
in chnrge of the shop, then In such case the
defendant has failed to prove his letter
true In that particular, even though the
regular foreman was absent at the time
the dies were taken away." We pcrcel\"e
no substantial error in this Instruction,
although It le not very well drawn.
If the principal holds out an agent or
servant aa possessing authority to control
a shop or place of b11siness, and a third
persou acts upon the faith or the appearances eo created, the principal may, In
1uch a case as this, be bound by the acts
of the apparent agent within the ecope of
his 011tPnslt>le authority, although. as hetweE>n tho} agent and his employer, no sncb
authority In fact existed. It would, It la
very clear, be unjust to Impute sinister
motives to a third pen1on whu bad obtained an article from a person in charge
of a shop without deceiving such person
by false 1ttateme11te. We think It waa
proper to Instruct the jury that it could
nut ba Inferred from the fact that appellee gut the dies from the agent 111 chllrge
of the appellant's shop that he "bad
watched hie chances," ln the sense conveyed by that phrase ns ui;ed In appelJa11t's letter. Counsel are 111 error in assertlnJr that the instruction aRSumee to Inform the jury who appellant's agent or
foreman was. It does not assert that any
particular person was or was not his
agent or foreman, but 1dmply asserts the
general prlnrlple that placing a pe1'8on In
charge of a shop constituted Ruch a person, as to third persons. un agent for the
performance of Ruch duties &R pertained to
the authority of one who In fact was
rightfully In charge of the shop. It Mt it
to the jury to decide wht>ther the person
from whom the dll'B wen' obtained was or
was not the pne In whose charge the shop
w11s at the time they were obtained. If
the appellant had desired SfX'Clfic directions gh·en to the jnry upon tht> subject of
the effel't of knowledJl,•~ or private instructions given by the principal to the agent,
he should have asked the rourt to epecltlcally Instruct upon that subject. We think
the Instruction before ns Is good as far
ate It assumes to go, and, under long-eettlt>d and oiten-declared rules, It mulit be
Hnst11h1ed. Insurance Co. v. Buchauarl,
lllO Ind. 63. Counsel astlume that the plea
Of justlftca tlon WttS, SO far as thut hranch
of It Is concerned, madt' out by e\•ldence
thntappell~eseeured thedleti from one who
hnrl no authority to deliver them, and
this we regard e.s an undue assumption.
The question le not whether the appellee
got the dies from a pt>rson having no au~hmity to deliver them, nor whether he
got them without pftying for them, for
the lnnl(unge of the letter clearly lmputts
to him a corr11)1t and diRhonest pur"lOlie,
and it de\"OI \'ed upon the llppelhrnt to prove
that this was the amwllee'ti purpose.
Odger, Sland. & L. 169. A written Instrument is to he construed by the cuurt, and
not by the Jury. It wa11 for the court to
Instruct the jury as tu whether the letter
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was or wasnot libelous. Gabe v. McGin-

U-,5’ 33 Ind. %; Young v. Clegg. 93 Ind.

9,71, authorities cited page 374. it would

mt-refure have been proper for the court

(0 have even more explicitly instructed

the jury than it did as to What was neces-

ﬁai-y for the appellant to prove in orderto

Q-0llSl3'lt\1t6 a justification.

The second instruction asked by appel-

iant is not correct, for it asks the court

to say to thejury that it was their ex-

elusive province to determine from the

evidence who, il any one. was authorized to

deliver the diesto the plaintiff. As we ha we

seen. the question of authority involreil

an element oi law,and it would have been

error to leave the whole question to tlm

jury. It is evident that to give such an

inﬂtruction would mislead the jury, and
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induce in their minds the belie! that they

were to decide the whole question. Judg-

ment atlirmed.
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was or w-asnot libelous.

Gabe""· McGln·

uls, 68 J:nd. 588; Young v. CleJt"g, 93 Ind.
:~71, autborltlee cited page 374. It would
therefore have been p1-01>er fur the court
to ba.ve even morP explicitly Instructed
the jury "t:ben lt did as to what was nl'CesM&.fY for the appellant t o prove In order to
constltut:e a Justlftca.t:lon.
The second tnstructton asked by appellant Is not correct, for it: uskH the court
to say to tile jury tba t; it was their ex-

(Cue No.

aa

elusive province to determine from the
evidence who, U any one, wns authorized to
deliver the dies to the plttlntlfJ. As we ha vi,
seen, the question of 1111thorlty ln\"ol;etl
ttn element of law, and It would have h(!('n
error to leave tbe whole question to th11
jury. It ls evident that to give such an
lm1tl'11ctlo11 would mlslea.d the jury, and
Induce In their mind!! the belief that they
were to dcl"icle the whole question. Judgment aftirmed.
·
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RELE V AN CY.

S.\IlTH v. SATTERLEE et al.

(29 N. E. 225, 130 N. Y. 77.

Court of Appeals of New York. Second Divi-

sion. Dec. 23, 1891.

Appeal from supreme court, general term,

third department.

Action by John H. Smith against Jolm

Satterlee and others to recover on an as-

signment of a claim for services rendered.

Judgment for plaiutii’i'. Defendants appeal.

Reversed. For former reports, see 43 Hun,

638, mem.; iii Hun, 681, inem.

ILELEVANCY.

RlHTH v. 1UTTERLEE et al.
(29 ~. E. 2"-5, 130 N. Y. 677.)
Court of .Appeals of N<>w York. Second Division. Dee. 23, 1891.
.Appeal trom supreme court, general term,
third department.
Action by John H. Smith against John
Satterlee and others to recoYer on an astdgnment of a elalm for servl<'f's rendered.
Judgment for 11lulntlft'. Defendants a11peal.
Ren~reed.
J.'or former reports, see 43 Hun,
63.~. wem.; 41i Hun, 081, mem.
T. C. l'ronin, for ap1lf'llants. l!'raDJ(. Cumt-t1ky, for respondent.

'1‘. (J. Cronin, for appellants.

mesky, for respondent.

Frans Cu-

PAIKKER, J. The complaint alleged‘ an

indebtedness on the part of the defendant

to one Lutz for services rendered, and his

assignment of the demand to the plaintiff.
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The answer denied any indebtedness to

Lutz, and averred that prior to the assign-

ment of Lutz's alleged claim to the plaintiff

he became indebted to the defendants in a

sum exceeding the amount for which tho

plaintiff demanded judgment. It was not

disputed on the trial that Lutz rendered the

services for which plaintiff sought to recov-

er, nor their value. But the defendant at-

tempted to prove that Lutz was intrusted

with a sum of money due one Minshull, then

an engineer on Lutz’s division; that Lutz

converted the money to his own use, and

thereafter the defendants were compelled to

pay Minshuil such amount. Whether Lutz

did or did not receive and retain the money

intended for .\Iinshull was the only question

in the case. The defendants’ evidence tend-

ed to show a request by Lutz of the pay-

PAUKER, J. The complaint allPgt>d an
indebtedneBB on the part of the defPndnnt
to one Lutz for services renderl'd, and his
aeslgnment of the demand to the lllalntur.
The answer denied any indebtNlness to
Lutz, and averred that prior to the assignment of J,utz's allPged claim to the plaintiff
he beeame lndPbtl'd to the defendants In a
sum excet'dlng thP amount for whl<'h the
plaintiff demanded judgment. It was not
disputed on the trial that J,utz renderl'd the
services for which plaintiff sought to rt>eoYer, nor their value. But tbe defendant attempted to prove that Lutz was lntrusted
with a sum of money due one Mlnshull, then
an engineer on Lutz's division; that J,ntz
converted the money to bis own use, and
thereafter the defendants were compellt>d to
pay l\llnshull such amount. WhPther J,ntz
did or did not reeelve and retain the money
Intended for lllnshull was the only qnPRtlon
In the case. The defendants' evldenee tended to show a request by Lutz of the paymaster for l\llnshull's money; that It was
properly counted, put In an envelope, and
placed on the desk with the other pa5' envelopes, which were taken by Lutz to the employee on his division. Lutz denied haYlng

master for Minshull‘s money; that it was

properly counted, put in an envelope, and

placed on the desk with the other pay envel-

opes, which were taken by Lutz to the em-

ployes on his division. Lutz denied having

96

received or asked for it. The defendant Sat-

terlee testified that Lutz admitted to him

that he had received the money. but had lost

it, as he supposed. out of his overcoat pock-

et. And in further support of defendants’

contention it was proven that Minshull did

not receive his money at the time the other

employes on the division received theirs, but

that it was paid to him by the defendants

about eight days later. and by check. The

plaintiff, against defendants‘ objection and

exception, put in evidence a letter written

over a year after this action was commen-

ced, of which the following is a copy: “B3

broadway, .\'ew York, April 16th, 188-i. .l.

H. Smith, Esq-~Dear Sir: Yours of the

1-ith inst. is at hand, and contents noted.

To save cost, and stop further litigation, we

are willing to send you our check for ﬁfty

($51)) dollars in full liquidation of your

claim. Please let us hear from you. Yours,

etc., John Satteriee & C0.” The defendants

then moved that it be stricken out, but the

motion was denied, and the exceptions thus
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received or asked for It. The defendant Satterlee testified that Lutz admitted to him
that be had reeelved the money, but had lost
It, as he supposed, out of hla overcoat poeket. .And In further support of dPfendants'
contentlon It was proven that Mlnehull did
not l"\'('elve his money at the time the other
employes on the division n-celved theirs, but
that It was paid to him by the defendants
about Plght daya later, and by c-he<'k. Tbt11IulntUr, against dPfendants' objection and
exception, put ln evidence a letter written
over a year after this action was commeneed, of whl<'h the following ls a copy: "63
hroadway, XPw York, April 16th, 188-1. J.
H. Smith, Esq.-Dear Sir: Yours of theHth inst. ls at hand, and rontents noted.
To save rost, and stop further litigation, we
are willing to aend you our cheek for fifty
($:-10) dollars in full llquldatlon of yourelnlm. Pie.nae let us bear from you. Yours,
etc., John Satterlee & Co." The defendants
then ruovl'<l that it be stricken out, but thewotlon was tlenled, and the exceptions thus
taken are aeslgned for error on this review,
and must be sustained, because the letter
does not contain an admleslon of a fact, but
rather an offer of compromise, matte for the
11urpose of procuring a aettlewent of a pending controYersy. Lawrence v. Hopkins, UJ.
Johns. 288; Marvin v. Richmond, 3 Denio,
riS; Draper v. Hatfield, l:.!4 MaBB. ria. We
cannot agree with the learned Judge at gene1"ai term that the judgment should not be
reversed because the adml11Rlon of the letter could not have atf('('ted the result. It 18
not seen how this court can dt-termine what
Plreet lt had on the mind of tl1t- referee, who
admitted It as evidence, and then refWled to
strike It from the reronl. Presumably ll
was coneldered lo connection with the other evidence, whl<'h lndu<'ed a finding favorable to the plaintiff. The judgment should
be reversed. .All concur.
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AKERS v. KIRK et Bl.

(18 s. 1-1. 366. 91 Ga. 590.)

AKERS v. KIRK et al.
(18 S. E. 366, 91 Ga. 390.)
Supreme Oourt of Georgia. .April 24, 1893.
l"Bl~OIPA.L A.llD AOBNT t:IC<>PB or AOll::SCT-EVI·
J>B!!iOB-Al>111ss10~8-HA&MLE88 ERROR,

Supreme Court of Georgia. April 24, 1893.

L It

PBl.\'ClPAl_. AND Aer-;_\"r -— Scorn or Aozxcr—Ev1-

D1-:scE—Am-nssioxs—LIAR.1vn.r:ss Eauon.

1. It vyas competent for the plaiutid to tes-

ﬂfy why 1t was that in the ﬁrst instance he

charged the account sued upon to the defend-

ant's husband.

2- All 11891103‘ to borrow money for the pur-

pose of clearing off liens from defendant's prop-

crty does not comprehend an agency to confer

with the holder or claimant of one of the liens,

and make to him declarations touching the

aw‘-“QY. the payment of the debt, the agent's

hopes Or arrangements as to borrowing money,

01’_ll\‘-’_ Purpose for which it was wanted, no ap-

pl1cnt1on_for any loan being made to such hold-

er or claimant.
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3. A conversation b0t\veen the parties short-

ly before the trial, in whiz-h the defendant made

¢?\'li1lI1 admissions, was not rendered inadmis-

Blble up evidence by being brought about by

the plaintiif through a proposition of settlement,

it Mt appearing that the defendant's admissions

were made With any view to a. compromise. nor

amt. ‘"15’ terms of settlement were mentioned

or d1scussed_

h 4-Th<‘I‘6 being evidence tending _t0 show

{lat the defcndanfs father had _auth0nty from

dell; W b0l'r0w money for the _d1schari:e _of the

9 li ﬁlled for in this action, his declarations to

persons to whom he applied for loans. as to the

P‘"'lZ°$9 for which the money xvas wanted, were

:g_ll1i8Il?le_lll evidence, the p1_1r-pose so declared

nymgowlfthm the scope and obJ_ect of the author-

concern? $1.!‘ as the debt now In con roversy is

. 5- There bel (-on test as to the owner-

")!!! of the pm,,,'§§_.,”,°} was irnnmterial who fur-

nished the money ta ay for them. _

th 5- Recovery may e had upon evidence that

9P1_1rt_v sought to be charged xvas the conceal-

ed Pflllcipal of 3 erqon who acted in his own

name without disc ogfng his agency, though this

“E be not alleged in the Dl°adi'."*’-'5' If lb“ °b'

ll was a good one t0 (he evidence, it should

“-"° “fa Presented and insitIs;¢€dt:???]:_']|:G‘_:t§gE

and the def was created.

...... he» in-‘“‘¢¥--.---= -:.**<;z:2a@‘*.'.¥..r:m

the case,“ alillatural equity 0:211 ‘egul evideuce to

“upper: it dhthere ‘.5 ‘Fun of some illegal evi-

deuce in breht e adnnssio evaiﬁng arty Wm not

rend:-r a he 11lf_of _the_ Pr usable. 0th the trial

court anq court being satisﬁed,

th - _

e-verdmt lnust stand.

, Fulton county;

by Thomas 1-111-1‘ Y0} 1-"miulst

xﬁrs Tlmre was 3 \'|\1(ll(_t 01 pun.

a trial denied. Defendant

new

r01-_ Aﬂ1ru)g\d-

u°"V'ing is thé Oﬂi"

\I1'S-

‘ﬁxed ‘ close a licn as con-

anq also to.t0r:;en for \\‘u1'k done

on and ugh“ matorial Qd for the I‘(‘[)illi‘lIi‘.!

- - .311

W'&B

competent for the plaintiff to tee-

ttff why it waa that In t:he first instancP. he
chargf'!d the account sued

upon to the defend·
ant's husband.
2. An agency to borro"W" 1noney for the pur:poee of clearing off liens froID defendant's propertY does not comprehend o.n ageDCJ to confer
with the holder or claimant: of one of the liens,
and make to him declara tiona touching the
agency, the payment of the debt, the agent's
hopes or arrangements as to borrowing money,
or the purpose for which it 'W'O.B wanted, no application for any loan being made to such holder or claimant.
a. A. conversation bet'W'een the parties short11 before the trial, in whi<>h the defendant made
Certain admissioDB, was not rendered inadmis·
Bible u evidence b7 being brought about by
the plaiutitr through a proposi Uon of settlement,
It not appearing that the defendant's admi11sions
were made with any vie'W' to a comproml11e, nor
that. any terms of nttlement were mentioned
or d111Ctl88ed.
4. There beinir evidence 'tending to show
that the defendant's father had authority from
her to borrow money for t:he diacharge of the
debt IUed for In thia action. his declarations to
pel'80na to Whom he applled for Joana, aa to the
PUl'JIOle for which the .IDoney w-ne wanted, were
~ml•ible In evidence, the purpose so de<'lared
. ag within the scope and object of the authority, ao far aa the debt no"W' in controversy ia
eoncernetf.
5. There being no cont:est aa to the owner~lp of the premises, it W'&& immaterial who furlllahl'd the money to pa7 for them. •
6. Recovery ma be bad upon evidence that
:e P'rt~ sought to ~ charged was the concealPnnc1pal of a person who acted In his own
name Without diacloaing bis a.gen<'Y, though this
fac~ be not alleged in the pleading&. I~ the obectioa WIL8 a good
to t:he evidence, 1t Rhould
ave been
one d Insisted upon whf'n the
eriden- Pl't'sented an
h
t
the dt'<'lnration
uld ..... wa.a offered so t a
cifi
th
""' be amended and made ape c as to •
IDode In •hi h th
tract between the plalnU and h
c
e con
ted
7 ~ e defendant W'&.8 creadoubtedly repreaenta 'th here the verdict ~u aound justice of
the caae_e natural eq.uity anh legal evldeuce to
1npp0rt 1 &.nd there is ~noug£ some Illegal evihthe admission :iung ;i>ILl'tY will not
deul'e in
re11d1•r a n e alf of ~he. prevsable. Both the trial
court an() ew trial .md1spencourt beiug satisfied,
the verdiet the revaewing
tSylJab
lllust stand.
·
u.. b,y the Court.)
Error tr-o
cour~ Fulton eonnty;
1

'

l;

M. J. Clar- Qi

SUI•l"l"

or

Action bk.e, Judge.
Kli-1~ & ('o. against
Ella A!ier.-e 3'" ~homu:,.ns a ,·t>rdkt for plain·
tiffs, au<1 •
'Ihere \•
denil•d. Defendant
brlnga e
a new tr u 1
The to~:r. AtftrJ.Ded~fll<."1n1 rl'port:
Kirk ~ "1\r!ng la t.be l\lrs. Akel'& upon nn
account, a:r::a. <~o. sued ~or~close a lit' n as <'On·
tractors a
<I alsb to- 1 men tor wol'k done
on and
mnt<>rl:lshNl for thl' rrpnlrln~
and buil(!t• t:erial :rurcertnln boUIW lwlonglng
to Mrs. ~ •g of a
f.•dtion alleged thnt the
lien waa fll~r-s.
Tbe
days attl.'r thl' work
waa corul>l ~<I with~ tbe material turnh~hl'1I;
and that 1:11. ~~ed an
brought within less than
12 month~ e Elult -was time the work was done
IDd DllltQ.t"'l~-l"'ou• tht bf.'d• and also within 12
llooths :t.t"' at.1 {"UrD 8 uu.ie the debt became

ll:l:<l

1;o

Q~

t;be

lr'll:.Q"a. .-v.--Jl

[Case No. 8G

dul'. •rhl' account attnched to the declaration ran trom July 23d to NOl·ember 10th,
but the year was not stated. The Hen wu
reeorded Decl.'mber 28, 1889. Defendant
pleaded "not indebted;" tbat she made no
contract with plalnturs; that they did not
Ille their llen within the time allowed by
law and alleged In the declaration; and thnt
they took personal eecurlty for their debt.
Plaintllrs obtained a verdict, and defend·
ant's motion for a new trial was ovcn-ulC>d,
to which she excepts. Her motion contained
the general grounds that the verdict wns
contrary to law, evldenee, etc.; also that the
court refused to nonsuit plalntltrs on motion of defendant; that no case wu made
out against her, but against her husbnnct,
G. W. Akers, for which she was not shown
to be responsible, whll'h refusal to noll8Ult
was error. Error in allowing plaintiff, over
defendnnt's objection, to testify: "We
charged the ac<'ount to G. W. Akers, bccauae
we supposed he owned the houae, and the
house was good tor It." Defendant objected,
because the lot was not responsible for the
Improvement., unleu the owner prOCUl"ed
the improvements, or snbsequently ratified
them. Because the court permitted plaintiff
to testify: ''I have bad a couversn.tlon with
her (Mrll. Akers') father since the work was
done, in reference to Mrs. Akers paying
the debt." Defendant objected on itrounds
of lrrelel"11ney, and tbat her father could
not bind her. Also because the court permitted plalntUr to testify: "Her tatbrr, u
near u I can remember, come into my store
a month or two after the lien was t\led,
and he stated to me that he hoped to sl·ttll•
this account In a very short ttme. Be ::_
making arrangements, I think, -with cd \t
Healy to borrow money; nnd b~ ~ '6°no~
would be all sntlsfnctory. and in u. v~te"O.dn.'n't
time he would puy the account."
.a -p\i).\13.'t\'!'
objected because the court perm\tt' · -renu&-n\::o
to testify: "He [T. J. t:;bepberd, '1~ ~-y\-n~ Oll
fath<>l'] wanted it [the mo1u•y he VII~
iJ.O~~e ~
borrow] to pay us for the wor1'
D~e...,\\."t
the house." Defendant olljl•cte6,...-.e~"3·
ground that the testimony was l
-- • <
and, further, tbat the promise, lf e.:'~ c1
Mrs. Akers' part to pay G. W. bo,1'-,,.
#•
should he In writing. Bel'nuse ~ ~
exnmlnntlon ot plaintiff he t.est\t\
~1
morning Mrs. Akers and her fat t
~
sitting togethrr, and be went o\J ; ~
.....w1•nt In and took n sPnt by bel', 1e.:I"'
'could not this in some -way be sett 11 '-•°"I~
case be scttled,-e.nd then this ot cit~
VEirsatlon occurred.' tn<>an\njlt b<'r 11 i:C?~
tl'Rtlfil'd to prevlomdy by \llnlntUl.'s;.s <
')lrR. Akrrs snld tbnt brr rather :ebt
to borrow the wonPY to \ll\Y the
t ~
1\urn pl•tintur so tt•:-4t\l\4.•(\, defendnndY
~
to exdnde the con verHtl. tlon alre~bO'°#C' ~
fi<'d to by plnin tHT. n.nd. set 0~
the ground that ,vbu.tever occ l·ould nol:admltted In said conv~~lo:n tbls trl*':j
11
received agnJnst de~e:o.

._e.-

"°"•

o"

Case No. 85]
Case No. 35]

RELEVAN CY.

_ recorded lien.

"testimony and that it was irrelevant.

it (the conversation) was looking to a com-

promise. Because the court admitted the

Defendant objected on the

grounds that the lien offered was recorded

about 60 days after the last item sued on,

and the petition set up that the lien claimed

was recorded within 30 days of the last

item, and that the aliegata and probata. did

not agree; that the substantial part of the

material sued for, to wit, the bills of August

13th and July 23d, was furnished over 90

days prior to the record of the lien offered;

and that no connection was shown between

the items of August 13th and July 23d, and

the remaining material or items. Because

the court permitted a. witness, J. A. Scott,

to testify: “I think he l'I‘. J. Shepherd]
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wanted to pay certain debts with_it. He

wanted to borrow it for his daughter.” De-

fendant objected on the grounds that there

was nothing binding on Mrs. Akcrs in this

Be

cause the court permitted Scott to testify:

“Mr. Shepherd stated that he wanted to

remove the liens that were on the property;

that was what he wanted with the money."

Defendant objected on the grounds that no

connection was shown with Mrs. Akcrs. and

that it was irrelevant. Because the court

‘refused to permit defendant to show who

furnished the consideration for the lot

ought to be subjected to the lien of plain-

tii'fs. As piaintiﬂs set up that Mrs. Akers

and Mr. Akcrs were concealing an agency,

this evidence was -proper. Because the court

permitted plaintiffs, in rebuttal, to prove by

a number of witnesses the length of time

Mrs. Akcrs was around the improvements,

and the extent to which she exercised super-

vision. The error alleged was that plaintiﬂfs

had gone into all this kind of evidence in

making out their case, and it was not legally

or properly in rebuttal. Because petitioner

alleged a contract and debt with Mrs. Akcrs,

but the evidence only tended to establish a

concealed principal, which was not alleged.

Because the allegations of the petition and

the evidence introduced thereunder do not

agree.

So far as material, the evidence for plain-

t;iff was: The materials mentioned in the

account went into the house. which belonged

to Mrs. Akcrs.

At the time piaintiifs were -

making the improvements they thought the §

house belonged to Akcrs. Akcrs came to

them, and got them to do the work, and they

charged the account to him, because they

supposed he owned the house, and the house

was good for it. They completed the job,

and have never been paid for it. Since the

work was done, plaintiff Kirk had a conver-

sation with Mrs. Akcrs’ father. Shepherd,

in rci'crcn':e to Mrs. Akcrs paying the debt.

This was a month or so after the lion was

tiled. lIer father came into the store, and

RELEVANCY.

It tthP <'on\·Pr811tlon) was looking to a com- to borrow money, and hoped lt would be all
pro1111Kl'. Because the court admitted the aatlst'nctory, and In a very short time he
r{'('()rded lien. Defendant objl'c·ted on the would puy the account Kirk did not think
i,'l'ounds that the Uen otrered was r('('()l"ded
be stated whom he was trying to borrow the
about 00 days after the last ltl'ru su<>tl oo, money Cur, only that he wanted to pay off
and the petition set up that tlw I:en t·lnlmed
the debt. Dltl not think he mentioned his
was recorded within 30 days or the last daughter's nnm«i>. He said he wanted It to
item, and that the all<>gata and probata did pay plulntltrs for the work done on the
not agree; that the substantial part of the house. Kirk had a conversation with Mrs.
material sul'd for, to wit, the bills of August Akers in reference to that conversatton with
13th and July !!3d, waa furnished over 90 her father, and she said that her father wae
duys prior to the rl'<'Ord of the lien offered; trying to borrow the money for her to pay
and that no conn('('tlon was shown betwt•en otr wbnt she owl'd plaintUl's. When the
the Items of Augmit t:lth and July 23d, and goods were sold, Akers beloni;:-t.'<I to a firm
the remnlnlng material or Items. Bt.'<'lluse which stood well, and plalnt1tr11 were perthe court permitted a witness, J. A. Scott, fectly willing to sell goods to Akt>ra, and
to tt>stlfy: "I think be [T. J. Shepherd) never asked Mrs. Akers whether he owned
wantl'd to pay certain d1~bts with. It. He the lot or not, nor Inquired of any person
wanted to borrow It for his daughter." De- In whom was the title to the lot, suppo1dng,
fendant objected on the grouncls that there ot course, that the house would be good
was nothing binding on Mrs. Akers In this for the Improvements. They gave the credit
'testimony and that It was lrrt•levant. Be- to Akers and the lot and house comblnro.
cnwie the court permitted Sl'ott to tl'Rtlfy: r.upposlng he owned the house, and that the
"Mr. Shephl'rd stated that he wantl'd to house was good for It Did not st>e Mrs.
remove the llt>ns that were on the pro11rrty; Akers at 311 in the transaction. There are
that was what be wanted with the money." oue or two articles In the account charged
Dl'fendant objl'ctro on tbe grounds that no to Mrs. A.k.?rs,-part of a gas fixture, one
<•onn<>c•tlon was shown with :\lrs. Akers, nnd or two of the small articles she might have
that It was lrrcle\"ant. Bt>rnn.~<' th<' court , 1>urchn11cct. The goods were not sold on the
l'<'fUsNI to permit defPntlant to show who <'rt•dlt or 1\11'1'. Akers, and she did not enter
furnl!:!l11'<1 the consfd('l"ntloo for the lot l11to the com1mtntlon at all. Plaintiffs aftersought to be subjected to the lien of plnln- wards clslmPd the mont-y from her, because
tltrs. As plalntUfs set up that Mrs. Akers they found out she owned the lot and hOU8e.
and Mr. Akers were concealing an agency, The lost Item of the ac<'ount Wl'Ut on the
this evidence was .proper. Because the court , house. The morning of thl' trial }lrs. Akers
permitted plafntltrs, In rebuttal, to prove by nnd her father were sitting togPtber, and
a number of witnesses the length of time he went out, RDd Kirk took a seat by be1·,
Mrs. Akers was around the lmprovem1•nts, and said In some way this case can be st>tand the extent to which she exercised super- tled, and thl'u the conversation with her
vision. The error alleged was that plaintiffs occurred. Kirk thought If they could arbod gonl' Into all this kind of evidence In range It without going to a trlnl he prt>ferred
making out their case, and It was not lt>gnlly to do so,-meant It should not go to trial It
or propl.'l·ly In rebuttal. Because petitioner she could pay up, and not have a trial. He
alleged a contract and debt with Mrs. Akers, did not know, of course, whether she would
but the evidence only tended to establish a or not. Had no Idea of compromise at all
coucealc>d principal, which was not allt•grd. She told him that hl'.r father had been tryBecause the allegntlons of the petition nnd ing to borrow the money to pay this debt,
the evidence Introduced thereunder do not but she did not know why he did not sucel'Pd. Thl're was no written contract to furagree.
Ro far as material, the evldt>nce tor plnln- nish the material, nor was tbl're a contract
tttr was: The materials mentioned In the with anybody, except a verbal one of Akers.
n<·count went Into the bou.~<'. whi<'h bt>longro Mr. Akers C'ame and made the trnde to 1tet
to Mrs. Akers. At the time plnintlfl'11 were a stove from 1>lalntltrs, and Mrs. Akers
mnklng tbe Improvements thl'Y thouji';ht thf' paid for It the following June. Akere left
house belonged to Akers. Akers cnme to Geo1·1.rta some time In December, l&~. or
them, nnd ~t them to do the work, and they January; 1800. Kirk thought be saw Mrs.
charged the account to him, because they Akers down at the house, and that she might
supposed he owned the house, and the house have been down In tht! store, but was not
was good for it. They completed the job, ct>rtaln that she was In the store. Scott tl'S·
nnd have uevao been paid for It. Since the tlll<'d that Shepherd wonted to borrow some
work was done, plaintiff Kirk bad a. conver- monl'y on the property from Henly for
sn Uon with Mrs. Akt>r'J' fntht>r, ~hl'plwrd, Sh<'pberd's daughter to pay <'Crtaln dl'hts
In r,•flor,•nce to l\Jrs. Akl'rs p:t.\"luir thP tle!Jt. with It, saying he wantl.'d to rt•movl' the
llm!! thnt wl'l·e on the propel'ty; nud Hlwp·
TniK w:tK a mouth or so afh•r thl• llPit wa11
tilt•d. Iler father came Into the l!to1·e, and hrrd put Into Scott's hands dt-l'lls to the lot
l!tatro thnt he hoped to settle the account> In question for examination. Shepherd al!:!o
In a vcrry short time. He was making ar- tried to borrow of \Vellhouse money on the
rnngl•rnents, Kirk thought, with Mrs. Healy property, to pay off the balance due on It,
98

•

-------ADMISSIONS.

[Case No. 33

ADMISSIONS.

[Case No. 35

and left a. deed at VVellhouse’s. Shepherd

Stated to Wehhouse that he wanted to bor-

row the money for his daughter. The daugh-

ter herself never applied to l/Vellhouse for a.

loan. There was evidence also that Mrs.

Aka-rs was at the house during part of the '

time that the work was being done; saw it

done, and directed sorne changes to be made.

For the defendant there was testimony

that she was absent frorn Atlanta during the

time the improvements xvere being made,

and when she returned it wvas all complete,

and she directed no change; . She did not

agree with anybody to inake the improve-

ments. and knew notl1in',<.>: about them. She

did not make anybody 1101' agents to have

the l_mp1-ovements made. Iler husband was

not her agent. and she never had any con-

versation with him in xvhich he said he was
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301111: to act as her agent, or anything of that '

kind. She had no notice of any purchases

to be made, knew nothing about build-

ing houses, did not eznploy any workmen

to assist in the work, and bought no mate-

rial. First saw Kirk the Inorning of the

llflﬂl. and did not rcrnenihr-r ever purchasing

anything from him. Did not buy the stove,

Pm did Pay for it; but nevvr gave any I"'°m'

189 to pay for anv other part of the debt.

In the COl1\»OI.satj(;n vvith Kirk the morning

Of the trial he asked her if there was any

W83’ the matter could be settled. She told

him she did not know, as she knew nothing

flfait in any way, having been absent from

c||;y_ She could not tell anything

about it. S1“; believed she

11 She "°1d him it, but did not

"<1 heard something Of

know anvthin

. ‘ . b t it, =1

111 ﬂnyfhiﬁggmzrgu ghe did not say any-

thing about hm. father Ilis name was not

mentioned as never appoint-

Her father W apacity, and

transactions

has one or two

0 attend to the

ather looks after

\Vo1'k had just

she went away.

ere going to re-

ng could not tell

she

in Atlanta W11

Qt knovv they ‘V

house and it. She

husband. Some

t °""" with nelyvhllershe heard

be done.

improve the house.

nk-ed it before she

oiug to be

id not know Eiterwliilsslfandrin ref-

not talk toing to be done to the

at “'“s gotions as to what was

ed ”° quess nad her deed to the

done‘ Ha ng ti1ne,—longer than

handss uni: I-Qniember when she

and left a deed at "W'ellhouse'a. Shepherd ter, aomt>Umes,-1 suppos(' so- As I was
• stated to Wellhouse t:hnt he wanted to bor· not here, I don't know anything about lt.
row the JDODey for his dn ughter. The d1mgh- I don't remember whether I turned over
·ter hersel.r never applied to Wellbouse tor a. my deed to my fatht>r, and told him to do
toan. There was evidence also thnt Mrs. the best he could with It, or not." Defend·
Akers 'W&S at the house during part ot the ant la using the property since the Improvetime that the work 'W'RS being done; anw It ments have been put upon It, and her hus<lone, and directed eon1e cllnnges to~ made. band has nothing to do '\\1th lt, having left
For the defendant there was testimony 'Georgia some time ngo. "'I don't know
that abe waa absent b-om Atlnnta during the what I ~ve father the deed for. I gnt'Ss
time the lmprovemen ts ""·ere being made, he- Nothing." "Don't know whether I let
and when she returned It 'W'ns all complete, 1 him have It to come to Atlanta and negotiand she directed no chunges. She did not ate a loan to pcy off this Indebtedness on
agree with anybody to 111nke the lmprove- my property or not. Father sorter overmt>nts, and knew nothJng about them. She sees my property sometimes. Since my
dld not make anybody h<>r agents to have husband Jett, some ot the time father baa
the lm1>rovements ma.de.
:I-Ier husband wns been In charge ot my atratrs, and I supnot her agent, and she ne,·er bnd nny <'OD· pose he la here now looking after this suit."
vcrs:1tlon with him Jn w-hlch be !'llllcl he wus "There bas bet'o several thousand dollars ot
going to act as her agent:. or anything of that Improvements put upon the house, and I
kind. She had no notJce o~ any purchases hnve not paid one dollar tor It." Shepherd
to be made, knew nothing about build· testified that Akers, In a letter, told him
he (Akers) owed some parties for material
Ing hous<>s, did not employ any workmen
turnlshed and labor done In repairing or
to asalat lo the work. and bought no mnterlal. First saw Kirk the JDOrnlog of the remodeling the house, and would like to
trial, and did not remein bE-r ever purchllslng have Shepherd assist Mrs. Akers In trying to
anything from him. DJd not buy the stove, get some money to pay olf the ln:l<'btedne88, suggesting that he thought Sh<'plwrd
but did pay for lt; but never gave any promise to pay for any other pa.rt ot the debt. could get some mont>y from Healy, WellIn the conversation wi tb Kirk the morning house, or others; that he thought, with
Shepherd's assistance, he could borrow the
Of the trial he asked her 1~ there was any
way the matter could be settled. She tdld money. Shepherd came to Atlanta for that
him she did not know as sbe knew nothing purpose, and saw several parties with a
or.it In any way ha..;lng been absent ti·om view of getting the money, but was lntormed
the city. She 'cou1d
not
tt>ll anything that the claims agnlnst the property amount·
nbout It. She told hllD she believed she ' ed to so much that "we>" abandonro the
bad heard something 0~ tt, but did not Idea. Mrs. Akers did not do nnyth\nJC. ~~~
know anything about tt:. 0 :nd could not tell nesa talked with her, ndvlaed with her. wl.th
him anything
did not any any· did not want to lncumber the propertJ ever
more. ~he
•t
thl
a mortgage, and no agreement -w~\t-o.ee&
ng nbout her father.
III& nawe Wll8 no
menttoned. Her father 'W'aJ!I never nppolnt· n•n<:h!'d from her to mortgage, tbat iu.ii> the
t ln anY capacity, and evt>r knew of. They were considerss 'l'l~t.
ed by her 118 h
she liad no ~~.:l~ e o:f a.DY transnctlons propriety of the thing when wi~e e ~o~
he lllay ha
h d g She bn& one or two to try to get the money to relieve ~-- o~.,.e~
gentlemen te A~ · ta vvho attend to the ot a debt which he believed AJ'C f!J· )';:.e.\1\'l>'rents or th n
an H r :ra tber looks after.: Wltne88 did not recognize that ~..-q4\'l.the bll8f
e place.
~
...,,,V ork had just 1 owed anything. The debts were .c;.
e.~
h~ne.ss sometimes.
'
Akers. Mrs. Akers never const\t~ve!~u
~WI on the house be~ore she went away.
'U'
She did not
tb y -were going to re- . nt'SS as 41er agent to negotiate.
0
build the
know
e ularge tt. She had 1 vised together In reference to v- ~
__,1
not talkect house and t> 11er bu&band. Some I this money, and witness a.ttem1>te6 J~
'
Ume after~t over wtt!od -wblle,-she henrd ' row lt,-was attempting to borro~ c~~ J. i
him 8Peak ll.t"ds,-a t g dld not know for cer- her property; that ls what they ~tl•e ~ ._
~,.
tain It 'VV'aor_ lt. bu
be done. Did not slderlng. The object 'Waa to ta\te t;
know they .:.. going toto improve the house. off the property. 'V\'ltnesa does n°'6• _, -~
Knew th
ere golng
ed lt before she what facts constitute an agency. ?til ~ ~
e~
'L.•
mDJ.en.:
wanted the 'parties pnld 1'.or the wor~ J.7
left, but di
.uu.d co
i t was going to be
done, Dld cl not kno'W ber husband lo ref· on the building, but ls not herselftll ~
ereoce to """"' ~<>t talk t:ol g to be done to the do It. She owns the property, w1
house. ~ bat was go ~0118 aa to what was room house upon lt, etc.
, ...
going to belc.~d. no quest bad her deed to the
Mayson & Hill, 'for plalntift ln ert0
land In b.e~ c:J.one. :a:~:ng tlme,-longer than 1• .Albert, tor defendants ln error.
six months b.nnds a
t remember when she
,........
benllnotetf• L.!.
BLECK I' EY • C. .:J • i p
~ ....
e r t of t h e -ti"',,.s,1
imve ft to ·
noes no nor bow long It was
o
re
I. tb\S c
:1fter the ~e~ :tather~:n,,gbt. Her father at- gethf'r with the oft\clu.
l gs lllade D
tended to llo t ,.,vas brt bU.SlD('SS of borrowing will render the r ul n
Tbere cun be :l
1'. the jurf ref'
money fo~ b.~e o:t. tbn._as lJ1 Atlnnta, looking autllclently lnteUlgi b1e.
:Ele
her· "ID this mat· doubt that the verdict 0
after her ' L e;r-.

..~lness

~or

I

:;J.

I

---n,.:-

Cll8c No. 35]
Case N 0. 35]

ltELEVA‘.\'(‘.Y.

.-ents the natural equity and sound justice

01' the case. The le,-_'al ground on which the

verdict rests is that Mrs. Akcm was the

concealed principal of her husb:u1d; and

that, although the credit was originally given

to the latter by Kirk & Co.. this was done

in ignorance of the agency and of the true

ownership of the property. There was

enough legal evidence that such was the

real truth of the ease to uphold the verdict.

That some ille,-zal ('\'itll‘lii‘t‘ was zuimitted

docs not render :1 new trial indispensable.

To every lover of justice the verdict al-

ready tonntl is more .~‘:lil~‘f:lt'im‘_\‘ than would

be one oi’ an oppo.-ite nature. It is impos-

sible not to feel that, as Mrs. Akers, not

HELEVASCY.

1<1•ntN the nntm·al equity nnd sound Justice
of the case. The le1ml g1·onud on wbkb thl'
verdict rests ls thut Mrs. Akers wu the
concealt'<I principal of her busbnud; nnd
that, although the crt'<lit was originally given
to the latter by Kirk & Co., this was done
In Ignorance o:f the agency and of the true
ownership of the property. There was
enough legal evldt•ncl' that such was the
rE'nl troth of th<' <':t,.t• to uphold tlw V<'rdlct.
That some lll<'gnl <'\"ltll'lll't' was 111lmltted
do<'11 not r<'nd<'r u n1•w trial lndl"l't'nsnble.
To every lo¥t•r of Jusli<'t' tht• wrdlct al·
ready fouml b1 more "atl,f:11·tory thnn would
be 00(' or llll 01>11011ltt• nntw·e. It la lmposRlhll' not to f<'el that, us Mrs. Akers, not
ht>r husband, obtained the benefit, she or
her property ought to answer tor It, rathel'
100

than lilrk & Co. should lo12e their money.
Wb<'rt! all the con,.hl('ratlon of a debt reaches
a wife as an acc~'41on to ht>r M.'J>IU'ate estate,
and she retulllll and enjoy& lt, only slight evl·
d<'Dl'e of the husband's agency In contracting
the debt Is r('qulrt'<I to t•barge hPr. We have
exnmlnro mnny adj111l11•atlons upon somewhat similar cast's, but It Is n('('dl<'l!B to cite
them; for, whllP som<' of thl'm would mnke
tor us, thf.'Y nre balanced by otht>rs of an op.
poelte tenclPncy. Wt> prt>rl'r to r1"8t the
casP on prlnl'lple and ltl'I own farts. Both
tl1P trial rourt nnd thf.' rt>vlt>wlng rourt nre
contt>nt with thf.' v1•r1llrt. Tbl11 bt>ln~ !10,
we d!'rllnP to ordE'r a nf'w trial tor 11lhrht
errors lmmlltPrlal to thP l't'11ult on the netwtl
merit& al the controvers7. .Judgment affirmed.

her husband, obtained the beneﬁt, she or

her property ought to answer tor it, rather

100
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than Kirk & Co. should lose their money.

Wliere all the consideration of a debt reaches

a wife as an accession to her separate estate.

and she retains and enjoys it, only slight evi-

dence of the. husband's agency in contracting

the debt is required to charge her. We have

examined many :1d_iudications upon some

what similar cases. but it is needless to cite

them; for. while some of them would make

for us, they are balanced by others of an op-

•

posite tendency. We prefer to rest the

case on principle and its own facts. Both

the trial court and the reviewing court are

content with the verdict. This being so,

we decline to order a new trial for sii,-.:ht

errors immaterial to the result on the actual

merits ot the controversy. Judgment at-

ﬁrmed.

..

•

-- ~-_.--

CO~FESSIO~S.
CONFESSIONS.

[Case No. 36

HOPT v-

HOPT v. PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY

OF UTAH.

(4 Sup. Ct. 202, 110 U. S. 57-1.)

PE()PIJE OF THE TERRITORY

OI“ UTAH.

(4 Sup. Ct. 202, 110 U. S. 574.)

supreme Court of the United States. March 3.

188-L

In error to the suprelne court of the terri-

tory oi.‘ Utah.

Thos. J. Marshall, for plaiutiii in error.

Supreme Court of the United States. March 3.
1884.
In error to the supreme court ot the teJTl·
torr of Utah.
Tbos. J. Marshall, 1'.or plalntll'l In error.
.-\14-'lt. Atty. Gen. Mau1-y, for defendunt In error.

Asst. Atty. Gen. .\Ia1n- ', for defendant in er-

l'0l'-

HARLAN, J. The plaintiff in error and

one Emerson were jointly indicted in a court

of Utah for the murder, in the ﬁrst degree.

of John F. Turner. Each (lofvmlant demand-

ed a separate trial, and pleaded not guilty.

lit-pt. being found guilty, “'21s sentenced to

suffer death. The judglnent was atilrmed by

the supreme court of the territory. But, upon
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writ of error in this court, that judgment

was reversed, and the case remanded, with

instructions to order a nexv trial. 104 U. S.

Q1. Upon the next trial, the defendant be-

ing found I-ruilry’ was again sentenced to

suffer death. That judgznent was aﬁlrmed

by the gum-,.me court of the territory. We

air now required to deterlnine whether the

court of originn] jurlsdk-tiOD in its conduct

of the last trial <_-omnlitted any error to the

Du-judit-e of the substantial rights of the de-

fendant_

l. The validity of the judgrnent is question-

ed upon the ground that 11 part of the pro-

ceedings in um "ml court xvere conducted in

The abs 1 nt.

(‘Ode otfmce of the defel“ :1 § 218, provides

that “it the indictment is for a felony the -

(lefen

"181; b

in the absence of the defendant; if,

however -essary for the

- hi _ is I1e¢ *

Purpose or ,§e§;“ﬁ“f;§§n_ the court may, upon

application of fie >1-osecuting attorney, by

an order or walrmlut require the personal

attendance g ndant at the trial.”

The Sam of the de e that 9, juror may be

v for actual bias;

°1' u xistence .,

was ﬁleaejust inference in referenu.

4 ith ti.

that he “ﬂu not act W en re

lmpai-gin" _ 239_ 241. Such a

(_ha"eng0,t3i>_ ‘ ber-tioziss be denied, must be

tried bv 1' the rac triers. not on the

. three imvarﬂal D the court. Sec-

’ and “PP"mted Inenged “nmy be

he Juror 8° ch”

examln rove or disprove

the chaeligis 9, xvitlieissttgngwer every (Ines-

tion pertin gﬁ. and In inquiry." Section 2-19.

“Other ‘tent to thégv also be examined on

either S1 e messes In rules of evidence ap-

Dlicable t ’ and the of other issues govern

the adm the trial Jusion of evidence on

then-1a_| ‘Q11 01' exilge ” Section 250. "On

the hial ‘E119 chalggllenge for actual bias,

“hen the the c concluded, the court

HA.RLAN, J. The plnlntlt'I' In error and
one l<~mf'rson were jointly lndleted In a court
of l;tah for the murder. In tbe first degree,
of John I<'. Turner. .E<Jach defl'ndunt demand·
ec:l a lie1>nmte trial, and ple>tull>d not guilty.
Hq1t. being found gnil ty, "•ns 11entenced to
1mlfer (jeath. 'l'he judgn:ient wns alHrmed by
the supreme <.'Ourt of the territory. But, upon
writ of error lo this court, that judgment
wus re'·ersoo, and the c•nse remnnrled, with
lnstmctlons to order a ne~ t:rtal. 104 U. S.
~1. U1>0n the next trial, t:he d<>t'encln.nt being found guilty, was ug.nln i:wntf'uced to
imlfer death. '!'hat judgrnen t wus nfftrmed
b~· the 111111rt-me court of t-he territory. We
lll'l' now reqnlred to det:erini ue whether the
l'OUrt of original jnrlsdlc-tfon in its couduct
of the last trial conuu i t te<l a uy error to the
Jll"(•judl<·e of the substant:inl rights of the defendant.
1. 'l'he l"lllldlty ot the j Uflgn1e11t le question~ llPon tbe ground tlia t: n
pnrt of thP pro~lnge In the trial c<>Urt -,.vere c-ond111·tl•1I ln

t~e absen<>e of the det'en<lu.nt:. The Criminal
{Ode ..Of p,..u
I
f U t~ b
..,,.'el ure o
·~
• § 218, provldt>s
ha
t t It the indictment ls ~or a felony the
defenclunt must be persona llY present ut the
trial; but If tor a m\edenien.uor the trial ~1ay
be had In theab eencc 0 L- the defendant, If,
hoWever bl
'
s pre11ence ls :necessary for the
purpose or Identification, the court may, upon
applleat1on of the rosecutlng attorney, hy
an Order 0
Pt require the personal
attendanee r warnn:i~-reuc:lnnt at the trial."
The same
of the
8 tbnt a juror may be
ehaUeng'edCode pro'\"lde artY tor actual bins;
that Is ··- by either P
6
a state ot mind
'
LOr tl
\stence OA.
Which lead~ . ie ex · t tu'ference In reference
to the cuse· to a jus 111 not act with entire
lmparttaUt tl1at he w
2:lU
2.U. Such a
challeogf• ~ • ·' Sectlo~s ·be denied, must be
tried b~· 'th r the facr:\nl triers, not on the
Jury P11ne1
r~ lmJ>ll1 ted bY the court. Section 246. :..rand app<>
cballenged "may be
examlneq a he juror 9 to prove or dlt!pro\·e
the chaUen 8 a wttnes st: answer every ques·
tlon Jlertln ~e. and muln<.Iutry." Section 249.
"Other '1P'lt:ent; to t:lle
also be exnmlned 011
either aide n~ffes ma~les of evidence applicable to> and the 0~ other Issues govern
the admlaet t:h_e trtal ctuston of evidence on
the trial 0 _ on or eJC
e " 8ectlon 200 "011
... 't:b
bnueug .
.
tile trial o.r e c
bauenge for actual bins,
when the
t:be c
concluded, the court
rnu11t lnst-.-:'\l"tdeDC~ 8rs t:bat lt la their ducy
- ... ~t; t;be ..... ae

:0
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to tlnd the challenge true, If In their opinion
the e\'lden(.-e warrants the conclusion that the
jnror has such a bias agnjnst the party challt>niclng him 88 to render him not impartial,
uml that It from the evidence they belle'\'e
him free from such bias they must find the
challenge not tme; that a hypothetlcnl opln·
loo on hearsay or information supposed to be
true is ot Itself no evidence of bias sutli·
clent to dlsquallty a juror. The court can
gh·e no other lnstruetlon." Section 2:>2.
"The trle1'8 must thereupon flnd the challenge
either true or not true, and their decision Is
final. If they find It tnte the juror must be
excluded." Section 2a3.
It ap(lears that six jurors were se1>arately
challenged by the defendant for actual bias.
The grounds of challenge In each case were
denied by the district attorney. For each Ju·
ror trll'rs were appointed, who, being duly
sworn, were, "before proceeding to try the
challenge," Instructed as required by section
2:'i2 of the Crtmlnnl Code; after which, In
each case, the triers took the juror from the
court-room Into a dll'lerent room and tried
the gronnde ot ehallenge out ot the presence
as well of the court as of the defendant and
hls coullllel. Their findings were returned ·
into court, and the challenge, being· found
not true, the jurors so challenged resumed
their seats among those summoned to try
the case. Of the six challenged for actual
hlae, four were sul1seq11ently challenged by
the defendant peremptorily. The other two
were sworn as trial jurors, one of them, how·
ever, after the defl'odant had exhausted all
his peremptory challenges. No objection was
made to the triers leaving the court-r~:g
nor wne auy exception taken thereto dU'ltlltn·
the trial. The jurors proposed were ~'Y belned by the triers, without auy tesd";:: -p't<>6elng ol'len>d or prorluced, either bY 't.
cutlon or the defense.
e-cenG~~~
It le lnslt;1ted, In behalf J>f the <'l , ·t vuf. ~ 0 i,
that the aetlon of the court \n pe1~1 le~g~~ \.'\\e
trial In hl11 absence of theRe (•bfllt e o. "i'le\\
jurors was eo lrrPgular as to 'V\t\~ t
~~es 1\<J
!mbsequent proceedings. '.rl1\!~ \lo\.. if O ~~& ·
taken. The Crlmtnnl {"o<\(' of Utall. 0 .._• .,_ co~
author!?.!' the trl:1l h~· tril'l'~ of ~ 1 1 ,.e
·
challeng~ to be bnd upart from t .,.-I'.'.~~
and In the absem·e of the defeut\l\.~ J
spedfic pro¥1slon matte for the el>" ct;
,~
of wltne11ses "on either side," su\>le t;1f""~_r
rules of e,·l<leuce uppl\cnble to t\1e \J t'J ~
other Issues, shows thnt the prosec tt-t:• p
torney and the defendant -were elltJJj~ 1
right to be present dur\ng the exn ~o~
by the triers. It certuln\y was not se "" s
pluted that witnesses should be tbe" i?",,:::i
bronght before the t:rlers -wlthont e ~ A
the prtvncg • .... ~
prolluclng them bnv ' ng
t ropo\JY- ff!?"
the eu11en·lslon of 1:be conrt. 0 11 _,.of§
·
\d e\\c\t the n""~
11uch questions nR 'vou
"~rtunltY to tl:JCV
facts, or without an <>~~xiun\nat\on. ~ '$:,
poslte side for
cros r t lu the furtbel° •
vlewe find some supgo ty ot tbe court"~ ....
vlslon making lt tbe
u
~
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RELEVANCY .

the evidence is concluded," and before the

triers make a ﬁnding, to instruct them as to

their duties. In the case before us the in-

structions to the triers were given before the

latter proceeded with the trial of the chal-

lenges. But all doubt upon the subject is re-

moved by the express requirement. not that

the defendant may, but, where the indict-

ment is for a felony, must be, “personally

present at the trial.” The argument in be-

half of the government is that the trial of

the indictment began after, and not before,

the jury was sworn; consequently that the

defendant's personal presence was not re-

quired at an earlier stage of the proceedings.

Some warrant, it is supposed by counsel. is

found for this position in decisions constru-

ing particular statutes in which the word

"trial" is used. Without stopping to distin-
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guish those cases from the one before us, or

to examine the grounds upon which they are

_placed, it is sufficient to say that the pur-

pose of the foregoing provisions of the Utah

Criminal Code is, in prosecutions for felonies,

to prevent any steps being taken in the ab-

sence of the accused. and after the case is

called for trial, which involves his substan-

tial rights. The requirement is not that he

must be personally present at the trial by

the jury, but “at the trial." The Code, we

have seen, prescribes grounds for challenge

by either party of jurors proposed. And pro-

vision is expressly made for the “trial" of

such challenges, some by the court, others by

triers. The prisoner is entitled to an impar-

tial jury composed of persons not disqualiﬁed

by statute, and his life or liberty may depend

upon the aid which, by his personal presence,

he may give to counsel and to the court and

triers. in the selection of jurors. The neces-

sities of the defense may not be met by the

presence of his counsel only. For every pur-

pose. therefore, involved in the requirement

that the defendant shall be personally pres

ent at the trial, where the indictment is for

a felony, the trial commences at least from

the time when the work of impaneling the

jury begins.

But it is said that the right of the accused

to be present before the triers was waived

by his failure to object to their retirement

from the court-room, or to their trial of the

several challenges in his absence. We are

of opinion that -it was not within the power

of the accused or his counsel to dispense

with statutory requirements as to his per-

sonal presence at the trial. The argument to

the contrary necessarily proceeds upon the

ground that he alone is concerned as to the

mode by which he may be deprived of his life

or liberty, and that the chief object of the

prosecution is to punish him for the crime

charged. But this is a mistaken view as well of

the relations which the accused holds to the

public as of the end of human punishment.

The natural life, says Blackstone. “cannot

legally be disposed of or destroyed by any

-individual, neither by the person himself,
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the evidence Is concluded," and before the
trlera make a finding, to Instruct them as to
their dutll'.8. In the case before ns the lnstru<'tlons to the triers were given before the
latter l>rO<'eeded with the trial of the challenges. But all doubt upon the subject hi removed by the express requirement. not that
the defendant may, but, where the Indictment Is for a felony, must be, "peraonally
present at the trial." The argument In behalf of the government Is that the trial ot
the Indictment began after, and not before,
the jury was sworn; consequently that the
defemlant's personal presence was not required at an earlier stage of the proceedings.
Some warrant, it ls supposed by ('OUnsel, Is
found tor this position in declslollll construing purtwular statutes In which the word
"trial" Is used. Without stopping to distinguish those cases from the one before us, or
to examine the grounds upon which they are
,placed, it Is sufficient to say that the purpose of the foregoing provisions of the Utah
Crlmlnul Code ls, In prosecutions for felonies,
to prevent any steps being taken In the abSe11('e of the accused, and after the case ls
<'ailed for trial, which Involves hll! substantial rights. Tbe requirement Is not that he
must be peraonally present at the trial by
the Jury, but "at the trial." The Code, we
have seen, prescribes grounds for challenge
by either party of Jurors proposed. And provision ls exprellt!ly made for the "trial" of
such challenges, some by the court, others by
trlera. The prisoner is entitled to an Impartial jury composed of persons not disqualified
by statute, and his life or liberty may depend
upon tb.e aid which, by his personal presence,
he may give to counsel and to the court and
triel'll, In the selection ot jurors. The necessl tles of the defense may not be met by th1>
presence of bis counsel only. For every pur·
pose. therefore, Involved In the requirement
that thl• defendant shall be personally prea
ent at the trial, where the Indictment ls for
a felony, the trial commences at least from
the time when the work of Impaneling the
jury begins.
But It Is said that the right of the accused
to be present before the triers was waived
by his failure to object to their retirement
from the court-room, or to their trial of the
several challenges In his absence. We nre
of opinion that .It was not within the power
of the accused or his counsel to dispense
with statutory requirements as to bis personal presence at the trial The argument to
the contrary necessarily proceeds upon the
&'round ibat he alone ls concerned as to the
mode by which he may be deprived of hls Ute
or Uberty, and thnt the chief objec>t of the
prosecution Is to punish him for the crime
charged. But this ls a mistaken view as well of
the relations whlc·h the accused holds to the
public as of the end of human punishment.
The natural life, says Blackstone, "cannot
legally be disposed of or destroyed by nny
· Individual, neither by the person himself,

102

nor by any other of his fellow creatures merely upon their ow.n authority." 1 BL Comm.
133. The public bas an Interest In his life
and liberty. ~elther'can be lawfully taken
eXC'eJ>t ID the mode prescribed by law. That
which the law makes essential In proc-eedlngs
Involving the deprivation of life or liberty
cannot be dispensed with, or affected by the
consent of the accused, much less by his
mere failure, when on trial and In custody,
to object to unauthorized met.bods. The great
end of punishment ls not the expiation or
atonement of the offense committed, but the
prevention of future offenses of the same
kind. 4 Bl. Comm. 11. Such being the relation which the citizen bolds to the publl<·.
and the object of punishment tor publtc
wrongs, the legislature has deemed lt essential to the protection of one whose ll!e or liberty Is Involved In a proaecutlon tor felony
that he shall be personally present at the
trial; that ts, at every stage of the trial when
his substantial rights may be affected by the
proceedings against him. If he be deprived
of his life or liberty without being so present,
such deprivation would be without that due
p1'0cess of law required by the constitution.
l<'or these reasons we are of opinion that It
was error, which vitiated the verdict and
judgment, to permit the trial of the challenges to take place In the absence of the accused.
2. Another assignment of error relates to
the action of the court In permitting the surgeon-who bad made a post mortem examlnstlon of the body ot a corpse whkh was
claimed by the proBe<'utlon to be that of John
F. Turner-to state that one Fowler Identified the body to him. The surgeon testified
that the body examined by him was on the
platform at the railroad depot In Salt Lake
City, In a wooden case and coffin. The father
of the deceased testllled that he did not communl<'ate personaUy with the surgeon, oor
see that his son's body was delivered to him:
that be left It at the railroad depot In Salt
Lake City, In a wooden coftln, lnclosed In a
box; and the tact that the body of the deceased was originally placed In such a coffin was proved by a wltneu who put It In
the coffin. And yet there was testimony
shpwlng that there was n body In the same
depot, at or about the time referred to by the
surgeon, which, having been 11la<'ed In a metalllc case covered by a wooden box, bad
been shipped from Echo, by rail to Salt Lake
City; also that It showed Injuries "generally
similar" to those described by the surgeon.
Were there two boclles of deceased persons,
at the same depot, about the same time, one
"In a wood comn lnclosed In a box," and the
other "lo a metalll<' <'ase covered by a wooden
box?" There would be some ground to so
contend did not the bill of ex<'eptlons, In Its
referen<'e to the hodv 11blpped from Echo In
a metallic casl', lmp1y that there was testimony showing It to be tbe one that "had been
ldentlfied as the body of the deceased, John
0

CO:SFESSIONS.
CO.\'F ESSIONS.

[Case No. 36

1)

F. Turner. The confusion upon the sub-

ject :u'i.=es from the failure. to statc that the

body winch the father of the deceased left at

the railroad depot W118 the same as that ship-

ed froin lcho to Salt Lake City. It was,

pei‘h8pS, to this part of the case the court re-

(erred xvhen, in the charge to the jury, it

said that the prosecution "has introduced a

vast amount of circunlstantial evidence.” Be

this as it may, it was a lnaterial question be-

fore the jury whether the body examined by

the surgeon was the saxne one that the father

of tho deceased had left at the depot, and

therefore the body of the person for whose

murder the defendant and Emerson were in-

dicted. It it was not, then all that he said

was immaterial. If it was, (U19 '~‘V!(1e!l¢‘9 Om-

erwise connecting defendant with the death
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of John F. Turne-r,) the statements of that

Witness as to the condition of the corpse, the

nature of the injuries-—-whether necessarily

fatal or not—observabl-e upon the body ex-

amined by him, and how’ the blows, apparent

upon inspection oi.’ it, ‘Vere probably inﬂicted,

became of great consequence in their bearing

"DOD the guilt or inn,“-ence of the defendant

°t the (‘Tillie oi’ murder.

N0 Dmper foundation xvas laid for the ques-

tion propounded to the surgeon as to who

Pointed out and identiﬁed to him the body he

examined as that of John 1<‘_ ’,1‘urner. He had

Previously stated that he did not personally

know the deceased and did not recognize the

body to be his. he’ did not kl10\V that lt w:1B

the body wméh the father of deceased de-

sired him to exmn1ne- consequently his an-

swer could only place before the jury the

statement of some one not under oath, and

W110. being absent c0n1(l nOt be Sl1l)]€Cl’e(l (0

the ordeafot a ’s5_exa1ni11z1tion. The ques-

tion plainly C3-Fed for hearsay evldellce,

which, in its ie ai sense, “denotes that kind

‘S15! evidence whip does not derive its value

Ely fI‘()In

3:85 hhnsﬁlf, but restﬁ,

Bomnclty and competenc

n' Greenl. E‘v’- § 99;

eral rule, subject

in part, on the

y of some other per-

1 Phil. Ev. 169.

to certain well-es-

Old as the rule itself,

and therefore to be

be, “that hearsay

_ t ta establish any spe-

€‘_m‘°mtpcctte I-118 in its nature suscep-

mch a xvitnesses who speak

_ _ “qed-re.” “That this

°““ mlothe gm further said,

Justice Marshall, “sup-

esﬁn10ny which might be

“lay case is not the sole

20?». *0

tible of from th;

Species

speaklngt testimony,

F. Turner." The con:ruslon upon the aubjeet arlses from the :rallure to state that the
bOdY 'Wblch the rather or the deceased left at
the railroad depot w-as t:he ssme 1111 that shl1>
ed 1'.ro111 Echo to SaU; Lake Ulty. It was,
perhaps. to this part o:r the case the court refened when, ln t:he charge to the jury, It
said that the prosecution .. has introduced a
vast amount of clrcumst:antlal evidence." Be
this as tt may, It was a material question before the jury whether t:he body examined by
the surgeon was the same one that the father
of the de<"eased had le:rt at the depot, and
therefore the bod$' or the person fo1· whose
murder the defendant an.<l I~merson were Indicted. It it was not. then all that he said
was immaterial. If It 'W'll&. (the evidence oth·
erwlse connecting de:rendant with the death
of John F. Turner,) tbe statements of that
witness as to the condition of the corpse, the
nature of the fnjurles-'W'hether necesaarlly
fatal or not-observable upon the body examined by him, and ho"· the blows, ap11arent
upon Inspection of It. were probably lnttl<-ted,
became of great consequence in their bearing
upon the guilt or fnncx•ence of the defendant
of the crime of murder.
No proper foundatlou "W'fl.B laid for the question prop0unded to tile surgeon ae to who
pointed out and ldeotUled to him the body he
examfned as that of .Tobn It... r.ru1·ner. He had
PrevlouaJy stated tbat he <lid not personally
know the deceased and did not recognize the
bodr to be hie· h~ did not: kn.ow that It was
the body wbl~b the 1'atber of deceased deBlred him to examine; consequently his answer COUld only place be1'ore the Jury the
statement of some one not under oath, and
Who, being alllle t co-old not be subjected to
the Ord.ea.I of a c~es-e.x.a i n inn tlon. The quesUon platnly
1'or beftr&aY evlOence,
11 d
Wbleh. bi lte l:a~ sense. "'denotes that kind
of etlden<!e which doe& not derive Its value
aoleJy troin th redlt to be given to the wlt·neu hhn.aeir ~ \ ests al&O. ln part, on the
veractty
u ~ n~Y o1' some other person." 1 Gr ~mE e 1 99; 1 Phil. Ev. 169.
The gene een · v •
ect: to certain well-establlshed l"al. rule,
old as the rule Itself,
-applfca b~ceptlo~s ses and therefore to be
rigidly
or liberty
at
Btake.-vv._ re ed In "MlID& Queen v. Hep8
burn, 7 ~ stat
t:o be, "that hearBlly
5
evidenc.-e 1 .-Unch, 29t;nt to establish any speclftc fact 11 lncompe
ln its nature suscep1
tible or ~ 'Vhlch tact 8 witnesses who speak
from thet_.
ln.g proved
bY ledge. " "That this
D
kDOW
llpecles o:t
ow
,, the court further said,
•i>eaklng
°t:~tlmony. ;rustlce Marshall, "sup)>Olled 8Qi:nb3T Chle~eetlniony which might be
addnee<i ln.e better rticular case Is not the sole
rround <>:t 1:he pa iuston- Its Intrinsic weakness, lta l:t::t l ts ex.c ncY to satisfy the mind of
the eXfet:e ~~Jinpetet:he -fact, and the frauds
Whlchrnig~~e o~ ctlced under itscover,comblne to 11~1> 1: be pra rule t:bat hearaay evidence
Is lnadzn.teal>ort 1:b~be speclftc fact to be established b~
0~ w-bat some one else said

&.nd

au!!

enr: •o:vwbC:re tite

i,1:::;;•

•

are
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to the aorgeo.o ae to the Identity of the body
submitted to hiB examination was that It was
the body of John F. •.rumer. What lt'owlerwho was not even shown to have been placed
In clwrge ot the body, nor commlBSloned to
deliver it to the surgeon, nor to be acquainted
with the deceased-said, in the abaence of
the prisoner, as to the Identity of the body,
•.;.
was plainly hearaay et"ldence, within the rule
recognized In all the adjudged cases. As such
It should, upon the showlns made, have been
excluded.
3. The next asslgnmt-ut of error relates to
that portion of the charge which represents
the court as saying: "That an atrocloue and
dastardly murder has been committed by
eorue l>el"BOn ls apparent, but In your deliberations you should be careful not to be ln1luenced by any feeling." By the statute& of
Utah, "murder perpetrated by poleon, lying
ID wait, or any other kind o! willful, dellber·
ate, mall<'lous. or premeditated killing, or
committed In the perpetration of or attempt
to perpetrate, any a1"B011, rape, burglary, or
robbery, or perpetrated from a premeditated
<lestgn unlawfully and maliciously to etreet
the death ot any other human being other
than hlm who ls kllled, or perpetrated by any
act greatly dangerous to the lives of others
and evidencing a depra,·ed mind regardleee
ot human life, Is murdt-r In the first degree;
and any other homlMde committed under
such clrc•umstances as would ha¥e constituted murder at common law, Is murder ln the
second degree." Comp. Lawe Utah 1873, P·
58G. The punishment of murder ID tbe first
degree Is death, or, upon the recommendaU0i:_
ot the jury, Imprisonment at bard l&~urt.
the penitentiary at the discretion of tb:be sec·
while tbe punb1hment for murder \: \abOr \11
ond degree ls imprisonment at )lo.r i\..,e ~o-c
the penitentiary tor not less tbS-1;~ -v\e,. of.
more than fifteen years. Id. GSO· tcb ~e \.~~t.
thf'Be statutory provisions, to '-"tae c\e&.T ~o
tentlon ot tile jury was called, \t l t:; ....,..~ "'c<>~
the observation by the court, tll9- .,ee..,:.\\-S r4'!
clous and dastardly murder baS .-~ .._ \.~e ~
mltted by some person," was J:J9- l~~ ~~ ~
garded by them as an lnstruct\on t ~~~e
tense, by whomsoever committee.\• t.i:- ~ •
der In the first decree; whereas -«:.<'.
the jury, having been informed tl J•"' ~-~
was murder by the laws ot Uttl iP p~
whether the facts made a case of _.~
the first degree or n1 urd.er ln tbe d~~ ~
gree. It was competent tor the 3\l ~ ~~
the &ttltutes of Utah, to atate to tbe ,.,.--~
matters of law necessary tor tbell"lJe,,......."
tton," and, coDBe<luently, to inform
t;~ 4
thOBe statutes defined aa murder d
$•
degree and murder tn t.be secoP 't' -.:Lawe Utah 1878. 1~· 120; ~od:ec~!~e<t , ;
283, 284. But It is express Y bat w P. "'
Code of Criminal. Proc~urea:d decl~1'"'""
may "state the t:est\mo Y
ury \Jl .:'
law" be "must not cbnrge the
Tl:Je _..,.
, sectton -··
......
to matters of tact ,
•
ed b'f the pred0
committed was Dot cur

:U

1.....
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servation of the judge, that by the laws of

Iftah the jury are “the sole judges of the

credibility of the witnesses and of the weight

of the evidence and of the facts." It is rath-

er more correct to say that the eifect of that

observation was destroyed by the statement

at the conclusion of the charge that the mur-

der, by whomsoever committed, was an atro-

cious and dastardly one, and therefore, as the

jury might infer, in view of the language of

the statute, was murder in the ﬁrst degree.

The prisoner had the right to the judgment

of the jury upon the facts. unintiuenced by

au_v direction from the court as to the weight

of evidence. For the reasons stated the judg-

ment of the supreme court of tl1e territory

must be reversed, and the case remanded,

with directions that the verdict aml judg-

mcnt be set aside and a new trial ordered.
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The assignments of error. however, present

other questions of importance which, as the_v

are likely to arise upon another trial, we

deem proper to examine.

-i. The ﬁrst of these questions relates to the

action of the court in permitting Ga!-r—caiied

as a witness for the defensc—to give in evi-

dence a confession of the prisoner. T’hat con-

fession tended to implicate the accused in the

crime charged. The admissibility of such

evidence so largely depends upon the special

circuiiistances connected with the confession

that it is difficult, if not impossible, to formu-

late a rule that will comprehend all cases.

As the question is necessarily addressed, in

the ﬁrst instance, to the judge, and since his

discretion must be controlled by all the at-

tendant circumstances. the courts have wise-

ly forborne to mark with absolute precision

the limits of admission and exclusion. It is

un11cc1~ssa|-y in this case that we should lay

down any general rule on the subject; for

we are satisﬁed that the action of the trial

court can be sustained upon grounds which,

according to the weight of authority. are suf- '

ﬂcient to admit confession made by the ac-

cused to o11e in authority. It appears that

the defendant was arrested at the railroad

depot in Cheyenne, Wyoming. by the witness

(‘at-r. who is a detective, on the charge made

in the indictment. The father of the (i\‘ceas-

ed. present at the time, was much excited,

and may have made a motion to draw a re-

volver on the defendant, but of that fact the

witiiess did not peak positively. The Wit-

ness 111ay have prevented him from drawing

a weapon. and thinks he told him to do noth-

iug rash. At the arrest a large crowd gath-

ered around the defendant; Carr hurried him

off to jail, sending with him a policeman,

wl1ile he remained behind. out of the hearing

RELE\' ANCY.

11ervatlon of the judge, that by the laws of exceptions states "the confet1Slon was volunrtah the jury are "the sole judges of the tacy and unlnftuenced by hopes of rewarcl or
<'redlblllty of the witnesses and of the weight fear of punishment; he held out no Induceof tht> eYhl('nce and of the facts." It ls rath- ment, and did not know of any Inducement
er more correct to say that the effect of that being held out to defendant to confess." This
ohlM'rt"atlon was destroyed by the statement was all the evidence showing or tending to
at the <'On<'luslon of the charge that the mur- show that the confeBSlon was voluntary or
der, by whomsoever committed, was an atro- uninfluenced by hope of reward or fear of
cious and dastardly one, and therefore, as the punh1hment.
Jury might Infer, ln view of the language of
While some of the adjudged cases Indicate
the 111tatute, was murder In the 11.l'llt degree. distrust of confessions which are not judicial,
'l'he prisoner bad the right to the judgment It is certain, as observed by Baron Parke In
of the jury upon the facts. unlntluenc•ed by Regina "'· Baldry, 2 Denleon, 430, 44:>, that
any direction from the court as to the weight the 1·ule against their admlsslblllty has been
of evidence. For the reasons stated the judg- sometimes <'llrrled too far. nnd in Its appllcament of the supreme court of the territory tlon justlt·e and eommon st•n11t' have too fremllilt be reversed, and the case remanded, <1uently been sacrificed at tilt> shrine of merwith directions that the vertlh·t and juclg- c•y. A coufe11111lon, If freely nml voluntarily
uumt be set aslcle and a new trial ordered.
made. Is evidence of tbt> moMt HUtlRfnc·tory
The assignments of error. however, prt>Nent c•harn<'tt>r. S1wh a eonfe11slon. snl<l J<~yre, <'.
other questions of importnnc•c• whh·h, as tl1ey B., In Klug v. WarlC'kshnll. 1 I.roeh, :wa. "ht
are likely to arise upon another trial, we d!'i>"t•rYlng of th(' blgheMt t•rt><llt. bt>caus'e It ls
deem prope1· to examine.
' 1>reMUme<I to flow from the strongest sense of
4. The first of these questions relates to the guilt, and therefore It ls admitted ns proof of
actlon of the court ln permitting Carr-called the crime to which It refers." Elementary
writers of authority concur in !laying that,
:iR a witness for the defen!K'-to gf\"e In evl1lence a eonft>sslon of the prisoner. Tbat con- while from the very nature of such evidence
fession tended to ln1pllcate the accused In the It must be subjected to C'areful sC'rutlny and
c-rlme eharged. The admlsslblllty of such received with great caution, a dellberate, volevidence so largely depends upon the special untary confession of guilt ls among the most
t·lrc•uwstanct!S connected with the confession elreC"tual proofs In the law, and constitutes
that It Is 11lffleu1t, If not Impossible, to formu- the stronge11t evlden<'e agalnMt the party maklate a rule that will comprehend all eases. ing It that can be glYen of the facts stated
As the qut>stlon Is necessarily addressed, In In sut•b conft>sslon. 1 Greenl. Ev. f 215; 1
the firRt Instance, to the judge, and since his Archb. Cr. Pl.12;;; 1 Phil. EY. r.aJ, 534; Sturkie,
<llsC'retlon must be controlled by all the at- Ev. 73. But the presumption upon whleh
tendant clreumstances, the courts have wise- weight ls given to such eYlden('(', namely, that
ly forborne to mark with absolute precision one who ls lnno€'ent wl'l not Imperil his safethe limits of admhislon and exclusion. It ts ty or prejudice his Interests by an untrue
unnet't•ssary In this case that we should lay statement, ceases when the c'OnfeBSlon apdown any general rule on the subject; for pears• to have been made Plther In consewe are satisfied that the action of the trial quence of Inducements of a tPmporal nature,
rourt mn be sustained upon grounds which, hehl out by one ln authority, touching the
a<-'t'Ordlug to the weight of authority, are suf- · cnarJre preferred or beC'au11e of a threat or
ficient to admit confeM111lons made by the ae- proml11e by or In the preMe1we of such person,
c·used to one In authority. It nppea!'ll that which, operating upon the fenrs or hopes of
the defendant was arr('Nted at the rallroad the acclliled, in reference to the charge, dedepot In Cheyenne, Wyoming, by the witness prive him of that freedom of will or self-con<'arr. who Is a detective, on the charge made trol essential to make his confession YohmIn tlw lndletment. The father of the dt•1·eas- tary within the meaning of the law. Testetl, present at the time, was much eiu·lted, ed by these C'ondltlons, there sePID8 to have
nod may have made a motion to draw a re- been no reason to exclude the C'onfesslon of
YolYer on the defendant, but of that fact the the aceused; for the existence of any such
wltnf!!'a did not speak positively. The wlt- inducements, threats, or promises seems to
11e1111 nmy have prevented him from drawing have been negnth·ed by the statement of the
a weupon, and thinks be told him to do noth- circumstances under which It was made.
ing m11h. At the arrest a large <'rowd gathBut It Is contended that the court erred In
ered around the defendant; Carr hurried him not excluding this proof until the prosecuotr to jail, sending with him a poll<'eman, tion produced the policeman and proved that
while he remained IJt>hlnd. out of the hearing nothing was said or done by him, In the
of tile pollceman and the defendant. In two abSt>nce of Carr, whleb unduly lnftuenC'ed
or three minutes he joined them, and lmme- the making of the confession. The argudla tely the accused commenced making a con- ment ls that, posl'llbly, the llOllcl'man offered
feBBlon. What conv;ersatlon, if any, OC'curred such Inducements, or made such threats or
between the latter and the policeman during 11romlst!8, that the prisoner, when joined by
the brief llerlod of two or three minutes pre- Carr, was not In a condition of mind to
eecllng the confl!flslon was not known to the make a 1•011ft>111slon which the law would
wltnesa. So far a1 wltnesa kllew, the bill of deem voluntacy. '!'bis poeltlon, although

of the policeman and the defendant. In two

or three minutes he joined them, and imme-

diately the accused commenced making a con-

fession. What conversation. if any, occurred

between the latter and the policeman during

the brief period of two or three minutes pre-

ceding the confession was not known to the

witness. So far as witness knew, the bill of
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plausible. is not sustained by authority. nor

consistent with sound reason. The circumstan-

ces narrated by the witness proved the con-

fession to be voluntary, so far as anything

was said or done by him on the immediate

occasion. There was nothing disclosed

which made it the duty of the court to re-

quire. as a condition precedent to the ad-

mission of the evidence, that the prosecution

should call the policeman and show that he

had not, when alone with the accused, un-

duly inﬂuenced him to make a confession.

In Rex v. Clewes, 4 Car. & I‘. 221; 3 Russ.

Cr. (Sharsw. Ed.) -131, 432, the prosecution

proposed to give in evidence a confession

made by the accused before the coroner. It

appearing that a magistrate had previously

an interview with the prisoner. it was sug-

gested that. as he may have been told by
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that oﬁicer that it was better to confess, the

prosecution should call him. But the court

said that while it would be fair in the pros-

ecutors to call the magistrate, it would not

compel them to do so; but if they did not,

the prisoner might do so if he chose.

In Rex v. “Fllllams, Roscoe. C-r. Ev. (Tth

Am. Ed.) 54, 3 Russ. Cr. (Sharsw. Ed.) 432,

it appeared that a prisoner, being l!l the cus-

tody of two constables on a charge of arson,

a third person went into the room. The

prisoner immediately asked him to go into

another room, as he wished to speak to him.

They went into that room, and the prisoner

made a statement to that person. It wa

contended that the constables ought to be

called to prove that they had done nothing

to induce the prisoner‘ to confess. But

Taunton, J.. after consulting with ilittiedaie,

.l., said: “We do not think, according to the

usual practice. that we ought to exclude the

evidence. because a constable may have in-

duced the prisoner to make the statement;

otherwise he must in all cases call the mag-

istrates or constables before whom or in

whose custody the prisoner has been.”

In Rex v. W'arner, 3 Russ. Cr. (Sharsw.

Ed.) +32, the prisoner, when before the com-

mittlng magistrate, having been duly cau-

tioned, made a confession, in which he al-

luded to one previously made to a constable.

It was remarked by the court that, although

it was not deemed necessary that a consta-

ble, in whose custody a prisoner had been,

should be called in every case. yet, in view

of the reference to him. he should be called.

The constable being called, proved that he

did not use any undue means to obtain a

confession, but he disclosed the fact that he

lmd received the prisoner from another con-

stable, to whom the prisoner had made some

statements. As it did not appear that any

confession was made to the latter. and only

appeared that a statement was made that

might either be a confession, a denial, or an

cxculpation, the court would not require him

to be called. S. C. Roscoe, Cr. Ev. (7th Am.

Ed.) 54. 55.

Roscoe (page 554) states the rule to be that

plamllhlt-, le not sustained by authority, nor
•("ODSlsteot with sound reason. The clreumstau<-t>S on rrn ted by the wltnt'!411 prm·l'<l tlw conreeeion to be voluntary, so fur as auytlllng
was suld or done by him on the immediate
occasion. There was nothing disclosed
which mude It thl' duty ot the court to re-quire. as a condition }ll"eC{'dent to the admission ot the evlden<--e, that the proe•~cutlon
shoulcl c·ull the policeman and show that he
had not, when alone with the accused, un·duly lntlul'nced him to make n confession.
Io ltl'x v. Clewes, 4 Car. & r. 221; 3 Russ.
Cr. (Shnrsw. Ed.) -131, 432, the prosecution
proposed to gh·e In e\·ldence a confes1don
made by the accused b<>fore the coroner. It
.nppearlng that a magistrate hnd previously
m1 inten·lew with tlle priROner. it was sngJl<'Sted that, as he may hnve 1*eo told by
that ottlcer that It was better to confess, the
Jlrosecutlon should call him. But the court
~:aid that while It would be fulr lo the proet't·ntol"!! to call the magistrate, It would not
rompel them to do so; but If they did not,
the prlsonPr might do so If hp ('hosP.
In lh•x "'· Williams, Hos<'oe. Cr. El'". (itll
Am. Eel.) 54, 3 Russ. Cr. (Sharsw. Ed.} 432,
it a11Jtt'tUW that n prisoner, h1•lni: l!l tht' eustody of two constables on a <'hurge of arson,
a third person went into the room. 'l'he
11rh1011er Immediately n11k1>c.l him to go Into
:mother room, as he wh1h1>tl to 1111Pnk to him.
They went Into that room. nod till' llliMner
mnde a statement to thnt 1>er11011. It was
rontended that the coustnhlt>s oui:ht to be
~lled to prove that thPy bad done nothing
to Induce the prisoner· to confp11s. But
Taunton, .T.. after consulting with Llttlec.lale,
.J., sulll: "We do not think, according to the
mmnl 1u1wtl1·P. thnt we ought to exc·lud<' the
t•dd1>n<<t>. IK'Pnuse a constable may hun~ ln·dU«<'<l till' prlsone1· to mnke the statement;
otl1Prwlse he m1111t In all cases call the magistrntP11 or constahle11 before whom or In
who11e <"n11tmly the prisoner has been."
In H1•x l'". 'Varner, 3 Russ. Cr. (Hbarsw.
1'~ct.) -ta:!, the prisoner, when before the committing magistrate, having been duly cautioned, made a confession, In whil•h he al·
htded to one previously made to a constable.
It was remarked by the court that, although
It was not clPPmed nece11snry thnt a constable, In whose custody a prisoner hnd been,
should be called In every ca!IP, yet, In view
of the refen>nce to him, be should he called.
The constable being called, proY('(l that he
-did not use any undue mean11 to obtain a
confession. hut be dl11closPd the fnct that he
hod recell'"ed the prisoner from anothPr constable, to whom the pr1so11er had mucte some
statements. As It did not np111•11r that any
eonfeselou was made to the lattt>r. und only
appear('(} thnt a stntement w11s mude thnt
·m ight either be a confession, a denlnl, or an
excutpntlon, the court would not 1·~1ulre him
to be <-1llled. S. C. Roscoe, Cr. E,·. (7th Am.
Ed.} 54, 55.
Roscoe (page 554) states the rule to be that
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"In order to Induce the court to <~all another
ofH<"er. In whosP <'UStocly th<> prisoner has
IJe!n, lt must nppear elthPr thut some In·
ducl•ment hus been used by, or some express
reference made to, such omcer." Russell
says: "l<'or the purpose ot introducing a con·
tes11ion In evidence. It Is unnec•essary, In gen·
eral. to do more than negative any promise
or lndueement held out by the person to
whom the confession was made." Vol. 3, p.
431.

'Vhlle a confession made to one authority
should not go to the jury unless lt appears
to the court to have bPen voluntary, yet, as
the plalntlft' lo error chose to let lts admissibility rest upon the case made by the detective, without any Intimation that It would
be dlft't>rent It the policeman was examined,
and since there wnK noth.ng ln the clreumstances sugi;:-estlng c'Olluslon between the officers, we do not thlnlc the court was bound
to exC"lude the c·onfesslon upon the sole
ground that the pollceman was not Introduced.
5. Th<> last qnPstlon relates to the action
of the court 111 ndmlttlug, as a witness In behalf of the prospcutlon, Emerson, then serving out a sentence of confluement In the
penitentiary for the crime of murder, and
the judgment against whom had never been
ren-•rsed. His testimony tended to Implicate the defendant In the crime charged
against him. Objection was made to his
competency ns a 'witness, but the objection
was overruled. At the time the homlc:lde
was committed, and when the Indictment
was returned, It was provided by the criminal procedure net ot Utah of 18i8 thnt "the
rules tor determining the competency ot
witnesses In civil actions are applicable also
to criminal actions and proceedings, except
as otherwise provided In this act." And the
civil pructlce act of thut territory provided
(section 3i4) that "all persons, without exception, otherwise than as specllled In this
chapter, may be witnesses In any action or
proceeding. Facts which, by the common
law, would cause the exclusion of witnesses,
mny still be shown for tht> purpose of affecting their credibility." Comp. Laws Utah,
505. Further, (section 378,) that "persons
against whom jnc.lgment has been rendt>red
upon a conviction for felony, unless pardoned by the go"ernor, or such judgment bas
been reversed on appf'nl, shall not be wltuessC's." Ou the ninth day of March, 188:.l,
after the <Intl' of the alleged homicide, but
p1ior to the trial of the <'Ilse, n.n net was
pussed which repealed the section of tue
cil'"ll practice net lust quoted. It ls contended that sucl1 rept>nl, by which convicted felons were made c•ompetent witnesses In civil
casN1, dill not mnke them competent In criminal c·asf's; In other words. for such is the
effect of the argument, those who were exclud1>d us wltnl•sses, under the civil practice
act, at the time the criminal procedure act
of 18i8 was adopted, remained Incompetent
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in criminal cases, unless their incompetency,

in such cases, was removed by some 1nodi-

tication of the civil practice act expressly de-

clared to have reference to criminal prosecu-

tions. in this view we do not concur. lt

was, we think, intended by the criminal pro-

cedure act of 1878 to make the competency

of witnesses in criminal actions and pro

ceedings depend upon the inquiry whether

they were, when called to testify, excluded

by the rules determining their competency

in civil actions. if competent in civil ac-

tions, when ealied, they were, for that rea-

son, competent in criminal proceedings.

The purpose was to have one rule on the

subject applicable alike in civil and criminal

proceedings.

But it is insisted that the act of 1882, so

construed, would, as to this case. be an ex
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post facto law, within the meaning of the

constitution of the United States, in that it

permitted the crime charged to be estab-

lished by witnesses whom the law, at the

time the homicide was committed, made in-

competent to testify in any case whatever.

The provision of the constitution which pro-

hibits the states from passing ex post facto .

' for, and the quantity or the degree of proof

laws was examined in Kring v. Missouri,

107 U. S. 221, 2 Sup. Ct. 4-43. The whole

subject was there fully and carefully consid-

ered. The court, in view of the adjudged

cases, as well as upon principle, held that a

provision of the constitution of Missouri de-

nying to the prisoner charged with murder

in the ﬁrst degree the beneﬁt of the law as

it was at the commission of the otfene,—

under which a conviction of murder in the

second degree was an acquittal of mur-

der in the tirst degree, even though such

judgment of conviction was subsequently

reverscd,——was in contiict with the constitu-

tion of the United States. That decision pro-

ceeded upon the ground that the state con-

stitution deprived the accused of a substan-

tial right which the law gave him when the

offense was committed, and therefore. in its

application to that offense and its consc-

quences, altered the situation of the party to

his disadvantage. By the law as establish-

ed when the oifense was committed, Kring

could not have been punished with death

after his conviction of murder in the second

degree, whereas, by the abrogation of that

law by the constitutional provision subse-

quently adopted, he could thereafter be tried
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- unaffected by the subsequent statute.

and convicted of murder in the ﬁrst degree,

and subjected to the punishment of death.

Thus the judgment of conviction of murder

in the second degree was deprived of all

RELEVANCY.

In criminal cases, unlesa their Incompetency,
In sm·h <11se11, was remo"red by some modlficntlou of the clvll pnwth!<' act expre88ly declared to have referen<•l' to criminal prosecutions. In this ylew we do not concur. It
was, we think, Intended by the criminal proccdurt> n<·t of 1878 to makt• the competency
of wltne8S<'s In criminal actions and proceedlngs dt•pend upon the Inquiry whether
they were, when called to testify, excluded
by the rules d<>terminlng their competency
In civil actions. lf eompetent In civil actlons, when call<'d, they were, for that renson, competent In criminal proceedings.
The purpose wa11 to have one rule on the
subject applicable alike In civil and criminal
proc-eedlng11.
But It Is lnslsh'd that the act of 1882, so
construed, would, as to this call(>, be an ex
post facto law, within the meaning of the
constitution of the United States, In that It
permitted the crime charged to be established by witnesses whom the law, at the
time the homicide was committed, made Incompetent to testify In any case whatever.
The provision of the constltutlon which prohibits the states from pasaing ex post facto
laws was examined In !\:ring v. :Missouri,
107 U. S. 221, 2 Sup. Ct. 443. 'l'he whole
subject was there fully and carefully considered. The court, In view of the adjudged
cases, as well as upon principle, held that a
provision of the constitution of Missouri denying to the prisoner charged with murder
In the ftrst degree the beneftt of the law as
It was at the commls81on of the offeruie,undcr which a conviction of murder In the
second degree was an acquittal of murder lo the first degree, even though such
judgment of conviction was subsequently
re'·ersed,-was In eoudlct with the constitution of the United States. That decision proceeded upon the ground that the state eonstltutlon deprived the accused of a substantial right which the law gave him when the
offense was committed, and tllerefore, In Its
app11cation to that offense and its consequences, altered the situation of the party to
his disadvantage. By the law as established when the offense was committed, Kring
could not have been punished with death
after bis conviction of murder In the second
dt-gree, whereas, by the abrogation of that
lnw by the constitutional provision aubsequ.-ntly adopted, he could thereafter be tried
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, and convicted of murder In the ftrst degree.
and subjected to the punishment of death.
'!bus the judgment of con,·lctlon of murder
In tJu> 8e<'oud degree was dt-prived of all
force as e"rldence to establish his aU80lute
Immunity thereafter from punishment ror
11mrd1•1· In the first degree. This was held
1 to l><' the d<'111·irntlon of a substantlnl right
whleh the 1wcused had at the time the alleged off<>nMe was committed. But there are
no such fentures In the case before us.
1 l'ltatutes which simply enlarge the class or
111•rsons who ma:r be competent to testify in
e1·imlnal cases are not ex post facto In their
1' application to prosecutions for crimes committed prior to their passage; for they do
not attach criminality to any act previously
done. and which was Innocent when done,
nor aggravate any crime theretofore committed, nor . provide a greater punishment
th1•refor than was prescribed at the time or
Its commission, nor do they alter the degree,
I or lessen th<> amount or measure, ot the
proof which was made necessary to conTlctlon when the crime was committed. The
crime for whkh the present defendant was
. lndl<•tf'd, the 1mul11hment pl.'f'scribed therei for, and thr quantity or the dPgree of proof'
J 1w1·1'Mary to cstablb1h his guilt, all remained
· uwiffected by the suhlwqueut statute. Any
statutory alteration of the legal rules of evidence which would authorize conviction Ul>on less proof, in amount or degree, than was.
required wht>n the offense was committed,
miiiht, In respect of that offense, be obnoxious to the eonstltutlonal Inhibition upon ex:
po11t facto laws. .Hut alterations which do
not increase the punishment, nor change the
Ingredients of the ollense or the ultimate
faets necessary to establish guilt, but-leaving untouched the nature of the crime and.
the amount or degree of proof essential t<>
convlctlon-only removes existing restrlc-tlous upon the competency of certain classes
of persona aa witnesses, relate to modes or
pl'O<'edure only, In which no one can be said
to have a vested right, and which the state,
upon grounds of public policy, may regulate
at pleasure. Such regulations of the mode
In which the facts constituting guilt may b&
pla('(>d before the jury can be made appllca.ble to prosecutions or trials thereafter had.
without reference to the date of the commission of the offense charged.
Judgment reversed.
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BuBSTER "'· STATE.
(50 N. W. 953, 33 Neb. 663.)

BUBSTER v. STATE.

(50 .\'. ‘V. 953, 33 Neb. 663.)

Supreme Court of Nebraska. Jan. 4, 1892.

Error to district court, Douglas county;

Clarkson, Judge.

Prosecution against Herman Bubster for

larceny. Verdict of guilty, and judgment

thereon. Defendant brings error. Reversed.

John I’. Davis and Davis & Stevens, for

plaintiff in error. Geo. H. Hastings, Atty.

Su11remt> Conrt of Xebraska. Jan. 4, 1892.

Error to district court, Douglas county;
Clarkson, Judg1o.
Pro11ecutlon against Herman Bubster tor
larceny. Verdict ot guilty, and Judgment
thereon. Defendant brings error. Ueversed.
John P. Davis and Davis & Stevens, for
plalutlff In error. Geo. H. Hastings, Atty.
Gen., for the .State.

Gen., for the .Statc.

.\IAX\\'ELL, J. The plaintiff in error was

informed against in the district court of

Douglas county for the larceny of a bug!-U‘

of the value of $75, and on the trial found

guilty, and sentenced to imprisonment in the

penitentiary for one year. The sole question

in this court is the sufficiency of the evidence

to sustain the verdict. The buggy, it seems,
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was found at a paint-shop in the city of

Omaha, and it is claimed the plaintiff in er-

ror took the buggy there to be painted, and

that it had been taken feloniously without

the owner's consent. There are two serious

objections to this verdict: First. The owner

of the buggy, although apparently within

reach of the process of the court, was not

called as a witness. Her son-in-law, who

resides with her, testiiies that he did not

give his consent, and very freely testifies

that his mother-in-law did not. She was

within reach of the process of the court, and

should have been called as a witness to

prove her non-consent. The rule is very

clearly stated in note 183, 1 Phil. Ev. (4th

Am. Ed.) A conviction of larceny ought not

to be permitted or sustained unless it ap-

pears that the property was taken without

the consent of the owner; and the owner

himself should be called, particularly in a

case like that under consideration, when the

acts complained of may be consistent with

the utmost good faith. There is a failure of

proof, therefore, on this point. Second. The

chief of police of the city of Omaha was

called as a witness, and on his direct exam-

ination he testiiies in substance that the

plaintiff in error confessed to him, and that

he offered no inducements to secure such

confession. On cross-examination, however,

he id effect admits that he did hold out such

inducements, and his testimony is clearly in-

admissible, as also that of .\Ir. Cusick, the

policeman. There is not suiiicient evidence

to support the verdict, and the judgment is

reversed, and :1 new trial awarded. Judg-

ment accordingly. The other judges concur.
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lIAXWELL, J. The plaintiff In el'ror wus
informt'<l against In the district com·t of
Douglas rounty for the larceny of a buggy
of the ,·alue of $7ri, and on the trial found
guilty, und sentenced to Imprisonment In the
penlteritlary for one yt>ar. The sole question
ln this court is the sutficlency of the evidence
to sustain the vel'dlct. The buggy, it seems,
was fow1d at a pnlnt-shop In the city of
Omaha, und It ls claimed the plaintiff in error took the lmi:gy there to be painted, and
that it bud l>eeu taken felonlom1I~· without
the owner·R com•ent. The1·e ore two serious
objections to this verdkt: 1'"lnt. '.fhe owner
of the buggy, although apparently within
reach of the process of the court, was not

[Casa No 3i'

called as a wltneBB. Her son-in-law, who
resides with her, testllles that he did not
i:Ive his consent, and very freely testifies
that his mother-In-law did not. She was
within reach of the process of the court, and
should have been called as a witness to
prove her non-consent. The rule Is very
clearly stated 1n note 183, 1 Phll. Ev. (4th
Am. Ed.) A conviction of larceny ought not
to be permitted or sustained unless It appears that the property wu taken without
the consent of the owner; and the owner
himself should be called, particularly in u
cnse like that under consideration, when the
acts complained of may be consistent with
the utmost good fulth. There Is a failure of
proof, therefore, on this point. ~ond. The
chief of police of the city of Omaha was
called as a witness. nnd on bis direct examlnatlon he testifies ln substance that the
plaintiff In error confessed to hlw, and that
be offPred no inducements to secure such
confeS11lon. On <'l'oss-exarnlnntlon, however,
he hf effect 11dmlt11 that he did hold out such
Inducements, und his testimony ls clearly Inadmissible, as also that of lir. Cusick, the
policeman. There ls not sufficient evidence
to support the verdict, and tbe judgment ls
reversed, and a new trial awarded. Judgment accordingly. The other judges concur.
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LOWE v. STATE.

Case No. 38]

RELEVANCY.

(7 South.

97, 88 Ala. 8.)

I.O\VE v. STATE.

(7 South. 97, 88 Ala. 8.) U

~nprerue

Court of Alabama. Jan. 7, lf!DO.

Supreme Court of Alabama. Jan. 7, 1890.

Appeal from criminal court, Jefferson

county; S. E. Gm-:1-:NI~:, Judge.

Gilbert Lowe was indicted for the mur-

der of John W.Meadows, and found guilty,

and appeals.

Appeal from criminal court, Jeftt-rson
eounty; S. E. GREENE, Judge.
Oilbert Lowe was Indicted for the murder of John W.Mea.dows,and foundgulltv
and appeals.
·'
S. M. & W. 0. Meek, for appellant. W.
L. Martla, Atty. Gen., for the 8tnte.

S. M. & W. C. Meek, for appellant. W.

L. Martin, Atty. Gen., for the State.

CLOPTON, J. The ﬁrst matter com-

pluined of is the refusal of the court to ex-

clude the entire confession of defendant on

the ground that it was not shown to have

been freely and voluntarily made. The

necessities of the case do not call for a. de-

cision of the question whether or not the

confession was voluntary. In his confes- ,

sion defendant described the kind ofclothing
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which the deceased wore when killed, and

the place when he was killed, and stated

that the body was left in a sink covered

with leaves. and also some keys, a. watch-

chain, a broken-handled knife, and a

hrown,soft hat. The court excluded all of

the confession, except the statements de-

scribing the dress of deceased, the place

where the killing occurred. and the man-

ner in which the body was left.

A modification of the rule which excludes

a confession not shown to be voluntary is,

if information derived therefrom leads to

the discovery of material facts, which go

to prove the commission of the crime, so

much of the confession as strictly relates

to the facts discovered. and the facts them-

selves. will be received in testimony, though

the confession may not be shown to have

been voluntar_v,for the reason that thedis-

covery of the facts corroborates the truth

of the confession to that extent. Banks v.

State, 84 Ala. 430, 4 South. Rep. 382; .\Iur-

phy v. State, 63 Ala. l. There is evidence.

showing that the bodyoi the deceased was

found at the place where accused stated it

was left, partially covered with leaves, as

were also a broken-handled knife. watch-

chain, keys, and a brown. soft hat, near

the body. The record does not affirma-

tively disclose whether the body and other

articles were discovered before the confes-

sion was made or afterwards, asa sequence

of the information derived from the ac-

cused. But the bill of exceptions does not

purport to set out all the evidence. In

this state of the record, we must presume,

if necessary to sustain the ruling of the

criminal court, that they were discovered

after the confession. It is true that the

clothing which the defendant stated de-

ceased Wore was not discovered. lie was

stripped of apparel, except the underwear.

The only identifying testimony as to the

clothing is that the deceased wore such the

last time he was seen before the killing. It

may be that the statement of defendant as

to the coat, vest. pantaloons and shoes of

deceased do not come within the ruleof ad-

CLOP'fON, J. The ftrt1t matter comJJlulne•I of 111 the refusal of the court to PX·
l'lude the .-ntlre ccmfPt<slon of dPfendan t on
the ground that ftwae not Rhown to have
been freely and voluntarily made. The
neceBBities of the ca.He do not call for" ell'cltllon of the question whether or uot the
confeHHion wa.H voluntary. In hh1 <'Onfes~Ion defendant described the kind of do thing
whlch the deceaMed wore when killed, and
the place whert he wa11 killed, and stat:A'<l
that the body was left In a sink co\"ered
with lea.n'R, and al110 11ome keys, a watchchain, a broken-handled knife, and a
hrown, Roft hat. The court excluded all of
th<> confeHslon, except the statemf'nte deHcrlhlng the dl'l'H11 of decP8.8l'<l, thl• place
whf.'re the kllllng O<'curred, and the manner In which the bodv was left.
A modification of ti1e rule which excludes
a confp1111lon not shown to be voluntary ts,
lf Information derived therefrom IP.ad11 to
the diHCovery of material fact11, which go
to J>ro\·e the comml881on of the crime, so
m0<·h of the confesHion as strictly relates
to thP factsdlll<'overed, and the fact11 them11elvt'M. will be received in te11tlmony, though
the conff'R8ion may not ht> shown to have
been voluntary.for the reaMon thatthedi11con~ry of the facts corroborates the truth
of the confession to that t>xtent. Bank11 v.
8tate, 84 Ala. 430, 4 South. Rl•p. ~2; ~lnrphy v. State, 6a Ala. 1. There ls evidmce.
showlnJP; that tht> boil~· of the cle<'eaMed was
found at the place whPre a<'CUMPtl 11tatP<l lt
was left, partially co\·ered with leaves, as
were also a broken.handled knife. watchehain, keys, and a brown, soft hat, near
the body. The rec:•ord does not aftlrmatlvely disclose whether the body and otllf'r
articles were cll~o,·er·('() bt•fore t11c confessionwBR madeorafterward11,8Jla llP<JUf.'nce
of the information derived from the accueed. But the bill of exceptlon11 does not
purport to set out all the e\·iclPnce. In
this state of the record, we nm11t pn>11nme,
if neeeMeary to su11taln thf' ruling of tlw
crlmlnal court, that tht>y Wf.'t'l' dl11co\·Pred
atter the confe11Mlon. It IM true thut the
clothing which the clrft-ndant Htatt'<l dl'ct>ruied wore was not dl11co,'ert.'<I. He was
stripped of apparel, except the undN"wear.
'l'he only identifying tl'fltlruon~· UH to the
clothing is that thede<-eaHed worp Huch the
la11t time hew8.ll Ml'l'll before the killing. It
may be that the statement of dPft•nthmt tl.8
to the coat, vest, pantaloons and shoes of
det·l'ased do not come within the rulP or aclmlBBlbllity. This question we clo not deeidE>. The motion was to exclllde, and the
108
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eX<'f.'ptton goee t.o the refoeal of the court
to exclude, theenttreconfeeslon. When general f'Xeeptlone are made to evidence partly admlBHlbl~ and partly lnadml881ble, tht>
court Is not bound to separate the l~a.l
and Illegal parts. The <'rlmlnal court
could have properly overruled the entire
motion, a portion of the statements of defendant being admlBSlble. No objection
ha \·Ing been ma.de Reparately and 11prelally
to the portion of the statement dl'llCrlblng
the clreft8 of deceased, which may be of
douhtful admlHSlblllty, and aB the court
.couhl have properly, on the wotlon to exclmlt• the entire confession, retained the
whole of It In evidence, defendant cannot
complain that the court failed to nicely separate the legal and Illegal parts.
Tht> <"ourt, bnvlnir charge<! the Jury. at
the lnHtance of defendant, that before they
can con,·lct of murder they mu11t be satlsflt'<I that he haR been proven guilty of the
often I!<', "fully, clearly, conclusl vely, sa tlafa<'torlly, and that to a moral certainty,
and Iw~·ond all rea.Honable doubt," the
proHf'f.'Utlnp; solfcltor requested the court
to lm1truct the Jury that the terms ulled In
the foregoing charge meant the same as
thut they must be eon vineed of bis guilt
"beyond a reasonable doubt." Thecharge
gh·en at the instance of the defendant waa
probttbly calculated. by the conjunctive
use of cumulative words and expressions,
to create upon the mind of the average
Juror the erroneous Impression tbata bigher dt>p;n>e of proof 111 e&Rtmtlal to conviction
for murder than 111 meant by the phrase
"hP.vond a rt'nHonable doubt." The f'X·
planntory charge wa.s proper, to prevent
the Jury from being misled. McKleroy v.
8tute, 77 Ala. 95.
There ls no error in the refusal of the
court to chargp the Jury that if a witness
ha11 wlllfully te11Ufted falsely to any material fact the Jury should dlt1regard bis evldencp altogether. or the weight and credlblllt.y of nil oral prouf, whether given for
or against the O.C<'USed, the jurors are the
sole Judites. Tht>;r may disregard altogether the evidence of a witness who bu
wlllfull~· sworn falMl'ly, or they may credit
portions of hill testimony, etepeclally if corroborated by other witlll'81!C8, or by elrcumstances clearly proved. The court can·
not, RR mntter of law, instruct them•to
dlMregard altogetht'r the tf.'stimony of an\·
wltnf'MM. The charge would have invaded
the 11rovlnre of the jury. Moore v. State.
SS Ala. 000; .Jordan v. State, 81 Ala. 20, 1
South. Rep. 577.
It cannot be said that the trite expretiRion, "It is hettl•r that ninety-nine guilty
mf'n should rscape than that one innocent
man Mhould be punished, "lsan established
maxim of the law. The law recognises no
su<'h comparison of numbers. ltR eole obJect Is to punish the guilty, and that the
hmo<'l•nt be &<'quitted. 'l'be tendency of
Rlll'h a chnrp;e, unexplained, ts to mislead.
We hn.ve heretofore rulc!I in 11p,·ernl cl\FleH
tlmt. ltl11noterrortorefuMe11lmilarrhargeo1.
Wnrcl v. Stnte, i~ Ala. 4-U; Carden v. State,
84 Alu. 417. 4 South. Rep. 823.
Affirmed.

CC)~FESSIONS.
CON FESSIONS.

[U-use N0. 39

STATE v. (‘LIFl<'ORD.

(53 N. \V._ 299, 86 Iowa. 55().i

"" 1892.

Appeal from district court, Shelby county;

Walter I. Smith, Judge.

Defendant was indicted for the crime of

larceny from a building in the nighttime,

Supreme Court of Iowa. Oct.

and was convicted of simple larceny. lie

appeals.

Byers & Lockwood, for appellant. John

Y. Stone, Atty. G-en., and Thus. A. Cheshire,

for the State.

KINNE, J. 1. The defendant and one Fill-

more were indicted for stealing from the

barn of Axline & Smith, in the nighttime,

26 bushels of clover seed, of the value of

$125. The court permitted a witness named

Cuppy to testify in rebuttal on part of the
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state as to statements made by the defend-

ant in his examination before the grand jury.

lt appears that while the defendant was

under arrest and in the county jail, charged

with the commission of the very crime for

which he was afterwards indicted and tried,

the foreman of the grand jury, then in ses-

sion, had the sheriii? of the county bring de-

fendant before said body, where he was

examined under oath as to his supposed con-

nection with the alleged larceny. It does

not appear that the defendant was informed .

as to his rights, or of the effect of the an-

swers he might give, or as to the fact as

no whether or not such answers could aft-

erwards be used against him. No minutes of .

his testimony were taken by the grand jury.

We may properly assume that he testified

under oath, without being informed as to

his rights, or the effect of his testimony, or

the possibility of its use against him there-

after. It is contended that his statements

ac made before the grand jury were not

voluntary, and hence inadmissible against

him upon the trial. The course of procedure

pursued by the grand jury with reference

to the examination of this witness was un-

precedented, and, to our minds, wholly un-

justiﬂabie from any point of view. They

had no right to compel the defendant, then

in custody, and charged with the commission

of the crime inquired about, to give testi-

mony before them. To put him under oath,

under such circumstances, without advising

him of his rights, was attempting to take

an unfair advantage of his situation. to his

prejudice. A statement so procured could

in no proper sense be said to be voluntarily

made. A confession or statement. to have

been voluntarily made, must proceed “from

the spontaneous suggestion of the party's

own mind, free from the inﬂuence of any

e.vn-aneous disturbing cause." “if made un-

der oath by the party charged, upon a ju-

dicial inquiry as to the crime. it [the con-

fession] is rejected, as not being voluntary."

People v. Mc.\lahon, 15 N. Y. 3ii.'». The law

I

'

(C11se No. 8&

STA.TE v. C'LIJ..'I•'ORD.
ls well settled that when a person fa com(53 N ~ 299
pelled to answer 11uestlons under oath, put
• · ' •.
• 86 Iowa, a50.)
to hlw by a committing magistrate, toucbSupreme Court of Iowa. Oct. 2'..?, 1892.
Ing his supposed connection with the crime
Appeal from district court, Shelby county; 1 then being llll"('Btlgated, and of which h,1.1
Walter I. Smith, Judire.
! llhtnds a<'<'Used, bis statements are not mlDefendant w11.11 Indicted for the crime of mlulble against him. 8 Am. & Eng. En<·.
larceny from a building In the nighttime, , Law, p. 488; Wbort. Cr. Ev. ff 668, 600;
and was convicted of simple larceny. lit> State v. !\la!he~s.. 66 N. C. 106; People v.
appeals.
' lkllahon, 1., X. I. 384; People v. llondon,
. 103 ~- Y. 211. 8 X. E. 496. And it Is said
Byers & Lockwood, for appellant. John ' thut, unle88 the dPfendant comprehended bis
Y. Stone, Atty. Gen., and Tbos. A. Cheshh-e, I rights fully. and Is Informed by the court
tor the State.
or examlnlult' body that his rerusal to answer the que11tlous propounded to him could
KINNE, J. 1. The defendant and one J..'Ul- ' not preJmlk't' bis <·use, or be constmed as an
more were Indicted for stealing from the evidence of bis guilt, any responsive confesbarn of Axline & Smith, in the nlgbttlme, 1 slon8 Implicating him In the crime charged
26 buahela of clover seed, of tile value of must be regarded as Involuntary, and hence·
'125. The court permitted a witness named inadmissible. Whart. Cr. Ev. ff 668, 669;
Cuppy to testify in rebuttal on part of the State v. Rorie, 74 N. C. 148; 1 Greenl. E'·state 88 to statements made by tbe defend- It 225, 226, and notes. The same rule would
ant in hla examination before the grand jury. apply 11.11 to examlnatloDB had, as In tbls case,.
It appears that whlle the defendant waa 11 before a grand Jury. Some of the states by
under arrest and In the county jail, charged , statute require mag111trate11 conducting such
with the commlaalon of the very crime for examinations to admonish the prisoner as to.
which he was afterwards indicted and tried, the ed'ect of his answer and bis right to.
the foreman of the grand jury, then in ses- · refuse to answer, but it Is belle\"ed that the
Blon, had the sherld' of the county bring de- 1 general mle of law Is as above stated, even
fendant before aald body, where be was in the absence of such a statute.
examined under oath as to his supposed conCoun.ael for the state contend that thenectlon with the alleged larceny. It does evidence was admlBSlble. and cite Code, t
not appear that the defendant was Informed
State v. Hayden, 45 Iowa, 11; State>
aa to his rights, or of the effect of the an- v. Row, 81 Iowa. 138, 46 N. W. 872; and
swera be might give, or 88 to the fa<"t 11.11 somt- Indiana cases. The statute referred toto whether or not such aDBwers could aft- ; provides that a member of the grand jury
erwards be uaed air;alnst him. No minutes of ' may be compelled to dls<"loee the testimony
h18 testimony were taken by the grand jury. of a witness examined before such jury, to
We may properly &811Ume that he testified . IUK'Prtaln 1f It be consistent with that given
under oath, without being informed as to ' by him before the court. It cannot be said
Ills rights, or the effect of bis testimony, or that tbls statute had the effect of making
the poeslblllty of its uee against blm there- the testimony given before tile immd jury,
after. It Is contended that bis statements under ontb and Involuntarily, by one at the
IQ made before the grand jury were not time charged with the very crime then bevoluntary, and hence lnadmi88lble against Ing Inquired about, and who. when so examhim upon the trial. The course of procedure ined, was under arrest then-for, competent
pursued by the in-and Jury with reference on a trial of the party umlPr Indictment for
to the examination of this wltne88 was un- such crime. Counsel have <"l!ed no case so
precedented, and, to our minds, wholly un- holding, and we find none. 'Ye see no reajust11lable from an7 point of view. They 1 llOD for holding that the legislature. In enactlaad no right to compel the defendant, then Ing the statute referred to, Intended to abIn custody, and charged wltb the comml1118lon rogate the universal mle of law tbat lnvolof the crime Inquired about, to give testl- untary admlsslonB In confe881on of a defendmony before them. To put him under oath, ant charged with a <"rime are lnadmlsslbl<>
under such circumstances, without advising against him on a trial for such crime. The
him of bis rights, was attempting to take statute was, we think. not Intended to co\"er
an notalr advantai;t> of his situation. to his sucb a <"Biie, aml the1·t•l>y J>ermlt a grand JupnaJudlce. A statement ao procured <'ould ror to give evidence of such Involuntary <.'Onlu no proper BPnse be said to be Yoluntttrlly fPM1don. whkh no other JlPrson Is permitted
made. A confession or statement, to bave to testify to. If tile dPf<>ndant, when ex·
been voluntarily made, must proceed "from I nmlned before thP i:rnnd Jm-y, bad bPen adtbe apontaneous suggestion of the pal'\,,t'B I vlst•d 11.11 to bis rlgbt11. and thPn given evtown mind, free from the lnftnPn<"I' of nny dPm"I'. the n1lt• mhd1t he dlft'erPnt. In State
l'Xtraneous dlsturblulf <·aullt'." "It ma<ll' un- I v. Hrli:i:s, ti..~ Iowa, 424. 2i N. W. 358, It
1lt'r oath by the party <"barged, upon a ju- wus held that a plea of guilty, entered by a
dlelal Inquiry as to the <.>rim€', It [the con- d€'fe1~dant to a pr<'llmlnary lnfonn1\tlon. lw
ft-sslon] Is rejected, as not bc>lni: \"oluntary." not '!wing Informed as to bis IPi:nl rights,
P<'<i11le v. McMahon, 1;; N. Y. 3H:i. The law wus a voluntary odmh;slou of his guilt, and
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I
I
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admissible against him. No authorities are

cited in support of this holding. In the case

at bar the defendant was put under oath.

lie was taken before the grand jury. not of

his own volition, but by the direction of the

examining body, for the purpose of being in-

terrogated as to his supposed connection with

the crime with which he was accused. In

the Briggs Case the magistrate aﬂorded him

an opportunity to plead guilty or not guilty.

In the case at bar the proceedings as to de-

fendant's being sworn and examined were

of a compulsory character, no election being

afforded him. For these and other reasons

the holding in State v. Briggs does not apply.

See, also, State v. Carroll (Iowa) 51 N. W.

1159.

2. It is claimed that the evidence does not

warrant a verdict of guilty. In substance,
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the evidence shows that Axline & Smith, in

January, 1892, had 13 sacks of clover seed

stored in their barn; that about January 20,

1892, said seed was stolen by some one; that

it was of the value of $125; that one Clouser

had worked for Axiine 8: Smith, and, among

others, knew where the seed was stored;

that he visited Fillmore (who was jointly in-

dicted with defendant) before the seed was

taken; that the sacks which had contained

the seed were found, after it had been stolen,

at llancock. Iowa; that about the time the

seed was taken 1-‘illmorc hauled to Council

Biufl's. and sold there. about 26 bushels of

4-lo\'t*i' seed; that (.‘liﬂ’ord went with him to

(‘ouncil Bluffs. and on the way he ascer-

tained from Fillmore that he had clover seed

in the sacks in the wagon, and saw him hide

the sacks under a culvert in the wagon road,

where they were afterwards found. it ap-

pears also that defendant accoinpanied Fill-

more hack from Council Bluffs to Avoea.

The reasons defendant gave for going to

Council Blui'l's with Fillmore were in part,

at least, unsatisfactory. But there was no

direct evidence in any way connecting de-

by means of which it was conveyed to Coun-

cil Bluifs. Defendant seems to have been a

passenger with Fillmore to Council Bluffs

under suspicious circumstances, which, how-

ever, are explainable consistent with his in-

nocence of the crime charged. The testimo-

ny does not point with reasonable certainty,

even, to defendant's guilt. Stated most

strongly against the defendant, it is a case of

suspicion, not oi’ guilt established. We are

at a loss to understand on what the jury

based a verdict of guilty, unless it was that

defendant, in a few of his answers, evinced

a disposition to be what is usually called a

“smart“ witness. The verdict is without

foundation to support it, and cannot stand.

3. It clearly appears from this rm-i;i'(l that

the trial court had grave doubts as to de-

fendant's guilt. When the court came to im-

pose sentence on the defendant he said to

him: “Mr. Clifford, it is contrary to my

usual practice to make any comments when

passing judgment in cases of this kind, but

RELEVANCY.

admlulble against him. No authorftlee are
clted In support of this holding. In the caae
at bar the defendant waa put under oath.
He was taken before the 1mLnd jury, not of
hla own volition. but by the direction of the
t>xamlnlng body, for the purpose of being In·
terrogated as to his supposed connection with
the crime with which he was accused. In
the Briggs Case the maglstmte nJrorded him
an opportunity to 1>lt-ad guilty or not guilty.
In the case at but· the proceedings as to defendant"s betnir sworn and examined were
of n compulsory character, no election being
afforded him. For theee and otht'l' reaeons
the holding lo State v. Briggs does not apply.
See, also, State v. Carroll (Iowa) 51 N. w.
llu9.

2. It ls claimed that the evidence doetf not
warrant a verdict of guilty. In substance,
the eddence shows that Axline & Smith, 1n
January, 1892, had 13 sa<'kB of clover Beed
stored In their barn; that about January~
1892,. 11&ld seed was stolen by some one: that
It was of the value of $125; that one Clouaer
had worked for Axline & Smith, and, among
other&, knew where the seed was stored;
tbat he visited Fillmore (who was Jointly Indlcted with defendant) before the 11eed was
taken; that the Backs whl<'h had contained
the IK!ed were found, after It had been stolen,
at Hancock, Iowa; that about the time the
l!l>t'd was taken I•'lllmore hnuled to Council
Bluffs. nnd sold thert-, about 26 bushels of
1•lowr seed; that Clltrord went with him to
<~oun<'ll Blulf11, and on the way be asc.-ertulnE'd from J<'lllmore that he had cloV'er seed
In the sa<'ks In the wagon, and saw him hide
the sack8 under a culT'ert In the wagon road,
where they were afterwards found. It appears also that defendant ac<'ompanled Fillmore back from Councll Bids to A Y0ca.
The reasoDB defendant gave for going to
Council Bids with l<'lllmore were In part,
at least, unsatisfactory. But there was no
direct evidence In any way connE>ctlng defendant with the crime charged. So far as
a}l})('&rB, ht' re<•elYed no part of the money
IJald Plllmore to1· the !l(>ecl. It dOl'B not apJK'ar that he was l!('('n at or nE>ar tlic barn
where the seed was stored There ls no
showlng that he In any manner exercised any
<'Ontrol over thE> Meed or the team and wagon
110

by means of which It was conveyed to Counell Bld11. Defendant seems to have been a
passenger with Fillmore to Council Blu1fa
under auspicious circumstances, wblch, however, are explainable CODBIBtent with hl8 lnnocence of the crime charge<L The teatlmony does not point with reasonable certainty,
even, to defendant's guilt. Stated moat
strongly against the defendant, It la a cue of
ausplclon, not ot guilt established. We are
nt a 1088 to unclerstand on what the jury
based a verdict of guilty, unle88 It wu that
defendant, In a few of his answers, evinced
a disposition to be what ls usually called a
"smart" wltneBB. The verdict la without
foundation to support It, and cannot stand.
8. It clearly appears from this r<'<.. ;rll that
the trial court had grave doubts as to defendant's guilt. When the court <.'lUDe to lmpose sentence on the defendant he Raid to
blm: "Mr. Clifford, it ls contrary to my
usual practice to make any comments when
pa88lng Judgment In cases of this kind, but
In this case I nm constrained to say to you
, that you havl' been found guilty of the crime
, ot larcen7 upon very alight evidence. I tlrm1 ly believe that, If you had conducted your; self upon the witness stand as you should
,. have done. 90 Jury could have been found that
would have returned a verdict of guUty upon such alight and trivial evidence." The
conduct which the court speaks of was the
manner of defendant on the stand, eapeelall7
: 1-n hlR answer& to eertaln questions relating
to bis reasons for going to Council Blu1f&.
. These answer&, which we need not set out
' here, Indicated a want of moral character
and rectitude In other dlrecttoDB. We think
this wn11 clearly a case where the trial court
should have exercised Its right to set aside
the vE>rdlct. It a man la to be committed to
the penitentiary tor a crime, his guilt of
which ls established, If at all, by clrcumstantlal e¥ldence, such evidence should not ont7
point him out as guilty, but be Inconsistent
with any reasonable theory as to his lnnocenct>. Thls the testimony In this cue fell
I far short of doing. It w111 not do to let a
verdict stand which deprives a mllD of hill
J uberty, when It la based upon mere auaplI clon. The judgment of the district court ta
: reversed.

I
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PEOPLE

T.

CilAPLEAU.

(24 N. E. 400, 121 N. Y. 266.)

,of recognition.

teams, of which the defendant's led. Aft-

PEOPLE v. CIIAPLEAU.

(24 N. E. 469, 121 N. Y. 266.)

Court of Appeals of New York. April 29, 1890.

Appeal from court of oyer and terminer,

(‘linton county.

James A verill, for appellant. Samuel L.

Wheeler, Dist. Atty., for respondent.

GRAY, J. The defendant was indicted

for the crime of murder in the first degree

for the killing of Irwin E. Tabor, and he

was tried at a court of oyer and terminer

held in and for Clinton county. The jury

rendered a verdict in accordance with the

charge in the indictment. and sentence of

death was passed. From the judgment of

conviction the defendant has appealed to

this court, and his counsel assigns as
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grounds for sustaining his appeal the ad-

_n1isslon of improper and incompetent evi-

dence, and the insufficiency of the evidence

to convict for murder in the first degree.

We have carefully read and considered the

proofs in this record relied on to establish

l the defendant’s guilt. We are satisﬁed that

no injustice has been committed against

him in the trial upon the indictment, and

that the verdictcould not have been other-

wise rendered by sensible men. The occur-

rence of the killing was in this wise, as it

is made to appear from the whole record:

The defendant lived near the village of

Plattshurgh, and was employed in the

hauling of wood. About 4 o'clock on Mon-

day afternoon, January 28, 1839, he and

two other teamsters were returning home

with their sleds, when, at a point in the

road, the_v met the deceased driving him-

self in a sleigh. He turned out with a nod

and passed the three

er passing, defendant attacked the de-

ceased, struck him upon the head with a

wooden stake, and knocked him out of his

sleigh upon the road, where he shortly aft-

er cxpired from his injuries. This attack

was testified to by one of the teamsters,

Nelson Brown; the other one having died

since the occurrence. Brown's attention

was attracted by hearing the defendant

address the deceased with loud and violent

language. He looked behind,and saw the

deceased stricken down from his seat. and

fall upon the road. Of other witnesses,

evidence was had of his loud and abusive

exciamations; of his hastening from the

rear of the teams where the body lay, with

a stake in his hand. to catch up with his

team. which had gone on ahead; and of

the finding of the body upon the road,

with the head battered almost beyond rec-

ognition, with t-he blanket and buffalo

robe still wrapped about his person, and

with a. piece of the driving reins tightly

grasped in his mittened hands. Evidence

was also adduced of the defendant's say-

ing to theofﬂcer who had arrested him the

same evening, and was conducting him to

Court of Appeals of New York. April 29, 1800.

· Appeal from court or oyer and termlner,
{'llnton county.
James .4 •·erlll, for appellant. Samuel L •
JJ'beeler, Db1t. Atty., for respondent.
GRAY, J. Tbe defE'ndaot was Indicted
for the crime of murder lo the ftrst degree
for the kllllng of Irwin E . Tabor, and be
wtt,. tried at a court of oyer and termloer
held In and for Clinton county. The jury
rendered a \"erdlct In accorchrnce with the
charge In the Indictment, ancl sentence of
death was passed. From the Judgment or
conviction the defendant bas appealed to
this court, and his counsel ttsslgnR as
grounds for sustalnlnll:' his appeal the ad·. mission of Improper and incompetent evidence, and the Insufficiency or the evidence
to convict for murder In the ttrst degree.
We have carefully read and considered the
. proofs in this record relied on to etctabllsb
the defendant's guilt. Weo.resath1fted that
no Injustice has been committed against
him In the trial upon the Indictment, and
thnt theverdlctcould not have been otherwise rendered by sensible men. The occurrence of the killing was lo this wise, as It
Is made to appear from the whole record:
The defendant lh·ed near the village ol
Plattsburgh, and was employed In the
hauling of wood. About 4 o'clock on Monday afternoon, January 28, 1889, he and
two other teamsters were returning home
with their sled11, when, at a point In the
road, they met the deceased drl\•lng himself In a sleigh. He turned out with a nod
,of recoftllltlon. and passed the three
.teams, of which the defendant's led. After passing, defendant attacked the deceased, struck him upon the head with a
woodPn stake, and knol'krd him ont of hie
Sleigh UJIOn the road, Wht're he Shortly arter expired from his Injuries. This attack
WM testified to by one or the teamsters,
Nelson Brown; the other one ha\•lni;i; dlt.>d
since the occurrence. Brown's attention
was attracted by hearing the clefendant
address the deceased with loud and violent
languap;e. He looked behlnd,aud saw the
d('(•eaiced 11trlcken down from bis seat, and
fall upon the road. Of other witnesses,
evldt'nce wae bad of his loud and abusive
exclamatlom1; of bis hastening from the
rear of the teams where the body lay, with
a stake In his hand. to catch UJJ with his
team, which had gone on ahead; and of
the finding of the body upon the road,
with the head battered almost beyond recognition, with the blanket and buffalo
rube still wrapped about his person, and
with a piece of the driving reins tightly
grasped In his mlttened hands. Evidence
was also adduced of the defendt•nt's Haying to theofflcerwbobatl arrl't!ted him the
same evening, and was eonductlng him to
Plattsburgh, "I do not think that l\ir. Tabor wlll poison any more cows." This
remark had refl'rence to the prlson<>r'11 prE"vlous etatements, testified to by witnesses,
that the dece88ed had poisoned his t•ow.
The utterance of threats hy the defendant
agalmlt the life of the deceased wa11 alHo
proved. One nelghbortestltled that tbede-

.
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fendant bad threatened to shoot Tabor,
remarking that he bad Injured hie cow.
Another testlfled that the nlgbt before,
when the defendant was at bis house, be
had narrated a convM'8atlon bad with
Tabor on the road. He told witness that
he had called Tabor "cow doctor. Ver. mooter;" and Tabor had told blm to
"shut up bis head ; " and he had answered
back, "I wlll not shut op my hPttd, but I
am going to ebnt up your head for you,
and when I ehut It up It wlll 11t.ay Abut."
When the wife of the witness, hearing this,
B&ld, "If you was to do that to Mr. 'l'abor,
you would be apt to get a rope around
your neck, "he replied: "Mrs. Brown, people wlll be 110 Jtlad to get that long body
destroyed, people will not hurt me much.
Any way, they do not ban" any more. If
I was going to be kllled, I would be kllled
that new way." The next day aft.er the
occurrence, when the coroner held bis Inquest, the foreman of his jury, who was
also the sheriff, Rtated that Chapleau, the
prleoner, wanted to come before the jury
and make a statement. He was brought
In, and what be thPn ea.Id was reduced to
writing by the coroner. That offlcalal, beln11: examined as a witness UJ>OD the trial,
gave In evidence the statements of the d6fendant as taken down by bhu at the time
of the Inquest. Be t;efltltled, from bis minutes, that be Informed the prisoner, before
the Jury, as to his right to depose or not,
ae he thought flt, an'd that the deposition
might he meed aga.lnst him thtoreafter; that
the prisoner elected of his own fl"efl will to
be sworn, and asked to be allowed to teRtlfy. The l"IRoner'11 story was then given
as thus Rtatw, In which berepreicented the
occurrence as provoked by deceased. He
stated that the df'Ceased refPrred to bis remarks about poisoning cows, and jumped
from his cutter upon the sled, with something In bis hand; wbereu1>on be(the prlaoner) hit him wttb the stake. He also
Rtsttt>d that the deceased harl threatened
to shoot him, and that they had had dlspt1tes concerning thl11 alleJCed pob1onlnaof hlH cowH by thP. deceased. As agalnat
the people's evidence the prl11oner add11<'cd
some evidence of his ,,:oor1 character. . 'l'he
charge of the trial Judge was very fair, and
was not excepted to; nor was It really
exceptionable In Its lnstn1ctlons to the Jury. But the appellant's counsl•I relies Rnd
lnsl11ts upon certain features of the case,
as It was developed upon the trial, al! exhlbl ting a lack or creditable evidence upon
which to ron\·lct; the Incompetency of the
coroner's evidence of the11tatument11 of the
accused; and the lnadml111dblllty of the evlden<.'e of what the prisoner hfvl said
whlle undE'r an'el!t, Immediately uftc•r the
occurrence. These polnta,i we will consider.
Three elements enter Into the proof convicting the defendunt of the crime cbnrged
to the Indictment. They are: The teKtlmnny of an eye-wltneRi4 of the occurrence;
the admissions and statements of the prisoner, and corroborating circumstances lo
the e\'lclence, of previous thrents by the
prh1oner; and of wlrnt tranHplred ahout
the time of the kllllng. arl'ot'Cllng to the evidence of per.mns who, while not sec•lng
the actual killing, saw the prisoner anti
the clc'Ceased on the road. They bud observed his actions, and saw the condition
111
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RELEVANCY.

in which the body of the deceased was

found. Before considering the points of

the appellant‘s counsel. we may here say

that the prisoner’s statements of what oc-

curred between him and the deceased are

absolutely negatived by the facts. The

position in which the body of the deceased

was found made it impossible that he

should have jumped from his cutter upon

the defendant’s sled to attack him, or that

any attack could have been made by the

deceased. 'l‘he body was found upon the

road, with the hands clenched in front,

and still holding the broken rein. The

blanket was nround his legs, and the buf-

falo robe partly under and up under his

right arm. Such circumstantial evidence

made itclear that the deceased was strick-

en down while on his seat in the sleigh,
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and engaged in driving his horses. The

accused, after making this deposition be-

fore the coroner and jury, refused, upon

the subsequent day, to sign it, and denied

making it. This subsequent action of the

accused may have been predicated upon

one of two mental conditions: Either that

he was unwilling to sign afalse statement,

or else that subsequent reﬂection made

him regret having made any statement at

all. But the defendant's counsel argues

that the statement before the coroner was

inadmissible in evidence upon thetrial; and

he places the objection on the ground that

the prisoner was then conﬁned in jail upon

the charge of murder, and that it was not

a voluntary statement. These were not

the grounds of the objection taken at the

trial. At that time they were that the

statements were not signed by the party.

But, overlooking the absence of other ob-

jections, we will consider if any injustice

was done, or any legal error committed in

the reception of the coroner's evidence.

The object of the law has always been

the accomplishment of justice by eliciting

the truth about an occurrence in such a.

mode as to minimize the chances of error

and mistake. and to charge the accused

with guilt by the most direct proofs; and

the aim of statutes of criminal procedure

is to secure the punishmentoi a person,in-

dicted for a crime. only by methods con-

sistent with the maintenance of every safe-

guard against error and sell’-crimination.

The design of the state is always to pre-

serve intact for the beneﬁt of the accused

the presumption of his innocence, in the

proceedings for his conviction. and courts

should endeavor to scrupulously guard

his privileges in that respect, and rather

to err on the side of a tender regard for

his rights; for the penalty is death. Sec-

tion l9(i of the (‘ode of Criminal Procedure

provides that, where a party is examined

before a magistrate, he shall be informed

as to his rights and privileges with respect

to making any statements. Section 200

provides that the statement must be re-

RELEVANCY.

In wht~b the body of the deceased wa11
found. Ilefore conslderlnir the point.a of
the appellant's counsel, we may here say
that the prhmner's statement.a or what occurred between him aud the deceased are
abec>lutely negatived by the fact.a. The
position tn which the body or the deceased
was found made it lmpo881ble that be
should have Jumped from his cutter upon
the derendant's sled to attack him, or that
any attack could have been made by the
decea11ed. 'rhe body was found upon the
road, with the hands clenched In front,
and ettll holding the broken rein. The
blanket was around hie legs, and the buffalo robe partly under and up under hie
right arm. Such circumstantial evidence
made ltl"lear that the dec:eaeed was stricken down while on his seat In the sleigh,
and engaged In driving hie borsee. The
accu11ed, after making tble de1>oeltlon before the coroner and Jury, refused, upon
the subsequent day, to sign It, and denied
making It. This subsequent action of the
accused may have been predicated upon
one of two mental conditions: Either that
be was unwtlllng to sign a false statement,
or else that subsequent reflection made
him regret having made any statement at
all. Bot tbe defendant's coun11el argues
that the statement before the coroner was
lnadml881bleln evldeuceupon thetrlal; aud
be pl11ces the objection on the groun1l tl1at
the prisoner was then confined In Jail upon
the charge of murder, and that It was not
a voluntary statement. These were not
the grounds of the objection taken at the
trial. At that time they were that the
stntementit were not signed by the party.
But, overlooking the absence of other obJectlonH, we will· conitlder If auy Injustice
was done-, or any legal error committed ln
the rece1Jtlo11 of the coroner's evlc1ence.
The object of the law ha.R a.I w aye been
the accomplishment of justice by eliciting
the truth about an occurrence In 1mch a
mode as to minimize the chances of error
aml mlHtake, and to l"harge the accused
with guilt by the most direct pl'oofs; nod
the aim of Htatutes of criminal procedure
Is to secure the punlshmentof a peraon,lndlcted for a crime. only by methods conehrt.ent with the maintenance of en•ry safeguard against error a.nd eelf-crlmlnntlon.
The design of the state le always to preserve intact for the beuettt of the accused
the preHumptlon of hlR Innocence, In the
proceedlngit for hie conviction. and court.a
shoulcl end..a'l"or to HCrupulouely guord
hlR prh·lleges In that re11pect, and rather
to err on the side or a tender regard for
his rights; for the penalty ls death. 1-lectlon 1116 of the Cmle of Criminal Procedure
provlde11 thnt, where a party ls examined
before a magistrate, be shall be Informed
as to hls rlgbt.H an<l prlvllegeH with respect
to making any statements. St'ctlon :mo
provides that the statement mm1t be retluced to writing, and, if defpn1lant refuses
to sl~n It, his reason tberl'for muRt be
Htated, and It must be Hlgncd and ct>rtltted
by the magistrate. '!'befit• conditions were
met In the present caHl'. Section 39:> has
pro,·itlrd that the confP~itlun of a defendunt, wlwt.her In the courHe of Jndlt·lal proCl!edlngs or to a private person, can be
given In evidence against him, unless made
under the induence or fear produced by
112

threats, 01· upon a stipulation of thf' dlHtrlct attorney that he Khllll not he 1>roe<'cuted therefor. The queHtlou, then, Is,
wu the statement of the prl1mner made
before the coroner and Jury 11.dmlR1dble to
prove the homicide? Clearly it was, under the provisions of section 395. It was
made at his own election and reque&t, and
without the operation of the lnttue.ices of
fear, produl'ed by threats, or of hoi>e, under a stipulation that he would nut be
prosecuted. It was adm!Aslble even before
the enactment of the Colle provlHton; for
It was voluntary, because It was made at
the prisoner's own suggestion.
·The case of People,,•. McMahon, 15 N. Y.
384, cltt>d by the counHE!l for the a11pel111.nt,
Is not agalnMt the principle of It.a a<lmll!Slbtllty. In that case the prisoner was arrested as the probable murderer; takt•n
beforethecoroner, then holding an lnt1uest
over the body of the deceased; and wu
sworn and examined as a witness. Upon
the tiial bis evidence so taken was read
against blm. This was held to be an error; but the ground taken by the court
wa11 that the teHthuony before the coroner
was In Its nature unreliable f!Vldence, and
that the reason of the rule of law whicb
demanded Its exclusion was In that con1dderation. It r.oultl not be said that the
11ta.tewents proceeded from the lntt•rnal
and spontaneous Impulses of the prlsont>r
alone, or were nnlnftuenced by any extraneouH cause of sufficient force to [Jrevent
free and voluntary mental action; and
that a judicial oath, administered when the
mind was agitated by a criminal charge.
might have thatenect. Jutlge 81:1.oEs delivered the opinion In that case, and he
dl!K'ueeed the meaning of the term "voluntary, " In reference to confeselone. He
thought there was an ob,•loue principle
underlying the rule which excluded the
HtatP.ments of a prisoner, where not made
free from outl!lde Influences of a nature disturbing to the mind. He stated It to be
that "we cannot safely Judge of the relations between themotivesand thetleclnratlone of the accused, when to the natural
agitation consequent upon being charged
with crime Is superadded the disturbance
produced by hopes or fears artiOcially excited;" and he defined a voluntary confession as one "proceeding from tht• spontaneou1J suggestion of the party's own
mind, free from the intfuence of any extraneous disturbing cause." In the caHeof
Teachout v. People, 41 N. Y. 7, the stat.ements of the prisoner before the coroner.
helng voluntarily made, and after he had
been informed that he was under no obligation to testlfyi were held properly admlttl'<I
upon the trla.. The Peoplev. ~fondon, 103
N. Y. 211, 8 N. E. Rep. 496. WM a recent
caer, dedlled since the passage of the>Co<lt'.
There the examination before the coroner
waH eiwlu1lt•d, not becau11e of any prlnt'iple
or lnadrnlesilllltt,v Inherent In the evidence
generally, but becausl' It had not, and
could not ha 'l"e been In the naturP of
thlngH, a 'l"oluntaryt·unfesslon. There, tho
prlHoner, upon bPlng 11rre1:<ted, was brought
before the coroner W4 a wl tne:-is anti examhll'd. He wus an ignor1111t mnn, WWI
una ttf!ncled l>y counHel, and was not Informed of hlt1 rlghtH or privileges as to
testifylnlf. JudKe RAPALLO reviewed tbli.
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question of the admissibility of the exam-

ination of persons under oath before a

magistrate or coroner. He held that they

must be excluded upon the subsequent trial

for the offense, under circumstances where

the prisoner, having been arrested as a.

suspected murderer, was taken beiore the

coroner's inquest or examining magis-

trate, and there examined on oath as to

circumstances tending to connect him

with the crime. His opinion was given

with reference to the facts of the case be-

fore him, which showed that there was no

confession, but an examination before a.

magistrate. He expressly held that sec-

tion 395 of the Code was intended to apply

only to voluntary confessions, and not to

change the statutory rules relating to the

examination of prisoners charged with
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crime. It is thus perfectly clear that both

before and since the enactment of the Code

provisions the test of admissibility of the

statements of a party accused of the com-

mission of a. crime. whether made in the

course oi judicial proceedings or not. is

whether they were voluntary: and that

can be determined by their nature, and the

circumstances under which made. If in

all respects, and however viewed, they

could only have been the voluntary and

uninﬂuenccd statements of the individual,

no principle of law warrants their exciti-

sion; and the Code expressly authorizes

tlhieilr being given in evidence upon the

ta.

The appellant's counsel argues that it

was error to admit the testimony of a

witness as to what the defendant said to

the officer shortly afterthe arrest. No ob-

jection was taken at the trial; and, as the

defendant's statements were voluntary

ones, no objection would be tenable. It

is no ground for the exclusion of ad-

missions that they were lnade while the

party was under arrest, if shown to ha-ve

been made voluntarily, and free from in-

ﬂuences of promises or threats. Baibo v.

People, 80 N. Y. 484.

Another ground of error presented is

that thejury should not have been allowed

to consider the testimony of Nelson and

Peter Brown. The appeiiant‘scounsei ar-

gues that they were perjured Witnesses,

on their own showing. If this were true,

it would be no reason for any such in-

struction by the court to the jury. But it

is not a correct conclusion from the facts

respecting these witnesses. They were ev-

idently men of low intellectual order. and

dull of comprehension. and frightened at

being drawn into the case. Nelson Brown

was the eye-witness of the occurrence;

and Peter Brown was the person at whose

house, the evening before, the defendant

had repeated his threats made to the de-

ceased. Nelson Brown at ﬁrst denied

knowledge of the facts to which he on a.

subsequent day of the holding of the in-

question or the admissibility or the examination or persons unller oath before a
magistrate or coroner. He held that they
JDU11t be excluded upon theRubsequent trial
tor the offense, under circumstances where
the prisoner, having bren arreRted as "
suspected murderer, was tuken before the
corom~r·s inquest or examining m aglstrate, and there examined on oath as to
clrt'umstances tending to connect him
with the crime. His opinion was glveu
with referenct• to the far.ts of the case before him, which showed that tberewus no
confeHslon, but an examination before u.
rnttgistrate. J;Ie expressly held that section 395 of the Code was Intended to apply
only to voluntary confessions, and not to
change the statutory rules relating to the
examination of prisoners charged with
crime. It Is thus perfectly clear that both
before and since the enactment of the Code
provisions the teMt of ad mlBKlblllty of the
statements of a party accused of the commission of a crime, whether made In the
course or judicial proceedings or not. Is
whether they were voluntary: and that
can be determined by their nature, and the
elrcumstances under which made. If In
all reHpects. and howe\"er viewed, they
could only have been the voluntur~· and
uninfluenced Rtacements of the lwllvlrlua.J,
no principle of law warrants their exclusion; and the Code expretisly authorl:o:es
their being given In evidence upon the
trial.
The appellant's counsel argues that It
war.1 errol" to admit the testimony of a
witness as to what the defendant 1u1ld to
the omcel." Rhortly afterthe arrest. No objection was taken at the trial: and, aR the
defendant's statements were voluntary
ones, 110 objection would be tenable. It
Is no ground for the exclusion of admlRSlons that they were made while the
party w&R under 1urPst, If Mhown to have
been made voltmtarlly, and fl't'e from Influences of promfMes or threatl!. Ba.Ibo v.
People, RO N. Y. 484.
Another ground of erl."or presented Is
that the Jury should not have bePn allowed
to consider the testimony of NelRon and
Peter Brown. The a.ppelitmt'scounsel argues that they were perjured wltnes11es,
on their own showing. If thl11 werl' true,
it would be no reason for any such ln11truct10n by the court to the Jury. But It
Is not a correct conclusion from the facts
resµeetlng these wtt1lCHses. They were evidently men of low Intellectual order. and
dull of comprehension. and frightened at
being drawn Into the ca11e. Nelson Brown
W88 the eye-witness or the OCCUl."rence;
and Peter Brown w11s the person at whose
house, the evening before, the 1lefPn<lant
had repeated bis ·threats made to the deceased. Nelson Brown at firHt denied
knowledge of the facts to which he on a
subsequent day of the holding of the Inquest <lid testify. Peter Brown did not
state upon his examination before the
coroner the fact:R of the couverstttlon. It
doesnotappearthat tbeyhad any motives
for this t>ondoct, or were influenced otherwfRe than by fright or Mome kindred emotion. 'l'hnt w1u1 moMt probably the truth
of the matter rui to both; and possibly, In
the case of Nelson Brown, there may ha Ye
been euperadded the motive to shield a
•n.nno

R.V

_q

[Case No. 40

friend. At auy rate, upotJ. the trtnt they
avowed their frigl•t as the ctrnHe and explanation. 'l'hey were not otherwise Impeached as witnesses, and the judge commented In his charge upon the te8tlmony
of thPse witnesses, and sal cl It was open
to the criticism of counsel for the defendant, and he Instructed the jury that they
must be satlsflcd of its truthfulness. We
think that It was for the jury to pass upon the question of the rrediblllty of these
witnesl!es. It wns fomwrly held to be the
1·ule that where a wltul'HH was shown to
have willfully sworn fnlsl'iy In u former
proceeding In the cnse, or upon the trial,
or, as In tile case uf People v. Evans, 40 N.
Y. 1, where the false swearing was i~1stl
gatecl by the prisoner, and the wltne11s
had been promised a rewar1l for so swearlnl{, that the Jury should be lnstrm·ted to
rllsregard the testimony or such witness.
Dunlop v. Patterson, fl Cow. 24:J, le an early and leading case Qn that subject. The
doctrine as to the treutment or testimony
whleh is affected by contradictions and lnconsistencie~: or by evidence making Its
falsity 11 nnlfest, and eetabllsbtng a consclousneRs In the witness of lb! Jnlslty, hae
been much consltlercd In the books. Opinions have not always bPen In accord; I.mt
the weight of authority was In favor of
the general rule that. the question of credibility of a wltneHs wus one for the jury,
and that the onl;v exl'eptlon to the rule
Wll.R In cases where the discrepancleR In the
testimony wero the result of deliberate
fab1ehood. The Santlsslma Trinldart, 7
Wheat. :139; Conrad v. Williams, 6 Hill,
446; People v. Evuns, suprn; Wilkins v.
Earle. 44 N. Y. 172: Pease v. Rmlth, 61 N.
Y. 477; Place v. Minster, 65 N. Y. 89; People v. Petmecky, 00 N. Y. 415, 2 N. E. Rep.
145. But since the enactment of section 714
of the Penni Code. and section S32 of the
Code of Civil P1·ocedure, we must hold that
a new r11le ohtulnR, and that the rule and
policy of the law are
allow all testimony to go to. and be weighed by. the jury.
By those sectlonH a flerl!on convicted of
any crime ls, notwithstanding, a competent witness in any cause or proceeding,
ch·ll or criminal: but proof of his conviction Is allowed for the purpose of affedlng the wel~ht of his testimony. In
Pl•ople v. O'Neil. 1011 N. Y. 266, ltl N. E.
Rep. GR, the court had refu11e1l to charge
that if the jury should flnd that certain
l'l'ltnesses had, In their previous testimony
In l'\'flpect to the same matters.committed
willful perjury, the jury should wholly
ilil'regard their testimony gl ven on tile
trial. This was held not to be error: and
AN01rnws, J ., said, In reference to the force
of Hection 714 of the Penal Coile: "It
woulc.l be mnnlfestly o.b1mrd. In the light
of this statute, now to hold that un unconvlcted perjurer was an lncompetl~n t
witness, whose e\•ldence could not be considered by the jury, when, under the sta.tute. tr he had been convicted his evidence
must be received and weighed by the
jury." Here the witnesseR, in teRtlfylng
to facts of which upon the preliminary
examination they had dPnied knowled~e,
or which thc>y hnd suppressed, may have
been mo\·e«l uncl rleterrl'd, as they swore
they were, by moth·eR of fright; and they
appear to ha.ve been perfectly free from

to
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improper lnsthxntluns or motives to swear defendant as the pen-petru’t01' of the crhne,

falsely. At any rate,itwas ior the jury to and which the jury could consider in (ggn-

decide whether they were to he believed nectlun with the evidence assailed. The

or not. There was other evidence of aclr- judgment ulconvictlonshould be aﬂirmed.

cumstantlal nature clearly pointlug to the All concur.
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iPlproper Instigations or motives to swear
fal11ely. At any rate,ltwa11 for the Jury to
decide whether they were to be belle\·ed
or not. There was other evidence of a circumstantial natu1-e clearly pointing to the
114

defendant as the perpetrator of the crime,
and which the Jury could consider In connection with the evidence assailed. The
Judgment ufconvlctlonehould be afDrmed.
All concur.
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DOW'NING et al. v. DIAZ et al.

(16 S. W. 49, 80_ Tex. 436.)

Supreme Court of Texas. March 27, 1891.

Appeal from district court. Webb county.

ii‘ Shmvalter and J. O. Nicholson, for

appellants. McCampbells& li'eIcb,forap-

pelices.

S'l‘AYTON,C. J. 'l‘his is an action of

trespass to try title, bi-ouglit by appel-

lees, who are shown to be entitled to take

by inheritance from Joaquin Cueliar.

They allege that the land in controversy,

known as “Porcion No. 36, ” was granted

to Jacinto Cueilar by the Spanish gov-

ernment in the year i767. and that he

gave it in exchange to Joaquin Cucllar

for

land in controversy was granted to Ja-

cinto. Jacinto and Joaquin Cuellar were
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brothers, and both died leaving descend-

ants. Appellants claim through patents

dated 9th and 20th of August, 1884, cover-

' tions.

porclon No. 35, which was originally \

granted to the latter at the same time the ~

ing the same land embraced in poncion No.

36, and located by virtue of land certiﬁ-

cates that issued since the adoption of the

present constitution of this state. The

cause was tried without a. jury, and thu

court found the following facts: “(1)

Plaintiffs, and those whoseestate they suc-

ceed to,havebeen in actual,continuouspos-

session, with improvements, of the porcion

of land described in the petition; and

within the knowledge of living and credi-

ble witnesses. who have testitied herein,

for at least 75 years prior to the institu-

tion of this suit. and claiming and hold-

ing under well-deﬁned boundaries. (2)

Said plaintiffs have so claimed and pos-

sessed the said poncion of land by virtue

of and under what is termed ‘An Act of

General Visit of 1767,’ archived Under the

Spanish government in that year, and

recognized by it for over 50 years. and re-

spected and acquiesced in by the Mexi-

can government for 22 years, copy of

which act was ﬁled in the general land-

oﬂice of Texas about 1871 by virtue of an

act of the legislature of Texas, entitled:

‘ An act to provide for the obtaining and

transcribing of the several acts or char-

ters iounding the towns of Reynosa,

Camsrgo, Mier, and Guerrero,in the repub-

iic of Mexico, and of Laredo in Texas, and

making an appropriation for that pur-

pose. Approved April 24. 1871, and same

constitutes now an archive of said gener-

al land-office under title 7, art. 57, subd. 5,

Rev. St. Tex. (3) Under said act ponciou

35 was originally adjudicated to Joaquin

Cueliar and port-ion 36 was originally ad-

judicated to Jacinto Cuellarz but i ﬁnd

from a preponderance of evidence that for

at least 75 years the heirs and lineal de-

scendants of Joaquin Cuellar ha ve been in

pea:-eabie, adverse. and undisturbed pos-

at the time or the location, surveyR, and
patenting of the lttnd~clalmed by defend(16 S. W. 49, 80, Tex. 436.)
ants herein, pore/on .No. 36, npon which
their said locations were made, an.I 11tttSupreme Court of Texaa. March 27, 1891.
e11te 1mheequently obcaloed, waseqnflably
Appeal from district court. Wehh county. owued by }llntntlfts un<ler color of title
from the sovereignty of the stntt-, tt1ul the
W Showalter and J. 0. Nlcho/so11, for
evidence of said approµriutlon was in tne
uppellants. Mcl'ampbe/ls .t H'e/ch,forap- general
land-office, and also evidenced by
pelll!el!.
the occupation of the owners of HR Id fJOl°cloa, who were ttncl are the plnlntlffM ht>reSTAYTON, C. J. 'rhte 1B on action or ln. Hind that thederendantJaml'11 Downtl"ellpa88 to try title, brou~ht by appel· ing had actual notice of same, as a tenant
lees, who nre shown to be entitled to take of plaintiffs at the ttme be made bis loca ·
by Inheritance from Joaquin Cuellar.
tlons. (6) The lends clalme•l by dl"fend'.fhey alleg;e that the lanc1 In controvel'8y, ante ore within and opuo porclon nnmknown as" Pore/on No. :16," was granted
brred 36, owned and possessed 11.v pluloto Jacinto Cuellar by the Spanish govtlns as shown by the survey in evidem·e.
ernment In the year 1767. and that. be (7) I find that the defendnotR herein, regave It In exrhange to Joaquin Cuellar pel·tl vely, are the pa teotee11 of the land de;
for pore/on No. 35, which was originally Elcrlhed In the answer and numbered, regrauted to the hitter at thl" same time the RIJeCtlvely, 91 und 92, lo the name of James
land In controvel'By was ,;ranted to Ja- Downing, and 410 In the nRme of W. Von
cinto. Jacinto and Joaquin Cuellar were Rosenberg, au<! same from the certlftcatee
brothers, and both died lea vlng deecend- recited therein were patented anc1 the loan ts. AppPllants claim through patents cn tlone therenndl"r madl" since the constidated 9th and 20th of Augo11t, 1884, cover- tution of 1876 WPDt Into effec:~t. n AH conlnsr: the same land embraced lo porcloa No. clnelone or law the court fonnd: "11) Unoo; and located by virtue or land certifi- der the tint, t1econd, and fourth eonducates that leeoed since the adoption of the slons of fact I Ond that }llalntlft11 bu v~ a
present constitution of this state. Tha good antl perfect title to porclon of land
cause was hied wlthou t a Jury, and th~ numbered ll6, and they are entitled to decourt found the following facts: "(1) cree quieting them In their title ao•l posPlalotlns, and those whose estate thl"y suc- session, and defendHnte must be enjoined
ceed tn,bave been In actoal,contlnuooti pos- from clalmlnic any part of the ett111e, or
8e881on, with Improvements, of the porcioa farther asHerting title by virtue of thl'ir
of land described in the petition: and patents, which are null aur1 void, and nrnst
within the knowlf'd~e of living and credi- be clellvered up for canr.eilntlon. (21 Unble witnetl8es, who have te11tltied herein, der the third conclusion of fart on exfor at leaBt 75 years prior to the lnstltu- chno~e of pore/om~ :l."i and 36, between Joaiton uf this suit. and claiming ttnd huld- quln Cuellar Rml Jacinto Cuellar. ls preing under well-defined boundaries. 12) sumed. (:J) Under the fifth conclusion of
Naid plalntlns have so claimed aud pos- fact defendants cannot recovl•r ht>reln in
sessed the said porelon of land by virtue
the nature of plea l'PConvi:ntion pm11<e1Bloo
of and under what le termed 'An Act of of the lands deteerlbed ln their pa tt>n t.R, as
General Visit of 1767,' archl\·ed under the Raid patents ti.re null and vol11." On tbe11e
Sp11nl8h government lo that year, and flndlnJrS a Ju1lgmeot was renderttd for the
recognized by It for over 50 years, and re- plalntUJs. The quest!ons r11.lsed rt>late to
spected and acqulescl"d In by the Mexi- the adml11slon and rejection or e\'ldence
~an atoven1ment for 22 years, co11y of
anrl to the sufficiency of the evidence to
which act was filed In the general lundsustain the pre1:1umpt!ons lndulgt'd by the
omce or Texas about 1871 hy virtue of an court.
act of the legislature of 1.'exas, entitled:
Tbe land In controversy was formerly
•An act to provide for the obtaining and
within the jurisdiction of the town ofGuer.
transcribing of the eev.eral aets or char- rero, once known as" Re\•llla." A paper
ters foon•llng the towns of Reynosa,
was offered in evidence which waR a certlCamaiiro. Mier, and Guerrt'ro, In the repuh- fle•l copy from the gt>nerul land-ofttce of a
Jlc of Mexico, and of L11.redo In Texas, and
paper thl•reln ftle1l by .J. L. Haynes In 11urmaking an appropriation for that pur- Rt1ance of tht> act of Aprll 24. 1M71, ( P111~ch.
pose. Appro\'ed April 24, 1871, and same DIF,. art. 5~26.) '!'bat paper was by Haynes,
constitutes now an nrclJlv" of said gener- In pursuenre of the ad referred to. obtained
al le.nd-omce under title 7, art. 57, sulld. 5, from the archives of thetownof Guerrero,
Rev. St. Tex. (8) Under said act poz-cioa and purpurts to be a copy of the proreed35 was originally adJudlicated to Joaquin lngs of a sub de legation composed of the
Cuellar and pore/on 36 waR orlglm\lly 11d- 11a.::ie persons, acting under the same authority and for the 11ame p11rpo11e, as
Jmllcated to Jacinto Cuellar: but I ftnd
from 11 preponderance of evillence th11.t for shown In the ~a11e of Railway Co. v. Jarat least 75 years the heirs and lineal de- vis, 69 Tex. 527, 7 H. W. Rep. :!10. In that
seenrlaota of J oaquln Cuellar have been In case tba law under which Huynf's was
peareable, advertie. and undlstur!Jed pos- t1ctlng when he olltalned and Hied In the
BP.Rslon of pore/on 36, and tht" heirs anrl general la1111.omce the pnper from which
auignees of Jacinto l'uellar have beE'n in the copy used In this waH taken, us well
adverse, peaceabl!!, and undisturbed pos- a statement of the otflclalcharucter of the
BeHHloo of porctou 85, and tht!He porclnns persons whose acbl It purports to eviare contlguoo11, (4) Plaintiffs are the dence, and the purpo11e fJf the visit of the
lineal dl'fleeodante of Joaquin Cuellar, a111t sub de Jegatlon will lie found, es Wt>ll as
lnh·!rlt all his right, title, and llJtt>t"eRt In a lltatem-ent of tile p;rneral coul'1'1e of proand tu eald porcion No. 36. lli) ltlod that cedure. 1.'be paper offered In evidence In
DOW?-."ING et al. v. DIAZ et al
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this case bears the same relation to the

town of Guerrero, its inhabitants and

property rights, as did the paper offered

in evidence in the case before referred to,

to the town of Laredo, its inhabitants

and property rights. It is in effect the

charter of the town, and at the same

time the evidence of the right of the town

to lands set apart for public use, as well

as the evidence of the right of each settler

to the land then designated and granted

to him. Both towns embraced lands on

each side of the Rio Grande. The locality

of the severa.i porcions granted to individ-

uals may be detiniteiy ascertained from

the instrument as well as the relation of

land granted to one to that. granted to

another. The recitals in reference to por-

cions 35, 36, and 37 are as follows: “ (35)
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On the same course and river bank they

measured thirty-four cords, which make

seventeen hundred Mexican varas, which.

with as many more on the opposite head

and twenty thousand on the sides, ad-

just a ponclon. They identiﬁed it, and,

being applied for by Don Joaquin Cuellar.

it was left to him. (36l They measured

an equal number of cords on the same

course. which makes seventeen hundred

Mexican varas, and with as many more

on the opposite head and twenty thous-

and on the sides. a purclon which they

marked out complete, and, being applied

for by Don Jacinto de Cueilar, it was ieit

to himilke the preceding one. (37) On the

same course and river hank they meas-

ured the same cords. which complete sev-

enteen hundred Mexican varas, with as

many more on the opposite head and

twenty thousand on the sides. a poncion

which they marked out. and, being ap-

pllcd for by Bartolimi Cuellar, it was left

to hiu|.”—and in this manner proceeded

the designation of porcions until all the

settlers received lands. There is evidence

of much detail in the whole transaction

from its inception to the close,with strict

conformity with the laws then in force.

After the several allotments were made,

the sub de legates made the following dec-

laration: “We hold, as adjudicated, the

sixty-nine porcions of land partitioned to

the residents and settlers of this town

and its jurisdiction, as the surveyors de-

clare they havc done with the assistance

at the time of surveying them of some in-

terested parties. “ ° ' For the fuiiexe-

cution of their contents a ‘test1mom'0‘

thereof shall he left to the captain or lus-

tice to be archived for the protection of

the parties so soon as he shall effect the

taking of possession, when he shall estab-

lish conspicuous and lasting monuments

in every porcion and sitio assigned in or-

der that the possession thereof may pre-

vent all damage and injury to third par-

ties." Chrlstibai Benz ilenavides, "cap-

tain or justice,” was required to place
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this case beani the same !"elation to the
town or Gue1"1-e1"0, its Inhabitants anll
pl"Opel"ty l"lghtM, as dhl the pupPI" ottel'ed
In evidence In the case befol"e referred to,
to the town of Lnredo, its lnh11bltants
und property l"lghtK. It Is In effect the
chnrcer of the town, and at the same
thm• the evidence of the l"lght or the town
to lands sC't apart fol" public use, as well
a~ the evidence of the rfgh t of eRch settle!"
to the land then d~l~natecl ttnd ~ranted
to him. Both towns emoracl'd lauds on
each 11lde of the Rio Urande. The locality
of the 11evPral por('fom~ gl"untl'll to lndlvidualt1 may be definitely asce1"t11lned from
the ln11trnment as well as the relation of
land granted to one to that gl"anted to
anothel". The recitals In refel"ence to pnrcions 35, 36, and 37 are as follows: "(35)
On the same r,onl'tle and rl vel" hank they
rueitsured thirty-four col"d'l, which mBke
11eventren hundnid Mexican va!"as, which,
wt th as many mol"e on the op111111ite bead
and twenty thousRnd on the sides, adjust a pure/on. Tht>y Identified It, and,
being applied for by Don Joaqnln Cuellu.
It was left to him. (86) They mea1rnred
an equal number of r.ol"dll on the aamP
coul'Se, which makt"t!I seventeen bund!"ed
Mexican v11ras. and with as muny more
on the opposite belld Rnd twenty thout1and on the 11ldt>s, a purdon which they
mal"ked out complete, and, being nppllt>d
for by Don Jacinto de Cuellar, it wa11 left
to him like the pl'eCedlng one. (37) Oo the
11ame counie and river h1tnk th11y meRsured tba same cordt1, whkh complllte seven teen hundred Mexican varnH, with ns
maoy more on the opµmdte head nod
twenty tho1111and on the sldt>s, a porcina
which they marked out, and, being ttppll<>d fol" by Bartollml Cuellar, It was left
to him. "-and to this mannel" pl"oceeded
the de11lgnatlon or pon•lons until all the
M'ttlel'll received lanil11. 'l'here is evidence
of much detail In the whole transa<.'tlon
from lt11 Inception to the close, with strict
confol"mlty with the lnw11 then In fol"ce.
After the several allotments were made,
the 1111b de legates made the followlngdeclal"ntion: "We hold, a11 alljurllcated, the
sixty-nine porclnns of land pRrtlt!oned to
the residents and settlel"s of thlB town
and Its jurls<llctlon, as ·the sul"veyors decla re thev bani done with tlui a11sh1tance
at the time of surveying them of some lnter..tited partlPB. • • • For the full execution of their ('ODtl!OtH II 'test/mon/O'
thereof shall be left to the captain Ol" Justice to be arcbh·ed for the protection of
the parties so soon &R he shall effect the
tu king of poH11ession, when he shall e11tablh1h conspicuous and laHtlng monuments
In evel"y voreiun and sltio aHHigned In Ol"·
•ler tb1tt the pos11est1lon thel'eof may pri>1·ent all damage anrl lnjul"y to thll"d Pill"·
ties." Chrlstibal Ilenz Benavides, "cuptaln or justice," watt required to pluce
persons to whom lan1ls ball been allotted
lo po11se11sion. and after ha vlug clone su to
uttnch the ol"lglnnl rvldencing hlH acts to
the ttwti111011io lert by the :rn/1 1Je /1•1.m te,
encl the l'ame to al"chlve fol" hlH protection or nil pel'eons intcresterl, and ahm to
fol"war(] to the .~11b <le leJ(11tP.~ a testimonio
of his procerdlngH. In pu11mance with the
Jl"der llennvh..lt>lil pl111:ed the lilettlel"e In possession of the lam.ls that had been allotted
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to them, but poeeee11lon seems not to have
ht>en given in the ol"der In which allotnents weni made; and In Flume lnetanr.ea
flxchaoares made het,veen pel"SonK aftel" al·
lotment, but before judicial poHBessloo
was given were recognlzetl as valid In the
·1rt of pos11e1111loo. In the pl"o~eedln~~ hy
him the following appeal'H: "(211) Next
thl•y pro•~l'f'detJ tu the place called 'LaH
Animas,' nnrtel" which petl"onage three
w1dom1 of hrnd are cnntalnefl. 'l'he ftrRI
111>longs to Don Jacinto de Cuellnr: FJllJ
the 11ecoml to Don Jouquln Cuellal"; (311
und the third to Don Bartoloml de Cuellar. When making the pl"oper 1le111011etratlo11R, as befol"e the said J aclnto a;1pea re1I.
pt>1·sonally repreKentinic the person11 of hiR
father and brother, arlJoinlng his own
tract, possee"lon wae delh•el"t>d to bhn In
the name of 1111. aud he receh·ed It In propl•r conformity aH thtt fo!"mer ones npoo th~
Htated condltlonM, the 1mld wltnesseM being
11re11ent." PosseeKlon preceding anrl following tblR was gh·en to the same per11ons to whom the allotments pre<'edlng
nnd following were madt>. He also Jtave
possPselon of lands to the mlRslon ond
lotR lo the town to settlel'll, as pl"ovlcled
In the ordel'8 of the sub de lega.tes. and
clo11ed the recol"d of hh1 acts by a declaration t11at thA lnstl"ument then executed
was such a l'ecorrl made for their pt'rpetuatluo of which be ordered n t.estimonlo
"he made ltt•m hy Item. literally, whl<'h.
being done, shall be fo1"war1led to his
Lo1"d11hl1> BrlgRdlel" Don J. Fel"nando Palacla, govel"nor and vice captain general of
this colony, In obedience of orden. and
that hl11 original he attbched to the testlmunlo of partition."
To give a full stntP.rueot of the contents
of the papel" offered In f'\"ldt>nce as a copy
of that known as the "Genernl Visit ..
would consume more time and space than
can now be ~lven to thnt pu1"po11e, but w&
may HBY that It throughout. from day to
clay, waH executed with all the formalltleK
required at that time, aud beam e\•locnce
that the pl"otocol rrom whkh taken was a
tl"ue and folthful l'C<'Ord of what occurred
at the time the town of GuPrrero waR el'tabll11hed a'I a SpanlHh munklpality. 'fhe
proceedings thuR e\'ldenced bep;an early
In Jnly, 17117, and ended on August 20th of
that year. Following the papers befnm
l't'ferl"ed to In the tl"anecl"lpt flied In the
gf>nerttl land-ottke by Hayne11. fl"om which
all the copies offt>red tn evhlence wem
taken, ttre muny Jlllflers, some of which
ap1>ea1" to have been taken fl"<>m pl"otocol11,
:ixecuted In nil l"C'spectH as the IAws then In
force required during the latte!" pal"t of the
lnet century, 11n<I f'Urly In the pl"t'llent,
which l't'fer to tho paper known &H the
"Gent•l"ul Vlt1lt," and rerognlze paa•tlcular
n11proprlatlun11 of land as thereby mu<le.
One of tht:'11e Wllll an 1111pllcatlon made by
.J ur1e ~lig-uel I.le Cuellnr, of d11 te Feb rua I'.''
20, lSOl, directP<l to the governor of thtt
province. In which he made known to tht+
J(overnor tlrn t he h11d su<.'ceede1l to the
rh:ht of hlR father, Bartoloml <:nelhu, to
the porl'io11 or Jund set a 11art In the" GenPrnl Visit," which was 1wrcion No. 37, 11ntl
<.'OlllJ>lainlng that hlH bruthPr .Jou11uin
Cuellal" had 11hut him off fl"om the view on
the south by an lnclosure, itnd thereby
prevented ·hie stock from gettln& water.
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and praying that the governor appoint

some comp:-tent person “ who shall, in ac-

cordance witn the said acts of the ‘Gen-

eral Visit,’ run the line. as it appears that

said porcion was given and bounded, and

that it be surveyed and run in accordance

with the tenor of said act, fronting on the

river, and with its depth on the estab-

lished courses as they appear in the pro-

ceedings of partition of lands, in order

that with surety l may obtain a watering

place on my property.“ In reply to this

petition the governor made the following

order. “I confer commission upon Don

Fraco. Corduite," who will. as is asked by

this party, conform himself to the ‘Gen-

era Visit,‘ with citation of adjoining own-

ers, and declare the boundaries of the por-

cions of laud referred to,and cause mortar
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and stone monuments to be erected tiiere-

on. " On March 9th of same year (‘orduite

caused the order to be sent to the cus-

todian of the writings known as the“ Gen-

era] Visit," requiring them to be sent to

him, in order that he mightduly discharge

his commission, which embraced other

land matters besides that already referred

to. and in pursuance of this order it ap-

pears that they were sent, and that (for-

dnite then re-established the lines and cor-

ners oi these purcions as were they at ﬁrst,

in which all interested parties concurred;

and on the 14th of the same month the

papers were remitted to the governor,

who, on November 18, 1801, ﬁnding the

work correct, approved it; but it does not

appear when the papers known as the

“ General Visit. ” properly archived in Guer-

rero, but delivered to (‘ordnite were re-

turned to their proper archive. The act

preceding the paper which purports to be a

record oi the proceeding of the sub de le-

gates and of Benavides, who was empow-

ered to establish lines aml corners of por-

clons and to give possession in 1767, is as

follows: “In the city of Guerrero, in the

free state oi Tamaulipas, on the third day

of the month of March, eighteen hundred

and thirty-one, I,Santiago Vela, constitu-

tional alcalde, acting with assisting wit-

nesses in default of a notary, there being

none in terms oi law. In view of the reso-

lution of his excellency the governor of the

state, agreeably to his counsel, dated the

15th oi October. in the year oi 1830, last

past. upon the restoration oi the proceed-

ings or acts of visit of this city, I order

thutit takes effect in all its parts. copy-

ing in the form oi testimouio the said doc-

uments, in order that, being protocoled,

they may perpetuate the evidence oi pos-

session of the ﬁrst settlers oi this city.

This I have determined by this decree.

Signed by me. with my assisting witnesses

in the prescribed form, which I certify.

[Signed] SAN'l"i.\U() VELA. Assisting wit-

nesses: Jose Ms FLORES. FLﬁlii'2.\‘(,‘l0

Vii.1.1lin~:.u.." Then follow the entire pro-

(Case No. 41

and praying that the governor appoint whleh purportPd to have been made on
some competent person" who shall, lu ac- February 4, 1831, but by what authority
cordance with the amid acte of the •Gen- ls not Rhown, showing to whom lends
eral Vlaslt.' run the line, es It a11pears that were grnnted by the" Ot•oeral Visit," who
said pore/on was given and bounded, aud owned them at time statement Wllll made.
that it be surveyed and ran in accordunce what landM were granted In 1784, and
with the tenor of said act, fronting on the what lands were denounced In the year
river, and with its depth on the PStab- ll'tlO, or under the colonization law. end
l111hed coul'l!es as they appear in the pro- on this It appeued that porclun 85 was
ceedlnlCll of partition of lands, In order granted to Jacinto <'ueller, 36 to Joeqofo
that with surety I may obtain a watering Cuellar, and 37 to Burtoloml CueJlasr, which
plat'e on my pru11erty." In reply to this were stated to be owned by the helni of
petition the g•>Vernor made the following these persons, except No. 85, which was
order. "I eonfer commission u1mn Don held by a 1-1el'lilon named aa a purchaser
Fraco. Cordulte, who will. as le a11ked by The paper last named wa11 objected to on
this party, conform himself to the' Gen- the ground that it did not appear that It
era~Vlldt,' with clttl tlon of adjoining ownwa11an arcblveatOuerreroorin thegenPral
ers, end declare the boundaries of the pur- lend-office, and It was furtherclalmed that
clona of land referred to, antl cauRP mortar
the original would notbeadmlMslble if proand stone monuments to be erectPCI there· duced. It sutflclently appears from theceron." On March 9th of 11nme year l'01·dulte tltlf'ate authenticating the transcript Hied
cauRed the order to be 11ent to the t'U8· by Heynee that the paper waa an archive
todlan of the writings known as the" Gen- at GuerrPro; and tr it appearedtbatltwas
eral Visit," requiring thPm to be sent to such a paper as Haynes was authorized,
him, In order that ht> mlghtdulydlBl'harge by the act under which he was appointed,
hl11 commission. which embraced other to preserve a copy of tbem, the copy filed
land matters besides that nlrendy referred by him In the gl'neral land-ofHce would be
to, end in porsuenee of this order It ap· an archive of that office; hut llM prellentt>d
pears that thPy were sent, end thn t Cor- we are of opinion that It should have been
dnlte then re-establlshell the lloeA aocl cor- ~xclmled on proper objection. We are of
ners of these porcions a11 were they llt first, opinion th11t tbe ar.t under which Haynes
In which nil Interested parties concurred; was appointed did not authol'lze him to
and on the 14th of the 11ame D1onth the procure and fl.le It In thi' general lanclpaptirs were remitted to the governor, ofHce; for the original wns neither an
who. on November 18, 1801, finding the "act, l'harter, or grant affecting the luncls
work correct,apJ1roved It; but ltdoes not on the enst 11lcle of the Rio Grande," but
appear when the paper11 known as the merely a statement, It may be, of aome
"General Visit," properly archived In Guer- ofHclal of the town uf Guerrero as to his
rero, but dellveretl to Cordnite were re- opinion as to th" ma ttens of whkh the
turned to their proper archive. The act paper.11peak1t. Jn this cu11e, If It was not
precf'dlntcthepaper which purports to he a proi1erly an archive Ira the general landrecord of the proceedlnJt of the sub de le- oftll·e, the certified copy ottered was not
RRtf'll aD1l of Bennvldes, who wus empowadmlBBlble.
ered to estahl111h lines and corners of porThe otlJPCtlon to papers before refel'red
clons and to give possee11ion In 1767, Is as to, other than those which are termed the
follows: .. In the city of Guerrero, lu the "Gt>neral Visit," made on the trial, ·was
free state or Tamaullpas, on the third day . es follows ... Beca11se all that portion of
of the month of March, eighteen hundred said document bl.'glnntn11: on page 64, at
and thirty-one, I, Snotiago Vela, conetltu- the said words,' lo the town of Revilla.'
tlonal alcalde, acting with assisting wit· and all the continuing portions thereof, apnenes lo default or a notary, there belnit pear to be made up of recitals of persons
none In terms of law. In view uf the re110- regarding ma ttel'I! and things not rehwant
latlon of bis excellency the governor of the to the Issues of this cause, and not admistrtate, airreeably to his counsel, dated the ~lble lo the form ottt>red, and Instruments
15th of October, In the year of 1830, last and clocum<'nte which do not rrnrport to1
past, upon the restoration of the proceed- be archives In any olflet> In l\f Pxlco, and
ings or acts of vl11lt or this city, I orclt>r none of whh·h nre 1·11 · itled to he archh·l'd
that tt takes ett1't't In nil Its parts, eopy- In the general hrncl·ullice of Texas." The
lng In the form or testlmoulo the said doc- papers here referred to are not mere ret'ltuments, In order that, being protocoled, als, not rPlevant to the l11sue11 In this case,
they may perpetuate the evidence of pos- but evidence the nets of the offtcers of the
•t'llldon of the ftrst 11ettlers of this city. Spanl11h government IQ malclnic grants of
This I have determlne<l by this decree. land, In the adjustment of boundaries of
Signed by me. with my &lli\lstlng witnesses lund grunted, ascertainment of UllBl'l>roIn the prescribed form, which I certlly, prlated hrnds, and like matters. Some of
[81gned] SANTIAOO V&J.A. Assisting wlt- them had bearing on the q uestlon of right
Dl'lll!(lff: J osB: MA 1''1.om;;s.
1''1,01u::>c10
of Joaquin Cuellar to the land In controVJLLAUEAL." Then follow the entire 1>rovel'Ky, end es tn lt11 bounclsrles. end all In
eeedlnga of the s11b de legation and other 11orue manner anected lands on the east
papers referred to. whlcl1 were properly side of the Rio Grande, and threw more
anthentlcatPd and dellver.-d to the Htate'11 or lees llgh t 011 the \"ery ma ttt>r& 10 releragent on 8eptember 9, 1871, by whom they cuce to which lnformutlon was sought
were filed In the general land-utflce, and through the aet of April 24, 1!l71. Such
certified copies thererrom were used on the bt>lnir their cbllrHl"tl'r, and It being clear
trlel or thlR cause. Haynes, with tile that they were properly brchlved at Guer
papera before referred to, end embraced in rero, the copies flied by the state'11 agent
the transcript certified by the proper eu- In the genPral land-oftlce bPCame archives
tborltleeat (:inerrero. also lile<l a statement of that omce, as held in Railway Co. v.
U7

Case No. 41)
Case No. 41] _

RELEVANCY.

Jarvis, 69 Tex. 527. 7 S. W. Rep. 210. There

were many objections made to the intro-

duction of the certiﬁed copy of the paper

known as the “General Visit, " which con-

sists solely of the writings evidencing the

acts of the sub delegates Palacio and Os-

erio. and of persons acting under their in-

structions, which were authenticated by

themselves with the necessary witnesses,

and by Bcnavides. \vho was authorized by

them to place inhabitants in possession

of lands allotted at time surveys were

made. The paper takes its designation

from the fact that it evidences the acts of

the sub de Ic,'_r.-ztes who came to the Rio

Grande frontier, at time named, to or-

ganize the frontier towns, ami to desig-

nate the lands that should pertain to

each for several public purposes, as well
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as to allot lands to the settlers of such

towns, and to give evidence of the rights

conferred. The many objections urged to

the admission of the certified copy from

the land-otiice may and will be grouped.

1. it was claimed that the paper

offered in evidence was neither a copy of

an archive in the land-oﬂice, nor of a

paper that could legally become an ar-

chive. As held in Railway Co. v.Jarvis. 69

Tex. 527, 7 S. W. Rep. 210, it rests with the

lcgislatureto determine whatshall become

an archive; and under the statutes re-

ferred to in that case it must be held that

the paper in the general land-oliice from

which the cop_v offered in evidence was

taken was an archive. but its eﬂect as evi-

deuce is a matter for consideration here-

after.

2. It was objected that the loss of the

Original was not proved, nor its absence

accounted for: and this objection em-

braces both the protocol and original tes-

fimonlo evidencing the proceedings known

as the “General Visit.” From the record

before us it appears that both the papers

referred to, properly become archives in

two places in a foreign country; and from

the nature of the proceedings evidenced by

them. did it not so appear in the record,

this court would takejudicial knowledge

that they should so have become, and

could not be legally withdrawn for pro-

duction here. The record of the proceed-

ings was, in effect,the charter of the town

of Revilla, now known as “Guerrero,”

as well as evidence of the town's right to

all lands set apart for public use, and, at

the same time, the evidence of individuals‘

rights to the tracts of land allotted to

persons in whose favor no separate evi-

dence of right was given. The protocol.

unless otherwise directed by competent

authority, was required to be placed in

the proper archive of the government,

while the original remained with the in-

tercsted parties as the evidence of their

right; and affecting, as it did, the town

in its municipal character and ownership,

RELEVANCY.

Jarvis, 69 Tex. 527. 7 S. W. Rep. 210. There
were many obj('('tlons made to the Introduction of the certlfled cory of the paper
known as the "General Visit," which con·
slsts solPly of the writlnitH evhlenclng the
acte of the .Yub de legates Palacio and Oserlo, and of penJone actlnK' under their In·
etrnctlon1t, wLlch were authentlcatt•d by
themselves with the necessnry witnesses,
and hy Benavides. who wns authorized by
them to place Inhabitants In po88e88loo
of Jtrnd11 allotted at time eurvey11 were
made. Tile paper takes Its dt.'fllgnatlon
from the foct that It evidences the acts of
the s11b de IPJrlltes who ca 11111 to the Rio
Grnnde frontier, at time named, to organize the frontlPr towns, and to de11lgnote the lands that should pertain to
each for several public purposes, as well
as to Rllot lands to the settlel'8 of sueb
towns, and to give evidence of the rights
conferred. The many objections urged to
the admission of the certllled copy from
the land-office may and will be grouped.
1. It was claimed that the paper
offered In evidence was neither a copy or
an archive tn the land.office, nor of a
paper that could le2ally hecome an archive. As held lo Railway Co. v.Jarvl1t, 6U
Tex. 527, 7 8. W. Uep. 210, It rests with the
ll•glslature to determine whats ball become
an archh·e; and under the statute& referred to In that ease It must be held that
the paper In the general land-office from
which the co(ly offered lo evlllence was
taken wwi an archive. but Its erfer.t as evldeuce ls a matter for consideration hereafter.
2. It wae objt>Cted that the IOBR of the
original WOB not proved, nor lt11 absence
accunnted for; and this objection embraces both the protoeol and orlglna.I testlmonlo evl'1enclng the proceedlngM known
as the "Genf'ral Visit." l<~rom the rec.-ord
before us It appears that both the papers
reff"rrerl to, properly become archives lo
two places In a foreign country; aud from
the nature of the proceedlnJ(sevhJP.11ced by
them, did It not so appf'nr In the record,
this court would take judlelal knowled~e
that they should MO have become, and
~:ould not be legally withdrawn for produC'tlon here. The record of the proceedings was, In effect, the charfor of the town
of Re\•llla, now known nil "Guerrero,"
as well as evidence of the town's right to
all la.ode set apart fur public use, aud, at
the SRme time, the evidence or lndlvlduRIK'
rights to tho tracts of lund allotted to
1w111oos lo whose favor no separate e\·ldence of right was Jl;lvPn. The protocol,
u•1 let1s otherwise dlrt>cted by c11m11E>tent
authority, was required to be plt1ced In
the proper archive of the JP;overumeot,
while the orlglual remained with the lnterf'eted partleK as the e\"lclence or their
right; and affecting, as It did, the town
In its municipal cha1·acter end ownerHhlp,
the ar\.'111\·e of the town was the proper
place of deposit. Tlw pa11er evldenct·M the
fact that neither the protocol nor urlitlnal
could tie lei.tully tmrrendered by their custo.tlans to indh·ltluals to be taken to another country. or for any othPr purpose;
and the ohJr<·tlons now con11ldered were
properly O\'erruled.
3. It was urged that the paper from
"·hlch that filed In the Keneral land-uftlce
ll8

I was

copied was not an archive In the
town of Guerrero, and that th111 n1>pe1trs
I froDl the Instrument Itself. So far as the
! contents of the paper Rhow, It wat1 one
1 not only 11uch as It was proper to maKe
an archive of that town, bot one which by
competent authority w11B required to ~e
so made. In refereuce to 11urh a matter It
la pt>cullarly proper to pl't'Kume that was
done which ought to hu ve been done, and
especially RO ufter the lapse of so many
yea!'ll. Jf the orlKlnal, authPntlea.t<!d by
the 8ub de lt.-glltes with oecet1sary wltneHMl'ff, and evidencing their acts, and
the Jlrotocol, properly authenticated, evidencing the acts of Henu vld('8 under their
orders, were found arw·hlved Rt Ouerrero.
thPy would he held to muke full prodf of
the facts testified to by them, In the
courts of all countries where the laws of
Sp•dn are In force, and In Rll courts governed by the rules or the common law
wherein should arise a question as to the
fRlth to be Klven to such lostrumt>nts, executed when the Spanish laws were lo
forct>, and aftectln,,; property subject to the
d'>mlnlon of that sovtlrelgnt:y. It Is not
clear from the reimrd, except as bt'fore
stated, bow the papers from which thoee
In the general land-office were copied were
authenticated; but It Is evident that thtt
copy In that office waR not made from
the original left by the sub de le/fates, and
the protocol executed by Benavides with
pro1>er witnesses. which wu directed to
be attacht'd to that original and both to
be archived In Huern;ro. We have aeen
not only that the papers last named were
directed to be ar~blved at that place, but
that tbls was done; and we have also seen
that, under tbP order of the governor of
the provlure, the11e paperR were directed
to be dellvert'd to Cordulte, and thnt they
were received by him. These facts appear
through papers properly authenticated,
and the record clearly rua.nlfeste that tbP.
labol'll of Cordulte were governed by these
paperB, to which frequent referenr.e Is
made. Whether the paperM orchlved lri
Revilla. In li117, and removed by ordt>r of
the gu,•ernor In JSCll, were ever returned,
cannot be clearly ascertained from the record before us; but It Is e\·ldent that they,
or co11les of them, were returned with a
resolution of the governor of the 11tnte of
date October 15, 1830. The reKolutlon Is
not fonnd In the record; but the lnferenre
from what does appear 111 that It accum11anled the pupers removed In 1801, or l'op.
lea of 11uch pa11ere, Rnd con talned an order that they Kbould be copied, and placed
in such enduring form aa would 11er1>etuate
the et'lclence or the rights of the tlrst settlers, as well as of the town. From tbe
df'l•ree of Mttrrb 3, 1831, It Is evldP.nt that
what wus then done was In ohecllenl'P to
the or1ler or reimlutlon of tbt' governor of
October 15, 1~-lO. and thut this reqnlre<I
whatever ptt.pcr11 were restored to be
copied .. In the form of testluwnlo, the
said documents, In order that, belnit pro.
tocoled, they n1ay perpetuate the evldenr.e
of po11seMlon of the first Mettlel'B of this
city." What wa11 directed to he done was
to perpetuate evldeuce of rll(hte, which
would be tmpoMelble If the rec--rd to ne
made would not Import verity. The
meanlug of the language above quoted le
1

RECLTALS IN
RECITALS IN STATUTES.

[Cass No. 41

not clear; but, in view of theiact that one ' that TOP This P088011 it 81101110 have been

of the papers constituting the “General

Visit” was a testimonio, and the other a

matrix or protocol, a copy to be made

from them would be. not only in form,

but in fact. a testimonio, and the direction

that they should be protocoled for perpet-

uation carries with it the idea that they

should be copied into a book. The Span-

ish word “protocolo, " when applied to a

single paper, means the first draft of an

instrument duly executed beiore a notary,

—the matrix.——because it is the source

from which must be taken copies to be

delivered to interested parties as their evi-

dence of right; and it also means a bound

book in which the notary places and keeps

in their order instruments executed beiore

him. from which copies are taken for use
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oi parties interested. It is evident that in

neither oi these senses, strictly, was the

Spanish word translated “protocoled.”

used in the order of March 3, 1831; but

the inference is that by resolution of the

governor of date October 15, 1-K30, the per-

son who made the order of later date. and

made the record from which the transcript

in the general land-oiiice was taken, was

directed to place in a book ior preserva-

tion, as are matrices when said to consti-

tute a protocol. The copies which the

governorintended should be preserved are

evidence oi rights, public and private,con-

ferred by the acts of the sub de legates,

and persons acting under their orders;

and we may be permitted hereto say that,

after so great a lapse oi time, with our re-

stricted means of acquiring correct inior-

mation,it would not be just to assume

that what was deemed suiiicient evidence

of right by t.hc otiicers of the former gov-

ernment, who must be presumed to have

been familiar, not only with the general

laws then in force. but with the special

laws and usages oi the time. as well as the

facts attending a. particular transaction,

is now entitled to no consideration. We

cannot hold, under the facts presented.

that the papers irom which the transcript

ﬁled in the general land-oﬁice was made

were not archives in the town oi Guerrero.

4. it was urged that the introduction oi_

thecertiﬂcd copy from the general land-of-

ﬁce was forbidden by section 4. art. 13, oi

theconstitution: but it iscvident that the

section oi the constitution has no applica-

tion to it. Railway Co. v. Jarvis. 69 Tex.

5-ii», T S. W. Rep. 2l0. It was claimed that

the paper should have been excluded be-

cause it does not show that porcion No.

36 was granted to Joaquin Cuellar, and

because it does not suiﬁciently describe the

land. It is true that the paper does not

show that the pomiou was originally

granted to Joaquin ijueliar. through whom

plaintiffs claim; hut one step in their de-

railzmnent oi title was to show that the

land was granted to Jacinto Cuellar by

STATUT~.

[Case No. 41

not clear; bot, lo -view of thefact that one • that for this reason it should have been
uf the papeni constituting the .. General excluded, unleBB proof of l!Onflrma tlon
\\'as made. The paper, upon its face, does
Visit,. was a testimonlo, a ml the other a
matrix or JJrotocol, a copy to be nuule not purport to evidence an Inchoate right;
f1'0m them woultl be, not only In form, hut, If It did, this would not furnish sutftbut In fact, a te11timonlo, and the direction cl1>nt reason for excluding It as evldeuce·
that they Hhould be protocolt>d for pt>rpet- of som1> rl~ht and description of the land;
oatlon carries with It the idea thot they and confirmation ou~bt to be prestimecl, If
should be copied Into a book. The Span- nf"!essary, f1·om the long and continuous
poeseH11lun shown under clRlm based on
ish word ~ protocolo," when applied to a
single paper, means the first draft of an the proceedings 1ivldenced by the pa1,er,
6. It wee Aeveral times urged, In effect,
Instrument duly executed berore a notary,
-the matrix,-becaulM' It Is the source that the record from which thecu1>Y Hied In
from wblch must be b1ke11 copieH to be thegenerol lund-ofHce was taken wolrid not
dellvert>d to Interested porllf's as their t-vl- have been llllllll'tslble to prove the facts
denee or rlicht; and it nlsu mP.ans a bound stated In it, or for any other purpose. If
buuk in which the notary ()laces and kct•pH thnt be true. the paper offe1·ed should hnve
In their order lnstrumen t .. executed before been exrlu<lt•d: but If that bP. not true, then
him. from whirh copit>R are taken for use the transcript filed In the general lendor parties interested. It is e\•ident that In office, or a certlHed copy taken from that,
neither of tl1ese Rf!nfl~, strictly, wtts the ought to have been received ae evldP.nce
8paolsh word translated "protocoled." of the fact11 which the paper states to bti
used In the order or March 3, l&'Jl; but trne: for. the transcript lo the land-office
the Inference le that by resolution of the ha.\·lng become by law an archive, certigovernor of date October 15, IS30, the per- fied eo11le" from It mas be need lo evidence
son who made the order of later date, and in cusf'M In which tile ra·ord now found In
made the rt>cord from which the tra nHt•rl1>t Guerrero coulfl be. The objections now
In the general land-office was taken, was undercon11ldMatlon are based on the propdirected to place lo a book for prel'erva- osition that the record found In Guerrero
tlon, as ure matrices when 11ald to consti- IA bot a copy, and too remote from the
tute a protocol. 'rhe co1>lee which the protocols to be received ln evldenee. It
go,·eroorlnteuded should be preRen·ed are must be conceded that the record In Guerevh.lence or rights, public and prlvute,con- rero now found In the archives of that
ferred hy the octe of the Rllb de lt>gate11, town was mnde In the yenr 1831; and It le
an<l persons acting under their or<lerR; proper to bold, from what appears, that
ancl we may be permitted ht>re to 11ay that, It was copied from the papers tht!re filed
after so great a la1,ee of time, with our re- In Ji67, 11ubsequt>utly removed, and not re.
stricted means of acquiring correct Infor- turned until some time after October Iii,
mation, It would not be just to aseume 1830. That record, In so far as It contHin11
that what wa11 deemed Rntttcleut evidence the proreedlngs of the s11b de /,,gutes,
of right by the officers of the former gov- would be what Is terme<I In the Spanish
ernment, who must be presumed to have law a "tra!l/11do," which 111 a copy taken
he1m familiar, not only with the general by a notary from the orlii:lnal, or a eubselaws then In force, but with the special quent copy taken from the protocol, and
laws and llil&gl'ti of the time. ae well as the not a eopy ta.ken dlrACtl,r from the matrix
faets attenillng a particul11r transaction , or protocol; bot, In so far as It conb1lns
lit now entitled to no conMh.le:ratlon. We the proe!'ecllngs by Benavides, It would be,
cannot hold, under thtt facts preeentoo. 110 fttr ae the rec•Jrd 11howe, what Is the
that the papers from which the transcript orlglnRI, because theflt"llt copy taken from
filed lo the gene1·al land-ofHce was made the protocol,orat mostasubscquent copy
were not archives In the town of Guerrero. taken from thut paper. It moy be con4. It was urgi>d that the Introduction of ceded that to entitle a papPr of the class
thPcertlftl"fl copy from the generul land-of-' last deHcrlbed to entlrl> faith under the
flee was forbidden by section 4. art. 13, of Spanish law, it 11houhl be gh•en by the
theconelltutlon; bot It ls evident that the officer before whom the protocol was exllPCtlun of thu l'lllllltl tu tlon has DO ll l)pJlca- ecuted, or if by another notary on lnc1ulry
tlo11 to lt. Railway Co. v. Jar,•lis. 6!1 Tex. after citation to parties ad verKely InterfH<1, 7 S. W. Rep. 210. It was claimed that ested; aml, further, that under the laws
the paper should have bel•n excluded be- In force here the execution of the copy
cause It does nut show thut pnrelon No. would have to be pro,·en even when the
36 was granted to Joaquin Cuellar, and protocol ls an archh·e of th0 goVt!l'lltnf'nt,
becauire It dues not MU tftclen tly describe the unlet:is by reueon of its age It was entitled
land. It Is true that the paper does not to be lntrodui~ed as an ancient Instruehow that the pore/on wu't originally ment. A paper of the rinse ftret named.aranted toJoaqulnt'uellur, through whom a copy tnken from an orlglnal,-nnder the
plain tins claim; but ono step In their de- Spanish htw, was onlyentltled to full faith
ralgnment or title wee to show that the agulnst the party producing It, 1111le11s
l11nd wus grante<l to Jacinto Cuellar hy given ufter citation to the person ad verHetht>8ponlsh government.and through him ly lntere11ted uuder judicial sanction; but
they eeek to show title In their ancestor; It seems to be held, when such a copy ls
amJ, If the paper tt>nded to prove thut gh·en by tbe notnry before whom the profact, It was 111lmiHslble, unless suhject to torol wa't executed, and by whom the
sorue other ohjectlon. Looking to the original was extended, tlrnt even such
whole paper, there cau be no donht thut coph•s are.entitled to full faith. Dut, unthe lund can he Identified IJy the descrlp- der that law, even a trm;/m/o, if It be antl•>u therein glf'en.
clt>nt, le entitled to full faith, althouAh
5. It wae ur~ed that tile paper did not given by a notary other than the une l>eshow mom than an Inchoate grant, and fore whom the protocol or original were
119
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authenticated. and without citation and

judicial sanction. in cases in which .the

property passed by it is possessed under

the right conferred by it for the period of

80 years. These rules of the Spanish law.

however, have no force here. further than

that we maylook to -them to ascertain the

character oi evidence one claiminga grant

ofiand from the Spanish government ought

toproduce. Assumiug,then, that thecopy

offered in evidence is an archive in the gen-

eral land-oiiice, and that its remoteness

from the protocols is as stated. then, in

view of the facts shown by other instru-

ments. to which the objection now under

.-onsideration does not appl_v,and of thefur-

therfact that plaintlffs,anrl those through

whom they claim. have had continuous

possession of theland described in thosein-
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strumen ts. and claiming through them, for

a period of 75 years, can it beheld that the

certiﬁed copy was not admissible under

the rules of the common law to show the

boundaries of their clnim. and thcgrounds

on which this has been so long asserted, if

for no other purpose?

it is unnecessary for us now to determine

whether it would be admissible and euth-

zicnt to show title if uncorroborated by

other facts. In State v. Cueilar, 47 Tex.

295, extracts from the papers we have re-

ferred to were considered. and properly

held not to be admissible in an action for

zonfirmation of title; but the transcript

before us shows all the matters which the

court was then unable to understand

from the brief extracts used in that case:

and, besides, since thatcase was decided the

zopy now in the land-office has been made

by law an archive. Many of the ques-

tions relating to the admission of the pa.-

pers in question were considered in Rail-

way Co. v. Jarvis, 69 Tex. 530,7 S. W. Rep.

210. which involved a similar question,

which may be looked to, on matters now

not fully discussed, for the reasons on

which some rulings are made. It is urged

that the court erred in ﬂnding that plain-

tiffs. and those through whom they claim,

before the institution of this action had

possessed the land continuously for at

least 75 years. claiming it under well-de-

ﬁned boundaries: but the evidcncc fully

sustains the findings, and there isevidence

tending to show that their ancestor was

in actual possession of the land at the be-

ginning of this century, when the bound-

ary between it and porciou No. 37 wasfnr

the second time established by the govern-

ment. The same facts tend to show the

authenticated. and without citation and
Ju<llclu.I M1111ctlon, In cases In which .the
property 111111...ed by It le poM11e>u11ed under
the right conferred by It for thl' period of
30 yf'ars. ThesR rules or the Spanish law,
however, have no force here, rurthPr thau
that we may look to ·them to a8l'ertaln the
cho rocter or evidence one claiming a grant
of land from the Spanish gO\·ern ruent ought
toprodnce. ABRumlng, then, that thecopy
offert'fl In evidence Is an archive In the generHI land-offke, and thut Its remoteness
from the protocols Is as stated, thl'n, In
view of the facts Hhowu by other ln11trum1>nte, to which tbe objection now under
!Omllderatlon doeit not apply ,nnd ofthefurtherfact that plaintiff-,, and those through
whom they claim, have had contlnuo1111
po11Hes11lon of the land deRcrlbed In thol'Pin11truments, sod claiming throuJrh thPm, for
a 11erlod of 75 yean, can It beheld that the
eertlfted copy was not admlBBlble unclPr
the rules of the common law to show the
noumlarlf's or their clnlm, and the grounds
on which this has heen so long ast1erted, If
lor no other purpose? We think not, and .
It Is unnecessary for us now to determ!ne
whether It would he admb11dble and soffi.
~lent to show title If uncorroborated by
other fact11. Jn State v. Cuellar, 47 Te-x.
29:>, ntracbJ from the papers we havl' referred to were comlidrred, and properly
held not to be admh11dble In an action for
:!onftrma tlun of title; but the tran~rlpt
before us shows all the matters which the
t>oort was then unable to understand
from the brief extracts use<l In that caAe:
and. beRldes, slncetha tease was dt>eided the
!op,v now In the land-omce bee bPen made
by law an arehh·e. Many of the questions rel a ting to the admission or the paper11 In qneetlon were corielllered tu Railway Co. v. Jarvis, 69 TH. 530, 7 S. W. Rep.
210, whlt>h tnvolvt'd ll similar question,
which may ht> looked to, on matten now
not folly dl11eussed, for the reaRone on
whl<'h some rullngR are made. It le ur11:ed
that the court erred In finding that plaln·
tlffR. and those through whom th1>yclalm,
before the lnRtltutlon of this action had
poSl!t'RMed the land continuously for at
least 75 yeal"I!, claiming It under well-defined boundarlt'8; but the e\'ldencc fully
ttoetalns the findings, and there lsevhlence
teudlnit tu show that thl'lr anct>stur was
In actual possession of the land at the be&1nnlnK of till.. cPntury, when the boundary betWePU It and porcfon No. a1 '\\'aHtnr
the second time established by the go\'ernment. The same facts teurl to show the
exchange between Jacinto and .Joaquin
Cuellar, and Justified the court's finding
In this respect; and the recognition or thl-'
right of plaintiffs and their ancestors to
the land by former governments And by
thlH, until the patentR relied on by the dt'rendante Issued, IR to be Inferred from the
faet that tlwlr claim was aKserted by posset111ion, recognlzi::d by the vlcinage a11 well
as by papera In the archh·eH of the former
government, and their right was never
questioned by any government or Individual ontil appellants concluded that the
land was vttcnnt.
It Is nrged that the court erred In finding that the land was equitably owned by
plaiotlfte lllldCr COior O( title from the BOV•
erf:lgnty or the soil at the time appellants

exchange between Jacinto and Joaquin

Cuellar, and justiﬁed the court’s ﬂnding

in this respect; and the recognition of the

right of plaintiffs and theirancestors to

the land by former governments and by

this, until the patents relied on by the dc-

fcndants issued, is to be inferred from the

fact that their claim was asserted by pos-
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made their locattona; but, tf we dlel't'gard
all the eridence contained In the certlfted
copy of the "Oeneral VIRlt" Issued from
the general land-otHce, no other eoncluHlon oujl'bt to have been reached from the
other evloence to the case, looking to the
laws of which the court should have tall:l'n Judicial notice. At the opening of this
<'entury the father of Joaquin Cuellar, co
whom was granted pore/on No. 37, made
known to the aotborltletf that his son
was In posAesslon of the land In controversy, whkh was conthruons to his, and
that h.v tncloRure made by the son on the
south he w11e excludf'd from water. By
the act of February 10, l81i2, pore/on No.
3i was conftrmed to the father, and porrlo11 No. 33 to Joaqnln Cuellar, and be.
tween thoHe Is pore/on 36, the hrnd in
t•ontruverey, or which plaintiffs and anceHton had continuous possession for 75
.real'M before the trial of thi11 cause; claiming the land Rll their own. These far.ts
a lnne would have Jnstlftt'd a ftnding thi&t
plalotiffH were not only tbeequltableownt•rs, bot that they heltl It under title from
the sovereignty of the Holl. The Hndlngs
or fact required i:he findings of law; and,
while It ts not nece11eary to rely upon the
certifted copy of the .. Heneral Visit" to abo w
the title or the plttlntlffH, we dewlre to note
the fact that by the al't of February 10,
1H52, (Pasch. Dig. art. 4461,) nolese than 20
porefons of land within the J01·l11dlctlon of
Guf'rrero were conftrmed by numbers, as
given in that t11st1·ument, to the persons
to who an that ehow~d these several porclons were grRnted in li67; and,had applf.
cation been made for confirmation of pol'c/011 No. 36, It doubtless would have beeo
made at the same time as was done In r&
gard to those abo\·e and below and con•
tlguoue to It.
'.l'hle action was brou~ht by 16 persons
all of whom claim by luheritauce from 01
through Joaquin Cuellar, except eomtt
who were huitbends of pcnone thus claiming, and joined pro formx, and among ·
tho11e so claiming le Francisco Coellar. In
bar of this artton. defe11dHnt11 pleaded .,.
judgment of the dlRtrlct court for Travlt.
county In favor or the stnte, renr1eree
against Francisco Cuellar, In ail action
brootcht by him as an heir of Jarinto
Cuellar, In which he aes1rn1ed to sue for
himself and co-heirs. who were not named.
for conHrmatlon of ttt.le to the pore/on ~
land In controversy. That action wa"
brought early In the year tsn. On tin
trial of thi11 cause defendants offPl"t'd tft
reall In evidence co11les of the pleadings.
judgmente,Hnd statement of facts in that
cm1e; bot the court excluded the statement of facts on objection, and admitted
the pleadings nod judgments. It ts urged
that the <·ourterred In excluding the statement of facts, but this ruling wa11 evidently <"orrect. It le also uri:l•d that the court
erred In excluding what 111 termed the
"Judgment Voll," bot this ls not 11ustained by the record, for it was admitted
oncler dl'fPndnntR' plea of not guilty, as
shown In the statement of fa<"ts.
It is claimed that the court erred In not
rendering Judgment In favor or app1>llanta
on their plea of res adjudieata, lmt there
was no error In this rulloi;i; for 1:1e\•eral
reasons. That action was by Francisco

RECITALS lN STATUTES.
RECITALS IN STATUTES.

[Case No. 41

Cuellar alone, and a judgment therein

could not bar the right of the other plain-

tlffsln this case. even il it would bar an

action by him; but that action was pros-

ecuted by him as an heir of Jacluto (Inel-

lur, and it would be no bar to this. even

as to him, for he now sues in a different

right. Thompson v. Cragg. 24 Tex. 582,"

(Iaruth v. Grigshy. 57 Tex. 266. I1, how-

ever, that judgment could operate as a.

har to him, this would not better the con-

dition oi appellants; for, the land being

equitably owned, titled, and occupied by

plaintiﬂs at the time deic-n(lants’locations

were made, under the provisions of the

constitution they could acquire no inter-

est in it, (Const. art. 14, § 2.) and the oth-

er plaintiﬂs would be entitled to recover.

Although the court below erred in the
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matter noticed, that furnishes no reason

for reversing the judgment; for, on the

evidence, no otherjudgment than the one

entered could have been rendered, and it

will therefore be uﬂirmed. It is so ordered.
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alone, and a Judgment therein
eould not bar the right of the other plaintltf11 ln tblR case. even if It would bar u.n
action hy him; but thRt action was prosecuted by him as an heir or Jacinto Cuelh1r, and It would be no be.r to this. even
as to him, for be now eue11 in a differt>nt
right. Thompson v. Cragg, 24 •rex. 5S2;
Caruth v. Grigsby, 67 Tex. 266. If, how~ver, that Judgment coulf1 operate a11 a
bar to him, this would not better the condition or appellants; for, the land being

~oellar

[Case No. 41

equitably owned, titlecl, and occupied by
plaint1ffli at the time defendants' loce.tions
were made, untlt>r the provisions of the
constitution they could acquire no intereMt In It, (Const. art. 14, § 2,) e.nd the otht-r plaintlHs would be entitlt>d to rPCover.
Although the court below erred in the
matter noticed, that furni11het1 no reason
for reversing the judgment; for, on the
""idence, no other judgment than the one
entered could have been rendered, E1n1l It
will therefore be aftirmecl. It Is so ordered.
121
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STEINBHUN'NER v. PITTSBURG & W. R.

co.

RELE VANCY.

STEINBRUNNER v. PITTSBURG & W. R.

CO.

(23 At]. 239, 1-lb‘ Pa. St. 504.)

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Jan 4, 1892.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Alle-

gheny county.

Action by Barbara Steinbrunner against

the Pittsburg & Western Railroad Company

tor damages for the death of plaintit‘t"s

husband, alleged to have been caused by de- ‘

tendant’s negligence. Judgment for plain-

tiﬂ, and defendant appeals. Reversed.

H.ELEVANCY.

(23 Atl. 239, 146 Pa. St. 504.)
Supreme Court oi Pennsylvania. Jan 4, 1892.
Appeal from court of common pleas, Allegheny county.
Action by Barbara. Stelnbrunner against
the Pittsburg & Western Railroad Company
tor dnmnges for the death of plaintiff's
husband, alleged to have been caused by defendant's negllgl•nce. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendunt appeals. Reversed.
John McCleaw, for appellant. Marcus A.
Woodward, for nptlellee.

Woodward, for appellee.

PAXSON, C. J. Upon the trial in the court

below, it became a vital question ot fact

whether the deceased, Xavier Steinbrunner,

stopped, looked, and listened just before he

crossed the railroad track. One witness for l

the plaintiﬂ, Miss Margaret Martin, testitied
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distinctly that he did stop on the sidewalk

crossing of Cherry street.

tive evidence, however, the other way.

Charles Rentz, a witness for the defense,

testiﬂed that the deceased did not stop. “He

didn't look either way; never looked either

way; just came straight through.” Wil-

liam Cernuska testified that he saw the de-

ceased from the time he started down the

hill until he was struck by the train; that

he did not stop, nor look either way; that he L

had a bag in his hand, and was looking at it.

Yvilliam F. Crooks, another witness, says:

“l noticed Mr. Sieiubrunner just coming out

of the foot of Cherry street, and he come on

down, and when he got along-side of the side

track, about three feet this side of the ﬁrst

track, the wheel kind oi‘ scotched. He stop-

ped just about a second, and then he went

ahead, and when the horse was about halt-

way over the main track the train struck

him. " " " He made no other stop.

" ‘ ' Didn't see him look up or down. He

had his head down, kind oi.’ this way, [illus-

trating.] It seems to me he was counting

some money or something. I know that he

didn’t look up or down. When his wagon

checked tor that short time, I thought he

was going to wait till the train passed on."

Under these circumstances we think it was

error for the learned judge below to say to

the jury: “The fact is uncontradicted that

he did stop at the crossing on Cherry street

just as he crossed over and came on River

avenue, but did he stop for the purpose of

looking out for trains?" It may be the

learned judge used this language inadvert-

ently. This is probable from the fact that

it is inconsistent with the portion of his

charge which immediately preceded it. But

as it stands it appears to be an erroneous

statement of the evidence upon the pivotal

fact in the case. We cannot say what in-

ﬂuence it had with the jury. Where a judge

states the evidence in two ways, one in favor

'corpo1-ations, especially railroad

There was posi- -

of a corporation and the other against it, a

jury may be depended upon to adopt the

PAXSON', C.J. Upon the trial In the court
below, It becnwe a vital question of fact
whPther the dt•<'<'ltlled, Xa'l"'ler Stelnbrunner,
stopped, looked, and listened just before he
crossed the railroad track. One witness for
the 1>lalutltr, lllss llnrgaret Martin, testified
distinctly that he did stop on the sidewalk
crossing of Cherry street. There was positive evidence, however, the other way.
Charles Rentz, a witness for the defense,
testified that the deceased did not stop. "He
didn't look either way; never looked either
wny; just came straight through." William Cernuska testified that he saw the deceased from the time he started down the
hill until he was struck by the train; that
he did not stop, nor look either way; that be
had a bag In his hand, and was looking at It.
Vi'llllam ~'. Crooks, another wltnell8, says:
"l noticed Mr. Stelnbrunner just coming out
of the foot of Cherry street, and he come on
down, and when he got along-side of the side
track, about three feet this side of the first
track, the wheel kind of sC'otched. He stopped Just about a second, and then he went
ahead, and when the horse was about halfway over the main track the train struck
him. • • • He made no other stop.
• • • Didn't see him look up or down. He
had his head down, kind of this way, [Illustrating.) It seems to me he was counting
some money or something. I know that he
didn't look up or down. When his wagon
cheC'kell for that short time, I thought he
wns ~olng to wait till the train passed on."
Umh•r these circumstances we think It was
error for the learned judge below to say to
the Jury: ''The fact Is uncontradlcted that
he did stop at the crossing on Cherry street
just as he crossed over and came on River
avenue, but did he stop for the purpose of
looking out for trains'!" It may be the
learned Judge used this language lnadve11:ently. This Is probable from the fact that
It Is Inconsistent with the portion of his
charge which Immediately preceded It. But
as It stands It appears to be an erroneous
statement of the evidence upon the pivotal
fact In the <'nsc. We cannot say what Influence It hnd with the jury. Where a judge
states the evidence lo two ways, one ln favor
122

of a corporation and the other against it, a
jury may be depended upon to adopt theIatter.
The sixth specification alleges that theconrt erred In answer to the plaintiff's second point. The point Involved the measureof damages, and lo most respects was correctly answered. But when the learned
judge told the jury that they should look at
this question "(rom a broad and sensible
point of view, and liberal, because It 18 not
a case to cut off corners too closely," wethink the expression was unwise, to say the
least. Juries do not need encouragement
from the court to give large verdicts against
corporations, especially rallroad corporations. Courts and juries should be Just t<>
both corporations and Individuals, but D<>
one has a right to be "liberal" with the money of other persons. While we are not prepared to say we would reverse for this reason alone, we have considered the matter of
sutHclent Importance to call attention to It.
The only remaining specification of error
which we think It necessary to refer to Is.
the ninth, which alleges that the court erred
In admitting certain evidence of the decensed's expectation of Ute, based upon the
Ca1·llsle tables. The question asked the witness was, "Will you state to the jury what
the expectation of life Is of a man in good
health, 46 years of age?" and the answer
was: "The Carlisle table would make It
23.81 years; the American table, 23.8 years."
Neither of the tables appears to have been
offered In evidence, but, as the answer of the
witness was based upon evidence obtained
from them, their effect may well be considered In connection with this specification;.
and, as the American table de1>ends upon thesa.me principle as the Carlisle table, we will
discuss the question more particularly In reference to the latter. In estimating the damages for the death of the deceased, his expectation of ll!e became an element of Importance. His earning power being fixed by
the evidence, the next question to be settled
by the jury would naturally be, how many
years wlll he probably live to exercise this.
power? Thls can never be decided accurately In single cases. The most a jury or any
one else can do ls to approximate It. A
man may die In a day, or he may live to earn
wages for 20 years. It follows that there
must always be an element of uncertainty In
every such case. But there are some rules
to be observed which aid to some extent In
such Investigations. Thus, If a man ls In
poor health, es1>eclally If lie Is suffering from
some organic disense which necPssarily tr111ls
to shorten life, his expectancy Is much le~s
than that of a man In robust health. Again,
the age of the person and his habits are
among the Important matters for consideration. It needs no argument to show that
the expectation ot life Is much greater at 21
years of age than at 00. The value of the

M~TTERS OF

gJSTOH."Y, MAPS, LTFE TABLES, ETC.

[Case No. 42

MATTERS or H‘5T0RY- MAPS, LIFE TABLES, mo. [Case No. 42

Qariiﬂle tables as bearing upon this question

“pends in a measure upon the manner in

which they xvere made up.

If be-<P‘1 upon

gaiected lives, that is to say, only 119011 lives

which are insurable, they would be of value

only for life-insurance purposes, and utterly

useless to apply to unselected lives or lives

generally. The evidence in this case is not

very clear as to the mode in which these ta-

bles were composed. I have therefore con-

sulted the Encycloptcdia Britannica, a very

high authority, (volume 18, p. 169,) from

which l extract the following: "The Carlisle

table was constructed by Mr. Joshua Milne

from materials furnished by the labors of

Doctor John Heyr.-ham. These materials

comprised two enumerations of the popula-

tion of the parishes of St. Mary and St.

Cuthbert, Carlislc, (England,) in 1780 and
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1787, (the number of the former year having

been 7,677, and in the latter 8,677.) and the

abridged bills of mortality of those two par-

ishes for the nine years, 1779 to 1787, during

which period the total number of deaths was

1,810. Thcse were very limited data upon

which to found a mortality table, but they

were manipulated with great care and ﬁdel-

ity. The close agreement of the Carlisle ta-

ble with other observations, especially its

agreement, in a general sense, with the expe-

rience of assurance companies, won for it a

large degree of favor. No other mortality

table has been so extensively employed in

the construction of auxiliary tables of all

kinds for computing the value of beneﬁts de-

pending upon human life. Besides those fur-

nished by Mr. Milne, elaborate and useful

tables based upon the Carlisle data have

been constructed by David Jones, W. T.

Thomson, Christopher Sang, and others.

The graduation of the Carlisle table is, how-

ever, very faulty. and anomalous results ap-

pear in the death rate at certain ages.” It

appears, therefore, that the Carlisle table is

based upon general population, and not upon

selected or insurable lives. In Shlppen’s

Appeal, 80 Pa. St. 391, it was held that the

Carlisle table was not authoritative in deter-

mining the value of a life-estate. and the

common-law rule of one-third the capital

sum was adopted as the measure of the life-

interest. It was said in the opinion of the

court: “As to the measure of the lite estate

of Slayton T. Platt, we may add that the

Carlisle tables are not authoritative. They

answer well their proper purpose. to ascer-

tain the average duration of life, so as to

protect life insurers against ultimate loss

upon a large number of policies, and thereby

to make a proﬁt to the shareholders. But an

individual case depends on its own circum-

stances, and the relative rights of the life

tenant and the remainder-man are to be as-

certained accordingly. A consumptive or

diseased man does not stand on the same

plane as one of thc same age in vigorous

hcalih. Their expectations of life differ in

point of fact." We can understand that in

car\\11\e tables as bearing upon tblS questton

ue\lends ln a measure upon the wanner in
wn\c\l they were made up. If based Upon
~elected lives, that is to say, only upon lives
whlch al'e insurable, they would be of value
only for life-insurance purposes, and utterly
useless to apply to unselected llves or lives
generally. The evidence In this case is not
very clear ae to the mode 1n which these ta·
bles were composed. I have therefore consulted the Encyclopredia Britannica, a very
high authority, (volume 18, p. 169,) from
which 1 extract the following: "The Cartlsle
table was constructed by Mr. Joshua Milne
from materials furnished by the labors of
Doctor John Heycham. These materials
comprised two enumerations of the population of the parishes of St. Mary and St.
Cuthbert, Carlisle, (England,) In 1780 and
1787, (the nuruber of the former year having
been 7,677, and 1n the latter 8,677,) and the
abridged bills of mortality of those two parishes for the nine years, 1779 to 1787, during
which period the total number of deaths was
1,840. These were very llmltecl data upon
which to found a mortality table, but they
were manipulated with great care and fidelity. The close agreement of the Carlisle table with other observations, especially Its
agreement, In a general sense, with the experience of assurance companies, won for it a
large degree of favor. No other mortality
table bas been so exteneh·ely employed In
the construction of auxiliary tables of all
kinds for computing the value of benefits depending upon human life. Besides those furnished by Mr. Milne, elaborate and useful
tables based upon the Carlisle data have
been constructed by David .funes, W. T.
Thomson, Christopher Sang, and others.
The graduation of the Carlisle table ls, however, very faulty, and anomalous results appear In the death rate at certain ages." It
appears, therefore, that the Carlisle table ls
based upon general population, and not upon
selected or insurable lives. In Shlppen's
Appeal, 80 Pa. St. 391, it was held that the
Carlisle table was not authoritative In determining the value ot a life-estate, and the

common-law rule of one-third the capital
sum was adopted as the measure of the llfefnterest. It was said lo the opinion of the
court: "As to the measure of the life estate
of Slayton T. Platt, we may add that the
Carlisle tables are not authoritative. They
answer well their proper purpose, to ascertain the average duration of life, so as to
protect life Insurers against ultimate loss
upon a large number of policies, and thereby
to make a profit to the shareholders. But a1•
Individual case depends on Its own clrcuru·
stances, and the relative rights of the life
tenant and the remainder-man are to be ascertained accordingly. A consumptive or
diseased man does not stand on the same
plane as one of the same age In vlgoroul!
health. Their expectations of life dllfer In
point of fact." We can understand that In
a contest between a lite-tenant and the remainder-man the Carlisle tables would not
serve as an authoritative guide. In such
Instance the question must be decided upon
Its own tacts. But In a case like the one In
hand, where the expectation of life of the
deceased was a question of fact for the jury,
we are unable to see why the tables referred
to were not competent evidence. Being Intended for general use, and based upon average results, they cannot be crindusive In a
given case. That ls not the question here.
It ls whether they are not some evidence,
competent to be considered by a jury. Their
value, where applled to a particular case,
wlll depend very much upon other matters,
such as the state of health of the person, his
habits of life, his social surroundings, and
other circumstances which might be mentioned. While we are unable to see bow
such evidence ls to be excluded, I must be
allowed to express the fear that It may
prove a dangerous element In this class of
cases, unless the attention of juries ls pointedly called to the other questions which affect It. Upon the whole, we are of opinion
the evidence referred to was properly received, and this specification ls not sustained.
The judgment le reversed, and a venlre
faclas de novo awarded.
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RELEVANCY.
were only 23 reeular Jurors In attendanre
upon the court. The court thereupon Instructed the eherlft to "summon one R
E. ~eelye D8 such Juror, aml he was eworu
as such and placed u11on the Jury." (Tpon
being furnh1hed with thlR llRt of jurortc, as
thus completed, the defcnduut objt'Cted to
the lb.;t or Jurors; bot the court overruled
Its objection, and the dP.fcndant duly excepted. 'l'here was Judgment for plalnttn,
and defenaant appeals.
HP.w/tt, Wnlkerct Porter, for appellant.
Rn wmHu & llarsb, for apvellee.

KA'SSAS CITY, M. & B. R. CO. T. SMITH.
(8 South. 43, 90 Ala. 25.)

KANSAS crrr, M. & B. R. co. v. SMITH.

(s South. 43, 90 Ala. 25.) '

June 11, 1890.

Appeal from city court of Birmingham;

H. A. Sharpe, Judge.

This action was brought to recover

damages for personal injuries sustained

by plaintiff on account of a wreck alleged

to have been caused by the negligence of

defendant. The complaint contained two

counts, on which issue was joined, viz..

the ﬁrst and third In the ﬁrst of these.

the plaintiff sought to recover for the al-

leged negligence of the defendant in using

in the train and transportation an old,

weak. and defective car, which by being

overloaded, gave way on a trestle and

caused the wreck. whereby the plaintiff

was injured; and in the third count the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:06 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104925781
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

plaintiff based his recovery upon the ai-

leged negligence of the defendant by rea-

son of defects in the condition of the

ways, works, and machinery used by the

defendant, whereby the accident occurred.

Issue was joined on these counts by the

defendant pleading the general issue, and

contributory negligence. Upon the trial,

as shown by the bill of exceptions. the

plaintiff introduced evidence tending to

show that the car which gave way, and

thereby caused the accident, was an old

car. and the timbers thereof were rotten,

and insecure; that it was loaded with

some kind of fertilizer or guano, and was

overloaded; and that, while on a trestle.

this car by reason of being old. rotten,

and insecure, and because of being over-

loaded, gave way, and fell through the

trestle, thereby causing the wreck wherein

the plaintiff was injured. The evidence

intro-luced by the defendant was in direct

conﬂict with the evidence of the plaintiff,

and tended to show that the cars used in

said train,itsmachinery,and its road-way

were in good condition. and that the said

car was not overloaded, and that the ac-

cident did not occur from any negligence

on its part. During the trial, after the

examination of Mary A. Hughes. a wit-

ness for the plaintiff, who testified that

she took a photograph ofthe wreck about

two hours after it occurred. and on being

shown the photograph testiﬁed that that

was the one, and that it was a correct

picture of the wreck and its surroundings,

the plaintiff offered to introduce the pho-

tograph in evidence. The defendant ob-

jected, but the court overruled its objec-

tion. allowed the photograph to be intro-

duced in evidence, and the defendant

thereupon duly excepted. During the ex-

amination of one Slaton, as a witness for

the plaintiff, he was asked, “How long,

how wide, and how thick is a sack of gua-

no that weighs from 167 to 200 pounds?”

The defendant objected to this question,

but the court overruled its objection, and

allowed the wiimss to answer against

Supreme Court of Alabama. lune 11, 1890.
Appenl from city court of Birmingham;
H. A. Sharpe, Judge.
ThlK action waA brought to recover
damages for personal Injuries sustained
by plalntlft on a<·connt of a wre<·k alleged
to have been caused by the neKllareuce of
defendant. The complaint contained two
counts, on which l88ue was joined, vl1.,
the ftl"l!t and third In the ftl'Mt of tbe11e,
the plaintiff sought to recover for the alFlbMERVILLE,J. l. Tbephotogra1>bof
Je~ed nPgllgence of the defendant In using
the tr<'Mtle and or the wrecked train or
In the train and tran11portatlon an old, carR was shown to have been taken ubout
weak, and defective car, which by being two hours 11fter the act'lde11t occurred, and
overlnuded, gave way on a tret1tle and was \'erlfted by the testimony of the 1>hocaused the wreck, wherelJy the plaintiff togro(1her &8 IJelng a correct representawu Injured; and in the third count the tion of the localltJ and 11ctme. It wa1
plaintiff baRed hie recovery upon the al- clearly admle11lble In evldt!nre to aid the
leged negligence of the defendant by rea- jury In properly undenrtamllng the case.
son of def<>CtR In the condition of the It la a well-understood rule, applied In
ways, workH, and machinery used by the every-day practice In the courts, thllt diadefendant, whereby the accident occurred. grams and maps Illustrating the scene of
l88ue was joined on these counts by the a tranRactlon, and the relative location of
defendant pleading the general lesue, and objet•ts, If proved to be correct, are admlscontributory negligence. Upon the trial, 11lhle In e\•ldence In ordP.r to enable the
as shown by the blll of exceptions. the Jury to understand and llpply the proved
plaintiff Introduced evidence ten<llnK to . f1ll'tH to the particular case. 3 Hrlck. Dig.
Khow that the car which gave .vay, 11n1l p. 431, § 366. A plan, picture. or other reprethereby cnused the at.•cldent, was an old sentu tlon prodm·ed by the art of photogcar. amt the tlmbt>ra thereof were rotten, raphy, le admlsellJle on like principles. If
and lnHecure; that It was loaded wltla verified as a true and arcurate represen1mme kind of ft!rtlllzer or guano, and was tation. It Is, In fact, but a itelentlflc reoverlundl•d; and th11t, while on a trestle, production of a fac simile of the original
this cur by reason of being old. rotte11, object In nature, by ft mechanical nrt
and lm1ecure, and bet•ttuee of being over- which Is every day advancing towor1la
loaded, ga\"e way, and fell through the perfection. 'l'be competency of such evitl"l'Stle, thereby causing the wreck whel'f'ln dence was settled In Luke v. Calhoun
the plaintiff was Injured. The evidence Co., 62 Ala. 115, npprovlng a like ruling
lntro.luced by the defc>ndant was In direct In the case of Uddersook v. Com., 76 Pa.
conftkt with the evidence of the plaintiff, St. 1\40. w)\t!re a photograph of a perand tendetl to show that the cars URt>d In son ln·ltfe. shown to be a corr.iet picture,
11ald trnln, Its machinery, and ltR road-way was admitted In evidence for the purpose
were in good condition. and thRt the Httld of al<llng In the ldentltkatlon of a decar W&R not overloaded, and that the ac- ceased person alleged to have been mur·
cident did not occur from any nep:llgc>nce dered. The caMe of Roloff v. People. 40 N.
on its part. During the trial, niter the Y. 213, eu)lport.8 the same frlnclple. In
examlnutlon of Mary A. Hughes. a wlt- the case of Blair v. Pelham. 18 :Maes. 4:.JO,
neAS for the plalntlft, who testified that which was an action against a town to
ijhe took a photograph orthewreck about recover damages for Injuries caused by a
two hours after It occurred. and on being dtfect In a highway, the defendant waa
shown the photograph teiJtlfted that that p<>rmltted to put In evidence a photop:r1tpb
was the one, and that It was a correct of the place of the accident, on I°' verificapicture of the wre<'k and ltH surroundings, tion by the photographer as a true repl't'the plaintiff offered to Introduce the pho- eenta tlon. So In Church v. City of Miitograph In evidence. The defenclllnt oh- waukee, 81 WIR. 1>12, an action for damjeeted, but the court overruled ltH objec- agf'B resulting to a lot-owner from a
tion, allowed the photograph to bl' Intro- clmnge In tbe grade or a 11treet, a photoduced In e\"ldence, and the defendant gruph of the prPmlees shown to be correct
thereupon duly excepted. During the ex- w&11 admitted "to aid the jury In 11rrlvlng
amination of one Slaton, as a witness for at a clear 11nd accurate Idea of the situathe plaintiff, he was asked," How long, tion of the premises, and enable them ,to
how wide. and how thick le a Rack of gua- better understand how they were affcctecl
no that welghR from 167 to 200 pounds?" by the chan11:e In the grade." And Cozz1>11e
The 1lefendant obje<-ted to this question, v. Hlg~lnR. 33 How. Pr. 436. decided l1y
but the court o\•erruled Us obJeetlon, and the :Sew York court of appeals, le to tlio
allowed the wlt1101H to anRwer ngnlnst same effect. In an action of trespaHS
the e:i:ceptlon of the defentlant as follows: agnlnRt an adjoining proprietor, for tho
"A 2011-pound Huck 111 Hbout 24 lnchl'l1 long, wrongful act of opening holes In the wttlli
about 18 lnl'bes wide, and, wh~n It le of the plaintiff's cellar, so as to render at
down, It le Rbout 9 lncheA thick, lying untPnllhle, by projecting Into It hetl\'.f'
down as It lny11 In a car. " Bt'lore the trli1l beams, a" photographic view" ofther.ellur
was entered Into, the defendant dPmanded was admitted In evidence aa "nn appro8 Strock jury for the trial Of thlH C8\11~e.
priate aid to the Jury In applying the evl•
.\t the time this demand was mude, there deuce." The case of Dy1ion v. Uallroad Co ..

I
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5,1Co!\“- 10- 17 Atl. Rep. 13?. is arlQﬂ'e" ‘111-

thoriw directly in point, wlicrc. in an 30-

mm ior dainagos agailist a railrﬂtl ¢("'_l-

pamy, a photographic view of tho I00"-\'_1n

qua oi the accident was held to be adn_ng.

sihie in evidence. The same ruling [)l‘€1.‘l:'~t¥-

- ly was made in the case oi Archer v. Rail-

road 00.. 13 N. E. Rep. 318, (decided in

133'l,by the New York court of appeals.)

We entertain no doubt as to the sound-

ness oi these rulings, and they iully sup-

port the action oi the court in admitting

in evidence the photograph oi the wrecked

train and surroundinglocaiity in this case.

1 Whart. Ev. (3d Ed.) §676; Eborn v. Zim-_

pelman, 26 Amcr. Rep. 319-321. note; Mar-

cy v. Barnes, 16 Gray, 161; Locke v Rail-

road (,‘0., 46 Iowa. 109.

2, 3. The question propounded to the
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witness Slaton, and his answer to it,

tended to throw some light on the plain-

tiffs contention that the car containing

the fertilizer was too heavily loaded;

which was one oi the grounds 0! negli-

gence imputed to the defendant as the

proximate cause oi’ the injury suffered by

the plaintiff. This evidence was therefore

relevant. and its admission iree from er-

ror. The objection interposed. moreover,

was general and undeﬁned. failing to par-

ticuiarize any speciﬁed ground, and for

this reason there was no error in dime

garding it. Dryer v. Lewis, 57 Ala. 551;

3 Brick. Dig. p. 443, § 567.

4. The evidence tended to sustain the

allegations of each oi the counts in the

complaint (the ﬁrst and the third) upon

which the merits oi the case were tried be-

iore the jury. And, under the circumstan-

ces, we are oi opinion that the questions

oi negligence by the defendant, and oi’

contrilmtory negligence by the plaintiﬂ,

were both properly left to the jury Rail-

road C0. v. Perry, S7 Ala. 392, 6 South.

Rep. 40. The objection take to the panel

oi jurors was clearly without merit. We

discover no error in the record, and the

judgment must be aiﬁrmed.
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~1conn.10. 17 Atl. Rep.13i, IB anotlier nu.
tMrltY directly tu point, whcr('. In an ac.

t\on tor da1nagt•B a11:alnst a railroad cum.
11any. a pbotop:raphic view of thA Jocux 1a
11uo ot the &C"chlent was held to he admis11\b\e In eviueqcu. 'l'he sume rullug preciiooly was made In the case of Archer v. RalJroad Co., 13 N. E. Hep. 318, (decided In
1887, by the New York court of appeals.)
We entertain no doubt as to the sound·
nees ol tbetie rulluge, and they fully support the action or the court In admitting
tn evidence the photograph of the wrecked
train and surrounding localt ty In this caee.
1 Wbart. Ev. (8<1 Ed.)§ ll76; }<;born v. Zhn-.
pelman, 26 Amer. Rep. 819-321, note; Marcy v. Barnes, 16 Gray, 161 ; Locke v Railroad Co., 46 Iowa, 109.
2, 8. The question propounded to the
wltn('SR Slaton, and hie answer to It,
t~mle<I to throw some Ugbt on the plalntltf's contention that the car contulnlug
the fertilizer was too bea vlJy loaded;
which waB one of the crounds of n~ll-

[Case No. 48

genre Imputed to the defendant as the

pro.1m1ate cause of the Injury suffered by

the J1lulntln. This evldenc~e was therefore
relevunt, and Its admlHslon free from error. The objection Interposed, moreol"er,
was p;eneru.l and undetioed, falling to Jlartlcularlze any specified ground, and for
this ret1eon there was no error In dl~re
gardlng It. Dryer v. Lewie, 57 Ala.. 551;
8 Brick. Dig. p. 448, § 567.
4. The evidence tended to sustain th9
allearatlons of each of the counts tn the
complaint (the ftntt and the third) upon
which the merltB of the case ware tried before the Jory. And, under the circumstances, we am of opinion that the questlous
of negligence by the defendant, and of
contributory negligence by the plaintiff,
were both properly left to the jury Railroad Co. v. Perry, 87 Ala. 892, 6 South.
Rep. 40. The objection take to the panel
of Jurors was clearly without merit. We
dlsrover no error In the record, and the
Judgment must be amrmed.
l2r>
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GLENN

T.

ORR.

RELEVAN CY.

(2 S. E. 538, 96 N. 0. 413.)

GLENN v. ORR.

(2 S. E. 538, 96 N. O. 413.)

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Supreme Oourt of North Carolina.
1887.

May 27,

Appeal from superior court, Mecklenburgh

1887.

Appeal from superior court, Mecklenburgh

county.

Action by John Glenn, trustee of the Na-

tional Express & Transportation Company,

against M. M. Orr, alleged to be shareholder

of said company, to recover the sum of $300,

being the amount of a call or assessment

upon the stock held by the defendant. The

court having refused to admit the evidence

('OUDty.

Action by John Glenn, trustee ot the National Express & Transportation Company,
against M. M. Orr, alleged to be shareholder
of said company, to recover the sum of '30(),
being the amount of a call or assessment
upon the stock held by the defendant. The
court having refused to admit the evidence
referred to In the opinion, the plaintiff suffered a nonsuit and appealed.

referred to in the opinion, the plaintiff suffer-

ed a nonsuit and appealed.

D. G. Fowle, A. Jones, and W. Fleming,

D. G. Fowle, A. Jones, and W. Fleming,
tor plalntur. W. P. Bynum, for defendant.

for plaintiﬂ. W. P. Bynum, for defendant.

May 27,

MERRIMON, J. It became material on

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:06 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104925781
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

the trial to prove the organization of the

National Express & Transportation Compa-

ny, and the appellant offered in evidence,

for this and other purposes, “the records,

books, and minutes" of that company, em-

bracing what purported to be the proceed-

ings in the organization of it under and in

pursuance of its charter. The appellee ob-

jecting, the court held that these records

were not evidence for such purpose. and the

appellant assigns this ruling as error. It

likewise became material to prove that the

appellee was a subscriber for 10 shares of

the capital stock of the company named,

charged and credited to his account as a

stockholder thereof, and the appellant oi.’-

fered in evidence for this purpose the same

records, which purported to show that the

nppellee did subscribe and was a subscriber

for the number of shares of stock mentioned;

that he had paid $50 on account of the same,

and the balance of the money due therefor

had not been paid; and that he was a stock-

holder of the company. The appellee ob-

jecting, the court declined to allow the rec-

ords so offered to be put in evidence for such

purpose, and the appellant assigns this re-

jection of the records as error. In view of

these adverse rulings, the appellant suffered

a judgment of nonsuit, and appealed to this

court.

It was admitted on the trial that the books

and records offered in evidence were those

of the National Express & Transportation

Company, and it must be taken, from such

admission, as there is no suggestion to the

contrary, that the proceedings entered in

them, and the orders and statements therein

made, are regular, and made by the proper

clerk, secretary, or agent of the company,

or some person autliorized to make them.

MERRIMON, J. It became material on
the trial to prove the organization of the
National Expre88 & Transportation Company, and the appellant offered In evidence,
for this and other purposes, "the records,
books, and minutes·• of that company, embracing what purported to be the proceedings lD the organization of It under and In
pursuance of Its charter. The appellee objecting, the court held that these records
were not evidence tor such purpose, and the
a11pellant assigns this ruling as error. It
likewise became material to prove that the
11.11pellee was a subscriber for 10 shares of
tbe <'t1pltal stock of the company named,
charged and credited to hie account as a
stockholder thereof, and the appellant offered In evidence for this purpose the same
records, which purported to show that the
appt>llee did subscribe and was a 1mbscrlber
for the number of shares of stock mentioned;
that be had paid $50 on account of the same,
and the balance of the money due therefor
had not been paid; and that he was a stockholder of the company. The appellee objecting, the court de<'llned to allow the records so ofT'ered to be put In evidence for such
purpose, and the appellant assigns this rejection of the records as error. In view of
these adverse ndlngs, the appellant suffered
a judgment of nonsuit, and appealed to this
court.
It was admitted on the trial that the books
and records offered In evidence were those
of the National Express & Transportation
Company, and It must be taken, from such
admission, as there Is no suggestion to the
contrary, that the proceedings entered In
them, and the orders and statements therein
made, are regular, and made by the proper
clerk, secretary, or agent of the company,
or some per1mn authorlzt>d to make them.
It mm1t so 111111ear before such records and
books can be received as evidence for any
purpose. The records and books, thus Identified, were evldence-<'ertalnly prlma facle
evldenc~f the organization and existence

It must so appear bei’ore such records and

books can be received as evidence for any

purpose. The records and books, thus iden-

tltied, were evidence—certainly prima facie

evidence—of the organization and existence

of the company. They purport to set forth

the proceedings of the organization, a list

of the names of the stockholders, the num-
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of the company. They purport to set forth
the proceedings of the organization, a list
of the names of the stockholders, the number of shares of stock owned by each, when
be subscribed for the same, the sum of money paid by each for hie stock, and the BUIDB
due therefor remaining unpaid, and an account of Its business transactions.
In Turnpike Co. v. Mccarson, 1 Dev. &
B. 806, Chief Justice Rutftn eald: ''The
case does not state the contents of the subscription and corporation books that were
produced, and therefore we cannot say positively ot what they were evidence. We
suppose them to be entries of such acts as
the charter prescribes, as no deviation ls
specified. If so, these documents, when Identified, were not only evidence, but complete
evidence, of the organization and existence
of the corporation." The rule le so stated
In Angell & A.mes on Corporations, ff 513,
514, 679; and so, also, Turnpike Co. v. :MeKean, 10 Johns. 154; Grays v. Turnpike Oo.,
4 Rand. (Va.) 578; Owings v. Speed, 5 Wheat.
420.
The books of the corporation offered lD evidence, lndudlng the stock book, purported
to contain, as we have seen, a list of all Its
stockholders, the number of shares of stock
owned by each, the enm of money paid, and
the balance still due from each on account
of his stock; and the name of the appellee
appears as a stockholder, and his account ls
stated showing a balance due from him for
hie stock. These books were competent evidence to prove that the appellee was a stockholder, and the state of his account as such
In respect to hie stock. It was so decided In
the very elmllar case of Turnbull v. Payson,
95 U. S. 418, In which the court say: "Where
the name of an lndlvldualappears In the stock
book of a corporation as a stockholder, the
prlma facle presumption le that he le the owner of the stock In a ell.Se where there Is nothing
to rebut that presumption; and, In an action
against him as stockholder, the burden of
proving that he Is not a stockholder, or of
rebutting that presumption, Is cast upon the
defendant." Hamilton Plank-Road Co. v.
Rice, 7 Barb. 157; Cotftn v. Collins, 17 Me.
44-0; Whitman v. Granite Church, 24 Me.
236; Wood v. Rallroad, 32 Ga. 273; Hoagland v. Bell, 36 Barb. 57; Mor. Corp. § 270.
The rule of evidence underlying this and similar decisions seems to be founded In convenience, and to rest upon the further ground
that corporations In this country are the
creatures of statute, with prescribed rights
and powers, subject, to an Important extent,
to public control and supervision, and are
therefore to exercise their powers as allowed and required by law, and to keep their
records accorcllngly and truly. Such presumption may, of course, be rebutted by any
competent evidence. This rule might, In possible cases, work Injury to a party, but thli;i
Is not probable, and, thus objected to, lt has

-coB11°a..a.T10N BOOKS.

[C11se No. 44

c0BP°RA'r10N BOOKS. [Case No. 44

me i695 We\8ht. as generally ever? lmgllllt There is error, and the appellant is enti-

mg the light to testify in his owll behalf. tled to have a new trial. To that end let this

Tumpme C0. v. McKean, supra; OW11188 V. opinion be certiﬁed to the superior court ac-

Speed, 9\1Pra.. cording to law. It is so ordered.

t\\t \e88 weight. as generally everY litigant

\la.a the Tight to testify 1n bis own behalf.
-rurnp\k.e Co. v. McKean, supra; Owings v.
s-peed, aupra.

There Is error, and the appellant is entitled to have a new trial. To that end let this
opinion be certified to the superior court according to law. It ls so ordered.
127

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:06 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104925781
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

127

Case No. !5]
Case No. 4-5]

RELEVAN CY.

HOVVARD v. GLENN.

(11 S. E. 610.)

Supreme Court of Georgia. April 21, 1890.

Error from superior court, Richmond

county; Ro.\'Ev, Judge.

F. H. Miller, for plaintiff in error. Cal-

houn. King 4': Spulrllng, and C‘. H. Cohen,

for defendant in error.

BLANl)F()BD,J. Attheappearanceterm

the defendant filed a motion to dismiss

the plaintiffs declaration on the ground

that he failed to annex a copy of the writ-

ten terms of subscription, and copies of

the proceedings referred to in his declara-

tion, with a copy oi the call for the en-

forcement of which this action was

brought. Subject to this motion, defend-

ant pleaded: (1) That the National Ex-

press & Transportation Company was not
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on the 14th day of l)ecember, L880, a body

politic and corporate, as alleged in the

plaintiffs declaration; (2) that the plain-

tiff is not a legally appointed trustee, and

authorized to institute this action by vir-

tue oi his appointment; (3) that, if the de-

fendant ever subscribed to stock, it was

to the National Express Company, whose

charter was amended without the knowl-

edge or sanction oi this defendant, (4. 5,

6) the statute oi limitations. When this

case came on to be tried, the court ordered

these pleas stricken, and overruled the

motion to dismiss the plaintiffs declara-

tlon.

1. In our opinion. the plaintiffs declara-

tion set iorth a. cause of action against the

defendant. The declaration substantially

alleged that Howard was a subscriber to

the National Express & Transportation

Company for ‘l5 shares of its capital stock,

amounting to the sum of $1,500; that this

company, having become insolvent, made

an assignment to certain persons as trus-

tees: that certain creditors of this com-

pany ﬂlcd a bill in the city court of Rich-

mond, upon which there was a decree ren-

dered, praying that the defendant in error,

Glenn, should be appointed a trustee with

authority to sue and collect from the cor-

porators oi the National Express&Trans-

portation Company a certain assessment

and call made upon them by the decree of

that court. The. officers or persons r;\pre-

scnting the National Express & Transpor-

tation Company were made parties defend-

ant to that bill. We think,so far as How-

ard had anyinterest in thiscompany, that

he was represented by the corporation in

that case, and that he was bound by the

decree rendered in the same. (it being ren-

dered by a court oi competent jurisdic-

tion.) notwithstanding that Howard may

at the time have been a citizen of Georgia,

and may not have been served with any

process in that case. So we think the

court did right to overrule the demurrer

of defendant to the plaintiffs declaration.

We think, also, that the pleas ﬁrst. sec-

RELEVANCY.

charter may bu·e been amended without
his knowledge or sanction, so as to mak&
It the National Express 4: 'fransportatlon.
Company, this did not relieve the defendError from euperior court, Richmond ant from any ltabutty to pay up bis uncounty; RoxEY, .Judge.
paid stock, this not being such a material
F. H. Miller, for plalntlft In error. Ca.1alteration of the charter as would relle\"&
houn. K/111( & SJ1aldlng, and C. B. Goben, the defendant, Howard; and this court
for defendant in error.
held In 81 Ga. SM, 8 S. E. Rep. 636. In this
same case, that the statute of Umltattoua
BLANDFORD,J. Attheappearanceterm did not apply to the same.
the defendRn l ftled n motion to cllsmlss
2. We think there was no error of th&
the plalntlff't1 declaration on the ground court In holding that the ftrst plea of the
that he failed to annex a copy of the writ- defendant In this case was lnsufftctent, In
ten t.erms of subscription, and copies of that it alleged that the action brought by
the proceedings referred to In bis declara- the J.llalntlft did notset forth the outstandtion, with a copy of the call for the en- ing creditors for whose benefit the earn&
forcement of which this action was was Instituted, the decree of the court In
brought. Subject to this motion, dP.fend- Vlrglnlft having set forth such cMltnrs;
ant pll'aded: (1) Tbttt the National Ex- and we bold that that decree was binding
iJree8 & Transportation Company wtts not
on the defendant, Howard, a.a to all maton the 14th day of December, l~O. a body ters therein contained. If be was a corpolitic and corporate, as alleged In the porator In the National Express 4: Trantfplatntlft'at declaration; (2) that the plaln- portution Company.
tlft Is not a legally appointed trustee, and
8. lt Is allt-ged as error that the court
authorized to tm1tltute this action by vir- erred In strtklng the second plea of detue of bis Appointment; (8) that, If the de- fendant; that the decree of the chancery
fendant ever subscribed to stock, it was court of the city of Rlcbmnn1l of De<.-ember
to the National Express Company, whose 14, 18k0, set forth lo the petition, was not
charter was amended without the kuowl- such a contract of record as was binding
edge or sanction of this defendant, (4. 5, upon him personally for any purpl•Se, In
6) the statute of limitations. When this
that the court was without jurisdiction
case came on to be tried, the court ordered over him as a resident citizen of the estate
these pleas stricken, and overruled the of Georgia, who was never served with
motion to dismiss the plaintiff's declu.ra- process thereto, who never a11peared, or
bad notice thereof, until the Institution of
tlon.
1. In our opinion. the plaintiff's declara- this suit. We think that w heu the corporation set forth a cause of action agatnstthe tion was sued at the Instance of creditors,
defendant. The declaration substirntla.lly and was duly served. Howard was bound
ulleged tl\at Howard was a subscriber to as acorporutor by any procl'C()lngs to that
the National Expl't'88 & Trans1Jortatlon case, and there was no error in strlkln1t
Company for 15 shares of Its capital stot'k, the second plea.
4. We think tbethtrd plea was also propamonutlug to the sum of fl,500; that this
company, having be<.'ome tut1olvent, ma.de erly stricken by the court, hrnsmncb as we
an assignment to certain persons as trus- think that whatever fraud way have been
tees: that certain creditors of this com- committed by the corporation wonld not
pany ftk-d a btll In the city court of Rich- operate to defeat an action by the credmond, upon which there waR a. decree ren- ltors4>f the corporutlon, however It might
dered, praying that the defendant In error, be as between the corporation and a corGlenn, Mhould be appointed a tru11tee with pora.tor. Persons who gave credit to this
authority to sue and collect from the cor- ::iorpora tlon would not be bound by any
pora tol'll of the Na.ttona.l Express& Trans- fraud between the corporation and the
portation Company a certain asHe11sment corpora tors. As between the corporation
and call made upon them by the lle<.'ree of and a corporator, such defense may or
that court. 'fhe olftcers or perHone r.r'pre- may not have been good ; but, SM between
sentlng the National ExprPss & Transpor- a trustee appointed by a court to bring
tation Com1Jnny were 1111:1rle parties defend- snit and collect the uupalll subscrtptlom1
ant to that blll. We think, so far as How- of a corpora tor, n<> su<.'b defem1e could be
ard had anyloterest In this company, that made.
he was represented by the corporation In
5. We think the fourth plea was propthat case, and that be WM bound by the erly stricken on demurre.r, In this: that
decree rendered In the same, (It being ren- while It alleged the decree of the court In
dered by a court of competent jurlatdlc- thl!l calil9 In Virginia, to the effect that If
tlon,) notwithstanding that Howard mfty the stockholders should pfty a certain per
at the time have been a citizen of Geora-la, cent. upon their subscriptions within a
and may not ba.\"e buen served with RllY certain time, tbts would be sufftctent to
procesR In that case. So we think the pay off the tndehtednff!R of the c<>mpany,
<.'ourt did right to overrule the demurrer the plea did not allege that there wae any
of defendant to the plaintiff's declnratlou. tender or offer on the part of dPlendant to
We think, also, thut the pleas ft~t. sec- pay under that decree, within the tlml'
ond, and third and fourth, fifth, and sixth therein prescribed, the amount pn>Scrtbed
were JJroperly dismissed on demurrer by to be paid. To a vatl himself or that dethe court. We think that Glenn was duly cree, the defendant should have paid, or
appointed a trustee, and as such bad a have offered to pay, the amount specified
right to briI1g this Rutt; and that 1f the In the decree. No such allegation appearat
defendant eub11ertbed to stock in the Na- In this plea, and therefore it waa properly
tional Express Company, although the stricken.
HOWARD v. GLENN.

(11 S. E. 610.)
Supreme Court of Georgia. April 21, 1890.
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s. it ‘F1 <=Om Dlained um the coil‘; tiifred

in striking the ﬁfth plea,or s_o muc V Ere-

cl as alleged that the subscription ‘I 3-5 in-

duced by fraud, and is void for false and

iraudulent representations made, and for

the fraudulent suppression of material

facts concerning said company. the court

allowing the words to stand in said plea;

that defendant at no time became a

subscriber to the National Express &

Transportation Company; that he did

sign a paper subscribing to the National

Express Company for 15 shares of the cap-

ital stock. Whether Howard became a

stockholder in this company by subscrip-

tion which was induced byfraud practiced

upon him or not, if he did become a stock-

holder in said company, he is liable to the

creditors of the company for so much of
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his unpaid stock as might be necessary to

pay the company’s debts.taken in connec-

tion with the other corporators of the

company; and whether fraud was prac-

ticed upon him or not would make no dif-

ference as to the creditors. It would be a.

question between him and the corporation.

with which the creditors had nothing

to do. So we think the court committed

no error in striking that portion of the

ﬁfth plea complained of. We think the

sixth plea was properly stricken. for the

reasons stated in justification of the court

in striking a portion of the ﬁfth plea.

7. In the seventh plea, which was also

stricken by the court, it is alleged that the

plaintiff had settled with and released

frpm liability several stockholders under

said decree, and defendant contends that

this is equivalent to a release of himself.

We think the court properly struck this

plea. The defendant ls bound to the cred-

itors upon his subscription to the capital

stock of this company. and whether other

stockholders were released or not is a

matter with which he has no concern. un-

less this action on the part of the creditors

or their agent increased his liability.

8. For the same reason we think the

court was right in striking the eighth plea,

which is complained of, and also the ninth

plea. When the plaintiff below showed

that he had been duly appointed a trustee

by a court having competent jurisdic-

tion. to recover of the stockholders of this

company their unpaid subscriptions, for

the purpose of paying off the credit-ors of

the corporation. and when the plaintiff

showed that defendant was u stockholder

and had subscribed so many shares to the

capital stock of this company. and that

g lt ll!I complained that the court erl'ed

\n ~tr\ldng the ttfth plea, orso m ucb thereot aa alleged that the eubeerlptlon wa.e induced by Ira ud. and is void for f pleed and
ttaudu\ent l"epresentatlone made, an for
the fraudulent suppression of material
facts concerniug said company, the court
allowing the words to stand In said plea;
that defendant at no time became o.
subl!crlber to the National Express &
Transportation Company; that be dtd
sign a paper eubeeriblnit tu the National
·Expl'el!s Company for 15 ehareM of the capital stock. Whether Howard became a
stockholder In thle company by 11ubecrlptlon whlcb was Induced by fraud practiced
upon blm or not, If he did become a stockholder ln said company, he le ltable to the
cmlitore of the company for so much of
bis unpaid stock as might be nPCeSBary to
pay the company's debts. taken In connection with the other corporatore of the
company; and whether fraud was practiced upon him or not would make no difference as to the credltorB. It would be a
quPBtlon between him and the corporation,
with which the credltol'B had nothing
to do. So we think the court committed
no error In striking that portion of t.be
tilth plea complained of. We think thA
Rlxtll plea was properly stricken. for the
l'e88ons stilted In justlftcatton of the court
lo etrlklug a portion of the fttth plea.
7. In the seventh plea, which was also
stricken by the court, It le alleged that the
plalntlft had settled with and relewiell
trvm liablllty several Btockholllere under
said decree, and defendant contends that
this ts equivalent to a release of himself.
We think the court properly struck this
plea. The defendant le hound to tlle Cl'fld·
!tore upon his subscription to the capital
stock of this company. and whether other
etockbolderB were released or not Is a
matter with which he has no concern, unleee this aettonon the part of thecredlton
or their agent lncreued his liability.
8. For the same reason we think the
court \Vas right In striking the eighth plea,
which ls complained of, and also the ninth
plea. When the platntlft below showed
that he had been duly appointed a trustee
by a court having competent jurisdiction. to recover of the stockholders of this
company their unpaid suhHcrlptlons, for
the purpose of paying oft the credltol'B of
the cor1mratloo, and when the plalntlft
showed that deft>nclant was n Htockllolder
and had eubsrrlhed so many shRreH to the
capital stock of tills company. and thut
the court had made an l\SKl'KHmeot upon
the etockholdel'B for a certain per cent. upon the stock subscribed, and authorized
him to sue and cullect the same, we think
be made out a case which t:>ntltled him to
rerover,notwlthetandlng any fraud which
might have been practiced upon the stockh~der to procure hie subscription to the
capital stock of this company by the corporation or Its agents. Fraud thu11 pr11.ctlced upon the subscriber was a matter
which did not affect the cre<lltora of the
corporation. The great qul•stlon in this
case le wht>ther the defl!ndant, Howard,
who 18 now the plaintiff lo error, was a
corporator and a subscriber to the capital
•tock of this company. He admits by hie

plea that he did subscribe to 15 shares of
the capital stock of the National Exprese
Company: and lt was shown by the evidence Introduced by the plalnttn lo tile
court below that the National Express
Company and the National Express &:
Transportation Company were ono and
the same. A mere change lo the name of
a corporation we du not think makes any
material dlfterence; clearly not such a difference as would relieve a subHCrlber from
llabtllty to pay for stock subscribed by
him.
9. It le Insisted that the court erred In
allowing the books of the corponttlon to
be put In evidence for the purpose of showing that the defendant did Hubscrlbe to 15
shares of fltock, and to show, a.1110, certain
other things therein contained. When it
was shown that the defendant wu a
11tockholder to the company, then the
books of the company were admissible in
evidence against him. But, when this fact
le not shown, WI.' aft' of the opinion that
the hooks of the com11any would not be
admissible In evidence against him. In
this rase, however, It was admitted by
the plaintiff In error tha.t he did eubecribetoeomanyeharee of atock In the National ExpresR Company: so, when It was
proven that the Na.tlonnl Expn!88Company
and the National ExprP.81t &: Trans11ortatton Company were one and the 11ame corpora tlon, we think the books were admissible lo evidence, not only to show
that Howard was a stockholder, the number of eharet1 and the value thereof he eubscrlbt>d for, but to show any other transaction that had ta.ken place be~ween him
and this company. We are aware that It
has b<.>en held that the books of a corporation are admissible to show prima facie
that the defendant was a subscriber to
tile stock of the com11a11y, and was a
et.ockholder therein: but while we do not
think thlR rnllng le correct, upon any reason or principle known t11 us, yet, under
the facts of thlK cnHe, we think the books
wer~ properly admitted In evidence. We
know of no dech1lon, however, which
shows upon principle that such books are
aelmlHHlble without some Hpeclal ch'CUDl·
stunre. We <lo not think that the ca11e of
Tumhull v . Puy1mn, 9:; U.S. 41~,-a declelon by Judge.C1.WFORD to the t•ffect that
the books of a corporation are u.dmls11lble
In <>vldcnce to show that a person Is a
stockholder,-ls correct. No reaKon Is asei~m·cl In that decb1lon, nnd none has been
ai-;Hignerl In any <lecbdon which we havA
bt.'en able to find In either North Carolina
or Alabama. But we think, under the
facts or this case, where the defendant ad111ltted that he was a subscriber to the
stock of the Nntlonnl Expl'l'IJ8 Comr,any,
and wher<> It was Rhown thutthe Nutlo·•al
I~xpreHs Company and the National Express & Transportation Company were
one and the Hame thing, that the books
were properly admitted. We think, furthermore, that when the suhecrlptlon list
was tendered, and admitted In evidence
by the court below, the plalotlft In error
hn.d n right to show that he £lid uot
eul>11crlbe to this li11t, and therefore think
the court committed error In rf!fuelng to
allow him to wake such proof; yet we

the court had made an asscssinent upon

the stockholders for a certain per cent. up-

on the stock subscribed. and authorized

him to sue and collect the same, we think

he made out a case which entitled him to

recover, notwithstanding any fraud which

might havebeen practiced upon the stock-

holder to procure his subscription to the

WlLGUB,BV.-1
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do not think this is reversible error. inas-

much as it appears from the record, with-

out more, that the plaintiff had a right to

recover in this case. So, upon consider-

ing this case, we are of the opinion that

therewas no material error committed by

the court below, and that the finding of

tl1e jury was right, under the facts in

proof.

10. It is contended by the plaintiff in er-

ror that the admission in the ﬁfth plea, to

the effect that he had never subscribed to

the National Express & '1'l'anspo|'tation

Company, but that he did subscribe 15

shares to the Na tionai Express Company,

could not be used us an admission against

him upon the trial of any other plea than

that; and the case of Glenn v. Sumner, 132

U. 156,10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 4l,is cited as au-
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thority to sustain this position. ln the

present case the main issue was whether

the plaintiff in error was a subscriber to

the stock of theNational Express&Trans-

portation Company. It was affirmatively

alleged in the declaration that he was;

do not think this Is revendble error. lnnsrnuch as It appN1rs from the record, without more, that the plulntlft ha<l a rlg;ht to
n'<:O\"er tn this ca.se. So, upon considering this case, we are of the opinion that
there was no material error commlttt-d by
the court below, anti that the finding of
the Jury was right, under the facts In
proor.
10. It Is rontenrled hy the plaintiff In error that the admh;slon In the filth plen, to
the erfPct thut he find ne\·er snbHcrlhe1l to
the Natlonnl J<;xpr~H & '1'1·an1o1portntlon
Company, but that he did sulii;crlbe 15
shares to the National Expre;o~ Company,
could not be used UH an admission agah1st
him upon the trial or any other plea than
that; and the case of Olenn v. Sumner, 132
U.S. 156, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 41,is cited aa authority to sustain this position. In the
preHent case the main Issue was whtither
the plelutlff in error was a subscriber to
the stock of the Natlonal Exprt'ss & Traneporta tlon Company. It was aftlrmatlrnly
alleged In the declaration that be was;
and, if he wae such subscriber, bis liability
under the fact.a of the case was clea.r and
unmistakable. We think this allegation In
the plaintiff's declaration that be was
such subscriber callecl forth from him a
clear and explicit denial of the same b.v a
plea or non est factum, as was strongly
hinted at by the supreme court or thl11
11tate in the case of Thornton v. Lane, 11

and, if he was such subscriber, his liability

under the facts of the case was clear and

unmistakable. We think this allegation in

the plaintiffs declaration that be was

such subscriber called forth from him a

clear and explicit denial of the same by a

plea of non est factum, as was strongly

hinted at by the supreme court of this

state in the case of Thornton v. Lane, 11

130

Ga. 489. This was the main issue in the

case. and, without a determination of the

same against the plaintiff. the plaintitf

was entitled to judgment. So we think

that a plea which denies that the defend-

antwas a subscriber to this company, but

which at the same time admits that he

was u. subscriber to another company,

(which two companies were one and the

same.) was evidence against the defend-

ant. (now plaintiff in error.) and might he

so used as an admission. While we admit

that, under the laws of this state. ade-

fendant may ﬁle as many contradictory

pleas as he thinks proper, yet, if one of

those pleas bears on the main issue in the

case, and there be an admission in the

same by the defendant which is calculated

to damage his cause, that admission may

be used in evidence against him. In fact,

the only issue to be determined by the

jury in this case was whether Howard be-

came a subscriber and stockholder in this

company, and any plea which bore upon

that issue, and which contained admis-

sions by the defendant, could be used

against him. S0 we think that in the case

of Glenn v. Sumner. supra, what was

said by the judge in delivering the opinion

therein,to the effect thatstatemenis made

for the purpose of presenting the issue to

which they relate are not evidence upon

any other issue in the same record, does

RELEVANCY.

130

Ga. 489. This wne the main issue 1n the
case. and, without a dt>t.ermlnatlnn of the
same against th"' plalntlrr. the plalntlft
was entitlerl to judgment. So we think
that a plea which t.lenlea that the defl'nda.ntwas a subRcrlber to this company, but
which at the same time admits that he
was a subscriber to another company.
(which two companies were one and the
same,) wns evldenre against the defendant, (now plaintiff in error.) and might be
so used as an admission. While we admit
that, under tho laws of this state, a de- ·
fenuant may file as many contradictory
pleas as he thinks proper, ,\·et, if one of
those pleas bears on the main Issue In the
case, and there be un admi11sion to the
same by the defenuant which is calculated
to damage bis cause, that admiSHion may
be used in evidence against him. In fact,
the only IHsue to be determined by the
jury In this C"l\8e was whether Howard been me a subscriber and stockholder In this
company, nncl any plea which bore upon
that Issue, and which contained admissions by the defendant, could be UKed
against him. So we think that In tbe CN!e
of Glenn v. Sumner, supra, what was
said by tbe Judge In delivering tbe opinion
therein, to the effect tha.tstatl"ments made
for the purpo11e of presenting the Issue to
which they relate are not evidence upon
any other issue In the same record , doee
not apply to thl11 case. Judatment affirmed.

JUDGMENTS.

(Case No. 46

JUDG.\IEN'1‘S.

[Case No. 46

coY:MONWEALTH "'· O'BRI~N' (two
cues).

Ggimonwmnixrn v. O'BRIEN (two

cases).

(25 N. JD. &14, 152 Mass. 495.)

(23 N. E. 834, 152 Mass. 495.)

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Es-

sex. Nov. 25, 1890.

Exceptions from superior court, Essex

county; EDGAR J. SHERMAN, Judge.

These were complaints against defend-

ant, Richard O’Brien, for the illegal keep-

ing oi intoxicating liquors on the 2d day

oi June. 1890. Appealed from the police

court oi Haverhill. A motion to dismiss

was ﬁled in the superiorcourt beiore a jury

was sworn to try the case, on the ground

that the complaint and warrant were not

sworn to or certiﬁed or issued according

to law. At the trial, defendant not hav-

ing waived his said motion, or the objec-

tions therein set iorth, offered, in support
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of said motion and objections, the testi-

mony of Edward B. George, clerk of the

police court oi Haverhiil, to explain the

record, to rebut the presumption that the

receiving of the complaint, swearing to

the same, and issuing of the warrant,

were done in court, or when the court

was in session, and to show that when

the complaint was received and sworn to

and the warrant issued the court was not

in session. The court refused to admit

the evidence and overruled the motion,

and defendant excepted. After trial on

the merits, the jury returned a. verdict of

guilty.

A. J. Waterman, Atty. Gen., for the

Commonwealth. Horace I. Ba-1-tIett;,ior

defendant.

KNOWLTON, J. In each oi these cases,

the complaint purported to have been

properly received and sworn to before the

police court oi I-iavcrhili, and the war-

rant to have been properly issued by the

court. The motion to dismiss was right-

ly overruled. The oral evidence offered to

impeach the record was incompetent.

Com. v. Intoxicating Liquors, 135 Mass.

519; Kelley v. Dresser, 11 Allen, 31. Ex-

ceptions overruled.
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Supreme Judicial Court of MaBBachuRrtts. Ea-

aex.

Nov. 25, 1890.

E:r.eeptlons from superior court, Essex
county; EDGAR J. SHERMAN, Judge.
Th~ were complo.luts against defendant, Richard O'Brien, for the Illegal keeping of Intoxicating liquors on the 2d day
of June, 1890. Appealed from the police
court of Haverhill. A motion to dlsml88
was filed In thesuperlorcourt before a Jury
was sworn to try the case, on the ground
that the complaint and warrant were not
sworn to or certlfted or IBSued according
to law. At the trial, defendant not ha vlng waived bis said motion, or the obJectlons therein set forth, offered, In support
of said motion and obJectlons, the testimony of Edward B. George, clerk of the
pollcP court of H!iverhlll, to explain the
~ord, to rebut the presumption that the

receiving of the complaint, swearing to
the same, nnd le11ulug of the wurrant,
were done In court, or when the court
was In f!eRBlon, and to show th1:1 t when
the complaint w1:1s receh·ed and sworn to
and the warrant Issued the court wus not
In StlRHlon. The court refu1<ed to admit
the evidence and overruled the motion,
o.nr1 defendant excepted. After t1·lal on
the merits, the jury returned a vMdkt of
guilty.
A. J. Wxterma11, Atty. Gen., for the
Commonwealth. Boruce I. Bartlett, for
defendant.
KNOWL1'0~, J, In Pach of these casefl,
thf' complaint purported to have been
properly received and sworn to berore the
police court of Haverhill, and the warrant to have been properly IB11ued by the
court. The motion to dlsmlM woe rightly overruled. The oral evidence offert-d to
impeach the record was Incompetent.
Com. v. Intoxlca ting Ltq uors, 13."> Mass.
519; Kelley ,. . Dresser, 11 Allen, 31. Ex·
ceptions overruled,
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NESBIT v. INDEPENDENT DISTRICT OF

RIVERSIDE.

(12 Sup. Ct. 746, 144 U. S. 610.)

Supreme Court of the United States. April 18,

1892.

In error to the circuit court of the United

States for the Northern district of Iowa.

Action by Eleanor Nesbit against the inde-

pendent district of Riverside to recover on

certain bonds issued by the district. Judg-

ment for defendant. l’laintiff brings error.

Affirmed.

Statement by Mr. Justise BREWER:

This was an action on ﬁve bonds purport-

ing to have been issued by the school dis-

trict defendant. The case was tried by the

court without a jury. Special ﬁndings of

facts were made, of which the following are

the only ones material to the questions pre-
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sented:

"(2 The value of the taxable property

within the boundaries of the independent

district, as shown by the state and county

tax lists, wa for the year 1872 forty-one

thousand four hundred and twenty-six dol-

lars, and for the year 1873 sixty-eight thou-

sand three hundred and seven dollars.

"(3) That on the 26th and 27th days of

March, 1373, the indebtedness of said inde-

pendent district, exclusive of the bonds de-

clared on in this action, exceeded the sum of

thirty-ﬁve hundred dollars.

‘-(4) That the bonds sued on in this action

bear date March 27, 1873, maturing ten years

thereafter, are ﬁve in number, for ﬁve hun-

dred dollars each, or $2,500.00 in the aggre-

gate, exciusive of interest, are numbered 14,

15, 16. 17, and 18, and that the signatures

thereon are the genuine signatures of the of-

ﬁcers of the district purporting to sign the

same, and that said bonds, with the accrued

interest. BOW amount to the sum of ﬁve thou-

sand six hundred and ninety-ﬁve dollars,

which bonds and interest coupons were pro-

duced in evidence by piaiutiﬁ. The said

bonds and interest coupons are in all respects

alike except as to number, and each coupon

refers to the number of the bond to which it

belongs and to said act under which it was

|s5ued_ All of said bonds contain the follow-

mg provision in the body thereof: This bond

is issued by the board of directors of said in-

dependent school district under the provisions

of chapter 93 01' the Acts of the Twelfth Gen-

eral Assembly of the state of Iowa, and in

conformity with a resolution of said boa1'd

dated the 26th day of March, 1873. A copy

of the 110$ referred to is printed on the back

of the bonds. The exhibits attached to plain-

tilT'$ I14‘-tilloll are correct copies of said bonds

and coupons-

“(4%) Th“ all of said ﬁve bonds and the

coupons attlwhed belong to the same series,

and were issued at the same time, undel‘ the

same circumstances, and part of the same

transaction.
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“(5) That the plaintiﬂ, who is a citizen of

RELEVANCY.

"(5) That the plalntltr. who Is a citizen ot
Great Britain, bought these bonds, and all
the Interest coupons belonging therefo, as an .
(12 Sup. Ct. 746, 144 U. 8. 610.)
investment from one Henry Hutchinson 011
the 20th day ot December, 1877, paying h\m
Supreme Court of the United States. April 18, therefor tbe sum of two thousand dollars;
1892.
that said plalntltr, when she made such purIn error to the clrcult court ot the United chase, bad no other knowledge co11cemlug
the bonds, or ot the tacts connected with
States for the Northern dlstrlct of Iowa.
Action by Eleanor !'Jesblt against the inde- their Issuance, than she was chargeable w\th
pendent district of Riverside to recover on trom the bonds themselves, and from the pro<.>ertaln bonds IBSued by the district. Judg- visions of the constitution and laws ot the
ment for defendant. l'lnintllT brings error. state of Iowa.
"(6) That said bonds were Issued without
AtJlrmed.
consideration.
Statement by Mr. Justlse BUEWER:
This was an action on fi.ve bonds purport"(7> That plalntlft' brought suit lo the Uniting to have been lssued by the school dis- ed States circuit court at Des Moines, Iow4,
trict defendant. The case was tried by the against the said Independent district of Rivcourt without a jury. Special fi.ndings of erside upon certain of t-ie Interest coupom
facts were made, of which the following are belonging to the bonds Noe. 14 and 15, bethe only ones material to the questions pre- ing two of the bonds Included in the present
action, and ln the petition In that cause filed
sented:
"(2) The value ot the taxable property the plaintU! averred that she was the owner
wlthln the boundaries ot tbe Independent ot the two bonds Nos. 14 and 15, and the coudistrict, aa shown by the state and county pons thereto attached, and asked Judgment
tax lists, was for the year 1872 forty-one upon the slx coupons theo due and unpaid.
thousand four hundred and twenty-six dol- To thls petition the defendant answered that
lars. and for the year 1873 sixty-eight thou- at the time the bonds were Issued the indebtsand three hundred and seven dollars.
edness ot the distrl<'t exceeded five per cent.
"(3) That on the 26th and 27th days of of the taxable propen:y of the district, as
March, 1873, the Indebtedness of said Inde- shown by the state and county tax l\sts, and
pendent district, exclusive of the bonds de- that the bonds were therefore void, under the
clared on lo this action, exceeded the sum of provision ot the constitution of the state of
thirty-five hundred dollars.
Iowa; that no legal or proper election upon
"(4) 'l'hat the bonds sued on lo this action the question ot Issuing the bonds was held;
bear date !\larch 27, 1873, maturing ten years that the bonds were issued under the prethereafter, are five In number, for five hun- tense of building a schoolhouse with the prodred dollars each, or f2,500.00 in the ag~re ceeds thereof, but the same has not been
gate, exclusive of Interest. are numbered 14, bullt, nor was tt Intended that it should be
15, 16. 17, and 18, and that the signatures built; that the district received no <'onsiderathereon are the genuine signatures of the of- tlon tor the bonds. anct that the same are
ficers of the district purporting to sign the fraudulent and void; that plaintiff Is not &
same, and that said bonds, with the accrued bona tide holder of said bonds.
"The case was tried to the <."Ourt, and ju<lgInterest. now amount to the sum of five thousand slx hundred and ninety-five dollars, ment was rendered in favor of plalntUf tor
which bonds and Interest coupons were pro- the full amount of the slx coupons declared
duced In evidence by plnlntllT. The said on In that cause. It is shown by evidence
bonds and Interest coupons are in all respects allunde that the five bonds bought by plainalike except as to number, anq each coupon tiff were In possession of plafntlfl'.'s counsel
refers to the nutnber of the bond to which It at the trial of the action at Des Moines, and
belongs and to said act under which it wss that bonds Nos. 1-l and rn were actually proIssued- All of said bonds contain the follow- duced and exhibited to the court at such trial,
ing provision to the body thereof: This bond and ottered tn evlden<'e. It 111 not shown that
Is Issued by the board of directors of said ln- at such trial the fact that plaintltr bad
depenctent school district under the provisions bought and was the owner of bonds ~os. 16,
ot chapter 98 of the Actt1 of the Twelfth Gen- 17• and 18 was made known to the court.
eral Assembly of the state of Iowa, and In The judgment entry In said cause shows that
conformity with a resolution of said board on that trial It appeared from the evidence
dated the 26th day of March, 1873. A co1>Y that when said bonds Nos. 14 and 15 were Isof the act referred to Is printed on the baek sued the indebtedness of the district. excluof the bonds. The exhibits attached to plain- sive of these bonds exceeded the constitutiff's petition are correct copies of said bonds tional limitation of 'five per cent.; that the
judges trying se.ld cause were divided ID
nod coupons.
"(41h} That all of said five bonds and the opinion upon the questton whether the r~
coupons atta<'he<l belong to the same seri,~s. cltals in the bond esto11ped the defendand
and were il!sued at the sam<> time, under the from .showing this fact against pJnlntUf, a~
same circumstances, and pa1t of tbe same certified a division of opinion on this qu t
ti
j
. ....A in favor o
transaction.
on, Udgment being rendei"""

:NESBIT v. INDEPENDE~"T DISTRICT OF
RIVEH.SIDE.
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iliaintiil. It docs not appear thﬂt the cause

property in the county is not stated; but, cx

was taken to the supreme court “P0” the

vi termini, it was usccrtainable in one way

q\\eS\'.\0I1 certiﬁed.

~-(3) Under the statutes of Iowa, ill f°1'Q9 in

1872 and 1873, regulating the assessment of

property for the purpose of state and county

taxation, the lists thereof could not be com-

puted before the month of August, and in

March, 1873, when these bonds were issued,

the last computed tax list was for the year

1872.”

Upon these facts judgment was ciitcreil in

favor of the defendant, (25 Fed. 637),) to re-

I t does not appear that the cause

property In the county 18 not stated; but, ex

taken to the supreme court upon the
l\uest\on certlft ed.

vi termini, It was ascertainable In one way

\\'19.\nt\ll.
'flaB

Under the statutes of Iowa, In force In
1S'i2 and 1873, regulating the assessment of
property for the purpose of state and county
tuaUon. the lists thereof could not be computed before the month of August, and Jn
Mareh, 1813, when these bonds were Issued,
the last computed tax list was for the yeur
"{8)

1872."

Upon th<>se facts judgment was t-ntered In
favor of the defendant, (25 Fed. 6a:i,) to reverse which judgment this writ of error was
sued ouL
W. WWoughby, for plalntln: In error.

verse which judgment this writ of error was

sued out. "

W. Wiiloughby, for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Justice BREWER, after stating the

facts in the foregoing language, delivered the
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opinion of the court.

Article 11, 5 3, of the constitution of Iowa

of 1857, ordains that “no county, or other

political or municipal corporation, shall be

allowed to become indebted in any manner,

or for any purpose, to an amount in the ag-

gregate excccding ﬁve per centum on the

value of the taxable property within such

county or corporation, to be ascertained by

the last state and county tax lists previous to

the incurring of such indebtedness." Under

that section, the limit of indebtedness which

the district could incur at the date of the

issue of these bonds was $2,071.30. It was

already indebted in a sum exceeding $3,500,

and the ﬁve bonds of themselves aggregated

$2.500, or nearly $500 more than the amount

of debt the district could lawfully create.

Aside, therefore, from the fact that they were

issued without consideration. they were in-

valid by reason of the constitutional pro-

vision, and created no obligation against the

district. They were issued at the same time,

and as one transaction, and were purchased

by plaintiff together and in one purchase. If

not charged with knowledge of the prior in-

debtedness, she was with the fact that, in-

dependent of such indebtedness, these bonds

alone were an overissue, and beyond the pow-

er of the district; for she was bound to take

notice of the value of taxable property with-

in the district, as shown by the tax list.

Buchanan v. Litchﬂcld, 102 U. S. 278; Bank

' v. Porter Tp., 110 U. S. 608, 4 Sup. Ct. 354;

Dixon Co. v. Field, 111 U. S. 83, -i Sup. Ct.

315. In the first of those cases, on page 23!).

it is said that “the purchaser of the bonds

was certainly bound to take notice, not only

of the constitutional limitation upon munici-

pal indebtedness, but of such facts as the au-

thorized ofﬁcial assessments disclosed con-

cerning the valuation of taxable propcrt_v

within the city for the year 1873;" and in the

last, on page 95, that “the amount of the

bonds issued was known. It is stated in the

recital itself. It was $87,000. The holder of

each bond was apprised of that fact. The

amount of the assessed value of the taxable

only, and that was by reference to the as-

Mr. Justice BREWER, after stating the
facts ln the foregoing language, delivered the
opinion of the court.
Article 11, I 3, of the constitution of Iowa
of 1857, ordains that "no county, or other
political or municipal corporation, shall be
allowed to become Indebted In any manner,
or for any purpose, to an amount In the ag«regate exceeding five per centum on the
value of the taxable pro11erty within such
county or corporation, to be ascertained by
the last state and county tax lists previous to
the Incurring of such Indebtedness:• Undt>r
that section, the limit of Indebtedness which
the district could Incur at the date of the
Issue ot these bonds was $2,071.:lo. It was
already Jndebted ln a sum exceeding $3,000,
and the ftve bonds of themselves aggregated
'2,500, or nearly $500 more than the amount
of debt the district coulil lawfully create.
Aside, therefore, from the fact that they were
IBSued without consideration, they were Invalid by reason of the constitutional provision, and created no obllgutlon against the
district. They were Issued at the same time,
and ae one tmnsactlon, and were purchased
by plalntltr together and In one purchase. If
ilot charged with knowledge of the prior lndebtedneBB, she was with the fact that, Independent of such lndebtef.lness, these bonds
alone were an overlssue, and beyond the power of the district; fer she was bound to take
notice of the value of taxable pro11erty within the district, as shown by the tax list.
Buchanan v. Litchfield, 102 U. S. 278; Bank
• v. Porter Tp., 110 U. S. 608, 4 Sup. Ct. 254;
Dixon Co. v. lt'leld, 111 U. S. 83, 4 Sup. Ct.
31:>. In the ftrst of those cases, on page 28!),
It Is said that "the purchaser of the bouds
was certainly bound to take 1:10tlce, not only
of the constltutlonnl limitation upon municipal Indebtedness, but of such facts as the authorized oftlclal asseBSments dls<'losed concerning the valuation of taxable property
within the city tor the year 1873;" and In the
last, on page 95, that "the amount of the
bonds Issued was known. tt ls stated In the
recital ltaelt. It was '87,000. The holder of
filch bond was apprised of that tact. The
.amount of the aBBessed value of the taxable

only, and that was by reference to the assessment Itself, a public record equally ac<"esslble to all Intending purchasers of bonds,
as well as to the county oftlcers." So when
the plalntltf purchased these bonds she knew,
or at least was chargeable with knowledge of
the tact, that they were unlawfully Issued,
and created DO obligation against the district. She could not, therefore, claim to be a
bona ftde purchaser, no matter what recitals
a111ieared oD the face of the Instrument.
But the question which ls most earnestly
pressed upon our attention ts the estoppel
which ls alleged to have been created by the
judgment against the district In the United
States circuit court at Des .Moines, upon coupons detached from the two bonds numbered
14 and 15. Is this a case ot estoppel by judgment? The law In respect to such estoppel
was fully considered and determined by this
court In the case of Cromwell v. County of
Sac, 94 U. S. 351. It was there decided that
when the second suit ls upon the same cause
ot action, and between the same parties as
the first, the judgment in the f1>rmer ls conclusive In the latter as to every question
which was or might have been presented and
determined in the first action; but when the
second suit Is upon a dtn:erent cause of action, though between the same parties, the
Judgment In the former action operates as an
estoppel only as to the point or question actually lltlgated and determined, and not qs to
other matters whl<.>h might have been litigated and determined.
Now, the present suit Is on causes of action different from those presented In the
suit at Dee Moln~s. Bonds 16, 17,· and 18
were not presented or known In that suit;
and while bonds 14 and 15 were presented,
alleged to be the property of plalntltf, and
judgment asked upon six coupons attached
thereto, yet the cause of action on the six
coupons ls distinct and separate from that
upon the bonds or the other coupons. Each
matured coupon Is a separable promise, and
gives rise to a separate <'II.use of action. It
may be detached from the bond and sold by
itself. Indeed, the title to several matured
coupons of the same bond IDllY be in as many
different persons, and upon each a distinct
and separate action be maintained. So, while
the promises of tile bond and of the coupons
In the first Instance are upon the same 11aper, and the coupons are for Interest due upon the bond, yet the promise to pay the coupon ls as distinct trow that to pay the bond
as though the two promises were placed in
different Instruments, upon dllTerent paper.
By the rule laid down In Cromwell v. County of · Sac, the judgment in the suit at Des
Moines Is conclusive In this case only as to
the matters actually litigated and determined. What were they? The defense pleade\l
was this: That at the time the bonds were
Issued the Indebtedness exceeded r> per cent.,
1H..'t

Case No. 47)
Case No. 47]
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and the bonds were therefore void; that the

district received no consideration; and that

the plaintiff was not a bona ﬂde holder. "he

judgment entry shows that it appeared from

the evidence that the indebtedness at the

time the bonds were issued exceeded the con-

stitutional limitation of 5 per cent.; but that

it was adjudged that the recitals in the

bonds estopped the defendant from showing

this fact against the plaintlif. In other

words, that which was determined was the

effect of the recitals. But this case does not

turn upon that question at all, and nothing

was determined here antagonistic to the ad-

jndication there. An additional tact, that of

notice from the amount of the bonds pur-

chased, was proved.

The effect of recitals in municipal bonds is

like that given to words of negotiability in
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a promissory note. They simply relieve the

paper in the hands of a bona iide holder from

the burden of defenses other than the lack

of power, growing out of the original issue of

the paper, and available as against the im-

mediate payee. Snppose two negotiable

promissory notes. issued at the same time,

and as a part of the same transaction. In a

suit on the ﬁrst, brought by a purchaser be-

fore m11tl11'1tY, the maker proves facts con-

stituting a defense as against the payee, but

mils t° brlllt-‘.' home notice of these facts to

the holder before his purchase. The judg-

ment must go in favor of the holder, for the

words of negotiability in the note preclude

the maker from such a defense as against

him: In a suit on the second of such notes,

may not the maker couple proof of notice to

the holder with that Qf the original invalid-

ity of U19 BOW, and thus establish a complete

defense against the holder? Is he precluded

by the ﬁrst judgment, and his failure in that

to prove notice to the holder? That is pre-

cisely this case. In the suit at Des Molnes

no‘ notice to the holder was shown. The re-

citals cut off the defense pleaded of original

invalidity. In this action notice is proved,

and an additional fact is put into the case.

which makes a new question. The effect of

recital is one thing; that of recitals coupled

with notice is another. The one question was

litigated and determined in the Des Moines
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suit; the other is presented here. Sureiyan

adjudication as to the effect of one fact alone

does not preclude in the second suit an in-

quiry and determination as to the effect of

that fact in conjunction with others. In-

fancy is pleaded in an action on a contract,

and an adjudication is made establishing it

as a defense. In a. second suit between the

same parties on a dilferent cause of action,

tllollilh created at the same time, may not

the lllllillliff Drove ratiﬁcation after majority‘!

Many reasons may induce or prevent the in-

¥t'°<1l_1('U0I1 into the ﬁrst case of all the facts.

SacW(ﬁS Well_ said in Cromwell v. County of

Page -5-'6) that: "Various considerations,

other than the actual merits, may govern a

RELEVANCY.

and the bonds were therefore void; that the
district received no consideration; and that
the plaintiff. was not a bona fide holder. 'l'be
judgment entry shows that It appeared tr«>J,D
the evidence that the lndebtedneee at the
time the bonds were Issued exceeded the con11titutlonal limitation of 5 per cent.; but that
It was adjudged that the recitals In the
honds estopped the deteudant from showing
this tact against the plnlntllT. In otlw1·
words, that which was deteru1ined was the
effect ot the recitals. But this case doe11 11ot
turn upon that question at all, and nothing
was determined here antagunlstic to the adjudication there. A.n addltionnl tact. that ot
notice from the amount of the bonds purchased, was proved.
The effect of recitals In municipal bouds le
Uke that given to words of negotlablllty In
a promlsBOry note. They simply relieve the
papet· In the hands of a bona fide holder fr«>m
the burden of defenses other than the lack
of power, growing out of the original Issue of
the paper, and available as against the Immediate payee. Suppose two negotiable
promissory notes. Issued at the same time,
and as a part of the same transaction. In a
suit on the first, brought by a purchaser before maturity, the maker proves facts constituting a defense as against the payee, but
falls to bring home notice of these facts to
the holder before his pul'('hase. The judgment must g«> In favor of the holder, for the
words of negotlablllty In the note preclude
the maker fl'om such a defense as against
him: In a suit on the second of such notes,
may not the maker couple proof of notice t«>
the holder with that of the original Invalidity of the note, and thus establish a complete
defense against the holder? Is he precluded
by the first judgment, and bis failure In that
to prove notice to the holder? That ls precisely this case. In the suit at Des .Moines
no· notice to the holder was shown. The recitals cut off the defense pleaded «>f original
Invalidity. In this action notice Is proved,
and an additional fact Is put into the case,
which makes a new question. The etrect of
recital Is one thing; that of recitals coupled
with notice ls another. The one question was
litigated and determined In the Des Moines
134

suit; the other Is presented here. Surely an
adjudication as to the etrect ot one fact alone
does not preclude In the second suit an In·
qulry and determination as to the etrect ot
that fact In conjunction with others. In·
fancy ls pleaded In an action on a coutmct,
and an adjudication Is made establishing It
as a defense. In a second suit between the
same parties on a dlfl'erent cause or action,
though created at the same time, may not
the plalntlt? prove ru tltlca ti on after majorlty1
Many reasons may Induce or prevent the Introduction Into the first <'Dse of all the facts.
It was well said iu Crom well v. County ot
Sac (page 3:iG) that: ··various conslderatlODS,
other tllnu the actual merits, may govern a
party In bringing forward grounds of recovery or defPnse In one action, which mo.y not
exist In another action upon a ullferent demand, such as the smallness of the amount,
or the value of the property In controversy,
the difficulty of obtaining the necessary evidence, the expense of the litigation, and his
own situation at the time. A party acting
upon considerations like these ought not to
be precluded from contesting, In a subaequ~nt
action, other demands arising out of the same
transaction."
This case may be looked at In another light.
The defense pleaded In the Des Moines suit
was that at the time of the Issue of the two
bonds then disclosed there wu a prior Indebtedness of the district ex<>eedlng the constitutional Umltatlon, and that defense was the
one adjudged to be precluded by the rec•ltnls.
Here an additional defense Is that the ftve
bonds In suit themst>lves created an overlssue. That queRtlon was not presented In the
Des Moines eult, and could not have been adjudicated. It Is presented for the first time
In this case, It ls of Itself a valid defense,
lrrespeetlve of prior lmlebtedness. So we
have In this case a new question not pre-.
sented in the Des Moines suit, the existence
of facts never called to the attention of the
court In that case, which of themselves create
a I>erfect defense.
" 7 e see no error In the judgment, and It la
amrmed.
0

M:r. Justice HARI,AN dissents.

JlJDGME~TS.
JUDGMENTS.

[Case No. 48

rn.x.\'KL11~: COUNTY v. GERMA-\' 8-\\'.

BANK. -

(12 Sup. cc 141, 142 U. s. 93-)

Supreme Court of the United States. Dec. 14,

1891.

ln error to the ci_rcuit court of the United

States for the Southern district of Illinois.

Action by the German Savings Bank

against the county of Franklin, lll., on the

coupons of certain railroad aid bonds. Jury

waived, and trial by the court. Judgment

for plaintiff. Defendant brings error. Af-

iirmed.

The facts of the case fully appear in the

YR~'SKLIN

CO"C"NTY v. GEU.:\IAN SA.V. mdo Railroad Company; $100,000 of which
were subscribed and Issued under the act
BANK.·
of the general assembly of Illinois entitled,
(12 Sup. Ct. 147, 142 U. S. 93.)
"An act to Incorporate the Belleville and
Supreme Court of the United States. Dec. 14, Eldorado Railroad Company;" approved
1891.
February 22, 1861, authorizing a subscripIn error to the circuit court of the United tion to the capital stock of said company,
States tor the Southern district of Illinois.
and $50,000 of which were subscribed and
Action by the German Savings Bank Issued under an act of the general 1188embly
against the eounty of J..'rnnklln, Ill., on the entitled, "An act to authorize cities and
l'Oupons of certain railroad aid bonds. Jury counties to subscribe stock to railroads,"
waived, and trial by the L'OUt1:. Judgment approved November 6, 1849. The bill al·
for plaintiff. Defendant brings error. Af· leged that both classes of bonds were subscribed and Issued In pursuance of the vote
firmed.
The tacts of the case fully u1,penr In the of the people of the county at an election
following stntement by :\Ir. Jmsth·e BROWN: held the 11th day of September, 1869, and
This wns an action by the Uerman Sav· thnt the order ot the county court submit·
Jngs Bank of Davenport, Iowa, upon 128 I ting the proposal to the voters named cer·
coupons cut from bonds ls1med by the coun- j taln conditions to be complied with before
ty of Franklin In payment of its subscrlp- I the bonds should be issued, one of which
tlon to the capital stock of the Belleville & was that the rallroad should be commenced
Eldorado Railroad Company. The allega- In the county of ~·ranklln within nine
tion of the declaration was that such bonds months from the date of the election, and
had been lSBued on the 10th day of ~ovem· completed through the county by the 1st
ber, 18ii, by the said defendant, "being day of June, 1872. '.l'he bill further alleged
thereunto duly authorized by an affirmative that the orders submitting the question to
vote of the legal voterB of said county, as the voters were never complied with, and
required by law." There was a further particularly that the road was not completed
averment that plaintiff became the owner of within the time provided; that all of the
20 of these bonds, whose numbers were orders and resolutions of the county court
given, from which the coupons ln suit had 1 and the board of supervisors subscribing
been cut. To this declaration a plea of non and attempting to subscribe, stoek to said
assumpait, and a replication thereto, were ralll'Oad company, were In conflict with the
tlled. A Jory being waived, the cause was constitution of the state, and were void;
tried by the court, which found ln favor of that the state auditor bad no right to levy
the plalntUr, and a Judgment was rendered taxes for the purpose of paying the princi·
on February 4, 1891, ln its favor, for the pal or Interest of said bonds; that the state
sum of $5,120, damages and costs. The treasurer had no right to receive or pay out
bonda purported on their face to have been the same; and that the act to provide for
"luued under the provisions of an act ol. the paying railroad debts by counties, approved
general 8.88embly of the state of llltnols en- April 16, 1809, was unconstitutional, conUtled, 'Ao act to Incorporate the Bellevllle trary to public policy, and void. The blll
and Eldorado Railroad Company,' approved praye1l an Injunction restraining the ofllcer8
February 22nd, 1861, authorizing subscrlp· of the state from collecting or paying out
tlons to the capital stock of said railroad, taxes In liquidation of said bonds, and that
and In accordance with the majority of the Individual defendants and unknown
votes cast at an election held 'In said coun- holders of the bonds be enjoined from suing
ty on the 11th day of September, 1869, In the county upon any of the coupons attach·
conformity with the provisions of said act." ed to such bonda.
Upon the trial of the case, the plaintiff
A temporary writ of Injunction was la·
bank, after presenting the bonds and cou- sued as prayed. Service by publication was
pons set forth In the declaration, put ln evl· made upon the unknown holders of the
dence the record of a suit In equity, begun bonds. Upon the 27th day of October, 1880,
In the same court, and carried to a final de- a decree was taken by default. At the Oc·
cree on July 3, 1883. The blll was originally tober term, 1881, the German Savings Bank
filed by the county ot Franklin in the cir· appeared in the cause, had· the decree open<.'Ult court of Franklin county, Ill., on the ed, and removed the case to the circuit court
4th day of August, 1880, against the Belle- of the United States for the Southern disville & Eldorado Railroad Company, the trict of llllnols, to which It was submitted
elerk, sherllr, and collector ot said county, upon proofs taken, and upon a stipulation
the auditor of public accounts of the state that the defendant was the bona fide holder
ot Illinois, the state treasurer of Illinois, of the bonds set up in its answer, and purseveral private Individuals, and the un- chased the same, for value, without notice
known holders of bonda lHued by the said of any defense. The answer of the bank,
Franklin county In aid of the sald railroad which was also adopted by other defendcompany. The bill alleged the lSBuing by ants Intervening for their own interests, put
the county ot $150,000 of Its bonds, dated In Issue every material averment of the bill,
November 13, 1877, to the Belleville & Eldo- and prayed that, as to the bonds and cou·
135
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following statement by Air. Justice BROWN:

This was an action by the German Sav-

.ings Bank of Davenport, Iowa, upon 128

coupons cut from bonds issued by the coun- '

ty of Franklin in payment of its subscrip-
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tion to the capital stock of the Belleville &

Eldorado Railroad Company. The allega-

tion of the declaration was that such bonds

had been issued on the 10th day of Novem-

ber, 18T'|', by the said defendant, “being

therennto duly authorized by an aﬁirmative

vote of the legal voters of said county, as

required by law.” There was a further

averment that plaintiff became the owner of

20 of these bonds, whose numbers were

given, from which the coupons in suit had

been cut. To this declaration a plea of non

assumpsit, and a replication thereto, were

tiled. A jury being waived, the cause was

tried by the court, which found in favor of

the plaintiff, and a judgment was rendered

on February 4, 1891, in its favor, for the

sum of $5,120, damages and costs. ’1‘he

bonds purported on their face to have been

"issued under the provisions of an act of the

general assembly of the state of Illinois en-

titled, ‘An act to incorporate the Belleville

and Eldorado Railroad Company,’ approved

February 22nd, 1861, authorizing subscrip-

tions to the capital stock of said railroad,

and in accordance with the majority of

votes cast at an election held in said coun-

ty on the 11th day of September, 1869, in

conformity with the provisions of said act."

Upon the trial of the case, the plaintiﬁ

hank, after presenting the bonds and cou-

pons set forth in the declaration, put in evi-

dence the record of a suit in equity. begun

in the same court, and carried to a ﬁnal de-

cree on July 3, 1883. The bill was originally

ﬂied by the county of Franklin in the cir-

cult court of Franklin county, Iii., on the

4th day of August, 1880, against the Belle-

ville & Eldorado Railroad Company, the

clerk, sheriif, and collector of said county,

the auditor of public accounts of the state

of Illinois, the state treasurer of Illinois,

several private individuals, and the un-

known holders of bonds issued by the said

Franklin county in aid of the said railroad

company. The bill alleged the issuing by

the county of $150,000 of its bonds, dated

November 13, 1877, to the Belleville & Eldo-

. the same;

(Case No. 48

I

Case No. 48]
Case No. 48]

RELE VANCY.

pons held by it, the bill might be dismissed

for want of equity, and the injunction dis-

solved. On July 3, 1883, a decree was en-

tered, declaring that all bonds involved in

the case, and purporting on their face to

have been issued under the provisions of

the railroad act of November 6, 1849, were

issued without authority of law, and were

therefore void, and decreeing that as to the

holders of such bonds the injunction be

made perpetual. The decree further pro-

vided that, as to the speciﬁc bonds desig-

nated by their numbers, and among others

the bonds belonging to the German Savings

Bank, “purporting on their face to be of the

series isued under the charter of the said

Belleville & Eldorado Railroad Company,

approved February 22, 1861, the court doth

decree in favor of said defendants, the said
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several respective holders thereof, and that

the said several bonds, and the coupons

thereof, are valid and legal Oiillilfltiﬂlls

against the county oi.‘ Franklin; and as to

said last-mentioned series of said bonds and

coupons thereunto attached, as held as afore-

said, the court doth decree that the injunc-

tion 188116-d in this cause be dissolved, and

the complainant's bill be dismissed for want

of equity."

The German Savings Bank in June, 1885,

appealed from so much of this decree as ad-

Jlldi-’ed that nine bonds, which had been is-

SUH1 11111191‘ the act of 1849, and were held

by the bank. were void, and upon such ap-

l><‘il1 this court affirmed the decree of the cir-

cuit <'0l1l't. German Sav. Bank v. Franklin

Co., 128 U. S. 526, 9 Sup. Ct. 1-">9. The coun-

ty of Franklin, however, did not appeal from

the decree establishing the validity of the

bonds issued under the act of 1861.

After the plaintiff had put in the said rec-

ord, decree, and mandate of this court in

the equity case, it introduced in evidence

the eighteen bonds whit-11, with the coupons

thereof. had been decreed to be valid and

legal oblhzntions ilizainst the county, and also

put in evidence coupons cut from two other

bonds which had also been adjudized to be

va,11d_ The defendant introduced no evi-

dence. but claimed that the evidence con-

tained in the record introduced by the plain-

tiff showed that the bonds and coupons

therefrom, upon which this action was

RELE\• ANCY.

pons beld by It, the bill might be dlsmlBBed
for want of equity, and the Injunction dissolved. On July 3, 1&~. a decree was entered, declaring that all bonds Involved In
the case, and purporting on their face to
have been Issued under the provisions of
the rallroa<l act of "Sovember 6, 184\J, were
issued without authority of law, and were
therefore void, and decreeing that as to the
holders of such bonds the Injunction be
made perpetual. The decrpe turther provided that, as to the specltlc bonds designated by their numbers, and among othel'IJ
the bonds belonging to the German Sa-rings
Bank, "purporting on their face to be of the
series Issued under the charter of the said
Belleville & Eldorado Railroad Com11any,
approved February 22, 1861, the court doth
d('(.·ree In favor of said defendants, the said
several respective holders thereof, and that
the said several bonds, and the cou11ons
thereof, are valid and le1rnl obligations
against the county of Fmnklln; and as to
said last-mentioned series of sahl bonds ancl
coupons thereunto attached, as hE'ld as aforesaid, the court doth decree that the Injunction luued In this cause be dlssolvE'd, and
the eomplalnant's bill be dismissed for want
of equity."
The German Savings Bank In June, lss:i,
a1>poaled from so mueh of this decree as adjudged that nine bonds, which had beE'n Issued under the act of 1849, and were held
by the bank, were void, and upon such appeal this court amrmed the de<'ree of the circuit rourt. German Sav. Bank v. I•'mnklln
Co., 128 U.S. 526, 9 Sup. Ct. 159. The county of Franklln, however, did not appeal from
the decree establishing the validity of the
bonds Issued under the aet of 18tll.
After the plalntttr bad put In the said record, decree, and mandate of this court In
the equity case, It Introduced In evldE'nCt'
the eighteen bonds wbll-h, with the <•ouponK
thereof, had been decl't'ed to be valid and
legal obligations against the count~·. and ulHo
put In evldencE' <'ou11ons cut from two otlwr
bonds which had also h1>en adjudgt'd to be
valid. The defendant Introduced no evidence. but claimed that the evid('nce <·ontalned In the record introduced by the plalntl« showed that the bonds and coupons
therefrom. upon which this action was
brou~ht, were Invalid.
The plalntltr contended that the validity of said bonds and
coupons bad been established In the said
E>qulty case, and that the question was res
adjmllcata; and the court so dt'<'lde<l. To
rm·erse the judgment of the clrc•ult court In
this behalf, this writ of ('rror was Mue<l out.

brought, were invalid. The plaintiff con-

tended that the validity of said bonds and

coupons had been established in the said

equity case, and that the question was res

D. M. Browning, for plalntlrr In error. E.
E. cook and S. P. Wheeler, for defendant In
error.

adjudicate; and the court so decided To

reverse the Jiidglnent of the circuit court in

this behalf, this writ of error was sued out.

D. M. Browning, for plaintiff in error. E.

E. Cook and 3- P. Wheeler, for defendant in

error.

Mr. Justice Baows, arm stating the

facts 9-3 9-b°Ve» delivered the opinion of the

court.

136

As both parties claim an estoppel by vir-

:Mr. .Justice BROWN, after stating the
facts as above, delivered the opinion of the
f'OUrt.

136

As both parties claim an estoppel by virtue of the decree ln the equity suit between
the 11artles to this suit, It only becomes necessary to consider the etl'ect ot this decree.
It contains two separate and distinct findings: First. So far as the nine bonds held
by the German Savings Bank, and Issued
under the net of November 6, 1849, were concerned, the decree !)J'Onounced them to be
void; and as to them the Injunction waa
made perpetual. l<'rom this part o! the decree
the bank appealed to tide court, by which
the decree was affirmed. 128 U. S. 526, 9·
Sup. Ct. 159. Second. As to the eighteen
bonds Issued under the act o! 1861, and tile
coupons cut from two other bonds Issued
under the same act, also held by the German Savings Bank, and purporting on the\r
faee to be of the series Issued under the
eharter of said Belleville & Eldorado Rallro1ul Company, approved February 22, 181ll,
tlw det•rt>e utlJutlged In favor of the defendant hunk. nod that the said several bonds,
and the eoupons thereof, were legal and
valid obligations against th(' county of
Franklin; nn1l as to this series the injunction was dissolved ·and the complainant's
bill dlsmlMsed. No appeal was tnkt•n from
this part of the decree by the county of
Franklin, but It now Insists that th('Re bonds
are void for the same reasons that tbe
bonds Issued under tht> act of November 6,
1849, were adjmlge<l to be void, namely, be-cause both series wen" h1sued pursuant to
the same vote, and subjeet to the same condltlon11.
The reeord of the equity suit does not
show clearly the ground upon which the
court based Its dlstlnc·tlon Ix>twt>en the two
elm~~" of bonds; nor Is It ne<·essary to 1*
ast·t>rtalned here. It ls sufflelent for the
purposes of this suit to know that the validity of these bonds was directly put In IMue
by the pleadings, and determined adversely
to the county. The plaintiff alleged lo Its
bill that thee~ bonds were Invalid by n>ason
of the non-compliance of the road with certain eondltlons precedent upon which they
were Issued, setting up with great particularity all the proceedings prior to the Issue
of the bonds; reciting the laws under which
they were claimed to have been authorized;
and demanding their cancellation and surrender upon the ground that the acts of the
county oftll'<"rs were unauthorized and void.
and the laws under which they were Issued
unconstitutional. The entire question of
their validity was presented and tried upon
the mertts, and the court could not have dlsmh1sed the bill as to these bonds without
holding that they were valid, and the further finding that the several bonds and eoupons therrof "are valid and Jegal obligations'' added nothing to the force of the
dC<'ree dismissing the blll.
nnec·
Tht> defendant's position In this co
tlon Is that as the entire l'('('(lrd. taken
gether, shows that tbese bOnds were vo ,

!r

JUDGMENTS.

(Cuse No. 48

JUDGMEN'|‘$- [Case No. 48

this Court ought not to treat the dscme _of bonds which this court had held to be in-

me court below, adjlldging them t0 9 Valid, valid. ‘The court denied the application of

as W5 ilﬂjudicata. It is true that were are the relator upon the ground that, in his

certain authorities to the effect that in the pleadings, he did not rely exclusively upon

case of deeds, if the truth plainly ﬁDllPI1I'8

on the face of the deed, there is, i;€nerall_v

speaking, no estoppel. meaning simply. as

stated by ltlr. Bigelow (Bigelow, Estop. 351,)

"that all parts of the deed are to he con-

strued togcther, and that if an allegation in

the deed which alone would work an es-

toppel upon the parties is explained in an-

other part of the deed, or perhaps another

deed to which reference is made for the pur-

pose, there is ordinarily no estoppel." Lord

Coke also states certain exceptions to the

conclusive effect of records. one of these

being, “where the truth appears in the same

record, as where the defendant is sued by

the wrong name, and enters into a hail-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:06 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104925781
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

bond prout the writ, as he must, and then

put in hail by his right name, he who was

arrested is not estopped from pleading in

abatement: or where the record shows that

the judgment relied on as an estoppel has

been reversed in error.” But we know of

no case which goes to the extent of holding

that. where a court having complete juris-

diction of the case has pronounced a decree

upon a certain issue, such issue may be re-

tried in a collateral action, even although

the evidence upon which the case is heard is

sent up with the record. If this were possible,

then in every such case where a judgment

or decree is pleaded by way of estoppel, and

the record shows the evidence upon which

it was rendered, the court in which the es-

toppel was pleaded would have the power to

retry the case, and determine whether a dif-

ferent judgment ought not to have been reu-

dered. The case of Brownsville v. Loague,

129 U. S. 493, 9 Sup. Ct. 327, has perhaps

gone as far in the direction indicated by the

defendant as any case reported in the books;

but it is far from being an authority for the

position assumed here. That was a petition

for a mandamus to enforce the collection of

Judgments of a. circuit court upon certain

the judgments. but opened the facts which

attended the judgments for the purpose of

counting upon a certain act of the legisla-

ture as furnishing the remedy which he

sought, and that by so doing he, in effect,

asked the court to order the levy of a tax to

pay the coupons, and relied upon the judg-

ments principally as creating an estoppel of

a denial of the power to do so. “Thus in-

viter," said the’ chief justice, “to look

through the judgments to the alleged con-

tracts on which they are founded, and ﬁnd-

ing them invalid for want of power, must

we nevertheless concede to the judgments

themselves such effect, by way of estoppel,

as to entitle the plaintiﬂ‘ ex debito justitize,

_to a writ commanding the levy of taxes un-

der a. statute which was not in existence

when these bonds were issued? * * *

But where application is made to collect

judgments by process not contained in them-

tll\S court ought not to treat the decree of
t\\e court below, adjudging tbem to be Valid,
as res adjudlcata. It Is true that there are

(!ertv.\n authorities to the errect tbnt ln the
ro11e of deeds, It' the truth 11hl.lnly appenrs
on the face of the deed, there ls, generally
speak\ng, no estoppel. meaning simply, ns
stated by Mr. Bigelow (Bigelow, Estop. &11,)
"that all parts of the deed nre to be construed togl!ther, and that If an allegation In
the deed \Vhlch alone would work an estoppel upon the parties Is explained lu another part of the deed, or perhaps another
deed to wbkh referenc•e Is made for the purpose, there Is ordinarily no e11toppel." Lor<l
Coke also states certain exl'eptlons to the
~on<'luslve effect of records. one of these
being, "where the truth appears In the same
record, as where the defendnnt Is sued by
the wrong name, and entl'rs Into a ballbond prout the writ, as he must, and then
put In bail by his right name, he who was
arrested Is not estop1>ed from plentlin:: In
abatement; or where the record shows that
the Judgment relied on as an estoppel has
been reversed in error." But we know of
no eMe wbh·h goes to the extent of hol1llng
that, where a court having complete Jurisdiction of the case has pronounced a decree
upon a certain issue, such issue may be ret11ed In a collateral action, even although
the evldenC"e upon which the case le heard Is
11eut up with the n-<.'Ord. If this were possible,
then In e\"i!l'Y such cnee where a Judgment
or decree le pleaded by way of eetoppel, an(J.
thP. record shows the eYillence UJIOU which
It was rendered, the court In which the estoppel was pleaded would have the power to
retry the case, and determine whether a different judgment ought not to have been rendered. The case of Brownsville v. Loague,
129 U. s. 493, 9 Sup. Ct. 32i, has perhaps
gone as far In the direction Indicated by tile
defendant as any case reported In the books;
but It is far from being au authority for the
position assumed here. That was a petition
for a mandamus to enforce the collection of
Judgments of a circuit court upon certain

bonds which this court had held to be Invalid. The court denied the application of
the relator upon the ground that, In llle
pleadings, he did not rely exclusively upon
the Judgments. but opened the facts which
attended the judgments for the purpose of
counting upon a certain net of the leg-islature as furnishing the remedy which be
sought, and that by so doing he, In errect,
asked the court to order the le\"y of a tax to
pay the coupons, and relied upon the judgments principally as creating an estoppel of
a denial of the power to do so. "Thus Invited," said the' chief justice, "to look
through the judgments to the alleged contracts on which they are founded, and finding them Invalid for want of power, must
we nevertheless concede to the judgments
themselves such effect. by way ot' estoppel,
as to entitle the plalntltT ex debito justltire,
to a writ commanding the levy of taxes under a statute which was not In existence
when these bonds were issued? • • •
But where application Is made to collect
judgments by process not contained In themselves, and requiring, to be sustained, referI ence to the alleged cause of action upon
i which they are founded, the aid ot' the court
should not be granted when upon the face
of the record It appears, not that mere error
supervened In the rendition of such Judgments, but that they rest upon no cause of
' action whatever." This. however, does not
touch the question of the binding eft'ect of
judgments when olTered In evidence in a
distinct and collateral action. W~ know of
no case holding their probative en'.ect to be
anything else than conclusive. Had the
plaintiff county desired further to test the
validity ot these bonds, It was Its duty to
1 bn\"e appealed from this decree, as dlcl the
1 bank with respect to the bonds which that
court held to be Invalid, when the question
of the validity of both Issues could have
been heard and determined by this court.
There was no error In the ftncllng of the
court below, and Its judgment must be affirmed.
137
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(IILMER v. MORRIS et ai.

(-16 Fed. 333.)

Circuit Court, M. D. Alabama.

In equity.

W. A. Gunter, H. C. Semple, and R. C.

Brickell, for complainant. Tompkins &

Troy, for respondents.

May, 1891.

BRUCE, J. 'l‘he facts appear in the opin-

ion of the court. There was a previous bill

between the same parties, which was dis-

missed by the supreme court of the United

States upon a question of jurisdiction, as

will be seen in case of Morris v. Gilmer,

129 U. S. 315, 9 Sup. Ct. 289. A new bill

was tiled, and we have for consideration the

sutliciency of the plea of res adjudicata,

which was considered and determined in

the former case, reported in 30 Fed. 476.
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The bill in this case and the plea are the

same as in the former case, and the ques-

tion has been again heard upon argument

and brief of counsel on both sides. It is

conceded that the original suit in the state

court was brought to recover the same

shares of stock for which this suit was

brought; that it was by the same complain-

ant against the same defendants; and, as

the bill was dismissed absolutely and the

de01'e6 affirmed on appeal, the defendants

insist that the cause of action set up in the

suit was adjudicated between the parties in

the suit in the state court, and that the

facts set up in the plea constitute a. bar

to the present suit. It will be observed

from the'record in the state court set up

in the plea that the original bill after amend-

ment, and a it stood when the trial was

had, stated a pledge of 120 shares of stock

in 1871 for $6,000, the original cost of the

same, and that this sum on the 30th day of

March, 1871, was paid by a sale of one-half

of the stock, and the remainder, 60 share,

was left to secure the balance of interest

due to Morris. The bill did not allege M15

of recognition on the part of Morris from

that time to the ﬁling of the bill in the state

court, on the 7th day of July, 1884. The

answer of the defendants admitted certain

facts, but denied, by way of conclusion, the

ownership of the stock by the complainant,

and coupled with the answer as a part there-

of, under the state practice, ﬁve different

grounds of demurrer, viz.: (1) The facts

alleged show that the demand is stale; (2)

that it is barred by the statute of limita-

tions; (3) the claimant has. an adequate

remedy at law; (4) the bill as amended

makes an entirely diiferent case from that

made by the original bill; (5) there is no

tender alleged lI1 the bill oi.’ the amount ad-

111111911 1° be 11119, and said amount is not

brought int" ¢0urt. Testimony was taken,

and the case was submitted upon the plead-

illgs and evidence Without a previous ruling

1-119011 the demllrrers, and the chancellor, in

vacation, rendered a decree dismissing the

138
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bill absolutely, which decree was on appeal
atD.rmed
by the supre1nc court ot the gtate.
(46 Fed. 333.)
80 Ala. 78.
The present bill 11tates th~
Circuit Court, M. D. Alabama. May, 1891. original transaction of 1871 by way ot inducement, and goes on to state a new and
In equity.
W. A. Gunter, H. O. Semple, and R. C. dllrerent pledge in 1875 of the same stock
Brickell, for complainant. Tompkins & for other debts and for future ndYances
which were from time to time made; and
Troy, for respondents.
the question ls, can the res adjudlcata In
BRUCE, J. 'l'he facts appear In the opin- the state court be held to apply to the case
ion of the court. There was a p1·e,·Ious bill now made by the b111 in this court?
It a new pledge of the same stock was
between the same parties, which was dismissed by the su11reme court of the United made lo 1875, and U by that It (the stock~
States upon a question of jurisdiction, as was to be held as security for adYances to
will be seen In case of Morris v. Gilmer, be ma<le, and which were afterwards made,
129 U. S. 315, 9 Sup. Ct. 289. A new blll then what is there In the record of the suit
was tiled, and we haYe for consideration the In the state court that operates as a bar
sutHclency of the plea of res adjudlcata, to this suit? Tbe opinion of the clJancellor
which was considered and determined In In the state court in tbe fOI'Wer sult shows
the former case, reported In 30 .!!'ed. 476. that he rested his decision on the statut.e
The blll In this case and the plea are the of llmltatlone. Hie language ls: "The statsawe as In the former case, and the ques- ute of llmltatlons le therefo1-e a bar to the
tion has been again heard upon argument rights of the complainant In this cause."
and brief of counsel on both sides. It ls '.rhat was a point in the demurrer, and clearconceded that the original suit In the state ly the point decided was that the case made
court was brought to recover the ume by the bill was barred by the statute of
shares of stock for which this suit was , lhnltatlons. Tbe Issue wu not wheth'1r
brought; that it was by the same complain- there were acknowledgments that took the
ant against the same defendants; and, as case out of the operation of the statute, or
the bill was dlsm188ed absolutely and the whether anything of that sort was proved
decree affirmed on appeal, the defendants or not, but only this: whether a cnse with·
Insist that the cause of action set up In the out such acknowledgment waa made by the
suit was adjudicated between the parties In blll; and the question of a new and dlJrerthe suit In the state court, and that the ent pledge in 1875 was not before the court
factB set up In the plea constitute a bar by any a verment in the blll, and the judgto the present suit. It wlll be observed ment of the court was not Invoked upon the
from tire · i-ecord In the state court set up case as it Is now made In this court. The
In the plea that the original blll after amend- sustaining of the demurrer to the bill In
ment, and as lt stood when the trial was the state court put tbe complainant out of
had, stated a pledge of 120 shares of stock court, and the suggestion of the counsel for
In 1871 for $6,000, the original cost of the the defendants is that be could have sought
same, and that this sum on the :lOth day of leave to amend bis blll, and state the matter
March, 1871, was paid by a sale of one-half Which be now claims took the case out or
of tbe stock, and the remainder, 60 shares, the operation of the statute of limitations.
was left to secm-e the balance of interest Conceding now that he might have done so.
due to Morris. The bill did not allege acts Yet was he obliged to do so, and did he
of recognltlon on the part of Morris from not have the 011tlon to confess the demurrer.
that time to the filing of the bill In the state and state new matter by way of amendmen~
court, on the 7th day of July, 188!. The or bring a new suit, and state new matter
answer of the defendants admitted certain Which would avoid the demurrer? The alfacts, but denied, by way of conclusion, the lownnce of amendments In pleading was
ownership of the stock by the complainant, certainly not Intended to prevent a partY
an<l coupled with the answer as a part there- frolll fl.ling a new suit, If he deems that the
of, under the state practice, five different better course. Wells, Res. Adj. § 440;
grounds of demurrer, viz.: (1) The facts Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 144; l\larsh v.
alleged show that the demand ls stale; (2) Maste11on, 101 N. Y. 406, 5 N. E. 59.
that it ls barred by the statute of llmltaThe very idea of amendment has In ft
tlons; (3) the claimant has_ an adequate that of other and new matter, and the esremedy at law; (4) the blll as amended toppel of the judgment ot a court can opermakes an entirely dUl'.erent case from that ate only upon the case made and presented
made by the original bill; (5) there is no for the judgment of the court. If a party
tender alleged in the bill of the amount ad- falls to state a case in his bill of complaint,
mitted to be due, and said amount is not and goes out of court on demurrer, the rule
brought Into court. Testimony was taken, of res adjudlcata operates as to the case
and the case Was submitted upon the plead- made by his bill and only as to that case.
ings and evidence without a previous ruling Gould v. Rnlh·oad Co., 91 U.S. 533; Blgelo":';
upon the demurrers, and the <'lmncellor, In Estop, PP. 152- 155 The question, then,
vacation, ren<lered. a dec1·ee dismissing the whether a d~fenda~t who h8.S been defeated
mr.lrnH v. MORRIS et al.
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on demurrer, because he has 110t made 0.

case by the allegations in his bill, can. bring

it new suit to recover the same P101“-ITY

time, and with different conditions, not only

for indebtedness then existing, but to ex-

ist,—that is, a continuing pledge, which in

{mm the salne party, upon supplying the

detects in his ﬁrst bill.

'i‘he statement of the proposition would

seem to carry its own answer, for how can

the merits of a diﬁerent cause, as set up in

a bill in a second suit, be heard and decided

on a different bill in a former suit, even

when it is between the same parties and for

the same property, or how, in such case, can

the estoppel of a judgment in a former case

operate as an estoppel in the second case?

'l‘he judgment rendered in a cause must be

held to the issues made by the pleadings,

and the estoppel will operate only as to the
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issue, and whatever was necessarily involved

in that issue. Presumption will never be in-

dulged in favor of an estoppel beyond what

is necessary to sustain the judgment ren-

dered. Russell v. Place, 9-i U. S. 606; Bige-

low, Estop. pp. 152-155; Barnes v. Rail-

road Co., 122 U. S. 14, 7 Sup. Ct. l0l3;

Black, J udgm. § 242. In Aurora City v.

West, 7 Wall. 82, it is said: The essential

conditions under which the exception of res

adjudicata becomes applicable are "the iden-

tity ot the thing demanded, the identity of

the cause oi‘ the demand, and of the parties

in the character in which they are litigants.”

Can it be maintained that the cause of the

demand in the case in this court is the iden-

tical cause of demand in the state court in

the former suit? The theory of the bill in

the state court seems to be a claim to the

property upon an acknowledged pledge and

trust relation subsisting between the parties

in 1871. The theory of the bill in this case

is that of another pledge at a subsequent

its nature was inconsistent with the run-

ning of the statute of limitations; and that

in fact there was no act of repudiation of

the pledge on the part of Morris prior to

June, 1884. It is claimed, however, that

the question is not simply what point was

decided in the former suit, but what was

necessarily involved in the issue in the for-

mer suit, and that, as the right to the stock

in question wa in issue, the matter now

sought to be litigated is res adjudicata in

the former suit. True, the same property

is claimed here that was claimed in the

former suit, but on a diiferent ground, as

we have seen; and as the judgment in the

former suit was on demurrer to the bill and

did not necessarily involve the question of

property except as there stated, and as an

estoppei must be certain to every intent,

and cannot be extended, in the case of judg-

ments, by implication, beyond matters es-

sential to uphold them, the former judgment

in this case cannot be held to conclude the

right of property to the stock in question,

which is involved alike in both cases. Bige-

low, Estop. pp. SO, 81, 152, 154; Moss v.

an demurrer, because he bas not made a
t-ase by the nllegatlons in hls blll, can bring
1. new suit to recover the same Pl'Ol>erty
trom the Ba.llle party, upon supplying the
defects ln his flrst bill.
·

'fhe statement of the proposition would
seem to carry its own answer, for bow can
the merits of a different cause, as set up in
a bill in a second suit, be heard and decided
on a ditterent blll in a former suit, even
when It is between the same parties and for
the same property, or how, in such case, can
the estoppel of a judgment in a former C88e
opel'ate as an estoppel In the second case?
'fhe judgment rendered In a cause must be
held to the lssues made by the pleadings,
and the estoppel will operate only as to the
isllne, and whatever was necessarily involved
in that lssue. Presumption wlll never be Indulged In favor of an estoppel beyond what
18 necessary to sustain the judgment rendered. Russell v. Place, 94 U. S. 606; Bigelow, Estop. pp. 152-155; Barnes v. Railroad Co., 122 U. S. 14, 7 Sup. Ct. 10:13;
Black, Judgm. I 242. In Aurora City v.
West, 7 Wall. 82, It ls said: Tbe essential
conditions under which the exception of res
adjudlcata becomes applicable are "the Identity of the thing demanded, the Identity of
the cause of the demand, and of the parties
in the character in which they are litigants."
Can it be maintained that the cause of the
demand In the case in this court ls the Identical cause of demand In the state court In
the former suit? The theory of the bill In
the state court seems to be a claim to the
property upon an acknowledged pledge and
trust relation subsisting between the parties
In 1sn. The theory of the blll In this case
Is that of another pledge at a subsequent

time, and with ditl'erent conditions, not only
for indebtedness then existing, but to exlst,-that Is, a continuing pledge, which In
Its nature was Inconsistent with the running of the statute of lhnltatlons; and that
In fact there was no act of repudiation of
the pledge on the l'art of Morris prior to
June, 1884. It ls claimed, however, that
the question ls not simply what point wa11
decided In the former suit, but what was
necessarily Involved In the Issue In the former suit, and that, as the right to the stock
In question was In Issue, the matter now
sought to be litigated Is res adjudlcata In
the former suit. True, the same property
ls claimed here that was claimed In the
former suit, but on a ditrerent ground, ll!I
we have seen; and as tile judgment In the
former suit was on demurrer to the bill and
did not necessarily Involve the question of
property except as there stated, and as an
estoppel must be certain to every Intent,
and cannot be extended, in the case of judgments, by Implication, beyond matters essential to uphold them, the former judgment
in this case cannot be held to conclude the
right of property to the stock In question,
which Is involved alike In both cases. Bigelow, Estop. pp. 80, 81, 152, 154; l\:loss v.
Anglo-Egyptian, etc., Co., L. R. 1 Ch. 113116.
The questions Jn this case have already
been considered. and although upon a rearguwent some views have l>N•n preseult'U
and some authorities cited in addition to
what was presented In the former case, yet
the conclusions reached do not dltler from
those expressed In former opinion, reported
30 Fed. 476, and It ls not deemed necessary
to go over the same ground again.
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FREEU.-\.\' et al. v. ALDERSOX ct al.

(7 Sup. Ct. 165. 119 U. S. 185.)

Supreme (fourt of the United States. Nov. 29,

1886.

Error to the circuit court of the United

States for the Northern district of Texas.

This was an action of trespass to try the

title to certain land in Texas. It is the

form in use to recover possession of real

property in that state.

The plaintiffs claimed the land under a

deed to their grantor, executed by the sher-

iff of )IcLennan county, in that state, upon

a sale under an execution issued on a judg-

ment in a state court for costs, rendered

against one Henry Alderson, then owner of

the property, but now deceased. The de-

fendants asserted title to the land as heirs

of Alderson, contending that the judgment
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under which the alleged sale was made, was

vo.d, because it was rendered against him

without personal service of citation, or his

appearance in the action.

The material facts of the case, as disclos-

ed by the record, are, brieﬂy, these: On the

sixteenth of July, 1835, a tract of land com-

prising one-third of a league was patented

by Texas to Alderson, who had been a sol-

dicr in its army. One undivided half of

this tract was claimed by D. C. Freeman

and G. R. Freeman, and they brought an ac-

tion against him for their interest. The

pleadings in that action are not set forth in

the transcript, but from the record of the

judgment therein, which was produced, we

are informed that the defendant was a non-

resident of the state, and that the citation to

him was made by publication. There was

no personal service upon him, nor did he ap-

pear in the action. The. judgment, which

was rendered on the first of October, 1858,

was of a threefold character. It ﬁrst ad-

judged that the plaintiifs recover one undi-

vided half of the described tract. It then

appointed commissioners to partition and di-

vide the tract, and set apart, by motes and

bounds, one-half thereof, according to quan-

tity and quality, to the plaintiffs; and to

make their report at the following term of

the court. And, finally, it ordered that the

plaintiffs have judgment against the defend-

ant for all costs in the case, but stayed ex-

ecution until the report of the commission-

ers should be returned and adopted, and a

ﬁlial decree entered.

At the following term the commissioners

made a report showing that they had divid-

ed the tmct into two equal parcels. The re-

port was confirmed. and on the thirty-ﬁrst of

March, 1859, the court adjudged that the

title to one of.these parcels was divested

i'rom Alderson, and vested in the plaintiffs,

the two l~‘rec-mans. and that they recover all

costs in that behalf against him, which were

$61.45, and that execution issue therefor.

Execution therefor was issued to the sher-

iff of McLennan county on the thirtieth of

.\ia_v directing him to make the amount out

UELlff ANCY.

May directing him to make the amount out
et al. v. ALDEHSO:S <'t al.
of "the goods, chattels, lands, and tene(7 Sup. Ct. 165, 119 U. S. 18aJ
ments" of the defendant. It was leYled on
Supreme Court of the United States. Nov. 29, the other half of the divided tract, which re1886.
mained the defendant's property. On the
Error to the circuit court of the United fifth of July, 1859, this half wne sold by the
Statf'B for the Northt>ra district of Texas.
Sherif[ to one Jamt'8 E. Head for $66.79, be'.rhls was an action of tres{lllBB to try the Ing the costs mentioned, and hlB Cet>s for the
title to <oertaln land In Texas. It 18 the levy and for his deed, which was executed
form In UAC to recover poe8t's.~lon of real to the purchaser. In Seoptt>mber following,
property In that state.
Head conveyed the premlBes to D. C. Free·
The plulntltrs claimed the land under a man for the alleged consideration of $178.
de<'d to their grnntor, executed by the sher- Two of the defendants dleclalmed having
11r of lkLennan county, In that state, upon any lnten>et. The other defendants, lncluda sale under an execution Issued on a judg- Ing Freeman, BO far as their title le cllscloement In a state court for costs, rendered ed by the trnruwrlpt, claimed under the sheragalm1t one Henry Alderson, then owner of Hr'e deed.
the property, but now deceased. The deOn the trial, the defendants, to show title
fendants aBSerted title to the land as heirs out of the plaintiffs, olrered ln evidence the
of AlderROn, contending that the judgment judgment for the costs, the execution IBBUed
und«>r which the alleged Bale was made, was thereon, and the eherllT'e deed; to the lnYo.d, because It was rendered agalWlt him troductlon of which the plaintiffs objected,
without personal service of citation, or hie on th~ ground that the judgment for costs
appearance In the action.
was 11. judgment In personam, and not In
The material facts of the case, as dlscloe- rem, nnd was rendered against the defended by the record, are, briefly, these: On the ant, who was a non-resident of the state,
slxt«>entb of July, lS.->5, a tract of 111.nd com- without his appearance In the action, or perprlslng one·thlrd of a league was pat«>nted sonal service of citation upon him, but upon
hy TexaR to Alderson, who bad bet>n a sol- a citation by publl<'fltlon only, and therefore
<lll'r In Its army. One undlYlded half of constituted no basis of title In the purchasthls tract was claimed by D. C. Frt>eman er under the execution. The court sustained
and G. R. Freeman, and they brought an ac- the objection, and excluded the documents
tlon ngalnet him for their Interest. The from the jury; and the defendnuts except~
pl<•ncllnge In that action are not set forth In ed to the ruling. No other evidence ot title
tht> tranR<.'rlpt, but from the record of the IM'ln1r produced by the defendants, a verdict
judgment therein, which wu produced, we I was found for the plaintiffs, and judgment
are Informed that the defendant wns a non- In their ra,·or was entered thereon; to rel'Nli<lPnt of the state, and that the citation to view which thP case le brought to this court
him was mode by publication. There was on a writ of error.
no personal service upon him, nor did be apM. 1''. l\forrls. for pl,alntlffs In error. E. H.
pear In the action. '£he judgwt>nt, whleh
was rendered on the ftrMt of OctolK'r, 18.">H, Graham and L. w. Goodrich, for defenaants
was of a thret>fold character. It firRt ad- In error.
judgl'd that the plalntllTR recO\·er one undivided holf of the described tract. It then
l\lr. Justice FIELD, after stntlng the case,
appolnfrd commissioners to partition and di- dellvered the opinion of the court as folvide the tract, and set apart, by metes and lows:
bounds, one·balf thereof, ncrordlng to quanActloDR In rem, strictly confJldered, are
tity and quality, to the plalntllrs; and to proceedings against property alone treated
make their report at the following term of as responsible for the claims aeeerted by the
the court. And. finally, lt ordered that the lliM'lnnts or plalntllrs. The property Itself
plalntltre have judgment 8Jmlnst the dPfPnd- ls In such actions the defendant, and, exant for all costs In the <·aHl', hut Rtayt'd t'X- <>ept In cases arising during war for Its hosecutlon until the report of the commission- tile character, Its forfeiture or sale ls sought
ers should be returned and adopted, and a for the wrong, In the commission of which
flnnl decree entered.
It has bM>n the Instrument, or for debts or
At the following term the commissioners obligations for which by operation of law
made a report showing that they had divid- It ls liable. The court acquires jurltldlctlon
ed the tract Into two equal pareele. The re- oYer the property In such cases by lte seiport was confirmed, and on the thirty-first of zure, and of the subsequent proceedings by
!'.Iar<'h, 1850, the court adjudged that the publlc <>ltntlon to the world, of which the
title to one of. these parcels was divested owner Is at liberty to avail himself by apfrom Alderson, and vested In the plnlntllTs, pearing as a claimant In the case.
the two Jo'reemans, and that they J'N'O'l"f'r all
There 18, howevt>r, a large class of cases
rosts ln thnt IM'half against him, whl<·h wt>re which are not strictly · actions In rem, but
$61.46, and that execution IBSUe therefor. are frequently spoken of as actions quasi In
J<]xecutlon therefor was Issued to the sher- rem, because, though brought agnlnet periff of McLennan county on the thirtieth of sons, they onl;y seek to subject certain prop140
FRl<~ElIA:S
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tJloSE' persona to the dlRc.•hn.rge ot the
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089 l)9\'5°“3 to the discharge of the

llsllel '

Such are actions in which 1 against the defendant by the tinai

til

judgment of the court. But it there is no

as °f ,,aeri@d-

Qniiﬂs oi non-residents is attached and f1Dpearance 01' the . _

P\'°pert:tl19 discharge of debts due by them me 01' process on bi(l]]I€l‘fet|ill?£a:;,S6aIl1)gC(I)]I(;lesSell:l

1ie14_ ﬁle“; of the Hale, and actions for the ii“-8 essential nature, a proceeding in 1-om

wgéice eﬂi °£ irtsgfsggliiriafld 0ther'liei1B- the only eifect of which is to subject the

°“ eed, all i>"°°°‘* 2, _ “=1 1’ or tiieir sole Dl‘0perty attached to the payment of the de-

lild ct the gale 01‘ ° 1191' d1SD0sition of the lnand which the court may ﬂnd to be due to

‘Me ﬂy or the (3.9-f9_m ant to satisfy the de- the plaintiff. That such is the nature of

i>"°K§S 0; the lllﬁllmﬁ are in a. general way this proceeding in this latter class of cases

‘$18 designated. But: they fli tfer, among is clearly evinced by two well-established

other things, from no ioéls wliicii are strict- propositions: First. The judgment of the-

iv in rein. in that the rgerest of the defend- court, though in form a personal judgment

int alone soiight tod e‘ aﬂ‘e(¢tvd, that cita- against the defendant, has no effect beyond

2-mu to him is requiie { Yand that Judgment the property attached in that suit. No gen-
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tlierein is only c0n¢l\1S \ 0 b£'t\veen the par- eral execution can be issued for any balance

um _ unpaid after the attached _property is ex-

The smte nan jurisdiction over property liausted. 1\o suit can be maintained on such

within its limits owned by non-residents, a Judgment in the same court, or in any oth-

and may therefore subioct. it to the payment er; nor can it be used as evidence in any

of demands against thein of its own citi- other proceeding not affecting the attached

mm 11-_is only in virtue of . its jurisdiction property; nor could the costs in that pro-

ovet me property, as we said on a _foriner cceding be collected of defendant out of any

occasion, that its tribunais can inquire into other property than that attached in the-

the non-residcnfs obligations to its own cit- suit. Second. The court, in such a suit, can-

1-,,@n_<-, and the inquiry can then proceed only not proceed unless the otﬁcer ﬁnds some

so far as may be necessary for the disposi-

tion oi the D1'°Pe"ty'

possesses n

It the non-resident

0 property in the state, there is

nothing upon which its tribunals can act.

Pennoyer V.

Neﬂ, 95 U. S. 723. They can-

not determine the validity of any demand

beyond that Whlﬂl

is satisﬁed by the prop-

ex-Q-_ F01‘ any further adjudication the de-

fendant must be personally served with cita-

tion, or voluntarily allpeﬂr in the 9°35“-

The laws of the state have no operation out-

side oi its territory, except so far as may be

allowed by comity; its tribunals cannot send

their citation beyond its limits, and require

parties there domiciled to respond '10 PTO-

ceedings against them; and publication of

citation within the state cannot create any

greater obligation upon them to 11PP9ﬂ1'-

Pennoyer v. Neil, 95 U. S. 727. So, neces-

sarily, such tribunals can have no jurisdic-

tion to pass upon the obligations of non-resi-

dents. except to the extent and for the pur-

pose mentioned.

This doctrine is clearly stated in Cooper v.

Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308, where it became nec-

essary to declare the eifect of a Personal 11°-

tion against an absent party without the

jurisdiction of the court, and not served with

process or voluntarily ﬂllllefmllg 111 the ac"

tion, and whose property was attached, and

sought to be subjected to the payment of the

demand of the resident plaintiff. After stat-

ing the general purpose ot the action, and

the inability to serve process upon the de-

saerted· such are ac'tlona ln wblcll
"'!Jlls 11 of non-residents ls a tt:ached and
propert1 we dlacllarge or debts due by theDJ
11eld for 08 of the state, and n.c.·tlons for the
to cit11£111eot of mortgages a n d other liens.
enforce all proceedings having ror their sole
indeedttbe sale or other dleposltlon ot the
objectrt1 of the defendant; to sn.t:tety the deprope of the ptalntU'l are ln a general way
1111\Ddlldelllgnated. But t.hey dift'er, among
tn118 things, from actlollB ~hlcb are strlctotber relllt ln that the interest or the defendJy ~ls alone sought to be aft'ected, that cltaan to him la required, nnd that judgment
tlon 1 la only conclusive bet-ween the parthere n
ert1 of

ue;-he state ha& jur\ad\ctlon over property
wlthln lta Umlta owned by non-residents,
and maY therefore aublect I t to the payment
of demands against thelll o:f its own cltlzena. lt ts onlY ln virtue o:f. lts jurisdiction
over the property, as we aald on a former
occasion, that its tribunals can inquire into
the non-resident's obllgatlons to its own cltlzeDB; and the lnquley can then proceed only
80 far as may be neee888.ry for the disposition of the property. 1:f the non-resident
po88K(!e8 no property ln the state, there ls
nothing upon which \ta tribunals cun act.
Pennoyer v. Netr, 95 U. S. 723. They cannot determine the validity of any demand
beyond that which ls satisfied by the property. For any further adjudication the defendant must be personally served with clt.atton, or voluntarily appear in the action.
The laws of the state have no operation outBlde of Its territory, except so far as may be
allowed by comity; its tribunals cannot send
their dtatlon beyond lta llmlts, and require
parties there domiciled to respond to proceedings against them; and publication of
cltatlon wlthln tbe atate cannot create any
greater obligation upon them to appear.
Pennoyer v. Neft, 95 U. S. 727. So, necessarily, such trtbunala can have no jurisdiction to pa88 upon the obligations of non-residents, except to the extent and for the purpose mentioned.
ThlB doctrine le clearly stated In Cooper v.
Beynolds, 10 Wall. 308, where It became neceuary to declare the effect of a personal action against an absent party without the
jurlsdlctlon of the court, and not served with
proeeu or voluntarily appearing In the action, and whose property was attached, and
11ought to be 111ubjected to the payment of the
demand of the resident plal11t1ll'. After statlng the general purpose of the action, and
the tnablllty to serve proceBB upon the defendant, and the provision of law for attach\ng bla property In such cases, the court,
speaking by Mr. Justice Miller, said: ''If the
defendant appears, the cause becomes mainly a BUlt tn personam, with the added Incident that the property attached remnins
liable, under the control of the court, to anBWer to aB7 demand which may be estab-

llab~·•

5&

~ IJ&'B/nst the defendant by the 4nal
Udgment ol the <:ourt. But It there fs no.
~Pi>earance ol the defendant, and no servl ce ot process on hfm, the case becomes, in
ts eBBentJal nature, a proceeding in rem,
the only effect ol which fs to subject theProperty attached to the payment o! the demand which the court may find to be due to
the pJalntl11'. That su<>h fs the nature of
this procet>dlng in this latter class of cases
ls clearly evinced by two well-established
propositions: First. The judgment of th&
court, though In form a personal judgment
against the defendant, bas no etfe<:t beyond
the property attached In that suit. No general execution can be issued for any balanceunpaid after the attached property la exhausted. No suit can be maintained on such
a judgment in the aame court, or In any other; nor can It be used as evidence In any
other proceeding not atrectlng the attached
property; nor could the cost& In that proceeding be collected of defendant out of any
other property than that attached In the·
suit. Second. '.rbe court, in such a suit, cannot proceed unless the officer flnds some
property of defendant on which to levy thewrit of attachment. A return that none can
be found Is the end of the l'llBe, and deprives
the court of further jurisdiction, though th&
publication may have been duly made and
proven in court." 10 Wall. 318.
To this statement of the law It may beadded what, Indeed, Is a conclusion from the
doctrine, that while the cost& of an action
may properly be satisfied out of the property att.ached, or otherwise brought under the
control of the court, no personal liability for
them can be created against the absent or
non:resldent defendant; the power of the
court being limited, as we have already said,
to the disposition of the property, which 18
alone within Its jurisdiction.
The pleadings In the case In which judgment was rendered for costs against Alderson are not before us. \Ve have only th&
formal judgment, from whl<'h It should seem
that the action was to recover an undivided
Interest In the property, and then to olltaln
a partition of It, and have that Interest set
apart In severalty to the pll'l.lntl!Ts,-a sort
of mixed action to try the title of the plaintiffs to the undivided half of the property,
and to obtain a partition of that half. Such
action, though dealing entirely with the realty, Is not an action In rem In the strict sense
of the term. It ls an action against the parties named, and though the recovery and
partition of real estate are sought, that does
not change Its character as a personal action. The judirment therein binds only the
parties In their relation to the property.
The service of citation by publication may
sumce for the exercise of the jurisdiction of
the court over the property so far as to try
the right to Its possession, and to decree Its
partition; but It could not authorize the creation of an7 personal demand against de141
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fendant, even for costs, which could be sat-

isﬁed OUL of his other property.

The judgment is for all the costs in the

case, and no order is made that they be sat-

isﬁed out of the property partitioned. Had

satisfaction been thus ordered, no execution

would have been necessary. The execution,

also, is general in its direction, commanding

the sheritf to make the costs out oi’ any

property of the defendant.

The judgment, as far as we costs are con-

cerned, must therefore be treated as a judg-

ment in personam, and, for the reason stat-

142

ed, it was without any binding obligation

upon the defendant; and the execution is-

sued upon it did not authorize the sale made,

and, of course, not the deed of the sheriff.

Were the conclusion otherwise, it would foi-
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low, as indeed it is claimed here, that a joint

owner of real property might sue a non-resi-

dent co-tenant for partition, and, having had

his own interest set apart to himself, pro-

ceed to sell out on execution the interest of

his co-tenant for all the costs.

The judgment of the court below must be

aﬁirmed; and it is so ordered.

~OJ

RELEVANCY.

fendant, even for coats, whleh could be aatlstled ou~ ot his other property.
'l'be judgment 111 tor all the costs In the
case, and no order la made that they be eatletled out of the property partitioned. Had
satisfaction been thus ordered, no execution
would have been nece88Bry. 1."lle execution,
also, is general In Its direction, commanding
the sherltf to make the costs out of any
property of the defendant.
The judgment, ae far ae Ule costs are concerned, must therefore be treated ae a judgment In personam, and, for the reason stat142

ed, It was without any binding obligation
upon the defendant; and the execution Issued upon It did not authorize the sale made,
and, of course, not tbe deed of the eberUJ.
\Vere the conclusion otherwise, It would follow, as Indeed It le claimed here, that a joint
owner of real property might sue a non-resident co-tenant for partition, and, having had
bis own Interest set apart to himself, proceed to sell out on execution the interest of
hie co-tenant for all the costs.
The judgment of the rourt below must be
affirmed; and It le so ordered.
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(1.0 ~. E. 160, 44 Ohio St. 613.)

¢B°S$ v. ARMSTRONG.

(10 14- E- 160. 44 Ohio St. 613.»

Suprell1e Court of Ohio.

Supmme CW11 of Ohio. Jan. 13, 1:537,

mm to district court, Tuscarawas coun-

;Jan. 18, 1887.

Error to district court, Tuscarawas coun-

tyiyhc actioll bl‘-10W was commenced by the

ﬁling in the ﬂlilrt of common pleas of a

petition which, in substance, alleges that the

pm-mm: is the aduiinistrator of William

Mmswong; that the assets are insutﬁcient

,0 pay the debts; and that the defendant is

the widow of the deceased. The intestate,

Apr“ 26, 1870, effected an insurance upon

msiifc, for the sum of $10,000, in the Provi-

dent Life & Trust Company of Philadelphia,

Pennsylvania, then doing business in Ohio

as an insurance company, and caused the

policy to be made payable on its face to his

wife, Polly Armstrong, the defendant. By

the terms of the policy, the assured, William
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Armstrong, agreed to pay, and did annually

D35‘. the sum of $339-1, yearly premium for

such insurance, from the date 01' the policy

until the time of his death, which occurred

March, 1879. The intestate, at the time of

his death, held the policy in his possession.

at his domicile in Ohio. The deceased, the

plaintiff, and the defendant were always cit-

izens of, and domiciled in, this state. After

the death of the assured. the defendant ob-

tained possession of the DOHCY, 00l1€':t9d of

the company the entire amount secured

thereby, and surrendered it to the company;

and she now holds the sum of $7,475-75 Of

the $10,000 received by her, for the use of

the plaintiﬂ, as the representative of the

deceased. To this an answer was tiled, Whlf-'11

alleges in substance-—First. That the Provi-

dent Life & Trust company is 11 <r0rnornt10n

organized under the laws of I‘ennS.vlVﬂI1i8;

that the insurance contract mentioned in the

petition was effected in that state, to be per-

formed, and was performed, in that state;

and that, by the laws of Pennsylvania, and

by virtue of the contract, the Tight Vested

in the defendant to receive the whole of the

insurance money secured by the D0110!’ T01‘

her sole use and beneﬁt. Se00nd- That -Tilly

25, 1879, the defendant instituted a suit in a

common pleas court, of the city of Philadel-

phia, upon that pclicy. against the insur-

auce company, to recover the $10,000 named

therein; that before plea pleaded the com-

pany came into court, and suggested that

the administrator of William Armstrong

claimed to have some interest in the insur-

ance fund, and prayed for leave to bring

the money into court, and for an interpleader

between the said Polly Armstrong and the

administrator of her husband, touching their

rights, respectively, t0 the D1'°¢‘@ed5 Of Such

insurance; that such leave was granted, and

a rule entered requiring the administrator to

show cause why an interpleﬂdcr should not

be awarded between him and Polly A;-m.

strong to determine their respective Ilghtg

and ownership in the fund agreeably to the

laws of Pennsylvania, a copy of which rule,

under the seal of the court, was, pursuant

ty

Tile action below was commenced by the
tlllng in tbe court of' common pleas of a

and ownership In the fund agreeably to the
laws of Pennsylvania, a copy of which rule,
under the seal of the court, was, pursuant
to the laws of Pennsylynnla and the practice
In said court, dellvered to said administrator,
at the county of Tuscarawas and state of
Ohio, together with a letter from the attorney of the company, notlfylng him that, under the lnws of that state, It was necessary
for him to nppear. Afterwards, the rule being made absolute, and the money bnvlng
been pald Into court, a citation was duly
Issued under seal, requiring and summoning
the admlnlstrator to appear In court and lnterplead, and notifying him that, ln case of
default, the moneys would be awarded to
sald Polly. and he declared estopped and
debarred from nny further right or claim
therein; which citation, pursuant to the lawa
of Pennsylvania, was duly served on the
administrator, by dellverlng the same to him
at sald county of Tuscarawas. The ndmlnlBtrator not appearing, the court adjudged
and decreed thnt the entire fund be pald to
Polly, and that the admlnlstrator be estopped
and debarred from all claims to any part of
said fund or In the pollcy of Insurance. To
this answer the plalntlfr interposed a general
demurrer. The court of common pleas overruled the demurrer, and rendered judgment
for defendant; which judgment wae affirmed by the district court. To obtain a reversal
ot these judgments the petition ln error ts
fl.led In this court.

petition wbich, in substance, alleges tbnt the
plalntlft ls the administrator of William
A.rmstrong; that the assets are insutncient
to pay the debts; and that the defendant ls
the w\doW of the deceased. The intestate,
April 26, 1870, effected an Insurance upon
hla Ufe, for tbe sum of' $10,000, In the Provident Lite & Trust Company of Phllndelphla,
Peunsylvnn\a, then doing business ln Ohio
88 an insurance company, and caused the
policy to be made pa.ya blr on Its face to his
wlfe, Polly Armstrong, the defendant. By
the terms of the pollcy, the assured, William
Armstrong, agreed to pay, and dld annually
pay, the sum of $594, yearly premium for
such insurance, from thP. date of the policy
until the tlme of hie death, which occurred
Mareh, 1879. The Intestate, at the time of
his death, held the poUcy In hls possession,
at hlB domicile In Ohlo. The deceased, the
plalntUr, and the def'endant were always cltlsens of, and domlclled ln, this state. After
the death of the aseured, the defendant obtained po881!sslon of' the. policy, collected of
the company the entire amount secured
thereby, and surrendered It to the company;
H. T. Stockwell, for plalntltr ln error. J'.
and abe now holds the sum of $7,475.75 of T. O'Donnell and Alexis Cope, for defendant
the $10,000 received by ber, for the use of
In error.
the plalntlft, as the representative of the
deceased. To thls an answer wae fl.led, which
SPEAR, J'. The questions arlslng In the
alleges In substance--Flrst. That the Provident .Life & Trust Company ls a corporation case are presented by the demurrer to the
organized under the la we of Pennsylvania; answer. It wlll be observed that there le
that the Insurance contract mentioned in the no denial of the allegations that, at the time
petition was effected In that state, to be per- of the etrectlng of the Insurance upon the
formed, and was performed, In that state; llfe of Wllllam Armstrong, he and the deand that, . by the laws of Pennsylvania, and fendant were residents of and domiciled In
by virtue of the contract, the right vested Ohio, and that they continued to so reside
1n the defendant to receive the whole of the until bis death, and sne bas ever since relnlurance money secured by the policy for sided within the state; that the premiums,
her llOle uee and benefit. Second. That July '594 each year, were wholly paid by the
25, 1879, the defendant Instituted a suit In a husband; that the debts of the estate are
eommon pleas court, of the city of Philadel- over $3,000, while the aSBetB are not more
phia, upon that p<'llcy. against the Insur- than $700; and that the defendant has reance company, to ret.-over the •10,000 named ceived from the Insurance company the entherein; that before plea pleaded the com- tire amount of the Insurance money covered
pen1 came Into court. and suggested that by the policy, $10,000. The claim of the
tbe administrator of William Armstrong plalntl.1r Is based upon the statute of Ohlo,
claimed to have B<'me Interest ID the Insur- section 3268, while the defendant's claim ts
ance fund, and prayed for leave to bring that the rights of the parties are measured
the money Into court. and for an lnterpleader by the laws of Pennsylvania, the place where
between the said Polly Armstrong and the the contract was made, and was to be enadmlnletrator of ber husband, touching their forced, and that those rights have been adrights, respectively, to the proceeds of such judicated upon and determined by the deInsurance; that such leave was granted, and cree and judgment of the court of common
a rule entered requiring the administrator to pleas of Philadelphia, set up In the second
abow cause why an lnterpleader should not defense of the ans"\\er. It ls urged that, by
be awarded between him and Polly Arm- the common law, the contract of insurance ls
ltroll( to determine their respective rights
to be construed by the law of the place where
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made; that the law of that place governs as

to the nature, obligation, and interpretation

of the contract: that, where the plaintii!

would have no right of action by the law of

the state where the contract was made and

to be performed, he can have none here; and

that, by the laws of Pennsylvania and by

virtue of the contract, the right rested in

the defendant to receive for her own ex-

clusive use the whole of the money secured

by the policy.

Assuming. without holding. that the law

of Pennsylvania is surliciently pleaded in

the answer. and that. unless the question is

determined by the statute referred to, the

claim made by the defendant as to the effect

of the law of Pennsylvania upon the rights

of the parties here is conclusive, how, if at

all, are those rights affected by section 3628
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of the Revised Statutes? That section reads

as follows: “Any person may effect an in-

surance on his life, for any deﬁnite period

of time, or for the term of his natural life,

to inure to the sole beneﬁt of his widow

and children, or of either, as he may cause to

be appointed and provided in the policy; and

the sum or net amount of insurance becom-

ing due and payable by the terms of insur-

ance shall be payable to his widow or to his

children. for their own use, as provided in

the policy, exempt from all claims by the

representatives and creditors of such per-

sou; but the amount of premium annually

paid on such policy shall not exceed the sum

of one hundred and ﬁfty dollars, and, in case

of such excess, there shall be paid to the

beneﬁciaries named in the policy such por-

tion of the insurance as the sum of one hun-

dred and fifty dollars will bear to the whole

annual premium, and the residue to the rep-

resentatives of the deceased.”

In obtaining an insurance of this kind, the

manifest intent of the husband is to make

provision for those dependent upon him. a

purpose every way rightful and laudable.

It is to be done by applying, from year to

year, the money of the husband, obtained

from proceeds of his own labor or otherwise,

to the future use and beneﬁt of those who

stand in such relation to him as to give them

a natural claim to his effects, forethought,

and bounty. And, up to a certain point as

to expenditure, such provision may legally be

made. In the same spirit our laws allow to

the widowdowerinlands,use of the mansion

house one year, a homestead right, a year's

support out of the personalty, a given propor-

tion of the residuum after debts are paid. and

certain speciﬁc articles of personal property,

if such the deceased possessed. But the

same laws recognize others as having rights

as regards the property of the deceased.

The creditors are not to be wholly ignored.

even though there be a needy widow and

needy children. As to the section referred

to, while it recognizes the right of the hus-

band to make provision for those of the fam-

ily who may survive, to the extent of $150
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made; that the law of that plare governs as
to the nature, obligation, and Interpretation
of the contract; that, where the plalntur
would have no right of action by the law of
the state where the contract was made and
to be performed, he can have none here; and
that, by the la we of Pennsylvania and by
Ylrtue of the contract, the right rested In
the defendant to receive for her own ex<·luslve use the whole of the money secured
by the policy.
Assuming, without bohUng, that the law
of PennsylYania le sutticlently pleaded In
the answer, and that, unless the question ls
determined by the statute referred to, the
claim made by the defendant as to the efl'ect
of the law of Pennsylvania upon the rights
of the parties here Is conclusive, bow, If at
all, are those rights affected by section 3628
of the Revised Statutes? That section reads
as follows: "Any person may etfect an insurance on hie life, for any definite period
of time, or for the term of bis natural life,
to Inure to the sole benefit of hie widow
and children, or of either, as be may cause to
be appointed and provided in the policy; and
the 11um or net amount of Insurance becoming due and payable by the terms of insurance shall be payable to his widow or to bis
chlldren. for their own use, as provided in
the policy, exempt from all claims by the
t't>presentatlves and creditor& of such person; but the amount of premium annually
paid on such policy shall not exceed the sum
of one hundred and fifty dollars, and, In case
of such excess, there shall be paid to the
beneficiaries named In the policy such portion of the Insurance as the sum of one hundred and fifty dollars will bear to the whole
annWll premium, and the residue to the representatives of the dec•ensed."
In obtaining an tnsumuce of this kind, the
manifest Intent of the husband Is to make
provision for those depencleut upon him, a
1mrpose every way rl11:htful and laudn ble.
It 18 to be done by applying, from year to
year, the money of the husband, obtained
from proce<>cl11 of his own labor or otherwise,
to the future use and benefit of those who
stand In such relation to him as to give them
a natural claim to his elTe<•ts, forethought,
and bounty. And, up to a et•rtaln point as
to expenditure, such provision may leg-ally be
made. In the same spirit our laws allow to
the wlclowdowerlnlands, use of the mansion
hon~ one year, a homestead right, a yenr'<J
l'npport out of the personalty, a given proportion of the residuum after debts are paid. and
<ertaln speclll.c articles of personal pro1wrty.
If such the de<'eased possessed. But tht>
same laws recognize others as having rlithts
as regarcls the property of the decea~l'll.
The creditors are not to be wholly Ignored,
eTen though there be a needy widow and
needy children. As to the section referred
to, while It recognl7..es the right of the husband to make provision for those of the family who may survive, to tbe extent of fl50
0
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yeal'ly thu Invested, It also provides that..
aa to insurance etreeted by payments over
that sum, it shall inure to the legal representa tlve. No question ls made that, as to contracts with Ohio companies, the statute would
apply. Should it receive such constnu·tlon
as to ron11.ne Its operation to that class o!
contmcts? It ls not doubted that lt Is com·
petent for the general assembly to enact laws
which In efl'ect forbid citizens of the state
from resorting to the courts of sister states
for the purpose of clt>featlng the operation
of laws of Ohio as to questions which affect
the rights of other citizens of Ohio, The law
which gives to a debtor, the head of a famlly,
and not the owner of a homestead, an exemption as against a claim of a creditor in attachment, where the sum due the debtor la
shown to be neceseary for the support of the
family, 18 a law of that kl.nd, inasmuch as It
ls held that such creditor may be enjoined
from bringing action In courts out of Ohio
where such exemption could be permitted.
And the law In question, If It applies to
poli<'les Issued by companies other than those
organized in Ohio, le an Inhibition against
citizens of Ohio placing moneys beyond the
reach of creditors, by entering Into contracts
with insurance companies organized out of
this state. It wtll be noticed that the words
of the statute do not ltmtt Its appll<'lltlon.
The language Is comprehem;Ive, and in terms
It applies to all contracts of Insurance obtained by citizens of the state. \\'hy should we
assume that the legislature intended that, If
tbe company happens to be a home company,
the statute applies, while, If one lo<'Rted in another state, It does not apply? Why not assume, rather, that that body Intended to cor·
rel't the mischief which the very enactment
of the statute raises the lmpll<'atlon then existed? It Is but the ordinary rule to gtye
such construction to statutes as will advan<'f'
the remedy and correct the mls<'hlef. Applying the law only to home companies wonld.
In gl'eat mettsure, defeat the very purpose
apparent in this legislation. The general as·
sembly must be aSBumed to have at least
BU<'h general and ccmmon knowledge upon
subjects of legislation as ls possessed by citizens at large; and It ls matter of common
Information that the great proportion of pol·
leles written upon the lives of citizens of
Ohio are Issued by companies organized outside the state, and there ls ltttle doubt that
this was true In a larger sense even at the
time this statute was enacted (1847) than It
ls now. Statlstl<'S, believed to be rellablP.
show that, ln the year 1884, out of about t:l.000 policies and certificates wrlttl'n upon th<'
lives of citizens of this state. more than 10..
000 were written by foreign companies. amt
out of '33,000,000 gross amount coTered by
those policies and certificates nearly $2fi.OOO.·
000 were in poli<'les iMned by foreign C'Ompantes. It Is probable that. prior to thE' or·
ganlzatlon of the various reliPf and aid associations now so common, the disproportion

JUDGMEXT8.

fC..:use No. Sl

JUDGMi.~l.\' Ts. [Case No. 51

9-ter than the above figures show.

one essentially In rem, and the court, having

'tilt -pat of Ohlo, and Were when rights unthe ~te •'CY &""'ru d
'
\ll.~ p01>
'"'" e • 'l:hose
rights are be-

having given notice according to the Jn.ws of
Pennsyl¥anla. had ample power to hear and
determine, and having so heard and ·determined, the parties are bound by the Judgment. That such proceeding could be in rem
seems a novel doctrine. "In rem" Is understood to be a technical term, taken from the
I Roman law, and there ui~ed to <llstlngulsh
! an action agulnst the thing from one against
the person, the terms In rem and In pereonam always being the opposite one of the
other; an act in personam being one done or
! directed agalnart a spe<"llic person, whlle an
· act in rem was one done with reference fo
no specific peraon. but against, or with 1-ererence to, a specific thing, and so agalnHt
whom It might concern, or "all the world."
A proceeding brought to determine the status of the thing ltself,-the particular thing,
1-ilnd which Is confined to the subject-matter ln specie, ls in rem, the judgment being
Intended to determine the state or condition,
and. pro facto, to render the thing what the
Judgment deelares It to be, while a proC'CNling which seeks the recovery of a personal judgment, is In personam. In the former, process may be serve.d on the thing
Itself, and by s1wh service, and making proclamution, the court Is authorized to decide
upon It without other notice to persons, all
the world being parties, while, In the latter,
In order to give the court power to adjudge,
there must be service upon those whose
rights are sought to be affected. As regards
rights, the terms signify the antithesis of
"available against a particular person," and
"avallable against tbe world at large." Thus,
"Jura in personam" are rights primarily
avallal>le "against specific persons; jura In
rem. rh:hts only a\"allable against the world
at lurj!'e." Be~·ond this, a judgment or decree Is in rem, or in thE> nature of a judgment In rem, while It binds third persons,
such as the sentenee of a court of admiralty on a question of prize; or a decree of
other courts upon the })E'rsonal status or relatlon of the party, such as dissolution of
munlnge contract, bastardy, etc.; a decree
In prolmte court admitting u will to probate
and re<"ord, granting administrators, etc.; or
a decree or a court of a foreign country as
to the status of n person domiciled there.
We quote from I<'reem. ,Judgm. the deflnltlon of "judgment In r<>m" glvE>n by th:it
author: "An adjudication against some perHon or thing, or upon the stutm~ of some subject-matter, whlc-11. whf'nt>ver and wherever
binding upon uny 11e1·Ron, is PfJlllllly binding
upon all pPr801111.'' In contmct, a Judgment
In personam Is. "In form, as well as substance, between the parties claiming the
right; and that It ls so Inter partes appears
by the record iti<clf." Woodruff v. Taylor,
20 Vt. 6.'i. From nil which It appears that a
judgnwnt In rem, nt least when against anything, may bind the res in the absence of

' was s\*‘“.e5 to this litiguﬂ

tel‘ than thé abo

one essentially in rem, and the court, having

011 are citizens of then obtained jurisdiction of the res, and

. -n

K? gate of Om“, and were when rights un- having given notice according to the laws ot

Q; ms policy accrued. Those rights are be- Pennsylvania, had ample power to hear and

mg m3“¢\i('1\i‘3‘3 in the courts of Ohio. Why

determine, and having so heard and ‘deter-

ﬁhmm ‘pose °°“1't3 1gﬂ01‘e our own law. or

mined, the parties are bound by the judg-

make “ subordinate to the law of another

State? we think they should not. To do so

Wm“ permit a citizen, largely indebted, to

invest his capital and earnings to an unlimit-

ed amomit tor the beneﬁt or members of his

tamily in insurance contracts in distant states,

thus making a fraud upon deserving cred-

itors, by placing such sums beyond their

reach, notwithstanding such investments

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:06 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104925781
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

would be in spirit a plain violation of the

spective rights of debtor and creditor. Very

much more might be said in elaboration of

this view, but we deem it unnecessary to

take further space, as we feel conﬁdent that

enough has been indicated to make it clear

that the demurrer as to the ﬁrst defense of

the answer was well taken, and should have

been sustained.

Does the second defense set up in the an-

swer stand in the way of a recovery? The

contention on part ot defendant is that, by

the judgment of the Philadelphia court, the

matter in issue here is res adjudieata, and

this is so, it that court had jurisdiction of

the subject-matter and of the person of the

plaintiff. The record shows that the service

on the plaintiff was by delivering to him in

Ohio a copy of the rule of court requiring

him to show cause why the court should not

give direction to the company to bring the

$10,000, owing by it on the policy, into court,

and why he should not interplead with Mr.

Armstrong as to conﬂicting rights to suc.h

money, together with a letter from the com-

pany's attorney, advising him to appear. and

by like service afterwards ot a copy oi.’ a

rule absolute, and of citation to appear and

interpiead. Is such notice sutiieient to re-

quire an Ohio administrator to go to another

state to litigate. in the courts of that state,

with a citizen of Ohio, questions arising un-

der the laws of Ohio affecting toe estate

which he represents, or refuse at his peril?

It is probable that no injustice would in this

case be done if the question were put in this

way: Can a resident of Ohio resort to the

courts of another state, and there compel an

administrator, raident of Ohio, and deriving

his authority from the courts of this state. to

litigate a dispute existing between them,

wherein the rights of the administrator de-

pends upon the law of Ohio, tor the express

purpose of evading the effect of our statute,

and of obtaining a judgment which would

be contrary to the law of the domicile of

both?

It is urged that when the company asked

that an interpleader be awarded, and brought

'n\

p-e t\etl to th\s UU.gation are citizens of then obtained jurisdiction of che l'es, and

~~ 11.~ud\eated

ln the courts of Ohio. Why
llllou\O. tbose courts ignore our own law, or
ma.'i.e \t subordinate to the law of another
state1
think tbey should not. To do so
wau\d pet"lll\t a cltlzen, largely Indebted, to
ln-vest n\s capital and earnings to an unllmlted amount for the benetlt of memberll of his
fam.Uy\n lnsurance contractslndlstant stat&!,
thus ma'i.\ng a fraud upon deserving credltoni, by lllaclng such sums beyond their
rench, notw\thstandlng such Investments
would be In spirit a plain violation of the
whole policy of our laws regulating the respectlve rights of debtor and c1·e<lltor. Very
much more might be said In elalJoration of
this view, but we deem It unnecessary to
take further space, as we feel confident that
enough has been indicated to make It clear
that the demurrer as to the first defense of
the answer was well taken, and should have
been sustained.
Does the second defense set up In the Rnswer stand In the way of 11 reeo¥ery? The
contentlon on part of defendant Is that, by
the Judgment of the Philadelphia court, the
matter In issue here is res adjudlcata, and
thls ls so, If that court had jurisdiction of
the subject-matter and of the person of the
pla\utlfl'. The record shows that the service
on the plnlntltr was by delivering to him In
Ohio a copy of the rule of court requiring
him to show cau11e why the court should not
give direction to the company to bring the
$10,000, owing by It on the policy, Into (•ourt,
and why he should not lnterplead with l\Ir.
Armstrong as to conflicting rights to such
money, together with a letter from the
pany's attorney, advlsln.ic him to appear, and
by like service afterwards of a copy of a
rule absolute, and of citation to appear and
lnterplead. Is such notice sufficient to require an Ohio admlnh1trator to go to another
state to litigate, In the courts of that state,
'ITlth a citizen of Ohio, questions arl!dug under the laws of Ohio affecting hie estate
which he represents, or refuse at his peril?
It ls probable that no Injustice would lu this
ease be done lf the question were pUL In this
way: Can a resident of Ohio resort to the
courts of another state, and there compel an
administrator, resident of Ohio, and deriving
hle authority from the courts of this 11t11te. to
litigate a dispute exlstlng between them,
wbereln the rights of the administrator depends upon the law of Ohio, for the express
purpose of evading the effect of our statute,
and of obtaining a jud~Iment which would
be contrary to the Jaw of the domicile of
both?
It Is urged that when the company askE>d
that an lnterpleader be awarded, and brought
the money owing by It Into court, the court
then obtained Jurisdiction of the fund, and,
from that time forward, the proceeding was

we
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any personal notice to the parties interested;

but a judgment in personam, as we have

seen, can have no validity except upon serv-

ice on the interested parties, or what is

equivalent to it. Why was the Philadelphia.

action, in its nature, not a proceeding be-

tween parties claiming right to money due

under the policy, rather than u proceeding to

determine the status of such money‘: If it

was the former, then the etiicncy of the judg-

ment depended upon having the parties be-

fore the court so that these conﬂicting claims

could be adjudicated; if the latter, then it

would appear to be one wherein the court's

judgment would have been effectual and con- i

elusive without reference to whether the

parties were before the court or not;

the rights of both of them could have been

as well settled by the tiling of a bill by the
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insurance company, and the bringing of the

money into court, and without the presence,

by service or appearance, of either of the

parties claiming to be interested in the fund.

It was not the status of any particular mon-

and -

ey that was to be determined; for any mon- ~

ey which was a legal tender would have ef-

fectually satisfied the claim of the party

receiving it; nor was there any clahn prima-

rily, by even the widow, much less the ad-

ministrator, to any money in specie;

did either the company or the widow, at any

time, claim or admit that the administra-

tor had any money or property within the i

jurisdiction of the court, or valid claim to

any subject-matter sought to be aﬂected by

the decree to be rendered. The proceeding

was clearly one of interplender, and that

only. We do not understand that an action

in personam, simply because a debtor brings

money, the right to recover which is in conten-

tion, and gives to the custody of the court a.

sum sufficient to discharge his debt, change

into an action in rem, or that an interpleader

suit is, in its nature, a proceeding in rem.

In the Philadelphia case the company could

have begun the action by original bill, and

obtained a. complete standing in court, if,

with other proper averments, the pleader

had alleged a willingness to bring the mon-

ey into court. Manifestly, the action thus

begun would not have been in rem. Then,

does the mere fact that the company, (the

debtor,) being sued, voluntarily delivers mon-

ey to the clerk of the court, rather than

keep it in its own safe, or to its credit in

bank, or loaned upon call, change the action

from one in personam to one in rem? We

think not.

It will be borne in mind that the Phila-

dephin suit was essentially unlike an at-

tempt to reach, by process of attachment,

the prtperty of an absent party. it was

rather an attempt to estop the administrator

from claiming any recovery against the com-

pany, to draw the estate of William Arm-

strong to a distant state for settlement, and

an attempt to compel the iuiministrator to

BELEY.ANCY.

any 1wrMow1l notice to the parties Interested;
I.mt u Jmlg111Pnt In personam, u we have
llt'en, can have no validity except upon aervlee on the Interested parties, f>r what Ill
equlvall•nt to It. Why was the l'hlladelphla
action, lu Its nature, not a proceeding between parties clalmlna right to money due
under the policy, rather than 11 procl'('<llng to
determine the status of such money1 If It
was the forD1er. then the emcacy of the judgment depended upon having the parties before the court so that these eontllctlng claims
could be adjudicated; If the latter, then It
would appear to be one wherein the court's
judgment would have been effectual and conelusive without reference to whether the
partles were before the court or not; and
the rights of both of them could have been
as well settled by the tiling of a bill by the
lnt:urance company, and the bringing of the
money Into court, and without the presence,
by service or appearance, of either of the
parties claiming to be Interested In the fund.
It was not the status of any particular money that was to be determined; for any money which was a legal tender would have ettectually satisfied the claim of the party
re<'t"lvlng It; nor was the1·e any claim pl'lmarlly, by even the widow, much less the admlnlstrator, to any money In specie; nor
dlcl either the company or the widow, at any
time, claim or admit that the admlDlstra,.
tor had any money or property within the
jurlsdlctlon of the court, or valid claim to
any subject-matter sought to be affected by
the decree to be rendered. The proceeding
was clearly one of lnterpleader, and that
only. "'e do not understand that an action
lo personam, simply because a debtor brings
money, the right to recover which ls In contentlon, and glyes to the custody of the court a
sum sufficient to dls<'harge bis debt, changes
into an action In rem, or that an lnterpleader
suit ls, In Its nature, a proceeding In rem.
In the Philadelphia case the company could
have begun the action by original bill, and
obtained a complete standing In court, If,
with other proper averments, the pleader
had alleged a willlngness to bring the money Into court. Manifestly, the a<·tlon thus
begun would not have been In rem. Then,
does the mere fact that the company, (the
debtor,) being sued, voluntarily delivers money to the clerk of the court. rather than
keep It In Its own safe, or to Its credit In
bank, or loaned upon call, change the action
from one In personam to one in rem? We
think not.
It wlll be borne In mind that the Phlladephla suit was essentially unlike an attempt to reach, by process of attachment,
the pr< perty of an absent party. It was
mtht>r au attl'lnpt to estop the n<lmlnlstrator
from claiming any recovery against the company, to draw the estate of William Arm·
strong to a distant state for settl<>ment, and
an attempt to <'OntJl(•l the ndmlnh1tmtor to
lltiiratc, 11.guinst his will, In a l'l•nu11yl\·unla
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court, a controvel'IJY aft'.ectlng the estate, and
with another resident of Ohio; hence the
claaa of cases which treat proceedings lD
attachment as substantially proceedings In
rem have no application to the case at bar.
If the case made In the answer cannot be
treated as a suit In rem, It appears clear
that the judgment rendered la void, as
against the administrator, for want of ;Jurisdlctlon, at least, of bis penon. No support ls given tbat judgment by the constl1 tutlonal provlMlon, and the act of congresa
I of 1700 111u111ed pursuant to It, which gives In
all states the same faith and credit to a
· judgment of a state as It bas by law or
! usage In the courts of the state where ren· dered; for, whatsoever strict coDBtructlon
; was given that provh!lon by the earlier d&
' clslona, It Is now well seti.Jed that parties
I sought to be affected by a judgment ren' dered In another state are not precluded
from showing that the court wherein the
action was 11endlng had no jurisdiction, el: ther of subject-matter or of the person; for,
· In order to entitle a Judgment rendered to
SU<'h full faith and credit, the court must
I have had jurisdiction as well of parties as of
1 subjt'<'t-matter. The law on this point Is well
stated by Johnson, J., In Pennywlt v. Foote.
· 2i Ohio St. 618, as follows: "From a care: ful review of numerous cases, we ftnd the
1 rule now well settled that neither the con: stitutlonal provision that full faith and credIt shall be given In each state to tbe public
acts, records, and judicial proceedings of H'•
ery other state, nor th£ act of congre88 p&BB1 ed In pul'8uance thereof, prevents an Inquiry
Into the jurisdiction of the rourt In which the
1 Judgment offered in evlden<!e was rendered,
· al"d such a judgment may be contradicted
as to the facts neceBSary to give the court
jurisdiction; and, If It be shown that such
facts did not exist, record ·•.1n be a nullity,
I notwithstanding It may recite that they did
exist, and this Is true either as to the subJect-matter or the person, or In proceedings
In rem as to the thing." The l!ltate of l'ennsylvanla could not extend Its sovereignty In·
to the state of Ohio. It could not, In an actlon In personam, compel a citizen of this
' state to respond to the process of Its court.a
sprved In this state. "No sovereignty can
extend Its proceBS beyond Its own territorial
limits, to subjeet either person or property
to Its judicial de<'lslons. Every exertion of
authority of this sort beyond this limit Is a
mere nulllty, and Incapable of hindering such
person or property In any other tribunals."
Story, Conti. Laws, § 539. "The jurisdiction
of state courts ls limited by state lines, and
upon principle It Is difficult to see how an
order of court, set'ved upon a party out of
the state In which It ls IBSued, can have any
greatt>r elfPct than knowledgl brought homP
to the party In any other way. llere knowl·
edsce of the pendency of a suit In the courts
ot another state, without service of the procpi,is, or an appearance, ls not suftlclent, of

I

I
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\e\1.w ° ¢<-1'

The cf!“

me“ “Y a c°“smeYat\°!1 of the policy and

. mus 0‘ °“" Statute, which directs in

ﬁfmcounty 311 administrator may be sued.

gecmm 5031 °§ the Revised Statutes pro-

vmes that 11@'“°“5 against an cxecutor,'ad-

mmistrator, guardian. or trustee may be

\,..(,“g\\\ in the Cmlnty wherein he was ap-

pomted or resides, in which case summons

may issue to any county. When so careful

c0in~rom\se the rlgbte of the party
\\It\!., to~at~· Ewer v · Cotn.n, 1 Cush. 23.
' 11 ~: c0nc1¢on we have reached is streogtha consideration of the policy u.od
~:\:!DB ot our statute, which directs lo
what couiiU' an adm\n\strn.tor may be sued.
Section :)()31 of the Revised Statutes provldea ttiat actions against an executor,· ad·
mlnlstmtor, guardian, or trustee may be
\irought \n tbe county wherein be was appointed or rer.ldea, ln which case summons
may mue to any county. When so careful
a ;>rovlslon la made aa to the situs of suits

[Case

against administrators In this state, and
while, under the section referred to, thl11
widow would have been cootlned to the limit above Indicated In the bringing of an action In Ohio, to settle the rights of the parties to the amount due on the policy, It would
seem strange. Indeed, If she could, by choosing a court In another state, compel the ad·
mlnlstrator to follow her there to defend the
claims of the estate be represented.
•
We are of opinion that the demurrer to the
answer should have been 8U8talDed. ludgments reversed.
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0. provision is made as to the situs of suits

against administrators in this state, and

while, under the section referred to. this

widow would have been conﬁned to the lim-

it above indicated in the bringing of an ac-

tion in Ohio, to settle the rights of the par-

ties to the amount due on the policy, it would

seem strange. indeed, it she could, by choo-
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ing a court in another state, compel the ad-

ministrutor to tollow her there to defend the

claims of the estate he represented. _

We are of opinion that the demurrer to the

answer should have been sustained. Judg-

ments reversed.
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CARLISLE v. KILLEBltE\V.

UELEVANCY.

CARLISLE v. IULLEBHEW.
(6 South. 756, 89 Ala. 329.)
Supreme Court of Alabama. Nov. 26, 1889.

(6 South. 756, 89 Ala. 329.)

Supreme Court of Alabama. Nov. 26, 1889.

Appeal from circuit court, Dale county; J.

M. Carmichael, Judge.

This was an action of detinue,and was brought

by the ap llant, R. K. Carlisle, against the ap-

pellee. Jo n G. Killebrew, and sought to recov-

er certain crops taken from the premises by de-

fendant. On the defendant being examined as

a witness in his own behalf, he was asked by

his counsel to “state whether he was put in pos-

session by the sheriff of the lands upon which

the crops were raised." The plaintiff objected

to this question, the court overruled his objec-

tion, allowed the defendant to answer that he

was so put in possession, and the plaintiff ex-

cepted. The bill of exceptions recites: “The

defendant then oﬁered in evidence, for the pur-
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pose of identifying fraction 12, [the tract of

land on which the crops were alleged to have

been raised, and which are in controvery in this

suit,] a patent, regular on its face, from the

governor of Alabama to Thomas L. Smith, con-

veying said fraction 12. ' ‘ " Defendant

then introduced the deed from T. L. Smith to

M. N.Killebrew,conveying fraction 12 as afore-

said. Said deed was acknowledged and record-

ed as required by law." The plaintiff objected

to the introduction of both the patent and the

deed, and reserved an exception to each of the

court‘s rulings in admitting them. “The de-

fendant then introduced a certiﬁed plat of said

section 16 [in ‘which said fraction 12 is sit-

uated] from the oﬂice of the secretary of state,

to locate said fraction 12 as aforesaid. ” The plain-

tif! objected to the introduction of this certiﬁed

plat, the court overruled his ob'ection, and the

plaintiff dulv excepted. “Defen ant then intro-

uced Prof. McCartha. who swore he was a prac-

tical surveyor, and that he had in his hands an en-

larged plat, and which was an exact copy of lat

from secretary of state, and witness propo to

use said enlarged plat in locating fraction 12 forthe

juiz.” Whcreupon the plnintiﬂ objected to the

sai witness using the said enlarged plat. which

objection the court overruled, and the plaintiﬂ ex-

cepted.

After the eneral charge by the court, the plain-

tiﬂ reques the court to give the followingcharge,

which was in writing: “If plaintiff was in the act-

ual and peaceable possession, at the time theplain-

tiﬂ brought this suit, of the lands upon which the

crops were raised, and that defendant had entered

on said land and removed said crops without per-

mission of plaintiff, then the plaintiff must recover

in this action.” The court refused to give this

Appeal from circuit. court, Dale county; J.
M. Carmichael, Judge.
This was an action of detinue, and was brought
by the appellant, R. K. Ce.rlisle, against the appellee, John C. Killebrew, and sought to recover certain crops taken from the premises by defcnda nt. On the defrn1lnnt bl'iug examined 88
a witness in his own behalf, he was asked b;y
his counsel to "11tate whether he was put In po1111e1111ion by the sheriff of the lands upon which
the crops were raised." The plaintiff objected
to this question, the court overruled hie objection, allowed the deff'ndnnt to answer that he
Wll8 so put in possession, and the plaintiff ex·
cepted. The bill of exceptions recites: "The
defendant then offered In evidence, for the purp08e of identifying fraction 12, [the tract of
land on which the crops were alleged to have
been raised, and which are in controYery in this
suit,] a patent, regular on its face, from the
governor of Alabama to Thomas L. !'mith, conveying said fraction 12. • • • Defendant
then introduced the deed from T. L. Smith to
M. N.Killebrew,conveylng fraction 12 as aforesaid. Said deed was acknowledged and recorded 88 required by law." The plaintiff objected
to the introduction of both the patent and the
deed, and reserved an exci>ptlon to each of the
court's rulings in admitting them. "Thi> defendant then introduced a certified plat of said
section 16 [in "Which said fraction 12 i11 11itunted] from the office of the sPcretary of state,
to locate 11airl fraction 12 n11 aforesaid." The plaintiff objected to the introduction of this certified
plat, the court overrl)led hl11 objection, and the
plaintiff dulv excepted. "Defendant then introduced Prof. Mccartha, who 11wore he was a praotical surveyor, and thnt he had in his hands an enlarged plat, and which was an exact copy of plat
from secretary of state, and witness proposed to
use said enlarged plat in locating fraction 12 for the
jury." Whereupon the plaintiff objected to the
said wttness using the aald enlarged plat, which
objection the court overruled, and the plaintiff excepted.

After the general charge by the court, the plaintiff requested the court to give the following charge,
which was In writing: "If plaintiff was in the actual and peaceable po1111ession, at the time the plaint.Ur brought this 11uit, of the lands upon w)Jich the
orops were raised, and that defendant had entered
on said land and removed said crops without permission of plaintiff, then the plaintiff must recover
in this action." The court refused to give this
charge, and the plaintiff duly excepted. The defendant then requested the court to give the fol·
lowing charge, In writing, to the jury: "When
Carlisle in the defense of the suit brought by Killebrew for fraction 12, disclaimed being In possession of fraotion 12, this disclaimer devolved upon
the jury the duty of ascertaining whether or not
he was In possession of fraction 12,and if thejudgment rendered was against Carlisle on the disclaimer, and in favor of Killebrew for rent, Carlisle is estopped by the judgment from saying that
he was not in possession of fraction 12, or that he
was not in possession of the particular piece of
land sued for as fraction 12, if It was embraced In
his disclaimer." The court gave this charge, and
the plaintiff reserved an ex<'eptlon to such giving by
the court. There was judgment for the defendant.
The plalntlft now prosecutes this appeal, and as
sign11 the various rulings of the court below as error.
A. L. Jlillegan, JI. E. Mlllegan, and H.
L. Martin, for appeilant. H. H. Blackman,
for appellee.

charge, and the plaintiff duly excepted. The de-

fendant then requested the court to give the fol-

lowing charge, in writing, to the jury: “When

Carlisle, in the defense of the suit brought by Kil-

lebrew for fraction 12, disclnimed being in posses-

sion of fraction 12, this disclaimer devolved upon

the jury the duty of ascertaining whether or not

he was in ossession of fraction 12, and if thejudg-

ment ren cred was against Carlisle on the dis-

claimer, and in favor of Killebrew for rent, Car-

lisle is estopped by the judgment from saying that

SOMERVJI,LE, J. The defendant, Killetirew, the Kpprllee in this C'l\Se, had, prior to
the present suit, recovered certain premisea
148

from the plaintiff, Carlisle, in a real action lo
the nature of ejectment. He was formally put
in possession by the sberitt under a writ or
pos.<Jession, and under such claim of righ~
gathered and appropriated the crops of cotton, corn, and fodder growing on the land.
Carlisle afterwards took possession ot the
land without resort to the courts, and brought
the present action in deti n ue to recover the
crops taken away by Killeurew.
1. The general rule of the common law is
that one who recovers land in ejectment is
entitled to the crops then growing on the premises, they being rPg1mled as pa1·t and p11rcel
of the realty. McLean v. Bovee, 24 Wis.
295; Page v. Fowler, 39 Cal. 412; Thweat v.
:Stamps, 67 Ala. 96. In other words, "as between the successful plaintiff In Kn action of
ejectment and the e\'icted defen<lant, growing
crops are a part of the realty." Van Alen
v. Rogers, 1 Amer. Dec. ll3, note, 116.
The statutes of Alabam:l modify this principle only tiy providing that, if the defendant in ejectment has a crop planted or growing on the premises recovered from him by
&he plaintiff, he may stay the writ of possession until the expiration of the year, by giving bond Rnd sureties to the plaintiff to secure the rent to him, which is dech1red tohave the force and effect of a judgment upon the defendant's failure to pay the rent at
the ex pi mtion or the year. Code 1886, §~
fu712, 2713. No such bond ha\'ing been gi\·en in this case, this statute can h1tve no bearJn~ on the rights of the parties litigant.
2. The main qnPslion ln the present suit is.
whether the defendant, Killelmiw, c:in tie permitted to introduce in evidence, in lbisactlon
for the crops severed from the freehold, the
ju1lgment of recovery in ejectment, and, It
so, what force as evidence this judgment will
exert. It is insisted by the appellant that
the court below erred in admitting this judgment, and the writ of possession issued on
it, because the question or title to the land
cannot be litigated in a personal action, and
tor the furthi.>r 1·eason that, at common law,
a prior judgment in ejectment was not admissihle in a s11use•]11tmt suit between the
same parties. The former principle, applied
to this case, operates to preclude the plaintiff, Carlisle, from challenging the defendant's right of possession and title acquired
under bis judgment in ejectment. Beatty v.
Brown, 76 Ala. 2t:i7; StringCellow v. Curry.
lei. 394. The latter rule is so stated by some
of the old write1 s, and is ba~Pd upon the use
of lictitious narne11 in the action of ejectment
proper, which is still tolerated in our form of
practice. llut this is not a second action of
ejectment in which it is sought to use as evidence a jmtgment recovered in a former action. 'fhe present is a personal action, and
the rule applies, as against the plaintiff himself, that he cannot collaterally raise the qnestion of title to the land by way of showing
lnddentally his right to the crops se\'E'l"ed
from the freehold. .Martin v. Thowpson, 12()

U. S. 376, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 586.

JUDGMENTS.
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‘O bar‘ further

in eject“!

P‘“°\_‘°.°' “me! the statute. it re-

w“hct's and judgments for the

suit by the plaintiff

pt, °Y‘“\% V681 action in the nature

of e-1w,“en$- Q-$19 13815. § 2714. But where

the qusﬂoﬂ ° 1\3\e arises collaterally, as in

M ad‘-,0“ ioi‘ mt‘-9l\e proﬁts, or otherwise, the

record 05 3 r6¢°V_9T§' In ejectrnent is not only

adm-,S._,-Me in evidence in favor of the party

put in po5S€SSl0ll under it, but is conclusive

bewme“ the same parties. and their privies,

on the same title. RS to the question of pos-

session and title. Shumake v. Nelms, 25 Ala.

126; Howard V. Kennedy, 4 Ala. 592; Van

Alen v. Rogers. 1 Amer. Dec. 113, note, 116;

2 Greenl. Ev. § 333; Camp v. Forrest. 13 Ala.
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114; 6 Amer. &. Eng. Cyciop. Law. 245q;

Chime v. R»-inecker, 2‘. Pet. 613, 622: Equa-

tor Co. v. Hall. 106 U. S. 86, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep.

128; Caperton v. Schmidt, 85 Amer. Dec. 187,

note, 208. The judgment recovered in the

ejectment suit involved the title and right

of possession of the parties to the present suit

to the same lands, upon which the crops in

dispute were at the time growing, and was

conclusive on collateral attack as lo the title

of the lands, and therefore of the growing

crops which were a part of the freehold at

the time of recovery.

3. The plat of fraction 12 in dispute, pro-

in KN‘

posed to be introduced by the plaintiﬁt‘, was .

ruled out by the court as inadmissible. This ,

was alleged to be the “original plat” of this

land given to the plaintiff as such by the sec-

retary of state. No legal proof was made on

this point, however, and the paper is not be-

fore us for inspection. We cannot say that the

trial court erred in excluding it from the jury.

4. We do not judicially know that thejudg-

ment of ejectment for the recovery of "frac-

tion 12, a part of the S. E. 1 and [of] N. E.

1 sec. 16, T. 4, R. 4, containing 34 75-100

acres,” was void for uncertainty. on the

ground that no such land exists. The record

shows that it was surveyed by the county

surveyor, and was found primu facie correct.

Moreover. the objection taken to the admis-

sion of this judgment, and other parts of the

record accompanying it, was so general and

undefined in its character that it was compe-

tent for the court to ignore it; no ground

of objection whatever being particularized.

Dryer v. Lewis, 57 Ala. 551; March v. Eng-

land, 65 Ala. 275; Steele v. Tutwiler, 57 Ala.

113.

i sec. 16, T. 4, R. 4. containing 34 75-100
'11lrdicts and judgments for the acres," was void for unct1rtainty, on the
1\1\\t~ t. t to bal further suit by the plaintiff ground that no such land exists. The record
d11t11n\\.\\n
· l action in the nature
'
. . ..... ent • or tne tea
shows that it was surveyed by the county
1U e1ec~...C0 d e 188.6 • R 2714 But where sur\•eyor, and was found primafacie correct.
·
t'""ent·
ot e1ee ,..
t t"tl
i
li
.
.
the uest.\on O 1 e ar ses collaterally, as m .M01·eover, the objection taken to the admisan ii:ul)n tor mesne J?l'C\fl_ts. 01' otherwise, the sion of this judgment, and other pal'ts of the
record ot a recovery in e1ootment is not only record accomp1mying it, was so general 11nd
admissible \n l'V\dence in favor of the party undt>tlned in its character that it was compeput \n po88ession under it, but is conclusive tent for the court to ignore it; no ground
betwet!n tbe same parti1·s. and their privies. of objection whatever being particulnrized.
on the same title, as to the question of pos- Dryer v. Lewis, 57 Ala. 551; March v. Engsession and title. Shumake v. Nelms, 25 Ala. land, 65 Ala. 275; Steele v. Tutwiler, 57 .Ala.
126: Howard v. KenneJy. 4: Ala. 592; Van 113.
Alen v. Rogers. 1 Amer. Dec.113, note, 116;
5. The other evidence to which objection
2 Greenl. Ev.§ 333; Camp v. Forrest, 13 Aha. was taken by appellant was a•lruissible to ex114; 6 Amer. & Eng. Cyclop. Law, 245q; plain the extent of defendant's possession,
Chirac v. R..ineckl'r, ~ Pet. 613, 622; Equa- and to ldt!ntify the lands on which the crops
tor Co. v. Hall. 106 U.S. 86, 1 Sup. Ct. Hep. in dispute were grown.
128; Caperton v. Schmidt, 85 Amer. Dec.187.
6. The court did not err in refusing to admit
note, 208. 'fhe judgment recovered In the in evidence the verdict and judgment in the
ejectment suit involved the title and right criminal prosecutiQSI instituted by Killebrew
of possession of the parties to the present suit against the plaintilY, Carlisle, for removing
to the same lands, upon which the crops in the crops, in which the latter was acquitted
dispute were at the time growing, and was by the presiding magistrate. .A verdict and
conclusive on collateral attal'k as to the title jurlgment in ll criminal case is not generally
of the lands, and therefore of the growing evidence of the fact upon which the judgcrops which were a part of the freehold at , ment was founded in a civil proceeding. 1
the time of recovery.
I Starkie, Ev. (Sharswoorl) •36:J-365.
3. The plat of fraction 12 In dispute, pro- \ 7. So the judgment of the m11gistrate showposed to be introduced by the plainLiff, was '. ing a recovery of damages by Carlisle against
ruled out by the court as inadmissiule. This ! Killebrew in the action of malicious prosecuwas alleged to be the "original plat" of thiis tion, based on the prosecution last referred
land given to the plalntitr as such by the sec- to, i11 not shown to involve the determinat•on
retary of state. No legal proof wits m11de on of any fact relevant to the present issues.
this point, however, and the paper is not ht-- The judgment of acquittal, moreover, in the
fore us for inspection. We cannot say that the Cl"iminal case. upon which the case of malitrial court erred in excluding it from the jury. cious prosecution was based, being inadmis4. We do not judicially know that the judg- sible as above stated, the latter proceeding
ment of ejectment for the recovery of "frac- must. also be excluded. We find no error in
tion 12, a part ot the S. E. i and [of] N. E. the record, and the judgment is affirmed.
\~

. '0

5. The other evidence to which objection

was taken by appellant was admissible to ex-

plain the extent of defendant’s possession,

and to identify the lands on which the crops

in dispute were grown.

6. The court did not err in refusing to admit

in evidence the verdict and judgment in the

criminal prosecution instituted by Killehrew

against the plaintiff, Carlisle, for removing

ut l'rac\.ic.e. under the statute. it re-

0
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BELEVANCY.

Cue No. a:J]
NEgDHAM v. THAYER.

Case No. 53]

RELE VANCY.

(18 N. E. 4:.!9, 147 Ma1111. 036.)
NEEDIIAM v. THAYER.

(18 N. E. 429, 147 Mass. 536.)

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

Hampshire. Oct. 22, 1888.

Exceptions from superior court, Hampshire

county; Dunbar, Judge.

Action upon a judgment obtained by plain-

tiff in the superior court in 1874. The an-

swer alleged, that at the time of the service

of the writ in the suit in which the judgment

was recovered defendant was an inhabitant

of the state of Connecticut, and had no no-

tice of the commencement of the action, or its

pB1l(i0ll('_\'; and that he was not indebted to

plaintiff in the amount for which judgment

was rendered. The court admitted, against

defendant's objection, the record of the for-

mer suit, and excluded evidence in support of

the allegations of the answer. The court
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found for plaintiff, and defendant excepted.

Supreme Judicial Court of :MassachUBetta.
Hamr1t1bire. Oct. 22, 1888.
Exceptions from superior court, Hampshire
rounty; Dunbar, Judge.
Action upon a judgment obtained by plaintUr in the superior court In 1874. The
swer alleged, that at the time of the service
of the writ In the 11ult In wblch the Judgment
\V&S recovered defendant was an Inhabitant
ot the state of Connecticut, and had no noUce of the <."Ommencement of the action. or lt11
peocleu(·y; and that he was not Indebted to
plulntll'C In the amount for which judgment
was rendered. The court admitted, against
defendant'R objection. the record of the former suit, and excluded evidence In support of
the allegations of the am1wer. The eourt
found for plalntltr, and defendant enepted.

an-1

•

D. W. Bond, for defendant.
Spellman, for plalntltr.

Maynard &

D. W. Bond, for defeifdant.

Spellman, for plaintiff.

MORTON. C. J . The question of the validi-

ty of a judgment rendered by a court of this

state against a defendant, who was not a

resident of the state, and who was not served

personally with process within the state, was

considered in Eliot v. McCormick, 144 Mass.

10, 10 N. E. 705. In that case this court, foi-

lowing the decisions in the supreme court of

the United States, held that such judgment

contravened the fourteenth article of the

amendments of the constitution of the Unit-

ed States, and was invalid, and would be re-

versed upon a writ of error. The case at bar

presents the question whether, in a suit in

this state upon such a judgment, the defend-

ant nniy show, by plea and proof, that it is

invalid. The recent cases in the supreme

court of the United States go upon the ground

that a judgment in personam against a per-

son who is not a resident of the state, who

150
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Maynard & '

l

has not been personally served with process,

and who has not appeared, is wholly void,

and that no suit can be nmintained on it,

either in the same or in any other court. Pen-

noyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. T14, T32; Freeman v.

Ald9l‘S0l1, 119 U. S. 185, 7 Sup. Ct. 165. The

court has no jurisdiction, and its judgment

has no force, either in the state in which it

was rendered, or in any other state. This

being so, the judgment cannot be enforced

by a suit upon it; and the non-resident de-

fendant cannot be deprived of his right to

show by plea and proof, if such suit is

brought. that the judgment is void, without

an abridgement of his privileges and immuni-

ties, to protect which was the object of the

fourteenth article of amendment. To com-

pel him to resort to our courts by a writ of

error, in which he must ﬁle a bond if he

would obtain a stay of the execution, is to

impose a burden upon him, and thus to

abridge his privileges and immunities. It has

has not been personally aerved with process.
and who bas not appeared, ls wholly void,
and that no suit can be mhlntalned on It,
eltht>r In the same or In any other court. Pennoyer v. ~etr, 95 U. S. 714, 732; ~·reeman v.
J Alderson, 119 U. S. 18.i, 7 Sup. Ct. 165. The
: court has no jurisdiction, and Its judgment
I has no force, either In the state In which It
was rendered, or In any other state. This
being so, the Judgment cannot be enforced
I by a suit upon It; and the non-resident deI fendant <'llnnot be deprived of his right to
, llbow by 11lt-a and proof, If 11uch suit Is
brought, that the jt11l!l"mt>nt Is void, without
an abridgement of his prl vllrges and lmmunl! ties, to protect whl<'h was the object of the
I fourteenth article of amendment. To compel him to resort to our rourts by a writ of
l error, In which be must ftle a bond If he
' would obtain a stay of the execution! Is to
I Impose a burden upon him, and thus to
I abrld!l"e his prl\"lleges and Immunities. It bas
J been hehl In man:\· <·ases that a domestic Judg·
ment (•unnot be impea<•be<l by plea and proof
In a suit brought upon it, because the proper
1 remedy
Is a writ of error. Hendrick v.
Whittemore, 105 Ma88. 26, and cases cited.
But' while a state may make laws binding Its
own citizens, requiring them to rellOrt to a
writ of error, It cannot so bind C'ltlzens of
other states. The case of McCormick v.
Fiske, 138 MasR. 379, seems opposed to our
views. But In that case the question of the
etrect of the fourteenth article of amendment
was not raised or suggt>.sted to the court, aml
therefore Is not considered. In the <'ase at
bar the effect of that amendment Is Involved.
The defendant's answer sets up that, at the
time when the original suit was brought
J against him, be was a non-reshlent, and that
no service was made upon him. We are of
the opinion that be bad the right to Impeach
the judgment by proof of these facts, and
that the ruling rejecting such evidence was
erroneous. Exceptions sustained.

MORTON, C. J. The question of the valldlty of a judgment rendered by a court of this
state against a defendant, who was not a
resident of the state, and who was not served
pel'80nally wltb process within the state, was
(•onsldered lo Eliot v. :McCormick, 144 Ma88.
10, 10 ~. E. 1o;;. In that case this court, following the dedslons In the supreme court of
the l'nlted States, held that such judgment
contravened the fourteenth article of the
amendments of the constitution of the United States, and was Invalid, and would be reversed upon a writ of error. The case at bar
presents the question whether, In a suit In
this Rtate upon such a judgment, the defendant way show, by plea and proof, that It ls
Invalid. The recent cases In the supreme
court of the United States go upon the ground
that a judgment In personam against a peraon who Is not a resident of the state, who
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GENERAL REPUTATION.
GENERAL REPUTATION.

O'BRIEN v. FR.A.::o;IER.

ot money placed to her credit in her bank-

(\ ~t\. ~~. 47 N. J. Law, 349.)

book, but that she swore falsely with respect
to the amount of cash she had paid to him,
and that the magistrate before whom he had
laid bis complaint, from a misconception of
his statement, inserted the former Instead of
the lattet accusation, and that he had ignorantly taken the oath in that form. This offer ot proof was rejected by the court, and,
in effect, the defendant was not allowed to
prove that be believed that the plaintlft' bad
perjured herself In her allegation of the
amount of cash she bad paid to him, and
that his purpose had been to charge her with
that olTense.
Tbe circumstances ot the case are peculiar;
but, upon reflection, I am satisfied that the
testimony thus shut out was admissible. It
ls not rcganled as legal, on the ground stated
in tbe brier of counsel, which was that it
helped to support the defendant's statement
that 11e had not meant to make the particular accusations contained In his aflidavit;
for such a collateral issue could not be interpolated merely by way of contlrmatlon. But
It Is conceived that lt was legitimate evidence, as it was an essential part ot the defense interposed. The case was In this situation: The defendant's aftldavlt bad been
produced. and It bad been proved that Its
crlminatlon was without foundation, and
without color of foundation. This the defendant admitted, and he thereby confessed
that he had made a faille charge of crime
against the plalntlft', resting on no probable
cause, and that by reason ot such Improper
action on bis part she had been an-ested and
Imprisoned. It the case had been closed at
this point, the jury would have been constrained in right reason to find, not only that
the prosel:utlon had been founded in falsehood to the knowledge of the defendant, but
that it was consequently malicious, and thus
hie llablllty would have ensued. In this posture of a.ft'alrs the defendant could not controvert the fact that the charge that he had
In point of tact sworn to was false and without foundation, but It was still open for him
to dlsp1-ove the Inference that would have
necessarily resulted from the admitted facts
that he had put the law In motion against
the plalutlf! from a malicious motive.
The exlstt>uce ot an llleJ."81 Intention In
this action was as essential to Its support
as we1·e the fabiity of the crlmlnatlon and
the absence of reasonable ground for a belief In Its truth. In order to manifest a
legal motive tor his conduct, the oft'er was
made to tbe elTect that the charge that he
had meaut to make was one touching a
di!Terent matter, and that such latter ln·
culpation was true according to his belief.
It will be observed that If this had been tbe
true attitude of the defendant, that ls, reasonnhly belle\"lng that the plaintlft' had committed the crime ot perjury In the particular
sought to be shown, and he had taken steps
in behalf of public justice to call her to
151

[Case No. 54

Snore

O‘BRmN "- FRAsn-:R.

(1 Pm" “¥°"'5- 4'? N- J. Law, 349.)

me C°‘“'t °£ New Jersey. Nov. 5, 1885.

of °ﬂ°r'

‘git suit was {OT B malicious prosecution.

The ¢ec\ara'ii°!1 Set forth, in the usual form,

the $005 ch111‘9-Qter of the plaintiff, and that

the Qgfeﬂﬂﬂuti intending to injure her in her

fame and cl-‘edlii without any reasonable

cause, made a charge of perjury against her,

and so caused her arrest and imprisonment

in the county jail until she was discharged

on account of no indictment having been

found against her by the grand jury; that

by means of these facts she was greatly in-

jured in her said credit and reputation, and

brought into public scandal, infamy, and dis-

grace, etc. The plea was the general issue.

Su~-retne court of New Jersey. Nov. 5, 188r..
Wr\t of enor.

Tb.e suit was for a mnJ.tclous prosecution.
The declaration set forth, in the usual form,
the good cb1lracter of the plnlntHr, and that
the defendant, intending to injure her In her
fame and credit without any reasonable
eause, made a charge of perjury against her,
and l!O caused her arrest and imprisonment
ln the county jail until she was dl11charged
on account of no indictment having been
found against her by the grand jury; that
by means of these facts she was greatly injured in her said credit and reputation, and
brought Into public scandal, Infamy, and disgrace, etc. The plea was the general Issue.
Stevenson & Ryle, for plaintiff in error.
A. M. Ward, for defendant in error.
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Stevenson & Ryle, for plaintiﬁf in error.

A. M. Ward, for defendant in error.

Bl'JASi.EY, C. J. The bills of exceptions

sent up with the writ in this case present

three points for adjudication. These several

propositions will be considered in the order

in which they stand in the brief of the coun-

sel of this plaintiff in error. The basis of

the suit was the arrest and imprisonment of

the plaintiff on an affidavit made by the de-

fendant containing a charge oi‘ perjury, and

which charge, it was asserted, had been

made falsely, maliciously, and without prob-

able cause. The false swearing thus imput-

ed to the plaintiff consisted in a statement

made by her under oath, in a suit between

herself and the defendant, that a certain

bank-book which she had turned over to the

defendant contained a credit of a certain

sum due from the bank to her. Upon the

strength of this aﬂidavit a justice issued a

warrant, and the plaintiif had been arrested

and imprisoned until she was discharged in

consequence of the grand jury failing to ﬁnd

an indictment against her. At the trial of

the cause it was admitted by the counsel of

the defendant that the statements of this

aﬂidavit were altogether untrue, and that

there had been no probable cause for the

arrest and imprisonment of the plaintiff on

that particular charge; and the defense was

that, although he signed the aﬂidavlt upon

which the warrant issued, he did uch act by

mistake; that the charge which he intended

to make was of a dilferent character;

what he meant to dcpose was that the plain-

tiif, on the trial referred to, had sworn false-

ly with respect to a certain amount of cah

she had given him, and not, as it stood in his

affidavit, that she had falsiﬁed touching the

contents of the bank-book which she had

transferred to him. In this aspect the de-

fendant was permitted at the trial, when he

was on the witness stand, to testify that he

(lid not intend to charge in his aﬂidavit that

the plaintiff swore falsely as to the amount

that_

of money placed to her credit in her bank-

book, but that she swore falsely with respect

[Case No. 54

BEASLEY, C. J. Tbe bills of exceptions
sent up with the writ In this case present
three points for adjudication. These several
propol!litions will be considered in the order
In which they stand In the brief ot the counsel of this plalntUf In error. The basis ot
the suit was the arrest and Imprisonment of
the plaintiff on an aftldavlt mulle by tbe defendant containing a charge of perjury, and
which charge, it was asserted, had been
made falsely, maliciously, and without probable cause. Tl1e false swearing thus !Inputed to the plaintlft' consisted in a statement
made by her under oath, in a suit between
herself and the defendant, that a certain
bank-book which she had turned over to the
defendant contained a credit of a certain
sum due from the bank to her. Upon the
strength of this aftldavlt a justice issued a
warrant, and the plalntUI had been arrested
a.nd imprisoned untll she was discharged In
consequence of the grand jury tailing to find
an indictment against her. At tbe trial of
the eause It was admitted by the cotm11el of
the defendant that the statement11 of tbl11
affidavit were altogether untrue, and thn t
there had been no probable cause tor the
arrest and Imprisonment of the plalntlft' on
that particular charge; and the defense was
that, although he signed the atfidavlt upon
which the warrant issued, he did such act by
mistake; that tbe charge which he intended
to make was ot a dllferent character; that
what he meant to depose was that tbe plain-·
Ulf, on the trial referred to, had sworn falsely with respect to a certain amount of cash
she had given him, and not, as it stood In his
n1ftdavlt, that she had falsified touching the
contents of the bank-book which she had
transferred to him. In this aspect the defendant was permitted at the trial, when he
was on the witness stand, to testify that he
did not Intend to charge In hie aftldavlt that
the plaintiff swore falsely as to the amount

Case No. 54]
Case No. 54]

liELE VANOY.

account, and in that course of law a mis-

take in the atiidavit had supervened, it is

clear that, no matter how negligent he had

been, his motive had not been illegal. Proof

of the naked fact that one charge had been

substituted for another would not of itself

have been a defense to the action, because

it would not have exhibited a legal motive

for the defendant's conduct. It would have

been consistent with such a state oi’ proof

that he had been actuated in the aifair either

by a legal or illegal inducement to the course

taken. In order to test the principle, sup-

pose the defendant had proved that he had

intended to charge a crime upon the plain-

tiff which he knew she had not committed.

but that by mistake he had charged a diﬂ’er-

ent offense, and had caused her imprison-

ment for it, would such proof have been a
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defense to this action? Such a contention

very plainly would not have availed. The

defendant could not escape responsibility by :

the subterfuge that the unintended and not '

the intended falsehood had worked the

plaintiff injury. On this side of the case

the question is whether the defendant's

motive was illegal with respect to the course

of law leading to the arrest of the plaintiff,

rather than to the particular mode of pro-

cedure that was adopted. No reason sug-

gests itself why the doctrine should be

made a part of the legal system that when

a person has been subjected to the sulfering

and ignominy to which the plaintiff was

subjected. such person is to be without re-

dress if, through the inadvertence or negli-

gence of the prosecutor, a mistake has been

fallen into with respect to the particular

charge which it was intended to make, no

matter how improper or vicious the purpose

of such prosecutor may have been. As the

case stood before the court below, it had

appeared that the charge made was false;

that there had been no reasonable cause for

beiieving it to be true‘; and the conclusion

is that unless the defendant could show that

his motive for putting the prosecution on

foot was not malicious, that is, was not

such a motive as the law prohibited, the

action was sustained. There was error,

therefore, in rejecting the testimony in ques-

tion.

The second objection urged against the

proceedings at the trial also arises from the

exclusion of proofs offered by the defend-

ant. The defendant. desirous, apparently,

to disparage the general reputation of the

plaintiff in point of morals, asked of a wit-

ness the following question: “Do you know

the reputation of Mrs. Frasier in the city of

Paterson?" This interrogatory, in the form

stated, was overruled; the court directing

the counsel to make the inquiry more spe-

ciﬂc. The following interrogatories were

then propounded, and were successively

overruled, to-wit: “Are you acquainted with

the general reputation, among her neigh-

bors and acquaintances, of the plaintiff?

UELEVA.NOY.

account, and In that course of law a mtstake ln the attldavlt bad supervened, It 18
clear that, no matter how negligent be had
been, his motive had not been Illegal. Proof
ot the naked tact that one charge had been
substituted tor another would not ot Itself
have been a defense to the action, because
it would not have exhibited a legal motive
tor the defendant's conduct. It would have
been consistent with such a state ot proof
that he had been actuated In the alralr either
by a legal or Illegal Inducement to the com°l!e
taken. In order to test the principle, suppose the defendant had proved that he had
Intended to charge a crime upon the plalntta which he knew she had not committed.
hut that by mistake he had <•barged a dlfl'erent offense, and had caused her Imprisonment tor It, would such proof have been a
defense to this action? Such a contention
very plainly would not ha,·e availed. The
defendant could not escape reeponslblllty by
the subterfuge that the unintended and not
the Intended falsehood had workPd the
plalntUf Injury. On this side of tilt" <·ase
the question ls whether the defendant's
motive was Illegal with respect to the course
ot law leading to the arrest of the plalntltf,
rather than to the particular mode ot procedu1-e that was adopted. ~o reason suggests itself why the doctrine should be
made a part of the legal system that when
a person has been subjected to the 1mtrerlng
and Ignominy to which the plalntltr was
subjected, such person ls to be without redreSB It, through the Inadvertence or negligence of the prosecutor, a mistake has been
fallen Into with respect to the particular
charge which It was intended to make, no
matter how Improper or vicious the purpose
of such prosecutor may have been. As the
case stood before the court below, It had
appeared that the charge made was false;
that there had been no reasonable cause tor
believing It to be true; and the conclusion
le that unless the defendant could show that
his motive tor putting the prosecution on
toot was not malicious, that le, was not
11ucb a motive as thi! law prohibited, the
action was sustained. There was error,
therefore, In rejecting the testimony In question.
The second objection urged against the
proceedings at the trial also arises from the
exclusion of proofs offered by the defendant. The defendant. desirous, apparently,
to disparage the general reputation of the
plalntllf In point of morals, asked ot a wltuess the following question: "Do you know
the reputation ot l\lrs. Frasier In the city of
Patersop?" This lute1Togatory, in the form
stated, was overruled; the court directing
the counsel to make the Inquiry more specific. The following Interrogatories were
then propounded, and were successively
overruled, to-wit: "Are you acquainted with
the geueral reputation, among her neighbors &nd acquaintances, of the plaintiff? .

iu2

Do you know whether the plalntta h8.8 been
charged with crime prior to the complalnt
wWch Yr. O'Brien made agalDSt her? Are
you acquainted with the general reputation
which the plalntttrhadamongher friends and
neighbors prior to the time that Yr. O'Brien
made his charge against her? Do you know
whether, prior to the charge that Mr. O'Brien
made against her, the defendant had olr
talned and acquired the good opinion and
credit of her neighbors? Are you acquainted with the reputation which .Mrs. Frasier
had, prior to Mr. O'Brlen·s charge against
her, for virtue?"
vnth respect to these Inquiries, two topics
are discussed ln the briefs ot counsel: 1''1rst,
whether the general character of the plalntllf In that action was open to attack; and,
second, this being answered In the aftlrmatlve, whether the Interrogatories, or any of
them, which were addressed to the witness
were In due form.
Touching the ftrst subject, It ls conceived that when a plalnttfl' In a suit for malicious p1"0secution founds his action In part
on an Injury done to his character by such
prosecution, that the legal rule is quite
settled that he thereby puts Ws general
charal'ter In Issue. As long ago as the case
ot Sa¥11e v. Roberts, reported In 1 Ld. Raym.
374, J..ord Holt, In deftnlng the damages
which wlll support a suit of this charncter,
states, as his first <'lass, those lnstanet>S
where the only Injury conMlsts In the ··damage to a man's fame, as It the matter whereof he ls accused be scandalous." It wou~d
seem to follow, thl'retore. that whenever tht"
action ls used as a ml"ans of reparation for
an Injury In whole or In part done to his
chara<'ter, the plaintiff In such procedure
must stand in precisely the same attitudethat the actor In an action tor libel or slander assumes, and ln the latter class of cases
It has been adjudged In this court that the
general bad character of the plaintiff at the
time of the alleged grievance ls admissible
on the part of the defense in mitigation of
damages. The case Indicated ls that of
Sayre v. Sayre, ~ N. J. Law, 235, In whl<'h
Chief Justice Green reviews the English
and American decisions on this subject, and
finally deel.a.n>s the claSB of evidence In question Is admh~1dble In mitigation of damages,
on the broad ground ''that It cannot be just
that a man ot infamous cllftracter should,
for the same libelous matter, be entitled to
equal damages with the man of unblemished
reputation." It is al8o to be noted In this
connection that In bis dlM<.'uS11lon of thla
subject the accurate jurist just mentioned
evidently considered the action tor mallcloUB
prosecution based on an Injury to charal"ter
as In part mnterla with the action for libel
or slander, and refers to both procedures
throughout hla opinion as resting on the
same general principle. And, Indeed, It does
not seem to be deniable that a mallclous
prosecution for an lndlctable and odloU&

GENERAL UEl'UT.A.TION'.
GENERAL REPUTATION. [Case No. 54

mm" to which is, in some cases,

6 illegal im

Prlsonment and the loss

\S tJ. l\bel, to 'Wb\eh ta. In some eases,
<ll~ dde<l 11\ega.\ imprisonment and the 1088
~t9' ~1 • BO that lt would be quite ab-0t \lta\)('
the .........
•

a\ fot'

-.&Ue court to declare that

~\\e actions tor Ubel the plalntllf's char-

\

‘:)\t“\“t:“e\-ti’ so that it would be quite ab-

““€ma\ got me Sam? court to declare that

m me actwns ml‘ hh‘~‘-\ the plaintiifs char-

acm -,5 la isms‘, but in actions for malici-

thus framed embraces other than moral

traits of character. It would not be easy

to put the inquiry in a shape at once suc-

cinct and yet comprehensive, so as not to

be open to such a subtle objection, for the

line that separates what is immoral from

oh-nsﬂ ‘B

0“ “Net-\\tl0ns it is not in issue. And the

dec1S1,,,, 3ust referred to appears to accord

Wm, me great weight of autiiorities, as

will plainly ﬂDiJ9ﬂ1' bl‘ reference to any of

the leading text-books treating of the sub-
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jeep 1 Whart. Ev. § 54; Bacon v. Towne,

4 Cusll. 211'; Fitzgibbon v. Brown, 43 .\ie.

169. Evidence as to the bad moral char-

acter of the plaintiff was, it is considered,

plainly admissible in mitigation of damages.

Whether such testimony would have been

proper, if such issue had been presented on

the facts, as a circumstance going to make

up a reasonable cause for the conduct of the

defendant is a question not now sub judice.

With regard to the other branch of thi-

suhject, it seems to me that the form of

some of the questions put to the witness

were unobjectionable. It was not merely

the bad character of the plaintiff on the

point in which it had been viliiied that was

subject to discussion, but her character gen-

erally with respect to morals. That the in-

quiry has .this scope was fully considered and

declared in the case just referred to of

Sayre v. Sayre. Consequently the interrog-

atory thus phrased, “Are you acquainted

‘with the general reputation which the plain-

tiff had among her friends and neighbors

prior to the time that Mr. 0’Brien made his

charge against her?" would seem to have

been all that the rules of practice require.

According to common usage the phrase re-

fers to the general moral character oi‘ the

person referred to, and it seems to savor ‘

of hypercritlcism to suggest that a question

What is indecorous is oftentimes exceedingly

indeﬁnite and indistinct. it will be found,

by referring to the language of the judges

as found in the reports, that the expressions

“bad character" and “general reputation"

are constantly used to signify character and

reputation with regard to morals. And if

this matter were in doubt. the other ques-

tion which was propounderi and overruled,

in the words, “Are you acquainted with the

reputation which Mrs. Frasier had, prior to

Mr. 0'Brien's charge against her, for vir-

tue?” was suﬁiciently specific; for the in-

quiry necessarily tested the knowledge of

the witness with reference to the general

moral standing of the plaintiif in public esti-

mation. The result is that these two ques-

tions were improperly overruled.

actet \e \ll \11Sue, but in actions for malicious \lrose<·ut\ona lt is not ln Issue. And the
decl.11\an )USt referred to appears to ae<..'Ord
with tbe great weight or a.utb011tles, as
w\U p\alnlY appear by reference to any of
the \ea.diJlg text-books treating of the subject. 1 Wbart. Ev. I M; Ba<.'OD v. Towne,
4 Cush. 217; Fltzglbbon v. Brown, 43 )le.
169. Evidence as to the bad moral chllr·
actet of the plalntltr was, it ls considered,
11lainly admissible ln mitigation of damages.
Whether such testimony would have been
proper, if such issue bad been presented on
the facts, as a circumstance going to iqake
up a reasonable cauiw for the <.-onduct of the
defendant ls a question not now sub judlce.
With regard to the other branch of tbl•
subject, It seems to me that the form of
some of the questions put to the wltnese
were unobjectionable. It was not meri>ly
the bad character of the plalntur on the
point In which It had been vllllled that Wll8
eubJ~t to discussion, but her character generally with respect to morals. That the Inquiry lu111 .this scope was fully considered and
declared ln the case just referred to of
Sayre v. Sayre. Consequently the interrogatory thus phrased, "Are you acquainted
"with the general reputation which the plaintllf bad among her friends and neighbors
prior to the time that llr. O'Brien made bis
~barge against her?" would seem to ba,·e
been all that the rules of practice require.
According to common usage the phrase refers to the general moral character of the
person referred to, and It seems to ea vor
.i hypettrltlclam to suggest that a question
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thus framed embraces other than moral
traits of character. It would not be easy
to put the Inquiry In a shape at once succinct and yet comprehensive, so as not to
be open to such a subtle objection, for the
line that separates what le immoral from
what ls indecorous ls oftentimes exl'eedingly
Indefinite and Indistinct. It will be found,
by referring to the language of the judges
as found In the reports, that the expreeslone
"bad character" and "general reputation"
are constantly used to signify character and
reputation with regard to morals. And If
this matter were In doubt. the other question which was propounded and oYerruled,
In the words, "Are you acquainted with the
reputation whlt>h lfrs. Frasier hsd, prior to
Mr. O'Brien's cberge against her, for virtue?" W118 sufilclently specific; for the Inquiry nect>118Rrily tested the knowledge of
the wltne8fl with referenC'e to the general
moral standing of the plaintUl' in public esti- ,
matlon. The result le that these two questions were Improperly overruled.
The third and last exception relates to the
rejection at the trial of the following questions put by the counsel of the defendant
to one of the witnesses, to-wit: "Do you
know whether, prior to Mr. O'Brien's charge
I against this woman, [the plaintllf,] she was
living In adultery with Mr. - - ? " It ls
I plain that the judicial course on this subject was correct. Pai·ticular criminal acts,
as a general rule, cannot be set up either
against a party or a witness. If the rule
were otherwise, Innumerable Issues, Incapable of all reasonable t11al, would be raised
In the progress of the ordinary suits. It ls
not known that any case warrants the
Introduction of suclr a species of testimony.
Let the judgment be reversed on the
grounds aboTe defined•
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RELEVANCY.

BACKDAHL et al. V. GRAND LODGE AN-

CIENT ORDER OF UNITED

VVORKMEN.

(48 N. W. 454. -16 Minn. 61)

Supreme Court of Minnesota. April 8. 1891.

Appeal from district court, Uennepin

county: Ran, Judge.

BACKDAHL et al. v. GRAND J,ODGE ANCIE~T ORDER OF UNITED
WORIOfE~.

(48 N. W. 454, -16 ::Uinn. fll.)

Supr«>mP Court of Minnesota. April 8, 1891.
Appeal from dletrlct court, Hennepin
count.v: llFa, Judgl'.
Mn·rit•k & Merrick, for apprllants. W.
H. Arlmns and E. ,<;;;n11t11wortl1. (Joseph
A. F,ck..,teill. of cou1111el,) for re~vondent.

Merrick & Illerrlck, for appellants. W.

H. Adams and E. Southwoi-tll. (Joseph

A. Ecksteiu. of counsel.) for respondent.

COLLINS, J. Plaintiffs, as the heirs of

Alfred Backdahl,deceased,brought this ac-

, tion to recover the amount ol"$2.000 upon

0. beneﬁciary certiﬁcate issued by defend-

ant to him. '1‘he answer denied that

plaintiffs were the heirs, and alleged two

defenses.-—the ﬁrst, that Backdahl had

been suspended for non-payment of an as-

sessment; second. that he had been sus-
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pended for non-payment of dues. When

the trial commenced, plaintiffs moved that

defendant be required to elect between

these two defenses relating to non-pay-

ment. on the ground that they werein-

consistent. The test of consistency in two

defenses is, can the facts pleaded in both

be true? if so. then. although either be-

ing proved, proof of the other may be un-

necessary, they are not inconsistent. As

the two suspensions alleged in the answer

were at different times, fordifferent causes.

effected in different ways, and having dif-

ferent consequences, the last in point of

time being more comprehensive than the

other, and as, notwithstanding theearller,

the defendant might have made the later

suspension. they were not inconsistent.

The verdict was for defendant. Each par-

ty clalms, in effect, to have been entitled

to a direction from the court for a. verdict.

As it is necessary to reverse the order de-

nying a new trial. we will not consider in

detail the 24 assignments of error, many

of them unfounded. but will refer only to

some general questions. which,in all prob-

ability, will arise on a second trial.

l. '1‘o prove that plaintiffs were sole

heirs of Backdahl. they offered in evidence

the decree of the probate court distribut-

ing his estate. This was properly exclud-

ed.for while binding, as to the matters

adjudicated. upon the parties to the ad-

ministration proceedings, it was no evi-

dence of the facts on which it was based

against a stranger to such proceedings, as

was this defendant. To prove they were

such heirs, plaintiffs further offered, and

the court admitted. the testimony of a

witness whose only knowledge in refer-

ence to the subject had been derived from

his acquaintance with the family and with

Backdahi, the witness and the latter re-

siding in this country, the plaintiffs in

Sweden. Although that sortof evidence

is in the nature of hearsay. is based on

hearsay, it is admissible from necessity, be-

cause many times in no other way could

relationship be shown but by proof that

COJ.LINR, J. Plalntlrfe, ae the helr1t of
Alfieri H111"k1lahl, decea11e1l, brought tbh1 action to rPCO\'er thr amount of$:!.OllO upon
o. bPnt>fklary certificate h1:med by defend·
ant to him. 'l'he anewer denied that
plalntiffe were the heirs, amt alle~ed two
defenReH.-the tlrst, that Backduhl had
bet-n su11pemlcd for non-payment of an usses.•nnen t; sel'und. that he bad b~n BUB·
peuded for non-1myment of due1t. When
the trlalco111mem·e1I, plnlntlffs moved that
defendaut be re4ulred to elect bt>tween
the!IP two defensee relating to non-payment, on the ground that they Wl'l'e lncousll'tent. The test of consl11tency In two
deff'n~l!M b1, can the facts pleaded In both
be true? If so, then, ulthough either being proved, ,,roof of the other may be unne<~eo11i'ary, they are not lnronfllHtent. AM
the two Puspeoslooe Alleged In the amnver
were at dlfft>l'l'nt thnes, fordtrrerentcauRes,
enected In different ways, and having different consequem·es, the last In polot of
time being more comprehenHive than the
other, and as, notwltlu~tundlug the earlier,
the defendant might have made the later
l!llNJ>enslon. they were nut Inconsistent.
The verdict wa11 for defendant. Each party claims, In effect, to have been entitled
to a dlrt>ctlon from the court for a \'erdlct.
As It Is neceli'l'Bry to reverse the order denying a new trial, we will not con111hler In
detail the 24 asRli;i:nments of error, mnny
of them unfounded, bnt will refer only to
sorm~ general que11tlonA. which, In all probability, wlll arise on a 11eco11CI trial.
1. '1'1> provf' that plain tins were sole
heirs of BaC'kdahl, they offered In evhleuce
the decree of the probate court dl11trllrntlnK his estate. This was properly excluded. for whiJP bln•llng, ns to the matters
ac1j111Jlcated, upon the parttee to the administration Ilroceedlngs, It was no evidence of thl' facts on which It w1111 ba11ed
against a stransz:er to such proceedln1i1:A, as
waH this dPfen!lant. To pro\'e they were
1mch hell'll, plain tlffH further orrere<l, and
the court acJmittf'd, the testimony of a
wlhlPRB whose only knowledge In reference to the subject ha cl been derived from
hiH lll'Qt111intance with the family and with
Bnck<tnhl, the wltnt>s"' and the lotter resldin1t In thiR country, the pluintlffs In
8we!lt'n. Althou11:h that sort of evidence
IR In th~ nature of hearsay, Is lJ1111ed on
hE>ursay, It Is aclmh•elble from neee11Hity, becoui.e many times 111 no other way conld
relatloni<hip be shown hut by proof thnt
relationship In and to a partlcula1· family
waH recognized hy the mt>mbers or the
family. l Green I. E\'. § 106. \\"hen such testimony Is lntroducell. It IR for the Jury to
detl'rmlne, from the extent of th«-' wltue11H' acl)ualnt11ocet1hlp with the ramll,y
15-l

rmd hla opportunities for knowing that Its
members ret'ognlzed the partlculRr peraon
as a member, what wt>lght to ll1\'e tt. In
this Instance, at least, the tet1tlmony of
the wltm•;.11 IDA.de a pr/ma facie ca1<e for
thP plRlntlffs on the quPt1tlon of kinship.
2. Tlwrc wus 11 l'ontea;t on the e\·irJ1•nce
ae to the making and notice to Backdahl
or the HBRcsHment for nun-payment of
which the suspension set out as a fil'llt deft>nse wa11 allel(ed. It appPnrs from the
coo11tltutlon ot dpfendaut that, when a
member entitled to participate In the heneftclnry fund dle8, the suhordlnR te lodge t()
which he belou11:ed Is to notify, by a prescrlhi_'<i form or death notll'e, the K'l'nnd recor1le1· of defPndanT lo1lge, who, on the
fil'Ht day of the following month, Is to notify each sul:ordlnate lodge. It 111 then the
duty or the latter to forward to the grand
recorder the· beneficiary funll on hand In
such lodge, (the sum being one dollar for
each certlHcate, and such eums al! may
Ila ve been received for certlftca tes renewed,) and then to make an aBHessment
of one dolbtr upon each member holding a
certltlc11te. An 0Hlce1· of the subordinate
lodge, railed a "financier." Is to send written or printed notice of the assessment tu
each member assessed, and, upon the failure of any memher within the specified
time to pay his &"8CS!llllent, he forfeltll all
rl~ht11 under his certificate. Till' financier
Is required to keep a book whel'l'ln all l\K11~smenh1 for the beneficiary fun'd shall be
entere!I airalnst eat•h member holding a
valid certltlcate. He IA al~o required to
furnish the recorderofthe lo~ge the names
of members h1 arreal'll upon aReessmenta;
and the recorder Is to plncfl theee names
un the minutes of the lodgP, and to mark
the certlftcntes of such members as su11pended on the certificate rt>glstry book.
So far as the return In th le caHt' shows, no
form or mode of making an ttl'.'Hl."RHment ill
prescrlbP.<1, and no record thereof required
to bti made. except by the finaneler In the
book kept hy him. To fix a member's
duty to p11;1· an ns1:1~sment, the11e are the
eRHl•ntlal thlngo: A death by ren1:1011 of
which an uset.'llsment maybemade; notice
of the death to the grand recurdt>r; tlitt
nntll'e before mentioned to the1:1ubordinot1t
lort~e: an &Sl:lf!SHment In fact; nnd nutktt
thereof by the financier to the member.
As the lluty to make the ae11P11sment Is lmperath'e, and no form or mode or maklmc
It IH prl'f!crlbed. and no record of It 1~. r&qulred to be kept, except In the financier's
book, It Is not nec.·essary that Much a88eaament be formally made by the lodge, or
that It be t-ntered In the lodge mlnute1:1,
thou11:h that would doul>tlese be the better way of preser\·lng evidence of the fact.
HenC'e snch 1tHRes1m1ent may be proven by
Jlarol. and the evidence of It producf'd UPon this trlnl was 11utflclent to go to the
Jur;1-.
3. Ancl so wae the te11timony as to tho
se1111lngof notice to Bat•kduhl. The ftnuucler, whose. duty It IH to forward notices. could not and would not tePtif.r .
positively and speclflcelly, that he malled
a notice to Backdahl, but he swore to
sending notices of this particular 0>1ses11ment to all of the membf'rs of the lodt(c, a11
be suppo~ed, and as he evidently Intended
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hw as sent to BHck· uar eek, 7 Q. B. S4fl;
12 C B 252· 1
~:~~\. Y,\' . § 40; 2 Whan: Ev. §'1s3o. •
<\ But tbe\-e was not sutt1clent evidence
to 'go to tbe lul'y as to th"' suspension for
non-payment ot duefl, alleged In the second deteose. and the court erred In rerus\ni;i: an. \nstruct\on requested by the plulnt\Tle tbot the 11eeond dcfonse hall not lleen
made out. ln Scheufier v. Thh4 Delt-ndaut,
(Minn.) 47 N. W. Rep. 700, we had for consideration those provhdons of defendant's
constltut\on wblch prO"ltlde for suspension for non-payment of assessments and
suspenidon for non-payment of dues. It
was held that the former operate ipso facto upon <Mault of the member, und without any action on the part of the lodge, or
of any o!Hcer thereof, while the latter require the action end determination of the
lodge or an offirer thereof. In other
worcls, that a failure to pa.'· an assessment of ttself, and without further ceremony, suspends the member. while a failure to pay dues gave cause for &Ul!penslon

'

ds\\1.
n “ as sent to Ba wk-

‘A‘\‘§\‘t a5\d\b°°k "- G9-Pbeck. 7 Q. B. sits;

“ ' V‘““°“‘°">\u:t1. 12 c. B. 252; 1

1 q, _

‘(‘.)§§§“_ \r,v- §4\i. 2 Wllzirt. Ev. §13a0.

g, tile“! was not sufficient evidence

,,‘,"g§‘{<, t\le1\1\'y as to the suspension for

,,0,,.paymeﬂi °i dues. alleged in the sec-

unq Qeiense. and the court erred in refus-

ing B“ insl\‘\l¢“0I\ requested by the plain-

tms “mt the second defense had not been

made out. in hcheuﬁer v. This Defendant,

(Minn) 47 N. W. Rep. 799, we had for con-

sideration those provisions of defendant's

constitution which provide for suspen-

sion ior non-payment of assessments and

suspension ior non-payment of dues. It
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was held that the former operate ipso fac-

to upon default of the member, and with-

out any action on the part of the lodge, or

of any oiiicer thereof, while the latter re-

quire the action and determination of the

lodge or an officer thereof. In other

words, that a failure to pay an assess-

ment- of itself, and without further cere-

mony, suspends the member. while a. fail-

ure to pay dues gave cause for suspension

only, and, as suspension for non-payment

of dues is in the nature of a forfeiture, the

lodge cannot. under its constitution, de-

clare it without notice to the member.giv-

ing him an opportunity to be heard in op-

position. There was no testimony tend-

ing to show such notice or opportunity.

5. It was claimed upon the trial of the

case, as well as upon the argument of this

appeal, that Backdahl had voluntarily

withdrawn, had discontinued his connec-

tion with the subordinate lodge. 'l‘lu-.evl-

dence produced in support of this claim was

abundant, but such a defense was not al-

leged in the answer, and there is nothing

in the settled case indicating that plaintiffs

consented to try such defense, although

not pleaded. However,alloithetestimony

which was received nearing: upon the

question was admissible and pertinent

upon the defense omuspenslon fnr non-pay-

ment of the assessment. alleged in the ﬁrst

defense. Order reversed.

VANDERBURGH, J.,absent on account

of sickness, took no part. MITCHELL.

J., not being present when this decision

was made and ﬁled, did not participate.
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only, encl, as suspension for non-payment
of dues ls In the nature of a forfeiture, the
lodge cannot, under 1te constitution, declare It without notice to the mPmber,glvlng him an opportunity to be heard In opposition. There wae no testlmouy tending to show euch notice or oppo1·tunlty.
o. It was cloimed upon the trial of the
case, as \'l"ell as upon t11e arainment of this
appeal, that Backdahl had voluntarily
wltbdr11wn, had db1contlnued hie connection with the 1mbordlnatl'! lodge. 'flwevldenceproducell In support of thlR claim was
abundant, but such a dPfem~e was not alleged In the answer, and there h1 nothing
In the settled case lncllcatlnittha t plalntlffH
com;en terl to try such defenRe, although
not pleaded. However, all oftbe testimony
which was recPlved tJeurln.a: upon the
question was ndml11slhle and pertinent
upon the defense of 13uspenslon for non-paymen t of the assessment, alleged In the first
defense. Order re'l"ersed.
VANDERBURGH, J ., absent on account
of sickness, took no part. MITCHELL,
J ., not being prefilent when this decision
was made au cl ft led, did not partlctpa tc.
1~
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RELE \'A N CY.

SULLIVAN v. STATE.

RELEVANCY.

SULLIVAN T. STATE.
(6 Tex. App. 819J
Court of Appeals of Texas. June, 1879.

(6 Tex. App. 319.)

Court of Appeals of Texas. June, 1879.

Appeal from district court, Gonzales coun-

ty; E. Lewis, Judge.

Harwood & VVinston and Fly & Davidson,

for appellant. Thomas Ball, Asst. Atty. Gen.,

for the State.

WINKLER, J’. This is an appeal from a

judgment of conviction of nmrder in the ﬁrst

degree, imposing the death penalty. The

most important and interesting inquiry here

presented for consideration may be stated

to be substantially as foll0ws:—

The appellant having been accused of the

murder of a woman, described in the indict-

ment as one “Harriet (a freedwoman, whose

name other than Harriet is to these grand

jurors unknown)," soon after the homicide
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was arrested and taken before the county

judge of Gonzales county for examination,

on which examination a witness called Owen

E. Dean testified; and on the trial at which

the conviction was had, the witness Dean

not being in attendance, counsel for the

state proposed to reproduce his testimony

taken before the county judge on the pre-

liminary examination, and for this purpose

placed on the stand as a witness one Ed

Titcombe. who qualiﬁed himself to testify

in the following manner, as set out in the

statement of facts: “He was deputy clerk

of the county court, and was present at an

examining trial held by John S. Conway,

county judge of Gonzales county. on the 11th

day of July, 1877. The examination was

held for the purpose of ascertaining whether

or not defendant, Thomas Sullivan, should

be committed to jail, he being charged with

the killing of the woman Harriet, and the

examination being had to ascertain the facts

in that case. The defendant, Thomas Sul-

livan, was present, and had an opportunity

to cross-examine the witnesses. He was ask-

ed by Judge Conway if he desired to cross-

exaniine the witnesses, and was so asked in

relation to each witness. Owen Dean was

sworn as a witness in said examining court

by me. and testified in the case, after being

threatened with punishment by the court for

refusing to testify.- I took down his testi-

mony. It was reduced to writing. and he

signed his statement ‘Owen E. liean.’ I

can state substantially all that said Owen E.

Dean testified to on said examination. He

(Titcombe) was then presented with the writ-

ten statement at said trial, and was going

on to stale Dean's testimony, when counsel

for defendant suggested that he had better

read the evidence from the record, which

was done. and the witness stated as follows."

Here follows what purports to be the state-

ment of Dean. as given by him on the ex-

amination before the county judge.

This testimony was admitted over ob-

1

I

i

Appeal from district court, Gonzales county; E. IA'wls, Judge.
Harwood & Winston and Fly & Davidson,
for appellant. Thomas Ball. Asst. Atty. Gen.,
for the State.
WINKLER, J. This Is an appeal trom a
judgment of conviction of murder In the ftrst
degree, Imposing the death penalty. The
most Important and Interesting Inquiry here
presented for consideration may be stated
to be substantially as follows:The appellant having been accused of the
murder of a woman, described In the Indictment as one "Harriet (a freedwoman, whose
name other than Harriet ls to these grnnd
jurol'B unknown)," soon after the homicide
was arrested and taken before the county
judge of Gonzales county for examination,
on which examination a wltne88 called Owen
E. Dean testified; and on the trial at which
the conviction was bad, the witness Dean
not being In attendance, counsel for the
state proposed to reproduce his te11tlmony
taken before the county judge on the preliminary examination, and for this purpose
placed on the stand as a witness one Ed
Tltcombe, who qualified himself to testify
In tht> following manner, as set out In the
statf'meut of facts: "HP was deputy clerk
of the rounty court, and was pre11ent at an
examining trial held by John S. Conway,
county judge of Gonzales county, on the 11th
day of July, 1877. The examination was
held for the purpose of ascertaining whether
or not defendant, Thomas Sullivan, should
he committed to jail, he being charged with
the kllllng of the woman Harriet, and the
examination being had to ascertain the fuct11
In that case. The defendant, Thomas Sullivan, was present, ancl had an opportunity
to cros..'4-examlne the wltnes11es. He wns asked by Judge Conway If he desired to <·rossexamlne the witnesses, and was so a"ke<l In
relation to each witness. Owen DP1111 was
sworn a11 a wltne88 In said examining court
by nw, and testlfie<l In the ('a11e, ·artn being
threatt>ned with punishment by the rourt for
refusing to testify. · I took down 11111· testimony. It waR rednced to writing. and he
signed his statement 'Owen E. Denn.' I
<'an state sub11tantlally all that said Owen E .
Dean testified to on said examination. H e
(Titcomhe) was then preMented with the written statement at said trial, and was going
on to state Dean's testimony, whc>n couns(•I
for defendant suggested that he had bettl'r
rend the evidence from the record, which
was done. and the witness stated as follows."
Here follows what purports to be the statement of Dt>an, as given by him on the examination before the county judge.
This testimony was admitted over ob156

jectlon by defendant's counsel, on the following grounds, as set forth In a blll of exceptlon11, to wit: ''(1) Said witness bad not
been put under the rule with other wltnel'Bf'B
for the state. but had been lD the court room
during the trial. (2) Because It had not bef'n
proven that Owen E. DP.an was dead. (:l)
Bemuse It was not shown that Owen E.
Dean was beyona the jurisdiction of the
court. or was even resi<Ung permanently out
of the state. (4) Because It was not proven
that the pretended statement of Owen E.
Dean was made In any court having any
manner of jurisdiction over the l'ause or ovf'r
the <lefendant. (5) Because lt was not 11ro,·en that the said purported 11tatement of
Owen E. Dt>on was made by Mid Dean under oath, and It was not shown that the pretended confessions made by snld defendant
to said Dean were voluntarily made." All
of which objections, the bill of exceptions
recltt>s, were overruled by the court.
It t11 further shown by the statement of
fa<'ts and by a bill of exceptions that certain
testimony of a witness named Smeed WllR
admitted over objection by defendant. The
testimony of the witness Smeed was substantially 88 follows: The witness knows
Owen Dean. Don't know his middle name,
or that he had any. He was here for several months, to Ret- after his brother, who
' was In jail, <'barged with mnrder. He was
here from Jammry until Augu!lt of last year.
He went away out of this state. I wrote a
letter to the po11tmaster at Mnrlon, )la888chusetts, Inquiring for Owen Dean. I got
a reply, he 111tv11. sr.ylng that Denn waH at
Boston, Massa<'hnsetts. Among hhl friend11
and acquatntan<"'H It 111 generally un<lerstoocl
that he 111 at Bo11ton, lfas!IB<'husetts. He aid
that D1•an <'ame here from Boston, Ma11&achns(•ttR.
·
The grounds of objec•tlon to this teBtlmony, as set out In tile bill of exceptton11, were:
F'lrst. The testlmuny does not show that the
man Owen E . Dean was beyond the jurisdiction of the court, or that he was PVen living
beyond the jurisdiction of the state. Second. That said evidence was hearsay. Third.
That the letter of whl<'h witness spoke was
ht•tter evidence U an witness's statement as
, to the contents of said letter. lt'ourth. ThP
lettf'r referretl to by witness was In rei,"llrd
to Owen Dean, aud not Owen E. Denn; and
because the man known here as Owen E.
DPan was not known In Massachusetts hy
that name.
I Another bill of ex<'eptlons recites that the
I defendant offered a witness to prove tlmt
the man called 0\\ en E. Dean was und1•1·
an assumed name, and not Dean; and :tl!IO
to prove that the man called Owen E. Dl':tll
stated to the witness that when the deft>ndant made the pretended confPsslon of guilt
to him, said Dean, about whl<'h witness '.rtt1 combe had testified, that he (dt>tendant) was
laboring under delirium tremens, caused b7

I

I
I

I
I
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the county court; and hence we ﬁnd, fur-

he state, and the

ther, that when the legislature, in enacting a

statute, refers to the presiding officer of the

county court, the appellation in use at the

time is the one employed in speaking of him.

Now, when our Codes were enacted, where
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sﬁgsmag t0 state them plainly is to show
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is mm concefﬂiﬂg the name of the man call-

?“ Beam We have no concern as to wheth-

9,. he was passing under an assumed name or

mt, Q; whether he had a middle initial let-

ter in his name or not. The only concern

the court and jury could have had was, not

with the name, but with the identity of the

witness who testified in that name before

the examining trial before the county judge,

and as to his identity there seems no room

for controversy. As a general rule of law,

a middle name is treated as of no conse-

quence whatever.

The ﬁrst question here presented is this:

Was the county judge lawfully authorized

and empowered to hold what the law de-

nominates an examining court? We do not

propose to discuss the question further than

it relates to conserving the public peace and

the subject of commitment, and release on

habeas corpus after arrest, without inquiring

into the general subject of jurisdiction, this

not being deemed of controlling inﬂuence in

the present inquiry.

It will be remembered that from the time

Texas ﬁrst threw off the Mexican yoke and

organized civil government under Anglo-

American ideas and auspices, a part of the

machinery of government was the organiza-

tion of counties. and placing at the head of

the judicial authority of each county a ju-

dicial oflicer. It was provided in the con-

stitution of the republic of Texas that “the

republic shall be divided into convenient

counties,” and “there shall be in each coun- i

ty a county court." Const. Rep. art. 4, §§ |

10, 11. And by act of December 20, 1836, the

oiilce of chief justice was created, and it was

declared that the county courts should con-

sist of one chief justice. Pasch. Dig. note

454.

Starting from this standpoint, we ﬁnd, by

noticing the several provisions of the several

constitutions and legislative enactments, that

from that early day, through the various

changes, down to the present time, there has

ever been, as a part of the judiciary, the dis-

tinct feature of a county court, presided over

by a magistrate, and which feature has been

GIVEN IN FOHMER PUOCEEDINGS.
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..q-e stated some of the questions preae'!~~,. tbese bl\\s ()f exception with, perha\)S un11ecessary I>artlculartty, for the reason 'Uiat to state them plainly is to show
the\r \ns\gnl.t\cance with reference to all that
\s sa\d conceru\ng the name of the man called Dean. We have no eoncem as to whether he was pass\ng under an assumed name or
not, or wbetber he had a middle lnltlal letter ln bi• name or not. The only concern
the court and jury could have had was, not
with the name, but wtth the Identity of the
witneas who testified ln that name before
the examlnlng trial befo1e the county judge,
and as to hlB identity there seems no room
for controversy. As a general rule of law,
a middle name ls treated as of no consequence whatever.
The first question here presented ls this:
Was the county judge lawfully authorized
and empowered to bold what the law denominates an examining court? We do not
propose to discuss the question further than
It relates to conserving the public peace and
the subject of commitment, and release on
habeas corpus after arrest, without Inquiring
into the general subject of Jurisdiction, this
not being deemed of controlling ln1luence in
the present Inquiry.
It will be remembered that from the time
Texas ftrst threw off the Mexican yoke and
organized civil government under AngloAmerlean Ideas and auspices, a part of the
machinery of government was the organization of counties, and placing at the head of
the judMal authority of each county a judicial oftlcer. It was provided in the constitution of the republic of Texas that "the
republtc shall be divided Into convenient
counties," and "there shall be In each county a county court." Const. Rep. art. 4, I§
10, 11. And by act of December 20, 1836, the
office of chief justice was created, and It was
declared that the county courts should consist of one chief justice. Pasch. Dig. note

t\tt\\S
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454.

Starting from this standpoint, we fl.nd, by
notMng the several provisions of the several
constitutions and legislative enactments, that
from that early day, through the various
changes, down to the present time, there bas
ever been, as a part of the judiciary, the distinct feature of a county court, presided over
by a magistrate, and which feature has been
maintained notwithstanding that the scope
and extent of the jurisdiction bas not In many
respects been uniform, nor the preHldlog officer called by the same name; and Whl>tber
the otllcer bas been <'alled by one name or
by another, the court bas been the same, and
baa maintained characterlstlce peculiarly Its
own. We wlll also constantly see that when
the appellation of "county judge," "chief justice," or ot ''presiding Justice" Is used, it lnVarlabq applies to the presiding ofllcer ot

[Case No. 00

the rounty court; and hence we fl.nd, further, that when the leglslature, in enacting a
statute, refers to the presiding otllcer of the
county court, the appellation In use at the
time ls the one employed In speaking of bhn.
Now, when our Codes were enacted, where
reference le made to this ofllclal, the appellation of "<'hlef justice" Is usually employed.
because that was the name by which he waR
at the time known; not to Indicate any particular functions, for these are otherwise prescribed, but simply the p1·esldlng oftlcer, the
<'hlef of the county court. Bearing these
things in mind, we need not be misled by the
terms employed by the Code when 11peaklng
of this oftlclal In connection with oftlcers,
peace oftlcers, magistrates, and examining
courts, and their authority over the subjects
of crime, ball, and the like, and by which effect can be given to the various provisions
on these subjects, In harmony with the manifest intention of tbe legl8lature and with establlehed rules of applying eucb legislative
enactments.
Some of the provisions of the Oode of Criminal Proeedure will be noticed:
"Art. 25. The provlsloJJs of this Code shall
be liberally construed, so ae to attain the obJeets intended by the legislature,-the prosecution, suppression, and punishment ot
crime."
"Art. 32. It Is the duty ot every oftlcer
known to thls Code as a 'magletrate' to preserve the peace within bis jurisdiction, by the
use of all lawful means; to lssue all procell8
Intended to ald In preventing and suppressing
crime; to cause the ID'rest of ot!enders by
the use of lawful means, in order that they
may be brought to punishment.
"Art. 33. A chief justlee of a county who,
when legally applied to, refuses to IBSue process, or who knowinirly and corruptly refuses
to discharge a duty imposed upon him by the
provisions of this Code, ls guilty of an offence for which he ls subject to removal, upon trial and conviction."
"Art. 52. Either of the following oftlcers
ls a 'magistrate' within the meaning of this
Code: The judges of the supreme court, the
judges of the district courts, the chief justice of the county," etc.
"Art. 55. When a magistrate sits for the
purpose of Inquiring Into a criminal accusation against any person, thl11 Is called an 'examining <'OUrt.'"
"Art. 248. Upon examination of a person
accused of a capital offence, no magistrate.
other than a judge of the supreme or district
court, or chief justice of a county, shall have
power to discharge the defendant," etc.
"Art. 249. When It ls made to appear, by
com1>lnlnt on oath, to a judge of the supreme
or district court, or <'hlef justice of a county.
that the ball taken In any case Is insuftlcient
In amount, such judge or chief justice shall
issue a warrant of arrest, and require of the
defendant additional security, according to
th.:i nature ot the case."

..
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Many other articles might be cited where

the term "magistrate" is used. when the

term would apply as well to the chief ju-

dicial county oﬁicer as to a judge of the dis-

trict court; but these will be sutiicient, not

only to show the importance of this magis-

trate in a proper enforcement of the provi-

sions of the Code, but also the trouble and

confusion which would ensue by any other

interpretation of these several articles of the

Code than the one here intimated, and would

render nugatory many of the provisions of

the Code, so far as any county oﬂicer is con-

cerned.

In support of this application of the term

“chief justice,” and strengthening our con-

clusions that the appellation was intended to

apply to the chief judicial oﬂlcer of the coun-

ty, we ﬁnd, on an examination of the Revised
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Code adopted at the recent sesion of the leg-

islature, that-the term "county judge" is in- v

serted in the revision wherever the term

“chief justice” is employed in the original in

corresponding articles. So that, when the

Revised Code goes into effect, the confusion I

will disappear, until some future legislature ‘

shall change the name of the county judge

to some thing else by unguarded enactment.

It is further worthy of note that, so far as

the articles of the Code which relate to the

prevention and suppression of crime are con-

cerned, and the deﬁnition of the terms “mag-

istrate” and “peace oﬂicer,” we know of no

material changes until the revision mention-

ed. which has not as yet gone into effect.

Our conclusions, therefore, are that, in so

far as the provisions of the Code of Criminal

Procedure relating to the subjects above set

out are concerned, and which speak of the

principal county judicial oﬂlcer as chief jus-

tice, they are intended to apply to the judge

who by law presides over the county court,

and that it is altogether unimportant what

particular name or appellation may be given

him;

Code. that county oﬁicial, whether called

“county judge," “chief justice,” or “presiding 1

judge” or “justice,” or by whatever name he

may be called, to distinguish him from other

magistrates, was and is authorized and em-

powered to hold an examining court.

In the present case we are of opinion that

the county judge had authority to inquire

into the accusation against the appellant, and

to either swear the witnesses himself or cause

it to be done by the clerk or deputy clerk,

and cause the same to be taken down in writ-

ing, and subscribed and sworn to by the wit-

ness Dean; and that, so far as the question

of jurisdiction is concerned, the court did

!\lany other articles might be cited where
the term "magistrate" ls used. when the
term would apply as well to the chief Ju·
dlclal county ofllcer aa to a judge of the distrlct court; but these wlll be sufllclent, not
only to show the lmporta~ce of this magi&trate In a proper enforcement of the provl·
stons of the Code, but also the trouble and
confusion which would ensue by any other
Interpretation of these se\·eral articles of the
Code than the one here Intimated, and would
render nugatory many of the provisions ot
the Code, so far as any county ofllcer ls concerned.
In support of this application of the term
"chief justice," and strengthening our concluslons that the appellation was Intended to
apply to the chief judicial ofllcer of the county, we tlnd, on an examination of the Revised
Code adopted at the recent session of the leg·
lslature, that.the term "county judge" ls In·
serted In the revision wherever the term
"chief justice" ls employed In the original In
con-espondlng articles. So that, when the
Revlsed Code goes Into effect, the confusion
wlll disappear, until some fnture legislature
shall change the nBJDe of the county judge
to some thing else by unguarded enactment.
It Is further worthy of note that, so far as
the articles of the Code which relate to the
p1·eventlon and su1>presslon of crime are concerned, and the definition of the terms "maglstrate" and "peace ofllcer," we know of no
materlal changes until the revision mentioned, which has not as yet gone Into effect.
Our conclusions, therefore, are that, In so
far as the provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure relating to the subjects above set
out are concerned, and which speak of the
principal county judicial oflleer as chief justlce, they are Intended to apply to the judge
who by law presides over the county court,
and that It ls altogether unimportant what
partlcular name or appellation may be given
him; and that, under the provisions of the
Code, that county ofllclal, whether called
"county judge," "chief justice," or "presiding
judge" or "justice," or by whatever name be
may be called, to distinguish him from other
magb1trates, was and is authorized and empowered to bold an examining court.
In the preRent case we are of opinion that
the county judge had authority to Inquire
Into the aceu!latlon against the appellant, and
to either swear the witnesses himself or cause
It to be done by the clerk or deputy clerk,
and c>ause the same to be taken down In writIng, and subscribed and sworn to by the witness Dean; and that, so far as the question
of jmlsdlctlon is concemed, the court did
not err In admitting the testimony.
The next Important Inquiry ls, was It competent for tht• 1itate to prove, under the ctrcumstances diliclosed by the record, what the
witness Dean had testified to before the examlnlng court?
Tht> ronstltutlon (article 1, f 10, Blll of
Hl;.:;llh<I llcl"lures that "In all criminal prose-

not err in admitting the testimony.

The next important inquiry is, was it com-

petent for the state to prove, under the cir-

cumstances disclosed by the record, what the

witness Dean had testiﬁed to before the ex-

amining court?

'l‘i|e constitution (article 1, § 10, Bill of

lti_~_-ins» declares that “in all criminal prose-
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cutlons" the accused "shall be confronted
with the witness against him." The Code of
Criminal Procedure (article 24) provides that
''the defendant upon a trial shall be contronted with the witnesses, except In certain cases,
provided for In this Code, when deposltlons
have been taken." In treating of constltutlonal provisions slmllar to the one above set
out, and found In all the constitutions of the
several states and In that of the United States,
Mr. Cooley lays down as the correct rule, deduclble from the authorities, and which we
adopt as correct, the following:
''The testimony for the people In criminal
cases can only, as a general rule, be given
by wltneues who are present In court. The
I defendant la entltled to be confronted with
' the wltneR&efl against him; and If any of
: them be ab11ent from the commonwealth, so
: that their attendance cannot be compelled,
· or If they be dead, or have become lncapac; ltated to give evidence, there ls no mode by
1 which their statements against the prisoner
; can be used for his conviction. The eX'-"P: ttons to this rule are of cases which are ex· eluded from Its reasons by their peculiar
c>lrcumstances; but they are far from nu: merous. If the witness was sworn before
l an examining magistrate, or before a coro~ ner, and the accu&M had an opportunity
,~ then to examine him; or If there were &
formal trial, on which he was sworn, It
seems allowable to make use of his deposltlon. or of the minutes of his examination,
It the witness has since deceased, or ls lnsane, or sick and unable to testify, or has
been summoned, but appears to have been
kept away by the opposite party." Cooley,
Const. Lim. pp. 363, 364.
Agreeably to Mr. Greenleaf, "upon the
question whether this kind of evidence Is
admls1dble In any other contingency except
the death of the witness, there ls some dlacrepanc>y among American authorities." 1
Green!. Ev. f 163, note. The rule In the text
appears to be that: "When the testimony was
: given under oath, In a judicial proceeding In
: which the adverse litigant was a party, and.
where he had the power to cross-examine,
i and was legally called ·upon so to do, the
j great and ordinary test of truth being no
longer wantlnl?, the testlmoLr so given ls admltted, after the decease of the witness. In
any suit between the same parties. It ls
1 also re1•elved If the witness, though not dead.
, Is out of the jurisdiction, or cunnot be found
after dlllgent search, or ls Htsane, or sick
and unable to testify, or has been summoned.
but appears to have been kept away by the
adverse party. But testimony thus otrered ts
open to all the objections which might be
taken if the witness were personally present."
There has also been controversy as to
whether these rules apply to other than civil
c>aus~·s. and the position tbnt they do not
J apply to criminal cases has been strenuously
and ably maintained; but It seems now to
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tli~usUvl:::
11:1 uot: an open one in thls court. In Black I presence of tbe witness could be had. Id.
, .. .State. 1 Tex. App. 368, it was held that, \ §§ 1098, 1099.
at a second or subsequent trial of a criminal ; The principle applies, not only to these
charge, it ls competent: :tor the prosecution \ formal depositions, but llkewlse to evidence
to put in evidence testimony given at a pre- of what a witness testified orally at a pre,·Jous trlal by a witness "Who has since died; vious trial. It, moreover, prevails not only in
and such testimony may be proved by a wit· 1 civil causes, but in criminal; and, in genness ·" 'rho heard it given ln, and who can eral, in tbe United States a.. well as in Engqua.Ufy himself to state tbe substance of it. I land. There are with us, perhaps, some juln Johnson v. State, 1 Tex. App. 333, lt was, ; dlcial localities ln which this doctrine is not
after mature consideration, held that the : received. • • • But the admission of the
rules and prnctk'e of the common law have ' evidence ls limited, or nearly so to the case
been substantially adopted by our Code in : in which the witness ls decea~ed; and in
res\lect to admitting as evidence for the pros- i this case it ls the general Americim tloctrine
t-cutlou the deposition of a deceased witness, j to receive equally the depositions taken aa
duly taken on a former trial of tbe accused ! before mentioned, and evidence of the forby a L-ourt or an exaxnlnlng magistrate, and I mer, or oral, testimony. It the witness ls
that the act of 1866 (Pasch. Dig. art. 6005), ! absent by the procurement of the defendwhkh 1>xpre~sly secures to the accused the I ant, It ls, perhaps, the American doctrine,
right to use such e'\·fdence, does not abrogate ~ the same as it ls the English, that the dePor Impair that of the st:a te to use such tes- I: osition, or eYidence of his tonner testlJllO~~~
tlmony.
.
. may be recelYed against him. But wb~~Y \n
But the question }Jere is, not as to the ! witness ls without this elelllent. ~~e p0~
rlght to reproduce tlle testimony of a de- i another state, or otherwise be5~!n~· 1- ~\sb·
l'l!llsed witness taken at a
:former hiul, but t•r of the court, this ls not sutP-c
tbe'S'
the right here clatmed and exercised lly the . Cr. Proc. f 1098.
vced· ~!s 9.1'&
state ls to prove the :torwer testimony of ; These and similar rules-de6 e-r stl.' on• 9.~!a llYiug witness· or at Jenst:. one who Is not I are, trom adjudications ln oi:P ed. "'~ -cef,"' O\·
shown or claim~ t~ be dead. but who, it ls : countries-are of necessity b.t:I-~-t:~'t.o..: & col'~\1'
<!lal111ed, Is not within tbe jurisdiction of the : influenced more or less by, st:.~iJ- ~~e ~'!~· \t
l'OUrt or Its J>roeess.
It is not perceived that : tlons, and liable to be mod\t\.e ~-«:.
&""""Ce ~9.-i:t
the reason of the rule which admits proof ~ led thereby, and with us lJlvc~'-7 ~0 ~~'\es ~f.
of what a deeeased witness bad on some : subordination to whatever 10 ~*~Ve 0 t ~~\).~
former occasion between tbe same parties, 1 any, we have on the s'\1b3ect.
#
. . ~ ~-eeS•
.._~\"
on an exatninntion into tbe sume criminal I a statute which prov\de s tb"t _.
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~ ~i \~.\'\.
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1iEl.EV.»\.\'CY.

timony of a witness has been reduced to

writing, signed. and sworn to before an ex- ‘

amining magistrate, or before any court, and

the witness has died since giving his testi-

mony, the testimony so taken and reduced

to writing may be read in evidence by such

defendant, as proof of the facts therein stat-

ed, upon any subsequent trial for the same

offence: provided, however. that in all other

respects the testimony of such deceased wit-

ness shall be subject to the established rules

of evidence in criminal cases. In every case,

the death of the witness must be established

to the satisfaction of the court." Pasch.

Dig. art. 6605. Whilst this seems to be a

privilege granted to the accused, yet, as we

have seen in Johnson v. State, 1 Tex. App.

333, by the rules of practice the prosecution

virtually has the same privilege. And whilst
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the provisions of this article, as well as the

ruling in Johnson’s Case, have reference to

the testimony of a deceased witness, as we

have already seen, the reason for the rule

applies as well to a witness whose personal

presence cannot be had, and that the testi-

mony of a witness who had been spirited

away after having testiﬂed ought to be re-

ceived.

Yet, inasmuch as this species of testimony

is admitted as a sort of judicial necessity,

the proof of the facts which constitute the

necessity for the departure from general

rules ought to be clearly established before

the testimony is admitted; as that the wit-

ness is dead, that diligent inquiry has been

made for him where it is most likely he

would be found, or that the defendant had

caused his absence. The proof on this sub-

ject should be complete and satisfactory, as

the question of the suﬂiciency of this proof

would necessarily be comlded largely to the

discretion of the judge, and not be revisable

on appeal when properly exercised.

On the whole, we are of opinion the au-

thorities warrant the following conclusions:

First. That a county judge is a magistrate 1

authorized to hold an examining court. Sec-

ond. That whcn a witness has testified be-

fore an examining court on the investiga- -

tion of a criminal charge against any pe1'son,

the testimony taken before such examining ‘

court, in the manner prescribed by law, may

be used as testimony on the trial, upon satis-

factory proof being first made that the wit-

ness whose testimony is offered has either

died since testifying, or been prevented from ‘

attending by the opposite party, or that he

cannot, after diligent inquiry, be found, or

his whereabouts ascertained; and that the

testimony so taken and reduced to writing

before an examining magistrate may be used

either by the prosecution or by the accused.

Third. That when a witness has testiﬂed on

a former trial of the case, it is competent for

either party to prove what the witness, if he

has since died, tcstitied on the former trial.

And, fourth, that, in either case the bare

fact that the witness wa out of the state at 1

UELEV AXCY.

tlmony of a wltneBS has been reduced to
writing, signed, and sworn to before an examining magistrate, or before any court. and
the wltneBS has died since giving his testimony, the testimony so taken and reduced
to writing may be read 1n evidence by such
defendant, as proof of the facts therein stated, upon any subsequent trial for the same
otren1'l•: (>rovlded, however, thnt In all other
respects the testimony of such deceased witness shall be subject to the established rules
of evidence In criminal cases. In every case,
the deuth of the witness must be established
to the satisfaction of the court." Pasch.
Dig. art. 6003.
Whilst tWs seems to be a
privilege granted to tile &<'<'Used, yet, as we
have seen In Johnson v. State, 1 Tex. App.
aaa, by the roles of pra<'tlce the prosecution
virtually has the same prtvUege. And whilst
the provisions of this article, as well as the
ruling In Johlll!on's Case, have reference to
the testimony of a deceased wltneBS, as we
have already seen, the renson for tht> ruh•
applies as well to a witness whose personal
presence cannot be bad, and that the testimony of a witness who had been spirited
away after haying testified ought to be received.
Yet, Inasmuch as this species of testimony
ls admitted as a sort of judicial necessity,
the proof of the facts which constitute the
necessity for the departure from general
rules ought to be clearly established before
the testimony ls admitted; as that the witness le dead, that diligent Inquiry has been
made for him where It Is most likely he
would be found, or that the defendant had
caused hie absence. The proof on this subject should be complt>te and eat111f1U'tory, as
the question of the su1H<•lency of this proof
would nece&Mrlly be contlded largely to the
dltK'retlon of tht> judge, and not be revisable
on appeal when properly exer<'lsed.
On the whole, we are of 01>lnlon the authorities wan11nt the following <'on<'luslons:
First. That a county judge Is a mnglstratP
authorized to hold an examining rourt. Se<·ond. That whPn a wltn('Sll bas tt>11tlftet1 ht-fore an examining court on the investigation of a criminal charge against any person,
the testimony taken before SUl'h examining
court, In the manner pres<·rtbed by lnw. may
be used as testimony on the trial, upon satisfactory proof helng ftn1t made that the wltnesR whOBt' t<•Rthuony 111 otrered lin11 either
died since tl•sttfrlng, or bt>en prevented from
attending by the opposite party, or that he
cannot, after diligent Inquiry, be found, or
his wht>reabouts aS<'ertalned; and that the
te11t1mony so taken and redu<'Pd to writing
before an examining magistrate may be used
either by the prose<"utlon or by the accused.
Third. That when a witness has testified on
a former trial of the case, It Is competent for
either party to prove what the wltne11B, If he
has since died. testified on the former trial
And, fourth, that, In either case the bare
fact that the wltneu was out of the state at

100

the time of the second trial would not. of ltself, be sutftclent ground for admitting proof
or his former testimony In a criminal prose! cutlon, unlesa admitted by consent.
Ap11tylng these rules to the case at bar, w•
are of opinion the prosecution had a right to
read as evidence on the trial the testlmon;r
of the witness DMn, given In the examining
court before the county judge, and thut tbP
l better evidence as to what be testlfted would
: have been the production of the written tesUmony so taken; and on this account we see
no error, as It appears that the witness Tltcombe read from the written statement of
the witness Dean, taken on the preliminary
1 examlnktlon before the county judge.
Yet we are of opinion that the absence of
the wltnesa Dean was not suftlclently accounted for at the trial to allow the Introduction of bis testimony taken before the
examining court. The evidence upon which
. Dean's testimony was admitted was that of
the wltneM Smeed, herelnbefore, set out,
which need not be repeated, and whleh ls
mentioned In the second bill of exceptions
taken to the admlBBlon of Smeed's testimony.
To our mind, the tangible defect In this testimony ls the want of any showing of prop1 er e1Tort to ascertain the fact as to whetht>r
11 the witness Dean could be produced on the
trial, or not; whereas It ehou!d have been
shown that It was not In thP 1iower of the
' stah! to 11roduce the witness In person, before admitting his former testimony. One
main ground of tht> statf'ment of the witness Smeed ap11ear11 to have been based partly upon a letter. which wa11 not even produee<l on the trial. We are of opinion the
/ showing, taken ns a whole. <lid not show el. ther that any proper e1Tort bad been made to
learn th~ whereabouts of the witness Dean,
or to show the lnablllty of the prosecution to
produce him In person on the trial. This
was a matter of grffit moment to the accused. He did not stand by In slll•nce and permit the error to be committed without obje<•tlon; on the contrary, be objected to the pn1rt>edlng nt the tlmt>. and also followed It up
by blll of exceptl<mK, and In hl11 motion for
, a new trial. and In his amtlttnm<•nt of error11.
· substantially; and for thlK l'rror, whlrb ls
the turning-point In the l'alll', the judgment
1 must bt• rt>verse1l.
It 111 11hown by blll of exceptions that the
defendant otrert>d to prove by a wltneBS
1 (Parker) that th<! wltne~H l>E>nn was passing
under an assum!'d name. There was no error In <•xdudlng this tt'Htimony; It was but
hearsay.
We nre of 011lnlon the objections to the
charge of the <•ourt are not well tnken. In
the main, the l'hargl' cort·t>etly Informed the
jury on the law of the c•aee as made by the
. evlden<'e, and there wrui no Important omlsi slon. Whether thl11 would be a proper
1 cliarge on another trial or not depends upon
· the case and the testimony as the same shall
1 be developed. U the charge should need

1
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modUlCfl tton or enlargement, these will readUy 8 uggest tbeniselves wben the occasion
arise&· Tbere ls nothing further suggested
by the record requiring any special ruJJJlg.
wJ.LGUB,BV.-11

r?'~OO.Ji:

For the
judgment ~
manded.

Revered
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RELEVANCY.

STATE v. REED. '

(37 Pac. 174, 53 Kan. 767.)

Supreme Court of Kansas. July 6. 1894.

Appeal from district court, Cowley county;

A. M. Jackson, Judge.

Isaac G. Reed was convicted of murder in

the second degree, and appeals. Reversed.

Chas. E. Elliott, C. J. Peckham, and Isaac

Reed, for appellant. John T. Little, Atty.

RELEVANCY.

STATE v. REED.
(37 Pac. 174, GS Kan. 761.)
Flupreme Court of KaD8&8. July 6, 1894.

Appeal from district court, Cowley county;
A. M. Jackson, Judge.

Isaac G. Reed was convicted of murder In
the second degree, and appeals. Reversed.
Chas. E. Elliott, O. J. Peckham, and Isaac
Reed, for appellant. John T. Little, Atty.
Gen., 0. J. Garver, and W. W. Schwinn, for
the State.

Gen., C. J. Garver, and W. W. Schwinn, for

the State.

JOHNSTON, J. Isaac G. Reed was char-

ged in an information ﬁled in the district

court of Sumner county with shooting and

killing Isaac Hopper, in Sumner county, in

such a manner and with such an intent as

to constitute murder in the first degree. The

information was ﬁled on August 31, 1892,

and on October 10, 1892, upon application
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of the defendant, a. change of venue was

granted, and the cause transferred to the

district court of Cowley county for trial.

The trial was begun in the latter court on

January 10, 1803, and, after the impaneling

of the jury, the production of the evidence

for the state and for the defendant, the

charmng of the jury, after the opening argu-

ment in behalf of the state and the argument

in favor of the defendant, and before the

closing argument for the state had been

completed, on January 20th, one of the jur-

ors became sick, and was unable to attend

at the trial. The cause was continued from

time to time for ﬁve days, and on January

26th, after an examination, and without the

consent of the defendant, the court deter-

mined that it was impossible for that jury

to conclude the trial, and thereupon it dis-

charged the jury. At the next term of the

court the plea of former jeopardy was inter-

posed, and attached to it was the evidence

taken by the court when the ﬁrst jury was

discharged; but the court sust:1ined a dc-

murrcr, and ruled that, the discharge of the

jury having been made necessary by the sick-

ness of a juror, it did not operate as a bar

to a further trial. The trial then proceeded,

and the defendant was convicted of murder

in the second degree, from which conviction

he appeals to this court, alleging numerous

grounds of error. We will only notice those

which seem to be material or require atten-

tion at this time. ‘

The ﬁrst contention is that the discharge

of the jury ﬁrst impaneled is equivalent to a

verdict of acquittal. It is true that the

jeopardy of the defendant began when the

jury were impaneied and sworn and the re-

ception of evidence was commenced; and it

is also true that the discharge of the jury

without the consent of the defendant, and

without suﬁicient reason, will ordinarily bar

a further trial. The statute prescribes the

grounds which will warrant the court in

discharging a jury before the completion of

a trial. It reads as follows: “The jury

may be discharged by the court on account

of the sickness of a juror, or other accident

JOHNSTON, J. lsaac G. Reed was charged in an Information filed In the district
court of Sumner county with shooting and
killing Isaac Hopper, In Sumner county, In
such a manner and with euch an Intent as
to constitute murder In the tlrst degree. The
Information was fl.led on August 31, 1802,
and on October 10, 1892, upon application
of the defendant. a change of venue was
granted, and the cause transferred to tht>
district court of Cowley county for trial
The trial was begun In the latter court on
January 10, 1893, and, after the Impaneling
of the jury, the production of the evidence
tor the state and for the defendant. the
cllarglng of the Jury, after the opening argument In behalf of the state nnd the argument
In favor of the defendant, and before the
closing argument for the state had been
completed, on January 20th, one of the jurors became sick, and was unable to attend
at the trial. The cause was continued from
time to time for fl.ve days, and on January
26th, after an examination, and without the
consent of the defendant. the court determined that It was Impossible for that jury
to conclude the trial, and thereupon tt discharged the jury. At the next term of the
court the plea of former Jeopardy was Interposed, and attached to It was the evidence
taken by the court when the first jury was
discharged; but the court sustained a demurrer, and ruled that. the discharge of the
jury having been made necessary by the sickness of a juror, lt did not operate as a bar
to a further trial The trial then proceeded,
and the defendant was convicted of murder
In the second degree, from which conviction
he appeals to this ·court. alleging numerous
grounds of error. We will only notice those
which seem to be material or require attention at this time.
•
The tlrst contention ls that the discharge
of the jury tlrst Impaneled Is equivalent to a
verdict of acquittal. It ls true that the
jeopardy of the defendant began when the
jury were Impaneled and sworn and the reception of evidence was commenced; and It
la also true that the discharge ot the Jury
without the consent of the dl'ft>ndant, and
without sutnclent reason, will ordinarily bar
a further trial. The statute prescribes the
grounds which will warrant the court In
dlschnrglng a jury before the completion of
a trial. It reads as follows: "The jucy
}IJ'l

may be dlscharged by the court on account
of the sickness of a juror, or other accldent
or calamity requiring their dlst'harge, or by
consent of both parties, or after they have
been kept together until lt satisfactorily appears that there ls no probability of their
agreeing." Clv. Code, I 281; Cr. Code, I 208.
In this case the sickness of a juror was the
cause for discharge, and whether that slck·
neas was of such a character as to make a
dlscharge absolutely necessary was the subject of Inquiry and decision by the court. A
court cannot arbitrarily determine such a
question, but the Incapacity of the juror,
and the necessity for discharge, are to be
beard and determined by judicial methods.
State v. Smith, 44 Kan. 75, 24 Psc. 84. That
course was pursued In the present case, and
the finding made by the court that such a
necessity existed was based on the testimony
of a physlclan and other evidence, some of
which ls not preserved. In the absence of that
evidence, we cannot say that there was not
good cause for the dlscharge. From what
appears, we think that the court did not act
caprlclously, nor without a. due regard for the
rights of the defendant After the Illness of
the Juror was reported, the court postponed
the trial from day to day In the expectation
that the juror would recover suftlclently to
complete the trial. Several Inquiries were
made as to his condition, and the prospect
of recovery. At the end of fl.ve days he was
still seriously sick, and his recovery was a
matter of great uncertainty. It ls said that
the near approach of the end of the term
lntl.uenced the court to some extent In reaching the conclusion which It did. Of Itself,
this might not be suftlclent to jutltlfy a discharge, but. as the real Inquiry was whether
the elcknees of the juror required the jury
to be discharged, the finding of the court
made upon this Inquiry ls necessarily binding
upon us. As the testimony taken at the
time of the discharge was made a part of the
plea, and a demurrer thereto sustained, the
question raised upon the reply to the plea
is not deemed material.
Upon leave of the court. obtained without
notice to the defendilnt, the state was permitted, at the time of the trial, to lndorse
upon the Information the names of eight
witnesses who gave material testimony In the
case. This lndorsement was made Just before the trial, on April 5th. and It ls contended that. as the testimony given by these
witnesses was Important, the action of the
court In permitting the lndorsement was a.n
abuse of discretion, which resulted in prejudicing the rights of the defendant. It appears that on the 3d day of February a motion was made to lndorse the names of the
new witnesses, which motion was sustalnE'd
by the court. A ftt>rwards the names of thl'Se
witnesses so lndorsed were stricken from the
Information, and It was said that It was
j done upon the ground that the order for ln1 dorslng the names of witnesses was made LD.
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.the absence ot the defendant.
It thus apfCJue
pears that the attention ot t.he defundant his Injury~H -'°oi?"'"
.
and bis attorneys was called to these wit- that, If h~
a. -tt "' 8 ..,_o.dJ. and admoolabed
nesses; and, further, that inquiry had been required
~llt1. -v /Juatoesa matters wb
mnde of them as to What their testimony them, as b~ e!o111. 0 o, ./Je should atteDd
edly
expl."eSB(ICI
<I Dot Jive long. He repea;
would be. Under the circumstances it canabout
to
dJe. 4 tbe opinion that he was
not be said that the court exercised its dlscre- called In. Ere
.lDfolster or the gospel was
tJon without due regard for the rights ot the as guardian ro .r-equested a neighbor to act
defendant, or that he was prejudiced by the
~ bis children, gave tnrormaruling.
·
tlon about Jnslll"a11ce on his lire, and directThree Jurors were challenged on the ed how It and his property should be ap.
piled. He sulfcred intense pain, and at times
ground that they did not posseBB the requiBlte qualUlcatlons of Jurors. The objection cried out, "I am dying now." A stenograurged Js that their names did not appear on pber was Ment for, and a dying statement
the tax rolls of the county. and hence that as to the shooting, and the cause of It, was
they should have been excluded from the tnken down; which was aftcr,vards Intropanel upon the objection. of'. the defendant. duced In evidence. Some time after the
The showing made upon. this point ls not 1.1tatement was given he rallied some, and
Blltlsfactory. While ft appeared that these used language which Indicated thnt he
jurors did not pay any personal taxes for was then not without hope of recovery; but
the precedJng year, It -wva.s not shown that soon afterwards he expired. It Is claimed
they did not pay taxes on real estate, nor that under the circumstances the statethat their names did not appeer on the as- ment should not have been received in eviIK'ssment rolls of their respective townships. dence. It Is clear that the statement was
made In the belief ot Impending death, and
It appears that two of them were listed for
personal taxes, but that the value or the the fact that there was an Interval of sevpersonal property which each had tor tsxa- eral hours between the time the. statement
Uon did not equal the exemption allowed to was made and his death does not make tt
Inadmissible. Nor will the tact that at times
him; and, In the case of the third, he stated
after the statement was made he enterlalnedll
that he had made a return for a stock com.
The
pany as Its manager and agent, but that he or expressed a hope that he might ge t we
had not been assessed for persona] taxPM. render his declarations fncoropeten~eclara
Whether he was upon the tax roll is uvt controlllng question Is whetber th~ \tnpcndd.
shown. No Inquiry was made as to whether tlons were uttered under a sense ~ deatn d\ ethey had reai estate listed fn their names In lng dissolution; and the fact -tl~:. nope ot.;\\\
the respectJve townships In which they lived, not Immediately ensue, or tbfl. t; ~u~\11ed&. ~11tr;·
covery was subsequently eIJ. -te ~Tl'·
lllld nothing to show that tbey did not pay
not atfect their admlssibtllty. 6
~11f. t-n.:t
taxes on rea1 estate for tbe preceding year.
Enc. Law, 117.
,el:>0aete"lli\.:w.-n
The statute Pro-vldes for listing both personThe admission of testlmoIJ.:f"° e;
1>-a ~.qqee"ll
a\ an11 r1>a1 est.at In the name of the owner.
_.,;J --oe ~i\a"ll"Gen. l!ll 1889 ~ 6889 6911. It Is further r-elatlons existing between
and the wife of the decease ~ P' c oeteu~';e
Pl'llvided that ltl ~In~ a list of persons to
l!l!n·e as llll'or8 th jur comnlissloners shall tended to show a crlm\nn\ tntt.!!;..e- :J. ~~ ot ~cei
Ill!~ from thoae e ~d on the asseRsment them, Is assigned as error...... ~~j. e-s\s"-0 ~
that proof of a crltnl
~1>- ~ -o1
~~s of the Se"era~:wnf\hlps &nd cities or admits
~ ~ ~b-e 'l."'0"'"-1
P~lng l' . Id
pars. 3567, 3601. between the defendant and tbe-tV
deceased Is admlss\ble to sbo.q9' ie~v:j:._.~~11 e 0 9).
~e ev\l\~t l)\tre1U. Is t~ obtain the service ot
a motive for the kU\\ng, at ttJI- ~
~ ~ ~e"llet. e·~....ellltllra
'1Vho
aP<>Be
bstantlal
citizens
and
<1wn..re BU
, wbere the killing bas to be es 1 ~ ~ _
l-~ ct. i\S
0
?11\\a ~ Of l>ro t and the assessment circumstantial evidence; and b: e
~~ ..> ~W\"'O.e
11
'1 th~ferr~ to 1.0~[jury law are evldent- as the klll\ng "W'RB adni\tted, tJJ. ~
~ o t ~o"ll
lll.d 11\l lllade In the listing of both real
the defendant could be snow!'\l'~ ~--~
~C.~a "'01
\hat~llalproPerty. As It does not appear way, but that a. d~t.~~"':~ ~!~\~ei.-t ~~ --t:~\:\\c~.
0
~ '1 Were not UPon the personal prop- , ate new issues, a.n the eons\de-rat.~_-.£'.?:;.. ~ ~fl).ee;~(
Q\'I\\~lllent rolls, nor that they dld not
of the jury 1'r~~e tbeoTY ot tbeou:i~ ~ ~ ., e:"'~
\~\\Q11. Pay t111.es on real estate, tbls ob- prln.c\pa\ \ssu.e. bo-m\c\de was ~ss'-~~~~():e~
1t~'lgg~llat be overruled. State ex re\. be\ng t.hat tbe because ot tne tne ~ ~~ ~ e
?~. ll:i\i • C<illllll\ssloners, 44 Kan. 528. 2A tb.e detenda:n~ -tor tb.e -w\te ~110w\e ~ -~ - ..._.. ~
~ltte11.~ ~ther <1blectlons ""Were made w\th \J.e entertn\nc deceased nad. a'.9' ot 6~~ ~ ~~ l
~\Q~\ha the lury, but an exam11u1.tlon ot wb\ch tbe tood \n tne :i\ \)\lT\lo ~~ :JJ. .._
~
'?lie 11.elt t they are not ma.ter\al.
t tb.nt. as be t.s b.\S des\-re,:.~cb e~st~~~~ _.:;. ~-\\\ttl)ll?t:lllp\a\nt re\u.tes 1:0 the ruun.g ()
earr-y\ng o:e re\a.t\on~ ,,\)on tue\l.-S tb- :t.-....
~
:is::>
'~~1111.. 11ll\ru\tt\ng What -was rece\~ed :-; mou1 ot t con-il:>et"-'" t.ne states s\uce> .c7~~
\lt! '1iaa\h~larn.t\on or t.he decens~d. ~ "t be \\\e\\\ wa~ ·on~e\ t".or cou<!i!de d., \Pe ('.'. ~ ~-;:-... _.:;.
o ·crsn.\\Y
e U-r\an \ll -set.~~
~1~11111g 0otby lleed about 5 o'clodt. o-P te-r- \\"\.Q\\'<e.
,,fi, n
"'-"\\'\...,
•Set "Y
d -re\\Te •e •
lo'-"b.
t.\e. s.n
d. d:• •
lui~w~ lda~ 21, 1892, n.nd soon tJ.i'.' e"1- ""e
-in:o\e to t.t.C=
~t \>St.
~,\t.ten 9."
s~
'~llat~11 l!ar!~ed to h\s hon.-ie, where 1).1.>- "l'-"Y- ()t \\\~ uo e.$ b0
'~lll. ~t Ins wound wn.~ i.nu.de b1 V J.J.O.t. ~\\\\ ue ~
llrugeona, Who h:i.formed hill). t:.
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RELEVANCY.

man who coveted his neighbor's wife had a

motive for desiring the death of his neighbor."

The evidence is not only competent as tending

to show the motive which induced the crime,

but it is important also in determining the

degree or grade of the crime that has been

committed. As a general rule, testimony

tending to show the commission of another

uiTense is not admissible, but, where such

offense is intimately connected with the one

charged, important proof to establish the lat-

ter cannot be excluded because it may tend

to prove that the defendant is guilty of an-

other offense. State v. Folwell, 14 Kan. 105.

There may be some cause for complaint at

the very extended inquiry that was made as

to the relations between the defendant and

Mrs. Hopper. A detailed inquiry was made.

and a large volume of testimony was taken.
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It may he said, however, that this was due

to a large extent to the fact that an undue

intimacy between these parties was denied

by the defendant. The testimony of the illic-

it relation, however, if it existed, was re-

ceivable in evidence as tending to show the

motive of the defendant in killing the de

ceased. Johnson v. State (Fia.) 4 South. 535;

Pierson v. People, 79 N. Y. 424; Com. v.

Merriam, 14 Pick. 518; State v. La\vlor, B

Minn. 216, 9 N. W. 698; State v. Hinkle, 6

Iowa, 380; 9 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 714; 15

Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 936.

A more serious objection is made to in-

terviews and conversations held with the

deceased some time prior to the shooting,

when the defendant was not present, and

of which he had no knowledge. A witness

was permitted to detail at length a. meeting

between himself and Hopper on the day be-

fore the shooting; the taking of a long drive

with the deceased, during which he related

to the witness his troubles at Wellington,

and his plans for leaving that place and go-

lug to Missouri. He was allowed to testify

what the mood and manner of the deceased

were on that day, and to relate the reason

given by the deceased for leaving Welling-

ton. The reason stated was the interfer-

ence in his family, and the trouble made by

the defendant. Another witness, over objec-

tion, related that he had met the deceased

on the next day, and had a conversation with

him, in the absence of the defendant, in

which the deceased informed him, among

other things, that he had determined to

go to Missouri, and the reason given was

“that if he could get his wife away from

where Judge Reed was, they could get along

all right together.” The acts and conduct

of the deceased previous to the fatal en-

counter which formed a part of the res

gcstae, or which tended to throw light upon

the question of motive or malice, might be

admitted in evidence; but the acts or con-

dnct of the deceased which are not a part

of the res gestae, and which could not have

inﬂuenced the defendant in the commission

of the homicide, cannot be shown. The

UELEVANCY.

man who coveted hl11 nelghbor'11 wife had a
motive for desiring the death of his neighbor."
The evidence is not only competent as tending
to show the motive which Induced the crime,
but It ls Important also In determining the
degree or grade of the crime that has been
committed. As a general rule, testimony
tending to show the commission of another
offense ls not admissible, but, where such
olfense ls Intimately connected with the one
charged, Important proof to establish the latter cannot be excluded because It IDtlY tend
to prove that the defendant Is guilty of another olfense. State v. Folwell, 14 Kan. 100.
There mny be some cause for complaint at
the very extended Inquiry that was made a8
to the relations between the defendant and
l!rs. Hopper. A detailed Inquiry was made.
and a large volume of testimony was taken.
It may be said, however, that this was due
to a large extent to the fact that an undue
Intimacy between these parties was denied
by the defendant. The testimony of the llllclt relation, however, If It existed, was receivable In evidence as tending to show the
motive of the defendant In kllllng the de
ceased. Johnson v. State (Fla.) 4 South. 535;
Pierson v. People, 79 N. Y. ~4; Com. Y.
Merriam, 14 Pick. 1518; State v. Lawlor, 28
Minn. 216, 9 N. W. 698; State v. HJnkle, 6
Iowa, 380; 9 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 714; 15
Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 936.
A more serious objection ls made to Interviews and conversatlon11 held with the
deceased some time prior to the shooting,
when the defendant was not present, and
of which be had no knowledge. A witness
was permitted to detail at length a meeting
between himself and Hopper on the day before the shooting; the taking of a long drive
with the deceased, during which he related
to the witness his troubles at Welllngt.on,
and his plans for leaving that place and going to :Missouri. He was allowed to teetlfy
what the mood and manner of the deceased
were on that day, and to relate the reason
given by the deceased for leaving Wellington. The reason stated was the Interference In his family, and the trouble made by
the defendant. Another witness, over objection, related that he had met the deceased
on the next day, and had a conYersation with
him, In the absence of the defendant, In
which the deceased Informed him, among
other things, that he had determined to
go to Missouri, and the reason given was
"that If he could get his wife away from
where Judge Reed was, they could get along
all right together." The acts and conduct
of the deceased previous to the fatal encounter which formed a part of the res
gestae, or which tended to throw light upon
the question of motive or malice, might be
admitted In evidence; but the nets or L'Onduct of the deceased which are not a part
of the res gestae, and which could not have
Influenced the defendant In the commission
of the homicide, cannot be shown. The
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manner and conduct of the deceased on the
day previous to the killing was not known
to the defendant, and was not connected
with the homicide, and therefore the defendant could not be alfected thereby. Anything that would throw light on the homicide, and everything that would operate on
the mind of the defendant, can be shown;
but evidence of the acts or manner of the
deceased which never came to the knowledge of the defendant, could not be pro'f'ed.
There was Introduced in evidence a paper.
ldentlfted by Mrs. Hopper, In which the deceased declared that he believed his wife to
be a woman of honor, Integrity, and high
moral character, and that any aceusattons
to the contrary were false. To meet the
Introduction of this evidence by the defendant the state was permitted to otrer a witness who related an occurrence between himself and the deceased on May lst,-the day
upon which the other paper was executed.
-In which the deceased presented to him a
paper which he said was prepared by Mrs.
Hopper. He then gives a conversation between the deceased and himself with reference to the paper and Its contents. After
reading It over, the witness told the deceased
that he would be a fool t.o sign It; that the
paper was not prepared by Mrs. Hopper.
but was prepared for the purpose of gettlnc
a divorce from him. A long conversation
ensued, In which It was Intimated or would
bear the construction that a. trap was belnc
le.Id by the defendant and the wife of the
deceased, so that, If trouble occurred, or a
divorce was asked for, the mouth of the deceased would be closed; and much of thecontents of the paper was disclosed In theconversation. This testimony was wholly Incompetent, and the objection of the defendant should have been sustained, and the motion to strike It out should have been allowed. It the testimony had been competent as an explanation of why the paperslgned by the deceased came to be executed
and ilellve11"d to his wife, It was still secondary evidence, and, If competent at all,
the letter Itself should have been produced,
or Its nonproductlon accounted for. The pa.per Itself, however, If In existence, wns not
competent proof, and the Introduction of Its
contents wns prejudicial error.
There Is just ground for the complnlnt
made by the defendant In permitting the
state to cross-examine the defendant in regard to bis early life. A great part of the
testimony In the cnse was devoted to the
qu('Stlon of whether the defendnnt sustained
adulterous relations with the wife of the
deceased, and on crOSIH!xamlnatlon he wns
required to relate the marital relations bet\\ el•n hiw nnd bis lirst wife, ba\·ing beeu
married In 1868; thut hl' wus divorced from
her In the sp1·lng of 1877; and to state the
grounds upon which the divorce was granted. The Inquiry was pressed so far that he
was required to state that cruelty and adul-

·- -- - -

-

-5r~Q.
'!)

l ) 'E:CL.1.RA.TI<>

they 1111,21) t tll/174‘/,<

5 100. “'11 ile file cbdcsob [C-as

l@oJ
that they ;l11i_g'1Jt L74. Q11‘ '£eQ_ ., 8 1

circlnnsta I1 ces 1/11/10,. Into s

tell were charged against blfllv ft-Sena“ er.

101‘! was made to show that his P ivor t wife

was the co-respondent in that (3 “nee Hit

with whom adultery was char:-‘J-’ "

fort wu made to show
was the co-respondent

to thc gﬂlllﬁllg of the divorce from his ﬁrst the qucsti ()1: of n'11ett1‘i1Or Job e:Z°’<1e:1¢u"’ J1

wife. Some of these direct questions were the statelzacnt undo‘. Q1‘ tiff 0 8 G5-01;)” h

not 1-eq|_11l‘0(1 to be answered, but the in- speedy (lea ti, Was, in the Q G t the egaﬂa

qu“-y was pushed sufficiently far to leave their consi (18l‘zl(I0l1, I Olfe } Qppicﬂaaed mar?‘

the inference with the jury that the (19. credibility ()_f the stat Ii Dag ex ehension ade

iendant had been guilty of another adu1- titled to consider whementasslngcluded wit

wry with 9, person other than the wife ot fact, the (1(:('e¢1ged 11 ether the J "Don the

the deceased 15 years before the 0C(!l11'rence ad > "IZY are em

covcry. and tn 1 lo

modiﬁed in :cc':_f;;‘:t1ohst

Starkey v- People, 17 c

ple,139 111. 102 28 N

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:07 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104925781
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

eron. 2 Pin. 49¢’). v_ '

1s1; State v. B,,',,,s§“"‘°

gaunbetli v_ State ‘)c;- “(SI O 14 S

tate,13 smed ’_ -' -ns ' r_ . E. 678;

1 Parker’ Cr. 9;&1l;{_ 506;S.P3.1-2:,‘ Nelms v.

Tex. 366; Jones v S; “’a11<e§°'§1e 7' Gm‘-‘I1.

v- Nash, 7 Iowa 347 sflfe. 71 Ind’ §;f"§- 37

Another com ' ' 84- ' ' mm

ot the homicide with which he was Charged,

A tull cross-examination should be allowed

upon anything connected with the homicide,

or which would affect the credibility of the

defendant as a witness; but it ls not compo

tent to prove previous acts of udultcr_v,

which have no connection with the offense

chargcd; nor can evidence of improper con-

duct with other parties than those charged

in the information, which happened in his

early lite, he given in evidence to sustain

the present charge. “'9 think there was an

abuse of discretion in this extended cross-

exnminniiou oi’ the defendant.

Another ground 0! complaint is the in-

stmction given by the court with 1-ctercnco

to the effect ot the dying declaration which

was admitted in evidence. The court char-

ged that: “Such declaration, when made in

the hellet that death was imminent, and the

deceased had abandoned all hope or recov-

ery, is admissible; and in this case, it you

should ﬂnd from the evidence that the do

ceased made a declaration as to the encoun-

ter with defendant before his death, then

the court instructs you as a matter of law

that such declaration was made when the

deceased thought death was imminent, and

he had abandoned all hope of recovery."

The court further advised the Jill‘? that the

weight to be given to the declaration and

the credibility of the witness making it.

0l1.'.:ht to be governed by the ordinary rules

of evidence, and to determine the Weight

and credit to be given to the same the jury

can consider all the circumstances under

which the declaration was made. The ob-

jection is that the court withdrew from tin-

jury all considerations as to whether tho

declaration was made when the deccascd

thought death was imminent, and after lu-

er-

that biS 1:i1vorce "•ft'e
ln tbat
an 8Uft
with whom adultery was cbu.rged~if <l that
Ile was engaged to his present
e l>rior
to the granting of the dlvorce frolll his first
wile Some of these dlrect questions Were
not requlrt'il to be answered, but the Inquiry was pushed suft\ciently far to leave
the Inference with the JW'Y tbllt the defendant bad been guilty of another adulM'Y with a person other than the Wife of
the deceased 15 years before the occwTence
of the bomiclde with which he was charged.
A full cross-examination should be allowed
upon anything connected with the homicide,
or which would affect the credibility of the
defendant as a witness; but lt Is not competent to prove previous acts of adultery,
which hnve no connection with the otfemw
charged; nor can evidence of Improper conduct with other parties than those charged
In the lnformutlon, which happened In his
early lite, be given In evidence to sustain
the present charl(e. "\Ve think there was an
abuse of discretion In this extended crossexamlnntlon of the defendant.
Another ground of complaint ls the instruction given by the court with referenc1•
to the e!Yect of the dying declaration wbid1
WllB admitted in evidence. The court charged that: "Such declaration, when made In
the bellef that death was imminent, and the
deceased bad abandoned all hope of recovery, 18 admissible; and in this case, it you
should tlnd from the evidence that the deceased made a declaration as to the encounter with defendant betore his death, then
the court ln11tructs you as a matter of law
that such declaration was made when the
deceased thought death was Imminent, and
he had abandoned all hope of recovery."
The court further advised the jury that the
weight to be given to the declaration and
the credibility of the witness making It,
ought to be govern!'d by the ordinary rult>t1
or evidence, and to determine the weight
and credit to be given to the same the jury
can consider all the circumstances undt>t
which the declarntlon was made. Tbe objection ls that the court wlthdrE'W rrom till'
jury nil considerations as to whether th1·
declaration was made when the decen&•li
thought death was imminent, and after b1•
had abandoned all hope of recovery. Th<'
court uinst decide, as a preliminary ques·
tlon, whether the declaration was made under a sense of Impending dissolution, anti
the admlsslblllty of the same ls exclusively
tor the consideration of the court; "but,
nftl'l' tbe evldenL'e Is admitted, its credibllity is entirely within the province of the JW'1,
who. or t•ourse, are at llb<.>rty to weigh nil
the circumstances under whkh the deelnrntlolll! were made, Including those alre:uly
proved to the judge, and to give the testimony only such credit BB, upon the whole,
0
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eople v. Green
ex. 366; .Too(>S v. State llllc.er v. State ai
v. Nash, 7 Iowa, 347 , .38:1,' 71 Ind. 66; s'tate
.Another complaint fs
•
Instruction given upon ~~tb reference to an
defense, In Which the
e Sllbject ot' seltthut, It one ts uninw.ru~urt told the Jucy
other, he may stand bl Y attacked b.v nn.
such force as reasonablys ground, and use
to
appears necessary
1
•
repe the attack and protect himselr
rhe criticism ls that the instruction give~
leu ves the Jury to Inter that the nppearnncC's
were to be judged by them, and not by the
defendant. "A party assailed ts Justified In
ncttng upon the facts as they appear to him,
and Is not to be Judged by the facts as they
are." State v. Howard, 14 Kan. 175. While
the Instruction ls not as explicit as it should
have been, It ls evident :trom other portions
of the charge that the court meant that he
might use such force "as at the time reasonably appeared to him to be necessary." Although the Instruction ts defective, we would
hardly think that the error of Itself wna
suffl.cll•nt to require a reversal. In any f'uture trial of the cause this omission can be
corrected.
There ls a further complaint that the
court failed to submit an in.st.ruction upon
man!llaught<>r In the s (•<'ond cll'l-{rt'I\ As th
hu1U·uction complained of related to a d e
gree of crime interior to that ot' which t:.hedefendant ls convicted, this objection b e
comes lm111aterlnl. State v. Dickson, 6 Ka. e'..!09; State v. Potter, 15 Kan. 302; State xi.
l~hm, ~ l~an. a7G; State v. Yarborough,
l\.nn. o~. 18 Pac. 47-1:. Further tbnn that:
hoWP'l"cr, we th\nk the testimony was not
such as to jn~tify the court ln submltth.l.g
an instru'-•t1on as to that grade ot on'.ense_
Other cri tic\!'!IDS are made upon the charge
ot the collrt. but \n them we find no erro~.
nor anytb.tug wbl.ch requires further c<>xn.lll<'Ht. l•'oi· tllC t•rrors referred to, the jutlµ;llll'llt Will
be revt>tsed, and the cau.o;;e _ r e nutndf>d for o,uotller tr\ul. All the justi.c"-"8
1-'0ncw·1·Iug.

t

t;r

28

:a

Case No. 58]
Case No. 58]

RELE VANCY.

STATE r. KINDLE.

(2-1 N. E. 485, -17 Ohio St. 358.)

Supreme (‘curt of Ohio. May 20, 1890.

At the October term, 1889, of the court

oi common pleas oi Brown county, George

W. Kindle was tried upon an indictment

charging him with the murder of one

Thomas Butt. On the trial, to maintain

the issue on the part oi the state, the pros-

ecuting attorney offered in evidence a

written sta tcment purporting to be signed

by Thomas Butt, purporting to contain

a dying declaration by him of the circum-

stances immediately attending the crime,

and relating to the identity of the per-

petrator. Iieiore offering the paper_ the

state called witnesses who testitied to the

satisfaction oi the court that the said

Butt. at the time the paper was written,
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and when it was signed by him, was un-

der a sense of impending death, and had

no hope of recovery, and that the paper

was read over to him before he signed it.

The statement was then, against the ob-

jection and exception oi the dciendant, ad-

mitted in evidence, and read to the jury.

A verdict ﬁnding the defendant guilty oi

manslaughter having been rendered, the -

defendant ﬁled a. motion for a new trial on

the ground, among others, that the court

erred in admitting in evidence the written

statement of Butt. On this ground alone

the court sustained the motion. To this

ruling the prosecuting attorney duly took

a bill oi exceptions. which upon leave was

ﬂied in this court “for its decision upon

the points presented."

D.V. Pearson, Pros. Att_v., ior the State.

C. A. White and W. W. Young, contra.

SPEAR, J., (after stating the iacts as

above.) The question presented by the

bill of eitccptions is, did the court err in

'the admission as evidence of the written

statement purporting to be a dying decla-

ration? While some oi the statements oi

the bill respecting the preliminary prooi

are not couched in the clearest and most

positive language, yet it is fairly to be un-

derstood that the testimony of the wit-

nesses satisﬁed the judge that the state- t

ment was prepared by one of the witness-

es called.under the direction oi the de-

ceased; that it was by one of the wit-

nesses read over to him, and was actual-

ly signed by him; and that at the time he

was under a sense oi impending death, and

had no hope of recovery. The paperitseli

shows that itis a recital of the circum-

stances immediately attending the assault

which resulted in Butt's death. It is not

questioned that the words used by the de-

fendant, or the substance oi them. might

have been testiﬂed to orally by those who

heard them. if they were able to recall

them; hut it is insisted by counsel that

to admit the written statement of the de-

ceased is to make him a witness in the

case, and is a violation of ti-a‘. clause oi’

BELEVANCY.

STATE v. KINDLE.
<'onstltutlon which provldee that tn any
such trial the party accuHed •hall be al(24 :S. E. 4&J, 47 Ohio St. 358.)
lowed "to meet the wlt11et1eM faee to face.~
Supreme f'ourt of Ohio. llrf&7 20, 1890.
It bPlng eonceded that what the deceased
Is the subHtllntlve matter to be given
At the October term, 1889, of the court said
the Jory, the only que.it1011 ls as to the
or common pleas or Brown county, George to
W. Kindle was tried upon an Indictment proper mode of communlcatlug from the
t to the Jury.
cbal"1:1ng him wtth the murder of one declaran
Dying declarations have beon l'flCelved
Thomaa Butt. Oo the trial, to motntatn
the l88ue on the part of the state, the pros- , In evidence on the ground or necessity,
ecutlng attorney onered lu e\•ldence a there often being no other evidence of the
written statement purporting to be l!hrned facts attainable. and sometimes on the
by ThomM Hntt, purporting to contain fnrthl:'r ground that the solemn ch-cuma dying declare tlon by him of the ch-cum- stances surrounding the wounded perBon,
stam•l'f4 lmmt-'11ately attending thP crime, In view of Impending death, will Ct"Pate an
and relating to the Identity of the per- obligation to utter the truth equal, In Its
petrutor. Ht>fore offering the pa11er. tba Influence, to the obligation ol an oath,
l!tate called wltnl'tl&es who testltied to the though lt ls dltHcult to see why, If the latsatlsfttctlon or the court that the said tea· Is a substantive ground, the declara.Butt, at the time the paper was written, tions itbould be limited to the facts Imu.nd when It was signed by him, was un- mediately connected with tlw killing. Mr.
der a sen11d of Impending death, and had Roscoe, In bb1 work ou Criminal Evidence,
no hope of recovery, and that the paper obsea·vel!I that the t·oncurrence of both
was read O\"er to him before be signed It. thee,, reasonB led to the admission of thte
The statement WWI then, against the ob- species of evidence. Page 38. 8uch decla.jection and exception of the defendant, ad- rn.tlontt !lre In the nature of hearsuy, and
ml tted In e-vldeul'e, and read to the Jury. their admieslon 111 an exception to the genA verdict finding the defendant guilty of el'al rule ol evidence. It follows from thle
manslaughter bu.Ying been ren<lered, the thut the person making them ls not, but
defen!lan t Hied a motion for a new trial on the person by whom they are proven ls,
the ground, among others, that the coua·t the witness. Hence the witness hy whom
erred In admitting In e\•ldence the written : the accused has the right to bet'onfronted,
11tatement of Butt. On this ground alone fit tbe one c111leJ to lay the foundation for
the <'OU rt sutttalned the motion. To this ('roof of the declaration, and by whom
rullng the prosecuting attorney duly took ' the making of the tleclaratlou le est'Lba bill of exceptions, which upon leave was llshed. '£he object Is to gl ve the accused
Hied In this court "for lta declttlon upou the opportunity to see and bear the witness, and for croHB-examlnatlon. If these
the points pl"f'sented."
objects are secured, the guaranty of the
D. V. PParaon, l'rOll. Atty., for the Stale. const.ltutlon Is maintained. Applying these
C. A. White and W.W. Young, contra.
conclu1tlo11s to the caso at bar, how can It
be said tbat the accused was deprived of
SPEAR, J., (after stating the facts as any right? In order to lntelllgently preahove. I The que11tlon presented by the pare the paper signed by the deelal'ant, It
.bill of e11:ceptlo11s Is, did the court err lo was neceuary for the witness to first talk
the adml111don as evidence or the written with him, or at least bear biK verbal statestatement purporting to be a dying decla- ment. Then, ba\•lug reduced the statern tlou? While Ho rue of the statements of ment to writing, heread It tothedt-clurant,
the bill respecting the prelimln11.ry proof and It was then 1dgned by him. All this
are not couched In the dearest and most must have been sh1•wn by the wltnetis bepositive language, yet It Is fairly to be nn- fore the court could have been entlsHPd of
derstood that the teiitlmony or the wlt- the neceMary facts prellmln11.ry to the adne&Aes satisfied the judge that the state- mission of the paper. Being tbas testified
Wl:'nt was prepared by one of the witness- to, the whole trnnttactlon, and every de·
es called, under the direction of the de- tall, was the subject of l'ross-examluutlon.
cease<l; that It was by one or the wlt- The accm1ed could Inquire wt to Juttt what
nes11es read over to him, and was actual- the declarant actuallyeald,Just bow much
ly Hli&ned by him; and that at the time be care was taken In wrltlug out tbe stateWllB under a sem1eof Impending death, and
ment, bow carefully and distinctly the pahad no hope or recovery. The paper Itself per was read to the declarant, and, In
shows that It ls a recital or the clreum- short, as to all that wHs said and done,
stnnces Immediately attending the assault the order of It, and the manner of It.
which resulted In Butt's (}ea th. It Is not Whether the accused availed hlmseU of
queHtloned that the words used by the de- this opportunity or not, the opportunity
fendant, or the substance of them, might was present. Jt ls cl~ur that In this case
have been testlHPd to orally IJy thm1e who the constltutl.o nal requirement wue comheard them. If they were able to ~all piled with, and every constitutional right
them; hut It le Insisted by counRel that was preserved to the accused. Whel'etl•h1
to actmlt the written statement of the llA- appears; the only 11uestlon Is, which Is
ceased 1'4 to make him a witness In the the preferable evidence of the actual dl:'ClacosP, aud lR a violation of ti.a! claosl:' of ratlone,-the memory of wltne88es, and
thecnnHtitutlon of the United 8t11 tes which their ability to reproduce the words UKed,
11rovldes that evPry pertton •ID trlal,charg- or the 1mb1ttance of them, or the pnper, reed with crime, 11hall have the rbrht "to duced to writing at the time, and signed
be confronted with the wltneitHe11 ag11tnst by the party m11klng the statement? Or,
him," and of the like clause Ju our own to present the exact question in thls caee,

l

106

~/ \

115; \

p o DE

m CLARAT1<)_,-_€*.9’-

ll there such De Von

preference to lat th an

l0l'mer|mctl_iod as to render Q02?!‘ ime ..dIef"§I€;:., (3 ;' _'I‘f‘i,-_g;,-(£251)

proper? We th1nk_ not. . Td upmlmon time of L'l("j1-S 11;“,/10,5608 [Case

judginent oi mankind, ioime at U 1 oh_ _; “.,.,-t,-"2-_ (‘Dd 1.06’) mg jibe at

sei-ration and experience, is h '9 a,1;_ 11- as — ,. - 1”}; Pea ‘t Q ate;

temvtw "Peat "16 language °’ °th“I's is l tllllrlociln‘ 1-H’? e¢-d°'1'bQ L be "“ved”'°<

always attended with unccri'»8l"ty- It 1 y ,§",,,, 1 ‘I115’, thome 0"-in he "Q70 ‘at

i rccoirnition of this fact that the Gust 8 i “<1 I €", IV @908 131- te v pllr ced 11

h!:1Q(il)tIl.llled at trials ior the ludgeuilg in“ h£t>hlt?'lec:la1 vlieedy D1..e'TIllbQ"1§>W’t(1;:e’ed‘

. . . . ' 4 _ra10n' 1 Q W]

ﬁ?gllt1i’(e)Hl1tl]lI‘1vT()jilHtl\,:i:a a&_‘:“‘;%v-1iI~_st|‘(ll(;-S. S ;1I:1ac‘e:l];()t}w1\'1-1tiIJ,g ansd e-To vigupigfggcg

. . , \- en ,

may not have fuilty understood the decla1-

mu:-it_be p1-(,J[,c:gea“’rjt§h§1tgPm,835g. tbzf

ant. He may no recollect accurately the p 1m.at,0nS_ ,9 The ails evidlg-, ifytbe re ,.e_

words or their substance; or, having an. E tent 41¢-¢1a_|.,mO ‘ 11,,-8 one ine lslierson
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dei-stood fling ren(i]enl1bermg,he may not \ directly Sustmnerziﬁgno evgilbgut 0! suche-(1116?-Ce:

isa?:;-‘2.,:u..:*&...2.e“*,ir %::::i“€..2‘e:%:' l in TOa]1'f?e"°@J¢; 9. ten statement, approved and signed n§ Stat‘-?,.26k‘€3é Q-')_ 1'11 Xian )(r1':.i8. ’(1>§§,,}jf‘;‘,"

the declara.nt,is not, ordinarily, open to vﬂqmte 58 6,) _in _M'fansa;‘ebsv.state,.

Nor can it be said that ' '59- 6-9‘ ‘semis ’ (c0lIler v

these objections. _

the paper so prepared and verified has not

a legitimate tendency to prove the facts

sought to be pruven; that is.to show

what the dying man said.

But, ii we had doubts as to this conclu-

sion, on principle, we would be impelled

to the same result upon authority. The

admissibility of dying declarations in cases

oi homicide has been recognized by the

courts for more than a century, and the

question oi the iorm in which such decla-

rations shall be given to the jury has oft-

en been under consideration. ln King v.

Ely, tried beiore Chief J ustice KING at Old

Bailey, in 1720, (12 Vin. Abr. 118,) it was

held that,“ in the case of murder, what the

deceased declared, alter the wound given,

may he given in evidence; ” and in Tr0w-

ter‘s Case, Id. 119, “ the court would not

admit the declaration of the deceased.

which had been reduced into writing, to

be given in evidence without producing

the writing. " 'l‘o like effect is Rex v.

Woodcock, 1 Leach, 500, (decided in 1789.)

In Rex v. Gay, 7 Car. & P. 2‘-30. it was de-

clared that ii a declaration in arniculo

mortis be taken down in writing, and

signed by the party making it. the judge

will neither receive a copy of the paper in

evidence, nor will he receive paroi evi-

dence of the“ declaration ; " a nd COLERIDGE,

J ., refused to receive the parol evidence of-

fered. Under the head oi‘ “ Form oi Decla-

ration.” lilr. Phillips, in his W0I‘li "I1 Evi-

dence, (volume 1. p. 240,) uses the follow-

inglunguage: “ With regard to the man-

ner in which a dying declaration may be-

come the subject of legal evidence, it may

be observed that an examination taken on

oath by a. magistrate, and signed by the

deceased and by the magistrate, has been

received in evidence as oi the same effect in

point oi admissibility as declarations not

madewith the same solemnity. ” And in a

Case No. 58]
Case N 0. 58]

REL l~I VAN CY.

sition. We think it cannot be now regard-

ed as such. _

Again, it is urged against the admissibil-

ity oi this statement that, “as our expe-

rience teaches, there are many men who in

the hour of death do not have the fear of

God before their eyes, are ﬁlled with mal-

ice, hatred, and anger, which go out only

with their lives. and are buried with them

in their graves, and with whom a con-

sciousness oi impending death moves to a.

desire for revenge; and that such declara-

tions,in a majority of cases, are prompted

by such desire.” But against his objection

may be quoted the observation oi Chief

Baron EYRE, in Woodcock's Case, supra,

to the effect that these “declarations are

made in extremity, when the party is at

the point of death, and when every hope
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of this world is gone; when every motive

to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is in-

duced, by the most powerful consideration,

to speak the truth. A situation so solemn

and so awful is considered by the law as

the objection, it goes to the weight oi the

testin|ony,and not to its competency, and

would be lust as forcible, if not more so,

against the admission of declarations

proven by Word of mouth. We are oi

opinion that in cases of homicide a state-

ment of the injured person, made in ex-

tmmis, while conscious of his condition,

and under a sense of impending dissolu-

tion, reduced to writing by a competent

person, at the instance of tne tieclarant,

or with his consent, approved and signed

by him, containing statements of the cir-

cumstances oi the unlawful act which re-

stilts in death, after proper preliminary

proof has been introduced, is admissible in

evidence. Whether or not such paperis

primary evidence in the sense that parol

evidence of the declarations will not he re-

ceived until the absence of the paper is ac-

counted for, we are not called upon to de-

termine. It follows that thecourt of com-

mon pleas did not err in admitting the

written statement of Thomas Butt in evi-

creating an obligation equal to that which I deuce, and that that court did crr in sus-

is imposed bya positive oath administered I taining the motion for a new trial by rea-

in a. court of justice. ” However, it is man-

ifest that, whatever force there may be in

168

son of the introduction of the written

statement. Exceptions sustained.

RELEVANCY.

eition. We think it cannot be now regard-

ed as such.

Again, it is urged a1:ainetthe admlesiblltty of this statement that," as our experience teaches, there are many men who In
the hour of denth do not have the fear of
God before their eyes, are filled with malice, hatred, and anger, which go out only
with their lives, and a.re burled with them
iu their graves, and with whom a consclo mmesH of lmpl"ndlng death moves to &
desire for revenge; and that such declara.tlons, in a majority of cases, are prompt~11
by such desire. " Buta11:ainst Ills olljt•cthm
may be Quoted the observation of Chief
Baron EYRE, In Woodcock's Case, supra.,
to the effect that theMe "declarationH are
made In extremity, when the pa1·ty is at
the point of death, and when e\·ery hope
of this world it1 gone; when P-very motl\·e
to falsehood is eUenced, and the mind Is Induced, by the most powerful consldera tlon,
to speak the truth. A situation so solemn
and so awful Is considered by the law IU!
creating an obligation equal to that which
Is imposed bya positive oathad111luh1tered
in & court of Justice." HoweYer, It Is manifest that, whatever force there may be 1D

168

the obJec.-tton, It goes to the weight or tile
testhuony,and not to Its competency, and
would be Just as forcible, If not more so,
against the admtsi:lion of declaratton11
proven by word of mouth. We a.re of
opinion that in cases of homicide a statement of the Injured person, made Jn e.rtremls, while conscious of hie condition,
and under a sense of impending diHHolutlon, redul'e1l to writing by a competent
pers<,u, at the Instance of tne oeclarant,
or with his consent, approved and signed
by him, con talnlng statements of tbe clr1"11 mstances of the unlawful act which ~
"'ults in death, after proper preliminary
p1·oof has been Introduced, is admissible In
evidence. Whether or not such paptr 111
primary evidence in the sense that parol
e\•ldence of the declarations will not he ~
celved until the absence of the paper is accounted for, we are not called upon to d&termine. It follows that tbecourt of common pleM did not err In admittlnir the
written statement of ThomM Butt in evlllPnl'e, an!l that that court did err In sustaining the motion for a new trinl by reason of the tntrnduction of th ·.~ written
statement. Exceptions eustaJned.

*f1°,\~ S .
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supreme court, First department, affirming in the pI"<)1)0s1't1'0-17 that qe _ I _ qty
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_ ably iucu 11-e(1_ Stgltnlmces (1121;-gs " less ANDREWS, J. The construction of the Rutland v, Dayton 968’. Insalil orflle defs=n.1-

covenant Of ﬂit! defendant, the SECOIIG Ave- covenant , 2 1. ’ $7111 "Hreag _

eh “S made I11. 58 117- 5 Ired.

nue Railroad Company, contained in the in-
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strument of December 15, 1852, to pave the

streets “in and about the rails," in a perma-

nent manner, and to “keep the same in re-

pair to the satisfaction of the street com-

missioners,” was considered in the Case of

Xiciliuilon, 75 N. Y. 235, and it was held that

the covenant bound the company to pave and

keep ill repair so much of the space between

the tracks as was disturbed in the original

conslrm-tion of the road. Upon this construc-

tion ot the covenant the defendant was bound

to keep in repair the whole space between

the tracks of its road on Second avenue, be-

tween Houston and Forty-second streets, as

it was shown that, while the laying of the

road originally would only require the actual

displacement of the pavement for a distance

of about 18 inches on the side of each rail,

nevertheless it would so disturb the belt of

intermediate pavement as to require it to be

relaid. The trial judge therefore correctly

ruled that the covenant extended to the en-

tire space between the tracks.

It is insisted, however, that, conceding this

to be the true construction of the'covenant,

the court erred in directing a verdict for the

sum expended by the city, and for the value

of the new materials used, as pl‘0\'9d by the

account kept by the city. The 0b1Q0ti0I1 15

twofold: First, that the rule of damages T01‘

a breach of a. covenant to repair» Where the

covenantor has neglected to P91'1'°1'm his

covenant, and the repairs have been made

by the covenantee, is the reasonable Cost of

the repairs, and not the sum expended by

the covenantee in making them, and that the

question of reasonable expense should, lllldﬂl‘

the evidence, have been submitted to the

jury; and, second, that improper evidence

was admitted to prove the amount of labor

and materials used in the work.

In reference to the ﬁrst‘ ground, it W118

shown, on the part of the city, without con-

tradiction, that the street was out of repair,

and that the defendant, having ncglectcd,

after due notice, to put it in repair. as re-

quired by its covenant, the city proceeded to

make the repairs at a cost, for labor and

materials, of $1,971.72. it employed labor-

Case No. 59)
Case No. 59]

It ELEVAN C Y .

there he checked on the time-book the time

of each man as reported to him by the gang

foreman. He also testified that he marked

the men's names as he saw them, and that

he knew their faces. The gang foreman did

not see the entries made by Wilt, but they

testified that they correctly reported to him

each day the names of the men who worked,

and, it any did not Work full time, they re-

ported that fact also. Upon this proof the

trial judge admitted the time-book in evidence,

against the objection of the defendant.

The trial judge also admitted in evidence,

under like objection, a written memorandum

or account, in the handwriting of Wilt, of

materials used. Wilt testified that the en-

tries in the account were made from daily in-

formation presented by the gang foremen

on the occasions of his visiting the work, and

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:07 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104925781
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

that he correctly entered the amounts as re-

ported. It does not appear that he had any

personal knowledge of the matters to which

the entries related. The gang foremen were

called as witnesses in support of the account.

Neither of them saw the entries, and on the

trial neither claimed to have any present

recollection of the speciﬁc quantities so re-

ported by them. .\Iaddcn testified that he re-

ported the correct amounts to Wilt, and it is

inferable from his evidence that, when the

reports were made, he had personal knowl-

edge of the factsreported. (Joughlan alsotes-

titied. in general terms, that he reported the

items correctly. But on further examination

it appeared that his reports to Wilt, of the

stone delivered at the work, were made upon

information derived by him from the carmen

who drew the stone, and who counted them,

and who reported the count to Coughlan, who

in turn reported to Wilt. Cc-ughlan saw the

carmen dump the stone, but he did not verify

the count, but appears to have assumed its

correctness. The carmen who delivered the

stone were not called as witnesses.

The exception to the admission of the

time-hook presents a. question of considera-

ble practical importance. The ultimate fact

sought to be proved on this branch of the

case was the number of days‘ labor per-

formed in making the repairs. The time-

book was not admissible as a memorandum

of facts known to \Vilt and veriiied by him.

His observation of the men at work was cas-

ual, and it cannot be inferred that he had

pc1's.on{il knowledge of the amount of labor

performed. His knowledge from personal

observation was manifestly incomplete, and

the time-book was made up, mainly at least,

from the reports of the gang foremcn. The

time-book was clearly not admissible upon

there he clwdted on the time-book the time
of each man as reported to him by the nng
foreman. He also tE'Stifled that be marked
the men's names as he eaw them, and that
be knew their faces. The gang foreman did
not see the entries made by Wilt, but they
testified that they correctly reported to him
each day the names of the men who worked,
and, It any did not work full time, they reported that fact also. Upon this proof the
trial judge admitted the time-book In evidence,
against the obje<'tioo of the defendant.
The trial judge also admitted In evidence,
nnder like objection, a written memorandum
or account, In the handwriting of Wilt, of
materials used. Wilt testlflecI that the entries In the account were made from dally Information presented by the gang foremen
on the occasions of hJs visiting the work, and
that be correctly entered the amounts as reported. It does not appear that be had any
pel'llOnal knowledge of the matters to which
the entries related. The nng foremen were
called as wltnes&e8 in 11upport of the a<'COunt.
Neither of them saw the entries, and on the
trial neither claimed to have any present
recollection of the l!}>e<'lftc quantities 80 reported by them. lladdt>n testified that he Teported the correct amounts to Wilt, and It ls
inferable from bis evidence that, when the
reports were made, he had pel'80nal knowledge of the facts rPported. Coughlan also testltled, in gt>neral terms, that he reported the
Items correctly. But on further examination
it appeared that his reports to Wilt, of the
stone delivered at the work, were made upon
information derived by him from the carmeo
who drew the stone, and who rounted them,
and who reported the count to Coughlan, who
in turn reported to Wilt. Coughlan saw the
carmen dump the stone, but he did not verify
the count, but a11pears to have aaumed its
correctneSB. The <'armen who delivered the
stone were not called as witnesses.
The t>xceptlon to the admission of the
tlm<>-book presents a question of considerable practical lmportanct>. The ultimate fact
aought to be proved on this branch of the
case was the nurul)('r of days' labor performed in making the repairs. The timebook wns not admlBSlble as a mE'morandum
of facts known to Wilt and verU\ed by him.
His obse1-vatlon of the men at work was casual, and It cannot be lnft>rred that he had
personal knowledge of the amount of labor
pPrformed. His knowledge from personal
observation was manifestly Incomplete, and
the time-book was made up, mainly at least,
from the reports of the gang foremen. The
time-book was clearly not admissible upon
the testimony either of the gang foremen or
of Wilt, sepnrntcly consldc>rE>d. The gang
forE'mE'n knew the tacts they reported to
Wilt to be true, but they did not see the entries made, and could not verify their correctness. Wilt did not make the entries upon his own knowledge of the facts, but
from the reports of the gang foremen.

the testimony either of the gang forcmen or

of Wilt, separately considcrcd. The gang

forcmcn knew the facts they reported to

Wilt to be true, but they did not see the en-

tries made, and could not verify their cor-

rectness. Wilt did not make the entries up-

on his own knowledge of the facts, but

from the reports of the gang foremen.
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Standing upon bis testimony alone, the entries were mere hearsay. But, comblnlng
the testimony of Wilt and the gang foremen,
there was-First, original evidence that laborers were employed, and that their tlmewas correctly reported, by pE>rsons who had
personal knowledge of the facts, and that
their reports were made In the ordlnarr
course of business, and in accordance with
the duty of the persons making them, and
In point of time were contemporaneous with
the transactions to which the reports related; and, second, evidence by the person who
received the reports that he correctly entered them, as reported, in the tlme-book,-the
usual course of his business and duty. It
la objected that this evidence. taken together, ts incompetent to prove tbe ultimate fact.
and amounts to nothing more than hearsay.
If the wltneBBee are believed, there can be
bot little moral doubt that the book Is a true
record of the actual fact. There could be
no doubt whatever, except one arising from
lnfl.nntty ot. memory, or mistake or fraud.
The gang foremen may, by mistake or fraud,
have misreported to Wllt, and Wilt may, either Intentionally or unintentionally, have
made entries not In accordance with the reports of the gang foremen. But the poaalblllty of mistake or fraud on the part of witnesses exists in all cases, and In respect t&
any kind of oral evidence.
The question arises, must a material ultimate tact be proved by the evidence of a
witneBS who knew the fact, and can reeall
It, or who, having no personal recollection.
of the fact at the time of bis examination as
a wltneSB, testifies that he made, or saw
made, an entry of the fact at the time, or reeently thereafter, which, on being produced..
he <'an verify as the entry he made or Raw,
and that he knew the entry to be true when
made; or may such ultimate fact be proved
by showing, by a wltne88, that he knew the·
faets in relation to the matter which is the
subJN!t of investigation, and communicated
them to another at the time, but had forgotten them, and supplementing this testimony
by that of the person receiving the communkatlon to the effect that he entered, at the
time, the tacts communicated, and IJy the
production of the book or memorandum In
which the entries were made?
Tht> adml881blllty o~ memoranda of thefirst class Is well settled. They are aumltted In connection with and as auxiliary t.0the oral evidence of the witness; and this.
whether the witness, on seeing the entries,
recalls the facts, or can only verify those entries as a true record made or seen by him
at or soon after the transaction to which It
relates. Halsey v. Slnsebaugh, 15 N. Y. 48";.
Guy v. l\lead. 22 N. Y. 462.
The other branch of toe Inquiry has not
been very distinctly adju1llcated In thls
state, although the admlsslblllty of entries
made under circumstances like those In this
case was apparently proved in Payne v.
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from reports made by others. The person

in charge of the laborers knows the fact, but

he may not have the skill, or for other rea-

sons it may be inconvenient that he should

keep the account. It may be assumed that

a system of accounts based upon substan-

tially the same methods as the accounts in

this case, is in accordance with the usages

of business. In admitting an account veri-
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master, but of a higher grade, who, in ti.me,
also ln accordance with hls duty, entered
the time as reported. We think entries so
made, with the evidence of the foremen that
they made true reports, and of the person
who made the entries that he correctly en·
tered them, are admissible. It 11 subst.anUally by thls method of accounts that the
tranaactlons of business ln numerous cases
are authenticated, and buelneBB could not
be carried on and accounts kept, ln many
'88eB, without great inconvenience, unleBB
tblB methOd of keeping and proving ac·
counts ls sanctioned. In a business where
many laborers are employed, the accounts
must, ln most cases, of neceeslty, be kept by
a person not cognlzant of the facts, and
from reports made by others. The person
lo charge of the laborers knows the fact, but
he may not have the skill, or tor other reaaona It may be Inconvenient that be should
keep the account. It may be &88Umed that
a system of accounts based upon substan·
tlally tbe same methods as the accounts ln
tbl8 cue, is In accordance with the usages
of bualneBB. In admitting an account veri·
lied as was the account here, there ls little
danger of mistake, and the admlBBlon of
soch an account as legal evidence ls often
necell8al'J to prevent a tallure of Justice.
We are of oplnlon, however, that it ls a
proper quallflcatlon of the rule admitting
nch evidence that the account must have
been made In the ordinary course of business, and that lt should not be extended so
as to admit a mere private memorandum,
not made ln pursuance of any duty owing
by the person making it, or when made upon Information derived from another who
made the communication casually and vol·
11J1tarlly, and not under the sanction of duty
or other obligation. The case before us l8
within the qualiflcatlon sugg.-sted.
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such an account as legal evidence is often

We are of opinion, however, that it is a
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-was admissible on tbbe l"eJ>o~rt0;1'~ ac-wblcb we have Justf; Raine Pounds 0
t:he time-book. .Madde~ the admJsslon ot
tied that he knew tlJe 1'ac fn substance testiP<>rted them, and WUt 1: t.s and properJy ret:ered them as reported eetJ11ed that he . enThe Part ot the acco·
Items of which were f unt ot materials, the
was not strictly admle~lahed by Coughlan,
not appear to ha
h
e. Coughlan does
of! th
ve ad i>ersonaI knowledge
1! e quantity ot atone delivered on his part
o die work, but took the count ot the car.
men, and bis reports to Wllt were based upon ~!le reports ot the carmen to him. 'l' bt>
carmen Wet'& not called, and the evidence of
Wilt and Coughlan was mere hearsay. l l
the attention ot the court had been called
by the detendant to this part of the account,
and objection had been speclft('fllly t&Aen to
the items entered upon the reports of Coughlan, the objection would, we think, have
been valid. But the objection was a general objection to the whole account. It was
clearly admlBBlble as to tbe Items reported
by Wilt, and we think the general obJec·
tton and exception Is not available to ra.lee
the question as to the admlsslblllty of 1:he
Items entered on the report ot Coughlan, Independently of the others. The Whole
amount of materials embraced ln the recovery was small, and we think no flljnati
will be done by afUrmfng the judgi:ne ce
The judgment Is therefore atflrmed.
n t.
All concur.
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SMITH v. RENTZ.

(30 N. E. 54, 131 N. Y. 169.)

(‘ourt of Appeals of New York. Feb. 12, 1892.

Appeal from supreme court, general term,

First department.

Action by Eugene Smith, executor of Rich-

ard Patrick, deceased, against Frederlcka

Rentz, for moneys paid out and expended by

plaintiﬂ"s testator at defendant‘s request.

Defendant appeals from a judgment of the

general term aﬂirming a judgment for plain-

(30 N.

E. M, 131 N. Y. 189.}

C'ourt of Appeals of New York. Feb. 12, 1892.
Appeal from supreme court, general term,
First department.
Action by Eugene Smith, executor of Richard Patrick deceased against Fredericka
Rentz, for n:oney8 patd' out and expended by
plaintiff's testator at defendant's request.
Defendant appeals from a judgment of the
general term aftlrmlng a judgment for plaintiff entered upon the report of a referee.
Reversed.

tiﬂ! entered upon the report of a referee.

Reversed.

Leopold Leo, for appellant.

Leopold Leo, for ap1>ellant. H. B. Clo880D,
for retlll<>ndent.

for respondent.

ANDREWS, J . The action was brought to

recover moneys advanced and paid out by

the plaintiffs testator for the defendant.

The complaint alleges that from 1882 to 1887
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the testator was the banker and general

H. B. Glosson,

business agent for the defendant, and that I

during aid years the defendant from time

to time deposited moneys with the testator;

and the latter, as requested by the defend-

ant, from her funds in his hands, and when

was liable; and that there was a balance

due the testator on account of such payment

of $3,744.75, which the plaintil claimed to

recover. The answer contained a general

denial and interposed special defenses. On

the trial before a referee the plaintiff offered

in evidence the ledger kept by the testator

containing the items of the alleged account.

It was admitted against the objection of the

defendant. Evidence was given on the part

of the plaintiff independently of the ledger,

tending to establish many of the items of

the account, but a considerable number of »

the items for which a recovery was had are

supported by the ledger alone. If the ledger

was improperly admitted in evidence the

judgment must be reversed. It was admit-

ted not only to establish the items, of which

there was no other proof, but its admission

may have influenced the referee in passing '

upon the items of the account, of which it 1

was not the sole evidence. The referee ad-

mitted the ledger on the ground that the de-

fendant had under the Code examined the

plaintiff })efore trial, and in that proceeding

had given notice to the plaintiﬁ to produce

the books oi.’ the tcstator, and that upon

such notice the plaintiff produced certain

books of the decedent. among which was the

ledger containing his account with the de-

fendant, which was inspected by the de-

fendant's counsel. The referee held that

the ledger was thereby made evidence for

the plaintiff. The ledger was not used on

the examination, nor were any questions

asked founded upon the entries therein. A

similar question was before the second divi-

sion of this court in Carradine v. Hotchkiss,

120 N. Y. 608, 2-1 N. E. 1020. There the

plaintiff, on the request of the defendant's

counsel, made on the trial, produced a let-

ter, and delivered it to the latter, who read

ANDREWS, J, The action was brought to
recover moneys advanced and paid out by
the plalntUf's te11tator for the defendant.
The complaint allPges that from 1882 to 1887
the testator was the banker and general
business agent for the defendant, and that
durlng said years the defendant from time
to time dPposlted moneys with the testator;
and the latter, as requested by the defendant, from her funds In his hands, and whPn
these were ln1mftlclent from his own, paid
her different sums In cash, and also paid
taxes and tradesmen's bills for which she
was liable; and that there was a balance
due the tPHtator on account of such payment
of $3,744.75, which the plalntUr claimed to
recover. The answer contained a general
denial and Interposed special defenses. On
the trial before a referee the plalntllf offerl'd
In evidence the ledger kept by the testator
containing the Items of the alleged account.
It was admitted against the objection of the
defendant. Evidence was given on the part
of the plaintiff Independently of the ledger,
tending to establish man~· of thf' Items of
the account, but a con11lderablt> numlK'r ot
the Items for whl<'h a recovery was had are
supported by the ledger alone. If the ledger
was Improperly admitted In evidence the
judgment must be reversed. It was admit·
ted not only to establish the Items, of which
there was no other proof, but Its admission
may have Influenced the referee In pa11Slng
upon the ltPms of the account, of whh'h It
was not the sole evidence. The rt>feree ad·
mltted the ledger on the ground that the de·
ft-ndant bad under the Code examined the
plalntUf jlefore trial, and In that proceeding
had given notice to the plaintiff .to produce
the book11 of the testator, and that upon
11ucb noth'P the plalntllf produ<'ed certain
hook11 of thP dP<'Pdent, among whl<•h was the
ledger c.'Ontalnlng his account with the defendant, whl<'h was ln11pected by the def Pndant's counsel. The referee hPld that
the ledger was thereby made evhlt>n<'e for
the plaintiff. The ledger was not u11t>d on
the examination, nor were any que11tions
asked founded upon the entries tberelu. A
li2

similar question was before the second dlvl·
slon of thlB court In Carradine v. Hotchkiss,
120 N. Y. 608, 24 N. E. 1020. There the
plalntur, on the request of the defendant's
counsel, made on the trial, produced a let·
ter, and dellvered It to the latter, who read
It, but did not offer It In evidence. Tbereupon, on demand of the plaintiff's counsel,
the court directed.the defendant's counsel to
put It In evidence, and In obt'dlenre to such
dll't'CUon, to which the defendant's counsel
j excepted, the letter was read to the jury.
1 When the case came to this court on ap: peal by the defendant this ruling was chal·
The court so decided,
1 l~nged as erroneous.
: Haight. J., saying: "Whatever may have
i been the ancient rule In England upon the
! subject, we do not understand that the rul·
' Ing of the court can be sustained under any
rule now existing In England or In this
state." But the court, being of opinion that
the letter did not prejudice the defendant,
aftlrmed the judgment. It la claimed that
the decision upon the point of the admlssl; blllty of the letter was unnecessary, and
! therefore ls not binding. The question was
properly raised, and was decided. Its declslon naturally preceded the decision of the
subsequent question, and the declaration of
the court was not obiter. We think, moreover, that the deelslon In the case accords
with the view which has prevailed In the
, courts of this state and the practice of the
. profe881on. In Lawrence v. Van Home, 1
[ Caines, 276, the defendant gave notice to the
: plalntitr to produce on the trial a certain let: ter, which the plaintiff refused to do unless
; the defendant would engage to read It In
! evidence. The defendant claimed the right
to Inspect the letter before decldinll wheth·
er he wo\Jld read It In evidence. The Judge
ruled that Inspection could not be demanded
except on the terms which the plaintiff Im. posed. On appeal one of the judges was of
the opinion that the ruling was right, and
' that the court could not compel a production
of a paper for Inspection only. But the
point was not decided. In Kenny v. Clarkson, 1 Johns. 385, Spencer, J., said: "I must
not be understood as sanctioning the course
· adopted at the trial In admitting the paper
, to be read without proof, because notice
i :bad been given to produce It, and It had
j been called for and perused. The case of
I Lawrence v. Van Horne, 1 calnes, 276, set1 ties nothing, the then chief justice -e.xpressIng no decided opinion on the question, and
the rest of the court were equally divided.
It appears to me that the notice to produce a paper, and <•ailing for Its Inspection,
ought to be considered as analogous to a
bill for discover~·. where most certainly the
answer ls not evidence but for the adverst•
party. I think It ls our <luty to adopt such a.
course as will not DN'dlPssly drive parties
'I Into equity for discovery."
The doctrine announced by Judge Spencer

!
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“The reasons drawn from analogy render

~..

New Hampshire case was decided upon an

elaborate examination 01' the English and

American authorities, and contains the most

thorough opinion on the question to be

found in the books. The courts of Massa-

chusetts, Maine, and Delaware seem to have

followed the supposed English rule on the

subject. It was said in the earliest case in

Massachusetts on the subject (Com. v. Da- .

vidson, 1 Cush. 33) that it was a mooted

point whether calling for the books of the

opposite party and inspecting them, and‘

doing nothing more, makes the books evi-

dence; but in Clark v. Fletcher, 1 Allen, 53,

the point was decided. In Maine (Blake v.

Russ, 33 Me. 360)‘ the question was decided

without assigning any reasons; and the rul-

ing in the Delaware case (Randel v. Chesa-
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peake Co., 1 Har. [Del.] 284) was made on

the trial, and, so far as appeal“, Wiﬂwllt

any examination. The authorities on the

question are divided. But we perceive 11°

reason for departing from the rule as un-

derstood in this state. The claim that it

gives the party calling for a paper M1 Unfair

advantage, if he may inspect it» ﬁnd $11611

decline to put it in evidence, $991118 t0 HS

rather specious than sound. The same ob-

jection would lie in case of bills for discov-

911'; but it was the settled rule that an an-

swer, though under oath, was evidence only

for the party who obtained it. The P8113’

who has in his possession books or papers

which may be material to the case of his

opponent has no moral right to conceal them

from his adversary. If, on inspection. the

party calling for them ﬁnds nothing to his

advantage, his omission to put them in evi-

deuce does not prevent the party producing

them from proving and introducing them in

Widence if they are competent against the

other party. The party calling for books

and papers would be subjected to great

hazard if an inspection merely, without

more, would make them evidence in the

vase. That rule tends rather to the sup-

pression than the ascertainment of truth,

keeping es 9

is no foundation for tﬁienk Vldence in ravm.

rule which pr . his We think the,-

it is said, frommtiligsl In sco:tte“ﬂ°'1- Th:

bO0kS Of 8. tradegmggv Of ate (adopted.

011

gaged in business co and).

1' Other

co _ _ ntal Person en-

ant’ kept Ill the 01- lung items of ac-

din“ -

accounts, are admissible 1;] yf;‘€l|FS9f0f book-

‘Or 0 the per.

ognizegllaz qrlzlgiﬁgzltipn of the rule was re;-.

state’ and has bee al eist tiieclsions in this

with general n ma nta ned by the com-ts

Thayer 12 Ioh uniformity. Vosburgh v_

reason ' Tl; 118. 461. It stands upon clear

or a pa-rt V I eh rule admitting account-books

a deparnllrll ‘is own favor, in any case, was
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80 far as our Reports sll0 tlle ba Ile- f and the <> ~ .I'0116fro ~
•
quiesced In by the courts and 1 a
l" or
better <-nJL<:"~-..i1.aeer/ to~ I&
£011a.
the state without question untlt beel"ecent justlce. "I::-.ll::::a ~ prottu,_.tJ. Pl-~ ~ ./"fe~
period. The English rule bas no !{it hi>. llni- on notice
I .I/SS t-be 1"0104 °4 0~o"fe 8eellJ
form. Lord Kenyon, In Sayer v.
e en, 1 If be ret"~ao;;s~s. I& ll111~ t~':J.. .b0o tlJe e8 to
Esp. 209, held that production of a Paper on fze the o~lf~-er part_,,
l.l.s 1'11 ~<->t- lc8 .tllJd 'll<Ja
notice did not make It evidence. The rule dence or
- t Jbelr contello ~I~ ~l#tt or tJie
seems to have been held otherwlt1e by Lord having I><>ss:seBS/on call t&, ~ ~clliec1, llllt}JrtJ
Denman In Calvert v. Flower, 7 Car. & P. producing "'t:~em.
But llot
llt~11
386, and In two or three other nlsl Prins favorable
t<> the othel" 1t> t1i 11:~e.11 a tbe Part:i·casee, but without any special examination. be dlsclos~ ; and Jt
&lei e~ co '18 JVer bj·
The courts of Pennsylvania and New Hamp- the party ~~1'usfng .ma lll'oci'tle. the;yllta111 ractH
ihlre held the view that production and In- ger of havl.Jag Beconda J> Jll80c·uo.n ls 011gbt to
speetlon alone do not make the paper evl- contents.
':l:'he claf.rm
l>l"Q ~ lllcur :;rused.
dence. Withers v. Glllespy, 7 Serg. & R. books were compet:-ellt& a180or Klvp11 0
10; Austin v. Thomson, 45 N. H. 113. Gibo:f the ent:rfea under th~ O!-/ lnade that the
eon, J., In Withers v. Glllespy, referring to ot account In certain
e J'uJ Kl11a1 evidence
the practice on bills ot discovery, says: of the party keepfn
~llse8
llllllcJag books
"The reason• drawn :from analogy render le no foundatfon
tbeD:J. .::ence la favor
the argument almost insuperable."
The rule which Prevails 1 . Uus co t e think therp
New Hampshire case was decided upon an It ls said, t'rom the 1 ll thle 8~~ntloa. The
elaborate examination of' the English and books ot a tradesrn!: :~ .:a-ollaa~J. <~;!r~':i;
American authorities, and contains the most gaged In business conta r other person eathorough opinion on the question to be ., count, kept Jn the ordJn hlfng ltem8 of acfound In the books. The courts of Massa- accounts, are admfssfbJ ary coul"Be of bookcb\lletts, Maine, and Delaware seem to have : son keeping them agaf e fn ravor ot the per.
followed the supposed English rule on the I w-hom the charg~s arenst the party against
1ubject. It was said In the earliest case in : preliminary tacts are sh Dlade, after certain
M8811achusetts on the subject (Com. v. Da- ! tlon to the case or bookown, has no appJlcavldson, 1 Cush. 33) that It was a mooted ' to cash fte
s or entries relatlng
ti
ms or dealings between the pa~
point whether calling for the books of the 0 es. This quallftcatlon of' the rule Wll8 ret·tgntfzed In the earliest decisions In this
opposlte party and inspecting them, and
doing nothing more, makes the books evl- s a e, and has been maintained by the courts
dence; but In Clark v. Fletcher, 1 Allen, 53, with general uniformity. Vosburgh v.
the point was decided. In Maine (Blake v. Thayer, 12 Johns. 461. It stands upon clear
RUBS, 33 Me. 360)" the question was decided reason. The rule admitting account-books
without assigning any reasons; and the rul-1 ot a party In his own favor, In any case, was
1ng in the Delaware case (Randel v. Chesa- a departure trom the ordinary rules of evlpeake Co., 1 Har. [Del.] 284) was made on , dence. It was rounded upon a supposed
the trial, and, so far as appears, without I necessity, and was Intended for cases of
any examination. The authorities on the 1· small traders who kept no clerks, and was
question are divided. But we perceive no confined to transactions· In the ordlnars
reason for departing from the rule as un- course of buying and selling or the rendJ.
derstood In this state. Tbe claim that it · tlon ot services. In these cases some protecgtves the party calling for a paper an unfair tlon against fraudulent entries Js atl'orded J
advantage, if he may Inspect It, and then j the publicity which to a greater or Jess e;x.n
decline to put It In evidence, seems to us 1 tent attends the manual transfer ot tanglbl rather speclona than sound. The same ob- articles of property or the rendition ot se e
jectlon would Ue In case of bills for dlscov- lees, and the knowledge whlch third Pe~
ery; but It was the settled rule that an an- sons may have of the transactions to Wht rawer, though under oath, was evidence only the entries relate. But the same necessi~h
for the party who obtained It. The party does not exist in respect to cash tran
Y
who baa In his possession books or papers tlons. They are usually evidenced by nc'.!!'"cwblcb may be material to the case of his or writing or vouchers In the hands or
opponent has no moral right to conceal them party Paying or advancing the mone e
from his adversary. If, on Inspection, the Moreover, entries of cash transnctlons couid
party calling for them finds nothing to his be fabricated with much greater safety, a.na
adnntage his omission to put them In evl- with less chance of the fraud being disco
dence d~ not prevent the party producing ered, than. entries of good11 sold and <l~l \:~
them from proving and Introducing them In ered or ot: services rendered. It would 'be
evidence If they are competent against the unwise to extend the operation of the X-U.leotber party. The party calllng tor books admitting a pat'Q''s books ln eYlden.ce \.:>~
and papers would be subjected to g n•ut yond its Drese nt Umlts, as would be the cnae ,
buard lf an Inspection merely, without we think. if bo<>ks containing caRh dealln..;;s
more, would make them evidence In the were held to be competent. Partle.s are ne>'W
l'll&e. That rule tends rather to the supcompetent: ~ltnesses In their o"n beha.l:r.
Preaslon than the ascertainment ot truth, A resort 1:o 1>00ks of account ls thereby reu:1..'7a
'1411,

the argument almost insuperabie.” The
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dored unnecessary in the majority of cases. should therefore be reversed, and a new trial

We think the ledger was erroneously ad- ordered. All concur, except MAYNARD, J.,

mitted in evidence, and the judgment below taking no part.

dered unnecessary in the majority of cases.
We think the ledger was erroneously admltted in evidence, and the judgment below
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should therefore be reversed, and a new trial
ordered. All concur, except MAYNARD, J.,
taking no part.
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. . 1k e fencliinl: 3 3 tog],-_s1;1,s0 _O 3 96- Ike, F- 2;

Appeal from district court’ P0 ount-Y5 Plaintilf s ll bSL'I'11)6iI "Pt" Stu 0- 8",‘)? 1:

JQQIAII GIVEN, Judge. but he Les I: i ﬁes that t fol‘ gob lsks. J25: 4

Action _to recover an amount alleged to be from 20 to 5” Wnho Ii D; 0 sh)0k 8,1845; l

due toplaintiff on account of salary earned as thorny, a D d that hem; hislybbe a,-as ogws ¢;,‘.

'5°¢"‘t“ry and '¥“*“ag@P °f defend?-"V There holder. Ii e votled a evx ‘Thor “'88 ch.st""1*'

was atrial by Jury, and a verdict and judg- lioldels On the st kt Ines‘: be "'1:-age "".5'ea

ment for plaintiff. The defendant appea1s_ virtue of a pm or: of _E:.t1“gs0-‘nut, a s¢;r.-iu.

Parsons ct-1’c~rr_1/. for appellant. James M_ taken by def-mg-_7' His “kin "fun, st0‘:fl':\'-

&' 96°11]? E- M°Ca".9h"'"- f°l' *1PPene°- any triiiisac-tion bill: 201:9 :15‘; ("'1-so Id»;

mu be tlr - - een - 013 "lkill w.-

ROBINSON, J. Plaintiﬂ was the Secretary storfk in h1§t0‘.¥"‘“ ‘"1’ huff §1n¢1°,',’,.‘.‘°¢<,~n.¢ 0';

and manager of defendant during the _vea.rs for it.and that ii“ name WI intendglftirr. It
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1885 and 1886, and for the month of Jan uary, St0ckinql.l(9Sl:1'Un£_|I;_I‘0cl“_ ien be subggritffff

13257, and cl-aims a balance due on accountof

salary of $755.62. Defendant denies the al-

leged indebtedness, and seeks to recover of

defendant $890.29, on counter-claims for

money of defendant alleged to ll?l.\'€ been col-

lected by plaintiﬁ and converted to his own

use. and for unpaid assessments on capital

stock of defendant alleged to be owned by

plaintiff. 'l‘he jur_v found that defendant

owed to plaintiff the sum of $379.20.

1. Plaintiff introduced in evidence certain

books of account, which belonged to and had

been kept for the defendant. Some of them

were objected to on the ground that they had

been kept by plaintiff while he was acting as

secretary of defendant. and on the further

ground that they were not shown to be books

of original entries. \Ve are of the opinion

that the books were properly retained in evi-

dence. After they were introduced it was

admitted that they were defendant’s books of

original entries; that they were kept in the

ordinary manner, and in the regular course

of business; and that the entries therein

were made at the time oi’ the traiisactioiis

which they represented. This made them

competent evidence as against defendant.

The fact that some of the entries were made

by plaintiff was imniaterial. under the issues

of the case. He made them. not for liiiiiselh

but for the defendant, and as its agent; and

the books when completed, were the books of

defendant, admissible in evidence against it.

2. One Eakln procured of defendant a cer-

tiﬁcate for shares representing $3.000 Of ii-8

capital stock. I-Ie agri.-ed with plainliﬁ to sell

and transfer this to him when he should pay

the amount required therefor. A note for

$7-50 was given to E-akin by plaintiff on ac-

count of this stock, and the certilicute was

placed in the hands of one Fuller. to be de-

livered to plaintiff when he should pay the

note. The note was not paid, and the stock

was not transferred. On the books of the com-

puny it stood in the name of Eakin. While

the plaintiff had an interest in this stock, he

never owned it, and never agreed with de.

tendaint to pay for it. He was not. there-

. Appeal from district court. polk COunty;
/08IA.H GIVEN, Judge.
· Action to recover an amount alleged to be
.due toplaintitr on account ofsalaryearnf'd 88
.secretary and manager of defendant. There
was a trial by jury. and a verdict and Judg- .
ment tor plaintiff. The defendant appeals.
Par10R8&Per1'1J, for appellant. Ja~M.
ct George B. McOa:ughan. forappell~
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ROBINSON, J. Plaintiff was the secretary
s ........ •n is own na
~ ·
Plaint/It. 1
and manager of defendant during the years
for it, and that he r Ille \\rl>~ntendecl to ~:
1885 and 1886, and for the month of January,
stock in question in 0 7ur8d F:n ~e aubsC!ri/JfJd
1887, and claims a balance due on accountuf
tion, but that would 11 lflltnent'&loa_totnk,.tbe
salary of $755.62. Defendant denies the alt Wet"n him and defend Of, l'llaJce or his su1_11Jcrlp.
leged indebtP<lneea, and seeks to recover of
wasactua)Jy takeu b
1tnt 00 thny priv1ty bedefendant 8890.29, on counter-claims for
corre1·tly in Wilhd 'Y ~It.kin The stoc:k wl1lcb
money of defendant alleged tu have been col•
f
•
ra "'' n B rrom
•
etl1e
court
rult'd
cons
den&t1on
ot a8Sf"Ss
Jury
all
lected by plaintiff and converted to his own
stock.
Complaint
fa
rn'
ll'.le'?ts
oa tl1e Eltkiai
use, and for unpaid RSSessmenta on c<4pital
of a remark of the eourt&<Je Jn this co11nPCtion
stock of defendant alleged to be owned by
H_B_
opinion on the quesurnttde fn ,._nuouncing
plaintiff. The jury found that defendant b1hty
on the Eakin st k on of pla1nt;tf•8 l/11•
owed to plaintiff the suro of 8379.20.
counsel oo that qnesti • a~"?r argument of
L Plaintiff introduced in evidence certain not designed
. un • 1 he re11uirk was
books of account, which belonged to and had and could not ~s an ~~strucuon to the Jury,
been kept tor the defendant. Some of them WHS
t
ave .,...en so understoo•I. It
no addrf'RSl'd to tlaern, and was not of
were objected to on the ground that they had
a
nature.
to
have
been consi<lert'd whilt" they
been kept by plalntiff while he WRS acting as
secretary of defend1mt, and on the further u.ere ~ehbentt111g upon tht>ir '·erdict, unle-s
ey disregarded the cha1·ge of the court. und
ground that they were not shown to be ~ks
of original entries. We are of the op101on we cannot presume tlmt they did.
8. Tb~ co~rt refused to submit to the jury
tb11t the books were properly retaine<l in evifive special interrogatories asked by deft-ncldence. After they were introduced it was ant.
The first w 88 3:1 follows: "(ll l>itl the
admitted that they were defendant's books of
books
of
account kept by the plain ti Jr, while
original entries; that they were kept in the In the management
of defendant's ilnsi 111-ss
ordinary manner, and in the regular coui;te as its agent, show thnt
receive1I, on acof bosiness· and that the ent1·ies therein count of defendant. ruore he
moneytlum he pnid
were made 'at the time of the tranaactions out. and, if so, what sum?"
'rllis w11s not
which they represented. This made them relevant to 1my issue in the CHSP, and w ..
8
competent evidence as agal net ddendant. properly
refused. The second interrogJ&tor,y
Tbe fact that some of the entries were made WM~ follows:
Did he receive, tlurfn
by plaintilr was immaterial, under the i<Jsues the tnne that ht' "(2)
hacl
the
man11geme11t or dell
of the case. He made them, not !or bi mself,
fendant's ilusiness. any sums of money Which
but for the defendanL, and ws its ngtmt; 1md do
not appear upon the books keJlt b\• h; rn
&he books whP.n completed, were the books ot and tor which he hns not acco1111ted ·to tJ •
defendant, adntiBSible in evldencA ~gainst it. defendant, and, If so, what sum?" w.. I\ l t j
2. One Eakin procured of deft:ndamt a c~r not prt-part>d to say that tJ1is might not ha ~e
tillcate for shares representing $3,000 of its been properly submitted, and yet it doe n' e'
e&Jlital stock. He agree<l with plai ntUY to sell appear to us Lhat prtjudice could Jul\·e11 r-ot
and transfer this to him when be should pay suited fro~ the rt>fusal to sulimit it. ~~
the amount required therefor. A. note for answ1>r Which could have been given w
t7SO was given to E11kin by plaintiff on &e· have cont1·01\ecl t.he general verdil-t, in01 1d
count of this stock, and the certltlcnte w11s absence of other sp•·cml llndings. Dr~ht»r •e
placed in the hands of one Fuller. to be de- Railway Co., 59 lowu, 601, la N. W. U ..-;·
livered to plainliJr when he should p11y the 75-J. The third special interroriaL11ry S•n•ght
note. The note Wll8 not paid, and the stock to have the jury slate _whl'l.her plains iff "'- .,,8
was not transferred. On thti books of the com. a suhscriber to the capital slock of tlt.'fe11t\u.nt
pany it stood in the name of Eakin. While and ff he \1\-us to stat." the amount or cu.u~ 1- 0~
the plaintilt had an interest. In this stork, he paym ·nt. if any, umlle ther..on and ~· n pa i~\.
never owned it, and nen•r agreed with de- '! his was 110t anadt! 111at1>r1al by any 1,.s ll 8 , >r
fendant to pay tor it. He wKS n_ot, the1·e. evlilence i
tht' ca-<e. Dl'ft>nc\ant dot>s n "'"
fore, liable to defendant tor unpaid Mli*'Ss- sel'ktoa·e 0 eronas11bscri tinnforstock. \u,t;
0
menta made on account of it. :See Cotle, § on stock :;, ;'1rtillcl\l" Ior which was i1:1sueu to
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RELEVANCY.

E-akin. N0 call was ever made on plaintiffs

subscription. The fourth special interroga-

tory asked inquired in regard to a settlement

of accounts between plaintiff and the board

of directors of defendant, and was properly

ref used, for the reason that there was no ev-

idem-e of such a settlement. The ﬁfth spe-

cial interrogatory was to be answered only in

the event that the jury answered the fourth,

and was therefore properly refused.

4. Counsel for appellant base some argu-

ment upon the weight and eifect of the evi-

176

dence. We do not deem it necessary to re-

view this at length, nor to notice more par-

ticularly other questions raised. The ab-

stract does not purport to set out all the evi-

dence given on the trial, and some of the

questions discussed have no foundation in the
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record as presented to us. It is suﬂicient lo

say that We have examined all questions pre-

sented by the record with care, but do not

ﬁnd any error prejudicial to defendant. The

judgment of the district court is therefore

atﬂrmed.

HELEVANCY.

Eakin. No call WM ever mndA on plaintiff's
sulJscription. 'fhe fourth special iriterroga·
tory asked inquil'ed in rep:ard to a settlement
of accounts between plaintiff and the board
of director.i of defendant, and was properly
refused, for the reason that there was no evi<lt'Dee of such a settlement. The fifth special interrogatory was to be answered only in
the event that the jnry answered the fourth,
and was therefore properly refused.
4. Counsel for apptillant base some argument upon the weight and e1l'.ect of the evi176

dence. We do not deem it necessary tor&view this at length, nor to notice more particalllrly other questions raisPd. The abstract does not purport to set out all the evidence given on the trial, and some of the
questions discussed have no foundation in Lhe
record ~ presented to us. It is sufficient l<>
say that we have examined all questions presented by the record with care, but do not
Hn<l any error prejudicial to defendant. Th&
judgment of the district court i8 thereforeatllrmed.

-DECLA.R.A.T.l.O:Ns l.:N colJ!tSE OF BUISL.'iESS.
NESS. [Case N0. 62

ofﬂcc0§1ut0f 5*

PRATT v. \\'H1TE_

(132 Mass. 477.)

Jlliiiciul Court of 1\Ia_qS

Meir. March 2, 1882

q_Q_'fj1'l'ell & N. H. Pratt, for

,) iiumivml, for defendant-

aehusetts_

supreme

plaintiff.

The admission of the books

party to prove items of ‘vork

delivered, when Supported

or, if he is deceased, that of

or executor’ has long been

state? and Under various

created by statute, in all

Uni0Ii. It has been sane-

tion i0 the general rule of
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isle“ that a Party should

his OWE! Case. and from

Sky, in 01‘ 91‘ 0 Drevent a

he .1» allowed

to ‘W0 ecord of his dally transac-

_ Erodu n_ of which, on account of their

t1oQs,to ma S mutene/Ss_ it cannot be ex_

vLXietY and “,1-u be witnesses.

ilicted therehzicomt to decide upon the ad-

it lS for g the book offered, although the

‘=:1lsS“’““y O to it afterwards must be

' en

weight ta be gw for the jury, in connec-

t‘on

Large\y&&h‘1“‘t‘*SS‘am,eamnce, the lnanner in

ting hwé is kept and the other evidence in

\\~ c '

ear to have been hon-

me case" It :21 sgotpsntentionally erased or

only kepndato have been the record of the

‘me-‘°“' M.‘ S of me paﬂy, made for the

daily busmestablishing a charge against an-

pr0'1'ed by Jt, ft could not ha•e been admitted
e"\'en 1t lt met those tests. Although somewhat Jrregularly made a part of the excep~11~~e J~dic\a\ Court of Mo.ssach URet:t:a
tions to be examined by the court, the book
·•
Norfolk. Mo.rch 2, 1882.
· •
bas not been produced by the defendant for
c. Q. 1'.'lrrell & N. H. Pratt, for plalntl:tr. our Inspection. It appears that measure,
J, nurol'bfey, for defendant.
weight, and quantity were not given In connection with the Items of goods charged,
but for this reason we are not prepared to
1 The admission of t:be books say that It was Inadmissible. It the book
pjJl'.S;NS, · rtY to prove lten:ie o:r -work contain
the record of the party, dally transof aC<.\'l~ut of a. padeUvered, when supported
actions made for the purpose of a charge,
~®e a -xid goods r if be Is deeea.sed, tba. t of It may be admitted, even if deficient In many
'ofli.\& c.wn oath, 0 0~ executor, has long been
respects. It does not follow that, before a
\i.\% a~\n\stro.~ state; and under various plalntUf can fairly &Bk a verdict, he may not
~nn\~:tEd In s created by eta. t.ute, l n all be compelled to supply deficiencies In the
tt'&tt\~t.lons. some Union. It has been sanc- evidence his book alfords. This blll of ex·
the 8"\ates of tbe tlon to the genera.I rule of ceptlons does not show that other evidence
tloD~ as an e:s.~epe:s.isted that a party should was not Introduced.
~w lib._"" 1ttorroer In bis own case. and from
A. time book which has only the name of
not ~ a w\tnes ltY In order to prevent a the party and marks under particular dates
lllPllllll>osed necess tbo.t he shall be allowed has been admitted. Mathes v. Robinson, 8
tall::::::,ire of justi~~ord of bis daily tra.nsac- Mete. (Mass.) 269. Upon the same principle,
to ~roduce the of -wblcb, on account of their marks on a. shingle or upon a notched stick
tto~s. to roanY lnuteness. it cannot be ex- have been admitted. Kendall v. Field, 14
va.._""S:'lety and Ill 11 be witnesses.
Me. 30; 1 Greenl. Ev. §§ 118, 119. Yet, with~ted there wl ourt to decide upon the ad- out additional evidence, these would afford
lt Is tor the c e book offered, although the but Incomplete proof of o cln.im. In Hooper
TC;::a.\BS\bU\tY of ;en to lt o.fterwa rds must be v. Taylor, 39 Me. 224, a book similar to the
'il'V'" elg'nt to be
tion for tbe 3ury, in connec- one here In question In omitting the weight
~8.rgely a ques ppearo.nce, the manner In and quantity of articles was admitted with
~<>n w\tb \ts a and the otber evidence In but little discussion.
""<N1Uc'n lt ls ke!~st appear to have been honThere would seem to be no reason why a
"\Jle case. lt d not Intentionally erased or delivery of epecl.fl.c articles might not be
e11Uy ke-pt, a~ bave been the record of the shown by a book of accounts, even If more
alteted, and 0 of tbe party, made for the evidence were needed to show the amount
dally bus\nes; bl\sh\ng a charge against an- which the plaintiff was entitled to recover.
purpose of e a
e rd ls to be had to It le easy to Imagine many facts In connec·
other. Necessa;l~i:e rp~y, his Illethods and tlon with which such charges might be very
the educat\on
ln deciding tbls important. We have no reason to suppose
knowledge ocf buwsle~~~s, ~~~ii.ver, 2 l\lass. 217; more weight WBB given to them than that
question.
ogs
·
to which they were fairly entitled, and we
Prince v. Smith, 4 Masa. 454.
the book must presume that the book was submitted to
Tbe decision of the court tosa:;:ti! Its char- the jury under all proper Instructions.
ht to be
ls l:lnal and conclusive, unles
Exceptions overruled.
that wblch was soug
acter, or ~m
uu
(132 Maas. 477.)
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l:c’?eIra1oi'mfr0cIgnthat which W35 5°“ght to be

wrnous, EV. -12
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Provefi by it, it could not hare been admitted

(Wen 1_f it met those tests. Although some-

“'““‘ "1'@gvIﬂ1'l:' made a part of the excel)-

ti0l1B to be examined by the court, the book

has not been produced by the defendant for

our inspection. It appears that measure,

(Case No. 62
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Caie No. 63]
Case No. 63]

RELEVANCY. .

ELLIS v. HARRIS.

(11 S. E. 248, 106 N. C. 395.)

' Supreme Court of North Carolina. March 31,

1890.

Appeal from superior court, Franklin

county; Co.\'.\"oa, Judge.

F. S. Spruill and Ba tchelordir Devereux,

for plaintiff. 0. M. Cooke, for defendant.

AVERY. J. The plaintiff claimed through

a deed from Bennett Gay. administrator

of James Burgess, to \Villium Crowder,

dated January 17,1859, and immediately

under a deed dated June 5. 186%), from E.

A. Gupton, sheriff of Franklin county. to

the plaintiff, reciting a sale by virtue of ex-

ecutions against Willie Urowder. The de-

fendant insiste.d that plaintiff’s deed did

not cover the land in controversy, and,

as evidence of title in himself, offered the
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recoi-d‘of a. special proceeding and a deed

from W. H. Spencer. administrator of J. B.

Mann, reciting asale to make assets in ac-

cordance with a decree in said special pro-

cecding.and alsointroduced evidence tend-

ing to show that the calls of said deed in-

cluded the land in dispute. The plaintiff

testified that he was present at the sale of

the land of Willie Crowder by the sheriff

in the year 1869, and bought the land of

said Crowder. including the reversionary

interest in the portion occupied as dower

by the widow of James Burgess, who re-

mained in possession of that portion of

the land till her death, in the year 1&8-1,

when he took and retained possession of

it till the defendant entered by force, and

expelled him, in the year 18%. On the

cross-examination of the plaintiff, the de-

fendant's counsel were permitted to ask

him ho\v many acres of land were con-

ve_ved by the deed of the sheriff. and he an-

swered: “s21~’. ” He then stated, in re-

sponse to a question, (plaintiff objecting.)

that he gave in for taxation 1,100 acres of

land afterhispurchase at sheriff‘s sale, and

before he sold 172 acres off his tract. The

plaintiff excepted. At a subsequent stage

of the trial, plaintiff was recalled. and ex-

plained that he listed the dower land for

taxation, ﬁrst. in 1885, the widow having

paid tax on it previously, and that he had

listed for taxation, in 1871, 922 acres. in-

cluding 90 acres bought from Spencer, ad-

ministrator.

it is true that in Thornburgh v. Mastin,

93 N. C. 258. the court said: “ Any one sup-

posing he has a claim upon the land of an-

other may list it, and pay the taxes; but

that would be verv slight, if any, evidence

tending to establish his title.” In the

t-use of ltuﬂin v. (iv:-rbv, SS N.C.369.it had

been previously held that paying tax on

land without actual possession would not

perfect a colorable title. But in the case

of Austin v. king. 97 N. C. 341, 2 S. E. Rep.

678. Justice DAVIH. delivering the opinion

of the court. settles the question bylaying

down the rule that the payment of taxes

EJ..I..JS v. IIARRIS.
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dlspoRes or the ftrst. third, seventh, and
ninth exce11tlons.
The plaintiff then offered fn evidence a
Supreme Court of North Carolina. March 31, deed from N. Patterson to James Burgees,
executed In 1845, and a deed from Alfred
1890.
BurgeRS to Jamee Burgess, executed In the
Appeal from superior court, Franklin year 11:146, fn which the lands conveyed are
county; Coxxon, Judge.
described by metes and bounds, and as
419 acres on Tar river. The plaintltt n.leo
P. &. Spruill and Batcllelor & Devereu:r,
for plalntitt. 0. M. Cooke, for defendant. introdncetl the record of the petition of the
widow of James BurgeHS for dower, showing a decree making an allotment to her
AVERY,J. TheplalntlffclRimed through by met~ and bounds. W. N. Fuller then
a deed from Bennett Gay, administrator testified, on behalf of the plaintiff, that be
of James Burge11s, to WUllum Crowder, surveyed the llurges11 tract of land, and ·
dated Jnnunrv 17, 1859, and Immediately very nearly located ft by the deeds, and
undl'r a deed ilatecl June !'i, 1869, from E. that he also had the survey made when
A. Gupton, 11heriff of Franklin county, to the dower was allotted. The plaintiff
the pluintlff, r<.'Citlng tt sale by virtue of ex- then" proved, u set forth in the statement.
ecutions against Willie Crowdf'r. The de- that .James Burgess owned tbi~ land, and
fendant lm1l11ted that plaintiff's deed did ret1lded on It, fl•om 1845 untll his death,
not co\·er the land In controveni,v. and, and owned no other land tn Franklin
as el'hlence of title In bhnirelf, off(•red the county, and that Willie Crowder died in
record ·of a 11peclal proceeding :md u deed 1870-71, and was plaintiff's brother-lnf!"om W. H. Spencf'r, admlnl11tr1:1.tor of J.B. law." This Rtatement comprehends all of
Mann, reciting 11sale to make aBHete In ac- the material evidenee for pl1tlntlft; and,
cordance 'vlth a decree In e1\ld special pro- as tnstruetton wait asked predicated upon
ceecllng, and also Introduced evidence tend- all or the testimony, It ls necessary to
ing to show that the calls of Maid deed In- know what It was. ThPland conveyed in
cluded the land In dh1pute. The plaintiff tbe11lwrlff'sdeed toplalntlrf(executed 1~691
testified that he was present at the sale of was descrll>ed therein us "eight hundred
the land of Willie Crowder by the sheriff and twenty-seven acres of land adJolnlng
In the year li;Jf19, and bought the hrnd of the lands o: J. B. Mann, deceu11ed, Mrs.
said Crowd<'r, tm:ludlng the reverelonary Jane Wilder, Gaston Wilder, and othl'rs,
lnt1>n•11t In the portion occupied as dower containing, by estimation, eight hundred
by the widow of .Jamee Burge88, who re- nnd twenty-seven acres, more or lees."
mained in JIOH11e11slou of that portion of The desrrl1)tive clause in the administrat.he land till her death, In the year 1884, tor's deed to Crowder, In 1859, IR as folwhen he took and retained possession of low e, Yiz. : "All that t1·uct or pnr.:l'i of land
it till the defendant entered by force, and belonging to the estate of James nurgeqi,
expelled him, in the year 18~4. On the deceased, lyh1g on Tar river, adjoininar
croH11-examinatton of the plaintiff, the de- lands of the said Willie Crowder, Dr. Jp.
fend1rnt'H counHPI were permitted to ask 11eph n. Man11, and. others, and 1mppoeed
him how man~· acres of land were con- to contain four hundred and nineteen acres,
ve.vecl by the dN·d of tbe sheriff, and he an· except the ltfe-estate of Lucy Ann Bnrgees,
swered: "S~." He then Htated, In re- the widow of Jamee BllrgellS, In that porsponse to a question, (plaintiff objecting,) tion oflluid land llH!!lgned to her as dower,
that ht• gave in for taxation 1,100 acres of the meaning and Intent of this deE-d being
land after hlH pnrchase at sheriff's sale, and to con \'ey to the said Wlllie Crowder, abbefore he sold 172 acres off his tract. The solutely. the whole of the said land not
pin inti ff exc!'pted. At a subsequent stage covered by the widow's dower, to vest In
of the trial, plaintiff was rrealled, and ex- po11ses11lon Immediately, and to convey
plained tlrnt he l111ted the dower hmd fo1· that portion covered by the widow's
taxation, first, In 188:>, the widow having dower to \'eKt in pos11e11sion at the death
paid tax on it previously, and that he had of said widow." The sheriff, Gupton, teslisted for taxation, In 1871, 92'2 ucres, in- tified that be levied on and sold Crowder's
cluding 90 acreH bought from Spencer, ad- land under a description given by him iu
ministrator.
1S69, ancl also referred to the tax-llf1t for
It 111 true thut In Thornburgh v . Mastin, deec1·lptlon; that he sold all of the Inter93 N'. C. 258. the court saltl: ··Any one eup- est of Crowder to the land de11cribed In the
J1<1Hi11g be has a elu.im upon the land of an- deed, but said nothing at the time about
other may list It, and pay the taxes; but dower. Calvin Benton testlfted for the dethat would be verr slight, If any, evidence fendant that the dower tract did not a1ljoln
tending tu PRta!Jlieh h111 title." In the the lands of Mr11. Jane Wilder or Ga11ton
<'llHe ol HufHn v. On•rbv, 8S N. C. 369. It had Wilder, nor did It join the Mann land tlll
bcPn pre,·lously held that paying tax on Mann bought the Burgess land.
land without actual possee1don would not
The defendant off1rcd to pro\'e the decperfect a colorable title. But in the case larations of Crowder while In possession
of Austin v. King. 97 N. C. 341, 2 S. E. Rep. of the land conveyed to him by Gay, ad6iM, Ju1:1ticl• D.HIH, delivering the opinion ministrator of Burgess, characterizing bis
of the court, 1:1ettl<.•H the queHtion by laying possession, but stuted that be did n<>t:
down the rulP tlwt the payment of taxes know whether lt was before or afte1· tne
h.\' n pnrty 11nte litem motam ls bb1 act as sale by the 11berlff: that It w1111 afh.•r
dlRtlngulHhc<.I from bis d<>Claratlon ln Mann's death, in 1865. (he thought tt was
1·t•fpr1•nce to the land, and is some evidence tn 1870 or 1871,) but that at the time Ellie.
to he weigherl by the Jury in paH11ing upon the plaintiff. wa11 not llvlng on the land.
till' i11sue lm·ulvlng title. This principle but was living 11omewbere else. Th{•co11 r"t
(11 S. E. 248, 106 N. C. 396.)
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‘Wit-by Y to the river, arid adopting

tlieiieiiS<¢- S a corner, it would have been

the pine 5 ,‘_0“-Q91-'3) interest to surren-

agiiinsi ill‘! ‘L

dci-all outside of that line. the testimony

. tent. Hearlen v. Wo-

was not gIY\‘58'2€:; Jones v. lienry, 84 N.

ma¢i.*“*.“;,'0,,'v_ Fort, 98 N. c. 173, 3 s. E.

Magen v. Blankenship, 95 N. C.
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\‘ Brmgermme Sm.veym-_ running the line
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d to The declaration was clearly one

.e _

made by Crowd“ m explanation of the

character and _eX _

a.m1,heinp; against his interest, was un

q ::'r:i:,?)t!?el'rlItlli2ie(l to testify fur-

‘ - . follows: “ I

ther’ p‘“1i,"u1gi1{f,b§§§¢tlll'i’;t ll]: did not claim

hm.“ J3 2'1 “-91- except the nine acres, un-

8.“-l O! tdem? Harris got to arguing about

?“ h-ehlm l found bv his papers that he bud

‘t’ “ §“t1'§.. to tliewliole of it.” When tlie

a g(i)0tiﬁ Fills was cross-exaniined, he
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Tio~s AG~l~sT INTEREST.

i\~ltted the decla.ra t l

\~~11~\\\ ~~~c~pted.

DECLAR

The

wlti~~~ ~nd

the

(Case No. 63

Bd Vertoo In discussing tlleexcl'ptlun to the
~V"idence of Cal\'111 J3enton and of Ba,Jger
"- tamn~. and theauthoritfoe already cited
SjUffR'taln the judge In overruling the.plaint
s objection.
1 twas not error in the court to refuse to
~\&int\'1, Ell111,euy tbathe O'Wnecl - a. ll heHrd inHtruct the jury that the plttlntlff w11s entitled to recover upon the wbole or the teMJpff!i'Bt \VUJi('! Crowder had in t h 0 ~ the
timony,or any of the different phases of It,
tuat•elCrowder) owned. I have u~-e:'i~ suggested
by the Instructions Mked by tho
t/JIJf neighborbool b~~~~~-1\~e 1 Yea rs.
1
plaintiff, which were 8J! follows: "The
1:111'11'
Dr. Me.i;:i·ba.d posseHstou. ~f ~fl !~e deeds shown In evidence show that Willie
(\oW~l'. Mad except the do-wer, ~rorn th~ Crowder was the owner of the Burgess
tract of land, Including the reversion In the
'1111~ E!lll Ian a'.le bY Gay' the ad ui t n Is trator
dower after the widow's <leath, and there
t\me c:ilth~~1 nd 1,08session of pa rt: afte; is
no eYldence that any other person had
Ilt. ~err~ t\l "
On crosH-exnn:•lnatl
\\allt."tl'~ dea · . "Dr. "h-Innn 'V
on any legal title to an.v part of said trru·t of
t\w '"·\t11ess Ra\1l.
i iow'e d
a.a not In land. ('fills Instruction was not given,
posl'I.
Ion of thew'
o~er.
I do and the plaintiff excepted.] The jury ca.n not" ~RA tbat Dr. Mann was in poasesnot eonHlder the declarations of Crowder
slo
lllean of it. 'l'he ,,large JHU-t "W' us In or Ellis WI affecting the title of el ther Crowdpo ~of~~~ofCrowder. ltisevhlent.1.bcre- er or Ellis to said land, and there Is no
fo~sess t h\s }lonor found thn t the <l~la evidence which can be considered by the
r ~e, tha were made by Cro"v iler V\-hne he jury to show that the Hald Crowder, up to
"~t1ous ot-tReKt1\on, before the 8a le by the the sherlff'11 sale, and ElllH after the sherMin 11 d when \twas against hl 8 Inter
iff's Knie, did not have the title to said
t1'11l"'lerlfl. a.n \t that beheld less la ncI than th; land, Including the part in contro\·erev In
~ttoa~m wcla\ms under a. deed for all or this action. [This Instruction wa.R ·not
i;;:-."""111lntl not so that. ii it be conceded gtven, and the platntlff excPpted.J There
'11h lnte~~U~g lhe Une, as in a rked, from
Is no evidence that Dr. Mann ever had any
-that, by ·ow to the r\ver, a.nd a.dopttng title l;O any part of the land In controthehellge-t acorner,\twouid have IJeen versy, and the deed to the defendant conthe p\ne1 !Cl'owder's)lntere1,1t t o surren- veys uo tltl~ to any part of the land In
aga\nst 1 :s\dc of t\1at \\ne. the testimony controveniy. [This Instruction WWI not
dcl' al\ ou \ncompetent.
Headen v. Wo- given, and the plaintiff excepted.] If the
waa n~ N C 4~~ ,\ones v. Henry, 84 N.
jury believe the testimony of the wl tnesHes,
n,ia3~·. ('\\ttou' v. Fort. 98 N. C. 173, _3 8. E.
they will find the first lsHue In favor or the
C
;ni{.. Magee v. B\ankenshtp, 9a N. C.
plaintiff. [This Instruction was not given,
Rev.'"'"
and the plalntltt excepted.] lithe jnry be00.~ d er Sta\\\ngs, a w\tuess fur the de- lieve the evidence of the plaintiff, ElllR, nnu
1
th'3 wltneSR Gupton, they wm find the flrHt
f : \
testltte1l as to\\O'WB :
" I know
,~~ll~:c~owder, nnd knew when t:he land Issue in favor of the plaintiff. [This Int overt1y wuR t10\d. Before the snle, struction was not given, and the plaintiff
in run r ,, 1 n \\'\\\le Crowder and Joe , excepted.]" The deeds set forth the bound\
I t111w Dr. " an •
•
Bridgers the surveyor. ruun\ng the llnl:' arleM of land, hut It le the testimony that
\
between 'crowder and Dr. l.1.ann. Crowder locates them. In this case, the conflict
then told me be bad a stru\ght ltne to th~ arising out of contradlctm·y e\·ldence 1U1 to
the extent of the plalnt.lff's land, whether
road. The \\ne ran through the dower.
The lorrgoing testimony was also except- it Included the whole of the dower, or till'
·ed to. 'l'hc ckclarntlon was clearly one lines should be so run a.s to exclude 10
made by Crowtler in explanation of the acres, covering the land on which the aldH\rncter and extE>nt of hle poeHeHsion, legPd treRpal!H waecommltted, could be setand, being against bis interest, was un- tled only b~· the jury. lf the declarations of
Crowder and EIUs were competent, as we
<1 uestlonalJly competent.
. .
'l'be wltnl'sswns permitted totestlfl fm- have held they were, then the jury could
ther, plaintlH objecting, as follows: "I consider the testimony as to what they,
or el ther of them, sale\ in reference to the
heard John E\l\B 11ay that be did not claim
loc1ttlon of the line, for what they d<'emecl
DY of tbe dower except the ntne acres, un~ll hennd Dr. Ha;.nR irot to arguing abont It worth, as tending to show whether the
lnnrl In controversy was sold by the sher.' when he found bv hlH J>apers that hE' l>nd
!!'11:ood title to the whole of it." When the iff, and was covered by plaintiff's cleed
plnlntlff, :Ellis, wll.R eross-examlnecl, he from him. The plaintiff could not recover
i
only on the strength of hie own title, and,
11aill: "When Widow Burµ;l:'RH died, I mnde
-c\nlm to the land. " The defe1ulunt WUB If the Jund WDB not embru.ee<l within the
boundurieH of hie deed from the sheriff, he
tlll'll per111ittell, his counsel objt•etl~g, to
could not recover; and in that event It
.a11k him as to bis cleclaratlons; and m rewas Immaterial whl'thcr th11 admlnlRtral-1\JODKe to the question he said: "I did not
tin\' that I bad no Interest In the dower tor'e deed Included the disputed territory
or not. It would have been error In the
except the 10 aeres. I did not RO.;\' so to Mr.
court to predicate itRlnetruct.lon upon the
Robert Moore, nor to an.v one." The testlmonv objected to on both occasions was suppoRed truth of the testimony of one or
<'ompetent to contradict Ellie, and to show more witnesses of the JllalntiH, as aHked,
that in fact he dtd not clulm the whole of when the testimony ol Benton, Stalllngi-;,
Wilder, and the defendant tended to conthe dower land.
tradict It, and when there was Rome conThe exception growing out of the testimony of the witness Wilder Is governed filrt between the ev\c\ence of the platntlff
bythe same principle to which we have and Gupton, the wltneMsei.i mentioned.
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eatlfted
Iii ate. \.~og.pen. I ea.w the eho :i:n.e a. Pine
11Re. ia\C\. I~ ran from a
hedge-1: ~~od line.
8tralg\I.~ hne to the river. The l avv. in a
V\78.tJ
wort\1-titeorelx dollars per a.ere

rd

f'

I
\

Case No. 68]
Case No. 63]

RELEVANCY.

We see no error in the charge of the

court ofwhich the plaintiff can justly com-

plain. A review of the charge will show

that it was even more favorable to the

plaintiff than was requisite in restricting

the jury to the purposes for which they

could consider certain testimony men-

tioned. The court charged the jury as fol-

lows: “The plaintiff contends that the

deed made by the sheriff in 1869 conveys

the land in controversy, being that part of

the Burgess land known as the dower.

The defendant denies this averment, and

says that the description in the deed does

not cover or include the dower. Your ver-

dict will depend .upon the view which,

upon the whole testimony, you may take

of this question. As a matter of law, I

charzrc you that all of the interest which
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\Villie Crowder had in the land described

in the deed passed to the plaintiff. It is

for you to say what land was sold, and is

described in the sheriff's deed. [Plaintiff

excepted to this part of the charge.] The

evidence of the declarations of Willie Crowd-

er in regard to the settlement ofa lien,

etc.,is not admitted for the purpose of

showing‘ ti tie. and you should not consider

it for that purpose; but it is proper for

your consideration as hearing upon the

question as to what land the sheriff sold.

The sheriff swears that he obtained a de-

scription of the laud for the purpose of

making a levy from Willie Crowder; that

he also consulted the tax-hooks. The tes-

timony of the witnesses in regard to the

possession of the land is admitted for the

same purpose. The testimony in regard

to the deciara tions of Ellis after the death‘

of the widow is admitted for the same pur-

pose; so the tax-lists, etc. [To this part
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of the charge plaintiff excepted] The tes-

timony of the acts, conduct, and declara-

tions of Willie (‘rowder and John Ellis are

not admitted for the purpose of affecting

the title of Crowder. but to aid you in de-

termining what land was levied upon and

sold by the sheriff. in this same connec-

tion, you may consider the testimony in

regard to the description given by Crowd-

er to Gupton, sheriff. for the purpose of

enabling him to make levy. [This part of

the charge was excepted to by the plain-

tiff.] When the boundaries of a tract of

land areestablished and known,the quan-

tity or number of acres called lor by the

deed is immaterial, and could not affect

the boundaries; but when the boundaries

are unknown,not established, and the jury

are charged with the duty of locating the

land, the number of acres called for may

be considered by them, in connection with

other testimony. in ascertaining what

land is in fact covered by the deed. [The

plaintiff excepted to this part of the

charge] ”

Counsel, in the argument, contended that

RELEVANCY.

We see no error In the charge of the
court or which the plaintiff c1tn Jm;tly complain. A re\·iew of the charge will Rhow
that it was even more favorable to the
plaintiff than was requi11lte In J'e!!trlctlng
the Jury to the purposes for which they
could consider certain testimony mentioned. The court charged thP jury as follows: "The plaintiff contends that the
deed made by the sheriff In 1869 conveys
the lnnd in controversy, being that part of
the Burgees land known as the dower.
The defendant denies this averment, and
says that the description In the deed does
not cover or include the dower. Your verdict wlll depend .upon the view whl<'h,
upon the whole testimony, you may take
of thh1 question. As a matter of law, I
charge you that all or the interest which
Wlllle Crowder had in the land described
In the deed pa11eed to the plaintiff. It Is
for you to say what land was sold, and b1
describe(] in the sherlff'EI deed. [Plnlntlff
excepted to this part of the charge.] '.rhe
evideuceof the l1eclaration11 of Willie Crowder in regard to the settlement of a lien,
etc., iR nut admittecl for the purpm1e of
11howing ti tie. and you should not l'On11l«ler
it for that purpose; but it ill pro11er for
your con11lderatlon as bearini;r upon the
question as to what land the sheriff sold.
The 11herlff swears that be obtained a description of the land for the purpose of
making a levy from Willie Crowder; that
he also <'unsuited the tax-books. The testimony of the witnesses In regard to the
po11eeseloo of the land Is admitted for the
e11.me purpose. The testimony in regard
to the declarations of Ellie after the death
of the widow le admitted for the same purpose; so the tax-lists, etc. [To this pa.rt
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of the charge plaintiff excepted.] 1.'he testimony of the arts, conduct, and declnratlone of WllUe f'rowder and John Eilts are
not admitted for the purpo11e of affecting
the title of Crowder. but to nld you In determining what land was levied upon and
sold by the sheriff. Ju this same connection, you may comdde1· the tet1tlmony In
regard to the deecrlptlon given by Crowder to Gupton, sheriff, for the purpose uf
enabling him to make levy. ['l'hle purt of
the charge was excepted to by the plaintiff.] When the boundaries of a tract of
land areestabllshe<l and known, the quantity or number of acres called for by the
deed le immaterial, and could not affect
the boundaries; but when the boundaries
are unknown, not established, and the jury
are charged with the lluty of locating the
land, the number of acres called for may
be considered by them, In connection with
other testimony, In ascertaining what
lanu Is In fact covered by the deed. [The
plaintiff excepted to this part of the
ChRr&"e.]"
Counsel, In the argument, con tended that
the plalntltf was entitled to recover because this was an uctlon for poseeRsion
only, and tb11 phtlntlff bad teRtltteli tbut
defendant expelkd him from the land by
force In the year 1884. Upon referrlnir to
the record, we find that the pleadings lllstlnctly raise the question of title, and that
the court euhmitted Issues lnvoh·fng the
ownership, wrongful possession, and damage, without objection. It le needless to
udd that the testimony tended on the one
hand to establish, and on the other to dlt1prove, tbut the title to the land in controversy was In plaintiff. There is no error.
Judgment affirmed.

l>"ECLARATIONs OF

TEST.A '.l'On AS TO LOST WILL. (Case No. €4

DECLARATIQNS OF TEST XTOR

PICKENS v. DA"\?"[S.

‘ : AS T

0.34 Maas. 252.)

O LOST WILL. [Case N0. 64

~~~e Judicial Court of Masaacb
P\nnouth. Feb. 3. 1883.
uaetta.

PICKENS v. DAVIg_

(134 Mass. 252.)

$“,,,,,,¢l\1<li¢in Court of l\Iass

A.\l\ll'Jl-1 from Probate Court, Ply~ou.t:h

Plymouth. Feb. 3, 1883

/Ji )i()rton, Judge.

lI;)“Il_s note.questions the soundness of the

S ~blll80n, tor

3 °‘e doctrine.‘ Page 529, note. While this

ilplbareut discrepancy in the respective

/p,/

00ll_I'ts remained not fully reconciled, in

(St 7 Wm. IV. and 1 Vict. c. 26) section 22

of which provided that “no will or codicil,

:~ ~~c!

or any part thereof, which shall be in any

than by the reexecution thereof, or by a

quired. and showing an intention to revive

the same." Since the enactment of this stat-

ute. the decisions in all the courts have been
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sequent will which contained an express rev-

ocation, or which, by reason of inconsistent

provisions, amounted to an implied revoca-

tion of a former will, such former will

would not be revived by the cancellation or

destruction oi.‘ the later one. Major v. Wil-

liams, 3 Curt. Ecc. 432; James v. Cohen, Id.

770. 782; Brown v. Brown, 8 El. & Bl. 876;

Dickinson v. Swatman, 30 L. J. Prob. &

Mat. & Adm. 84; Wood v. Wood, L. R. 1

Prob. & Div. 309. In order to have the effect

of revocation, it must, of course, be made to

appear that the later will contained a rev.)-

catory clause, or provisions which were in-

consistent with the former will; and the

ii:!..

mere fact of the execution of a subsequent

will, without evidence of its contents, has

been considered insuﬂicient to amount to a

revocation. Cutto v. Gilbert, 9 Moore, P. C.

131. See, also, Nelson v. McGiﬂ’ert, 3 Barb.

Ch. 158.

In the United States there is a like dis-

I

!

established in the ecclesiastical courts. This

It chusetts_

Apptll-1 from Probate Court, Ply ulouth (-_.oun_

1’/7 /71011111309, for appellant‘ H‘ Kingman,

/4/mﬂieiiee.

L The two questions in this

°;@§“.“il{-st. sew we -a-Q-11-mm or .1

Q“ ‘vas executed, am ca\\\L\\“ed a clause expressly revoking T011118!‘

“ ﬂeet, I18 mattel‘ of law, to

-ills the 9 . - .

r:vi\: mstormer W1“ wmd‘ lfas not been

destleiead or whether in each ‘nstanmﬂ it 18

10- _

d as a question of intention, to

géﬁoaeﬁergefrom an the circurnstances of

lb<0 se' and, secondly, if it ls to be re-

ca - a question ot_ intention, whether

Bl§_rded ilﬂt oval declarations of the testator

stilisequepsible in evidence for the purpose

at: adms W t his intention \vaS_ These

($1 showing “ostlons in this commonwealth,

its 00°“ qBoﬂaIld, 14 Mass. 208, the second

former

t

uniform that, after the execution of a sub-

W ,\loff°I1, Judge.

:a

-:::.r:·

codlcil executed in manner hereinbefore re-

in favor of a doctrine substantially like that

KJ ngi:nnn,

use expressly revoking
the ettect. as matter or law to
~ )la8
ill which hacs
•
revl~
for111er w
·
"" not been
d~ ~ a or wbetber \n each ln.st:ance It le
to
rded as a question or lnt:en:tlon, to
be
ga fr<>JD all tbe clrcun:urtnn.cee of
th
con~edand. secondly, if It ts to be re..._ caae. question of intention, 'Whether
~ :rded 88 oral declaratlone or the testator
~"beque~ \ble \n evidence for t:he purpose
·~~ adm 88 wbat b\s intention. 'Was.
These
~~ 111owtng uesUons \n this commonwealth.
&::::are open \orland, 14 Mass. 208, the second
~~v\nvalid, for want of due attestation.
nton v. A.tldns, 1 Fick. 535, the sec-in Lau~ was ad3udged to be null and void,
<ind w \
been -procured through undue ln811 bav °:nd fraud; and the whole decision
1luentce :pon the ground tbat lt -wae never
wen u
valid and cou\d not be.
Th~ 1lrst ot tbese questions bas i:-een much
d1Bc\188ed. both in Eng\and and America;
and it nas often been said tbat the courts of
rommon law and the ecc\eeiastlcnl courts In
E land are at variance upon lt. See 1 WllEx'rs (Mb A.m. Ed.) 154-156, where
tbe authorlt\es are cited. The doctrine of
the eccleslastlcal courts was tbus stated In
1824 In Ustlcke v. Bawden, 2 Add. Ecc. 116,
l2ii: ''The legal presumption ts neither adverse to, nor in favor of, tbe revival of a
former uncanceled, upon tbe cancellation of
a later, revocatory, wlll. Having furnished
this principle, the law withdraws altogether;
and leaves the question, as one of Intention
purely, end open to a decision either wa~;
lely according to ·facts and circumstances.
alao Moore v. Moore, 1 P.hllllm. 400;
~llBon Wilson, 3 PhlWm. 543, 554; Hooton v. Head, Id. 26; Klrkcudbrlght v. Klrkcudbrlght, 1 Hagg. Eec. 325; Welch v. Pbll1\1)8, 1 Moore, P. C. 299. In Pow. DeY. (Ed.
1827) 527, 528, a distinction Is taken between
the effect of the cancellation of a second
will which contains no express clause revoking former wills, and of a will whft>h
(()Dtalns such a clause; and In reBPect to
the latter It le said that: "If a prior will
be made, and tben a subsequent one, exPl'l!llllly revoking the former, In 1mch case,
although the ftrst will be left entire, and
the aecond will afterwards canceled, yet
the better opinion seems to be that the
former 18 not thereby set up again." Jarirl11a

manner revoked. shall be rcvived otherwise

though the clear preponderance appears to be

H.

1;.llJellee.

S ;r 'f}le two questions tn this
C. ~LLE~rst' •wbetber the cancellation ot a
(lilt llL-n· 1''
•
·
as
dulY executed• and -which

1331, the English statute of wills was passed

crepancy in the decisions in dlﬂerent states,

appellant.

coun.

I
'

:e.

v:

JJl~ll'e note questfone the soundness ot the
a Ve doctrine.' Page 529, note. While this
apparent discrepancy In the respective
court.a remained not fully reconciled, In
1837, the Englfeh statute of wllle was passed
(St. 7 Wm. IV. and 1 Viet. c. 26) section 22
ot which provided that "no wUl or cocUcU,
or any part thereof, which shall be In any
manner revoked, shall be revived otherwise
than by the ~xecutfon thereof, or by a
codicil executed In manner herelnbefore required, and showing an Intention to revive
the same." Since the enactment of tbls statute, the decisions In all the courts have been
uniform that, atter the execution of a subsequent will which contained an exprese revocation, or which, by reason of lnconslBtent
provleloDB, amounted to an Implied revocation of a former will, such former will
would not be revived by the cancellation or
destruction of the later one. Major v. Wllllams, 3 Curt. Ecc. 432; James v. Cohen, Id.
770. 782; Brown v. Brown, 8 El. & Bl. 876;
Dickinson v. Swatman, 30 L. J. Prob. &
Mat. & Adm. 84; Wood v. Wood, L. R. 1
Prob. & Div. 309. In order to have the elfect
of revocation, It must, of f!Ouree, be made ti)
appear that the later wlll contained a rel"J·
catory clause, or provisions which were incoll.lllstent with the former will; and th3
mere fact of the execution of a subsequent
will, without evidence of Its contents, baa
been considered lneuftlclent to amount to •
revocation. Cutto v. Gilbert, 9 Moore, P. C,
131. See, also, Nelson v. McGlffert, 3 Barb.
Ch. 158.
In the United States there 18 a like dlscrepnncy In the decisions ln dllferent states,
though the clear preponderance appears to be
In favor of a doctrine substantially like that
established In the ecclesiastical courts. This
rule was established In Connecticut In 1821,
In .James v. :Marvin, 3 Conn. 576, where It
was held that the revocatory clause In the
second will proprlo vfgore operated lnstan·
taneoll8ly to elfect a revocation, and that the
destruction of the second will did not set up
the former one; and the like rule was declared to exist In New York by the supreme
court ot that state, In 18:'i7, In Simmons v,
Simmons, 2H Barb. GS. '.rhe question was
greatly considered In ::\laryland, In 1863, In
Colvin v. Warford, 20 l\ld. 357, 391, and the
court declared that "a clause In a subsequent will, which In terms revokes a previous will, Is not only an expression of tho
purpose to revoke the previous will, but an
actual consummation of It, and the revoca·
tlon ls complete and conclusive, without regard to the testamentary provisions of the
will containing It." The court further beld
that the cancellation of a revoking will prlma
facle Is evidence of an Intention to revlYe
the previous will. but the presumption may
be rebutted by evf<lenct- of the attending circumstances and prohnble motives of the tes·
tator. In Harwell v. Lively, 30 Ga. 315, tn
l&JO, a _similar rule was laid down and main-

Case No. 64]
Case No. 64]

RELEVANCY.

tained with great force of reasoning. The

opinion of the court concludes with the fol-

lowing pertinent suggestion: “It must be

conceded there is much law adverse to the

doctrine. " " "‘ Calculated as it is to sub-

serve and enforce the tenor and spirit of our

own legislation, and to give to our people

thc full beneﬁt of the two hundred years’

experience of the mother country, as em-

bodied in the late act, is it not the dictate

of wisdom to begin in this state where they

have ended in England? We think so." See,

also, Barksdale v. Hopkins, 23 Ga. 332. The

courts of Mississippi, in 1836, and of Michi-

gan, in 1881, adopted the same rule. Bo-

henon v. Walcot, 1 How. (.\Iiss.) 336; Scott

v. Fink, 45 Mich. 241, 7 N. W. 799. It is to

be observed that some of the foregoing deci-

sions are put expressly on the ground that
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the later will contained an express clause

of revocation. 45 Mich. 2-16, 7 N. W. 799;

90 Md. 392. An examination of the cases de-

cided in Pennsylvania leads us to infer that

a similar rule would probably have been-

adopted in that state, it the question had

been directly presented. Lawson v. Morri-

son, 2 Dali. 286, 290; Boudinot v. Bradford,

2 Yeates, 170; Id., 2 Dali. 266. Flintham v.

Bradford, 10 Pa. St. 82, 85, 92.

On the other hand, in Taylor v. Taylor, 2

.\‘ott. & .\IcC. 482, in 1820, it was held in

‘south Carolina that the earlier will revives

upon the cancellation of the later one; and

the same rule prevails in New Jersey, as is

shown by Randall v. Beatty, 31 N. J. Eq.

M3, and cases there cited.

In various states of the Union statutes

have been enacted substantially to the same

effect as the English statute above cited,

showing that wherever, so far as our ob-

servation has extended, the subject has been

dealt with by legislation, it has been

thought wiser and better to provide that an

earlier will shall not be revived by the can-

cellation of a later one. There are, or have

been, such statutes in New York, Ohio, Indi-

ana, Missouri, Kentucky, California, Arkan-

sas. an'l Virginia, and probably in other

states. Concerning these statutes of New

York, it is said in 4 Kent, Comm. 532, that

they “have essentially changed the law on

the subject of these constructive revoca-

tions, and rescued it from the hard opera-

tion of those tecnnical rules of which we

have complained, and placed it on juster and

more rational grounds."

On the whole, the question being an open

one in this state, a majority of the court has

come to the conclusion that the destruction

of the second will in the present case would

not have the effect to revive the ﬁrst, in the

absence of evidence to show that such was

the intention of the testator. The clause of

revocation is not necessarily testamentary in

its character. it might as well be executed

as a separate instrument. The fact that it

is inserted in a will does not necessarily

show that the testator intended that it

RELEVANCY.

talned with great force of reasoning. The
opinion of the court concludes with the following pe1'tlnent suggestion: "It must be
conceded there ts much law adverse to the
doC'trine. • • • Calculated as It ls to subserve and enforce the tenor and spirit of our
own legislation, and to give to our people
thP full benefit of the two hundred years'
experience of the mother country, as embodied In the late act, ts It not the dictate
ot wisdom to begin to this state where they
have ended ln England? We think so." See,
also, Barksdale v. Hopkins, 23 Ga. 332. The
courts of Mlsslsslppl, ln 1836, and or. Mlcblgan, In 1881, adopted the same rule. Bohanon v. Walcot, 1 How. (Miss.) 336; Scott
v. Fink, 45 Mich. 241, 7 N. w. 700. It ls to
bo~ observed that some of the foregoing decl81008 are put expressly on the ground that
the later will contained an express clause
of revocation. 45 Mich. 246, 7 N. W. 799;
20 Md. 302. An examination of the cases decided In PeDD8ylvanla leads us to Infer that
a similar rule would probably have been
adopted In that state, if the question had
bee'l dlre<'tly presented. Lawson v. Morrll'OD, 2 Dall. 286, 290; Boudinot v. Brat•ford,
2 Yeates, 170; Id., 2 Dall. 266. Fllnthnm v.
Bradford, 10 Pa. St. 82, 85, 92.
On the other band, In Taylor v. Taylor, 2
Sott. & McC. 482, In 1820, It was held In
'IJoutb Carolina that the earlier wlll revives
upon the cancellation of the later one; and
the same rule prevails lo New Jersey, as ls
shown by Randall v. Beatty, 31 N. J. Eci.
f'.!3, and cases there cited.
In various states of the Union statutes
have been enacted substantially to the same
effect as the English statute above cited,
showing that wherever, so ta1· as our observation has extended, the subject has been
dealt with by legislation, It bas been
thought wiser and better to provide that an
earlier will shall not be revived by the cancellation of a later one. There are, or have
been, such statutes in New York, Ohio, Indiana, Missouri, Kentucky, California, Arkansas. an1 Virginia, and probably In other
states. floncernlng these statutes of New
York, it ls said In 4 Kent, Comm. 532, that
they "have essentially changed the law on
the subject of these constructive revocatloD8, and rescued It from the hard operation of those tecnnlcal rules of which we
have complained, and placed it on juster and
more rational grounds."
On the whole, the question being an open
one In this state, a majority ot the court has
come to the conclusion that the destruction
of the second will In the present case would
not have the e!Tect to revive the first, In the
absE-nce of evidence to show that such was
the Intention of the testator. The clause of
revoeauon ts not necessarily testamentary In
Its character. It might as well be executed
as a separate Instrument. The tact that It
ls Inserted in a will does not necessarily
show that the testator Intended that It
182

1

should be dependent on the continuance In
force of all the other provisions by which
his propt"rty ls disposed of. It ls more reasonaole and nntural to assume that such
revocatory l'lnuse shows emphatically and
conclusively that he has abandoned his
former Intentions, and substituted therefor
a new disposition of his property, which for
the present, and unless again modified, shall
stand as representing his wishes upon the
subject. But when the new plan Is In Its
tum abandoned, and such abandonment Is
shown by a cancellation of the later will, It
by no means follows that his mind reverts
tp the ortglnal scheme. In point of fact, we
believe that this would comparatively seldom be found to be true. It ls only by 11n
artificial presumption, created originally for
the purpose of preventing Intestacy, that
such a rule of law has ever been held. It
does not correctly represent the aetnal opera tlon of the minds of testators In tbe majority of Instances. The wisdom which has
come from experience In 'England and In
this country seems to point the other way.
In the absence of any statutory provision
to the contrary, we are inclined to the opinion that such intention, If proved to have existed at the time of canceling the second will,
would give to the act of such .cancellation
the etrect of reviving the former will; and
that it would be open to prove such lnten·
tlon by parol evidence. Under the statuteof England, and of Virginia, and perhaps or
other states, such revival cannot be proved
In this manner. Major v. Wllllams, and
Dickinson v. Swatman, above cited; Rudisill
v. Rodes, 29 Grat. 147. But this results
from the express provision of the statute.
In the present case there was no evidence
tending to show that the testatrix Intended
to revive the first wlll, unleBB the bare fact
t.uo.t the first will had not been destroyed
amounted to such evidence. Under the <'lrcumstances stated lo the report little weight
should be given to that fact. The wlll was
not in the custody of the testatrix, and the
evidence tended strongly to show that Slle
supposed It to have been destroyed.
The question, therefore, ts not very Important, In this case, whether the subsequent
declaratloDB of the testatrix were admissible lo evidence for the purpose of sbgwlng
that she did not intend by her cancellation
of the second will to i:evlve the first, because, in the absence of any aftlrmative evidence to prove the existence of such Intention, the first wlll could not be admitted to
probate. Nevertheless, we have consldel'C<I.
the question, and are of opinion that su<'b
declarations were admissible for the purpose of showing the Intent with which th<>:act was done. The act Itself was consistent
with an Intention to revlve·or not to revlvethe earlier will. Whether It had the OllE"enect or the other depended upon what was
In the mind of the testatrix. It would I n
many IDBtances be more satisfactory to hav~

ln~:cL:\RA.TlO~s
mill decl r tion . .

1&‘§‘w_ mﬂence oi’. declaratio

QM Qﬂ" 8 to be received

Tm melllmve been made for the ~,.-er _ Dm__

Se 0; msleading the hear-er as to the dis_

,,,s\t\@n\vh1ch the speaker meant; to mak

- en, . trier 11 °°f

jjgplllp i’ On theo and, they may

M76‘ been made “nae? éuch . circuDJStl1DC9S

ﬂm furnish an entirely satisfactory

ofﬁlk rea1pu1‘P°5e' —1ttli:(§l:-le that it

rmt\v< propel‘ to P¥°‘° or revoect act 9f can"

N“a‘iOn, de5tf\1Cil0D,there is c'tahtioI1 1_n this

NMQQ,-' Butwl1e“_ and oh Q1‘ evidence

oi on act oi revocilﬂml» eaﬂi“'_ en the Q1168-

tion oitlie revival of *1? te i‘ will depends

upon memtention of nets s at01‘_. which is

to [M gathered from lac ﬁnd circumstan-
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ces his declarations’ S 1°“ mg Such i11t9l1'

ma‘ whether ri<>1'- °°“temp°"“.n“°“S’ °r

S ‘L ent may be proved in evidence.

‘§hse<£1 géeat cage oi! Sugden v, gt Leon-

a 1“ t ePr0b_ Div. 154, th<_%_ question under-

rdsv 1 ii discusion, in 1816. wvhether writ-

Rrcnt ﬁg om, declarations rnade by 11 testa-

‘Q11 lm before and after the execution of

ior. both W the event of its loss, admis-

Q~t ~ s to be rece\ved vvitb caution.
Tllel \ll~y have been made 1'.or the very pur~se ot mlsleadlng the hearer n.s t:o 1:be dis\)Ollltlotl Which the speaker men.nt to make of
}J}8J>foperty. On the other hand. they niay
'I! ,a,een made under such clrcumstu.nces
/Jlf< [ rnlsh an entirely sntisfn<"tory proof
P /IJ
0 uri>08e. lt \s true tba. t 1 t may
of !Ifs-. real P to prove the direct net of canuot ~proper trUctioO, or revoca. tion. in this
ce\\a~Ion, des •"en there is other evidence
But '\'1....
rull.lllli:ii..er.
vocation, and "'\Vben the queso~ ll."'IQ. net ot r:\val of an earlier -will depends
uo\\. ot the re uon of t11e test:a tor, vvblch ls
UJJ{)ll, tue lnteD fl'Olll facts and circumstantO ~ gatbere:ratlone, showing such lntenCel!'.., his decl
rtor contemporaneous, or
th'~. whether a; be 'proved in eYldeuce.
8-....11seciuent, ~ case of Sugden. v. St:. Leonln the grea DlV. 1M, the question undera :rds, 1 Prob. l:lflOD ln 1876, ""bethe1· writ~-~ut full dlSC~ec\ar~tlODS made by a testnt_~U and ora~ e and after the execution of
~r, botb be 0[n the event of its loss, admiehls w\1\, are, da.n' evidence of its content11;
slble as seco:ec\ded \n the afllrmative. It
and It was \n the argument a.t one stage
was admitted ion that such subsequent decot the &scuss

' evidence of its contents;

decided in the aiﬁrinative. It

(1 in the argument at one stage

i the discussion that such subsequent dec-

o

“PS 111‘-1111* at

“ll Caution.

may

1121 1'31 (ft(>'|_~ of.

E‘: atlons would be admissible to rebut 11 pre-

'I

_mDtion of revocation of the will; but,

151118 being afterwards questioned, it was de-

clared and held, on the greatest considera-

tion, not only that these, but also that dec-

larations as to the contents of the will, were

admissible. See page-s 174, 198, 200, 214,

215, 219, 220, 225, 227, 228, 240, 241. ’.|.ue

09-se of Keen v. Keen, L. R. 3 Prob. & Div.

105, is to the same effect. See, also, Gould

v. Lakes, 6 Prob. Div. 1; Doe v. Alien, 12

Adol. & E. 451; Usticke v. Bawden, 2 Add.

Ecc. 123; Welch v. Phillips. 1 Moore, P.

C. 299; Whiteley v. King, 10 Jur. (N. S.)

1079; In re Johnson's Will, 40 Conn. 587;

Lawyer v. Smith, 8 Mich. 411; Patterson v.

Hickey, 32 Ga. 156; 1 Jarm. lVills (5th Am.

Ed. by Bigelow) 130, 133, 134, 1-12, and notes.

The question was also discussed, and many

cases were cited, in Collagan v. Burns, 57

Me. -1-10, but the court was equally divided

in opinion. Many, though not all, of the

case. which at ﬁrst sight may appear to

hold the contrary, will be found on examina-

tion to hold merely that the direct fact of

revocation cannot be proved by such decla-

rations.

The result is that, in the opinion of :1 ma-

jority of the court, the will should be disal-

lowed, and the decree of the probate court

reversed.

·.rEs·rA.".l'Oa .AS TO LOST WJJ,L.

111111e~,u~showlng clearly the charn:te';,e~.
tlme, t
Evidence of declarations ....~~d
\\le ac . es 1
.......... ~ e a t

TESTATOR AS TO LOST WILL. [Case No. 64

will llwjshowinga glearlyuigicég (ft the "91’?

OF

~lslte declaration made u t: t:h

DECL.-\R.*\T1()NS Q1,

I

(Case No. 64

1s.1·attol18 would be admlssllJle to relJut a prcSUinptlon of revocation of the will; but,
this being afterwards questioned, It was declared and held, on the greatest conelderntlon, not only that these, but a.leo that declarations ae to the contents of the will, were
admlssilJle. See pages H4, 198, 200, :!14,
215, 219, 220, 22:>, 22;, 228, 240, 241. '..1.J..Le
ell.Se of Keen Y. Keen, L. R. 3 Prob. & Div.
105, ls to the same ef!'ec·t. S~e. also, Goul<l
v. Lakes, G Prob. Div. 1; Doe v. Allen, 12
Adol. & E. 451; Ustlcke v. Bawden, 2 Add.
Ecc. 123; Welch v. Phillips. 1 Moore, P.
C. 299; Whiteley v. King, 10 Jur. (X S.)
torn; In re .Johnson's \Ylll, 40 Conn. :i8i;
Lawyer v. Smith, 8 likh. 411; Patterson v.
Hickey, 32 Ga. 156; 1 Jarm. Wille (;Jth Am.
f~d. by Bigelow) 130, 133, 134, 142, and notes.
The question was also discussed, and muny
cases were cited, ln Colla.gan v. Burns, 57
l\Ie. -HU., but the court was e<1unlly dlYlded
tn opinion. Many, though not all, of the
cases. which at first eight may appear to
hold the contrary, will be found on examlnauon to hold merely that the direct fact of
revocation cannot be proved IJy such decla.·
rations.
'£he result le that, in the opinion of a majority of the court, the will should be disallowed, and the decree of the probate court
reversed.
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YOUNG v. KAl'ISAS CITY, FT. S. & M. R.

co.

RELEVANCY.

YOUNG v. KANSAS CITY, FT. S. & M. R.

CO.

(39 Mo. App. 52.)

_ Court of Appeals of Missouri. Jan. 21, 1890.

Appeal from circuit court, Howell county;

J. F. Hale, Judge.

RELEVANCY.

(39 Mo. App. 52.)
Court of Appeals of Missouri. Jan. 21, 1890.

Appeal from circuit court, Howell county;
J. F. Hale, Judge.

Wallace Pratt and Olden & Green, for appellant.

Wallace Pratt and Olden & Green, for ap-

pellant.

ROMBAUER, P. J., delivered the opinion

of the court.

This is an action for double damages, un-

der the provisions of section 809 of the Re-

vised Statutes of 1879. There was judg-

ment for plaintiff below, and the defendant,

appealing, assigns for error that the state-

ment is jurisdictionally defective, that the

court admitted illegal and incompetent evi-

dence, and that the evidence is insutiicient

to support the judgment.
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The statement, the suiliciency of which is

thus challenged, is as follows:

"Before W. W. Tucker, J. P., Hutton Val-

ley township, in Howell county, Missouri.

George K. Young vs. Kansas City, Ft. Scott

& Memphis Railroad Company. Damages.

Plaintiff states that the defendant is and

was on the seventh day of September, 1888,

a corporation organized and existing under

the laws of the state of Missouri, and, as

such corporation, owned and operated a rail-

road passing and running through Dry

Creek township, in said county and state

aforesaid; that on the seventh day of Sep-

tember, 1888, the said defendant, by its

agents, servants, and employés, while run-

ning a locomotive and train of cars on said

road in said DryCreek township, ran against,

struck, and killed a certain mule of plaintiff

of the value of one hundred dollars, and one

calf of plaintiff of the value of ten dollars,

to plaintiffs damage in the sum of one hun-

dred and ten dollars; that said mule and

calf came upon the track of said railroad in

said township where it passes through un-

enclosed lands where said railroad company

was and is by law required to erect and

maintain a good and lawful fence on each

side of its railroad, and where there was

not any crossing of said railroad by a public

or private highway; that the defendant on

said seventh day of September, 1888, and for

a long time prior thereto, failed and neg-

lected to keep and maintain a lawful fence

on the sides of said road, at a point where

said mule and calf got upon the track and

were killed, and that, by reason thereof, said

mule and said calf got upon said railroad

track and were killed, and the killing of

said mule and said calf was occasioned then

and there by the neglect and failure of the

defendant to erect and maintain lawful fen-

ces on the sides of its said railroad afore-

said. Plaintiff also states that Hutton Vai-

ley township is adjoining to said Dry Creek

township in said county. Wherefore plain-

tin‘, by reason of the killing of said mule

and said calf, as aforesaid, and by virtue of

section 809 of the Revised Statutes of Mis-

ROlIBA t:ER, P. J., delivered the opinion
or the court.
This Is an action for double damages, under the provisions of section 809 of the Revised Statutes of 18W. There was judgment for plaintltr below, and the defendant,
appealing, assigns for error that the statement ls jurisdictionally defecth"e, that the
court admitted Illegal and Incompetent evidence, and that the evidence ls lnsutHclent
to support the judgment.
The statement, the sufficiency of which le
thus challenged, le as follows:
"Before W. W. Tucker, J. P., Hutton Valley township, In Howell county, Missouri.
George K. Young vs. Kansas City, Ft. Scott
& Memphis Railroad Company. Damages.
Plalntllf states that the defendant le and
was on the seventh day of September, 1888,
a corporation organized and existing under
the laws of the state of Missouri, and, 118
such corpo1-atlon, owned and operated a railroad passing and running through Dry
Creek township, In said county and state
aforesaid; that on the seventh day of September, 1888, the said defendant, by Its
agents, servants, and employ~, while running a locomotive and train of cars on said
road ln said Dry Creek township, ran against,
struck, and killed a certain mule of plaJntltr
of the value of one hundred dollars, and one
calf of plalntUf of the value of ten dollars,
to plaintltr's damage In the sum of one hundred and ten dollars; that said mule and
calt l'ame upon the track of said railroad In
snld township where It passes through unenclosed lands where said raJlrood company
was and Is by law required to erect and
maintain a good and lawful fence on each
side of Its rallrood, and where there was
not uny crossing of said railroad by a public
or printte highway; that the defendant on
said seventh day of September, 1888, and for
a long time prior thereto, failed and neglected to keep and maintain a lawful fence
on the sides of said road, at a point where
Bllld mule and calf got upon the track and
were killed, and that, by reason thereof, said
mule and said calf got upon said railroad
track and were killed, and the killing of
said mule and said calf was occasioned then
and there by the neglect and failure of the
defendant to erect and maintain lawful fences on the sides of its said railroad aforesaid. Plaintiff also states that Hutton ValIt>~· township is adjoining to said Dry Creek
township In said county. Wherefore plaln-
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tlt't, by reason of the killing of sald mule
and said calf, as aforesaid, and by virtue of
section 809 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1879, demands judgment for double
the value of said mule and the said calf ln
the sum of two hundred end twenty dollars."
No particular defect in the statement Is
pointed out by appellant, and we can see none.
It states all necessary jurisdictional facts.
It expressly states the obligation of the defendant to fence Its tmck where the accident occurred, and that the animals came
upon the track where It was unfenced, and
where the defendant was under legal obligation to fence, and that they were killed
in consequence. It further states that this
happened in an adjoining township to the
one where the suit Is brought. That the
suit Is brought In Hutton Valley township
appears by the statement, by the justice·s
transcript, and by the circuit clerk's certificate, which describes the transcript ftled In
his office as being a tranectlpt from the office of W. W. Tucker, one of the justices of
the peace of Hutton Valley township In Howell county. The ftrst 118Signment ot error
ls, therefore, clearly untenable.
Upon the trial the plalntllf gave oral evidence to the etrect that Dry Creek township,
where the accident occurred, and Hutton
Valley township, where the suit was Instituted, were adjoining townships. This evidence was objected to by the defendant, on
the ground that such fact was matter of
record, which could not be e11tabllshed by
oral evidence. The law, as embodied In
sections 7426 and 7427 of the Revised Statutes of 1879, requires the county court to
divide the county Into convenient townships,
to cause Its clerk to enter the description
of the townships of record, and, within thirty days after establishing a township, to
transmit to the secretary of state a description of such township and Its boundaries.
The general rule unquestionably ls that oral
evidence cannot be substituted for any Instrument which the law requires to be In
writing, such as records, public documents,
etc. (1 Greenl. Ev. § 86); but we do not understand the rule as ex<'luding evld<.>nce of
reputation, where the fact sought to be established Is a boundary not of particular
but of general public interest. Upon principle the same rule should, and unquestionably does, apply to such boundarll's. as applies at common law to anc>lent boundaries
of parishes, manors, and the like, which are
of public Interest, and touching which oral
proof was always admissible. 1 Greenl. Ev.
§ 145'\ 'Ille boundaries of a township are of
public Interest to all its Inhabitants, as, under our laws, qu(>Stlons of taxation for local
purposes are determined by such boundaries. "'\Ve must, therefore, conclude that the
second assignment of error is likewise untenable.

•

DECLA..RA TIONs A.s TO ~lll3uc RIGHTS, ETC.
~8.Salgnment is like'\Vlse untenable.

DECLAR

Tut\\~~nce was suttlc\ent to justify the

A'r1o.\rs AS TO PUBLrc man

'I\lt t~

~jlfer that the tm\n1a.ls ca.~e upon
\llT1 \t\e~· and were killed, at a pol n.t -where

TS, ETC. [Case No. 65

\‘\o\\s\o ‘ _ _ , _

~ \\~adeom-po.ny was under

legal obllgaVaughan v_ Railroad, 34 l\lo.
1_.1. The fact that the plaint:l:rr ,v88
~\lj~lJOll'n to be an adjol.nlng O'Wner vvas Im~ __,_, since there was no pretense that
JJ}i/t'f1411Jr

m_1&1- lhe fact ihift the plalntiﬂf we-as

~!n~\o fence.

W, smwn to be an adimfllllg Owner xvas im_

/1/./1/a//'-1111511109 there was n° pretense that

the animals came upon the track from ad-

joining ﬁelds which were fenced, as was the

0888 in Ferris v. Railroad, 30 M0. App, 122,

and cases there cited, but it was shown that

the railroad, at the place where the aniumls

came upon the track and were killed. ran

through open and unenclosed lands.

All the judges concurring, the judgment ls

aﬂirmed.
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tbe animals came upon the track from adjoining llelds which were fenced, as was the
case In Ferris v. Railroad, 30 Mo. App. 122,
and cases there cited, but It was shown thnt
the railroad, at the place where tbe anlmnls
came upon the track and were kllled, ran
through open and unenclosed lands.
All the judges concurring, the judgment ls
affirmed.

BELEY .ANCY.

Cue No. 66]
Case No. 66]

RELEVANCY.

SITLER et al. v. GEHR.

SITJ,ER et al v. GEHR.
(106 Pa. St. 577.)
l::lupreme Court of Pennsylvania. March 7,
1884.

(105 Pa. St. 577.)

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

~l'l'or

to court of common pleas, Berks

<'OUDty.

1884.

Error to court of common pleas, Berks

county.

A. G. & H. D. Green (Wharton Morris and

Wm. H. Livingood, with them), for plaintiffs

in error. Isaac I-iiester (Humes & Frey and

John F. Smith, with him), for defendant in

error.

March 7,

PAXSON, J. The first five assignments

of error may be considered together. They

raise the question of the admissibility of the

declarations of Anna Marla Gehr and John

Gehr upon a question of pedigree. The pur-

pose of offering said declarations was to es-

tablish relationship between the plaintiff,
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and Balser Geehr, of Berks county. The evi-

dencc was objected to because it was not

shown allunde that the declarants were of

the family of the Berks county Balser Geehr.

The evidence was admitted and bill sealed

for the defendants.

The rules of evidence applicable to pedigree

cases are: (1) That the statements must be

made ante litem motam. (2) Declarant must

be dead. And (3) But a prior condition to

both these is that it should be proved by

some source of evidence. independent of the

statement itself, that the person making the

statement is related to the family about

which he speaks. Smith v. Tebbitt, L. R. 1

Prob. & Div. 354.

It was not denied that the ﬁrst two condi-

tions had been fulﬁlled. Neither was it ques-

tioned that the declarants were shown by

evidence dehors the declaration to be relat-

ed to the family of Joseph Gehr, the ancestor

of the plaintiff, but it was contended that

the declarants must be shown by evidence

allunde to be related to Balser Geehr, of

Berks county; in other words, to the person

last seised of the estate, or his particular

branch of the family. To state the question

in another form: The declarants were Anna

Maria Gehr and John Gehr. The plaintiffs‘

ancestor was Joseph Gehr. The deceased

ancestor was Balser Geehr, of Berks county.

It was not denied that the declarants were

of the family of Joseph Gehr, and it was at-

tempted to show by their declarations that

the above-named Joseph Gehr and Balser

Geehr were related to each. The question

was whether sufficient ground had been laid

for such declarations.

The plaintiffs in error contend, not only

that the declarants must be shown by evi-

dence allunde to be related to the family as

to which the declarations were made, but

also that they must also be thus shown to

be related to the person who died seised.

The ﬁrst part of this proposition is undoubt-

edly true under all the authorities. The lat-

ter portion of it is not so clear. I have care-

fully examined all the authorities cited on

both sides upon this point, and many others

A. G. & H. D. Green (Wharton Morris and
Wm. H. Livingood, with them), for plalntltls
lo error. Isaac Hiester (Humes & Frey and
John b'. !Smith, with him), tor defendant in
error.

P.A.XSOX, J. The llrst five assignments
of error may be considered together. They
raise the question of the admlsslblllty of the
declarations of Anna Marla Gehr and John
Gehr upon a question of )ledlgree. The purpose of olferlng said declarations was to esta bllsh relotloushlp between the plalntltl,
and Balser Geehr, of Berks county. The evidence was objected to ))e(•ause It was not
shown allunde that the declarants were of
the family of the Berks county Balser Geehr.
The evidence was admitted and bill sealed
for the defendants.
The rules of evidence applicable to pedigree
cu11es are: (1) That the statements must be
made ante litem motam. (2) Declarant must
be dead. And {3) But a prior condition to
both these ls that It should be proved by
some source of evidence. Independent of the
statement Itself, that the person making the
statement ls related to the family about
which he speaks. Smith v. Tebbltt, L. R. 1
Prob. & Div. 3M.
It was not denied that the first two conditions had been fulfilled. Neither was It questloned that the declarants were shown by
evidence dehore the declaration to be related to the famlly of Joseph Gehr, the ancestor
of the plalntltr, but It was contended that
the declarants must be shown by evidence
allunde to be related to Balser Geehr, of
Berke county; in other wor<\B, to the person
last seleed of the estate, or hie particular
branch of the family. To state the question
in another form: The declarants were Anna
Marla Gehr and John Gehr. The platntltls'
ancestor was Joseph Gehr. The deceased
ancestor was Balser Geebr, of Berks county.
It was not denied that the declarants were
of the family of Joseph Gehr, and It was attempted to show by their declarations that
the above-named Joseph Gehr and Balser
Geehr were related to each. The question
was whether sufHcient ground had been laid
tor such declarations.
The plnintltrs in error contend, not only
that the declarants must be shown by evidence allunde to be related to the family as
to which the declarations were made, but
also that they must also be thus shown to
be related to the person who died selsed.
The llrst part of this proposition ls undoubtedly true under all the authorities. The latter portion of It ls not so clear. I have carefully examined all the authorities cited on
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both sides upon this point, and many others
to which our attention was not called upon
the argument; and, although there ls some
confifct In the cases, the weight of authority
seems to be that, while a declarnnt must be
shown by evidence aliuude to belong to the
family, It does not appear to be necessary to
show that be belongs to the same branch of
It. In Vowles v. Young, 13 Ves. 14i, it was
held that the declarations of a deceased husband concerning the descent or pedigree or
bls wife are admissible. And In Jt:'well v.
Jewell, 1 How. 219, that the declarations of
a dt~eas<>d husband and or one of the plaintiffs, claiming as heir of her father, that his
wife was not matTled to her father, were admitted.
It would seem, however, that the declarations of a husband In regard to his wife's
family, or of a wife In regard to her husband's, rest upon substantially the same
principles as those of a relation by blood.
and these cases do not throw much light upon the question we are considering.
Doe d. Jenkins v. Davies, 59 E. C. L., 314,
cited by plalntUr in error, was an action of
ejectment, and the vital question lo the case
was, whether Elizabeth Jenkins was legitimate. U she was, it was admitted the verdict must be for defentlant. After the plalntllr had otrered evidence to show that E. J.
was not legitimate, an attorney produced a
certificate of the marriage of Eleanor Diller
to John Davies, the father of E. J., and stated that he had received It from E. J. when
he was Inquiring Into the pedigree. He was
then asked whether E. J. made any statement regarding her mother's marriage. The
question was obj~te<l to upon various
grounds: "(l) That she was not yet conclusively proved to be a member of the famlly; and (2) that the question whether E. J.
was a member of the family was In fact the
Issue for the jury, and, If she was decided to
be legitimate, her declarations to prove her
legitimacy were superfluous." It was held
by Lord Denman, In regard to the first objection, that It was the duty of the Judge to
decide whether It was proved to him, and he
decided that It was; and as to the second ob- ..
Jectlon, he answered It by saying: "Neither
the admissibility nor the etrect of the evidence ls altered by. the accident that the tact
which ls for the judge as a condition precedent ls the same fact which ls for the jury
in the issue." Here the declarant was not
shown allunde to be a member of the family.
Her declaration tended to make her so.
Blackburn v. Crawfords, 3 Wall ls:>, also
cited by plalntltrs In error, does not sustaln
their contention. In this case the question
was whether Dr. Crawford bad been married to Elizabeth Taylor. The plalutltrR
claimed to be his nieces and nephews. To
prove this relationship, they otrered the dE'<.·laratlon of one Sarah Evans, who was a sister of Elizabeth Taylor. The evidence was
held Incompetent, becau,1e she did not belong

--·

PED1Gll.E~.
1>ED1(;, BEE.

[Case N o. 61$
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_-,.\ _ d as authority against the p931.
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Qie of o'ho died intestate. Clhe claims of
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Gem-ge F‘-3 the declarations of Johann Ja-

Qd ‘O90 lyr an uncle of George Frederick

cob Loch en. havmg been established that
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me decmm“ declarations were admit-

. his

eréidtk fsﬁheﬁg’ pedigree of George Frederick
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im with George Iieylor, the in-

{he declarant, was
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11; was shown, however,
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\-_ 0-gmunessy, 7 Jur. 1140, was an attempt

to pl-we declarations of a Catholic priest as

to the legitimacy of the parties. It was not

contended that he was related to any of the

parties, and his declarations were only to

~Y. The question -wa.e
\o\llteza<t'~ld's helra? It was -l~ho 'Were
~~\\ct?i~allle, ln delivering the optby · Mr.
\\\eto11tl-~ "It lt bad been proved b nlon of
ndent '\'..l!StllllOny that Sarah Evans Y inde~ted 'of blood to any branch or the ~as reot David Crawtord, and her decla.rn.tto!~Y
/Jff!ll t1Ltered to prove the relationship o'f an~
p//;er _QJ'SOD clahntng or clnhned. to belong
,.,_that tuntly, this case-Monkto
dtJ "--J
era! 2 RUSS. & M. 1;;7
n "'·
A.ttoro.......ey
paUit. But thls <leclnra.t~~ul~
\llve ~n
offered to prove thu. t her sl~
Sa?al:a Evans. ed bY marriage -with
~ wonnect
a niem~~\~t taniily, was neither 'V\'lthln the
prlnt!\\)le nor the ianguage of that: authority."
M~\lktOD v• .A.ttorne:Y General. rercrred to
by,;i-'18tlce swayne, wlll be comin.en.ted upon
Jal~ In thlll opinion.
~ rneY General v. Kobler. 9 H. L. Cas.
~tto regard as authority against the posit\
' we ed bY the plaintiffs.
There the
C::::::..n aesuinthe rtght of succesl!llon to the esla....ue was George Keylor, an ottlcer of ar~e of on:O dled Intestate. The claims or
1 '1!ery, w dents depended upon their eetab~e ~ \dentltf of the intestate -with one
--iianlnll Frederick Koehler, whlch they offer~rged bY the declarat\ons of'. Johann Ja~ to'K! Ohl.er an uncle of George Frederick
<.'Ob 100 lt' '-av\ng been established that
Xoeb er.,A-nt ,_
o :f George Freddec..... a was the uncle
the
,_
t'
.
rl It Koehler, 'Ills dec ....ra .•ona -were admit~~ as to the pedlgree ot George Frederick
Koehler and the events of his early llte,
tracing blm mto the artlllery service, and
Identifying h\m with George Keylor, the intestate. It wlll be noticed in tbls case that
there was no evidence auunde to show that
Johann Jacob Koehler, the declarant, was
related to George Keylor, the artllleryman.
It was shown, however, tbat be belonged to
a branch of the tamlly ·
ID Chapman·v. Chapman, 2 Conn. 347, the
witness dld not name the person whose declaration he bad swom to, nor did it ever appear that the declarant was dead It was
properly held that the evidence was lnadmls·
alble.
1n Davies v. Morgan, 1 Cromp. & J. 587, lt
was ruled that declarations of deceased corratora were evidence or a custom to ex~ude foreigners. But it waa not shown that
the declarant was a member of the corporation. In Doe v. Randall, 2 Moore & P. 20,
tt waa held that declarations of a party connected by marriage are admissible. Casey
v. O'Sbaunesey, 7 Jur. 1140, waa an attempt
to prove declarations of a Cathollc priest as
to the legitimacy or the parties. It was not
contended that be was related to any of the
'Pirtle&, and bis declarations were only to
the elrect that the parties bad always been
reputed to be husband and wife in his pariah. In Johnson v. Lawson, 2 Bing. 86,
It was held that declarations of servants
and Intimate acquaintances are not admiaalble evidence ln questions of pedigree.

G:

:t

a.

(Case No.

61.)

c::~lse v. Barrett, 1 Cromp. M.

& R. 919.
I
lved a question ot custom, ln which It
was held that "declarations of a deceased

lord ot the manor as to the extent of his.
rights over the wastes ot a manor are not
admissible; aUter 1t spoken or the extent or
the waste only." In Jackson v. Browner, 18.
Johns. 37, the witnesses were not connected
with the famUy, and had no personal knowledge of the tact ot which they spoke, and
did not deri¥e their Information from persons connected with the famJly. Waldron v.
Tuttle, 4 N. H. 371, merely confines the rule
to declarations or deceased persona who had
no Interest and who were relatives. Gl."E'gol'y
v. Baugh, 4 Rand. 611, ls principally a review or all the laws concerning Indian slavery In the state of' YJrglnla, and It was held
that 1n questions of freedom, evidence that
there had been a belier In the neighborhood,
more than fifty or sixty yeare before, that
the female ancestor of the plaintiff was entitled to her freedom, was not ad.mlaaible.
Whltelocke v. Baker, 13 Yea. 514, was a case
of partition, and it was merely ruled that the
tradition must be from pel'lllODS having such
Ii. connection with the party to whom It relates that it la natural and likely from their
domestic habits and connections that they
are speaking the truth, and that they could
not be mistaken.
Many or the above authorities wel'e not
cited bf the plaintUl'a In error. Moat or them
are, however, referred to In the authorities
they rely upon, and I have gone over them,
at the risk of being tedious, In order to ascertain just what they decide. It will be
seen that those or them which bear upon this.
question at all do not go beyond the admitted principle that, before declamtlone of deceased peraone can be J'e<'elved In queetlone
of pedigree, the declarnnt must be shown
allunde to be related to some branch or the
family as to which the declaratione are ottered. The whole question Is thus summed
up by Mr. Wharton In hla work on Evldence(page 216): "Declarations as to a tamny, ln
order to be received, must emanate from deceased persons connected with such ramJly
by blood or marriage." The same rule la
laid down in most of the approved text-books.
See Phil. Ev. I 275; Taylor, Ev. i'ii6. Thelaat case to which I shall refer la that o!
}lonkton v. Attorney General, 2 Rues. & M.
157, where It was said by Lord Brougham:
"I entirely agree that, In order to admit hffirsay evidence in pedigree, rou must by evidence dehora the declarations connect thepereon making them with the family. But I
cannot go the length or holding that you
must prove him to be connected with both
the branches of the tamlly, touching which
bis declaration la tendered. That he le connected with the family ta eutliclent; and that
connection once proved, bis declarations are
then let ln upon questions touching tbat family; not declarations or details which would
not be evidence, but declarations or the na187
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ture of pedigree,—that is to say, of who was

related to whom, by what links the relation-

ship was made out, whether it was a rela-

tionship of consanguinity or of aﬁinity only,

when the parties died, or whether they are

actually dead; everything, in short, which

is, strictly speaking, matter of pedigi-ce,—

may be proved as matter relating to the con-

dition of the family, by the declarations of

deceased persons, who, by evidence dehors

those declarations have been previously con-

nected with the family respecting which

their declarations are tendered. To say that

you cannot receive in evidence the declara-

tions of A., who is proved to be a relation by

blood of B., touching the relationship of B.

with 0., unless you have ﬁrst connected him

also by evidence dehors his declaration with

C., is a proposition which has no warrant ei-
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ther upon the principle upon which hearsay

is let in, or in the decided cases; and it

plainly involves this absurdity: that if, in

order to connect B. with (3., '1 am ﬁrst to

prove that A. is connected with B., and then

to superadd the proof that he is connected

with 0., I do a thing which is vain and su-

perﬂuous, for then the declaration is used to

prove the very fact which I have already es-

tablished; inasmuch as it is not more true

that things which are equal to the same

thing are equal to one another, than that

persons related by blood to the same individ-

ual are more or less related by blood to each

other. It is clear, both upon principle and

from total want of any contrary authority in

adjudged cases, or in the dicta of judges or

text writers, that the argument fails en-

tirely, which would limit the rule respecting

evidence of that description to a greater ex-

tent than by requiring you to connect with

the family, by matter dehors the declaration

itself, the party whose declaration you re-

ceive.”

This case was much relied upon by the

defendant in error. and the facts certainly

are strikingly similar to those of the case in

hand. The decedent, Samuel Troutback,

died at Madras in 1785. After reciting in

his will that he had no relation or kindred

alive to his knowledge or belief, having

outlived them all, he gave "unto Mr. John

Troutbeck, surgeon, late of the ship Speke,

in the English East India Company’s serv-

ice, the sum of ﬁve gold star pagodas " “' '

as a person nearly of the same name with

Troutback, though I solemnly believe and

declare that the said John Troutbeck is not

in any way related to me, or of the same

family or kindred with me,and I disclaim all

relationship with him or to hin1.” The tes-

ture of pedigree,-that ls to say, of who was
related to whom, by what links the relationship was made out, whether it was a relatlo11Bblp of consanguinity or of am.ntty only,
when the parties died, or whether they are
actually dead; everything, In short, which
ls, strictly speaking, matter of pedigree,may be proved as matter relating to the condition ot the family, by the declarations of
deceased persons, who, by evidence debors
those declarations have been previously connected with the tamlly respecting which
their declarations are tendered. To say that
you cannot receive In evidence the declarations of A., who ls proved to be a relation by
blood of B., touching the relationship of B.
with C., unleBB you ba ve first connected him
also by evidence dehors his declaration with
C., ls a proposition which has no warrant either upon the principle upon which hearsay
ls let tn. or ID the decided cases; and it
plainly involves this absurdlt;r: that If, in
order to conned B. with C., ~ am first to
prove that A. ls connected with B., and then
to superadd the proof that he ls connected
with C., I do a thing which ls vain and superduoue, tor then the declaration ls used to
prove the very fact which I have already established; inasmuch as It ls not more true
that things which a.re equal to the same
thing are equal to one another, than that
persons related by blood to the same individual are more or leBB related by blood to each
other. It is clear, both upon principle and
from total want of any contrary authority in
adjudged cases, or in the dicta of judges or
text writers, that the argument falls entirely, which would limit the rule respecting
evidence of that description to a greater extent than by requiring you to connect with
the family, by matter dehors the declaration
itself, the party whose declaration you re<?eive."
Thie case was much relled upon by the
defendant in error, and the facts certainly
are strikingly similar to those of the case In
hand. The decedent, Samuel Troutback,
died at Madras in 1785. After reciting in
his wlll that he had no relation or kindred
alive to his knowledge or belief, having
outlh·ed them all, he gave "unto ?t!r. John
Troutbeck, surgeon, late of the ship Speke,
In the English East India Company's service, the sum of five gold star pagodas • • •
as a person nearly of the same name with
Troutback, though I solemnly believe and
dt'<'lare that the said John Troutbe<>k ls not
In any way related to me, or of the same
family or kindred with me, and I dls<'lalm all
relatiom1hlp with him or to him." The testator thE'n proc>E'E'ded to dispose of his property by charitable bequests which were void.
On the appeal the main question was how
far the vlc•e chancellor was right in rejecting from his consideration, as evidence of
the relationship between the testator and
the claimants, certain documents purporting
to be a genealogical narrative and pedigree

tator then proceeded to dispose of his prop-
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the claimants, certain documents purporting

to be a. genealogical narrative and pedigree
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of the Troutbeck: family. These papera were
In the handwriting of John Troutbeck (the
surgeon mentioned as legatee In the will),
and were found among his papers at the
time of his death, which occurred In 1792.
The result of the narrative and pedigree
was that George, the narrator's father, and
Samuel, the testator, who died at Madras,
were descended from the same grandfather,
and were therefore first cousins. There was
no d111lculty In connecting the claimants and
the narrator with George of Riding; and
the testator was .dlstlnctly shown to be the
son of Samuel Troutback of Wapplng. The
dltll.culty lay In connecting George with
Samuel, and this was fully made out by
the narrative or pedigree referred to, which
was held to be admlulble for that purpose.
It was to these tacts that Lord Brougham
applied the language I have cited from his
opinion, and the case shows very satlsf~
torlly that while a declarant must be connected with the family-that ls, with some
branch of it-yet, when that connection ls
proved, the relationship between dlft'.erent
members of the family may be shown by his
declarations, or, as ls stated In the syllabus
to that case: "Where lo a pedigree case the
object ls to connect A. with C., after proving that B., a deceased person, was related to A., it ls competent to give ID evidence declarations by B., In which he clalIUed relationship with C."
We now return to the question of the
competency of the declarations In this case.
We have already seen that the declarants
were related to the plaintiff's ancestor.
They were therefore of his family. The
plaintiff's name was Baltzer Gehr, and tht>
question was whether he wall related to the
Balser Geehr of Berks county. The deposition of the plalntlft'., taken after he was
one hundred years old, was read upon the
trial below, and he testified that he was
named atter Balser Geehr of Berks county,
and that the said Balser Geebr was his
uncle, a brother of his father. It ls tn1e
that his knowledge of this relationship was
derlvE'd from his mother. He said: "About
his being my uncle, my mother told me that,
she always called him my uncle; that's
what made me know." Was this sutll.clent
to justify the learned judge in admitting
the dN'laratlone?
It ls to be observed, In the first place, the
evldenc>e was to the court, not to the jury.
It le the province of the court to decide
whether a sutll.clent connection bad been established to pennlt the declaration to go to the
jury. As was said in Doe d. Jenkins v. Davies,
supra, lo similar case: "It was the duty
of the judge to decide wheth<'r it was proved
to him. There are conditions precedent
which are requlr(>() to be fulftlled before <'VldE'nce ls admissible for the jury. Thus, an
oath or Its equivalent, and competency, are
conditions precedent to admitting viva voce
evidence; and apprehension of Immediate
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tidt' pj)DD their credlb\Uty. If counter e~~ of immediate Instead of mediate perception.
"'reitl ofered, be must receive i t befo - To say that A. Is a brother, or a cousin, or
ift'/Ji
d be bllS no right to
re an uncle, or an aunt, Is not hearsay but
/It' tlttl-.jeS, an
on the fact as
the primary evidence. But recognition of 'pedlopfllfoa
of the }.urYsee Bartlett v. Srnl ~ondl- gree ls not limited to such conditions. .l!:ven
t\ou \\r-.ecedent.
h, 11 where there Is no famlly consensus to be
\\eea. & w. 483.
below was eatl ft
appealed to, what Is said by one member of
8
'Th11 '-~arned judge
'Ve can
ed and the family to another as to pedigree may be
ttte\"~<l the ev\den:intlft'. was an~! say he received to prove such pedigree. Hence It ls
'W\\I W"J:>ong. The p l w and hi
t rnpetent admissible for A. to pl'ove, with the limltawttn~~. made so bY awlth Bals!r estlmony, tlons hereurter expressed, what was told
u ~ lils relationship
i Geehr, of him by deceased relatives as to family rela1
Berl!;..:
.., was proper Y rece Ved_
It le tlons."
coun.,,
f
·
true ~his
lnformauon was
th t derived
ext
rom his
We
cannot say, therefol'e, that the plalntllf
mol.._ner and was to
a t th eut hearsay. was an Incompetent witness to prove his reBu~ a'larl!e proportion
he kno'1Vledge lationshlp to the Balser Geehr of Berks counwb.....:t.ch every Intelligent man as le derived ty, nor that his testimony was Incompetent
f~1D! hearsllY· Indeed, we scarcely realize trow the tact that his knowledge upon that
11~., Utile we actuallY know from our own 1 subject was derived trom his deceased motho~servaUon and investigation. ~ e learn the er. She always told him that Balser Geehr
~ths ot hi.story, the secrets of science and 1 was his uncle. It was a part of their fam~~r Jmowledge ot the world generally, from I lly history; one of their family traditions,
what we uave read, or from 'INhat others furnished by one who had the means of
~ve told us. What does a man kno"W" of his knowledge, and no possible motive to falsify,
deceased ancestors but what he has learned I so far as appears In the case. When the
~TOm bis Immediate relatives'! Ho~ was the plaintilf testified that Balser Geehr, of Berks
'l!lalnti!t, who bad never seen Balser Geehr, county was his uncle, he testified to a fact.
of Berks county, to know that the latter The evidence was primary, not secondary.
was his uncle, except from his mother? It ] This puts at rest all question of the declarals in just such cases that the strict i:ules of tlons of Anna Maria Gehr and John Gehr.
evidence are relaxed as regards hearsay. If They are shown to belong to a branch of the
it were otherwise, pedigree could not be Gehr family and from their position as such
proved at all in many cases, and in one likely to have had accurate Information of
sewie It Is primary, not secondary. evidence. the matters to which their declarations reTlle law upon this po\nt \s clearly stated In !erred. 'l'he learned judge below thought the
1 Whart. Ev. l 201: "l'edl.gree, from the na- connection between the families sutticlently
ture of things, Is open to proof by hearsay established to admit the evidence, and In this
In respect to all family Incidents as to we see no error.
which no living witness can be found. It
The sixth assignment of error does not rewbat bas been banded down in families can- quire an extended discussion. The evidence
not be in this way proved, pedigree could rejected does not come within any recognized
not, In most cases, be proved at all. Nor is rule in regard to pedigree. No declarations
such tradition, in its best sense, open to the , of any deceased person were olfered. It was
obje<"t\ons applicable to hearsay. A .• called ' slmply a conversation between two living
as n witness to pedlgi·ee, may indeed say, persons in regard to the Gehr family. Even
•B told me this.' But pedigree testimony \ the conversation was not olfered, but merely
n~uallY takes another shape. It ls not, 'B. j the conclusion which they drew from it. 'l'he
told this,' but •such was the understanding olfer was properly rejected.
ot tbe family.' The constitution ot a family
The seventh and eighth assignments relate
may become a matter of Immediate percep- to the rejection by the court ot "the oliginal
t\on. A., B., c., and D., are brought up as record of the Kutztown Evan~elical Lubrothers In the same household. If any one I theran Church, commencing in 1810, tor the
says to A., 'B. Is your brother,' A. would not purpose of showing the burial record of Hanregard such an announcement as any more nah Bast, and the names of her parents,
disclosing a ract to him than would tile au- I place of birth, dates of birth and death,
nouncement to him that he Is a human which was the usual way of keeping the recbeing. That B. ls his brother Is one of tile ord." Objection was made to this because
conditions of his family existence. He fits it was not a church record, but merely a prlinto a family ot which B. is a member in vate book kept by the pastor, Rev. John
the Bame way that one stone fits into an Knoske, claimed by him as his private proparch of which another stone Is part. The erty, and containing a minute of bis acts outpoaitlon of one presupposes tlie position of slde as well as inside of the church.
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The further objection was made that the

record was not evidence of any thing except

the death and burial of the person mentioned

and the time and place thereof.

The learned judge held that the book in

question was a church registry for mar-

riages, deaths, and burials; that it was in-

tended to be" kept, and possibly was kept, ac-

cording to the requirements of the act of

1.800; that it would be evidence to show the

deaths of Mary Eva Zimmerman and Han-

nah Bast, but that for the other purposes

offered it was incompetent. Without discuss-

ing the character of the book, we are of opin-

ion it was properly rejected. It was not al-

leged that the time of the death of these

ladies was material to the issue; on the con-

trary, the manifest object of the offer was to

prove that Hannah Bast was the daughter
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of Conrad Geehr and Anna Maria, his wife,

and to show when and where she was born.

This burial list was competent to show the

death and burial of these ladies, but what

the pastor put down in the book as to their

parentage, and the time and place of their

birth, was incompetent, for the plain reason

that it was no part of his duty to make such

entries. Such registers are not, in general.

evidence of any fact not required to be re-

corded in them, and which did not occur in

the presence of the registering otticer, 2 Phil.

Ev. "280. It was held in Clark v. Trinity

(.‘hu1-ch, 5 Watts &. S. 266, that "an entry in

1811, in the handwriting of the pastor of a

church, in a book kept in the church as a

registry of baptisms and births, the object

of which entry was to register the baptism of

a person, and not his biith; and in which

the time of the birth is introduced merely by

way of description, is not evidence cl-‘ the

date of the birth."

The rule is thus stated by .\Ir. Greenleaf

in his work on Evidence (volume 1, § 493):

“A parish register is evidence only of the

time of the marriage, and of its celebration

dc facto; for these are the only facts neces-

sarily within the knowledge of the person

making the entry. So a reglter of baptism,

taken by itself, is evidence only of that fact,

though. if the child were proved aliunde to

have been then very young, it might afford

presumptive evidence that it was born in the

same parish. Neither is the mention of the

child's age in the register of christenings any

evidence of the day of his birth, to support

a pica of infancy. In all these and similar

cases, the register is no proof of the identity

of the parties there named, with the parties

in controversy, but the fact of identity must

be established by other evidence. 1t is also

necessary in all these cases that the register

be one which the law requires should be

kept. and that it be kept in the manner rc-

quircd b_v law." This principle i recognized

l

I

Car. & P. 690; Williams v. Lloyd. 39 E. C. L.

.'iii.'»; Whitcher v. McLaughlin, 115 Mass. 168;
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Thl' furthe1· objection was made that tht>
record was nut e\·ldence of any thing except
the death and burial of the person mentioned
and the tlwe and place thereof.
The learned judge held that the book In
qut'fltlon was a cbur<'h registry for marrlagt>s, deaths, and burials; that It was lnten<led to be' kept, and possibly was kept, ac<:ordlng to the requirements of the act of
1800; that it would be evidence to show the
deaths of Mary l<~va Zimmerman and Hannah Bast, but that for the other purposes
<>tiered It was incompetent. Without dl&euSBlng the <•harn<'ter of the book, we are of opinion lt was p1·011erly rejected. It was not alleged that the time of the death of these
ladles was material to the issue; on the contrary, the manifest object of the otter was to
prove that Hannah Bast was the daughter
of Conrad Geehr and Anna Marla, his wife,
and to show when and where she was bom.
This burial list was competent to show the
death and burial of the11e ladles, but what
the pastor put down lo the book as to their
parentage, and the time and place of their
birth, was Incompetent, for the plain reason
that lt was no part of his duty to make such
~ntrles. Such registers are not, ln general,
evldt>nce of any fact not required to be re<'Ortled ln them, and which did not occur In
the 1>resence of the registering otHcer. 2 Phil.
J<:,·. *280. It was helcl ln Clark v. Trinity
Chun.·h, ;; 'Vatts & S. 266, that "an entry In
llill, ln the handwriting of the pastor of a
<"imrch, In a book kept In the church as a
registry of baptisms and births, the object
-0f which entry was to register the baptism of
a person, and not his birth; and In which
the time of the birth Is Introduced merely by
way of description, ls not evidence <:-t the
date of the birth."
The rule ls thus stated by Mr. Greenleaf
In his work on Evlden<'e (volume 1, I 4U3):
"A parish register Is evlden<.'e only of the
time of the marriage, and of its celebration
de fa<'to; for these are the only facts necesflllrily within the knowledge af the person
making the entry. So a register of baptism,
taken by itself, ls evldenc·e only of that fact,
though, lf the child were proved nllunde to
have bt>en then very young, lt might afford
p1·t>11umptlve e\'ldc>nce that It was born In the
1111tm1• 11nrl11h. ~f'lther ls the mention of the
cldld's age In the register of <.'hrlstenlngs any
evhll'n<.'e ot the day of his birth, to support
a 1>len ot Infancy. In all th..,se and similar
<·1111e11, Ute 1·eglster Is no proof of the Identity
-0t the parties there named, with the parties
In 1·ontro\'ersy, but the flll't of Identity must
be Nltabllshed by other evidence. It Is also
nt.><·t't'!lll.ry In all these cases that the register
l>e <me which the law requires should be
kt•pt. an<l that It be k..,pt In the manner retJnlrl'd by law." This principle Is n>eognlzed
tu mo.it of the leading text-books and numerous d<'<'lslons In :England and In this country.
It 111 sutftclent to refer to Rex v. Clapham,
4 <'nl'. & P. 29; Burghart v. Angersteln, 6
100

Car. & P. 000; Williams v. IJoyd. 39 E. C. L.
I :i!l:i;
Whlt<•ht>r v. McLaughlin, 11:; Mass. 168;

i Blackburn v. ('rawtords, 3 Wall. 189.
We are una1'1e to see any error In the rel Jectlon or the mortgage referred to In the
ninth asslgnmeut. The object of this otrer
was to show that the Conrad Geehr mentioned by the defendants' wltneSBes as the father
of the Geehrs of Berks county resided 1n
Phllndelphla as early as 17'J9, and that the
family ot Geehr In Berks county were entirely different trow the IALDcaster county family of the same name, from whom the plaintiff was descendl'd. The obvious objC<"tlon to
this evidence was that none of the defendant&' witnesses speak of any Conrad ~hr
residing at Germantown, and the recital In
the mortgage In no way connected the Con! rad Geehr, who was the mortgagor, with the
Conrad Geehr mentioned by the witnesses.
'l'he bare fact that a Conrad Geehr llved In
Germantown, that he borrowed money and
gave a mortgage to some one In Oley township In 1743, many years before Balser Geehr
Is heard of In that township, would not of
Itself connect that Conrad with this Balser
, Geehr. llere Identity of name must be accomJ>anled with some circumstances of time
or pince before we can attach any value to
1 It as atrectlng rights of property.
It Is true there are some authorities which
hold that Identity of name Is prlma facle
evidence ot Identity of person. So mn<·h wu
said by Justice Sharswood ln McConeghy v.
Kirk, 18 P. F. Smith, 203. That this ls the
I ordinary rule may be conceded. But It does
not apply where the transaction ls remote.
I The true rule Is bellevl'd to be that laid
down by Chief Justke Gibson In Sailor v.
1 Hertzoirg, 2 Pa. Rt. 182, where he says:
I "Identity of name ls ordinarily, but not all ways, p11ma facle e\·lden<'t' of personal ldentlty. The autho11tles on the subject may be
consulted In Sewell v. E\·ans, 4 Adol. & E.
1 626, from which Lord Denham and other
1 judirf's of the queen's bench, concludl'd that
' Identity of name ls something from whkh
an Inference may be drawn, unless the name
wt>re a very common one or the transaction
remote; and the reason given for casting the
1 onus on the party who denies is that dl&: proot <.'an bt> readily bad by calling the peri son whose Identity Is denied Into court. The
: name In this instance ls not a very common
one; but, atter more than a quarter of a
century, tht>re ought certainly to be some
preliminary evidence, however small." The
soundness of this rule cannot be successfully questioned. It would work great Injustice If rights of property, after a gren t
length of time, were allowed to de1>end upon
mere l<l..,ntlty of name. A prlma fa<'le ('Id~.~
thus submitted to a jm·y might be exh:t•n\~"1.y dltftcult, lf not lmtlOssible, to dls1iro\'e.
I
know of no case In which mere identity of'
name has be<>n held suftlclent after the gr~~u t
lapse of time which exists here.
The assignments from the tenth to the

I

I
I

11

........-
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“w“4J1rciusive allege Q1-1-01.

M 4.’ “tries of volurninous

@1"$i°““ mu-

mmme ic records of Lancaster coun-

I To 50 “iii these papers in detail

jxtem dais opinion to an lDCOI1\’el1ie11t M would serve no good pur-p0se_ The ob:

W01 the otters, us I understand tllelll, was

/ammviilepeaigree of the 1>1a1nurg-S ram

/7% 411] that he was not Qonnected vvith the

i|.V of Berks county. {phey Show

ﬂﬁﬁk fillmwiris,oeedB»‘“°“g:‘geS» etc- There

MAL S ories of ﬁssessmen S and °t11e1' Pﬁ-

arr“ sag“ Me‘ P91-haps, the equivalent of

Xlhsiﬁeclarutlous of decegsﬁd persoI.‘s’ but

there 1,; nothing '¢° connécm. ' -or enher °“"

mm uh the Baltzer e vs o rs the plain.

‘ W or Wm! the Berks county

ff ~ " Suit! _

I.-i1I:\}n ﬂtuiblechr. Hence the °bjeQt.lOns made

ill ylfeﬂleteudﬂllts to the admisslon of the
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{Anna Marla Gelrr and John

g‘§mru:2:?<i)swl,1lch have already been consid-

Q -hr, W with far greater force to these

1§cd, ai>iiRegM_dmg them as declarations, me

i‘§1P°"5' V e not shown alrunde to belong

‘\Q°‘“"‘“ts at ii of the fau1lly_ xve am of

. brauc _ _

iqpigidﬁlthat these records W81 e p1 Qpel-ly ex-

“-1)

in the ex-

doﬁurnents

n but the ﬁfteenth and six-

nents, in which error is as-

“mm asshﬁx charge of the court in some

(19 by the learned judge

mm commelxsllteesng? if not entirely accurate,

they disclose no such error as vvould justify

a reversal.

Judgment amrmem

(May 16. F34)-

3 A motion has been made for

' he above case, based up-

(1 to the exclusion of

ords by the court.

PAXSON»

3 1-gargrllhelli in i

on our ruling in 1'95“?

the Lancaster count)’ 1'9“

The iullliresslon ﬁDl)9*“'s to mievau that be-

‘ f er-

\ cl the assignments °

cause we dism ss r mm without an ex_

i1

; ror relating i0 this illleb .

’ tended discussion we had I1°t 9-‘giﬁlinted tn

I’ with care, or were misled “D011 9 “C S-

" -rtainly incorrect.

Ilnle ﬁ’?,t,e§s:§;:‘1,‘:§:¢§;;0r11e case with all

thtéxisnngm care from the fact that we were

not aided by an extended oral. argument.

Y bookg, however, supplied us with

The we g 1 1-inted argument, so that the

3 1-el§t(.'ﬂ.l'G lgrali arvument was not so im_

w::ta(nt 3: it may seem to the learned coun-

gel for the plaintiff in error. That the poiint

was not more fully discussed in the 0Dl11 0!!

was owing to the fact that it had already

. been extended to what I feared was an un-

X reasonable length i? td£S"“S"i';7" the mare im-
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t.,e_tr.\~ ln~\usi\"e allege error 1
t~~slor.a-1' a sertes of volun1inous dn the ex- odld (1788), J1fs father, wfth his famfly, movetlll1ll \he ~Ub\ic records of r 4nn.cas~cuments e
from CocuJlco township, Lancaster coun,1. 'tot." orer these papers ln de~ir coun- ty, Where he had lfved on his brother Paul's
~xten~t}'.l\Bop\nlon to an inconvenient 1 -would land; second, that his father's name was
ar.d wovld serve no good purpose_
..
Joseph, and that he was the youngest of
jee\ ot tile otters, as 1 understand th
ob- the family; and third, that his father had
/p/}JIJlf tbe pedigree of the l>laintu~~::· f was
three brothers, Paul, Andrew, and John, who
i!.h #P~ that be was not connected 'Vi th~:; lived in the same neighborhood In I.anc1tster
n;,~'/ '•m!I," of :serks county. They show county. The plaintiff did not know uls
ue<'P·
'"
·'
ds mortga
grandfather's name; he never saw him. And
recfta.... In wills, dee '
gee, etc. There then stated that Balser Geeh1·, of Be1·ks couns 1 8 of assessments and other
at~dliir.:socoPi;__
perbaps, the equiva.Ientpoaf- ty, was his uncle, upon Information de1i,·ed
tJe1'll·
TheY .... ~. f deceased
from his mother.
t\le ~«larations 0
persons, but
The defendants attempted to show by the
tM~ 18 noth\ng to connect them, or either of excluded records that .Joseph Gehr the plaln\"'e..r.
.u """• with the Baltzer Gehr
Ith thwho
B ls the plain- t""''
lu. s f at h er, and Paul, Andrew, ' and John
tJJr \ll tills suit, or w
e
erks county Gehr, mentioned In the records of Lancasfa~ \l t Geebr. Bence the objections made ter county, were brothers; that they were
by ._. 10detendants to the admission or the the sons of John Gehr, senior, and hence
,be
f A.nna Maria Gehr a
de~1arations o
b
already b
n.d J ohn could not have been the sons of Oonrlld
~hr and which ave
t
r_
een. consld- 1 Geehr, a brother of the Balser Geehr of
e~-ed' apply wltb far grea er orce to these 1 Berks county.
'
ll
' Regarding them as declarations, tbe I The d111lculty In the way of the defendants
~~ts are not sbown all_unde to be"long I Is that there Is nothing but identity of name
~ either branch of tb~fam 11:-V- '\.Ve are of to connect the Gehrs named In the records
~pinion that these reco 8 wet e properly ex- with the famlly of the plaintiff. This w111
not do as to 1>eople who died a hundred
1 ded
.c ~he~ rema\n but !be fi.:~~i:-nth and six- years ago. The reason and the authority for
-teenth asst11:nments, in w c
error Is as- this position were given in the opinion aled to tbe charge of the court in some ready filed, and need not be repeated. ~ot
~:t comments made by the ~en.rued judge I only Is there no proof allunde to connect
the ev\dence. If not entirely accurate, \ them, but there Is evlcleuce as to Paul nnd
~:;disclose no such error 118 'Would justify Andrew, at least, which makes their Identity
a reversal.
more than doubtful. Indeed, It seems hardJudgment atnrmed.
ly possible that they are the Paul and Andrew referred to by the plaintiff. To show
,
()lay lG, ll"Si).
the competency of the eYltlence, the arguPAXSON, l . A mot\on \ms been made for ment was made that the plalnUft' had spoa reargument ln tbe abo'\'e 1.'Use, based up- I ken of his father living on hls brother l'nul's
on our ru\lng ln regard to the exclusion of I land In Cocalico tow1n1hlp, Lancnster counthe Lancaster county recon\s by the court. ty. But we must remember that the plalnThe impression apvear1:1 to pre\"all that be- tiff was born in li82; he left Lanc·aster
cause we d\smlssetl tbe at1signments of er- county in 1788, when aoout six years old,
ror relating to this question without an ex- and the records show thnt the Paul Gehr
tc:-nded (Uscuss\on we uatl not examined It named therein died In 1773, which was five
with care, or were misled upon the facts. years before the plaintil'l' was born. And as
The first assumption is c!'rtalnly lncon-ect. to Andrew Gehr the case was still stronger,
i
I examined this branch of the case with all for the plaintiff testified to having seen hls
1
the
more care from the fact that we were t'nthet·'s brother Amll·ew, while the Andrew
I
r
not aided by an extended oral argument. Gehr of the records must have died prior
Tbe paper books, however, supplied us with to 1772, according to the records thenu1elves.
a very careful printed argument, so that the It ls not con·ect, therefore, to suy. thnt there
was proof allumle to connect the8(• Gehrs
1088 ot an oral argument was not so lmportnnt as lt may seem to the learned conn- I with the plaintiff. and that the plnlntitI"s own
sel for the plnlntlft' In error. That the point \ deposition furnishes such proof. There is
wns not more fully discussed in the opinion really nothing but Identity of name, und
was owing to the tnct that lt had already e,·en if this were some eYhlenee it would be
been extended to wltat I feared was an un- too weak and lnconclm1ive to base a '\'erreasonable length In disc·u8>1lng the more lm- dkt upon. Unless the plaintiff's case ls a
I fabrication, nnd the testimony false us to
portant questions of the c·ause.
A eareful re-examination and study of the the declamtlons of the deceased members of
cnse bas tailed to satisfy us that we were his tarully, his relntionshlp to Balser Geehr,
mlsletl eltber upon the fncUI or the lnw.
of Berks county, wns estnhlisbell. There ls
The records referred to w<>rP offer<>d to nothing In the ca8e to imlieute such a fnhrehut the testimony of the pluiutin: and to rlcation, and If the e'l"idence rejected had
establ111b tlte pedigree of his fumlly in Lan- been admitted, lt woultl not be suftlclent to
cnster county. The plalntlft' In his <lepoRI- jui;tlfy a jury In com\ug to such a conclutlon bad stated that when he wus six years sion.
191

r;::gth,

I

\
\

I
I
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RELE VAN CY.

The rejected records do not contradict the

plaintiﬂ’s testimony. As a 1l('(1l;§l'L‘(3 of his

family, it rests upon a number of circum-

stances, each dependent upon the other.

With the essential links relating to Paul and

192

Andrew Gehr broken, the whole superstruc-

ture crumbles.

We see no sufficient reason to order a ru-

argument, and the motion therefore is re-
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fused.

HELEV A:NCY.

The rejected records do not contradict the
plalntllf'e testimony. Ae a pedigree ot hie
tamlly, It rests upon a number ot circumstances, each dependent upon the other.
With the essential links relating to Pa.ul a.nd
192

Andrew Gehr broken, the whole superstmcture crumbles.
·we see no sufficient reason to order a reargument, and the motion therefore Is retused.

--PEDIGH:g~.

•
PEDIGREE.

“mff_i0N et al. v. Hornxrms

,6 F>“l1-Ct. rso, 11? U. s. 389-)

éam of the United States_

ym,U~~N

et al. "· HOY..l\J:Es

et

l~ ;lup.ct. 780, 117 u. s. S89.)
%·~•
Ourt of 22,
the United S1:a. t:ea
,..
1886.
•

al.

March

22,1ssu.

to errol‘ to the circuit court of the United

States wt the we_stem mSt_mct 0f W’i1'ginla.

M/3. |y:1'Sa11 action of et;i1cct11\ent_ The de_

/2%/Mts ill error were t e plaintiffs in the

et 8.1.

$\\ii“‘-me 11 arch

- the heirs at 1

, 7 U11 and W919 aw of

ﬂ/Mi/Rlcltincsy deceased‘ They brought the ac-

Jolm 0 ' 13-;1,torecover a. tract of 3,000

\'\o\\'\L igulﬁljfin Lee county. in the state of

“\,‘Q':re\:it\(:i,a The defendaDi$ Izliaded the gen-

eml Xsgue. The case W3-5 trhed by a. jury,

and th ewas a Verdict or , e_p1ainuﬂ7$- 011

er endercd juﬂglnent, and the

out this writ of er-1-Q1-_
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mm the bill of e_X(?'3I)tio11s um

to sustain the 1tSS\J‘.:e fon their

deuce a. pa en 1-om the

P"§g oﬂeredtgloﬁvglrirginia to S:-unuel Young,

(‘L my 7’ 1137, tor the Dfelrlises in con-

ted‘ which was admitted vvrthout objec-

trwiemy‘ “en offered a deed for the same

"~°"-_Th°y m gamuel 0. Young to John

mremlseﬂ "° 6 my 12, 1:-519. This at-ea re-

€1°1m°s’ date“; by the commonvve-alth of Vii-.

tlied megm “Q1 Young of the premises in

gill“ to Sam Samuel Young, the pat-

. L“ t

c°:“°v€-,Zy'd1eqaintestate; that Samuel O.

en ee.

_ . was his only child and

Y°.““g' “‘e,§,‘,,“,m¢(:é title to said lands had

hwﬂ’ “Pd “D Appellded to the deed was a

“SM m h 1 acknowledgment dated July 15,

cemﬁcate O Eastern district of Pennsylvania,

l8‘:){)o1;tt1t1i\ge to have been taken by Richard

D

t t “age for the dltrlct

P““""' “med S a ‘*3 jsigned by him.

or Pennsyhxrilmaiginto have been witnessed

(l1)eedJc?lFr?e,S1baw and John C\'IliSe- Immedi-

y.

ately after vt‘l::>.tce\11't‘li:)C“i::1 °tt0*1b°:‘t1l‘l):"Il_$(c1(;gi1;1te'(:€

gg.‘r)r‘:\ai::l9dC“YourI1)g gr the consideration mon-

ey mentioned in the deed, which was $ég3O2'

signed by him and witnessed ‘DY -7° “ 3 '

The plaintiffs Dl'°‘°d the hand: ti1tiian:l;ea(t)i11:

Judge Peters to the certiﬁcate, 11" hi h

I John Shaw, one of the witnesses, w c

0 la more than M Years before the

23?; pA(pepended to the deed was the follow-

‘“§ ﬂegiliateig iegtljrtrftatliggun and held for

1,9: county, at the court-house thereof, on

the ﬁfteenth day of Jamwry. 1859- this "1"

denture of bargain and sale for land between

Samuel C. Young of the 0118 i>l11't- mid John

Holmes of the other D1111, W93 admmed to

'In ett01 to the circuit court of'. the U
1
SIJ.tei t41f the Western district or Vlr n t:ed
!/7J/S JV8I an action of ejectinent.
~~1::
/fllt/Plb fD error were the plalntltrs In. the
..1.-1/
urt and were the heirs at: la.'W f
fffe"" CO , deceased· They brought the ao
Iolul ~o!DleB. t 1811,to recover a tract or 8 ~
~n\lL.. .A~\n i,ee county, in the stat~ of
;~
~be defendants pleaded the gen~~ 'tbe case was tried by a. jury
~o th~~".IVas a verdict for the Pla.ln.tltrs, o~
whle-'h. the court rendered judgment. and the
defe--..
ti sued out this writ or error.
It -..dnD red froJD the blll of exceptions that
the ~Pfnu«s. to sustain the iBBue on. their
ia~P~lfered in evidence a pa tent :rroin the
co . , wealth of Virginia to Samuel Young,
~~0~1 '7 1 787, for the premises In con~
whlch was admitted 'Without obJec·
~ ;-ve~y next ottered a deed :ror the same
~n.
from Samuel C. Young to .John
dated July 12, 1819. This deed reo:~e gn.nt bJ tbe common'Wea.lth of Vlr~la to Samuel "Young of the premises In
ray· that Samuel Young. the pat~:'"~4 'died intestate; that Samuel c.
~ ' the grantor, was b\s only child and
n:~g'and that tbe tlt\e to eald lands had
vest~ \n b\m. Appended to the deed was a
cert\lleate of acknowledgment cla"ted July 15,
1819 al the Eastern district of Pennsylvania,
purPort\ng to bave been taken by Richard
Peters, United States ludge for the district
of Pennsylvania, and signed by him. The
deed appeared also to ba.ve been wttnessetl
by Jobn Sbaw and Jobn Craige. Immediately after the cert\tlcate of acknowledgment
appeared what purported to be the receipt of
Samuel C. Young for the consideration money menUoned in the deed, wblcb was $10,400,
atgued by him and witnessed by John Cmlge.
The plalntltrs proved the handwriting of
Judge Peters to the certlftcate, and the death
of John Shaw, one of the witnesses, which
took place more than 00 years before the
trial. Appended to the deed was the follow\ng certificate of registration:
"Vlrglnla. At a court begun and held for
i,ee county, at the court-house ~hereof, on
the filteenth day of January, 1838, this lndentnre of bargain and sale for land between
Samuel C. Young of the one part, and John
Holmee of the other part, was admitted to
record upon the certUicate of Richard Petel"ll,
Judge of the Penm~ylvanla district of the
United States. J. W. S. Morrison, D. C."
Tbe deed bore the following lndorsement:
"Recorded In the clerk's otH.ce of the county ronrt of IA?e, In book :So. 7, page 401.
Teste: J. W. S. Morrison, D. C."
Tbe plalntHfs also Introduced evlden~c
tending to show that the patent to Samuel
Young, and the deed from Samuel C. Young

c::!.

=mlaeB

record upon the certiﬁcate of Richard Peters.

judge gf the Pennsylvania district of the

United States. J. W. S. Morrison. D- C-"

The deed bore the following 1nd<>1'Se111eI1i=

“Recorded in the clerk’s oiiice of the coun-

tv court of Lee, in book N0- 7, Page 491-

Testc: J. W. S. Morrison, D. G."

10
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to John Holmes, were found among the paof the latter atter h1s death, In 1834
They a1Bo otrered the testimony of Joh~
Hohnes, a son-In-law of John Holmes, the
grantee of the land, who testified that uc
knew that said grantee owned a tract of
3,000 acres of land In Lee county, Virginia,
and that the deed for the land was In the
possession of John Holmes, the elder, at the
time of his death; that at the request of one
of the e.'tecutors of John Holmes, the elder,
and of the family, the wltne88, In the year
1830, went to Virginia, to examine the lands·
that he took with him a map and plan and
two deeds, one being the patent above mentioned for the lands In controversy, the other the deed from Samuel C. Young to John
Holmes for the same lands; and that these
papers had been ln his po88esslon or under
his control for a period of 37 or 38 years. On
his said visit the witness went upon the
lands with Peter Fulkerson, who lived In
sight of them, and who, as well as Frederick
D. Fulkerson and Mr. Ewing, brother-In-law
of the latter, recognized him as representing
the owners of the land. It was at that time
called the "Holmes Plantation." There were
no Intruders upon the land, and no one In
actual posse88lon. In 1840, Frederll'k D.
Fulkerson treated by letter with the witness
for the purchase of the land, and, tn 18-W,
James Fulkerson wrote the witness to learn
the least he would take for the land, and repea ted his Inquiry in the year 1847. It may
be here stated that the defendants claimed
possession under patents Issued, one to the
Peter Fulkerson above mentioned, dated Oc·
tober 30, 1838, and another to said Frederll'k
D. Fulkerson and James Fulkerson and Eliz·
abeth Fulkerson, dated October 31, 1846, and
by subsequent conveyances from said patentees. Having lntl'oduced this evidence the
plalntUrs rested.
One of the defenses set up to the action by
the defendants was that under the laws of
Virginia the lands In controyeray had been
forfeited to the state, and the title by reason
thereof had, Ipso facto, re\"erted to the state,
and was therefore out of the plalntltrs. The
acbl of the state of Virginia applll'nble to the
present case, providing for the forfeiture or
lands delinquent for the non-payment of
taxes, were as follows: The second section
of the act of February 2'7, 18:-hl, after rel'lt·
Ing, b:V way of preamble, tbat whereas, It
was "known to the general assembly tllat
many large tracts of land lying west of the
All<>ghany mountains which were granted by
the commonwealth before the first day of
April, 1831, never were, or ba\"e not been for
many years last past, entered on the bookR
of the commissioner of the re\"enue where
they respectively lie, • • •" 1leclared thnt
every owner of any such tract of land should,
on or before the ftrst day of July, 1831\, enter, or cause to be entered, on the bookR of
the commissioner of revenue for tbe county
in which the lands lay, any land owned by
193
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him the title of which came through grants

by the commonwealth, and have the same

charged with all taxes and damages in ar-

rears properly chargeable thereon, and pay

all such taxes and damages which had not

been relinquished and exonerated by the sec-

ond section of the act concerning delinquent

and forfeited lands, passed March 10, 1832;

and upon failure to do so such lands, not

in the actual possession of said owner. should

become forfeited to the commonwealth after

the ﬁrst of July, 1836. Laws Va. 183-l, 1835,

c. 13, p. 12. The second section of the act of

.\larch 10, 1832, referred to in the statute

just recited, provided that all taxes and dam-

ages due and chargeable on lands lying west

of the Alleghany mountains, returned delin-

quent for the year 1831 or any previous year,

and which had not been redeemed, or ex-
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onerated by former laws, should be dis-

charged, and the lien of the commonwealth

therefor relinquished, provided said taxes

and damages did not exceed $10. See Laws

Va. 1832. c. 73, p. 67. By successive acts oi’

the legislature of Virginia——act of March 23,

1836, (chapter 3, p. 7; Act 1835—36;) act of

.\[arch 30, 1837, (chapter 8, p. 9, Acts 1836-

37;) act of March 15, 1838. (chapter 8, pp.

16, 17, Acts 1838,)—the time for entering

lands upon the books of the commissioners

of revenue. and paying the taxes and dam-

ages charged thereon, and thereby saving

them from forfeiture, was extended to the

ﬁrst day of July, 1838.

In order to prove the forfeiture of the land

in controversy to the state of Virginia the

defendants introduced “:1 table of tracts of

land in Lee county assessed with taxes,” cer~

tlﬁed on September 5, 1876, by the auditor of

public accounts of the state of Virginia.

This table showed that three tracts of land,

containing in the aggregate 6,300 acres, had

been listed for taxation against Samuel

Young, of Philadelphia, for the years from

1827 to 1832, inclusive. The taxes on the

three tracts for the ﬁve years from 1827 to

1831. inclusive, were, according to the table,

unpaid. and amounted in all to 38 cents. The

taxes for 1832 were marked paid. The audi-

tor of public accounts certiﬁed that the books

of Lee county prior to 1827 were missing;

that the records showed that the taxes on

said three tracts of Samuel Young had been

paid up to and including the year 1822; that

the taxes were released to 1831, inclusive;

and that said lands were returned among th'e

unascertainable lands in 1832, and subsc-

quently dropped from the commissioners‘

books of Lee county.

To rebut this testimony introduced by the

defendants the plaintiffs put in evidence the

certiﬁcate of the deputy-sheriff of Lee coun-

ty, dated December 14, 1837, to the effect that

he had placed a tract of land in the name

of Samuel Young for 3.000 acres, which was

returned in the year 1834 not ascertainable,

on the commissioners’ books of said county

of Lee, and taxed the damages thereon.

RELEVANCY.

blm the title of which came through grants
by the commonwealth, and have the same
charged with all taxes and damages ln arrears properly l'bargeable thert'On, and pay
all such taxes and damages which had not
been relinquished and exonerated by the second section of the act concerning dellnquent
and forfeited lands, passed }la1·ch 10, 1832;
ancl upon fallure to do so such lands, not.
ln the actual possession of 811.ld owner, should
become forfeited to the commonwealth after
the first of July, 1836. I,aws Ya. lS:U, 183:>,
c. 13, p. 12. The second section of the act of
llnrch 10, 1832, referred to ln the statute
just recited, provided that all taxes and damages due and chargeable on lands lying west
of the .Alleghany mountains, returned delinquent for the year 1831 or any previous year,
and which bad not been redeemed, or '!X·
onerated by former laws, should be dls<·barged, and the llen of the commonwealth
the1·efor relinquished, provided eald taxes
and damages did not exceed •to. See Laws
Ya. 1882, c. 73, p. 67. By successive acts of
the legislature of Virginia-act of March 23,
183(1, (chapter 3, p. 7; .Acts 1835-36;) act of
:\larch 30, 1837, (chapter 8, p. D, Acta 1836:J7;) act of llnr<'h 15, 1888, (chapter 8, pp.
l<l, 17, ActM 1838,)-the time for entering
lands upon the books of the commissioners
of revenue, and paying the taxes and damages <'ha1·ged thereon, and thereby saving
them from forfeiture, was extended to the
first day of July, 1838.
In order to prove the forfeiture of the land
In controversy to the state of Virginia the
defendants lntro<lu<'ed "a table of tracts of
land ln Lee county assessed with taxes." eer·
tlfied on September 5, 1876, by the auditor of
public n<'counts of the state of Virginia.
•r111s table showed that three tracts of land,
<"ontalnlng In the aggregate 6,300 acres, bad
been listed for taxation against samuel
Young, of Philadelphia, for the years from
1827 to 1832, inclusive. The taxes on the
three traet11 for the five years from 1827 to
1831. lndmd \"e, were, according to the table,
unpaid, an<l amounted In all to 38 cents. The
taxes for 1832 were marked paid. The auditor of publl<" accounts certified that the books
of I..ee county prior to 1827 were missing;
that the records showed that the taxes on
Raid three tracts of Samuel Young had been
paid up to and lneludlng the year 1822; thnt
the taxes were released to 1831, Inclusive;
and that said lands were returned among tlie
unilscertalnable lands In 1832, and subsequently dro1>ped from the commissioners'
books of Lee county.
To rebut this testimony Introduced by the
defentlants the plalntltt's put In evidence the
certlfl<'ate of the deputy-sheritr of Lee county, dated December H, 1837, to the etreet that
be had placed a tract of land lo the name
of Samuel Yoong for 3,000 acres, which was
returned In the year l~H not ascertainable,
on the commissioners' bOOks of said county
of Lee, and taxed the damages thereon.

™

They also lntl"Oduced "an extract," certUled
September :;, 187:i, by the auditor of public
accounts, "from the land-books of the com·
mlesloners of the revenue for the county of
Lee, for the years 1838 to 1875, both inclusive, • • *" of lands ft88e88ed successively
to John Holmes, John Holmes, Jr., and John
Holmes' eRtnte, for each of said years. The
extract showed that a tract of 3,000 acres of
land, conveyed by Samuel C. Young, was list·
ed for taxation to John Holmes and John
Holmes, Jr., of Ph1ladel1>hla, and to the estate of John Holmes, for the years above
mentioned. The taxes down to 1874, excepting one year. appeared to have been paid or
released by law.
John A. Buchanan, for plalntlfl's In error.
Wm. Pinkney Whyte, Patrick Hagan, and
John A. Campbell, for defendants ln error.
WOODS, J. It Is first assigned for error
that the circuit court "allowed the deed from
Samuel C. Young to John Holmes to be read
in evidence without Instructing the Jury that
the recitals therein In res11ect to the death ot
Samuel Young and the helrshlp of Samuel C.
Young were not evidence agalni,it the defendants, even If lt were admlsslble at all, with·
out proof of Its execution or possession accompanying and held under It.·• The deed
of Samuel C. Young to John Holmes was
rightfully admitted In evidence as an ancient deed, without proof by the sube<'rlblng
witnesses, or of possession by the 1>lalnt11re or
those under whom they claimed. 'When of·
fered lt was more than 60 years old. .It was
lJroduced from the custody of the heirs of.
John Holmes, the grantee, who claimed the
lands described therein. It, as well as the
patent for the same land from the commonwealth of Vlrglnla. to Samuel Young, was
shown to have been found among the papers
of John Holmes. The lands described therein were shown to have been listed tor taxation
to John Holmes, or to his heirs, for a period
beginning with the year 1838 down to and
Including tbe year 187:>, whlcb was atter the
bringing of this suit; and lt appeared that
during that time they bad paid the taxes assessed on said lands, or the same bad been
released to them by law. It was furthasbown that the judge before whom the acknowledgment of the deed bad been ma<le
was dead; that his signature to the c~rtitl
cate of acknowledgment was genuine; that
the deed had been recorded in the county
where the lands lay for more than 42 years
before lt was offered ln evidence; and that
before and after the deed was put UPon reconl the lands described therein were rt-ported to be the lands of John Holmes, the
grantee, and his heirs, and were known and
designated in the neighborhood where thev
lay as the "Holmes Plantation." This eta~
of facta amply justified the admission of tbe
deed ln evidence as an ancient document.
without other proof. Caruthers v. Eldridge.
12 Grat. 670; Applegate v. Mlnlng Cu., u

1

J
I

PEDIGREE.
PEDIGREE.

[Case No. 67

Sup. Ct. 742 (decided at the preent term),

and cases there cited.

The question is therefore fairly presented

whether the recitals made in the deed of

Samui C. Young to John Holmes, to the ef-

fect that Samuel Young, the patentee, had

died intestate, leaving one child only, namely,

the said Samuel C. Young, the grantor, were

admissible in evidence against the defend-

ants. who did not claim title under the deed.

The fact to be established is one of pedigree

The proof to show pedigree forms a well-

settied exception to the rule which excludes

hearsay evidence. This exception has been

recognized on the ground of necessity; for as

in inquiries respecting relationship or de-

scent facts must often be proved which oc-

‘curred many years before the trial, and were

known to but few persons, it is obvious that
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the strict enforcement in such cases of the

rules against hearsay evidence would fre-

quently occasion a failure of justice. Tayl.

Ev. § 635. Traditional evidence is therefore

admissible. Jackson v. Cooley, 8 Johns. 99;

Jackson v. Browner, 18 Johns. 37; Jackson

v. King, 5 Cow. 237; Davis v. Wood, 1

Wheat. 6. The rule is that declarations of

deceased persons who were de jure related

by blood or marriage to the family in ques-

tion may be given in evidence in matters of

pedigree. Jewell v. Jewell, 1 How. 219;

Blackburn v. Crawfords, 3 Wall. 1’i'5;' John-

son v. Liwson, 2 Bing. 86; Vowles v. Young,

13 Yes. 147; Monkton v. Attorney General,

2 Russ. 8: M. 150; White v. Strother, 11 Ala.

720. A qualiﬁcation of the rule is that be

fore a declaration can be admitted in evi-

dence the relationship of the declarant with

the family must be established by some

proof independent of the declaration itself.

Monkton v. Attorney General, 2 Russ. & M.

156; Attorney General v. Kohler, 9 H. L.

Pas. 660; Rex v. All Saints, 7 Barn. &. C.

T89. But it is evident that but slight proof

of the relationship will be required, since the

relationship of the declarant with the family

might be as difficult to prove as the very fact

in controversy.

Applying these rules, we are of opinion that

the recital in the deed of Samuel C. Young

to John Holmes, supported as it was by the

circumstances of the case shown by the evi-

491199. was admissible, as tending to prove

the facts recited, namely, that Samuel Young,

the patentee, was dead, and Samuel C.

Young. the grantor, was his only child and '

heir.

As the deed in which the recital was made

was entitled to be admitted in evidence, it

ﬂtﬁnils upon the same footing as if its exe-

cution had been proved in the ordinary way.

The fact, therefore, that on the twelfth day

of July. 1819, the date of the deed, in the

"ft? °t Phﬂildelllhitl, before Richard Peters,

United 3W9‘! Judge, and two other persons

as witnesses, Samuel C. Young, the grantor

in the deed mentioned, made the declaration

ll fillesﬂoﬂ, may be taken as established.

[Case No. 67

Sup. Ct. 742 (decided at the present term),
It Is not disputed that when, upon the trial
and caaes there cited.
of the case ln the circuit court In October,
The question I.a therefore falrly presented 1880, the deed containing the recitals was
whether the recitals made In the deed of ofrered In evidence, the declarant, Samuel C.
Samul C. Young to John Holmes, to the et- Young, was dead. It only remained, therefect that Samuel YOUDg, tbe patentee, had fore, to <>«er some evidence that the declar-Oled Intestate, leaving one child only, namely, ant, Samuel C. Young, was related to the
the llllld Samuel C. Young, the grantor, were family of Samuel Young. One circumstance
admlasible ID evidence against the defend- relied on to show his relationship was the
ants, who did not claim title under the deed. BlmllaJ'fty of names. This, after the lapse ot.
The fact to be established Is one of pedigree so great a time, was entitled to weight. .AnThe proof to show pedigree forms a well- otber fact was that the patent to Samuel
11ettled exception to the rule which excludes Young tor the land In controversy was found
hee.l'Blly evidence. This exception has been with the deed of Samuel C. Young to John
recognlZed on the ground of necessity; for as Holmes among the papen of the latter after
In Inquiries respecting relationship or de- his death.
The well-known practices and
:acent facts must often be proved which oc- habits of men In the transfer of title make ,
•<.111Ted many years before the trial, and were It clear that the patent was dellvered to
known to but few pel'80ns, It ls obvloU8 that Holmes by Samuel C. Yotmg when the latter
the strict enforcement ID such cases of the delivered bls own deed to Holmes for the
rules against he81'88Y evidence would fre- preml.ees conveyed by the patent. There was
quently oceaslon a failure of justice. Tnyl. therefore persuasive proof that on January
Ev. I 635. Traditional evidence ls therefore 12, 1819, Samuel O. Young had ln his po88eBadmlsslble. Jackson v. Cooley, 8 Johns. 99; slon, clalmlng It as a munlment of his title,
J'ackson v. Browner, 18 Johns. 37; Jackson the patent lssued by the commonwealth of
v. King, IS Cow. 237; Davis v. Wood, 1 Virginia to Samnel Young, and the presumpWbeat. 6. The rule ls that declarations ot tlon Is that bis poBBeeslou of the patent wu
decmsed persons who were de jure related rightful. The tact that Samuel C. Young,
by blood or marriage to the family In ques- representing himself to be the son and heir
tlon may be given In evidence ID matters of ot Samuel Young, had ID his rightful poeeespedlin-ee. Jewell v. Jewell, 1 How. 219; sfon the title papen of the latter to a valuBlackburn v. Crawfords, 3 Wall 175;· John- able estate, ls a fact tending to prove the
son v. Lawson, 2 Bing. frl; Vowles v. Young, truth of his asserted relationship. .Another
13 Yes. 147; Monkton v. Attomey General, circumstance of weight Ill that Samuel
2 HUS& & M. 159; White v. Strother, 11 Ala. Young, having 8118umed, as the son and sole
720. A qualification of the rule ls that be- heir of Samuel Young, to convey the landed
fore a dec-laratlon can be admitted In evl- estate of the latter, and bis grantees having
<dence the relationship of the declarant with for more than 60 yean claimed title under
the family must be established by some bis conveyance, the right of Samuel C. Young
proof Independent ot the declaration itself. to make the conveyance has never, so tar 88
Monkton v. Attorney General, 2 RU8s. & M. appears, been questioned or challenged by
156; Attorney General v. Kobler, 9 H. L. any other person claiming under Samuel
<'as. 660; Rex v. All Salut15, 7 Barn. & C. Young. After a lapse of 61 years we think
~- But It 18 evident that but slight proof these circumstances were suftlclent to prove
~f the relationship wlll be required, since the that Samuel C. Young was of the family of
relatlonslilp of the declarant with the family Samuel Young, and that the declaration of
might be as difficult to prove as the very fact the former, deliberately made ln an ancient
In controversy.
writing, signed, sealed, witnessed, acknowlApplylng these rules, we are of opinion that edged, and recorded, to the effect that the
the recital In the deed of Samuel C. Young declarant was the only child and heir of Sam·
to J'ohn Holmes, supported as It was by the uel Young, and that tbe latter was dead,
<'il'CUllllltances of the case shown by the evl- was of right admitted In evidence as tending
dence, was admiBslble, as tending to prove J to prove the facts so recited. This conclutbe facta recited, namely, that Samuel Young, slon ls sustalned by the case of Deery v.
t~ patentee, was deed, and Samuel C. Croy, 5 Wall. 795, which ls directly In point.
Young, tbe grantor, was his only child and j See, also, Carver v. Astor, 4 Pet. 1; Crane
heh·.
I v. Astor, 6 Pet. 598; Garwood v. Dennis, 4
.As the deed In which the recital was made Bin. 314; Stokes v. Dawes, 4 Mason, 268;
was entitled to be admitted In evidence, It Jackson v. Cooley, 8 Johns. 00. In view,
11tnnds upon the same footing as If its exe- therefore, of the clreumstan<'eS of the <'lll!e,
<·utlon had been proved In the ordinary way. there was no error ID the refusal of the court
The fact, therefore, that on the twelfth day to lnstruC't the jury that said recital was not
-Of July, 1810, the date of the deed, In the evidence against the defendants.
dty of Philadelphia, before Richard Peters
The next and only other ground of error
United States judge, and two other pel'BOW: alleited by ·the defendants ls that the court
aa wltnet!Se8, Samuel C. Young, the grantor refll8e(l to charge the jury on the question of
In the deed mentioned, made the de<.>laratlons forfeiture. We think there was no error
In question, may be taken as established.
here. The forfeiture of the lands In contro19j

o.

I
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versy Is alleged to have occurred by virtue
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RELE VAX CY.

versy is alleged to have occurred by virtue

of the provisions of the second section of the

act of ‘February 27, 1835. Two classes of

lands were declared subject to forfeiture by

this act. The ﬁrst was lands which had

never been entered upon the books of the

commissioners of revenue for the county in ‘

which the lands lay. There is a failure to

show that the lands in question had never

been listed for taxation upon the books of

the commissioners of Lee county, within

whose limits they were included. It is true

the certiﬁcate of the auditor of public ac-

counts, introduced by the defendants, ltates

that the records of Lee county prior to 1827

are missing; but it can hardly be maintain-

ed that when a party shows his inability to

prove an essential fact, the fact may be in-

ferred from his inability to prove it. But
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the same certiﬁcate shows that the lands of’

Samuel Young were placed on the books of

the commissioners of Lee county for six

years, namely, from 1827 to 1832, inclusive.

and that the taxes on the same lands had

been paid up to and including the year 1822.

Upon the showing of the defendants them-

selves, it appears that the lands in question

do not belong to the class which had never

been entered upon the books of the commis-

sioners of revenue.

Nor are the defendants any more successful

in showing that the lands in controversy fell

within the second class liable to forfeiture,

namely, those which for many years previous

to February 27, 1835, the date of the act

declaring the forfeiture, had not been entered

upon the books of the commissioners of reve-

nue. For, referring to the second section of

the act of March 10, 1832 (Laws Va. 1832, c.

73, p. 67), it appears that only those tracts

of land on which the unpaid taxes exceeded

$100 were liable to forfeiture under the act

of February 27, 1835. There is no proof that

the taxes and damages on the lands in ques-

tion exceeded that amount. On the contrary,

196

if the table of lands showing the taxes there-

on for the years 1827 to 1832, inclusive, certi-

fled by the auditor of public accounts, in-

cludes the lands in controversy, as the de-

fendants contend, the taxes thereon for all

the years stated amounted to only 38 cents,

and the taxes were therefore released and

relinquished by the second section of the act

of March 10, 1832; and if this table did not

_‘ include the lands in controversy, then there

is an entire failure to show what the taxes

were. The defendants, therefore, have fail-

ed to prove that the lands in controversy

were liable to forfeiture under the act of

February 27, 1835.

But there is affirmative proof that no for-

feiture could have occurred, for the time for

entering the lands on the commissioners‘

books for taxation, and for paying the taxes,

and thereby preventing forfeiture, was ex-

tended, as has been stated, to the ﬁrst day

of July, 1538; and it was shown by the cer-

I

If the table of lands showing the taxes thereon for the years 1827 to 1832, inclusive, certlact of 'February 27, 1833. Two <.>lasses of 11.ed by the auditor ot public accounts, Inlands were declared subject to forfeiture by eludes the lands ID controversy, as the detbls act. The ti.rat was lands which had j fendants contend, the taxes thereon for all
never been entered upon the books of the 1 the years stated amounted to only 38 cents,
commls81oners of revenue for the county In I and the taxes were therefOl'e released and
which the lands lay. There ls a fallure to relinquished by the second section of the act
show that the lands in question bad never of March 10, 1832; and it this table did not
been llsted for taxation upon the books of Include the lands In controversy, then there
the commlsBloners of Lee county, withlD ls an entire failure to show what the taxes
whose limits they were Included. It 111 true were. The defendants, therefore, have fallthe certlftcate of the auditor of public ac- ed to prove that the lands In controYersy
counts, introduced by the defendants, ttates were liable to forfeiture under the act ot
that the records of Lee county prior to 1827 j .It'ebruary 27, 1835.
are missing; but it can hardly be maintainBut there ls affirmative proof that no fored that when a party shows his inabl11ty to felture could have occurred, for the time for
prove an essential fact, the fact may be In- entering the lands on the commissioners'
ferred from his Inability to prove It. But books tor taxation, and tor paying the taxes,
the same certitl<.>ate shows that the lands of· and thereby preventing forfeiture, was exSamuel Young were placed on the books of tended, WI has been stated, to the first day
the commissioners of Lee county for six of July, 1!:138; and It was shown by the ceryears, namely, from 1827 to 1832, Inclusive, tlf:lcate of Crabtree, the deputy-sherttr, that
and that the taxes on the same lands had as early as December 14, 1837, the lnnds in
been paid up to and Including the year 1822. controveniy were placed upon the tax-bookR.
Upon the showing of the defendants them- and the damages thereon taxed; and lt was
selves, It appears that the lands In question further shown that the state of Virginia
do not belong to the claBs which had never never claimed the lands as forfeited, but.
been entered upon the books of the commls- from the year 1838 down to the beginning of
&loners of revenue.
this suit, a period of more than 33 years, had
Nor are the defendants any more suC<'etl8ful aeseBBed and colleeted taxes therefor from
In showing that the Janda In controversy tell the plalnturs and those under whom they
within the second class liable to forfeiture, claim. It follows that the failure to show a
namely, those which for many years previous forfeiture ot the Janda under the act of Febto February 27, 1835, the date of the act ruary 27, 1835, was complete. It would,
declaring the forfeiture. had not been entered therefore, have been the duty of the court.
upon the books of the commissioners of reve- if It gave any Instruction upon this branch ot
nue. For, referring to the second section of the defense, to say to the jury that the dethe act of March 10, 1832 (Laws Va. 1832, c. fendnnte had failed to maintalD it. It can
73, p. 67), It appears that only those tracts hardly be urged by them, as a ground for the
of land on whkh the unpaid taxes exceeded reversal of the judgment, that the court did
$100 were liable to forfeiture under the act not so charge. Brobst v. Brock. 10 Wall.
of February 27, 1835. There ls no proof that 519; Philltps Const. Co. v. Seymour, 91 u.
the taxes and damages on the lands ID ques- S. 646.
Judgment aftlrmed.
tton exceeded that amount. On the contrary,
196
of the provisions of the second section of the
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WIGHT FIRE-PROOFING CO. V. POC-

ZEKAI.

(22 N. E. 543, 130 Ill. 139.)

Supreme Court of Illinois. Oct. 31, 1889.

Appeal from appellate court, ﬁrst district.

Action by Peter Poczekai for the use of

James G. Weart against the Wight Fire-

Prooﬁng Company. Defendant appeals.

WIGHT FIRE-PROOFING .co. v. rocZEKAL
(22 N. E. 543, 130 ID. 139.)
Supreme Court of Illinois. Oct. 31, 1889.

Appeal from appellate court, first district.
Action by Peter Poczekai for the use of
JamPs G. Weart against the Wight FireProoling Company. Defendant appeals.
Wm. Eliot Furness, for appellant. Nelson
Monroe, for appellee.

Wm. Eliot Furness, for appellant. Nelson

Monroe, for appellee.

BAKER, J. Appellee recovered judgment

in the superior court of Cook county iii case I

for $2,000, and on appellant's appeal the

judgment was aﬂirmed by the appellate court

of the ﬁrst district. Bnsse &Sturtevant had

the contract for the mason-work on a. build-

ing which the Phoenix Insurance Company

of Brooklyn was erecting on the south- west

corner of Clark and Jackson streets, in Chi-
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cago, and appellee was working for them.

(hi December 6, 1886, the mason-work was

ﬁnished, and appellee was employed with

others in lowering certain planks, which had

been used by the masons for scaffolding. from

the attic ﬂoor of the unﬁnished building

through an elevator way, by means of a rope,

to the ﬂoor below. In the perform.-ince of

this duty and at the time he was injured ap-

pellee was using due and ordinary care.

Over him, on the frame-work of the roof,

some of the servants of the appellant were at

work. Appellant had a contract for doing

the lire-proofing of the building, and its

servants on the frame of the roof composed

a gang of three or four men who were pre-

paring the centerings, so called. necessary to

be put in place in order to enable. the appel-

lant to lay the ﬁre-proof arches between the

girders iorining the frame of the roof. The

centerings were a sort of platform supported

from above, built close to and under the

girders, on which the tiles of the arches, ﬁat

on the under side, were laid, and rested un-

til the mortar with which they were built

should harden, and on which the workmen

0mplo_\'ed in springing the arches stood while

working. The appellant had nothing to do

with the iron-work of the building, and tho

girders of the roof had been put in place by

a contractor who had done the iron-work.

They ran north and south, were some six or

seven fe.-t apart, and, as the morning in

question was frosty, they were slippery. The

centering gang were working over that part

of the attic ﬂoor where appellee was at work,

and Lynch, the foreman of the gang, in step-

Plﬂg around upon the roof girders, stepped

On a short iron girder weighing ﬁve or six

hundred pounds, and loose at both ends,

which _was no part of the roof, and which

was lying east and west across the north and

south girders, which were in that place about

as far apart as the short girder was long.

Lynch called the attention of Lee, another of

appellant's workmen, to the fact of the loose

girder. A few moments thereafter he or-

dered Lee to go below to the attic ﬂoor, and

tie the timber cross-pieces to a rope, by which

BAKER, J. AppelleP recovered judgment
in the superior court of Cook county in case
for ~2,000, and on appellant's 11ppeal the
judsnnent was affirmed hy the appellate court
of the first district. Busse & Sturtevant had
the contract for the mason-work on a building which the Phoonix Insurance Company
of Brooklyn was erecting on the south-west
corner of Clark and Jackson strPets, in Chicago, and appellet> was working for tllt'm.
On December 6, 1886, the mason-work was
finished, and appellee was employed with
others in lowering certain planks, which had
been used by the masons for scaffolding, from
the attic floor of the unfinished building
through an elevator way, by means of a rope,
to the floor below. In the performance oi
this duty and at the time he wa.'! injured appellee was using due and ordinary care.
Over him, on the frame-work of the roof,
some of the servants of the appellant were at
work. Appellant had a contract for doing
the fire-proofing of the building, and its
servants on the frame of the roof compoaed
a gang of three or four men who were preparing the centerings, so called, necessary to
be put In place in order to enable the appellant to lay the fire-proof arches between the
girders forming the frame of the roof. The
centenngs were a sort of platform supported
from al.Jove, built close to and under the
girders, on which the tiles of the arches, ftat
on the under side, were laid, and rested until the mortar with which they were built
should harden, and on which the workmen
employed in springing the arches stood while
workii1g. The appellant had nothing to do
W:itb the iron-work or the building, and th6
guders of the roof had been put in place b1
a contractor who h11d done the iron-work.
They ran north and south, were some six or
seven. fe:t apart, and, as the morning in
quest1011 WllS frosty, they were slippery. The
centering gang were working ove1· that part
of the attic floor where appellee was at work,
and Lynch, the foreman of the gang, in steppmg around upon the roof gir1Jers, stepped
on a abort iron girder weighing five or six
hundred pounds, and loose at both ends,
Which was no part of the roof, and which
was lying east and west across the north and
south girders, which were iu that place about
as far apa1·t as the abort girder was long.
Lynch called the attention of Lt-e, another of
ap1iellant.'s workmen, to the fact of the loose
girder. A few moments thereafter be or-

[Case No. 68

dered Lee to go below to the attic floor, and
tie the timl.Jer cross-pieces to a rope, by. which
he (Lynch) would bani them up. This order
was obeyed by Lee, and when the rope was
tied to one of the cross-pieces he notified
Lynch to pull up. The latter at this time
was standing with the rope on one of the
girders this loose girder Wl\S rE>sting on, and
not more than three or four feet away from
it. Lee, who wns a witness for appellt>e,
stated in his tE'stirnony: "As he [Lynch]
hauled away J looked up after the cross-piece,
and as the cross-piece got up I seen thii1 g i rdt>r
turn over on its enrl and drop." This short
girder, in falling, struck appellee, and Inflicted upon him the injuries to recover damages
for which the suit was brought.
Several ~rounds are urged for the reversal
of the judgment. It is claimed there is a
variance bet ween the clecluration and the evidence in respect to the acts of negligence
which ransed the injury. The variance sugge;ited does not seem to be of a very substantial character, but, be this as it may, appellant cannot now avail himself of it. It does
not appear from the record that any claim of
variance on the ground now indicated was
made in the trial court; and If there maite,
and deemed essential, it could readily have
been obviated by amendment. The failure
of appellant to there object on the ground ot
the variance must be regarded as a waiver of
the objf'ction. City of Elgin v. Kimball, 90
Ill. 3:i6; Railroad Co. v. Estes, 9ti Ill. 470;
Society v. Fietsam, 97 lll. 474.
The main ground of alleged error is that
when appellee rested bis case the supe1·ior
court denied the motion of appellant to direct
the jury to return a verdict for the defendant.
Thi' gist of the action was the alleged negligence of the defendant, through it.8 servants,
and that such negligence was the proximate
cause of the injury t.o the plaintiff. There
was evidence before the jury tending to
prove both of these propositions. The foreman of appellant knew the girder was
loose, and that it rested upon frosty and
slippery iron supports; and whether or not
it was culpable 11egiigence, under such circumstances, to stand upon the supporting
girder, and in such close proximity to the
short and loose girder, and pull up timbers
from below with a rope, was a proper question of fact for the determination or the jm·y.
As the cross-piece got up to where Lynch
was standing, not more than three or four
feet frnm the girder, the girder was seen to
turn on its end and fall. We are unalile to
say, as matter of law, it was not a legitimate
inference 11nd conclusion for a jury from this
testimony, taken in connection with the other
cit·cu111stances in proof, that the timber or
rope with which it was hauled came In contact with the girder, and caused one end of it
to slide from its support. There was 110 error
in the action of the court in refusing to take
the case from the jury.
The cou1·t sustamecl objections to two
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RELE VANCY.

questions asked of the witness Wight, and

such refusal is assigned as error. The ques-

tions wereas follows: “Placing the center-

ing boards in position, what eﬁect would it

have as to any mass of plank resting on top

of the beams, with reference to its reaching

or falling below?" and, “When the center-

ing beams are in position, can anything fall

from above down below?” Such ruling was

not erroneous. and for two suﬁicient reasons.

In the ﬁrst place, the rule is that, as to mat-

ters which do not so far partake of the nature

of a science as to requirea course of previous

habit or study in order to an attainment of a

knowledge ofthem, the opinions of witnesses,

though experts, are not admissible as evi-

dence. Pennsylvania Co. v. Conlan. 101 Ill.

93. and authorities there cited. Besides this,

the negligence here in issue was not in the
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mere act of placing the centering boards in

position, but was in the alleged negligent

manner in which the servants of appellant

proceeded in getting ready for the perform-

ance of such work.

It is not claimed it was error to refuse the

last instruction in the series asked by ap-

pellant, but it is insisted the modiﬁcation

made therein by the court rendered it erro-

in-ons. The modilication made was the inser-

198

tion of the word “sutﬁcient.” The conclu-

sion of the instruction, as given to the jury,

was as fo1‘ows: “If the fact of negligence be

doubtful from the evidence, the defendant is

entitled to the verdict. The fact of an acci-

dent having occurred is not of itself sulﬁ-

cienl: evidence of negligence.” It would

seem that the fact the girder did fall affords

some evidence that it was lying in such

condition and position upon the beams as

that it was liable to be precipitated below,

where appellee and others were at work, if a

moving body came in contact with it. The

servants of appellant knew it was there. and

were fully advised that it was loose. and that

the irons which supported it were frosty and

slippery, and we see no good reason why the

fact it actually fell should have been vrholly

excluded from the juryin the consideration of

the question of the alleged negligence. The

court told the jury, in substance. that the

fact it fell did not establish negligence,

but, beyond that, left the question of negli-

gence to be determined by the jury upon all

the evidence before them. We are unable to

see that appellant has any cause of complaint

in this action of the court. We ﬁnd no error

in the record, and the judgment of the appel-

late court is aﬂirmed.

RELEVANCY.

questions asked of the witness Wight, and
such refusi&l is assigned as error. Tile ques·
tions were as follows: "Placing the centering boards in position, what elfect would it
have as to any mass of plank 1·esting on top
or the beams, with reference to its reaching
or falling below?" and, "When the centering beams arti in position, can anything fall
from above down below?" Such ruling was
not erroneous. and for two sufficient reasons.
In the first plRCe, the rule is that, 88 to matters which do not so far partake of the nature
of a science as to require a course of previous
habit or study in order to an attainment of a
know ledge of them, the opinions of w itnesse11,
though experts, are not admissible as evidence. Pennsylvania Co. v. Conlan, 101 Ill.
93, and anthorilies there cited. Besides this,
the negligence here in issue was not in the
mere act of plRClng the centering boards in
posit'on, but was in the alleged negligent
manner In which the servants of appellant
proceeded in getting ready for the performance of such work.
It is not claimed it was error to refuse the
last instruction iu the series asked by appellant, but it is insisted the modification
made therein by the court rendered it errolll'ous. The moJi Ii cation wade was the inser198

tion of the worll "sufficient." The conclusion of the instrnction, a11 given to the jury,
was as fol~ows: "lf the fact of negligence be
doubtful from the evidence, the dl'fendant is
entitled to the verdict. The fact of an accident having occurred is not of itself 11ufficient evidence of negligence." It would
seem that the fllct the girder did fall affords
some evidence that it was lying in such
condition and position upon the beams aa
that it was liable to be precipitated bt'low,
whPre appellee and others were at work, if a
moving body came in contact with it. The
servants of appellant knew it was there, and
were fully advised that ft Wl\S loose. and that
the irons which supported it were frost,r and
slippery, and we see no irood reason why the
fact it actually fell should have been wholly
excluded from the jury in the consideration of
the question of the alleged negligence. '£he
court told the jury, in substance, that the
fact it fell did not establh1h negligence,
but, beyond that, left the question of negligence to be determined by the jury upon all
the evidence before them. We are unable to
see that appellant h11s any cause of complaint
in this action of the court. We find no error
in tt.e record, and the judgment of the a1ipellate coul't is affirmed.

OPINlONS.
OP1Nl()NS.

[Case No. 69

McKILLOP v. DYLTTH ST. RY. C’).

(55 N. VV. T39. 53 .\1inn. 532.)

Supreme Court of Minnesota. June 21, 1893.

Appeal from district court, St. Louis coun-

ty; Ensign, Judge.

Action by Alexander McKillop against the

Duluth Street-Railway Company to recover

for personal injuries received while plaiutiﬂ

was lying in a public highway on defend-

ant's track, in an unconscious condition.

Plaintiif had judgment, and defendant ap-

peals. Reversed.

Billson & Congdon. for appellant. Edson

& Edson, for respondent.

GILFILLAN, G. J. The court below erred

in excluding the opinions of the witnesses

that plaintiff was intoxicated. It was hard-

ly a. question for expert testimony, so that-

the facts and circumstances, his acts, ap-
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pearance, and’ speech, being detailed by other

witnesses—u witness might be called to state

whether, in his opinion, they indicated in-

toxication, for the matter being one of ob-

servation, and not of science or skill, the

jury can judge, from the details given, as

well as any one, to whom they might be

stated. But there are certain conditions,

mental or physical, or both together, the in-

dications of which it is impossible for any

witness to adequately describe, so that the

relation of them shall have on the mind of

the jury the same effect that witnessing

them legitimately had on the mind of the

spectator. In such cases, from necessity, so

that the matter may be fully laid before the

jury, the spectator may state the effects

the acts, appearance, and speech had on his

mind; that is, may give his opinion as to the

condition they indicated. It is so in respect

to joy, grief, hope, or despondcncy, (Tobin v.

Shaw, 45 Me. 331;) friendliness or hostility,

(Blake v. People, 73 N. Y. 586;) fright,

(Brownell v. People. 38 Mich. 732; Darling

v. ivestmoreland. 52 N. H. 401;) jests or

earnest, (Ray v. State, 50 Ala. 104;) offensive

or insulting manner, (Raisler v. Springer, 38

Ala. 703.) So that a person appears to be

well or iii, or acts sancly or otherwise. (Jan-

nady v. Lynch, 27 Minn. 435, 8 N. W. Rep.

164. So a. witness not an expert, who tes-

tiﬁes to acts and declarations showing an

opportunity to form an opinion, may give

his opinion, based on such facts, of mental

‘capacity. Woodcock v. Johnson, 36 Minn.

217, 30 N. W. Rep. 894. That another cause

of. plaintiifs demeanor was suggested by the

evidence made no difference with the propri-

ety of allowing the witnesses to give their

opinions as to his intoxication. It was for

the jury to determine what caused such de

meanor,—an injury or intoxication; and it

was necessary, in order to do so, that they

have all the evidence before them. If intox-

ication was the cause of plaintlfs falling,

and lying in a helpless condition, on defend-

ant's track, it was contributory negligence on

his part.

The defendant's oﬂer speciiied in the

(Case No. 6.9

McKILLOP v. Dl"IXTII ST. RY. C'l.
· c:tpadty. Woodcock v. Johnson, 36 ~linn.
217, 30 :N. W. Rep. 894. That another cause
(55 :S. W. 739, 53 :\!inn. 532.)
Supreme Court of Minn('Sota. June 21, 1893. of. pllllntUf's demeanor was sugg(':;Jted by th&
e\"idence made no dilference with the propriAppeal from dlstrlot court, St. Louis coun- ety of allowing the witnesses to give their
ty; l'~nsign, Judge.
opinions as to his Intoxication. It was for
Action by Alexander :McKille>p against the
the jury to determine what caused sueoh deDuluth Street-Rallway Company to recover" meanor,-an injury or intoxication; and It
f->r pet"SOna.l Injuries received while pla.lntltf was necessary, in order to do 80, that they
wa11 lying 1D a public highway on defeod- have all the evidence befor~ them. It Intoxant'S' track, In an unconscious condition. ication was the cause of plalntl1r's tulllnit.
Plaintltf had judgment, and defendaoit ap- nnd lying tn a helpless condition, on defendpeals. Reversed.
ant's track, it was contributory negligence on
Blllson & Congdon, for appellant. Ed800 his part.
The defendant's olfer specltll'd In the
& Edson, for respondent.
fourth assignment of ·error was rightly exGILFILLAN, C. J. The court bel<>W erred cluded. A municipal oorpor:i.tlon hae,
In excluding the opinions of the witnesses through its council, control and charge of the
that plnlntttr was intoxlcnted. It was hard- streets, and may regulate the laying ot
ly a question for expel't testimony, so that- street-railway tracks upon them; and it the
the facts and clrcumstances. hls actll, ap- oount'il directs tlhe railway company to lay
pearmoe, an<fspeech, being detalled by other the tracks upon a speclfted level or grade,
wttn~ witness might be called to state
and so laying them makes the street unsafe
'\\1let2ler, ID hls oplntoo, they tndioated In- for ordinary travel, the municipal corporatoxication. for the matter being one ot ob- tion would doubtless be lla.bl.e for injuries
servutlon, and not ot science or aklll, the resulting therefrom. But it could ha1·dly be
Jury can jUdge, from the details given, aa said that eo laying them would be an net
well as any one, to whom they m!Jcht be of negllgence on the part of the railway
stated. But there are certain oonditions, company. The olfer did not propose to show
mental or physical, or both together, the ID- any such direction, or even authority, from
dicatioos of wblch it is impossible for any the council, but only that, tbe village engiwitness to adequately describe, so that the neer having lndtcated by stakes a grade for
relation of them shall have on the mind of paving the street contemplated and contl"act1he jury the aame etteet that witnessing ed for, the raJlwa;r company, to nntklpntlon
tbem legitimately bad on the mind of the of such wt.ended paving, laid its track.ii in
spectator. lo such aises, from necessity, so Cll"COrdance with the grade tbus Indira ted.
that the matter may be fully laid before the That the street was, some time In the fujury, the spectator may state the ettects ture, to be brought to that grade, was no
the acts, appearance, and speech had on his authority to the company to at onee lay the
mind; that ls, may give his oplnton as to the tracks according to it, if 80 doing would
condition they tndicated. It is so ID respect render the stroot unsafe, and thus renderto joy, grief, hope, or despondency, (Tobin v. ing it unsafe would be negligence with reShaw, 45 Me. 331;) triendllneas or hostility, spect to any one Injured 1D consequence.
(Blake v. People, 73 N. Y. 580;) trlght,
The evidence of the Witness Labby, ob(Brownell v. People, 38 Mloh. 732; Darling jected to, was proper.
v. Weetmorel.•mrt. 52 N. H. 401;) jests or
As there must be a new trial, for the error
e&me8t, (Ray v. State, 50 Ala. 104;) otrenslve 11.rst above speclfted, it ls unnecessary to conor lnamltlng manner, (Ralsler v. Springer, 38 sider the assignments of error based upon
Ala. 703.) So that a person appears to be
the charge of the court, further than to say
well or tll, or actB aanely or otherwise. Can- that 1D the part e>f the dln.rge specified In
nady v. Lynch, 27 Minn. 435, 8 N. W. Rep.
the Dinth &11Slgnment the rule of care r.elM. So a witness not an expert, who tesqulred of defendant, under the clrcumWles to acts and declarattODB showing an
st:uices, might be understood by the jury
opportunity to form an opinion, may give more strongly than, we snspect, the trial
bis oplD.loo, based on such tacts, ot mental
court Intended. Order reverBed.
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Case No. 70]

IKELEVANCY.

CONNECTICUT MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v.‘

LATHROP.

lfUT. LIFE !XS. CO. v:
LATHROP.
(4 Sup. Ct. 533, 111 U. S. 612.)
Supreme Court of the United States. May 5,
COX~ECTICUT

•

(4 Sup. Ct. 533, 111 U. S. 612.)

Supreme Court of the United States.

V 188-}.

In Error to the Circuit Court of the Unit-

ed States for the Western District of Mis-

souri.

May 5,

UELEVAXCY.

lSS!.

In Error to the Circuit Court of the United Htates for the Western Dlstrict of Missouri.
Jetr. Chandh~r. for plalntltr In error.
Wallace Pratt and Jeff. Brumback, for defendant In error.

Jeff. Chandler, for plaintiff in error.

\Vallace Pratt and Jeﬂ’. Brumback, for de-

fendant in error.

iIARLA‘.\‘, J . This is a writ of error from

a judgment in favor of Helen Pitkin, the

beneﬁciary in two policies issued by the

Connecticut .\Iutual Life Insurance Company

upon the life of her husband,—0ne, on the

tenth day of August, 1866, for the sum of

$.'»,000; and the other, on the twenty-fourth
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day of September, 1873, for the sum of $i23.

The insured, George E. Pitkin, died on the

twenty-ninth day of September, 1878. After

the case came here, the beneﬁciary in the

policies (lied, and there was a revivor against

her personal representative. The defense

~ was the same as to each policy. Brieﬂy stat-

ed, it is this: That the policy expressly pro-

vies that in case the insured shall, after its

execution, become so far intempemte as to

impair his health, or induce delirium tre-

mens, or should die by his own hand, it

shall be void and of no effect; that, after

its execution and delivery, he did become

so far iutemperate as to impair his health,

and induce delirium tremens; also, that he

died by his own hand, because, with pre-

meditation and deliberation, he shot himself

through the heart with a bullet discharged

by himself from a pistol, by reason whereof

he died. Further, that the atﬁrmatlve an-

swer by plaintiff, in her application for in-

surance, to the question whether the insured

was then and had always been of temperate

habits, being false and untrue, the contract

was annulled, because, by its terms, the

policy was to become void if the statements

and representations in the application—1-on-

stituting the basis of the contract between

the parties—were not in all respects true and

correct. The plaintiff, in her reply, put in

issue all the material allegations of the an-

swer, except that alleging the self-dcstruc-

tion of her husband; as to which she aver-

red that, “at the time he committed said act

of self-destruction, and with reference there-

to,” he "was not in possession of his mental

faculties, and was not responsible for said

act."

At the close of the evidence introduced for

the plaintiff. the defendant, by counsel, mov-

HARLA~. J. This la a writ of error from
a judgment In fayor of Helen Pitkin, the
beneficiary In two poll<'ll'll Issued by the
Connecticut :\lutual Life Immmnce Company
upon the life of her husband,--0ne, on the
tenth day of August, 18UO, for the sum of
~,llOO; and the other, on the twenty-fourth
dny of ~eptember, 18i3, for the sum of $123.
The Insured, George E. Pitkin, died on the
twenty-ninth day of September, 18i8. After
the <'O.se <'ame here, the benefi<'lary In the
lJOll<'les died, and there was a revlvor against
her personal representative. The defense
' was the snme as to each policy. Brlctly stated, It Is this: That the policy expressly provies that In t1lse the Insured shall, after Its
execution, become so far Intemperate as to
Impair his health, or Induce delirium tremena, or should die by his own hand, It
shall be void and of no etrect; that, after
Its exe<'utlon and delivery, be did become
so far Intemperate as "to Impair his health,
and Induce delirium tremens; also, that he
died by his own hand, because, with premeditation and dellberatlon, he shot himself
through the heart with a bullet discharged
by himself from a pistol, by reason whereof
he died. Further, that the aftlrmatlve answer by plalntlJr, In her application for Insurance, to the question whether the Insured
was then and had always been of temperate
habits, being false and untrue, the contract
was annulled, because, by Its terms, the
policy was to become void If the statements
and representations in the ap11llcatlon--constltuttng the basis of the contract between
the parties-were not In all respects true and
cor1't•ct. The plnlnt!Jr, In her reply, put in
Issue all the material allegations of the answer, except that alleging the self-destruction of her husband; as to which she averr(>(} that, "at the time he committed said act
of self-destruction, and with reference thereto," he "was not In possession of his mental
faculties, and was not responsible for said
act.''
At the close of thP evidence Introduced for
the plaintiff, the dt>fendant, by counsel, moved the court to Instruct the jury that upon
the pleadings and eYldence the plalntltr could
not re<'OVl'r. That motion was dt>nled, and
the action of the court-to which the defendant a.t the time excepted-ls assigned
tor error. This Instruction, It ls claimed,

ed the court to instruct the jury that upon

the pleadings and evidence the piaintiﬂ! could

not recover. That motion was denied, and

the action of the court—to which the de-

fendant at the time exccpted—is assigned

for error. This instruction, it is claimed,

should have been given upon the ground

that the evidence disclosed no symptom
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should have been given upon the ground
that the evidence disclosed no symptom
whatever of Insanity upon the part of the Insured. But that position <.'annot be sustained upon any proper view of the testimony.
There certainly was evidence tending to
show a material, If not radical, change for
the worse In the mental condition of the Insured Immediately preceding hls death. In
the judgment of several who knew him Intimately, and had personal knowledge of
such change, he was not himself at the time
of the a<'t of self-destruction. Whether his
strange demeanor Immediately before his
death was the result of a dellberate, conS<'lou11 purpose to feign Insanity, so as thereby the more readily to defraud the company, was a matter peculiarly within the
province of the jury to determine. If the
refusal of the court to sustain the motion
would have been error, had there been an
entire absen<'e of proof to sustain the plalntltr's suit, It Is suftl<.'lent to say tha.t there
was evl<len<'e of a substantial character tend·
Ing to show that the Insured was insane
when he took bis life.
In Insuran<'e: Co. v. Rodel, 95 U. S. 238,
where the question was made as to the duty
of the court, on a motion by the defendant
for a peremptory Instruction based wholly
on platntitr's evidence, ft was said that "If
there was any evidence tending to prove
that the deceased was Insane when he took
the poison which caused his death, the judge
was not bound to, and, Indeed, could not
properly, take the evldenCf' from the jury.
The weight of the evidence ls for them, and
not for the judge, to pass upon."
The case clearly comes within the rule announced In Insurance Co. v. Doster, 106 U.
S. 32, 1 Sup. Ct. 18, that "where a cause
fairly depends upon the effect or weight of
testimony, It ls one for the consideration and
determination of the jury, under proper directions as to the principles of law Involved.
It should never be withdrawn from them
unless the testimony be of such a conclusive character as to compel the court, in the
exercise of a sound legal discretion, to set
aside a verdict returned In opposition to It."
When the evidence was concluded on both
sides the defendant submitted requests for
Instructions. Some of them were given and
some refused, but It does not appear from
the record which were given and which refused. As the exception which was taken
related to the refused Instructions, and since
It does not appear which of them belonged
to that <.'lass, none of the series asked by
defendant can be noticed. " 'e may, ooweyer, remark that the <'barge of the court,
to which no exception was taken, embodll'd
all of defendant's lnstru<'tions that were applicable to the case, and which could properly have been given.
This brings us to the consideration of the
substantial questions presented by the U·
slgnments of error. They relate to the ad·
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mission, against the objection of the de-

fendant, of certain evidence touching the

condition of the mind of the insured at or

about the time he destroyed his life.

Before the introduction of the particular

testimony to which the objections related,

there was, as we have already said, proof

tending to show that Pitkin was not entirely

sound in mind. Witnesses well acquainted

with him remarked the unusually excited,

wild expression of his face. A domestic in

his family testiﬁed that “he looked very wild

and frightened out of his eyes; he looked

like some one that was crazy." Within a few

hours before death he bade one witness,

whose store he visited, good-bye, saying that

he was “going to a country where there is no

return." To another witness, on the same

occasion, he appeared to be "out of his head;
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kind of mad, insane."

At this stage of the case one Streiu was in-

troduced as a witness for plaintiff. Pitkin

was in his saloon about 11 o’clock of the day

on which he took his life, and a few hours

only before his death. So much of his ex-

amination (omitting the questions) as is nec-

essary to a proper understanding of the ob-

jections made by plaintiff in error is here

given: "Answer. He asked for a glass of

wine, and I gave it to him. He said he

hadn't had a drink yet that day, or since

the one he had last night from me,—that

was a glass of wine. He said, ‘I may look

queer this morning or drunk to other people,

but I ain't drunk.‘ He said, ‘Some people

may think me drunk, but I am not; I am

not drunk in my body, but I am in my

mind.’ He looked unusual to me. He had

on his old clothes, and his neck-tie was out

of shape, his face was red, and his eyes

staring at me, which made me think he was

quite out of his usual way. His appearance

and the look ,was quite diiferent from his

usual appearance prior to that time. He

looked, in his face, quite red, and his eyes

had quite another expression. He had them

open wide, with a look that was wild, and

he looked around the room awhile and walk-

ed up and down, and seemed very restless.

He would not stand at one place like he

usually did, but walked up and down. I

spoke a few words after that, but I did not

notice him very much, for I was very busy.”

The witness being asked to state the impres-

sion made upon him by wh-at he saw of

Pitkin‘s condition, the defendant objected

to the question as incompetent. But the ob-

jection was overruled, and an exception was

taken. The witness answered: “My im-

pression was that he seemed to be quite out

of his head that morning. I could not say

the reason. I didn't know then anything

about his disappointment; I found that out

afterwards."

Another witness, l\Ir. Ferry, an attorney at

law, was introduced by the plaintiff. He saw

Pitkin the morning of the day he killed him-

self. What occurred was thus stated by him:

mission, against the objections of the de·
fendant, of certain evidence touching the
condition of the mind of the ln11ut-ed at or
about the tlwe he destroyed his life.
Before the introduction of the particular
testimony to which the objections related,
there was, as we have already said, proof
tending to show that Pitkin was not entirely
SOWld ln mind. \Yitnesses well acquainted
with him remarked the unusually excited,
wild expression of his face. A domestic in
his family testified that "he looked very wild
and frightened out of his eyes; he looked
like some one that w·as crazy." \Vithin a few
hours before death he bade one witness,
whose sto1-e he visited, A'OOd-bye, saying that
he was "going to a country where there Is no
n.>tnru." To another witness, on the same
0<·(•aslon, he appeared to be "out of hls bead;
kind of mad, lni:ane."
At this stage f)f the case one Streln was ln·
troduced WI a witness fol' plalntilT. !'Itkin
was in his saloon about 11 o'dock of the day
on which he took his life, and a few hours
only before his den.th. So much of his examination (omitting the questions) as ls nece8Sllry to a proper understanulng of the obJeetlons made by plaintllf In error Is here
given: "Answer. He asked for a glass of
wine, and I gave It to him. He said he
lmdn't had a drink yet that day, or since
the one he had last night from me,-that
wn.s a glass of wine. He said, 'I may look
queer this morning or drunk to other people,
but I ain't drunk.' He said, 'Some people
may think me drunk, but I am not; I am
not drunk ln my body, but I am in my
mind.' He looked unusual to me. He had
on his old clothes, and hls neck-tie was out
of shape, his face was red, and his eyes
staring at me, which made me think he was
quite out of hls usual way. His appearance
and the look ,was quite different from his
usual appearance prior to that time. He
looked, ln his face, quite red, and his eyes
bad quite another expression. He had them
open wide, with a look that was wild, and
be looked around the room awhlle and walked up and down, and seemed Ye1-y restless.
He would not stand at one place like he
usually did, but walked up and down. I
spoke a few ,,·ords after that, but I did not
notice him very much, for I was yery busy.''
The witness being asked to state the lmpt·ession made upon him by whnt he saw of
Pltkiu's condition, the defendant objected
to the question as incompetent. But the objection was overruled, and an exc·eptlou was
taken. The witness answered: ".My lmpre11slon was that he seemed to be <1u1te out
of his head that morning. I could not say
thP reason. I didn't know tllen anything
about his disappointment; I found that out
afterwards."
Another witness, l\Ir. Ferry, an attorney at
law, was introduced by the plnlntlfl'. He saw
Pitkin the morning of the day he killed himself. What occurred was thus stated by him:
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"I came down Broadway, walking, and Mr.
Pratt came down from hls residence on Washington street, in a street car, and got out on
the corner of Sixth and Broadway, and we
went there ln front of the omce. :Mr. Pitkin
was standing very near the door, anll as we
passed up the stairway going to our omce
we both said, 'Good morning' to hlm, and Mr.
Pratt says, 'Pit., why ain't you at church?'
l\Ir. Pitkin said, 'I am not going to church,
I am going to hell;' and we Immediately
passed on up stairs and Into the doorway, but
as we started up stairs Pltkln stuck his head
Into the door and says, 'Do you want to send
any word to him?' Mr. Pratt says, 'To
whom?' 'To the devil; I am going to hell,'
and he turned immediately and went out of
the door.'' Being asked how Pitkin looked
during that CQnverSlltlon, he said that "he
seemed very much agitated and net·vous; his
face was tlushed; the pupil of his eye dilated
and bright, and there was no expression ln
lt." Against the objections of defendant he
was pern1ltted to testify that the impression
left on hls mind, from the conduct, actions,
manner, expressions, and conversation of Pitkin, was that "he was crazy, and didn't know
what he was doing."
Exct•ptlon was also taken to the action of
the court in permitting the witness Aldrich
to answer a certain question. He saw the deceased a few moments before his death, and
observed that he "looked strange;" had "a
very peculiar look," one that he had never
seen before. It was "a wild look." Being
asked what lmpresslon Pitkin made upon hlm
by his manner and conduct at the time, he
nnswered,-the defendant's objection to the
evidence being overruled,-"! thought he was
out of his head."
It Is contended, in behalf of plaintiff In error, that the Impressions and opinions of these
non-professional witnesses as to the mental
condition of the Insured, although accompanied by a statement of the grounds upon which
they rested, were Incompetent as evidence of
the fact of Insanity. This question was substantially presented ln Insurance Co. v. Rodel,
ubl supra, which was an action upon a Ute
policy containing a clause of forfeiture In case
the Insured died by Ills own hand. The Issue wal!I as to his sanity at the time of the
act of self-destruction. Wltn~::ises acquainted
with him desNlbed his conduct and appenl'ance at or nbout,aml shortly before, his death.
They testified as to how he looked and acted.
One said that he "looked like he was insane;"
another, that his hup1·esslon was that the lnsul'ed "was not In his right mind." In that
case the court said that "although such testimony from ordinary witnesses may not have
great wel~ht with experts, yet It was competent testimony, and ex11l'essed in an innrtlttclal the Impressions which are usually
made by Insane persons upon people of ordl·
nary understanding.'' The g-eneral n1le undoubted!;\· Is that wltneRses are restl'l<'ted to
proof of facts within their personal kuowl·
201
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RELEVANCY.

edge, and may not express their opinion or

judgment as to matters which the jury or the

court are required to determine, or which

must constitute elements in such determina-

tion. To this rule there is a well-established

exception in the case of witnesses having

special knowledge or skill in the business, art,

or science, the principles of which are involv-

ed in the issue to be tried. Thus the opinions

of medical men are admissible in evidence as

to the sanity or insanity of a person at a par-

ticular time, because they are supposed to

have become, by study and experience, famil-

iar with the symptoms of mental disease, and

therefore qualiﬁed to assist the court or jury

in reaching a correct conclusion. And such

opinions of medical experts may be based as

well upon facts within their personal knowl-

edge, as upon a hypothetical case disclosed
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by the testimony of others. But are there no

other exceptions to the general rule to which

we have referred?

Counsel for the plaintiff in error contends

that witnesses who are not exports in medical

science may not, under any circumstances. ex- 1

press their judgment as to the sane or insane ‘

state of a person's mind. This position, it

must be conceded, ﬁnds support in some ad-

judged cases as well as in some elementary =

But. in our opinion, it i

cannot be sustained consistently with the.

treatises on evidence.

weight of authority, nor without closing an

important avenue of truth in many, if not in

every case, civil and criminal, which involves

the question of insanity. Whether an indi-

vidual is insane, is not always best solved by

abstruse metaphysical speculations, expressed

in the technical language of medical science.

The common sense, and, we may add, the

natural instincts of mankind reject the sup-

position that only experts can approximate

certainty upon such a subject. There are

matters of which all men have more or less

knowledge, according to their mental capacity

and habits of observation,-—matters about

which they may and do form opinions suf-

ﬂciently satisfactory to constitute the basis

of action. \Vhile the mere opinion of a non-

professional witness, predicated upon facts

detailed by others, is incompetent as evidence

upon an issue of insanity, his judgment, based

upon personal knowledge of the circumstan-

ces involved in such an inquiry, certainly is

of value; because the natural and ordinary

operations of the human intellect, and the ap-

pearance and conduct of insane persons, as

contrasted with the appearance and conduct

of persons of sound mind, are more or less

understood and recognized by every one of

ordinary intelligence who comes in contact

with his species. The extent to which such

opinions should inﬂuence or control the judg-

ment of the court or jury ,must depend upon

the intelligence of the witness, as manifested

by his examination, and upon his opportuni-

ties to ascertain all the circumstances that

should properly affect any conclusion reached.

HELEVANCY.

edge, and may not express their opinion or
judgment as to matters which the jury or the
court are required to determine, or which
must constitute elements In such determination. To this rule there ls a well-established
exception in the case of witnesses having
special knowledge or skill In the business, art,
or scle1we, the principles of which are involved in the Issue to be tried. Thus the opinions
of medical men are admiBBlble in evidence as
to the sanity or Insanity of a person at a particular time, because they are supposed to
have become, by study and experience, familiar with the symptoms of mental disease, and
theref01·e qualified to assist the court or jury
In reaching a correct conclusion. And such
opinions of medical experts may be based as
well upon facts within their personal knowledge, as upon a hypothetical case disclosed
by the testimony of others. But are there no
other exceptions to the general rule to which
we have referred?
Counsel for the plaintiff in error contends
that witnesses who are not experts in medical
sclenee may not, under any circumstances. exl)ress their judgment as to the sane or Insane
state of a person's mind. This position, lt
must be conceded, finds support in some adjudged cases as well as In some elementary
treatises on evidence. But. in our opinion, it
cannot be sustained consistently with the
weight of authority, nor without closing an
Important avenue of truth in many, if not in
every case, civil and criminal, which involves
the question of insanity. Whether an individual Is Insane, Is not always best solved by
abstruse metaphysical speculations, expressed
in the technical language of medical science.
The common sense, and, we may add, the
natural instincts of mankind reject the supposition that only experts can approximate
certainty upon such a subject. There are
matters of which all men have more or less
knowledge, according to their mental capacity
and habits of observatlon,-matters about
which they may and do form opinions sufficiently satisfactory to constitute the basis
ot action. \Vhlle the mere opinion of a nonprofessional witness, predicated upon facts
detailed by others, Is incompetent as evidence
upon on Issue of Insanity, his judgment, based
upon personal knowledge of the circumstances Involved in such an Inquiry, certainly ls
of value; because the natural and ordinary
operations of the human intellect, and the appearance and conduct of Insane persons, as
contrasted with the appearance and conduct
ot persons of sound mind, are more or less
understood and recognized by eYery one of
ordinary Intelligence who comes in contact
with his species. The extent to which such
opinions should inftuence or control the judgment of the court or jury .must depend upon
the lntelllgence of the witness, as manifested
by his examination, and upon his opportunities to as<"et1aln all the circumstances that
shoulll properly affect any conclusion reached.
It will also depend, in part, upon the degree
~

of the mental unsoundness of the person
whose condition Is the subject of Inquiry; for
his derangement may be so total and polpalJle
that but slight observation is necessary to
enable persons of ordinary understanding to
form a reasonably accurate judgment as to
his sanity or insanity; in other cases, the
symptoms may be of such an occult charact!'r
as to require the closest scrutiny and the highest skUl to detect the existence of insanity.
The truth Is, the statement of a non-prufe~·
slonal witness as to the sanity or Insanity.
at a particular time, of an individual, whose
appearance, manner, habits, and conduct
came under his personal observation, ls not
the expression of mere opinion. In form It is
opinion, because It expresses an Inference or
conclusion based upon obserrntlon of the ap·
pearance, manner, and motions of another
person, of which a coITect idea cannot well
be communicated in words to others without
embodying, more or less, the lmpreBBlons OC'
judgment of the witness. But in a substantial sense, and for eyery purpose essential t<>
a safe conclusion, the mental condltlon of an
individual, as sane or insane, ls a fact, and the
expressed opinion of one who has had adequate opportunities to observe his conduct and
appearance ls but the statement of a tact;
not, indeed, a tact established by direct and
positive proof, because In most, It not an
cases It ls Impossible to determine, with ab~
lute certainty, the precise mental condition or
anothe1·; yet, being founded on actual observation, and being consistent with common experience and the ordl111uy manifestations of
the condition of the mind, It Is knowledge,
so tor as the human intellect can acquire
knowledge upon such subjects. Insanity "ls
a disease of the mind which assumes as many
and various forms as there are shades of difference in the human character." It ls, as has
been well said, "a condition which impresses
itself as an aggregate on the observer," and
the opinion of one, personally cognizant or
the minute circumstances making up that aggregate, and which are detailed In connection with such opinion, ls, In its essence, only
fact "at short-hand." 1 Whart. & S. lied. Jur_
§ 257. This species of evidence should be admitted, not only because of its Intrinsic value.
when the result of observation uy persons or
Intelligence, but from necessity. We say
from necessity, because a jury or court, having had no opportunity for personal obset"Vatlon, would otherwise be deprived of the
knowledge which others possess; but, also,
because, if the witness may be permitted to
state-as, undoubtedly, he would be whe~
his opportunities of obserratlon have been
adequate-"that he has known the· Individual
for many years; has repeatedly conversed
with him and heard others converse with
him; that the witness had noticed that in
these conversations he was incoherent and
silly; that In his habits he was occasionally
highly pleased and greatly vexed without a
cause; and that in his conduct he was wild,
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irrational, extravagant, and crazy,—what

would this be but to declare the judgment or

oplnioii of the witness of what is incoherent

or foolish in conversation, what reasonable

cause of pleasure or resentnient. and what

the indicia of sound or disordered intellect?

It he may not so testify, but must give the

supposed silly and incoherent language, state

the degrees and all the accompanying cir-

cumstances of highly excited emotion, and

speciﬁcally set forth the freaks or acts regard-

ed as irrational, and thus, without the least

intimation of any opinion which he has form-

ed of their character, where are such witness-

es to be found? Can it be supposed that

those, not having a special interest in the

subject, shall have so (?ll:ll'j.'Q(l their memories

with these matters, as distinct, independent

facts, as to be able to present them in their
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entirety and simplicity to the jury? Or, if

such a witness be found, can he conceal from

the jury the impression which has been made

upon his mind; and, when this is collected,

can it be doubted but that his judgment has

been inﬂuenced by many, very many, circum-

stances which he has not communicated,

which he cannot communicate, and of which

he himself is not aware?" Clary v. Clary, 2

Ired. Law, 83. The jury, being informed as

to the witness’ opportunities to know all the

circumstances, and of the reasons upon which

he rests his statement as to the ultimate gen-

eral fact of sanity or insanity, are able to

test the accuracy or soundness of the opinion

expressed, and thus, by using the ordinary

means for the ascertainment of truth, reach

the ends of substantial justice.

These views are sustained by a very large

number of adjudications in the courts of

this country, some of which are cited in the

nia.rgin.1 In several of those cited the whole

subject was very fully considered in all its

aspects. While the cases are. to some ex-

tent, in conﬂict, we are satisﬁed that tne

rule most consistent with sound reason, and

sustained by authority, is that indicated in

this opinion.

Counsel for the plaintiff in error calls our

attention to the case of Wright v. Tatham, 5

Clark & F. 670, as an authority for the broad

proposition that non-professional witnesses

cannot give their opinions and impressions

1 Clary v. Clary, 2 lred. Law, 83: Dunham's

Appeal, 27 Conn. 193: Grant v. Thom ison, 4

Conn. 203; Hardy v. Merrill. 56 N. H. 2‘ 7. sub-

stantially overruling Boardman v. Boardman.

47 N. H. 120: State v. Pike, 49 N. H. 399, and

State v. Archer, 54 N. H. 468; Hathaway's

Adm’r v. Insurance Co.. 48 Vt. 350; Morse v.

Orawford, 17 Vt. 499; Clark v. State, 12 Ohio,

(Case No. 70-

irrational, extravagant, and crazy,-what concerning the state of a person's mind,
would this be but to declare the judgment or even in connection with the facts within
opinion of the witness of what ls incoherent their personal knowledge, upon which such
or foolish in conversation, what reasonable opinion ls based. On a question of the comcause of pleasure or resentment. and what petency of a party to make a will, certain
the lndicla of sound or dlaordered intellect? letters, written to that party by third perIf he may not so testify, but must give the sons, who had died before they were offered
supposed sllly and Incoherent language, state as evidence, and which letters were found
the degrees and all the accompanying cir- many years after their date among the tescumstances of highly excited emotion, and tator's papers, were held, In that case, not
specifically set forth the freaks or acts regard- to be admissible without proof that he acted
ed as Irrational, and thus, without the least on them. Whether the opinions of non-exintimation of any opinion which he has form- perts, in connection with a statement, under
ed of their character, where are such witness- oath, of the facts, are admissible upon an Ines to be found? Can It be supposed that quiry as to the Insanity of an lndll"idual,
those, not having a special Interest In the was not involved or determined In that case.
subject, shall have so charged their memories On the contrary, the observations made by
with these matters, as distinct, Independent some of the judges, In lllustrntlon of their
facts, as to be able to present them In their opinions upon the precise point in judgment,
entirety and simplicity to the Jury? Or, if would indicate a concurrence in the general
such a witness be found, can he conceal from views we have expressed. Arter stating that
the jury the Impression which has been made the letters were otrered as evidence of theupon his mind; and, when this ls collected, opluions of the writers, Baron Alderson said:
can it be doubted but that his judgment has "The objection of their admissibility Is that
been infiuenced by many, very many, circum- this opinion ls not upon oath, nor ts It posstances which he bas not communicated, sible for the opposite party to test by crosswhich he cannot communicate, and ot which examlnatlon the foundation on which It
he himself Is not aware?" Clary v. Clary, 2 rests. The object of laying such testimony
Ired. Law, 83. The jury, being informed as before the jury Is to place the whole lifeto the witness' opportunities to know all the and conduct of the testator, It possible, becircumstances, and of the reasons upon which fore them, so that they may judge of his cahe rests his statement as to the ultimate gen- pacity; for this purpose you call persons.
eral tact of sanity or Insanity, are able to who have known him for years, who hal"e
test the accuracy or soundness of the opinion seen him frequently, who hal"e conversed
expressed, and thus, by using the ordinary with him or con-esponded with him. After
meam for the ascertainment of truth, reach havmg thus ascertained their means of
knowledge, the question ls put generally as
the ends of substantial justice.
These views are sustained by a very large to their opinion of his capacity. I conceive
number of adjudications In the courts of this question really means to Involve an inthis country, aome of which are cited In the quiry as to the eft'ect of all <the acts which
margin.1 In several of those cited the wholP the witnesses have seen the testator do for
subject was very tully considered In all Its a long series ot years, and the manner in
aapects. While the cases are, to some ex- which he was, during that period, treated
tent, In conJllct, we are satisfied that tne by those with whom he was living In fa.rule most consiatent with sound reason, and mll1ar Intercourse. This Is not properly
sustained by authority, ls that indicated in opinion, like that of experts; but rather a
compendious mode of putting one Instead of
this opinion.
Counsel for the plalntltr In error calls our a multitude of questions to the witness unattention to the cue of Wright v. Tatham, 5 der examination, as to the acts and conduct
Clark & F. 670, as an authority for the broad of the testator." 5 Clark & F. 720. And
proposition that non-professional witnesses Baron Parke: ''These lettel'S are sufficiently
cannot give their opinions and impressions proved to have been written and sent to the·
house of the deceased by persons now dt>nd.
i Clary v. Clary, 2 Ired. Law, 83; Dunham's
Appeal1 Z1 Conn. 193; G,rant v. Thompson, 4 !er v. St. Louis Life Ina. Co. 45 Iowa, 93;
Conn. 203; Hardy v. Merrill, 56 N. H. 227, sub:- Pl'<>Ple v. ~anford, 43 Cal. 29; State v. Klingt>r,
stantially overruling Boardman v. Boardman, 46 Mo. 229; Holcomb v. State, 41 Tex. 12:>:
47 N. H. 120·h State v. Pike, 40 N. H. 309, and McC!o.ckey v. State, 5 Tex. App. 320; Norton
State v. Arc er, 54 N. H. 468; Hathaway's v. Moore, 3 Head, 482; Powell v. State, 2;;
Adm'r v. Insurance Co.. 48 Vt. 350; Moree v. Ala. 28; 1 Bish. Cr. Proc. §§ 536-540; 1 Whart.
Crawford, 17 Vt. 499; Clark v. State, 12 Ohio, & S. Med. Jur. A 257; Whart. Ev. I 510 et
483; Gibson v. Gibson, 9 Yerg. 330; Potts v. seq.; 1 Redf. Wills, c. 41: pt. 2, in a recent ediHouse, 6 Ga. 324; Vanauken's Case, 10 N. J. tion of which (page 140, note 24) it ie said.
Eq. 190; Brooke v. Townshend. 7 Gill, 10; touching the decision in Hardy v. Merrill, ubi
De Witt v. Bai:ly, 17 N. Y. 342, expJnining supra: "There will now remain scarcely any
decision in same c11Se in 9 N. Y. 371; Hewlett di88entients among the elder states; and those
v. WoodJ..~oo N. Y. 634; Clapp v. :Fullerton, 34 of recent origin, whose decisions have been
N. Y. lw; Rutherford v. Morrie, 77 Ill. 397; based upon the authority of the earlier decisiom•
Duffield v. Morris' Ex'r, 2 Har. 384; Wilkin- of some of the older states, which hn.ve aince
llOn v. Pearson, 23 Pa. St. 119; Pidcock v. abandoned the ground. may also be exp,ected to
Potter 68 Pa. St. 342; Doe v. Reagan, 5 change." See, also, May v. Brndll'<.', 127 MaSB.
Blackf. 218; Dove v. State, 3 Heisk. 348; But- 414; Com. v. Sturtivant, 117 llal!I!. 122.

483; Gibson v. Gibson, 9 Yerg. 330; Potts v.

House. 6 Ga. 324; Vanaiikeifs Case, 10 N. J.

Eq. 190; Brooke v. Townshend. 7 Gill, 10;

De_Witt v. Barly, 17 N. Y. 342, ex laining

decision in same case in 9 N. Y. 371; glewlett

v. \Vood 55 N. Y. 634; Clahplp v. Fullerton, 34

N. Y. 190; Rutherford v. orris, 77 111. 397;

Duﬂield v. Morris’ Ex’r, 2 Har. 384; Wilkin-
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RELEVANCY.

and they indicate the opinion of the writers

that the alleged testator was a rational per-

son, and capable of doing acts of ordinary

business. But. it is perfectly clear that, in

this case, an opinion not given upon oath in

a judicial inquiry between parties is no ev-

idence; for the question is, not what the

capacity of the testator was reputed to be,

but what it really was in point of fact; and,

though the opinion of a witness upon oath

as to that fact might be asked, it would be

only a compendious mode of ascertaining the

result of the actual observation of the wit-

ness. from act done, as to the habits and

demeanor of the deceased." Id. 735.

One other assignment of error remains to

be considered. It relates to the admissions

of the statements made by two witnesses of

what passed between each other on the oc-
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casion of their seeing and conversing with

the deceased, within an hour or two before

he shot himself. They detailed what puss-

ed between them and the deceased, describ-

ing the latter‘s appearance and condition as

and they Indicate the opinion of the writers
that the alleged testator was a rational person, and capable of doing acts of ordinary
business. But It Is perfectly clear that, In
this case, an opinion not given upon oath in
a Judicial inquiry between parties ls no evidence; for the question ls, not what the
eapa<'ity of the testator was reputed to be,
but what it really was ln point of tact; and,
though the opinion of a witness upon oath
as to that fact might be asked, It would be
only a compendious mode of ascertaining the
result of the actual obt!ervatlon of the witness, from acts done, 88 to the habits and
demeanor ot the deceased." Id. 73S.
One other assignment of error remains to
be <'Onsldered. It relates to the admissions
of the statements made by two wltne11ses ot
what passed between each other on the oc<:>aslon of their seeing and con¥erslng with
the deceased, within an hour or two before
he shot himself. They detailed what passed between them and the deceased, describing the latter's appearance and condition 88
lndwatlng, In their judgment, that he was
not In his right mind. As he left the presence of these wltnesees, one of them re204

indicating, in their judgment, that he was

not in his right mind. As he left the pres-

ence of these witnesses, one of them re-

204

-—--——>* 7

marked to the other that “Pitkin is not him-

self; George looks kind of crazy.” The oth-

er, in response, expressed substantially.

though in different language, his concur-

rence in that opinion. To the admission of

this brief conversation between the witness-

es, on the occasion referred to, the defend-

ant objected. but the objection was over-

ruled, and an exception taken. We do not

think there was in this any error to the prej-

udice ot the substantial rights of the compa-

ny. The witnesses, when under oath, ex-

pressed the same opinion as to the condition

of the deceased. What passed between them

at the time to which their testimony refer-

red was a part of what occurred on the oc-

casion when they saw the deceased, and

may well have been repeated to the jury,

as showing that their opinion as to the men-

tul condition of the deceased was not then

presently formed, but was one formed at tne

very moment they saw him, within a very

few hours before his death.

Upon the whole case we perceive no error

in the proceedings of which plaintiff in er-

ror may complain, and the judgment is af-

ﬁrmed.

•

marked to the other that "Pitkin ls not himself; .George looks kind of crazy." The other, In response, expressed substantially.
though In dUferent language, his concurrence In that opinion. To the admission of
thls brief conversation between the witnesses, on the occasion reterred t.o, the defendant objected, but the objection was overruled, and an exception taken. We do not
thlnk there was in this any error to the prejudice of the substantial rights of the company. The witnesses, when under oath, expressed the same opinion as t.o the condition
of the d~ased. What passed between them
at the time to which their testimony referred was a part of what occurred on the ocC8810n when they saw the deceased, and
may well have been repeated to the jury,
as showing that their opinion as to the mental condition of the deceasetl was not then
presently formed, but was one formed at tne
very moment they saw him, within a very
few hours before his death.
Upon the whole case we perceive no error
In the proceedings of which plaintiff In error may complain, and the judgment la afflrmP.d.

OPINIONS.
OPINIONS.

[Case No. 71

WILLIAMS v. SPENC-ER et al.

(23 N. E. 105, 150 Mass. 346.)

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

\Vorcester. Jan. 1, 1890.

Exceptions from supreme judicial court,

Worcester county; Cnxnuzs Dsvmxs,

Judge.

An appeal from the decree of the probate

court for Worcester county. admitting to

probate the will of Polly Crosby, and ap-

pointing petitioner administrator. The

will was made on March 25, 1885. An issue

was submitted to the jury whether testa-

trix was sane when the will was made. Ap-

Dellants proposed to ask one of the attest-

ing witnesses what his present opinion

wasas to thesouuduess of testatrix’s mind

at the time of the execution of the will.

The witness having testiﬁed that he formed
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no opinion on the subject at the time he

witnessed the will, but had an opinion at

the time of the trial, which had been

formed.in part.from what be-had seen and

heard since, and in part from what he saw

at the time, the question was excluded,

and the appellants excepted. Petitioner

called one Upham, at whose house testa-

trix visited from April 20, 1885, till August

22, 1585. who testified in chief that he saw

testatrix a few times after her husband

died, November, 1884, and that while she

was at his house he never saw any change

in her intelligence, coherence of speech, or

memory, and gave accounts of several con-

versations and acts tending to show sound-

ness of mind. To impeach his evidence ap-

pellants offered evidence tending to show

that since testatrix's death the witness had

WILLIAMS v. SPENCER et al.
(23 N. E. 105, 150 :Maas. 346.)
Supreme .Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
\Vorcester. Jan. 1, 1890.
Exceptions from supreme judicial court,
Worcester county; CHARLES DEVENS,
Judge.
An appeal from the deereeof the probate
court for Worcester county. admitting to
probate the will of Po11.v Crosbv, and ap.
pointing petitioner administrator. The
will was made on March :?;>, Ul85. An Issue
was submitted to the jury whether testatrix was sane when the will was made. Appellants proposed to ask one of the attesting wltnesscs what hie present opinion
wae as to the soundness of teetatrlx'11 mind
at the time of the execution of the will.
'l'he wltneas ha vlng testified that he formec.J
no opinion on the subject at the time he
witnessed the will, but had an opinion at
the time of the trla.J, which had been
formed. In part, from what be bad eren and
beard since, and in part from what he saw
at th~ time, the question was excludeil,
and the appellants excepted. Petitioner
called one Upham, at whose house tetoitatrlx visited from April 20, 1885, till Augu1:1t
:!2, 1RS5, who testified In chief that he saw
tt't!tatrlx a few times after her husband
died, .November, 1884, and that while she
was at hie house he never saw any cbnnge
in her Intelligence, coheren<>e of speech, or
memory, and gave accounts of several conversations and acts tending to Hhow soundness of mind. To Impeach his evidence appellants offered evidence tending to show
that elncetestatrlx'edeath tbewitneee had
declared that be bad never seen her, since
her husband died. when she was fttto make
a will. The evidence was excluded, and
the appellants excepted. 'l'he jury answered the issue In favor of the sanity of
the tel!tatrlx.
F. P. GotJ/r/fng and J. l'tf. Cochran, for
appellants. lV. S. B. Hopkins, for appel-

lee.

declared that he had never seen her, since

her husband died, when she was ﬂtto make

a will. The evidence was excluded, and

the appellants excepted. The jury an-

swered the issue in favor oi the sanity of

the testatrix.

F. P. Gonlrling and J. M. Cochran, for

appellants. W. S. B. Hopkins, for appel-

ee. -

KNOWLTON, J. How far the opinion of

witnesses as to the mental condition of n

testator may be received in evidence in

proceedings to establish the validity of a

will is a. question about which there is :1

great conﬂict of authority. in this com-

monwealth, and in the courts of common

law in England, and in many of the states

of this countrv,it is held that an ordinary

witness cannot give a mere opinion, what-

ever opportunities of observation he may

have had. On the other hand, in the eccle-

siastical courts of England, and in many

courts in the United States, all witnesses

have been permitted to give, not only facts

upon which an opinion may properly be

formed, but their opinions founded on tbosc

iacfs. It is universally held that an attest-

ing witness may give his opinion. formed at

the time, as to thesanity or insanity of the

testator when the will was executed. In

KNOWLTON,J. Howfartheoplnlon of
witnesses as to the mental condition of o
testator may be r~>celved In evidence In
proceedings to establish the validity of a
will ls a qu~tlon ah11ut which there is n
great conflict of authorltv. In this commonwealth, and In the courts or common
law In England, and In ma.ny of the state;;
or this countrv, It Is held that a.n ordinar.v
wltneee cannot give a mere opinion, whatever opportunities of observation he ma,y
have bad. On the other hand, in the eccleBl811tlcal courttl of England, and in many
courts in the United States, all wltnesseH
have been permitted to give, not only factfi
upon which an opinion may properly be
lonned, but their oplulonl! founded on thos('
facts. It le universally held thatun attesting witness may give hie opinion, forme1I at
the time, as to the sanity or lnimnit.v of the
teHtator when the will wnl! execut~d. In
those courts where opinions are mlmltterl
on the ground that conclusions In regurtl
to the mental condition of another, formed
by one who bll8 had an opportunity or observing him, a~ In themKelveB valuable
and unobjectionable 11.11 evidence, there way

[Case No. 71

be good reaeonR for holding thnt the final
opinion of the witness at the time of the
trial should be receln~d. But where a different doctrine le held the opinions of atteHting wltne11see to a will stand upon a
peculiar ground. 'l'bewltnessesarechoeen
by the testator, and are thereby, under the
law, charged with an important duty In
relation to the execution and proof of the
wm. It may be presumed that, In the performance of that duty, they will observe
carefully the appearance of the testator at
the time, and form an opinion as to hie
sanity. That opinion naturally u.nd properly may determine their action In signing
or refusing to sign as wltne88e8. It Is regarded asafactof 11omesignlfic1:1.nce, which
enters Into the transaction, and which the
court should be permitted to know and
consider, like any other fact touching the
execution of the Instrument. Upon this
theory, the oplnlou of an attesting witnl'se,
formed at another time, heforeor after the
execution of the will, should stand like
that of any other witneeR. It might be
competent, In croRs-examlnatlon, to affect
the value of his testimony as to hl11 coqcluslon at the time of attestation, but it could
not be received on account of the value t<>
be attached to it as a mere opinion. In
Poole v. Rlclrnrdsnn, 3 !\Jase. 330, the court
permitted the witnesses to give" the judg{llent they formed of the eoundne11s of the
testator's mind at the time of executing the
wlll." In RohlnMon v. Adame, 62 Me. 360,
409, referring to the time of execution of a
will, the court say: "It Is the opinion
then formed that li,i admlsHlble." In Clapp
v. Fullerton, 34 N. Y. 100, It le said of the
facts teHtifled to bv the wltneefies, which
occurred u.t the time of atteHtlng, that "It
Is legitimate to give them such additional
weight as mRy be derived from the conviction they produced at the time.'' Jarman stat<'s the rule to be that" subscribing wltnPHi;es are permitted to te11tHy as
to the opinion they form of the testator's
capacitv at the time of executing his will."
1 .J arm: Wille, 74. Redfield says: "lt is
admitted In nearly all the cases that the
sul1scrlblng witnesses to the will are competent to express au opinion of the testator's apparent sanity at the time of execution." 1 Redf. Wills, 140. 'fhe only case to
which we narn been referred which decides
that a subscribing wltne!IB mn.v give an
opinion formed afterwards is Runyan v.
Price, 15 Ohio St. 1; and In Ohio, all witnesses who have had an opportunity of observing a. testator tt.re permitted to give
their opinions, founded on what the.v have
seen. We are of opinion that, under the
authorities In this commonwealth, the
testimony of the attesting witness was
rightly excluded.
Whether the declaration of the witness
Upham, offered to contrtullct him, 11houlcl
have been received, depends u11on whl'ther
It was inconRlstent with his former testimony. Ir It be tteHumNl that the expreRelon "fit to make a will," referred to the
mental condition of theteHtat1ix,and that
It Is generally known that IL person of full
age aml sound mind le fit to make a will,
and If we diRrc~nrd the differcnceR of opinion that mn.v be presumed to exif1t aH to
what con1:1titutes sounc.Jne1:1sof mind or fit20i>
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ncss to make a. will, we cannot say that

the declaration was contradictory to the

previous testimony. It may or may not

have been, according as the facts not re-

ported were oi one kind or oi another.

The witness “gave accounts oi several

conversations and acts tending to show

soundness of mind.” That certain iacts,

indicating that the testatrlx was of sound

mind, could be shown by his testimony,

did not necessarily imply that he believed

her to besane. We do not know the iullsig-

niﬁcanee oi those acts and conversations.

and other facts within his knowledge may

have shown that she was insane. Upon

this ground the case oi Hubbell v. Bissell,

2 Allen, 196. is authority in favor of the rul-

ing. Nor upon the facts reported can we

say that his testimony that “ he never saw

206
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any change in her intelligence, coherence oi

speech, or memory," while she was at his

house, alter the death of her husband,

proves that he believed her to be ﬁt to

make a will. So far as the bill of excep-

tions shows, and so far as we have infor-

mation from any source, she may have been

all her life of such mental capacity and

condition as to make it doubtful whether

she was ever of sound mind. and the wit-

ness may have always considered her un-

ﬁt to make a. will. The unreported facts

oi the case may have been such as to make

the evidence competent. If the testimony

had been reeelved.anrl the appellee had ex-

cepted, we should have assumed. on this

bill oi exceptions, that they were. But

against the excepting party, who must es-

tabllsh the error on which he relies, we

must assume that they were not. Excep-

tions overruled.

RELEVANCY.

neMS to make e. wlll, we cannot say that
the declaration was contradlr.tory to the
previous testimony. It may or may not
have been, according as the facts not reported were of one kind or of another.
The witness "gave accounts of several
~onversattons and actK tending to sbow
Hount1ness of mind." That certain facts,
Indicating that tbetestatrlx was of sound
mind, could be shown by bis testimony,
<lid not necessarily Imply that he believed
hertobesane. Wedonotknowthe full significance of those acts and conven1atlon1t,
and other facts within his knowledge may
have shown that she waR Insane. Upon
this ground the case of Hubbell v. Bl1JHell,
2Allen,196. is authority In favor of the ruling. Nor upon the facts reported can we
say that bis testimony that "be never saw
any cha.nge In her intelligence, coherence of
206

speech, or memory," while she waa &t hie
house, after the death of her husband,
proves that he bt>lleved her to be flt to
make a will. 80 far as the bill of exceptions Khows, and so fnr as we have information from any source, she may ha ye been
all her lHe of such mental capacity and
condition as to make It doubtful whether
she was ever of sound mind, and the witness may have always conslt.lered her unfit to make a. will. The unreported facb!
or the case may have been such as to make
the evidence competent. If the testtmony
had been received, anrl the appellee had excepted, we should have aBKumed, on this
bill of exceptlon11, that they were. But
against the exeeptlng party, who nmst establish the error o,n which he n>lleK, we
must aseume that they were not. Excep.
tlons overruled.

EXL'EH'rs.
EX PE HTS.

[Case No. 72

' her destination,

LOUISVILLE, N. A. & C. R. CO. v. "WOOD.

(14 N. E. 572, 113 Ind. 5+1.)

Supreme Court of Indiana. Dec. 21, 1887.

Appeal from circuit court, Washington ,

county; T. S. Collins, Judge.

This was an action brought by Lizzie

Wood against the Louisville, New Albany

& Chicago Railroad Company tor injuries

caused by the negligence of a conductor on

one of the company's trains. The plaintiff

recovered Judgment, and the defendant ap-

pealed.

Geo. W. Easley, Geo. W. Friediey, and W.

H. Russell, for appellant. Voyles & Morris

and John A. Zaring, for appellee.

ELLIOTT, J. The material facts stated

in the appellee‘s complaint‘ are these: On

the twenty-ﬁrst day of October, 1882, the
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appellee purchased a ticket, and entered

one of the appellant's passenger trains.

The ticket entitled her to a passage from

Salem to Campbellsburg. At the place 01'

the appellant failed and

refused to stop the train a suﬂicient length

of time to enable her to leave it; but, hav-

ing stopped the train, the conductor who

had charge thereof, “before the plalntiﬂ

had suiiicicnt time to get safely off the

cars, and while the plaintiff was standing

on the platform of the cars, which point

she had reached while the train was not in

motion, signaled the train so soon as she

(the plaintiff) had reached the platform, to

move on. The engineer did obey the signal,

and did start the train in motion before the

plaintiff could get otf, and while she was

standing on the platform. After the en-

gineer had started the train, the conductor

willfully, carelessly, and improperly seized

her, and, without any fault or negligence

on her part whatever, wrenched her of! the

steps, and jerked her to the ground," caus-

illir her to sustain very great bodily injury.

We cannot perceive the slightest ground

for the contention of counsel that the com-

plaint is bad. The carrier clearly violated

a legal duty in not stopping the train a

suﬂicient length of time to permit the ap-

pellee to alight in safety. Railroad Co. v.

Buck, 96 Ind. 346. Railroad Co. v. Carper,

(May Term) 14 N. E. 352. The conductor

in jerking the appellee from the train was

i~'11ili_\' of a tort while engaged in the line

of his duty, and the appellant is unques-

tionably liable for such a tort. This lia-

bility exists even though the tort was a

Ilrgligent, and not a willful, one! Railroad

Co. v. Jackson, 81 Ind. 19; Railroad Co.

\‘. Kelly, 92 Ind. 371; Railway Co. v. Sav-

age. 110 Ind. 156, 9 N. E. 85; Railroad Co.

\'. ('nrper. supra, and cases cited. Counsel

-“ilyi “There is no averment that the plain-

tiff was invited or directed to alight at the

iioint she did. so as to bring the case with-

in Railway C0. v. Farrell, 31 Ind. 406.”

i

The halting of the train at the station to

[Case No. 'i2

LOUISVILLE, X. A. & C. R. CO. v. WOOD. The halting of the tralo at the station to
which the appellant undertook to carry the
(H N. E. 1>72, 113 Ind. 544.)
appellee was an implied Invitation to alight;
Supreme Court of lnaiana. Dec. 21, 1887.
so that, even If the complaint proceeded on
Appeal from circuit court, Washington . the theory that it Is assumed by counsel ft
does, it would be good. The theory, howcounty; T. S. Collins, Judge.
'fhis was an action brought by Lizzie i ever, on which it does proceed ls that the
Wood against the Louisvllle, New Albany conductor in charge of the train heedlessly
& Clllcago Rallro&d Company for injuries and wrongfully pulled the appellee from tt
caused by the negllgen<'e of a conductor on while lt was In motion. The cases we have
one of the company's trains. The plalntllr cited show beyond all controversy that the
l'ecovered judgment, and the defendant ap- conductor in the management of the train,
and in caring for passengers in entering
pealed.
and alighting from the train, 18 the repreGeo. W. Easley, Geo. W. Frledley, and W. senta tive of the company in whose service
H. Ru88ell, for appellant. Voyles & Morrls be ls engaged, so that the complaint ls good
and John A. Zaring, for appellee.
on the theory on which it does proceed.
rmlouhtedly, there must be, as counsel asELLIOTT, J. The material facts stated sc1·t, a connection between the negligence
in the appellee'e complaint· are these: On and the injury (Pennsylvania Co. v. Hensll,
the twenty-first day of Octeber, 1882, the iO Ind. 009; Railway Co. \". Conn, 104 Ind.
appellee purchased a ticket, and entered 6-1, 3 N. E. 636); but we think It too clear
one of the appellant's passenger trains. to require discussion that the complaint
The ticket entitled her to a passage from d<.es show that the tort of the conductor
Salem to C4mpbellsburg. At the place of caused the appellee's Injury.
It ls said by counsel: "While the carrier
·her deetlnatloo, the appellant failed and
refused to stop the train a suftlclent length ls responsible for negligence willfully or
of Ume to enable her to leave it; but, hav- C'&relessly Inflicted upon passengers by servlng stopped the train, the conductor who ants employed In the performance of duhad charge thereof, "before the plalotur ties within the general scope of their emhad softlcfent time to get safely oft the ployment, the 11uestlon In such roses ls
cars, and while the plalotlft was standing whether the servant, wllen he lntllcted the
on the platform of the cars, which point injury, was acting within the llne of his
she had reached while the train waa not In employment; not whether the particular
motion, signaled the train so soon as she net was authorized or not. Railroad Co.
(the plaintiff) had reached the platform, to ,._ Kelly, 02 Ind. 371." We fully assent to
move on. The engineer did obey the signal, the l'Ule as coun@el state .It, but we <·nnuot
and did start the train In motion before the nicree that they give it a corr,!Ct 111>plk'fl·
plalntltt could get oft, and while she was tlou. We have already shown that tlle <'Ollstanding on the platform. After the en- ductor's net ·was within the srope of bis
gineer had started the train, the conductor employment, so that the rule which counsel
wllltullr, carelessly, and improperly seized invoke ls decisively a11:alnst them. It ls
her, and, without any fault or negligence also said by counsel that ••the ca~e of Railon her part whatever, wrenched her oft the road Co. v. Jackson, 81 Ind. 20, in Its dicsteps, and Jerked her to the ground," caus- tum, goes too tar;" but counsel are In error,
ing her to austaln very great IJodlly Injury. for that ease states the rule as rounsel conWe cannot perceive the slightest ground <'ede It, ltnd ls abundantly supported by autor the contention of counsel that the com- thority. Railway Co. v. Savage, supra.
plaint ls bad. The carrier clearly violated
It Is further contended that, as the coma legal duty in not stopping the train a plaint does not directly allege that the conllllfllclent length of time to permit the ap- ductor was acting within the scope of bis
pellee to alight in safety. Railroad Co. v. employment, the complaint fa bad, and we
Buck, 96 Ind. 346, Railroad Co. v. Carper, are referred to the case of Helfrich v. Wil(May Term) 14 N. E. 352. The conductor liams, 84 Ind. 553. The pla.111 answer to
in Jerking the appellee from the train was this ls that the facts stated do show that
gullty of a tort while engaged in the line the conductor was acting within tlle line
of his duty, and the appellant Is unques- of hls duty when he pulled the passenger
tionably Hable for such a tort. '£his Ila· from the train, Instead of alTordlng her au
hlllty exists even though the tort was a opportunity to safely alight, as It was hie
D('gliJrent, and not a wlllful, on~ · Railroad duty to do.
C',o. v. Jackson, 81 Iml. 19; Railroad Co.
'I'l>e morning after the Injury occurred,
v. Kelly, 92 Ind. 371; Railway Co. v. Sav- Dr. Rife was called to give tbe :tppellee
age, 110 Ind. 100, 9 N. E. 85; Rnllrond Co. medleal attention, and he testified that she
'"· Cnl'J:>er, supra, and cases cited. Counsel told him "what her trouhle was." ·rhls
!18y: "There ls no averment that the platn- testimony was competent. In order to entlfr was Invited or dire<'ted to all,,;ht at the able a physician to lotelllg<.>ntly prescribe
rolnt she did, so as to bring the case with- or advise, be must be lnfornu>d of the pnlnH
in Railway Co. v. Fnnell, 31 Ind. 408." sufrered lly his patient, and where they are

I
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located. To this effect the authorities uni-

formly go. Turnpike Co. v. Andrews, 102

Ind. 138, 1 N. E. 364, and cases cited; Rail-

road Co. v. Newell, 104 Ind. 264, 3 .\'. E.

S36, and cases cited; Railway Co. v. Falvey, *

101. Ind. 409, 3 N. E. 389. and 4 N. E. 908.

All that the appellee testiﬂed that she told

her physician was what her pains were,

and in what part of her body they were

located. Counsel are mistaken in asserting

that Dr. Rife was not called as a physician,

for he was called in that capacity, and in

that capacity prescribed for the appellee.

The appellee, while on the witness stand

giving testimony, was allowed to remove a

shawl from her feet. and exhibit them to the

jury. There was no error in permitting this

to be done. The text writers and the deci-

sions all agree that such an exhibition is not
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improper. Dr. Wharton says: “Injury to

the person may also be proved by inspection.

Thus, in an action to recover damages for

an injury to a limb, the injured limb may be

exhibited on trial.” Whart. Cr. Ev. 5 312.

Mr. Best, speaking of this species of evi-

dence, denominates it “real evidence," and

says: “Immediate evidence is where the

thing which is the source of the evidence

is present to the senses of the tribunal. This

is of all proof the most satisfactory and con-

vincing.” 1 Best, Ev. (Morgan's Ed.) 307.

The old writers often speak of such evidence,

and in Hale, P. C. 633, a notable instance is

given of its force. Mr. Taylor collects a

number of cases, affirms that the species of

evidence here under discussion is always

competent, and assigns to it the highest

rank. 1 Tayl. Ev. § 512. An American au-

thor, discussing the subject, says: “The in-

jured member may be exhibited to the jury."

Abb. Tr. Ev. 599. In a recent article by

Judge Thompson, entitled “Trial by Inspec-

tion," many cases are collected, all holding

that exhibitions of persons or things are

proper. 25 Cent. Law J. 3. Henry Wade

Rogers, in an article entitled “Profert of the

Person," also discusses the subject, and col-

leets many authorities. all agreeing that ex-

hibitions of injuries are not improper. 15

Cent. Law J. 2. Cases on the general sub-

ject are also collected in Thurman v. Bert-

ram, 20 Alb. Law J. 151. In Osborne v.

City, 32 Fed. 36, it was held not error for a

surgeon to thrust a pin into the side of a

person, alleged to he paralyzed, in the pres-

ence of the jury. Without further comment,

we refer to other cases which are directly

in point: Schroeder v. Railroad Co., 47 Iowa,

375; Mulhado v. Railroad Co., 30 N. Y. 370,

and note; State v. Wicners, 66 Mo. 29. The

principle has been asserted in many cases

by this court. Car Co. v. Parker, 100 I11d.

181; Story v. State, 99 Ind. 413; l\IcDonel

v. State, 90 Ind. 320; Short v. State, 63 Ind.

376; Beavers v. State, 58 Ind. 530. Counsel

for the appellant, although they argue the

question at length, cite only a single case,

that of Ihinger v. State, 53 Ind. 251; but, as
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located. To this etrect the authorities uniforruly go. Turnpike Co. v. Andrews, 10'.l
Ind. 138, 1 N. E. 36!, and cases cited; Rallroad Co. v. Newell, 104 Ind. 264, 3 :X. E.
S:Ul, and cases cited; Railway Co. v. Falyey, ;
10.i l'ld. 409, 3 N. E. 389, and 4 !II. E. UOS. 'I
All that the appellee testified that she told
her physician was what her pains were.
and In what part of her body they were
l0<·ated. Counsel are mlstttken in asserting
thnt Dr. Rife was not called as a physician,
for he was called in that capacity, and In
that capacity pres<>rlbf!d tor the appellee.
The appellee, while on the witness stand
giving testimony, wl18 allowed to remove a
shawl from her feet. and e:r:hlblt them to the
jury. There was no error in permitting this
to be done. The text writers and the dldslons all agree that such an exhibition ls not
improper. Dr. Wharton says: "Injury to
the person may also be proved by Inspection.
Thus, in an action to recover damages for
an Injury to a limb, the injured limb may be
exhibited on trial." Whart. Cr. Ev. I 312.
Mr. Best, speaking of this species of evidence, denominates it "real evidence," and
SBys: "Immediate evidence ls where the
thing which ls the source of the evidence
ls present to the senses of the tribunal. This
ls of all proof the most satisfactory and convincing." 1 Best, Ev. (Morgan's Ed.) 307.
The old writers often speak of such evidence,
and In Hale, P. C. 633, a notable Instance ls
given of Its force. Mr. Taylor collect11 a
number of cases, aftlrms that the apecles of
evidence here under dlacusslon ls always
competent, and assigns to It the highest
rank. 1 Tayl. Ev. § 512. An American author, discussing the subject, says: "The Injured member may be exhibited to the jury."
A bb. Tr. Ev. 599. In a recent article by
Judge Thompson, entitled ''Trial by Inspection," many cases are collected, all holding
that exhibitions of persons or things are
proper. 2il Cent. Law J. 3. Henry Wade
Rogers, In an article entitled "Profert ot the
Person;• also discusses the subject, and collects many authorities. all agreeing that e:r:hlbitlons o! Injuries are not Improper. ll'i
Cent. Law J. 2. Cases on the general subject are also collected In Thurman v. Bertram, 20 Alb. Law J. 151. In Osborne v.
City, 32 Fed. 36, It was held not error for a
surgeon to thrust a pin Into the side of a
pel'lilon, alleged to be paralyzed, In the presence of the jury. Without further comment,
we refer to other cases which are directly
In point: Schroeder v. Railroad Co., 47 lowa,
37U; Mulhado v. Railroad Co., 30 N. Y. aiO,
and note; State v. Wlene1·s, 66 Mo. 29. The
principle bas been asserted In many C'8ses
by this court. Car Co. v. Parker, 100 Ind.
181; Story v. State, 99 Ind. 413; M<'Donel
v. State, 90 Ind. 320; Short v. State, 63 Ind.
376; Beavers v. State, 58 Ind. 530. Counsel
for the appellant, although they. argue the
question at length, <'lte only a single case,
that of lhluger v. Stote, 03 Ind. 2:'>1; but, as
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shown In Car Co. v. Parker, supra, that cs.ae
ls not In point, for the reason that the only
qu<>stlon decided arose upon an Instruction.
llore nt>arly· In point are the cases of Roblnius v. State, 63 Ind. 235; Swigart v. State,
6! Ind. 598; and Bird v. State, 104 Ind. 384,
3 N. E. 827,-but these cases form an exceptlon to the general rule. In those cases, the
question was whether the personal appearance of a party could be considered by a
jury In determining a person's age, and It
was held that It could not. These cases
have been vigorously assailed by many writers and courts; but we do not feel lt necessary to depart from them, for we think
they are distinguishable from our other cases,
as well as from the present case. As said
of Roblnlus v. State, In one ot our former
cases: ''There ts a distinction between such
a case and the present, for, where age ls the
material question, as It was In the case
cited, the decision upon Inspection really determines the whole question; whlle, In such
a case as the present. the Inspection ot the
wounded member simply lllustrates and
makes clear the testimony of the party, and
assists in determining the character of one
ot the facts In the case." Car Co. v. Parker,
supra. To what was there said we may
add that here the e:r:hlbltlon of the Injured
member streets only the e:r:tent and character of the Injury, which ls only a single fact
In the case; while, In ·a <'Ilse where the decision depends upon the age of a party, the
opinion of the jury upon Inspection conclusively settles the whole question, thus effectually depriving the party aggrieved of
the benefit ot an appeal. But, ID a case like
this, the Inspection of the Injured part settlea nothing more than the extent and character of the Injury, If, Indeed, It can be
justly said to settle so much. At most, then,
an Inspection of an Injured limb does no
more than supply evidence upon a single
fact, and It does not deprive the party of
any substantial right on appeal; for It ls
conclusively settled that the appellate court
will not weigh the evidence In any case
where there ls a contltct. It ls obvious,
therefore, that the case under discussion ts
very dltrerent from one In which age decisively determines the whole controversy.
It ls evident that the learned counsel have
expended much labor on this point, and, as
they cite only the single case we haYe referred to, we may well Infer that there are
no others that lend any support to their position. We have ourselves given the subject
very careful study, and our search has not
revealed a ~lltary authority that opposes,
directly or lndll"e<'tly, the doctrine that It la
competent to exhibit an Injured limb to the
jury. It certainly has always been the practice, as Mr. Chitty says, to exhibit modE>ls,
articles of apparel, or other chattels; and the
case before us Is the same In principle.
Miss Drumond testified that she was acquainted with the appellee; described her
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personal appearance and physical condition

previous to her injury. She also described

the appellee's condition immediately after

the accident, and for a few days afterwards.

After she had testiiicd to these facts, she

stated that she saw the appeilee a month

afterwards; that she (the appeliee) had

grown worse, and the witness described her

condition as it then existed. If this case

was one requiring a non-expert witness to

state facts before expressing an opinion, wé

should have no hesitation in holding that the

facts stated were sutﬂcient to entitle the wit-

ness to express an opinion. But we do not

understand that upon such a question a

knowledge of facts is required to be stated

in advance, or that the witness must be an

expert. Turnpike Co. v. Andrews, supra.

In Hardy v. Herriii, 56 N. H. 227, a very
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learned opinion was delivered, in which very

many decisions of the English and American

courts were cited; and it was said, among

other things, that “all concede the admissi-

bility of the opinions of non-professional

men upon a great variety of unscientiﬁc

questions arising every day, and in every

judicial inquiry. There are questions of iden-

tity, handwriting, quantity, value, weight,

measure, time, distance, velocity, form, size,

age, strength, heat, cold, sickness, and

health.” Dr. Wharton lays down a like

rule, and cites many authorities. 1 \Vhart.

Ev. § 513. Other text writers assert the

same rule. Rog. Exp. Test. 5 3; Lawson,

Exp. Ev. 470. Counsel cite upon this point

two cases. The ﬁrst of these (Com. v. Start-

ivant, 117 Mass. 122) bears upon the ques-

tion here under discussion, inasmuch as it

decides that, (1) where the trial court ad-

judges that a witness is qualiﬁed to give an

opinion, the appellate court cannot review

the decision; (2) that it is competent for a

witness to give an opinion as to the health

of a party; and (3) that it is not improper to

call upon him to describe speciﬁcally the

matter of which he speaks. In discussing

the second of these propositions, the court,

after stating the general rule that non-ex-

pert witnesses may express opinions in many

cases. says: “It is competent for a witness

to testify to the condition of health of a

person; that he is ill or disabled, or has a

fever, or is destitute, or in need of relief.

Parker v. Steamboat Co., 109 Mass. 449; Wil-

kinson v. Moseley, 30 Ala. 562; Barker v.

Coleman, 35 Ala. 221; Autauga Co. v. Davis,

32 Ala. 703.” As we read the case cited, it

lends counsel no support whatever, but, on

the contrary, is strongly against them. The

court fully adopts the view expressed in

Steamboat v. Logan. 18 Ohio, 378, that, “it

i not true, as a legal proposition, that no

one but an expert can give an opinion to a

Jiury." The second of the cases cited (Reid

v. Insurance Co., 58 Mo. 425) is not well con-

sidered, as there is neither argument nor

authority adduced. The witness in that case

was asked as to whether the assured was in

personal appearance and physical condition
previous to her injury. Sbe also described
the appellee's condition Immediately after
tbe accident, and for a few days afterwards.
After she had testified to these facts, she
stated that she saw the appellee a month
afterwards; that she (the appellee) had
grown worse, and the witness described her
condition as it then existed. If this case
was one requiring_ a non-expert witness to
state facts before expre11slng an opinion, we
should have no hesitation lo holding that the
facts stated were sufllclent to entitle the wltne88 to express an opinion. But we do not
understand that upon such a question a
knowledge of facts ls requlred to be stated
In advance, or that the witness must be atl
expert. Turnpike Co. v. Andrews, 11upra.
In Hardy v. Merrill, 56 N. H. 227, a very
learned opinion was delivered, In whi<'h vt•ry
many declsloDB of the Engllah and American
eourts were cited; and It was said, among
other things, that "all concede the admlselbWty of tbe oplnlons of non-profeBBlonal
men upon a great ftriety of unsclentl1lc
questions arising every day, and In every
judicial lnqnlry. There are questions of Identity, handwriting, quantity, value, weight,
measure, time, distance, velocity, form, Blze,
age, strength, heat, cold, sickness, and
health." Dr. Wharton lays down a like
rnle, and cites many authorities. 1 "\\'hart.
Ev. I 513. Other text writers assert the
•me rule. Rog. Exp. Teat. t 3; Lawson,
Exp. Ev. 470. Counsel cite upon this point
two cases. The first of these (Com. v. Sturtlnnt, 117 :Maes. 122) bears upon the question here under dlecu&11lon, lnHmucb as It
decides that, (1) where the trial court adjudges that a witness le qualified to give an
oplnlon, tbe appellate court cannot review
the decision: (2) that It le competent for a
wltneBB to give an opinion as to the health
of a party; and (3) that 1t 18 not Improper to
call upon blm to describe specifically the
matter ot which be speaks. In discueelng
the second of these propositions, ·the court,
after stating the geneml rule that non-expert witnesses may exprees opinions In many
cases, Pays: "It ls competent tor a wltnel!B
to testify to the condition of health of a
person; that be le Ul or disabled, or hne a
fever, or ls destitute, or In need of relief.
Parker v. Steamboat Co., 109 Maes. 449; WllklDBOn v. Moseley, 30 Ala. 562; Barker v.
Coleman, 35 A.la. 221; Autauga Co. v. Davle,
32 A.la. 703." As we read the case elted, It
lends counsel no support whatever, but, on
the contrary, le strongly against them. The
court fully adopts the view expreBSed In
Steamboat v. Logan, 18 Ohlo, 378, that, "lt
ls not true, as a legal propoeltlon, that no
one but an expert can give an opinion to a
jury." The second o( the eases cited (Reid
v. Insurance Co., GS Mo. 425) ls not well con1fd('red, as there le nelth('r argument nor
authority adduced. The witness In that <'llfle
Wll8 aaked as to whether the aeeured was In
WILGUS,BV.-14
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good health, and the court simply held that
the question waa incompetent; saying that

"the question IDvolved a mere concluBlon,
and was objectionable." Thie ls not the lnw,
for every answer of a wltneBB to such a
question 18 necessarily a concluelon, amt yet,
as we have seen, It la well settled thnt such
a conclusion 18 competent. Turnpike l'o. v.
Andrews. It le said, however, that the evidence should have been excluded, because It
permitted the witness to Institute a comparison. There le no strength lo this i>oeltlon. The testimony of the witness was directed to the condition ot the a1>p('llee a
month subsequent to her Injury, and, after
fully describing It, the witness said that It
was worse than It was Immediately after the
accident. In determining whether an Injured person ls growing better or worse, a
non-expert wltnel'IB must neceBSarlly exprc11s
an opinion, for, as the cases we have cited
hold, the fact 18 one that cannot be described
by any other than an expert witness. Any
witness ot ordinary lnt('lllgence may be able
to state that a sick or wounded person has
grown worse, or has Improved, without being
able to give an accurate de11Crlptlon of his
condition, and this brings the case fully
within the authorities. Undoubtedly, the
facts on which the conclusion rests may be
asked for on cross-examination; but the
opinion ls not Incompetent merely be<'ftnse
the wltneBB cannot adequately state tile
grounds on which It rests, although the failure to do so may. perhaps, weaken Its probative force. But In this case the fn<'ts
were as fully stated as any non-expert could
poBSibly state th~m; so that, even If we were
wrong In relying on the authorities we hove
cited, the appellant cannot prevail, tor the
case ls fully within the rule that, where a
non-expert witness states tacts on which hie
opinion ls based, the opinion le competent.
One ot the medical witnesses who had seen
and examined the appellee, and who had deecrlbecl her condition, was asked: "What,
In your opinion as a medleal expert. pr~
du<'ed the symptoms you saw In her case?"
There was no error In permitting this question to be asked and anewere<l. Railway
Co. v. Falvey, lM Ind. 409, 3 N. E. 389, and
4 N. E. 908, and authorities cited. Railway
Co. v. Savage, supra. If It were conce<led
that Van Deusen v. Neweomer, 40 l\llch. 120,
does decide what the appellant dolme, and
that It ls sound, lt would not u·all the appellant, tor here the medical expert did detail
the tacts within his knowledge to the jury.
Hagi:erty v. Brooklyn, G1 N'. Y. 62-l, ('ftecl
by appellant, simply de<•il.les that it was not
cow1wtent to ask a non-expert wlt11l'ss •·tf
the eondnctor did all In bis power to avoid
an accld('nt."
A long h,vpothetlenl question was asked Dr.
C. W. l\lurplly, and It ls obJe<·ted that It did
not embnwe all the evlden<'e In the ease.
It ls settled bE>yond controversy that a party
who propounds an hypothetical question may
209
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assume such facts within the range of the

evidence as he believes the evidence tends to

establish. Railway Co. v. Falvey, 10-1 Ind.

412, 3 N. E. 389, and 4 N. E. 908, and au-

thorities cited; Goodwin v. State, 96 Ind.

550, and authorities cited; Elliott v. Russell,

92 Ind. 526; Guetig v. State, 66 Ind. 94. Mr.

Rogers, in discussing this question, says:

“lf framed on the assumption of certain

facts. counsel may assume the facts in ac-

cordance with his theory of them; it not be-

ing csseiitial that he should state the facts

as they actually exist.” Exp. Test. 39. An-

other author says: “It is the privilege of

counsel in such cases to assume, with the

limits of the evidence, any state of facts

which he claims the evidence justiﬁes, and

have the opinion of the expert upon the

facts assumed." Lawson, Exp. Ev.153. Coun-
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sel say: "The hypothesis should include the

substance of all the evidence.” In support

of this proposition, they refer us to Com. v.

Rogers, T Metc. (i\-lass.) 500, and People v.

Lake, 12 N. Y. 362. Neither of these cases

supports the proposition. The New York

cases are fully and strongly against the doc-

trine of couns Stearns v. Field, 90 N. Y.

6-10; Mercer Vose, 67 N. Y. 56; Harnett

v. Garvey, 66 N. Y. 641. It is evident that

the proposition cannot be sound. If it be

regarded as correct, then, in every case, the

court must determine what facts were or

were not proved, and this would be an

usurpation of the functions of the jury. If,

as happens in most cases, the evidence is

conﬂicting, then, if counsel are right, the as-

sumption must of necessity contain contra-

dictoi" statements. These reasons are in

themselves enough to condemn the proposi-

tion of counsel, even in the absence of au-

thority; but all the authorities are against

them, so that the overthrow of their position

is decisive and complete.

Dr. Neal, a medical expert, was permitted

to testit'y that the irritation of the mouth

of the urethra produced the contracted con-

dition of the appellee’s legs. \Vhat we have

said in considering the testimony of another

medical witness disposes of this point. It

is, however, said that the question which

drew out the testimony was leading. If it

were granted that the question was leading,

it would not entitle the appellant to a re-

versal. It is generally held that permitting

a leading question to be asked will not be

suﬁicient cause for reversal, although some

of the cases hold that, where there is a

clear abuse of discretion, the rule is other-

wise. \\'e need not decide which line of

cases "hath the better reasonz" it is enough

for us to decide. as we do, that there was no

such abuse of discretion as would require :1

reversal, even if we accepted the latter line

of cases as correctly expressing the rule.

Counsel say: “The twelfth and thirteenth

caliscs assigned in the motion for a new

trial were intended to bring before the jury

the accepted views of medical writers and
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&S8nme such facts '\°\'lthlu the range of the
evidence as be belle,·es the evlden<'e tends to
establish. Uallway Co. v. Falvey, lot Ind.
412, 3 N. E. 389, nnd 4 N. E. 008, and authorities cited; Goodwin v. State, 00 Ind.
550, nnd authorities cited; Elliott v. Russell,
92 Ind. 1'i26; Guetig v. State, 66 Ind. 94. Mr.
Rogers, in discussing this question, says:
"It fmmed on the assumption of certain
facts. C'ounsel may asRume the facts In ac<'ordance wUb his theory ot them; it not bt>ing l'!<Rentlal that he should state the tacts
as they a<'tually exist." Exp. Test. 39. Another author says: "It is the prlvllege of
counsel in such cases to assume, with the
limits of the evidence, nny state of facts
whl<'h he claims the evidence justlftes, and
have the opinion of the expert upon the
facts assumed." Lawson, Exp. Ev. Hi3. Counsel Ray: "The hypothesis should Include the
substance of all the evidence." In support
of this proposition, thv refer us to Com. v.
Rogers, 7 Mete. (MnsS.) 500, and People v.
Lake, 12 N. Y. 362. iNelther of these cases
supports the proposition. The New York
cases are full1ud strongly against the doctrine of couns
Stearns v. Field, 00 N. Y.
640; Mercer
Vose, 67 N. Y. 00; Hamett
v. Harvey, 66 N. Y. 641. It ls evident that
the proposition cannot be sound. It It be
regarded as correct, then, in every case, the
court must determine what facts· were or
were not proved, and this would be an
usurpation of the functions of the jury. It,
as happens in most cases, the evidence ls
<'Onfilctlng, then, If counsel are right, the assumption must of necessity contain contradictory statements. These reasons are in
themselves enough to condemn the proposition of <'Ounsel, even In the absence of authority; but all the authorities are against
them, so that the overthrow of their position
ls declRh·e on<l <.'OlllJ>lete.
Dr. :Seal, a medical expert, was permitted
to testify that the Irritation of the mouth
of the urethra produced the contracted condition of the appellee's legs. What we have
said In conRldering the testimony of another
medical witness disposes of this point. It
is, however, said that the question which
drew out the testimony was leading. If It
were granted that the question was leading,
It would not entitle the appellant to a reveninl. It ls generally held that permitting
a leading question to be asked will not be
sutttclent cause for reversal, although some
ot the cases hold that, where there is a
dear nbuRe of discretion, the rule ls otherwise. We need not decide which line of
<:U!l('S "hnth the better reason:" It is enough
for us to decide, us we do, tbat there was no
such abuse of discretion as would require a
reversal, even If we accepted the latter line
of cases as correctly expressing the n1le.
Counsel say: "The twelfth nnd thlrtt>euth
<·nu~l'S a11slg11ell In the motion tor a uew
trial were Intended to bring before the Jury
the accepted views of medical writers and
210

practltloners as to what was.commonly understood by and known to the medical profesalon, that the condition of the lower
limbs of the plalntur ls frequently produced
by uterine trouble. It this was the fact,
the defendant had a clear right to have it ln
proof before the Jury. It It was an unusual
fact, It would have made against the defendant; but If It were usual, and was commonly underst.ood by medical authors and
practitioners, It would have much weight In
favor of the defendant. There can be no
just reason assigned for excluding evidence
as to what is commonly understood and •
known by the medical profession ln that regard." We have copied all that ls said by
counsel upon this subject, and we are by no
means convinced that the trial court erred.
It ~he question had arisen Oll cross-examlllfltion, a dlft'erent rule would perhaps obtain;
but the witness was Introduced by appellant
and his opinion eli<'lted. The quallftcatlon
of the witness was thus asserted, and It
was not necessary for the appellant to go
further than to show the knowledge and
experlencs of the wltnesa, while, on crossexamlnatlon, It would perhaps ba,·e been
proper to test his knowledge and experience
by a proper examination. If a witness
should be permitted to state what "l.8 commonly understood by the medical profession," a never-ending investigation would be
opened, and a collateral matter presented
that would, as the evidence before us makes
apparent, lead to an almost endless conftlct
of opinion. There would be, at best, an Intangible con.ti.let of opinion, without any authoritative method of settling lt. If the defendant were permitted to ask such a question, then the plalntitr would be entl~ed to
meet It, so that the contest would fall upon
the vague and uncertain subject of what
profeBBlonal men "commonly understood."
What men commonly understand can be determined only by an Inquiry Into their mental processes, and such an Inquiry ought not
to be allowed upon a purely collateral question. A matter so vague and so Intangible
ought not to be made the subject of Inquiry, unless it 1.8 directly In 188ue, as motive, Intention, or the like.
Appellee's counsel asked on the cross-examination of Dr. Painter, one of the expert
wltnenes Introduced by appellant, this question: "Suppose she received a shock upon
her feet going a distance of four or five feet
outward and some three feet downward. as
much as two years and six months ago, how
far would such a shock account for her
present condition?" We have no doubt, although the question ls somewhat confused,
that the ruling of the trial court was right.
The witness testified, In bis e\-ldence ln
chief, that he had examined the 01>pellet',
described her condition, and gave his opinion upon various l>hases of her case. It
was then>fore competent for the a1>pellee to
ask him for his opinion, not only for the
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purpose of testing his ability as an expert,

but also for the purpose of placing the opin-

ion before the jury as sustaining her theory.

Railway C0. v. Falvey, supra, and cases

cited; Rog. Exp. Tet. 50. It is a mistake

to suppose that when counsel, in the exam-

ination in chief, open on a general subject,

that the line of examination adopted must

be followed by cross-examining counsel; on

the contrary, it is well settled that, where

the direct examination opens on a general

subject, the cross-examination may go into

any and all phases of that subject. De

Haven v. De Haven, 77 Ind. 236;

-On a cross-examination, counsel may direct

and separate, or unite and join, the facts

involved in the general subject.

Vogel v. E

Harris (December 8, 1887), 14 N. E. 385. ‘
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The only ;

restriction upon the right of cross-examina- E

tion. so far as aifects the question as it is '

here presented, is that it must be conﬁned ,

to the subject-matter of the examination in .

chief. As decided in Higham v. Vanosdol,

101 Ind. 162, a distinct and independent sub-

ject cannot be introduced on cross-exa1nina-

tion, but the cross-examination may go to ‘

all matters involved in the subject embraced

in the examination in chief.

It is said by counsel that "the eighteenth

cause for a new trial raised the question

whether Dr. E. P. Easly could answer cer-

tain questions from his opinions derived

from medical books." We do not think that

the record presents the question just as

counsel state it. The witness was asked:

“What effect would her [the plaintiff] living

with a man who was a paralytic have upon

her; how and in what way would it affect

her?“ To this he answered: “I can’t say

what effect it would have upon her. I

could recite the reported cases. We know

that persons have become paralytics simply

by waiting on a paralytic.”

the opinion that it would not, in any event,

be proper to recite special cases reported in

medical books; but, however this may be,

no offer of evidence was made, and no ques-

tion is presented which will avail the appel-

lant. In this instance. we may observe, the

witness was permitted to give his opinion

derived from the books, and the only effect

.' 104 Ind. 26-i, 3 N. E. 836;

We incline to '

Exp. Test. 81-107. The cases cited by coun-

sel are directly against them, for they both

concede that it is competent to ask an

opinion as to probable results, although it i

held that merely speculative opinions are

not competent. In the last of the cases

cited it was said. in speaking of an instruc-

tion, that the true rule was, as laid down,

that “the plaintid could only recover dam-

ages for such pain and suffering as the evi-

dence rendered reasonably certain would

necessarily result from the injury."

One of the attorneys of appellant had

purpose of testing bis ablllty as an expert,
but also for the purpose of placing the opinion before the jury as sustaining her theory.
Railway Co. v. Falvey, supra, and cases
cited; Rog. Exp. Test. 50. It ls a mistake
to suppose that when counsel, ln the exam!nation in chief, open on a general subject,
that the line of examination adopted must
be followed by cross-examining counsel; on
the contrary, It ls well settled that, where
the direct examination opens on a general
-subject, the cross-examination may go into
any and all phases of that subject. De
HaV"en v. De Haven, 77 Ind. 236; Vogel v.
Harrls (December 8, 1887), 14 N. E. 385.
-On a cross-examination, counsel may direct
and separate, or unite and join, the facts
lnvoh·ed In the general subject. The only
restriction upon the right of cross-examlnatlon. so fur as atrects the question as It ls
here presented, ls that it must be contlned
to the subject-matter of the examination in
chief. As decided In Higham v. Vanosdol,
101 Ind. 162, a distinct and independent subject cannot be introduced on cross-examinatlon, but the cross-examination may go to
all matters Involved In the subject embraced
in the examination ln chief.
It ls said by counsel that "the eighteenth
-cause for a new trial raised the question
whether Dr. E. P. Easly could answer certaln questions from his opinions derived
from medical books." We do not think that
the record presents the question Just as
·<'OlllllK'l Rt.ate It. The wltnPss was asked:
"What effect would her [the plalntltf] llvlng
with a man who was a paralytic have u1>on
ber; how and In what way would lt atrect
her?" To this he answered: ''I can't say
what etrect It would have upon her. I
could recite the reported cases. We know
that persons have bet"Ome paralytics slmi>lY
by waiting on a paralytic." We Incline to
the opinion that lt would not, In any event,
be proper to recite special cases reported In
medical books; but, however this may be,
no otrer of evidence was made, and no questlon ls presented which will avail the appellant. In this instance, we may observe, the
wltneu was permitted to give his opinion
derived from the books, and the only etrect
of the ruling was to deny the right to give
apeclal cases reported in the works of medlcal writers. Lawson, Exp. Ev. 100, and
eases cited.
The only argument made In support of one
of the points stated by counsel ls this: "Tho
twenty-ti.rat, twenty-second, and twenty·
third causes at1Blgned for a new trial are
good, under the rullngs of the cases of
8trohm v. Railroad Co., 00 N. Y. 300, and
(,'urtle v. Railroad Co., 18 N. Y. 541." The
questions asked the medical witnesses were
a& to the probable results that would follow
from an Injury described by the witnesses
who testltiP.<l on the trial. We understand
It to be well settled that such questions are
proper. Lawson, Exp. Ev. 108-114; Rog.
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Exp. Test. 81-107. The cases <:lted by counse1 are directly against them, for they both
concede tlUAt It ls competent to II.Elk an
oplnlon as to probable results, although It Is
held that merely speculative opinions are
not competent. In the last of the cases
I cited it was said, in speaking of an lnstruction, that the true rule was, as laid down,
that "the plalntltr could only recover damages for such pain and sutrering as the evldence rendered reasonably certain would
necessarily result from the injury."
One of the attorneys of appellant bad
' made an atlldavlt ln support of an unsuci cessful motion for a continuance; and this,
, when otrered in evidence, was excluded.
1 Clearly, there was no error in this n1llng.
Appellant otrered to prove by the same
attorney what the conductor who, as the
evidence shows, pulled the appellee from
the train, said as to attending the trial.
There was no error in this ruling. What the
witness proposed to state was mere hearsay,
and Its exclusion Is sustained by one of the
' plainest rules of evidence. The appellant
had a right, either ]\V compulsory proce88 or
; by deposition, to the testl~ny of the wltI ness, but lt had no right to have his state, ment rehearsed to the jury. We think aPI pellant's counsel are in error in assuming, as
i they lmplledly do, that Dr. Neal did not exf amine the appellee In a professional capaclty, for the record shows, not only that he
visited her in that capacity, but that be did
so under the order of the court. It Is well
established by authority that statements
made to a physician In his profeeslonal capa<'lty are competent, when descriptive of
existing symptoms or pains, although they
are not admissible when mere narratives of
past occurrences. Railroad Co. "· Newell,
104 Ind. 26i, 3 N. E. 836; Railroad Co. v.
Falvey, and cases cited; Murphy v. Rallroad Co., 66 Barb. 125; Kent v. Lincoln, 32
Vt. 5111-597; Barber v. Merriam, 11 Allen,
322; Looper v. Bell, 1 Head, 373; Hatch v.
Fuller, 131 Mass. 574; Railroad Co. v. Johns,
36 Kan. 700, 14 Pac. 237. In the case last
cited, the autboJlltles are collected and reviewed, and it was said: "But the mere
fact that the declarations are made after
suit bas been commenced, and while It ls
pencllng, wlll not be sutllclent to exclude the
declarations, and they should be allowed to
go to the jury." This ls ln accordance with
our dedslons, and with the decided weight
of authority. Following Quaife v. Railway
Co., 48 Wis. 513, 4 N. W. 658, this court said,
in speaking of declarations such as those
here given in evidence: "They are especlally competent, and of more weight, when
made to a physician for the purpmie of re·
celvlng treatment, or to a medical expert
who makes an examination at the request
of the opposite party, or by dlredlon of a
court, for the purpose of basing an opinion
upon as to the phy11l<'al situation of the
party whose condition ls the subject of ln-

I
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quiry.” Railroad Co. v. Newell, supra. As

suggested in the case from which we have

quoted, and in some of the Massachusetts

cases, without some information as to the

seat and character of pain, and as to the

symptoms of the sick or injured person, it

is impossible, in many cases, for :1 physician

to form an intelligent opinion; for many of

the organs of the human body are concealed

from view. Roosa v. Loan Co., 132 Mass.

439; Bacon v. Charlton, 7 Cush. 581; Barber

v. .\Ierriam, 11 Allen, 322. It results that,

as said in Railroad Co. v. Newell. and other

cases, the evidence is admitted on the

ground of necessity. That this is true is

obvious, since its denial would in many

cases completely thwart justice. Another

well settled legal principle supports the rule,

and that is this: Where an act or transac-
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tion is competent, declarations forming part

of the thing done are also competent.

Dr. Neal was asked “whether the condi-

tion of the womb in which you found it day

before yesterday will account for the condi-

tion of the spine and its tenderness, as well

as the drawn limbs, and all the conditions

now." The objection to this question is

that the witness had not stated the facts

to the jury. We think it only necessary to

say, on this point, that counsel's position

rests on an erroneous assumption. We think

the facts relevant to the opinion were fully

in evidence. Indeed, the question itself di-

rects the attention of the witness to a fact

that must have come under his own ob-

servation, and, of necessity, involved in the

matter on which his opinion was asked.

We set out the instructions given at the

request of the appellce, as they contain the

'.' trongest expression of the law against the

" pellant found in the series. These are the

instructions: “(ii If the plaintiff was a pas-

senger upon defendant's road in one of de-

fendant's coaches, as charged in her com-

plaint, the defendant‘s obligation was to car-

ry hcr safely and properly; nnd, if the de-

fendant intrusted this duty to the servants

of the company, the law holds the defend-

ant responsible for the manner in which they

execute it. The carrier is obliged to protect

its passengers from improper and unneces-

sary violcncc at the hands of its own serv-

ants. And it is the established law that a

carrier is responsible for the negligence and

wrongful conduct of its servants, suffered

or done in the line of their employment

whereby a passenger is injurcd. (2) The du-

ty of :1 carrier is to safely can-1'_v passengers.

It is true that a carrier of passengers is not

an insurer of the safcty of those whom it

lnitlcrtakcs to carry, against all the risks of

travel: but nevcrthclcss there rests upon

such cnrricr this general duty of safely car-

rying. (th A carrier of passengers for pay

is responsible for injuries sustained by a pas-

senger through the neglect, recklessness, and

carelessness of the servants of such carrier,

while such servants are engaged in the gen-
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qulry." Railroad Co. v. :Sewell, supm. As
suggested In the case from which we )lave
quoted, and ID some of the llassa(•busetts
cases, without some Information as to the
aeat and character of pain, and as to the
symptoms of the sick or Injured person, It
Is Impossible, In many cases, for a physlolan
to form an lotelllgent opinion; for many of
the organs of the human body are concealed
from view. Roosa v. Loan Co., 132 :\lass.
439; Bacon v. Charlton, 7 Cush. 581; Barber
v. Merriam, 11 Allen, 322. It results that,
as said In Railroad Co. v. Newell, and other
cases, the evidence Is admitted on the
ground of neceplty. That this Is true Is
obvious, since Its denial would In many
cases completely thwart justice. Another
well settled legal principle supports the rule,
and that Is this: Where an act or transaction Is competent, declarations forming part
of the thing done are also competent.
Dr. :Seal was asked "whether the condition of the womb In which you found It day
before yesterday will account for the condl:
Uon of the spine and Its tenderness, as well
as the drawn limbs, and all the conditions
now." The objection to this question Is
that the witness had not stated the facts
to the jury. We think It only necessary to
say, on this point, that counsel's position
rests on an erroneous assumption. We think
the facts relevant to the opinion were fully
ln evidence. Indeed, the question Itself dl~ts the attention of the witness to a fact
that must have come under bis own observation, and, of neceBBlty, Involved In the
matter on which his opinion was asked.
We set out the Instructions given at the
request of the appellee, as they contain the
~ngest expression of the law against the
'tlppellant found In the series. These are the
l•tructlons: "(1) It the plalntUf was a pasetnger upon deCendant's road In one of defendant's <'Ollches, as charged ID her complaint, the defendant's obligation was to carry her safely and properly; and, If the defendant lntrusted this duty to the servants
of the company, the law holds the defendant responslbh• for the manner In which they
execute It. The carrier Is obliged to protect
Its pn.ssengers from Improper and unnecesHary violence at the bands of Its own servants. And it ls the established law that a
(•arrler ls resj)Onslble for the negllgen<'e and
wrongful conduct of Its servants, suffered
or done In the line of their employment
whereby a passenger Is Injured. (2) The duty of a C'arrler Is to safely <.'arry passengers.
It ls tnie that a carrier of passPngers Is not
an ln11urer of the safety of those whom It
un<l1•rtnk1•s to curry. against all the risks of
trnvPl; hut nev<>rtlwl<>ss th<>re re11ts upon
sm•h <'lllTIPr this ~l'neral duty of safely carrying. (:II A <.'arrler of passengers for pay
ls r<>s1>011sll>l<> for lnjurll'e sustained by a pasBE'nger through the n<'glt><•t, reckl1>ssness, and
carelt'esnese of the servants of such <.'arrler,
while such sen-ants are engaged in the gen212

eral scope ot thelr employment, whether the
act was or was not authorised by the master. (4) A passenger is warranted In obeying the direction of the serviants and agents
of the carrier, when given within the scope
ot their duty, unless such obedience leads to
a known peril which a prudent person would
not encounter. (5) It, In this case, the jury
belle'l"e, from a fair preponderance of the evidence, that the plslntlft' obeyed the defendant's conductor, In charge of the train upon
which she was a passenger, In getting off of
the train, and If she was not then apprised
of any peril that she would encounter thereby, she would not be guilty of contributing
to any Injuries received by her In thus alighting from the train. (6) It the fact be that
the defendant's conductor, having charge o!
the train upon which plalntl1f was a passenger, seized bold of her while the train
was In motion and was moving on, and
pulled her from the platform of the coach
by the exercise of physical foree, and thereby <'&Used her to strike the ground or otberhard substance below, whereby she was Injured, she would not be guilty of conhibutlng to Injuries recel'l"ed thereby. (7) It plalntl1f did not receive the Injuries complained
of by any contributing act of negligence or
fault of her own, but was Injured at the
time complained of by the C'arelessneBS and
1 negligence or fault of the defendant's servants, or one of them, committed In the general sco1>e of employment as such servants.
or servant, the defendant Is liable for such
damages as she mny have 1metalned by the
Injuries thus received. (8) If you ftnd for
the l>lalntlft', you are Instructed that, In assessing plaintiff's damages. you cannot exceed the sum sued for In the complaint, whlN1
Is twenty-ftve thousand dollars; and, In asset~1dng the damages, It Is proper that you
consider the Injuries received by plalntltr,
their extent, whether of a temporary or permanent character, and you may take Int<>
consideration loss of time, expenses Incurred, physl<'al suffering, bodily pain, and permanent dlsablllty, If proved to be direct
results of the Injuries de8<'rlhed In the complaint, and you should thereupon assess such
compenl'atory damages as In your opinion
the evlden<.'e bPfore you warrants. (9) A
railroad company carrying pa88engers for
hire has not discharged Its duty, or reUeved
lts<'lf from llablllty, to them, till It stopped
at the end of their journey a reasonable
time for them to get oft' the train In safety."
In our judgment, these Instructions state
the law quite as favorably to the appellant
as It bad a right to ask. If there Is error
In them It Is against the appellee. It ls said
by counsel that the first and 11econd lm~truc
tlons glvPn for the plaintiff are W<'l't' abi;;tra<.'t propo11ltlons. \Ve, bowen•r, regar1l
thl'm as COITt><·t statements of the law. Wt>ll
applied to the partl<'ular en11e. The fourth
and ftftb Instructions are c.·orrect In thrlr
statement of legal principles. Railroad Co.
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v. Carper (this term) 14 N. E. 352: Rail-

way Co. v. Pinchln (this term) 13 N. E. 6.77.

We do not, in this holding, controvert the

doctrine that a passenger must not obey the

directions of the employés where it will lead

to known danger which a prudent person

would not encounter. On the contrary, we

approve these instructions, because they as-

sert that doctrine. VVe cannot hold that the

instructions are not relevant to the evidence;

nor can we hold that they are not within

the issue tendered by the complaint. The

use of the epithet “willt'ul" does not control

the other averments. We think it must be

regarded as conclusively settled by our ca-

ses that the use oi.' the words “wlllful" or

“willful negligence" does not change the

character of the pleading. As a matter of

pleading, epithets are of no great force.
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Palmer v. Railroad Co. (this term) 14 N.

I-1. 70; Gregory y. Railroad Go. (Ind. Sup.)'

14 N. E. 228; Railway Co. v. Ader, 110

lad. 376, 11 N. E. 437; Railway Co. v. Bryan,

107 Ind. 51, 7 N. E. 80"; Railroad Co. v.

Mann, 107 Ind. 89, 7 N. E. S93; Railway

Co. v. Schmidt, 106 Ind. 73, 5 N. E. 684.

lt is alleged in the complaint, among other

things, that “the plaintiif sustained said in-

juries without any fault on her part, and

that the same were received by her because

of the negligent, careless, willful, heedless,

and improvident acts of said conductor.”

This, taken in connection with other aver-

ments, makes the cause of action one of neg-

ligence, rather than of intentional and ma-

licious wrong. What the conductor did, al-

though constituting a tort, did not, upon the

theory of the complaint, constitute a. willful

and intentional assault. It is evident that

the theory on which the complaint proceeds

is that the wrong was not an intentional or

malicious one, tor it is alleged that it was

heedless and negligent, and that there was

no contributory negligence on the part of

the plaintiilf. The court below construed the

complaint as we construe it, and so, also,

did the appellant, as appears from the in-

structions given at its request; the ilrt of

which reads thus: “(1) The jury are in-

structed that this is an action on the part

01' the plaintiﬂ to recover damages against

the defendant for injuries alleged to have

been sustained by the plaintiil‘. on the night

of the twenty-ﬁrst day of Uctober, 1882, in

getting oi! of the steps of a car of one of

defendant’s passenger trains at Campbells-

burg; the plaintiff alleging that ‘the con-

ductor oi! said train negligently, heedlessly,

willfully, carelessly, and improperly seized

her while said train was in motion, and,

without any fault or negligence of the plain-

tiff whatever, he wrenched her off of said

steps, and jerked her to the ground, where

she alighted in a twisted posture,‘ thereby

injuring her feet, legs, and body generally,

and causing a concussion of the spine, re-

sulting in paralysis of the lower limbs. ren-

dering her unable to walk, and that such in-

v. Carper (this term) H N. E. 852; Railway Co. v. Plnchln (this term) 13 N. E. 6.77.
We do not, In this holding, controvert the
doctrine that a passenger mWlt not obey the
directions ot the employ4!8 where It will lead
to known danger which a prudent person
would not encounter. On the contrary, we
approve theae instructions, because they 11&sert that doctrine. We cannot hold that the
Instructions are not relevant to the evidence;
nor can we hold that they are not within
the Issue tendered by the complaint. The
use ot the epithet "willful" does not control
the other averments. We think It must be
regarded as conclusively settled by our cases that the use of the words "wflltul" or
"wllltul negligence" does not change the
character ot the pleading. As a matter ot
pleading, epithets are ot no great fol'<!(>.
Palmer v. Railroad Co. (this term) 14 N.
E. 70; Gregory v. Railroad Co. (Ind. Bup.1
14 N. E. 228; Rallway Co. v. Ader, 110
Ind. 376, 11 N. E. 487; Railway Co. v. Bryan,
107 Ind. 51, 7 N. E. 807; Railroad Co. v.
Mann, 107 Ind. 89, 7 N. E. 893; Railway
Co. v. Schmidt, 106 Ind. 73, 5 N. E. 684.
It ls alleged In the complaint, among other
things, that "the plalntUr sustained said Injuries without any fault on her part, and
that the same were received by her be<'ause
ot the negligent, careless, wllltul, heedleBS,
and Improvident acts ot sa.ld conductor."
This, taken In connection with other averments, makes the cause of action one of negligence, rather than of Intentional and malicious wrong. What the conductor did, although constituting a tort, did not, upon the
theory ot the complaint, constitute a wllltul
and Intentional auault. It la evident that
the theory on which the complaint proceeds
ls that the wrong was not an Intentional or
malicious one, for It ls alleged that It waa
heedless and negligent, and that there was
no contributory negligence on the part of
the plalntur. The court below construed the
complaint aa we construe it, and so, also,
did the appellant, as appears from the Instructions given at Its request; the first of
which reads thus: "(1) The jury are Instructed that this la an action on the part
of the plaintiff to recover damages against
the defendant for Injuries alleged to have
been sustained by the plaintiff on the night
of the twenty-first day of October, 1882, In
getting off of the atepa of a car of one ot
defendant's paBBenger trains at Campbellsburg; the plalntltr alleging that 'the conductor of said train negligently, heedlessly,
wlllfnlly, careleBBly, and Improperly seized
ht>r while said train was In motion, and,
without any fault or negligence of the plalntltr whatever, he wrenched her otr of snld
steps, and jerked her to the ground. where
she alighted lo a twisted posture,' thereby
injuring her feet, legs, and body generally,
and causing a concussion of the spine, resulting In paralysis of the lowt>r limbs, rendering her unable to walk, and that such lo-
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jurtea are permanent. The anewer of the
defendant ls a general denial, which cast.
upon the plalntur the burden ot provincFlrst, that she was wrenched otr ot the atepa
of said car, and jerked to the ground, by the
conductor; 11eeond, that the Injuries alleged
by the plaintiff were the direct and immediate consequences of the manner In which
she was taken off the train; and, third, that
the plalntur did not, by any act or conduct
of hers at the time, contribute to the Injury,
and that she was tree from fault or negllgence on her part." The doctrine in Carver
v. Carver, 97 Ind. 497-4>16, applies here with
peculiar force: "When a theory ls thua
adopted, and acted upon below, with the concurrence of both parties, a judgment ought
not to be reversed because the court Instructs the jury ln accordance wlth It."
The only objection urged against the Instructions given by the court on its own motion, not disposed of by what we have already said, ls that they direct the jury to find
a general verdict, and thus Impliedly Instructed them not to return a special verdict. A
number of Interrogatories were submitted by
the partlea and the court; and we a.re inclined to the opinion that the fair meaning
of the Instruction on this point la that, lo
case answers were returned to the Interrogatories, there must also be a general verdict. It this be true, there was no error;
but if we are wrong ln this, still there can
be no reversal, for our statute provides that,
"lo all actions, the jury, unleBB otherwise
dlre<>ted by the court, may render a special
or general verdict." Rev. St. I 546; Work,
Pr. I 849. The court has authority to direct
a general vt>rdlct, and we must presume that
the authority wns justly exercised; for, until the contrary appears, all reasonable lntendments are Indulged lo favor of the rulings of the trial court.
Conceding that the fourth Instruction asked by the appellant was correct, (a concession not warranted, as we Incline to think,)
It was substantially embodied In the third
lnstn1ctlon given at appellant's request. It
ls too well settled to require the citation of
authorities that a trial court ls not bound to
repeat Its Instructions. What we have said
ot the fourth Instruction applies to the sixth,
seventh, and eighth Instructions asked by the
appellant, for, so tar as they were correct,
they were substantially Included lo other lnstruetions given. The tenth Instruction does
not express the lnw, nnd was rightfully refused. It Is not necessary that the wrongdoer should apprehend the 11artlcular consequences which may proximately result from
his a<'ts, although the act must be of such a
nature as to produce some injurious result.
To lllustrnte: A man lll with consumption,
who ls wrongfully Injured lo alighting from
a train, and so Injured as that a hemorrhage
results, has a right to recover although the
se1"1"aots of the carrier may not llave had reason to app1·ehend such a result. Unllrond
213
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Co. v. Riley, 39 Ind. 568. In no case is it

necessary that the particular result which

follows should be anticipated. Certainly, no

man who strikes a. feeble person and injures

him can be heard to say that he did not an-

ticipate that it would hurt him more than it

would have done a robust man. Where a

tort is (f0I1‘il.‘llii~"B(1 from which injury may

reasonably be anticipated, the wrong-doer is

liable for the proximate results of that in-

jury, although the injury extends further

than it would have done had the injured per-

son been in perfect health. It is the general

character of the act, and not the particular

result, that the law regards. It is true that

the act which causes the injury must be a

negligent one, and this it cannot be unless

the facts show that it was one which ordi-

nary care would have enabled the person
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who does it to foresee and provide against.

Railway Go. v. Locke (this term) 14 N. E.

391. There is a plain difference between the

wrongful act and its consequences: for, when

a wrongful act is done, the wrong-doer must

answer for all proximate consequences, al-

though he may not have foreseen or antici-

pated the particular form or character of the

resulting injury. The doctrine which the au-

thorities lay down is thus stated in Hill v.

Winsor, 118 Mass. 251: “The accident must

be caused by the negligent act of the defend-

ants, but it is not necessary that the conse-

quences of the negligent act should be fore-

seen by the defendants. It is not necessary

that either the plaintiff or the defendants

should be able to foresee the consequences

of the negligence of the defendants, in order

to make the defendants liable. It may be a

negligent act of mine in leaving something in

the highway. It may cause a man to fall

and break his leg or arm, and I may not be

able to foresee the one or the other.” ln an-

other case it was said: “It is not necessary

that injury in the precise form in which it

in fact resulted should have been foreseen.”

Lane v. Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 136. In

Newell v. Whitcher, 53 Vt. P89, the court

was asked to charge the jury “that, if the

defendant's acts and conduct would not have

injured a person of ordinary nerve and cour-

age, then there can be no rec0very;” and it

was held that this instruction was properly

refused. But we cannot add to the length of

our already very lengthy opinion by com-

menting upon the authorities. We refer,

without discussion, to some of the many de-

cided cases: Railroad Co. v. Riley. supra;

Railroad Go. v. Buck, 96 Ind. 346; Railway

Co. v. Falvey, supra; Railway Co. v. Jones,

108 Ind. 551, 9 N. E. 476; Railroad Co. v.

I'itzer, 109 Ind. 179, 6 N. E. 310, 10 N. E. 70,

and cases cited page 188, 109 lnd., and pages

Rlliand 70 of 6 and 10 N. E.; Stewart v. City,

38 \Vis. 58-i; 0ii\'er v. Town, 36 \Vis. 592:

Kellogg v. Railway Co., 26 Wis. 233; Mc-

Namara v. Village, G2 \Vis. 207, 22 N. W. 472;

Brown v. Railway Co., 5-1 Wis. 342, 11 N. VV.

356; Williams v. Vanderbilt, 28 N. Y. 217;

REL.EVANCY.

Co. v. Rlley, 89 l'nd. 1568. In no case is It
nece88ll.ry that the pnrtlcular result which
follows should be anticipated. Certainly, no
man who strikes a feeble person and injures
him can be henrd to say that he did not anticipate that It would hurt him more than It
would have done a robust man. Where a
tort ls comml:.:-ed from which Injury may
reasonably be anticipated, the wrong-doer Is
liable for the proximate results of that Injury, although the Injury extends further
than It would have done had the Injured person been In 1rerfect health. It Is the general
character of the act, and not the particular
result, that the law regards. It ls true that
the net which causes the Injury must be a
negligent one, and this It cannot be unless
the facts show that It was one which ordinary care would have enabled the person
who does It to foresee and provide against.
Railway Co. v. Locke (this term) 14 N. E.
391. There ls a plain dUl'erence between the
wrongful net and Its con11equences: for, when
a wrongful act ls done, the wrong-doer must
answer for all proximate consequences, although he may not have foreseen or anticipated the particular form or character of the
resulting injury. The doctrine which the authorities lay down is thus stated In Hill v.
'Winsor, 118 Mass. 251: ''The accident must
be caused by the negligent act of the defendants, but it ls not necessary that the consequences of the negligent act should be foreseen by the defendants. It ls not necessary
that either the plaintiff or the defendants
should be able to foresee the consequences
of the negligence of the defendants, in order
to make the defendants liable. It may be a
negligent act of mine In leaving something In
the highway. It may cause a man to fall
and break his leg or arm, and I may not be
able to foresee the one or the other." In another case it was said: "It ls not necessary
that Injury In the precise form in which It
In fact resulted should have been foreseen."
Lane v. Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 136. In
Newell v. Whitcher, 53 Vt. f>89• the court
was asked to charge the jury "that, If the
defendant's acts and conduct would not have
Injured a person of ordinary nerve and courage, then there can be no recovery;" and It
was held that this Instruction was properly
refused. But we <'annot add to the length of
our already very lengthy opinion by commenting upon the authorities. We refer,
without discussion, to some of the many decided cases: Railroad Co. v. Riley, supra;
Unllroad Co. v. Buck, 96 Ind. 346; Railway
Co. v. Falvey, supra; Railway Co. v. Jones,
108 Ind. wl, 9 N. E. 476; Railroad Co. v.
Pitzer, 109 Ind. 170, 6 N. E. 310, 10 N. E. 70,
and cases cited Jlage 188, 109 Ind., and pages
ato nml 70 of 6 and 10 N. E.; Stewart v. City,
38 Wis. f>84; Oliver v. Town, 36 Wis. 592;
l~ellogg v. Hallway C-0., 26 Wis. 233; McNamara v. Village, o'2 Wis. 207, 22 N. W. 472;
Brown v. Railway Co., 54 Wis. 342, 11 N. W.
356; Williams v. Vanderbilt, 28 N. Y. 217;
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Ehrgott v. Mayor, 00 N. Y. 261; Bean<'hnmp
v. Mining Co., 00 Mich. 163, 15 N. W. 6.1;
Barbee v. Reese, El> Miss. 006; Railway Co.
v. Kemp, 61 Md. 74; Fitzpatrick v. Railway
Co., 12 U. C. Q. B. 645. ''The general rule,"
says an eminent court, "la that, In actions of
tort like the present, the wrong-doer ls liable
for all the direct Injury resulting from his
wrongful act; and that, too, although the extent or special nature of the Injury could notr
with certainty, have been foreseen or contemplated as the probable result of the act
dooe." Railway Co. v. Kemp;supra. A late
writer collects many cases, and lays down.
the rule, In very strong terms, as we have
declared it. 2 Wood, Ry. Law, 1232. We
conclude that, both upon principle and authority, an Injured person may recover compensatory damages for Injuries sustained,
although the wrong-doer did not know, or
could not foresee, that the special or particular Injury would be greater to the person
upon whom the wrong was actually Indicted
than to one In full strength and robust
health. A person, feeble or strong, young or
old, ls entitled to recover full compensation
for the injury actually sustained by the acts
of a wrong-doer.
In Instructions given at the request of the
appellant, the court asserted In exprees
terms, and, probably, In stronger language
than the law warrants, that the plaintiff
could not recover If the Injuries resulted from
disease, and not from the negligence of the
defendant, and It was unnecessary to repeat
these Instructions. Two of these Instructions
read thus: "(7) By direct and Immediate
cause and proximate cause, as used In all
the Instructions In this case, ls meant such
cause or causes as are usually and ordinarily
followed by the result attributed to the act
or acts, and such as a person of ordinary experience and judgment could reasonably apprehend would follow as the direct effect of
the act or acts charged as being the cause
of the Injury." "(13) If the jury believe
from the evidence that the plaintiff's Injured
and diseased condition la due to chronle
womb disease, and other ailments existing
prior to the twenty-first of October, 1882, and
not the direct and Immediate result of the
manner In which she was assisted from the
car-steps, then the verdict of the jury must
be for the defendant." It may be that the
appellee can justly complain of these Instructions, but certainly the appellant cannot.
The Instruction asked after the argument
was closed was properly refused. A party
has no right to demand an instruction at so
late a period In the trial.
Seventy-five interrogatories were submitted
by the appellant, and the court refused to
send 60 of them to the jury, but did send 15
of them, and did also prepare and submit
other Interrogatories to the jury. WI! perceive no errol' In the ruling of the court on
this subject. All of the rejected interrogatories, except, perhaps, the slxty·fi.fth, are

EXPEHTS.
EXPERTS.

[Case No. 72

open to the objection that they ask for evi-

dence, and not facts. There is everywhere in

jurisprudence an important difference be-

tween evidence and facts, and in no branch

of jurisprudence is it more important than in

that which governs the verdicts and ﬁndings

of juries. It would lead to most evil conse-

quences to permit a party to compel the jury

to rehearse mere items of evidence. But it

is needless to discuss the question; our stat-

ute and our decisions forbid the practice

here defended by the appellant. We cannot

examine the interrognltorics in detail; it is

enough to say that if there was error at all

in the ruling of the court, as we think there

was, it was in giving some of the interroga-

tories submitted by the party who now com-

plains. The 19 interrogatories submitted in-

cluded 15 of those asked by appellant, and
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certainly were as many as it was proper to

submit; they were, indeed, more than the

case required.

There is evidence very satisfactorily prov-

ing that prior to the accident Mrs. Woods

was a strong and healthy woman about 40

years of age. It is further shown that her

husband was a paralytic, and that she did

the household work of a woman, and the

Work of a man in managing the business af- 3

fairs of a farm. The evidence also shows

that prior to the accident she did a farmer's

hard work: such as hauling wood, making

hay, and the like. Since the accident she has

been physically almost helpless, and is una-

ble to do any work. Her injuries are of a

permanent nature, and, from the evidence,

the fair inference is that she will probably

grow worse. She has suffered much, and, it

is reasonably certain, will suffer more as the

years go by. Her vision is affected, her

hands and legs are partially, if not totally

paralyzed, and there is some curvature of the

spine. It is very apparent, therefore, that

there is evidence fully warranting the infer-

ence that the appellee is a physical wreck,

and, indeed, the evidence fairly justifies the

inference that her mental powers are seri-

ously impaired. We cannot, under the cir-

cumstances, declare that the damagcs are

the result of passion, prejudice, or corrup-

tion, and it is only where this can be justly

asserted that a verdict can be set aside.

Hougland v. Moore, 2 Blackf. 167; Guard v.

Risk, 11 Ind. 156; Yater v. Mullen, 23 Ind.

562; Alexander v. Thomas, 25 Ind. 268;

Reeves v. State, 37 Ind. -H1; Railway Co. v.

Coliarn, 73 Ind. 261; Railway C0. v. Fix, 88

Ind. 381; Car Co. v. Parker, 100 Ind. 181;

Turnpike Go. v. Andrews, 102 Ind. 138, 1 N.

E. 364; Railway Co. v. Falvey, supra; Rail-

road Co. v. Holland. 18 Ill. App. 418; Groves

v. Rochester, 39 Hun, 5; Osborne v. City, 32

Fed. 36.

It is alleged as a cause for a new trial that

some of the jurors were guilty of misconduct.

The evidence upon this point very fully and

satisfactorily supports the ﬁnding of the

court, and we cannot interfere. It has long

[Cuse No. 72

open to the objection that they ask for evi- years go by. Her vision 111 alTected, her
dence, and not facts. There is everywhere in bands and legs are partially, If not totally
jurisprudence an Important dllTerence be- paralyzed, and the1·e ls 1;ome curyature of the
tween evidence and facts, and In no branch spine. It ls Yery apparent, therefore, th:it
of jurisprudence Is it more Important than ln there ls evidence fully warranting the Inferthat which governs the verdicts and findings ! ence that the appellee ls a physical wreck,
of juries. It would lead to most evil conse- and, Indeed, the evidence fairly justifies the
quences to permit a party to compel the jury Inference that her mental powers are se1ito rehearse mere items of evidence. But 1t ously Impaired. We cannot, under the cirls needless to discuss the question; our stat- cumstances, declare that the danlllges are
ute and our decisions forbid the practice the result of passion, prejudice, or co1·111phere defended by the appellant. We cannot tlon, 11IJ.d It ls only where this can be justly
examine the Interrogatories ln detail; lt ill asserted that a verdict can be set aside.
enough to say that lf there was error at all Hoogland v. l\loore, 2 Blnckf. 167; Guard v.
In the ruling of the court, as we think there Risk, 11 Ind. 156; Yater v • .Mullen, 23 Ind.
was, It was ln giving some of the Interroga- 562; Alexander v. Thomas, 25 Ind. 268;
tories submitted by the party who now com- I Reeves v. State, 37 Ind. 441; Rallway Co. v.
plains. The :W Interrogatories submitted in- Collarn, 73 Ind. 261; Railway Co. v. Fix. 88
cluded 15 of those asked by appellant, and Ind. 381; Cur Co. v. Parker, 100 Ind. 181;
certainly were as many as it was proper to Turnpike Oo. v. Andrews, 102 Ind. 138, 1 X.
submit; they were, ·indeed, more than the E. 3!i4; Hallway Co. v. Falvey, supra; Unllroad Co. v. Holland, 18 Ill• .App. 418; Oroyes
case required.
There ls evidence very satisfactorily prov- 1 v. Rochester, 39 Hun, 5; Osborne v. City, 32
ing that prior to the accident l!rs. Woods I Fed. 30.
was a strong and healthy woman about 40 I It ls allegec'I. as a cause for a new trial that
years of age. It ls further shown that her some of the jurors were gullty of misconduct.
husband was a paralytic, and that she did The evidence upon this point very fully and
the household work of a woman, and the satisfactorily supports the finding of the
work of a man lu managing the business af- court, and we cannot Interfere. It has long
fairs of a farm. The evidence ·also shows been the rule In this, as In other np)l('llnte
that prior to the accident she did a farmer's comts, that, where a question of fact Is debard work; such as hauling wood, making cided by the trial court, lt wlll not be dis·
hay, and the llke. Since the accident she has turbed lf there Is e\·ldence fairly sustaining
been physically almost helpless, and ls una- lt. Pedigo v. Grimes (May term) 13 N. E.
ble to do any work. Her Injuries ue of a 700, and authorities cited.
permanent nature, and, from the evidence,
"\Ye have thus, with patience and care, exthe falr Inference Is that she wlll probably amined all the questions properly saved, and,
grow worse. She bas sulTered much, and, It as we are not able to find any error, we must
ls reasonably certain, wlll suf!'er more as the afllrm the judgment.
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Case No. 73]
Case No. 73]

.RELEVANCY. .

CITY OF BLO().\IING'I‘O.\’ v. SHROCK.

(110 Ill. 219.)

Supreme Court of Illinois. June 11, 1884.

Appeal from appellate court, Third dis-

trict.

, RELEVANCY•.

BLOOill~GTO~

v. SHROCK.
(110 Ill. 219.)
Supreme Court of Illinois. June 11, 1884.

CITY OF

Appeal from appellate court, Third district.
John T. Llllard, tor appellant. Fifer &
Phllllps, for appellee.

John T. Lillard, for appellant.

Phillips, for appellee.

Fifer &

SCH()I.I~‘IELD, J . This was an action on

the case for negligence, by appellee against

appellant. Appellee, a married woman, was

violently thrown down while walking along

a sidewalk adjacent to one of appellant's

streets, by reason of a defect in the side-

walk, and thereby received injuries which

she claimed resulted in causing her to have

an abortion. It was contended by appellant

upon the trial that she was guilty of such

contributory negligence as to bar her right
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to recover, in omitting proper care and cau-

tion to avoid the abortion; and this was the

most important question upon the trial, al-

though there were other questions of minor

consideration contested. '

Dr. Luce was called and examined as a.

witness on behalf of appellant, as an expert,

and gave evidence tending to prove that ap-

pellee was guilty of negligence in the re-

spect contended by appellant. He quoted

from and made reference to no book. but

upon his cross-examination counsel for ap-

pellee inquired of him whether he was ac-

quainted with “Playfa.ir” and “Bedi’ord"

(treatises on midwifery), and, upon his re-

sponding in the affirmative, and that they

were standard authorities on questions of

this character, counsel proceeded to read at

length from each of these authors, consec-

utively, and then inquired of the witness

whether he agreed with the authors as to

the parts so read. This was objected to by

the counsel for appellant, but allowed by

the court, and the witness was required to

inalze answer.

The weight of current authority is decid-

edly against the admission of scientiﬁc

books in evidence before a jury, although

in some states they are admissible. 1

Greenl. Ev. § 440, and note; Whart. Ev. §

665; Rog. Exp. Test. §§ 168, 169, et seq., and

cases cited in notes. And the weight of

current authority is, also, against allowing

such treatises to be read from, to contra-

dict an expert, generally. See authorities

supra, and Com. v. Sturtevant, 117 Mass.

122; Davis v. State, 38 Md. 15; State V.

()’Brien, 7 R. I. 336. Where, however, an
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expert assumes to base his opinion upon the

work of a particular author, that work may

be read in evidence to contradict him. This

was, in eifect, our ruling in Insurance Co.

v. Ellis, 89 Ill. 516; and it was expressly so

ruled in Pinney v. Cahill, -18 Mich. 584, 12 H.

W. 862; City of Ripon v. Bristol, 30 Wis.

614; and Huffman v. Click, 77 N. C. 55.

See, also, Marshall v. Brown, 50 Mich. 148,

15 N. W. 55; Rog. Exp. Test. § 181.

SCHOL~'IELD, J.
Thia was an action OD
the t'88e for negligence, by appellee against
appellant. Appellee, a married woman, wae
violently thrown down while walking along
a sidewalk adjacent to one of appellant'•
streete, by reason of a detect In the sidewalk, and thereby received Injuries which
she claimed resulted In causing her to have
an abortion. It was contended by appellant
upon the trlal that she was guilty of such
contributory negligence as to bar her right
to recover, In omitting proper care and caution to avoid the abortion; and this was the
most Important question upon the trial, although there were other questions of minor
consideration contested.
·
Dr. Luce was called and examined as a
wltne88 on behalf of appellant, as an expert,
and gave evtdence tending to prove that appellee was guilty of negligence In the re11pect contended by appellant. He quoted
from and made reference to no book. but
upon bis cro88-examlnatlon counsel for appellee inquired of him whether be was acquainted with "Playfalr" and "Bedford"
(treatises on midwifery), and, upon his responding In the atflrmatlve, and that they
were standard authorities on questions ot
this character, counsel proceeded to read at
length from each of these authore, consecutively, and then Inquired of the witness
whether he agreed with the author11 as to
the parts so read. This was obje<'ted to by
the couneel for appellant, but allowed by
the court, and the witness was required to
mn!!:e answer.
The weight of current authority Is decidedly against the admission of scientific
books In evidence before a jury, although
In some states they are admissible. 1
Greenl. Ev. f 440, and note; Whart. Ev. f
(}(};); Rog. Exp. Test. ff 168, 169, et seq., and
<'ase11 elted In notes. And the weight of
<'Urrent authority is, also, against allowing
RU<'h treatises to be read from, to contradl<'t an expert, genemlly. See authorities
1mpra, and Com. v. Sturtevant, 117 Mass.
12'..?; Davis v. State, 38 Md. 15; State v.
O'Brien, 7 R. I. 336. Where, however, an
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expert assumes to base his opinion upon the
work of a particular author, that work may
be read in evidence to contradict him. Thi•
was, In effect, our ruling In Insurance Co.
v. Ellls, 89 Ill. 516; and It was expressly so
ruled In Pinney v. Cahill, 48 Mich. 584, 12 ! ....
W. 862; City of Ripon v. Bristol, 30 Wis.
614; and Hutrman v. Click, 77 N. C. 65.
See, also, Marshall v. Brown, 50 Mich. 148,
15 N. W. 55; Rog. Exp. Test. 1181.
But counsel for appellee Insist the ruling of the court below ls In exact conformity
with the ruling of this court In Insurance
Co. v. Ellis, supra. Thie ls a mlsapprehen·
slon. In that case the witness stated "that
he had read text books that he ml&"ht be
able to state why he diagnosed the case as
delirium tremens"; and It was held "not un·
fair to the wltne88 to call his attention to
the definitions given In the books of that
particular disease, and· asking him whether
be concurred In the definitions." And It
was said: "That ls, In no just sense, reading books to the jury a.s evidence, or for the
purpose of contradicting the witness." 'l'he
source of his professed knowledite was given, and It was allowed to show that he was
mistaken, by resorting to that souree. In
the present case, It bas been seen, the course
pursued was entirely different. The wltnesa
based no opinion which be gave upon the
authority of books, and they were only
brouitht In to Impair his ~vldence on croseexamlnation.
Where a wltne88 says a thing or a theory
ls so beeause a book says eo, and the book,
on being produced, ls discovered to say directly to the contrary, there le a direct contradiction which anybody can understand.
But where a wltne88 simply gives his opinion as to the proper treatment of a given qi•
ease or Injury, and a book is produced reeommendlng a different treatment, at most
the repugnance ls not of fact, but of theory;
and any number of additional books expressing dlft'erent theories would obvtously
be quite as competent ae the first. But
sln<'e tile books are not admissible as original evidence In such cases, •t must follow
that they are not admissible on cross-examination, where their Introduction ls not for
the direct contradiction of something asserted by the witness, but simply to prove a
contrary theory.
We think the court erred In admitting this
evidence, and for that error the judgment
ie reversed, and the cause remanded.
Judgment reversed.

EXPEl\TS.
EXPERTS.

[Case No. 74

SIZOCOVICH et al. v. ORIENT MUT. INS.

CO.

(14 N. E. 802, 108 N. Y. 56.)

Court of Appeals of New York. Jan. 17, 1888.

Action by George Slocovich and others

against the Orient Mutual Insurance Com-

pany on a policy of marine insurance; Judg-

ment was rendered for plaintitfs by the gen-

eral term, and the defendant appeals.

SLOCOVICH et al. v. ORIE!'IT :MUT. INS.

co.

(14 N. Ill. 802, 108 N. Y. 56.)
Court of Appeals of New York. Jan. 17, 1888.
Action by George Slocovlch and others
against the Orient .Mutual Insurance Company on a policy of marine Insurance; Judgment was rendered for plalntld's by the gen~ral term, and the defendant appeals.
Edward M. Shepard, for appellant. Sldne7
Chubb, tor respondents.

Edward M. Shepard, for appellant. Sidney

Chubb, for respondents.

EARL, J. This action was brought to re-.

cover on a policy of marine insurance issued

by the defendant to insure a “port risk in

the port of New York” upon the ship Zorka.

The policy was in favor of the plaintiffs, un-

der their ﬁrm name of Slocovich & 00., "on

account of whom it may concern;" loss, if

any, to be paid to them or order. The risks
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which, by the terms of the policy, the de-

fendant assumed, were, among others, “per-

ils of the seas, ﬁres, and all other perils,

losses, and misfortunes that have or shall

come to the hurt, detriment, or damage of

the said vessel, or any part thereof." The

ship was valued in the policy at the sum of

$111000, and was insured for $11,001). It was

alleged in the complaint that after the issuing

of the policy, and on or about the ﬁfth day

of April, 1883, the Zorka, while lying at an-

chor in the port of New York, was burned

and partially destroyed by the perils insured

against. The answer admitted the making

of the policy, and that on the day named the

ship was burned and partially destroyed by

ﬁre, but denied that the plaintiffs had an

insurable interest in her to the amount of

$16.000, or, otherwise, that she was destroy-

ed by perils insured against in the policy;

and alleged by way of counter-claim that

the valuation of $16,000 was excessive to the

plaintiffs‘ knowledge; that the ship was in

fact worth not more than $5.000; that she

was by the plaintiffs valued at $16,000

fraudulently, and to defraud and induce the

defendant to accept such valuation and ex-

ecute the policy, and that the defendant, re-

lying on the accuracy of such valuation,

made and delivered the policy, and that she _

was burned and destroyed by ﬁre by and

through the act and negligence of the plain-

tiffs, and by and with their knowledge, pro-

curement, and assent; and judgment was

demanded for the defendant that the com-

plaint be dismissed, that the policy be ad-

judged and decreed void and of no effect,

and that the same be delivered to defendant

for cancellation. To the counter-claim the

plaintiffs served a reply, denying the allega-

tions thereof. At the trial the issues of fact

litigated were as to the insurable interest

of the plaintiffs in the vessel; as to the cause

of the ﬁre,-—the claim on the part of the

defendant being that the ship was set on

tire by the captain, at the instigation of, and

in collusion with, the plaintiifs; and as to

the value of the ship,—the claim of the de

fendant being that there was a fraudulent

EARL, J. Thia action was brought to re-.
<!Over on a policy of marine Insurance issued
by the defendant to Insure a "port risk In
the port of New York" upon the ship Zorka.
The pollcy was in favor of the plalntlft'.s, under their firm name of SiO<!Ovicb & Co., "on
account of whom it may concern;" loss, if
any, to be paid to them or order. The risks
which, by the terms of the policy, the defendant assumed, were, among others, "perils of the seas, fires, and all other perils,
10illle8, and misfortunes that have or shall
<!Ome to the hurt, detriment, or damage of
the said vessel. or any part thereof." The
ship wa11 valued in the policy at the sum of
$16,000, and waa insured for $11,000. It wu
alleged In the complaint that after the l.ssuing
of the policy, and on or about the fifth day
-Of April, 1883. the Zorka, wblle lying at an<:hor In the port of New York, was burned
and partially destroyed by the perils Insured
against. The answer admitted the making
-0f the policy, and that on the day named the
ahlp wa11 burned and partially de8troyed b7
fire, but dented that the plaintld's had an
Insurable Interest in her to the amount of
$16.000, or, otherwise, that she was destroyed by perils insured against in the policy;
and alleged by way of counter-claim that
the valuation of $16,000 was excessive to the
plaintift'.s' knowledge; that the ship was in
fact worth not more than $:i,000; that she
was by the plalntld's valued at $10,000
frauclulently, and to defraud and induce the
dt•ft•ndant to accept such valuation and execute the policy, and that the defendant, relying on the accuracy of such valuation,
made and dellvered the pollcy, and that she
was burned and destroyed by fire by and
through the act aad negligence of the plaintld's, and by and with their knowledge, pro-curement, and assent; and judgment was
demanded for the defendant that the complaint be dismlll8ed, that the policy be adjudged and decreed void and of no ed'ect,
and that the same be delivered to defendant
for cancellation. To the counter-claim the
plalntld's served a reply, denying the alle~a
tlons thereof. At the trial the issues of fact
litigated were as to the Insurable int{'rest
of the plalnturs in the Ye88el; as to the cause
of the ftre,-the claim on the part of the
<lefendant being that the ship was set on
tlre by the captain, at the instigation of, and
in collwdon with, the plalntllrs; and as to

the value of the ship,-the claim of the defendant being that there was a fraudulent
overvaluatlon. Upon these issues of fact
there was su11lcient evidence for the conBideration of the jury; · and their determina·
tion, having been satisfactory to and approved by the general term, concludes us.
We deem it important now elmply to notice
a few of the principal errol's relied upon for
a reversal of the judgment.
1. As above stated, there was an issue upon the trial u to the value of the vessel at
the time of her insurance, and of her destruction soon thereafter by fl.re, and several
experts were called and testlded upon both
sides as to her value, who varied widely in
their judgment& Among the witneBBes called on the part ot the defendant was Francis
A. Martin, who testified that he was a marine surveyor; that he had been engaged In
that business altogether 25 years; that he
had followed the sea six or seven years, and
had been In command of a vessel; that his
business had led him to be familiar with the
market values of veBSels In the port of New
York for 10 years; that In his regular business be had been called upon to value vessels, principally by adjusters of averages;
that he knew the ship Zorka, and had been
on board of her a good many times, but not
within five or six years. He st.a ted, in answer to a question, that he thought he waa
able,from hlsexperienceand pel'80nal knowledge, and the pe1'80nal examination he had
made of her, to form an opinion aa to her
value in 1883. He was then asked this question: "What, in your judgment, judging
from your personal knowledge of the vessel
gathered from your personal observation,
and your knowledge of the ordinary results
of wear and tear In ordinary use, was the
market value In the port of New York of the
ship Zorko. in the month of .A.prll, 18S3 t•
This question was objected to by the plaintid's, and excluded by the court, on the
ground, as we must assume from the record,
that the witness did not have su11lclent
knowledge of the vessel to testify as to her
value at the time she was bumed. It wlll
be observed that the witness was asked for
his judgment based solely upon his personal
knowledge. 1t was for the trial judge to
determine, in the first instance, whether the
wltneBB was competent as an expert to testify to the value of this vessel. He had not
seen her for five or six years, and knew nothing about her condition at the time of her
destruction. It did not appear what her condition was at the time he last saw he1·; and
it appeared that, subsequently to that time,
and after the year 1880, the plalntltrs had expended at least $i,OOO in re1>alrlu.g her. Under such circumstances, we cannot say that
the judge committed any error In e:iwluding the testimony. If the evidence had been
received it certainly would not have been
entitled to very much weight with the jury.
While It would not, we thl~k, have been er217
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roneous to receive and submit the evidence

to the jury for what it was worth, we cannot

say, as matter of law, that the judge ex-

ceeded the bounds of a. reasonable discre-

tion in holding that the witness was not

qualiﬁed as an expert to give an opinion as

to the value of the ship at the time she was

burned. The rules determining the subjects

upon which experts may testify, and pre-

scribing the qualiﬁcations of experts, are

matters of law; but whether a witness of-

Iered as an expert has those qualiﬁcations is

generally a question of fact to be decided by

the trial judge; and it has been held that

his decision in reference thereto is not re-

viewable in an appellate court. Sarle v.

Arnold, 7 R. I. 582; Dole v. Johnson, 50 N.

H. 455; Jones v. Tucker, 41 N. H. 546;

Wright v. Williams, 47 Vt. 222. Without
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going the full length of these cases, it is

suﬂicient to hold here that the decision of the

trial judge in such a matter should not be

held to present an error of law, and on that

account be reversed, unless it is against the

evidence, or wholly or mainly without sup-

port in the facts which appear. Here, we

think, it was a fair matter for the judgment

of the trial judge whether this witness had

the requisite knowledge and qualitications

to give an opinion as an expert as to the

judgment is not the subject of review here.

witness and examined him as an expert as

to the value of the vessel. He tesiiiicd that

he had been a ship-broker and a ship-owner

in the city of New York for ten years past,

and for ﬁve years before that in London;

that in 1883 he knew the fair market value

of ships in the port of New York; that during

the last 15 years he had bought and sold over

200 ships and steam-boats; that he had seen

the Zorka once, and knew her from report,-—

from the books, the American Lloyds, the

Green Book, and the Record Book; that those

books were published in reference to the stand-

ing of all ships, giving their descriptions,

and are used by the underwriters and mer-

chants; that he never made any personal

examination of the Zorka, but that his knowl-

edge of her was substantially conﬁned to

the information he got from the general rec-

ords used ln his business and reports made

therein. b_v which he was always guided in

buying and selling ships. He was then ask-

ed this question: “Do you know what would

be a fair market value in the port of New

York during the months of March and April,

1883, of the Zorka?” The defendant object-

ed to the question, on the ground that the

witness had no personal knowledge of the

vessel. The objection was overruled, and

the witness answered, “Yes, I know." This

was a mere preliminary question, and was of

itself entirely harmless, and no error was

committed by the court, in permitting it to

be answered. Thereafter, without any fur-

. ship.

‘~ an opinion.

ther objection, and apparently with the con-
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roneous to receive and submit the evidence
to the jury for what it was worth, we cannot
say, as matter of law, that the judge ex·
ceeded the bounds of a reasonable discretion ln holding that the witness was not
qunlllled as an expert to give an opinion as
to th<" \'nlue of the ship at the time she was
burned. The rules determining the subjects
upon which experts may testify, and prescribing the qualifications of experts, are
matters of law; but whether a witness Of·
fe1·ed ne an expert has those quaiUl.catlons ls
generally a question of fact to be decided by
the trial judge; and It has been held that
hls decision In reference thereto is not revlewahle In an appellate court. Sarle v.
Arnold, i R. I. 582; Dole v. Johnson, uO N.
H. 4a::i; Jones v. Tucker, 41 N. H. 546;
W1·lght v. Williams, 47 Vt. :?22. Wlthout
going the full length of these cases, It Is
sutttdent to hold here that the decision of the
trlnl judge In such a matter should not be
held to p1·esent an error of law, and on that
account be reversed, unless It Is against the
evidence, or wholly or mainly without support In the facts which appear. Here, we
think, It was a fair matter for the judgment
of the trial Judge whether this witness had
the requisite knowledge and quallllcatlons
to give an opinion as an expert as to the
value of this ship. And hence we think that
judgment le not the subject of review here.
2. '£he plaintiff called one Boyesen as a
witness and examined him as an expert as
to the value of the vessel. He testified that
he had been a ship-broker and a ship-owner
ln the city of New York for ten years past,
and for five years before that In London;
that In 1883 he knew the fair market value
of ships In the port of New York; that during
the last rn years he had bought and sold over
200 ships and steam-boats; that he had seen
the Zorka once, and knew her from report.from the books, the American Lloyds, the
Green Book, and the Uecord Book; that those
books were published ln reference to the standing of all ships, giving their desc11ptlons,
and are used by the underwl'lters and merchants; that he never made any personal
examination of the Zorka, but that his knowledge of her was substantially confined to
the Information be got from the general records used In his buslnei;s and reports made
thert!ln, by which he was always guided in
buying and selllng ships. He was then asked this question: "Do you know whnt would
be a fair market value in the port of New
York during the months of March and April,
1883, of the Zorka ?" The defendant objected to the question, on the ground that the
witness had no personal knowledge of the
vessel. The cbjectlon was ovel'ruled, and
the wltn!'ss answered, "Yes, I know." This
was a mere preliminary que11t1011, and was of
itselt entirely harmleRR, and no error was
committed by the court, In permitting It to
be answered. Thereafter, without any fur218
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ther objection, and apparently with the consent of the defendant, the witness was per·
mltted to testify as to the market value of
the Yessel. But If It should be assumed that
all the further evidence wa:1 s11~1Ject to the
same objection, we should still l.Je of opinion
that no error was committed In receiving lt.
It ls true that the witness bad no 'knowledge
ot thls vessel, based upon any personal examination, and that, substantially, ail his
knowledge 'vas derived from the report!'!,
books, and records to which he referred. But
there was evidence showing her age, ~oanage,
condition, and character. There waseyldence,
also, tending to show that those books and
records contained a full and accurate description of her character, condition. age, tonnage, and the material of which she was
made; and that they were commonly referred to by undenVl'lters, merchants, and persons buying and selllng ships, for the purpose of ascertaining the condition and description of the ships; and lt ls to be inferred that their standing In the market and
among business men depends somewhat, lf
not largely, upon those records. They were
regarded as sutflclently reliable for the guidance of underwriters, merchants, and buyers and sellers of ships; and they have been
so frequently before the courts that we may
take judicial notice of the fact that they are
referred to by business men for the purpose
of ascertaining the condition, capacity, age,
and value of ships. It was not a sutflclent
objection to the competency of this witness
that he had no personal knowledge of the
ship. An expert is qualified to give evidence
as to things which be has never seen. He
may base an opinion upon facts proved by
other wltnesKl'S, or upon tacts assumed and
embraced within the case. Questions may
be put to him assuming the tacts U(lOD which
he ls asked to base bis judgment and expreBB
an opinion. In this case, the question put
to the witness might have assumed the age,
tonnage, character, condition, and quality of
the vessel, and he could have been asked to
give an opinion as to her value based upon
such facts; or the facts relating to the vessel appearing in the books and reco1'tls which
he referred to, and which were also proved
upon the trial, might have beE-n assumed ln
the question put to the witness, and he asked
to give an opinion ns to her value based upon
them. The plaintiff was not asked to pursue
this course In putting his question, and there
w11s no objection that the witness did not
have sufficient facts before him upon wllkh
to base bis opinion 11!1 to the Ynh11> of th•'
ship. The sole objection was that he did
not have personal knowledge of the vessel.
It seems to have been assumed that the character, condition, and quality of tilt' ,.,.,.,.cJ
were sutflclcntly proved, and that all the coudltions existed which would qualify the \Vttness to ~ive nn opinion ns to 'l'alue. except
that of personal knowledge, and that, as we
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have seen, was not necessary. If the de-

fendant had requested that the facts appear-

ing in the evidence should be assumed and

stated in an hypothetical question, it is fair

to assume that his request would have been

complied with. We are therefore of opinion

that there was no error in receiving the evi-

dence of this witness as to the value of the

vessel.

3. Alfred Ogden, defendant's vlce-presi-

dent, was called by it as a witness, and ask-

ed this question: “According to your under-

standing of the use of words in the business

of insurance, what do the words ‘port risk’

mean?” This was objected to on the part of

the plaintiff as being no longer an open ques-

tion in this state, as the court of appeals had

settled what “port risk" means, in Nelson v.

Insurance Co., 71 N. Y. -153. The court ex-
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cluded the question, and the defendant ex-

cepted to the ruling. The counsel for the de-

fendant gave the court no information as to

what he expected to prove by the witness,

and in no way indicated the particular pur-

pose of the question. The attention of the

court was called to the case referred to,

where it is stated in the opinion that “port

risk in a marine insurance policy means a

risk upon a vessel while lying in port, and

before she had taken her departure upon

another voyage." That decision having been

made several years before this policy was is-

sued, we think it just to hold that the term

must have been used in the policy with the

meaning thus given to it by this court. If

if was the purpose of the question to show

that it did have sucn meaning, then it was

wholly unnecessary. If it was intended to

show that it had any other or different mean-

ing, or if there was any other purpose, the

intent and purpose should have been dis-

closed to the court, so that the proper ruling

could have been intelligently made. It is

impossible to perceive what the object of the

question was, as, at the time of her destruc-

tion, the vessel was in the port of New York,

and had not yet started upon her voyage.

She was not rigged for the voyage, and her

crew had not yet been shipped. It is impos-

sible to perceive why the destruction of the

vessel under such circumstances was not a

“port risk in the port of New York;" and the

trial judge did not err, in the absence of any

further information than was given him. in

so holding. But we think that in all policies

issued in this state since the opinion in the

case referred to was pronounced and pub-

lished, these words should have the meaning

given them therein, as it is most probable

that such would be the meaning attached

to them by the parties using them.

4. The defendant's counsel requested the

court to charge the jury as follows: "The

burden of proof is on the plaintiffs to estab-

lish to your satisfaction that the loss of this

vessel took place without any agency or in-

strumentality of the plaintiffs, direct or in-

direct,” and that “the plaintiﬂ's must estab-

have seen, was not necessary. If the de·
fendant had requested that the facts appearing in the evidence should be assumed and
stated In an hypothetical question, it ls fair
to assume that his request would have been
<.'Omplled with. We are therefore of opinion
that there was no error in receiving the evidence of this wltne88 as to the value of the
vessel.
3. Alfred Ogden, defendant's vice-president, was cnlled by it as a witness, and asked this question: "According to your understanding ot the use of words in the business
of insurance, what do the words 'port rlsk'
mean?" This was objected to on the part of
the plalntur as being no longer ari open question in this state, as the court o! appeals had
settled what "port risk" means, ln Nelson v.
Insurance Co., 71 N. Y. 4:;3. The court excluded the question, and the defendant excepted to the ruling. The counsel !or the defendant gave the court no information us to
what he expected to prove by the witness,
and in no way indicated the particular purpose of the question. '£he attention of the
court was called to the case referred to,
where lt ls stated in the opinion that "port
risk In a marine Insurance pollcy means a
risk upon a vessel while lying in port, and
before she had taken her departure upon
another voyage." That decision having been
made several years before this policy was issued, we think it just to hold that the term
must have been used in the policy wlth the
meaning thus given to it by this court. If
lf was the purpose of the question to show
that It did have sucn meaning, then 1t was
wholly unnecessary. If lt was Intended to
show that It had any other or dl!Terent meaning, or if there was any other purpose, the
Intent and purpose should have been disclosed to the court, so that the proper ruling
could have been intelligently made. It ls
Impossible to perceive what the object of the
question was, as, at the time of her destruction, the vessel was ln the port of New York,
and bad not yet started upon her voyage.
She was not rigged for the voyage, and her
crew bad not yet been shipped. It ls impossible to perceive why the destruction of the
vessel under such circumstances was not a
"port risk in the port ot New York;" and the
trial judge dld not err, in the absence of any
further lu!ormatlon than was given him, ln
110 holding. But we think that ln all policies
Issued ln this state since the opinion ln the
ease referred to was pronounced and published, these words should have the meaning
given them therein, as lt ls most probable
that such would be the meaning attached
to them by the parties using them.
4. '.fhe defendant's counsel requested the
court to charge the jury as follows: "The
burden of proof ls on the plalntltTs to establish to your satisfaction that the loss of this
vessel took place without any agency or ln·
strumentallty of the plalntllrs, direct or ln-
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direct," and that "the plalntltTs must establlsh this fact, that the loss was without any
agency 01· instrumentality of theirs, by a
clear prC'ponderance of credible testimony."
The court refused to charge either of theserequests, and to the refusals the defendant
excC'pted; and it is now claimed thnt in this
the court erred. The rule contended for by
the defendant would be quite unfair and lmpractkal>le ln the trial of Insurance cases..
Wherl.l there ls an insurance against n loss
by tire, and lt ls proved or admitted thnt the
property Insured has been destroyed by fire,
the loss is brought llterally nud exactly
within the terms of the policy. If, in such a
case, the Insurance company claims to be exempt from paying the sum Insured, be<·nuse
there bas been a brench of some condition
cont.nlned in the pollcy, or the violation of
some obllgatlon or duty imposed upon thelnsured by the law or contract, the burden
rests upon lt to establl11h the facts whld1 it
thus relles upon as a defense to the claim
under the pollcy. Every presumption of law
ls against the commission of a crime, and ln
all forms o! action, clvll and crlmlnnl, every person ls presumed to be Innocent untll
his guilt has been e11tnbllshed by at least a
preponderance of evidence. These humane·
rules of law would be violated If a person
suing upon a policy insuring hls property
against fire was bound to assume the bm·den
of showing that he was not guilty of the
crime of burning bis own property. The defendant making that allegation against him
must bear the burden of establishing lt. Tidmarsh v. Insurance Co., 4 Mason, 439, Fed.
Cas. No. 14,0-.:!4; lt'lske v. Insurance Co., 15
Pick. 310; Murray v. Insurance Co., 8;) N.
Y. 236; Hellman v. Lazarus, 00 N. Y. 6i2;
1 Greenl. Ev. § 35; Uoscoe, Ev. 52. The burden in such a case to prove the crime of lncendia11sm should rest upon him who alleges
lt, just as the burden of proving Insanity
rests upon hlm who assails a wlll, deed, orotber Instrument upon that ground. 1 Wllllams, Ex'rs (6th Am. Ed.) 24; 1 Uedf. Wllls,
c. 3, § 4; Schouler, Wllls, H 147, 173. In
1 Greenl. Ev. (Red!. Ed.) I 80, the learned
author says: "Where the negative allegation
Involves a criminal neglect of duty, whether
oftl.clal or otherwise, or fraud, or the wrongful violation ot actual lawful possession of
property, the party making the allegation
must prove It; for In these cases the presumption of law, which ls always In fuvor
of Innocence and of quiet possession, ls ln
favor of the party charged." Here the burn·
Ing and destruction of the vessel nre admitted ln the answer, and the defendant makes
the allegation and tenders the Issue that the
fire was caused by the insured; and in such
a caHe lt ls a just rule to hold thnt the defendant, by the Issue lt has thus mnde, has
assuml'd the burden of maintaining Its allega tlons.
We have carefully considered the other al219
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legations of error to whlr-h our attention has further attention here. The judgment should

been called, and are satisﬁed that they are be aﬂirmed, with costs.

not well founded. They are suﬂiciently .All concur, except ANDREWS and PECK-

treated in the oplnlon below, and need no HAM, JJ., dissenting.
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legations of error to whfrh our attention has
been called, and are eatlsfl.m that they are
not well founded. They al'e sufficiently
tl'ented In the opinion below, and need no

220

further attention here. The judgment should
be affirmed, with costs.
. All concur, except ANDREWS and PECKHAM, JJ., dlBBentlng.

EXPEl.T3.
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PEOPLE V. MCELVAINE.

(24 N. E. 46-3, 121 N. Y. 250.)

Court of Appeals of New York. April 29, 1890.

Appeal from court of oyer and terminer,

Kings county.

George .il. Curtis, for appellant. James

W. Ridgway, Dist. Atty., for respondent.

RUGER, C. J. The defendant upon trial

was convicted of the crime of murder in

the ﬁrst degree, for having killed one Luca.

in his own house, in Brooklyn, about 3

o'clock in the morning of the 23d day of

August, 1889. The evidence showed that

the defendant entered the house through

a window in the second ﬂoor. by means of

a ladder, which he found on the premises,

and that such entrance was effected by

forcibly removing a wire screen from the

window. Access to this window was ob-
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tained from a. back yard, into which an

unlocked gate opened i'rom the street.

The deceaed was killed by stabs with a

knife inﬂicted upon him while endea voring

to forcibly prevent the escape of the ac-

cused from the room which he ﬁrst en-

tered. Twelve stabs were given. of which

four were described to have been mortal.

The defendant was positively identiﬁed by

two persons who saw him in the net of

inﬂicting the wounds, and wasimmediate-

ly arrested by the police officers in the

street near the gate, within 100 feet of the

premises, with a bloody knife in his pos-

session. Independent of the confessions

subsequently made by the defendant to

the police officers and others, no doubt

could possibly be entertained, on the evi-

deuce. as to the identiﬁcation of the ac-

cused us the person who committed the

homicide. No effort was therefore made

on the trial to show that he was not the

person who caused the death of Luca.

The soiedeiense attempted was the alleged

insanity of the accused. Considerable evi-

dence was given on the trial in his behalf,

tending to show that he possessed a. de-

fective mental organization, and was sub-

ject to delusions and hallucinations. which

were claimed to be evidence oi his insani-

ty. Two witnesses were called on his be-

half, as experts. who respcc tively gave evi-

dence tending to show a belief that he

was, to a certain degree, insane. Two ex-

pert witnesses were also called on behalf

oi the prosecution, to give opinions upon

the question of the defendant's sanity, and

each testified that he wus.in their opinion.

sane. itcannot be questioned but that the

evidence of these witnesses was material,

and had weight with the jury, upon the

question of the deiendant’s men tai condi-

tion. If these opinions were based upon an

erroneous hypothesis, and were founded

in any material respect upon indeﬁnite or

unascertainabie conditions, or upon con-

siderations which were not the proper sub-

jectof expert evidence, they must be re-

gezzrded as having been erroneously admit-

(24 N. E. 463, 121 N. Y. 260.)
Court of Appeals of New York. April 29, 1800.

Appeal from court of oyer and termlner,
Kings county.
George .\I. Curtis, for appellant. James
W. Ridgwll.J', Dist. Atty., for respondent.
RUGER, C.J. The defendant upon trial
was convicted of the crime of murtler In
the first degree, for ha vlng killed one Luca.
In bis own house, In Brooklyn, about 3
o'clock In the morning of the 23d day of
August, IRS&. The evidence showed that
tbe defendant entered the house through
a window In the second door, by means of
a ladder, which he found on the premb1es,
and that such entrance was ettected by
forcibly removing a wh-e scr~n from the
wludow. Access to this window was obtained from a. back yard, Into which an
unlocked gate opene•l from the strt>et.
The deceased was kmed by stabs with a
knife lnftlcted upon him while endeavoring
to forcibly prevent the escape of the accul!ed from the room which he first entered. Twelve stttbs were given, of which
four were described to have been mortal.
The defendant was posltlvelyldentlfted by
two persons who saw him In the act of
IDftlctlng the wounds, and was Immediately arrested by the police officers In the
street near the gate, within 100 feet of the
premises, with a bloody knife In his posBe881on. Independent of the confesslon11
subsequently made by the defendant to
the police officers and others, no doubt
could possibly be entertained, on the evidence, as to the Identification of the accused a.s th~ penion who committed the
homicide. No effort was therefore made
on the trial to show that he was not the
person who caused the death of Luca.
'l'he aoledefeneeattempted was the alleged
Insanity of the accused. Con1ddera.ble evidence was given on the trial In his behalf,
tending to flhow that be posseH1ttl(l a defective mental organization, and WWI subject to delu11loneand halluclnatlons. which
were claimed to bP. evidence or hh1 lntmntty. Two witnesses were called on hie behalf, as experts, who res11rettvely gave evidence tenc.llng to show a belief that he
was, to a certain degree, Insane. 1.'wo expert witnesses were also called on behalf
of the prosecution, to glvt> opinions upon
the question of the defe11da.nt'11sanity,aml
eacb teetUlec.l that he w11s. ln their opinion,
sanP.. It cannot be q uestloned but that the
evidence of tbetie wltnesi;eii was matcrt11l,
and hud weight with the Jury, upon the
question of the defendant's mental condition. If these opinions were bused upon an
erroneoua hypothesis, aml we1·p founded
In any material respect upon ludeflnitc or
11n1U1Certalnahle conditions, or upon conelderattons which were not the pro1wr subject of expert evidence, they must bt• regarded as ha.Ying been erroneously adwltt.ed.

The only serious objection to the conviction arlfleS upon an exce}ltion to the
ruling of the r.ourt 11ermlttlng Dr. Gray,
a wltnt'88 for the prosecution, and an expert of high reputation and character, to

[Case No i:>

answer, against objection, a hypothetical
question ae to the defendant ·s sanity.
The que11tlon put by the dlstl'ict attornt>y,
and the proc8Eldlngs accompanying thtt
question, were as follows: "\!uestlon.
.!Sow, are you able toea.y whether, In your
JmJgment, based upon all the testimony,
the acts ol the defendant on tht' night of
this homicide. the testimony as to lus past
lHe. given by the witnesses In his defense,
and based upon the whole case, whether
this young wan ls sane or insane? Mr.
Curtis. I object, as It Is not a queatlon
properly put. The Court. Wbynot'? Mr.
Curtis. It ls too vague and Indefinite. In
order to put an hypothetical question properly, ao say the court of appe11ls, It must
consist or specltl<'ally pro\"en facts, whkh
come within the pale of the proof; not
where a penion, for Instance, is permitted
to gt ve au anomalous opinion. TbeCourt.
You had better frame the question. Atr.
Ridgway. Then I will ask thestenogra)>l1er
to read all the evidence to this wl tness.
The Court. I don't "lee why the question ls
not competent. Mr. Curtis. The way ls,
to take compact, substantial, <'oncentrated oral proof,-what the learned counsPl
relies on to prove the defendant ls sane.
The Court. Where a medical wltneas, who
Is called as an expert, has been In court
during the whole trial, and beard all th&
testimony in the case, everything that has
been done and said by everybody, I don't
see why It iB not competent to ask him
whPther, upon those facts, all he heard
te11tlfled to, he thinks the defemlunt ls.
sane or Insane. This wltnesa has heard
all that hes been sworn to by eiveryhody.
To the Witness. You have heard all th&
testimony In the case? The District Attorney. Pase the whole testimony of th&
prosecution and the defcn~e. Including
the hypothetical question put by Judge
Curtis, an<l everythi~ that you heurd
sworn to here,-now wm you answer thequestlon? (Thedefenseexcepts.) A. lhavtt
formed an opinion. Q. l:)ta.te It. lThedefem1e exceptit.) A. I believe the defendant
Is sane. CJ. What do you believe be was
at the time or the commission of the offense·! A. I believe he was sane at thetime of the commission of the offense."
We cannot doubt hut that this question
was Improper. The witneBs wus thus.
permitted to take Into consideration all
the evidence In the case given upon a long
trial, extending over nine days, and, upon
so much of It its he could recollect, determine ror hlmAelf thP. credibility of the witnesses, the prohablllty or lmprohat>lllty of
their statementlt, and, drawing therefrom
such Inferences as, In his judgment, were
warranted by It, pronounce upon the sanity or lmmnlty of the defendant. It cannot be questioned but that the wltnl•ss
was by the quesrlon put In tbepluce of the
Jury, 11n<l was allowed to <lett>rmlne, upon
hl11 own judgment, what their verdict
onght to be In the case.
It hardly needs discussion or authority
to show the Impropriety of thl11 question.
and, Indeed, the learnec.l trial Jm.lge, at a
sub111equent stnge of the proccedlngs, emphatically proteRted agalnc1t the Implication that he had permlttetl such aqueHtlon
to be put to the witness. A reference to
221
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the record, however, shows that thecourt

must then have been laboring under some

misconception as to what had really tak-

en place. Thismigbt reasonably have bap-

pened to any judge from the prejudice ex-

cited by the exasperating mode in which

the defense was conducted by the prison-

er's counsel. The rule as to the condi-

tions governing the formation of hypo-

thetical questions to expert has frequent-

ly been discussed and illustrated in the re-

ported cases in this court. It was said by

Judge Asnimws, in the case of People v.

Barber, 115 N. Y. 491, 22 N. E. Rep. I82,

that “the opinion oi medical experts. as

to the sanity or insanity of thedefendant.

based upon the testimony in the case, as-

sumed for the purpose oi the examination

to be true, was undoubtedly competent.
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S0. in connection with their opinion, they

could be permitted to state the reason

upon which it was founded. ' ' ‘ But

inferences from facts proved are to be

drawn and found by thejury, and cannot

be proved as facts by the opinion of wit-

nesses. " In Reynolds v. I{obinson,6-i N. Y.

595, Judge EARL, in speaking of evidence

attempted to be given under an hypothet-

ical question, says: “In such a case it is

not the province of the witness to recon-

cile and draw inierences from the evidence

of other witnesses, and to take in such

facts as he thinks their evidence has estab-

lished. or as he can recollect and carry in

his mind, and thus form and express an

opinion. His opinion may be obtained by

stating to him a hypothetical case, taking

in some or all of the facts stated by wit-

nesses, and claimed by counsel putting the

question to be established by their evi-

dence, and when the question is thus stat-

ed the witness basin his mind a definite

state of facts, and the province of the

triers. whether referees or jurors. is not

interfered with. ” So, too, it was said by

-Iudge Mff.I.l<2Riil Gnlterman v. Steam-Ship

Co., 83 N. Y. 358, thatitis not theprovlnce of

an expert witness “to draw inferences, or

to take in such facts as he can recollect,

and thus form an opinion.” In Gregory

v. Railroad Co., reported in 28 N. Y. st. Rep.

726. 8 N.Y. Supp. 525, the court hold ' “An

expert witness cannot be asked to give an

opinion based upon what he has heard

other witnesses testify. Such opinion must

be based on an liypotlietical question con-

taining iucts which are assumed to have

been proven. ” Thecase of People v.Lake,

I2 N. Y. 3.38, is not an authority for appel-

lant on the question under discussion.

'l‘hc court in that casc did not concur in

the opinion written, but placed theirdecls-

ion upon two propositions: one of which

only hen rs upon the question here, and

that was that “the court of oycr and ter-

mincr erred in permitting physicians, who

did not hear all the evidence relating to

the mental condition of the prisoner, to
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tht• reco1·1!, however, shows that thecourt
must then ha,·e been laboring under some
mlBt'Onl·eptlon as to what bad really tak-t.'n place. 'l'hlK might reasonably have ha1>pened to any judge from the prejudice ex-cited by the exasperating mode In whkh
the defense was conducted by the prlson.er's coum1el. 'l'be rula as to the eondltlonH go\·ernlng the formation of hypothetical 11u~tlons to experts has frequently been dlscusHed and Ulustrated In the reported cases In this court. It was said by
Judge ANDREWS, In the case of l'eople v.
UurlJer, 115 N. Y. 491, 22 N. E. Hep. 1~2,
thnt "the opinion of medical experts. as
to the sanity or Insanity or the defendant,
based upon the teHtimony In the case, assumed for the purpoite of the examination
to be true, was undoubtedly competent.
So. In connt..>etlon with their opinion, they
.could be pPrmltted to Htate the reason
upon which It was founded. • • • But
Inferences from facts proved are to be
drawn and found by the jury, and cannot
he proved as facts by the opinion of wltnestiee." In Reynolds v.Roblntion,M N. Y.
n95, Judg;e EARL, In speaking of evidence
attempted to be glYen under an hypothetical question, sa;ys: "In 1mch a case It Is
not the province of the wltneRS to reconelle and draw lnferenceH from the evidence
or other witnesses, and to take In Ritch
fact11 as be thinks their evhlence hasestabJIHhe<l. or as he can recollect and carry In
his mind, and thus form n.nd express an
OJ>lnlon. Hie opinion may be obtained by
Htu ting to him a. hypothE'tlcal case. taking
In eome or all of the f1tcts stat:.ed by wltne11ses, and claimed bycoun110J putting the
•111estlon to be eetabllehed by their evidence, and when the question Is thus eta.t-ed the witness hM In bis mind a definite
etate of facts, and the province of the
triers, whether reft-rees or jurors. ls not
interfered with." So, too, It was salll by
.I udge M1u,1rn In Gal term an v. Steam-Ship
Co., lo!3N. Y. 358, thatlt ls not thefJrovlneeor
an expert witness "to draw lnfN-enceH, or
to tnke In such facts as be can recollect,
and thus form an opinion." In Gregory
v. Railroad Co., reporterl In 28N. Y. ist. Rep.
726. SN. Y. Supp. 52.3, the court hold· "An
expert wltnei;e cannot be asked to give an
opinion based upon what he has heard
other wltnerises te11tlfy. Such opinion must
be bast"d on an hy11othetlcal question containing facts which are assumed to have
hf'011 pron•n." Tlleca110 of People v. Lake,
12 N. Y. aas. ls not an authority for appellant on the question under discussion.
The rourt in that caee did not concur In
the opinion written, b11t placed thelrdeclHlon upon two prop0Hltlon11: one of which
only hearH u11on the qul'Htlon here, and
that waH that "the court of oyer and termlner erred In permitting phyMlclam1, who
did not hear all the evhleure relating to
the mental condition of the prisoner, to
give oplnlone as to his sanity, founded on
the portion ht>ard by them.•• '.rhe qneHtlon waR not mooted or decided whether,
In •·nH•· thl'y had heard all of the evidence.
th('.\" 1·011ld give opinions based thereon:
hut it J>llHHC'd oft solely upon the question
wht>ther a perHon. who had heard only a
11urt of the t-vldence upon n trial, could
J1:lv1• an opinion bal'E'd u1>0n the portion of
the e\·idence HO beard by hlw. It 111 tt·ue
222

that an Implication may be drawn from
the decision that, if the witness bad beard
the whole evidence. he might properly
have given his opinion: but that qut>Htlon
was not In the case, and It falls far short
of being an authority on the point.
The ease of Sanchez v. People, 22 N. Y .
l!lO. le to a similar effect. Two opinions
were dellvert>d In that case-, but nt!llh1r ut
them secured the ~oncurrence of the court.
The decision was placed upon thE: declKlon
In the Hartung Cuse. (Id. 95.1 and had no
reference to the question under consideration here. The case of People v .1'hut"Hton, 2
Parker Crim. R. 49, woe In the supreme
court, and failed to secure the concurrence
of the C{iurt In the grounds upon which It
f..as decldPd. No rule was thel'Pfore legally formulated hy the decl11lon, but the
Inferences to be drawn from the opinions
read are plelnly opposed to the people's
contention here. No other decisions from
this state are cited, and we deem It unnecessary to discuss or consider the ruleR prevalllnar In other countrll'B, In view of the
reported 1lf'clslons made In our own courts.
An attempt was subsequently made to,
In some dE'gree, cure the error committed,
hy proving by the wltneRS that In answering the question be assumed the truth of
the evidence given by the defendant'll w1tnessee: but we think this did not remove
the vice Inherent In the question. Even
ae thuR a.ft1-ctcd, It left the uncertainty of
hie memor.v as to all tht> evidence In the
case, and the fn>edom of hie Judgment as
to all other eYldf'nce, to give such weight
as he Mhould In hie own mind determine It
was entitled to, and substantially allowed
him to usurp the functions of the Jury In
declrllng the q uestlons of fact. We think It
Is not competent, In any case. t.o predicate
an hypothetical question to an expert upon all of the evidence In the case, whether
he has heard It all or not, upon t·he assumption tbnt he then recollf'Cte It; for It
would then be tmpoKtJlble for t.he Jury to
determine the factH u1>on which the witness bases bis opinion, and whether such
facts were proved 01· not. 8uppose the
jury conclude that certain facts are not
proved, how ere they, In such an event,
to determine whether the opinion IR not.
to a great degree. b11eed upon such facts?
When epecltlc facts, either proved or asBttmed to have been proved, are embraced
In the qu1l8tlon, the jury are enabled to
determine whether the answer to such
11uet1tlon Is baKed upon facts which have
been pro,·ed In the case or not, and whether other facts heurlng upon the corrt'Ctnees and force of the answer are contained
therein or have been omitted from It: but,
111 the ubst•nce of such a qoeKtion, the evidence muHt always be, to a certain extent,
uncertain, unlntelllgtlJle, and, perhaps,
misleading. We regret that an error of
this char11etcr ls found In a case which
waR otherwise tried b.,. the lea med court
with au lntelllgent undt>t"Mtandlng or and
adhE>rence to the rules ol law applicable
to the ca11e, and a sttict regarll to the
rlithte of the accu1Jed; hut. In compllanre
with the uniform practice of courtH In ea.pltn I eases to uvold even thl:' poMlhlllty of
lnj11Htlce to the accu110d, we think the t>rror refE>rred to requires a new trial. All
COlll'Ul'.

HANDWRITING.
HANDWVRITING.
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WILSON ct al. v. VAN LEER et nx.

(17 Atl. 1097, 127 Pa. St. 371.)

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. June 28,

1889. __

Error to court of common pleas, Lancaster

county; D. W. Parrcnsoy, Judge. *

Issue derisavit oel non. Needliam Wil-

son died September 22. 1872. in Lancaster

county. His last will and testament, of

which the plaintiffs in error were executors,

having been duly executed on March 2, 1865.

was admitted to probate on September 28.

1872. On August 18, 1877, suit was brought

by Caroline Van Leer, formerly Carman.

upon the following instrument of writing:

"August 13th. 1865. I give these ﬁew lilies

to Caroline Carman to show that I want her

to have the sum of twelve hundred dolars

at my death she livd with mee A number of
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years And got verry little for it so i thought

it rite to leave her This little sum to be paid

to her out of my home property from NEED-

"AM WILSON.” At that time it was con-

tended for Caroline Van Leer that the paper

was a promissory note. and the court below

so held. but this court held it to be of a tes-

tamentary character, and that it would not

support an action of assumpsit. Wilson v.

Van Leer, 103 Pa. St. 600. .\_‘ubsequently.

on June 23, 1883. this paper was offered for

probate before the register of Lancaster

county as a codicil to the last will and theta-

ment of Needham Wilson, and, having been

admitted, upon an appeal taken by the plain-

tiffs in error. an issue decisavit vel non was

directed. There were no subscribing wit-

nesses to the execution of the paper. One

witness. a sister of Caroline Carman, testi lied

that she saw \\'ilson write and sign the paper,

and the only other witness called in support

of it was a brother, Cornelius Carman, who

undertook to testify to his signature from an

acquaintance with his handwriting. This

witness testified that he had seen Wilson

write once or twice when he. the witness.

was a boy 12 years old. 31 years before the

trial. and once afterwards, 23 years before

the trial, at a tavern in Lancaster. In com-

menting upon the testimony of the other

witness, who said she saw Wilson write and

sign the paper, one of the counsel for plain-

tiffs in error was about to show the jury, by

a reference to the almanac for 1865, that Au-

gust 13th was Sunday, which was in direct

conﬂict with her testimony. On objection

made by counsel, that as the almanac had

not been formally offered in evidence no ref-

en.-nce could be made to it, the court refused

to allow it to be used.

There was a verdict in favor of plaintiffs.

and defendants bring error, assigning, inter

a/ia,the following grounds: “(2) Thecourt

erred in its answer to del‘entlants' third point

as follows: (3) If the jury do not believe

(‘ornelius Carman is a competent witness

to prove the execution of the alleged codicil,

the verdict must be in favor of the defend-

ants. B1/'the Court. We deny that point

as stated. The belief of the jury as to Cornt>liua Carm1m being a competent witness
baa nothing to do with his competency.
Competency means the legal fitness of a witness to be heard on the trial of a c1rnse. It
is a lekal question, and the court is the sole
judge of his or her competency. The jury
bas nothing to do in deciding whethP-r they
are competent. If the court think th~y are
so interested, or in a position that they cannot testify, they will rule them out; but if
they decide he is a competent witness, then
that makes his testimony come before you,
like that of any other witnes11. The court is
the sole judge of bis or her <.-ompetency. '.l.'he
co111"t admitted Cornelius Carman as a competent witness. His testimony, however, Is
for the jury, like 1my other witness. His
credibility is for them to determine." "(5)
'fhe court erred in refusing to allow co•mael
for defendants below to refer to the almanac
for lt;65, in his address to the jury."
8. H. Reynolds and J. Hay Brown, for
r1laintiffs in error. .A. Herr Smith and D.
(J. Ealileman, for defendants In error.

WILSOX et al. v. YAX LEER et nx.
(17 Atl. 109i, 127 Pa. St 371.)
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. June 28,
1889.

'
Error to court of common pleas, Lancaster
county; D. w. PATTERSON, Judge.
~
Issue der'8a"it oel no11. N ee<lham Wilaon died September 22, 1872, in Lancasf.er
county. His last will and testament, of
""hich the plaintiffs in error were executors,
having been duly executed on March 2, 1865,
was admitted to probate on September 28,
H!72. On August 18, 1877, suit was brought
-by Caroline Van Leer, formerly Carman,
upon too followin~ instrument of writing:
"August 13th, 1865. I give thest> flew lines
to Caroline Carman to show that I want her
to have lhe sum of twelve hundred doh1rs
at my death she livd with mee A number of
years And got nrry little for it so i thought
it rite to leave her This little sum to be paid
to her out of my home property from NEEDHAM WILSON." At that time it was contended for Caroline Van Leer that the paper
was a promissory note, ancl the· court below
so held, but this court held it to be of a testamentary charRCter, and that it would not
support an action of aasumptsi.t. Wilson v.
Van Leer, 103 Pa. 8t. 600. Subsequently,
on June 23, 1883, this paper was offt>red for
probate before the register of Lanc11stn
county as a codicil to the 111st will and t.·staruent of Needham Wilson, anti, having been
admitted, upon an appeal taken by the )'laintiffs in error, 1tn issue decisa"it vel non was
directed. 'fhere wt'l1·e no snbsl'ribing witnesseg to the execution of the paper. One
wi~ness, a sister or Caroline Carman, testified
that she saw Wilson write 11nd sign the paper,
and the only other witness 1·alleJ in support
of it was a brother, <.:omelius Carman, who
undertook to testify lo his signatu1·e from an
acquaintance with his handwriting. This
witneSB testified that he had seen Wilson
write once or twice when he, the witness.
was a boy 12 years old, 31 years before the
trial, and once afte1·wards, 23 years bt1fore
the trial, at a tavern in Lancaster. In commenting upon the testimony of the other
witness, who said she saw Wilson write and
sign the paper, one of the counsel for plaintiifs In erPOr was about to show the jury, by
.a reference to the almanac for 1865, that August 13th was Sunday, which was in direct
conflict with her testimony. On objection
made by counsel, that as the almanac had
not been formally olfl'fed in evidence no rererence could b6 made to it, the court refuaed
k> alJow n ~o be used.
There was a verdict In favor of plalntitr11,
~md derendants bring error, assigning, inter
.afia, thefolJowing grounds: "(2) Theconrt
erred in lta answer to deren1lnnts' third point
a" follows : (:I) If the jury tlo not believe
t'ornelius Carman is a competent witness
to prove lht! execution of the alleged codicil,
the \"erllict must be in favor of the defend.ant.<J. Bv "th6 Court. We deny that point
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1

MITCHELL, J. The competency of Corne-

1 uns Carman was in the ftr11t Instance <'ll'itrlv

a matter for the court, and, no s11hseq11erit
evidence hitving raised any dl11pute of fact
upon it, the learned judge was right in saying that the co11rt Wits the sole judge of corupet.-ncy, and refnainl( to allow the jury to
review the ruling. Had the facts upon which
the judge held him prima facie competPnt
heen dt>nied or contr1tdicted. it might have
, been proper to submit the whole matter to
I the final decision of the jury, (Lee v. WPlsh,
1 Wkly. Notes Cas. 453,) but therP w1ts no
1 such conlli1·t as made that course necetll!ltry.
' The lt'arned judge was also within the line
of authorities in hohling that Carman had
sutllciPnt knowledge of Wihlon 's hand writing
to make him competent to telltify <'Oncerning
it. It la said to be sufficient if the witness
has seen the party write but once, and then
only his name, (1 Green]. Ev. § 577;) and
probably no higher standard can be llxed for
a definite rule, though, consil.lt>ring the untrustworthinPSS of opinions on handwriting
in general, (s~ note of Chief Justice REDFIELD to his edition of Greenl..uf, vol. 1.
~ 578,) such evidence ought to be t-eJ{arded
with grt>at caution. Nor in the nnture of
things is it pos.'tible to fix any arbitrnry limit
I of time within whid1 the witnes:1 must have
J seen the writing done.
That must depend
on his intellige111:e, his habit of observation
I or such matters, the apparent strength and
confidence of his mf!mory, etc., which must
1 he passPd upon in the first instance by the
I trial judge. Carman'a knowledge seems
not only to have been extremely stale, but of
the narrowest extent; and if the learned judge
had hl'ld that it was too remote and unreliable to qualify him we should not have been
di:5posed to disagree with him. Hut the mntter was within his discretion. and his conclusion was, as already said, within the line of

I
I
I
I

2~
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the authorities. It was therefore for the

jury, and not 1'or us, to determine the weight

to which the testimony should be entitled.

The assignments of error in relation to Car-

man’s testimony are therefore not sus mined.

We are obliged, however, to hold t rat the

court erred in refusing to permit the conn-

sel for defendant bel0W to refer to the alma-

nac to show, in support of his argument

against the testimony of Margaret Manahan,

that a certain date in 1865 fell upon Sunday.

All of the authorities agree that this is one

of the matters that do not require to be

proved. but are taken judicial notice of \vith-

out evidence. “Neither is it necessary to

prove * * * the coincidence of days of

the week with days of the month.” 1 Greenl.

Ev. § 5; and see Starkey, Ev. pt. 3, § 20, (page

738,10th Amer. Ed.) “Itis * * * wholly
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immaterial * * * whether the facts of

public and general history and their dates are

recognized by the court suapte sponte, the

books and chronicles or almanacs being used

merely to aid the memory; or whether they

will remain unnoticed until suggested by

the parties, and veriﬁed by the books; or

whether the books themselves are adduced

by the parties, and admitted by the court as

instruinentsof evidence; * * * the pro-

cess and the result being in each case the

same.” 3 Greenl.Ev. §269. The mere mode

of introducing the almanac seems to vary,

as indicated by the last extract from Green-

leaf; but, as all the authorities agree that no

proof is necessary, it follows that it is not

required to be put in evidence at all. “The

almanac in such cases is used, like the stat-

utes. not strictly as evidence, but for the

purpose of refreshing the memory of the

court and jury.” State v. Morris, 47 Conn.

179. “The almanac is part of the law of

England." POLLOcK, C. B., in Tutton v.

Darke, 5 Hurl. & N. 649. In Hanson v.

Shackelton, 4 I)owl. 48, there was a rule to

set aside a writ, on the ground that it was

dated on Sundav, and the report proceeds:

“Cali-ridge. J. Have _vou any atlidavit show-

ing that the day on which this writ is dated

was a Sunday? Bag/ly. The aﬁidavit does

not state that the day * * * was a Sun-

day, but, -* * * the day of the month

being given, the court is bound to take ju-

dicial notice on what day of the week that

day fell. * * * Cur. adv. molt. Cole-

1'z'd;/e. J. I have consulted the other judges

of the court, and they are of opinion that I

ought to take judicial notice of what the day

was on which this day of the month fell.

* * * Rule absolute." So in Reed v.

Wilson. 41 N. J. Law, 29, there was a dec-

laration on a note dated August 12th. at

four months; and on demurrer assigning,

inter alirl, that the nar-1'. showed demand and

protest on December 14th, one day too soon,

the court took judicial notice that December

224

15th was Sunday, and therefore that the de-

mand was rnade on the proper day. In

RELEVANCY.

the authorities. It was therefore for the 15th was Sunday, and therefore that the dejury, and not fo1• us, to dPtermine the WPight mand was made on the prope1· day. In
to which the testimony should be entitled. Railroad Co. v. Lehman, 56 Md. 226, it was
The assignments of error In relation to Car- held that "It is the duty of the court to noman's testimony are therefore not sns~ined. tice the days of the week on which particular
We are obliged, however, to hold tFiat the days of the month fall; and hence we know,
court erred in refusing to permit the coun- without other averment, (on demurrer,) that
sel for defendant below to rl!fer to the alma- tl~e 28th of July, 1878, was Sunday." Arni
nac to show, in support of his argument in Mcintosh v. I.ee, 57 Iowa, 358, 10 N. W.
against the testimony of Margaret Manahan, Rep. 895, it wa~ said by the court: "The
that a certain date in 1865 fell upon Sunday. petition alleges that the defendant entered
All of the authorities Hgree that this is one into the written lease on March 10, 1878.
or the matters that do not require to be Courts take jmlicial notice that the 10th day
proved, but are tHken judicial notice of with- of March, 1878, was Sundny. The petition,
out evidence. "Neither is it necessary to therefore, in effect.alleges that the lease was
prove * * * tltl' coincidence of days of executed on Sunday;" and it was therefore
t.he week with da,·s of the month." 1 Green I. held that, under the pleadings, evi<lence was
Ev.§ 5; and see Starkey, Ev. pt. 3, § 20, (page not admissible that th1i lease was executed
738, 10th Am,.r. Ed.) "It is • • * wholly on Monday. These authorities-and none
immaterial • • • whether the facts of have be6n found In opposition to thempul•lic and general history and their dates are show clearly that, however often departed
recognized by the court suapte sponte, tile from as a matter of convenience, the rule is
books and chronicles or almanacs being used tlrnt m1ilte1'8 of which judicial notice is taken,
merely to aid the memory; or whether they inclucling the dates in the almanac, do not
will remain unnoticed until suggested by require to be pnt in e\•i<lence at all.
the parties, and verified by the IJooks; or
It is argued for the defendant in e'r ror that
whether the books themselves are adduced the fact of Augu!lt 13th having been :Sunday
by Um parties, and admitted by the court as did not necessarilv contradict Mrs. Manai11stru111entsof evidence; * • • the pro- han, 1md therefore·that, even if the court becess and the result bPing in each case the low committed an error, it was an immaterisame." 3 Green I. Ev.§ 269. 'fhe mere mode al one, for which the judgment should not
of introducing the almanac seems to vary, be reversed. But there was an apparent conas indicated by the last extract from Green- tradiction, which at least required explanaleaf; but, as all the authorities agree that no tion. and, in a case where the evidence in
proof is necessary, it follows that it is not support of the plaintiff's case was so mear"quired to be put in evidence at all. "The ger, it is impossible to say that even a slight
almanac in such cnses is used, like the stat- ~loubt thrown on the testim1111y of the main
utes, not strictlv as evidence, but for the witness would not have turned the scale in
purpose of refr~1d1ing the memory of the the minds of the jury.
court and jury." State v. Morris, 47 Conn.
It h also argued that the 11lmanac, having
179. "The almanac is part of the law of been brought forward at so late a staice in
England." POLLOCK, C. B., in Tutton v. the case, deprived thti plaintilf below of the
Darke, 5 Hurl. & N. 649. In Hanson v. bt>nefit of an argument upon it by one of her
Shack1-lton, 4 Dow I. 48, there was a rule to con nsel. Hut in this respect it was like any
set aside a writ, on the ground that it was other argument or illustration which counsel
dated on Sunda\', amt the repm·t proceeds: may make towards thti end of a cnse. If it
"Col•·rid.qe, J. Have you any affidavit show- has not been auticipatt>d, it is a surprise, and
ing that the day on which this writ is datetl that is a risk which parties must encounter
was a Sunday? Bayly. The affidavit dotls ln every case. If counsel had run the calnot state that the day * * • was a Sun- :mlation back himself. so as to show that that
~ay was Sunday, no one could have ques·
da~·. but, ·* • • the day of the month
bPing given, the court is bound to take ju- tioned his right to do so. His refereucc to
dicial notice on what day of the week that the almanac was no more than a refrren<"e to
day fell. • • * Cur. a<lv. tJttlt. Cole- the multiplication table. as a labor·saving
rirl.qe, J. I have consulted the other j11LlgPs mode of refreshing 01· cunllrming knowledge
of the court, and they are of opinion that I
le11ally presumed to be in everyb1•dy's mind.
ought to take judicial notice of what the day This kind of surprise is one of the dangers
was on which this day of the month fell. incident to every contest, and lhe only rt>lief
• • • Rule ahsolutEi." So in Reed v. against it is the discretion of thA jndge, where
Wilson, 41 N. J. Law, 29, there was a dec- the new matter or new view may lead to sublaration on a note dated .August 12th, at stantial injustice, and is such as could not
four months; and on demurrer assigning, reascnabl.v have been foreseen, to allow au
intn· alirI, that the nan'. showed demand aud opportunity of reply, or subsequently to gorant
protest on December 14th, one day too soon, a new trial. Judgment reversed, and ve1ifrtt
the court took judicial notice that December de novo awarded.
224
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BEVAN v. ATLANTA NAT. BANK.

[Case No. 77

BEVAN v. ATLANTA NAT. BANK.

(31 N. E. GT9, 142 Ill. 302.)

June 17, 1892.

Appeal from appellate court. Third dis-

trict.

Assumpsit by the Atlanta National Bank

against John L. Bevan. administrator of the

estate of Alice Williams, deceased, upon a

promissory note. Plaintiff obtained judg-

ment, which was aﬁirmed by the appellate

court. Defendant appeals. Reversed.

Beach & Hodnett, for appellant. F. L.

(31 N. E. 6i9, 142 lll. 302.)
Supreme Oourt of Illinois. June 17, 1892.
Appeal from appellate .court. Third district.
Assumpelt by the Atlanta National Bank
against John L. Bevan. administrator of the
estate of Alice Williams, deceased, upon a
promissory note. Plaintltr obtained judg·
ment, which was amrmed by the appellate
court. Defendant appeals. Reversed.

Beach & Hodnett, for appellant. F. L.
Capps and Blinn & Hoblit, for appellee.

Capps and Biinn & Hoblit, for appellee.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

PER CURIAM. This is an action of as-

sumpsit brought by the Atlanta National

Bank against John L. Bevan, administrator

of the estate of Alice Williams, deceased, up-

on a promissory note for $1,000, which pur-
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ported to be executed by C. E. Pratt and

Alice Williams. To the declaration the de-

fendant pleaded the general issue sworn to,

and upon a trial the plaintiff recovered a.

judgment for the amount due on the note,

which judgment was aﬂirmed in the appel-

late court. No complaint is made against

the decision oi.‘ the court in instructions, but

it is claimed that the court erred in its rul-

ings in the admission and exclusion of evi-

dence, and upon this ground it is insisted

that the judgment is erroneous. The note in

controversy bears date May 1, 1883. payable

60 days after date, to the order of Atlanta

National Bank, signed, "C.E. Pratt, Alice Wil-

liams." No question was raised in regard to

the execution of the note by Pratt, but, as to

the execution of the instrument by Alice

Williams, on the one hand it is claimed by

plaintiff that the note contains her genuine

signature, while on the other hand the ’de-

fendant, the administrator of her estate,

claims that the signature of Alice Williams

to the note is a forgery.

Stephen A. I\‘ole_v, a witness for the plain-

tiff, testiﬁed, against the objection of the de-

fendant, that he had a conversation with

Alice Williams at Atlanta in July or August,

1888, which was, in substance, as follows:

“We were talking about family affairs, and

ﬁnally we came to Charlie, and I asked her

if she thought that she would be likely to

lose anything by Charlie. I meant Charles

E. Pratt. She said she would not. She did

not think she should. Charlie had been very

good to her, even better than her own chil-

dren. She said to me, ‘You know I have

assisted Charlie, and I don't think I will

ever lose anything by it.’ " It ls claimed that

the testimony has no reference to the note,

and hence is inadmissible. It is true that the

note was not mentioned, but it was proper

to show the relation existing between the

two parties; also that Mrs. Williams had as-

sisted Pratt, and that she did not anticipate

any loss on account of the assistance ren-

wn.ous,nv.-15
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dered; and it was for the jury to determine

PER CURIAM. This Is an action of asmmpslt brought by the Atlanta National
Bank against John L. Bevan, administrator
of the estate of Alice Williams, deceased, upon a proml88ory note for ,1,000, which purported to be executed by C. E. Pratt and
Allee Williams. To the declaration the defendant pleaded the general llllue sworn to,
and upon a trial the plaintiff recovered &
judgment for the amount due on the note,
which judgment was afilrmed In the appellate court. No complaint le made against
the decision of the court In Instructions, but
It Is claimed that the court erred in its rulings In the admission and exclusion of evidence, and upon this ground It le Insisted
that the judgment Is erroneous. The note in
controversy bears date May 1, 1888, payable
00 days after date, to tl:e order of Atlanta
National Bank, signed, "C. E. Pratt, Alice Williams." No question was raised In regard to
the execution of the note by Pratt, but, as to
the execution of the Instrument by Alice
Williams, on the one hand It ls claimed by
plaintiff that the note contains her genuine
elgnature, while on the other hand the 'defendant, the administrator of her estate.
claims that the signature of Allee Williams
to the note le a forgery.
Stephen A. Foley, a witness for the plalntltr, testified, against the objection of the defendant, that he had a conversation with
Alice Williams at Atlanta In July or August,
1888, which was, In su.bstance, as follows:
"We were talking about family atralrs, and
finally we came to Charlie, and I asked her
if she thought that she would be likely to
lose anything by Charlie. I meant Charles
E. Pratt. She said she would not. She did
not think she should. Charlie had been very
good to her, even better than her own children. She snicl to me, 'You know I ha'\"e
assisted Charlie, and I don't think I will
ever lose anything by It.'" It Is claimed that
the testimony has no rererence to the note,
and hence Is Inadmissible. It Is true that the
note was not mentioned, but It was proper
to show the relation existing between the
two parties; also that Mrs. Willlams bad assisted Pratt, and that she did not antlcipat~
any loss on account of the assistance r'el'll'ILOUB,Ev.-15
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dered; and It was for the jury to determine
whether the assistance she had rendered had
reference to the note or to some other transaction. We do not regard the evidence entitled to much weight, but, at the same time,
we think It wr-s competent for the consideration of the j11r7 In connection with the other
evidence.
On the trial the plalntur called as a wltneBB Sylvester Hoblit, who testified that he
had seen .Alice Wllllams write, and wll8 acquainted with her signature, and, upon being
shown the note In controversy, be testltled
that the signature of Allee Williams was her
genuine signature. On cross-examination
the following questions were asked the wit·
·ness: "Question. You may now examine a
note dated Atlanta, Ill., July 14, 1884, for $j(),
and state whether or not that Is one of the
signatures of Alice Williams that you saw
her make, and upon which you base your
knowledge of her handwriting. {Note shown
to witness, marked 'No. 3, L. E. W.') Q.
· If there Is any dl!rerence In the signature of
Allee Williams upon that note and the slgna.
ture of Alice Williams on the note In controversy, you may state In what that dltrerence
consists. Q. You may examine the note
shown to you dated October 10, 188-l, signed
by Alice Williams, and state whether or not
that Is another of the notes you saw her
make, and upon which you base your knowledge of her signature. (Marked 'Xo. 4, L.
E. W.,' for ldentlftcatlon by· stenographer.)
Q. If there Is any dltrerence between the signature of Allee Williams upon the note last
shown you and the signature tq the note In
controversy, you may state In what particular It exists. Q. You may examine the note
shown to you of date June l, 1885, with the
name of Alice Williams signed to It, and
state If that Is another of the notes you saw:
her make, and upon which you base your
knowledge of her signature. Q. If there la
any dltrerence between the signature of Alice
Williams upon that note and her signature
upon the note In controversy, you may state
what it Is. (Note marked 'No. 5, L. E. \V.,'
by stenographer for Identification.) Q. Is It
not true In all of the notes you eaw her sign,
and which have been shown to you, and to
which your attention has been called, she
wrote her name 'Allie Williams?' Q. Is It
not true that there ls a mtrerence between
the signature of Alice Williams on nil of
these notes you saw her sign, and to which I
have called your attention, and upon which
you. in whole or In part, base your knowledge of her signature, and the signature of
Allee Williams on the note In conh·oyerAy·1
Q. Is It not tme In all the notes you saw her
sign, and to which your attention has been
called here, and upon which you say you
base your knowledge of Allee Wiiiiams'
handw1·1ting. she spells her name dl:tlerent
from the way It Is spelt In the note in C'On·
troversy?" The plolntl1f objected to the sev220
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eral questions, the court sustained the ob-

jection, and the defendant excepted. Simi-

lar questions were asked other witnesses,

and the court made a like ruling. It was

claimed by the defendant that Mrs. Williams,

in the execution of notes and papers, signed

her name “Allie Williams," while the note

involved was signed “Alice Williams.” Un-

der such circumstances, we are induced to

think the rule of cross-examination adopted

by the court was too restricted. The several

notes which the witnesses had seen Mrs.

Williams execute, upon which they predi-

cated their opinion that the signature to the

note in question was genuine, were produced

and shown the witnesses. Now, if in the

execution of all of these notes Mrs. Williams

made her given name "Allie" instead of

“Alicc," no reason is perceived why it was
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not competent to establish such fact on cross-

examination, for the purpose of testing the

soundness of the opinion given by the wit-

nessesthat the signature to the note in ques-

tion was genuine. In many cases, in order

to ascertain the truth and arrive at a. correct

result. it is necessary that considerable lati-

tude be given in the cross-examination of

witnesses in order to test the accuracy of

their evidence. The genuineness of the sig-

natures to the several notes to which the at-

tention of the witness was called was not

in controversy, and the purpose was not to

prove a signature by comparison, but, as

was done in Melvin v. Hodges, 71 Ill. 425, to

test the accuracy of the witness’ opinion or

judgment which had in the direct examina-

tion gone to the jury. If the witnesses call-

ed by the plaintiff to prove that the signa-

ture of Mrs. Williams in the note in ques-

tion predicated their judgment, in whole or

in part, upon signatures to notes they saw

her sign, and the signatures to these notes

eral questions, the court sustained the objection, and the <lefendant ext·epted. Similar questions were asked other witnesses,
and the court made a like rullng. It was
dnhned by the defendant that Mrs. Wllllams,
In the execution of notes and papers, signed
her name "Allie 'Villlams," while the note
h1voh-ed was slgne<l "Alice Williams." Under such Circumstances, we are induced to
think the rule of cross·f'xnmlnntion adopted
by the court was too re8trlcted. The several
notes which the witnesses bad seen llrs.
Wiiliams execute, upon which they predl~
cated their opinion that the signature to the
note lo question was genuine, were produced
and shown the witnesses. Xow, It In the
execution of all of these notes Mrs. 'Yllllams
made her given name "Allle" Instead of
"Alice," no 1·eason ls perceived why It was
not competent to establish such fact on crossexamination, tor the purpose of testing tbi!
soundness of the opinion given by the witnesses ·that the signature to the note In question was genuine. In many cases, In order
to ascertain the truth and arrive at a correct
result. It ts necessary that considerable latitude be given in the cross-examination of
witnesses In order to test the accuracy of
their evidence. The genuineness of the signatures to the several notes to which the attention of the witness was called was not
in controversy, and the purpose was not to
prove a signature by comparison, but, as
was done In :\lelvln v. Hodges, 71 Ill. 425, to
test the accuracy of the witness' opinion or
judgment which had in the direct examlnntton gone to the jury. It the witnesses called by the plaintiff to prove that the slgnnture ot Mrs. Wllllams In the note In que~
tlon predicated their judgment, In whole or
In part, upon signatures to notes they saw
her sign, and the signatures to these notes
differed from the signature in the note in
question, It seems plain that the defendant
bad the right to call out that fact In crossexamination, as It was a tact proper tor the
consideration of the jury 1n determining what
weight they should give to the opinion of the

differed from the signature in the note in

question, it seems plain that the defendant

had the right to call out that fact in cross-

examination, as it was a fact proper for the

consideration of the jury in determining what

weight they should give to the opinion of the

226

witnesses who gave their opinion that the

note was genuine.

The defendant oﬁered in evidence the notes

which were exhibited to the several witness-

cs in cross-examination, but the plaintiif ob-

jected, and the court sustained the objection.

and this decision of the court is relied upon

as error. We perceive no ground upon

which the notes were admissible in evidence.

The law is well settled in this state that the

genuineness of a signature to a note or other

instrument in writing cannot be proved or

disproved by comparing it with another sig-

nature, admitted to be genuine. Kernin v.

Hill, 37 lli. 209; Massey v. Bank, 10-1 Ill.

330. It is true that the evidence was not

offered for comparison of hands, but that did

not obviate the diﬂiculty. There are cases

where certain evidence may be competent for

RELEV .ANCY.
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witnesses who gave their opinion that the
note was genuine.
The defendant offered in evidence the notes
which were exhibited to the several witnesses In cross-examination, but the plaintiff objected, and the court sustained the objection,
and this decision of the court Is relled upon
as error. '\Ve perceive no ground upon
which the notes were admissible In evidence.
The law ls well settled in this state that the
genuineness of a signature to a note or other
instrument In writing cannot be proved or
disproved by comparing it with another signature, admitted to be genuine. Kernin v.
Hill, 37 Ill. 209; Massey v_ Bank, 1().1 Ill.
330. It ls true that the evidence was not
offered for comparison of bands, but that dill
not obviate the dlftlculty. There are cases
where certain evidence may be competent for
one purpose, but incompetent for another;
but here we do not regard the offered evidence competent tor any purpose, and, bad It
been admitted, its effect on the jury could
not have been other than prejudicial to the
rights of the plaintiff.
Several ot the witnesses ot the plalntltr
were asked, on cross-examination, whether
they held notes signed by P1·att and lira.
Williams, where the genuineness of her signature was dls1mted, or were interested in
any bank which held such notes, and the
court excluded the evidence. It Is not claimed that the holding of such a note, or having
an Interest 1n the bank which held such a
note, would dlsquallfy the witnesses from
testifying In the case; but the claim Is tbnt
the witnesses were interested, and the evidence was competent as al'f'ecting their credlblllty. It ls always competent to show, on
cross-examination, that a witness ls Interested in the result of the suit; but here the
witnesses bad no direct Interest In the result
of the suit; the Interest, it any, was so remote that we do not regard the ruling of the
court regarding the evidence as erroneous.
For the error Indicated the Judgment of the
circuit and appellate courts will be reversed,
and the cause remanded.

BEST EVIDENCE.
CANJ!,IELD

BEST EVIDENCE. ‘

T.

JOHNSON et al.

[Case No. 78

CANFIELD v. JOHNSON et ai.

NEW ENGLAND MONUMENT 00. 'T;
JOHNSON et aL

NEW ENGLAND MONUMENT CO. v.

JOHNSON et al.

(22 Ati. 974, 144 Pa. St. 61.)

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Oct. 5, 1891.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Ti-

oga county; John I. Mitchell, Judge.

Action of assumpsit by (J. B. Caniield, sur-

viving partner of O. B. Canﬂeld and G. T.

Batterson, doing business as the New Eng-

land Monument Company, against F. A.

Johnson and A. J. Van Dusen, partners as

Johnson & Van Dusen. Judgment for de-

fendants, and plaintiffs appeal. Reversed

The evidence tended to show that the

George Cook Post, G. A. R., determine-l to

erect a monument, and appointed a com-

mittee to select a suitable design, and pro-

cure estimates of the probable cost. Plain-
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tiﬁs, through their agent, one Douglass, sub-

mitted a certain design to the comm ttee,

and it was adopted. Afterwards the cym-

ntittee held another meeting for the pu-pose

of receiving bids, at which Douglass was

-also present. Plaintiffs claimed that Doug-

lass, as their agent, entered into an agree-

ment with defendant Johnson, on behalf of

defendants, by which plaintiffs were to al-

low defendants to make the lowest bid for

the erection of the monument, and then that

plaintiffs should make and ship the morn-

ment according to the design furnished by

them, and adopted by the committee, and

defendants were to lay the foundation and

put it up; each party, out of the contract

price between defendants and the committee,

to receive fair pay for the materials fur-

nished and work done by them, respectively,

and to divide any surplus. Defendants pur-

-chased the monument from other persons,

having it made after the design furnished

by plaintiffs, and this action was brought

by plaintiffs to recover one-half of the prof-

its made by defendants.

(22 Atl. 974, 144 Pa. St. 61.)
'Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Oct. 5, 1891.
Appeal fMm court of common pleas, Ti~ga county; .John I. Mitchell, Judge.
Action of ll.BBumpsit by C. B. Canfield, s1•rvlvlng partner of c. B. Canfield and G. T.
Batterson, doing business as the New .England Monument Company, against F. A.
Johnson and A. J. Van Dusen, partn.~re as
Johnson & Van Dusen. Judgment lo~ defendants, and plillntllrs appeal. Revel"!K•d.
The evidence tended to show that the
George Cook Post, G. A. R., determlm°!'l to
erect a monument, and appointed a committee to Belect a suitable design, and procm·e estimates of the probable cost. l'l11lntllfs, through tl1elr agent, one Douglass, rnbmitted a certnln design to the comm ttee,
.and it was adopted. Afterwards the c Jmmlttee held another meeting for the PU"J)()Se
of receiving bide, at which Douglass was
also present. Plaintltrs claimed that D?ugIass, as their agent, entered Into an agreement with defendant Johll80n, on behalf of
defendants, by which plaintltrs were to allow defendants to make the lowest bid tor
the erection of the monument, nod then that
plalntllrs should make and ship the ruorument according to the design furnished by
them, and adopted by the committee, and
defendants were to lay the foundation and
11ut It up; each party, out of the contract
price between defendants and the committee,
to receive fair pay for the materials furnished and work done by them, respectively,
and to divide any surplus. Defendants purchased the monument from other persons,
ha 'l"lng It made after the design furnished
by phlintltrs, and this action was brought
by plaintiffs to recover one-halt of the profits made by defendants.

Stephen I<'. Wilson, Jerome B. Niles, Aaron
R. Niles, and Alfred J. Niles, for appellants.
G. W. Merrick, :ll. F. Elllott, and 1',. E. Watl'OWI,

for appellees.

Stephen F. Wilson, Jerome B. Niles, Aaron

R. Niles, and Alfred J. Niles, for appellants.

G. \V. Merrick. .\i. F. Elliott, and F. E. \Vat-

rous, for appellees.

GREEN, J. The contract in question he-

tween these parties was made with the de-

fendants by an agent of the plaintiffs. On

the trial, the plaintiffs, having examined the

agent who made the contract, and proved by

him its terms, as he had made it, proposed

to prove that he informed them of what he

had done, and that they thereupon accepted

the contract, and undertook to execute it.

’l'his offer of proof was rejected by the

learned court below. It is difficult to under-

stand upon what principle this testimony was

rejected. The contract having been made

through the intervention of an agent, it was

clearly competent to show that the action

of the agent was communicated to his prin-

cipals, and that they accepted and ratified

the contract as he had made it, and that

they undertook to carry it out. It is only

in that way that the assent of both parties

GREEN, J. '.fhe contract In question between these parties was made with the derendnnts by an agent of the plalnturs. On
the trial, the plalntltrs, having examined the
agent who made the contmct, and proved by
him Its terms, as he bad made it, proposed
to pro,·e that he informed them of what he
had done, and that they thereupon accepted
the contract, and undertook to execute It.
'fhis otrer of proof was rejected by the
learned court below. It ls di!Hcult to understand upon what principle this testimony wn11
rejected. The contract having been made
through the Intervention of an agent, It was
clearly competent to 11how thnt the action
or the agent was communicated to his prlnelpals, and that they accepted and ratlfted
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the contract as be had made It, and that
they undertook to carry It out. It Is only
in that way that the ll88ent of both parties
to the contract can be shown, and their wllllngneBB to be bound by its terms established.
The first and second assignments are sustained.
The plaintiffs proved by overwhelming testimony that the design (No. 161) for the monument was adopted by the Gmnd Army
post and the committee, and that this design
was furnished by tbe plalntltrs. In the
course of putting In the testimony on this
subject, the plaint.Ure otrered to prove by
whom the design wu prepared, and that no
slmllar design had been made by otherM.
This otrer was rejected, for the singular reason that no letters patent or copyright of the
design bad been taken out by the plalntUrs,
and therefore they had no excluBlve ownership therein. We eannot po881bly assent to
such a doctrine. Most assuredly, when an
architect prepares a design for a building,
for one who Is about to erect such a structure, he le entitled to be paid tor it without being obliged to have it patented or
copyrighted. He would be entitled to compensation for It whether it was accepted or
not, unless he had expreBBly agreed otherwise; but certainly, where his design was
accepted and actually used by the party to
whom It was furnished, it would be a perversion of justice to deny compen1111.tlon to
the designer because he bad no patent or
copyright tor his design. In this particular
rose, the proof was also a.dmlsstble because
it tended strongly to corrobomte the plalntllrs' claim to having made the cont1'1lct In
question with the defendants. We therefore
sustain the third aselgnment, and we also
sustain the tenth, because the nalT. counted
as well for compensation for use of the design as upon the entire contract alleged.
We are quite unable to understand why
the offers of testimony covered by the fourth,
fifth, sixth, eighth, and ninth assignments
of error were rejected. They related to the
subject of the cost of building the monument and pedestal upon which it was to
stand, the cost of transporting them to the
place where they were to be erected, and
the cost ot setting them up lo place. These
were all perfectly legitimate matters of
proof; Indeed, absolutely essential In order
to enable the plalntltrs to recover upon their
theory of the case; and the sources of the
proof were those from which the best attainable Information could be obtained. The
persons who actually built the monument
which was In reality erected by the defendants, and who shipped the same to the defendants, were not allowed to teetlty to the
eost of the shipments, though they named
the weight and eost per 100 pounds and tbe
final amount paid; the persons who participated In the transportation of the monument and pedestal from the place where they
were made to the place where they were set
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up were not allowed to testify to their knowl-

edge upon that subject; the original freight-

bills, containing upon their face the precise

amounts of freight paid, were rejected for

untenable reasons; and the testimony of an

experienced and competent person, having an

extensive, and claiming to have an accurate,

knowledge of the cost of building such mon-

uments and pedestals as the one in question,

and of the cost of removing and transport-

ing them, and of setting them up in place,

was entirely rejected, and the plaintiffs

thereby deprived of the opportunity of prov-

ing the very essential facts of their case.

The objections to these offers were that they

were incompetent and irrelevant. Irrelevant

they certainly were not, because they re-

lated to the very matters in controversy.

They tended to prove directly how much
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proﬁt the defendants had made by violating

their alleged contract with the plaintiffs.

Neither were they incompetent, because the

persons and the papers offered were the orig-

inal persons and papers, from whom and

which original and material information

could be obtained. We have examined all

these oﬁers of testimony, and the objections

to them, and we are clearly of opinion that

they should have been allowed. The objec-

tion which seems to be chieﬂy urged to their

admissibility, and which appears to have con-

trolled the court below, is that the offers do

not furnish the precise and exact cost in the

actual dollars and cents paid by the defend-

ants; and it is argued that the plaintiffs

might have called the defendants as witness-

es, and proved by them the precise amounts

paid in each instance, and, as this was the

best evidence, any other testimony was for

that reason incompetent. We cannot avoid

an expression of surprise that uch an objec-

tion should have prevailed. It amounts to

this: that where a plaintiff who claims dam-

ages for the breach of a parol contract for

the division of the proﬁts of a mutual trans-

action seeks to establish his claim, he must

call the defendants to prove the exact

amounts paid by them in the course of the

transaction, on penalty of having all other tes-

timony on that subject rejected. There is no

such rule of evidence. The rule that the best

evidence of a fact must be produced, if it

can be had, has no such meaning. It re-

quires that where two different grades or

qualities of proof exist, that which is the

best shall be adduced, if practicable; as, for

instance, the contents of a writing must be

proved by the production of the writing be-

fore secondary evidence can be given. But

that rule has no application to a choice be-

tween witnesses, where both have legitimate

knowledge of the subject-matter of‘ the in-

quiry. Some may have a better knowledge

than others, but that will not exclude the

knowledge of those who are the less in-

formed. if it is otherwise competent. It is

for the jury to judge of the sutiiciency of the

proof. So, also, the proof oifered by the.

PUOOF.

up were not allowed to testify to their knowledge upon that subject; the original frelghtbllls, containing upon their face the precise
amount& of freight paid, were rejected for
untenable reasons; and the testimony of an
experienced and competent person, having an
extensive, and claiming to have an accurate,
knowledge of the coat of building such monuments and pedestals as the one In question.
and of the cost of removing and transporting them, and of setting them up In place,
was entirely rejected, and the plalntltrs
thereby deprived of the opportunity of proving the very essential facts of their case.
'.fhe obJectlone to these otrers were that they
were Incompetent and Irrelevant. Irrelevant
they certalnly were not, because they related to the very matters In controversy.
They tended to prov.e directly how much
profit the defendants had made by violating
their alleged contract with the plalntltrs.
Neither were they Incompetent, because the
persons and the papers otrered were the original persons and papers, from whom and
which original and material information
could be obtained. We have examined all
these offers of testimony, and the objections
to them, and we are clearly of opinion that
they should have been allowed. The objection which seems to be chiefly urged to their
admlasiblllty, and which appears to have controlled the court below, Is that the otrers do
not furnish the precise and exact cost in the
actual dollars and cents paid by the defendants; and it is argued that the plaintiffs
might have called the defendants as witnesses, and proved by them the precise amounts
paid in each instance, and, as this was the
best evidence, any other testimony was for
that reason incompetent. We cannot avoid
an expression of surprise that such an objection should have prevailed. It amounts to
this: that where a plaintiff who clalms damages fo1· the breach of a parol contract for
the division of the profits of a mutual transaction seeks to establish his claim, he must
call the defendants to prove the exact
amounts paid by them In the course of the
transaction, on penalty of havlng all other testimony on that subject rejected. There Is no
such rule of evidence. The rule that the best
evidence of a fact must be produced, if It
can be had, has no such meaning. It requires that where two dilterent grades or
qualities of proof exist, tbat which Is the
best shall be ad(luc·ed, If practicable; as, for
instance, the contents of a writing must be
proved by the production of the writing before secon<l111·y evldenq~ can be given. But
that rule lms no application to a choice between witnes.<1eR, where both have legitimate
knowledge of the subject-matter of· the Inquiry. 8ome may lmve a better knowledge
than others, but that will not exclude the
knowle1lge of those who are the less informc<l. If It is otherwise competent. It Is
for the jury to judge of the sut1klency of the
proof. So, also, the proof offered by the .
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expert testimony of Mr. Douglass was entirely legitimate, and should have been received. He had a competent experience to
qualify him for proving the probable cost of
bulldlng and transporting the monument and
pedestal, and of setting them up, and therefore he was a competent witness for that
purpose. Even it there were others who
had a better knowledge than he, that would
not exclude his testimony. Least of all
would It be excluded because the defendants
knew exactly what they had paid, and therefore would be the only pel'80ne who could
testify on that subject. Non constat that
they paid more than they should have paid,
and thus deprive the plalntlfre of more than
their legitimate share ot the profits which
might have been made had the defendants
performed their contract literally. The proof
of what the defendants did pay rested with
them, and their ·right to give such proof was
not at all Impaired by admitting the plaintiffs' otrers. After the evidence was all In,
the whole case would be for the decision of
the jury. All of these several assignments
of error are sustained.
The seventh assignment Is not sustained.
The mere opinions ot the members of the
committee, as to whether there was a contract between the plaintltrs and defendants.
would not be evidence to prove that fact.
We do not agree with the learned court
below In holding that there could not be
a recovery ln the action of assumpslt. The
allegations and proof of the plaintiffs were
that the defendants had not carried out the
contract with them. , They had not engaged
In the execution of a contract of partnership, or any contract for their mutual advantage or profit. On the contrary, they had
proceeded to have the monument and pedestal built and placed exclusively on their own
account, and for their own benefit and ad·
vantage, and had thus violated the contract
which the plaintiffs claimed and gave evidence to prove. In other words, they had
broken the contract of partnership or joint
Interest, and therefore no such contract was
performed or executed. In such clrcmnstances, the Injury or breach which gives a legal
remedy ls a violation of the contract of partnership, and not Its execution and consequent partnership liability. Hence a partnership blll which Iles between persons who
actually are partners, and for the settlement ot the partnership accounts. Is not the
proper remedy, simply because, although the
defendants agreed to become partners with
the JJlalutlffs In this trallBll<'tlon. In point of
faC't lhey did not, and hence the relation did
not exist. The action, therefore, must be rega1·ded as an a('tion to recover dnmages for
the brench of a contract to be(•ome partnerio:,
and for that purpose the proper remedy
would be an action of assurupsit on the uude1·taking. But, of course, while all this Is
true, the measure of damages would be in
accordance with the terms of the contract,

BEST .EVIDENCE.

[Case No.

7~

BEST EVIDENCE.

[Case No. 78

to-wit, one-half of the proﬁts which the de-

fendants did make, or ought to have made,

in doing the work in question. Hence it was

quite legitimate for the plalntiﬂs to claim

in the narr., and to prove on the trial, that

they were entitled to have the one-half of

those proﬁts from the defendants, and to

give evidence as to what those proﬁts were

or should have been. Moreover, as this was

a single transaction, without any complicated

accounts to adjust, we would incline to hold,

were it necessary to do so, that the case

came properly within the somewhat numer-

ous decision of this court, in which it is

held that, where the transaction is single,

without complicated accounts, and there are

no debts to be adjusted, a bill in equity is

not necessary for the settlement of the ac-

counts, but an action of assumpsit will lie.
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instances o this are to be found in Wright

v. Cumpsty, 41 Pa. St. 103; Cleveland v.

Fararr, 4 Brewst. 27; Gaibreath v. Moore,

2 Watts, 86; Meason v. Kaine, 63 Pa. St.

336. It ls not necessary to rest the decision

of the present case upon this principle, how-

ever, as we regard the proceeding as an ac-

tion to recover damages for the breach of a

contract to enter into a. partnership or joint

relation, and not as a proceeding to settle

partnership accounts. The eleventh assign-

ment is sustained.

While it may be that there was not suf-

ﬁcient evidence to show what the proﬁts

made by the defendants were, that result

was largely due to the rejection by the court

of the plaintiffs’ offers of testimony, and the

plaintiffs could not fairly be held responsible

therefor. Technically, therefore, the defend-

ants’ _second point may have been correctly

answered, in view of the actual state of the

admitted testimony, and for that reason only

we do not sustain the twelfth assignment.

The thirteenth assignment is sustained be-

cause we do not agree with the learned court

below in holding that there was no evidence

that Van Dusen had any knowledge of the

contract made by Johnson, and that Johnson

had no authority to bind the ﬁrm by such

a contract as is alleged by the plaintiffs. It

was a contract fairly in the line of their busi-

ness, and therefore within the authority of

a. partner. Moreover, Johnson, as a partner,

was the authorized agent of the ﬁrm for

the making of contracts within the scope

of the ﬁrm's business, and we are of opinion

that this contract was within that class. In

addition to this, however, the letter of Jan-

uary 18, 1886, to Douglass, signed by the

‘ﬁrm name, and in direct answer to the one

written by Douglass to the defendants on

January 13th, just preceding, would be quite

suﬂicient to take this question of Van Du-

sen’s knowledge to the jury. The letter of

the ﬁrm to Douglass, of November 28, 1885,

is in the same category of testimony. But

it would require a most violent presumption,

against all the probabilities of the case,

to declare that Van Dusen had no knowledge

to-wit, one-half of the proft.t.s which the defendants did make, or ought to have made,
in doing the work In question. Hence 1t was
quite legitimate for the plalntllfs to claim
In the narr., and to prove on the trial, that
they were entitled to have the one-half of
those proftts from the defendants, and to
give evidence as to what those proftts were
or should have been. Moreover, as this was
a single transaction, without any complicated
a('('()unts to adjust, we would Incline to hold,
were It necessary to do so, that the case
eame properly within the somewhat numerous deeildons of this court, In which it Is
held that, where the transaction Is single,
without compli<'ated accounts, and there are
no debts to be adjusted, a bill In equity Is
not necessary for the settlement of the accounts, but an action of assumpMlt will lie.
Instances oJ this are to be found In Wright
v. Cum1J11ty, 41 Pa. St. 103; Cleveland v.
Farnrr, 4 Brewst. 27; Galbreath v. l\loore,
2 Watts, 86; Meason v. Kaine, 63 Pa. St.
336. It Is not necessary to rest the decision
of the present case upon this principle, however, as we regard the proceeding as an action to recover damages for the breach of a
rontt·act to enter Into a partnership or joint
rein tlon, and not as a proceeding to settle
partnership accounts. The eleventh assignment Is sustained.
While It may be that there was not sufftctent evidence to show what the profits
made by the defendants were, that result
was largely due to the rejection by the court
of the plnlntltfs' offers of testimony, and the
plalnttrrs could not fairly be held responsible
therefor. Tl'Chnlcally, therefore, the defendants' .second point may have been con·ectly
ans,vered, In view of the actual state of the
admitted testimony, and tor that reason only
we do not sustain the twelfth assignment.
The thirteenth assignment Is sustained because we do not agree with the learned court
below In holding that there was no evidence
that Van Dusen had any knowledge of the
contract made by Johnson, and that Johnson
had no authority to bind the firm by such

a contract as ls alleged by the plalntltrs. It
was a contract fairly ln the line of thelr business, and therefore within the authority of
a partner. Moreover, Johnson, as a partner,
was the autho.rlzed agent of the firm for
the making of contract.s within the scope
of the firm's business, and we are of opinion
that this contract was within that class. In
addition to this, however, the letter of January 18, 1886, to Douglass, signed by the
'f irm name, and in direct answer to the one
written by Douglass to the defendants on
January 13th, just preceding, would be quite
sufticlent to take this question ot Van Dusen's knowledge to the jury. The letter of
the firm to Douglass, of November 28, 18&3,
Is In the same category of testimony. But
It would require a most violent presumption,
against nil the probabilities of the case,
to deelare that Van Dusen had no knowledge
of the contract made by Johnson with the
plalntltrs, and we do not consider that the
court bad any right to make such a presumption as a matter of law. It was for the jury
at the best, and there were plenty of facts
and circumstances In the case to enable the
plalntltrs to challenge the correctness of any
such presumption by the Jury. A matter
much discussed by the counsel for the defendant.s was the legality of the contract
made, or alleged to have been made, by the
plaintiffs with the defendants. It was declde<l against the detendant.s by the court
below, and Is not before us. We therefore
do not consider It, but that circumstance
must not be taken as a concession that there
was error In the court's ruling on that subject. While there was perhaps some evidence that the defendants had made profit out
of their work, It was scarcely specific enough,
or complete enough, to leave to the jury, and
we therefore do not sustain the fourteenth
assignment. The fault, however, was due
to the Improper rejection of the plaintiffs'
offers of proof, and they cannot be regarded
as responsible for the lnsufticlency of the
proof. Judgment reversed, and new venlre
awarded.
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GADY v. STATE.

(3 South. 429, 83 Ala. 51.)

Supreme Court of Alabama. Jan. 6, 1888.

Appeal from criminal court, Jefferson coun-

ty; S. E. Greene, Judge.

Indictment for embezzlement.

The indictment in this case charged, in a

single count, that the defendant, Ada Gady,

“did embezzle, or fraudulently convert to her

own use, or fraudulenly secrete with intent

to convert to her own use, eighty dollars in

money, consisting of ten-dollar bills and twen-

ty-dollar bills, currency of the United States

of America, a more particular description of

which money is unknown to the grand jury;

which said money was deposited with said

Ada Gady by Charles Reed, the property of

said Charles Reed, of the value of eighty dol-

lars, and which the said Ada Gady received
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as the bailee of said Charles Reed." A trial

was had on issue joined on the plea of not

guilty, which resulted in a verdict of guilty

as charged, the value of the money embez-

zled being assessed at $60. A motion in ar-

rest of judgment was made, on the ground

that the indictment “charges no oi'fense,—is

too uncertain in the description of the money

alleged to have been embezzled;” which mo-

tion was overruled. “On the trial,” as the bill

of exceptions states, “the testimony for the

state tended to prove that, about two months

before the ﬁnding of the indictment in this

case, Charles Reed, the prosecutor in this

case, gave to the defendant seventy dollars in

money, to be safely kept by her, and to be re-

turned to him when demanded; that this

occurred in said county of Jeﬁerson; that de-

fendant returned but ten dollars of said mon-

ey to said Reed, and had never paid the bal-

ance, although often demanded by him to

do so, but had embezzled the same. Said

Reed, the witness, could neither read nor

write, did not know what kind of money he

had delivered to the defendant, and could not

tell the jury whether it was French or Span-

ish money, or currency of the United States

of America. The solicitor handed the witness

a ten-dollar bill, which he stated was a na-

tlonal bank-bill of the United States, and ask-

ed the witness if it looked like the money he

gave the defendant; and the witness answer-

ed that it looked like the money he delivered

to the defendant. To this question and an-.

swer, each, the defendant duly objected and

excepted. The defendant, then being exam-

ined as a Witness, stated that she got sixty

dollars in greenbacks from said Reed. This

was, substantially all the evidence in the case.

The defendant thereupon asked the court to
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charge the jury that they must ﬁnd a verdict

of not guilty, if they believed the evidence."

The court refused this charge, and the defend-

ant excepted.

W. J’. Callahan, for appellant. Thos. N. Mc-

Clellan, Atty. Gen., for the State.

SOMERVILLE, J . 1. The amended return,

made in response to the certiorari issued from

PROOF.

GADY v. STATE.
(3 South. 429, 83 Ala. 51.)
Supreme Court of Alabama. Jan. 6, 1888.
Appeal from criminal court, Jefferson county; S. E. Greene, Judge.
Indictment for embezzlement.
The Indictment In this case charged, In a
single count, that the defendant, Ada Gady,
"did embezzle, or fraudulently convert to her
own use, or fraudulenly secrete with Intent
to convert to her own use, eighty dollars In
money, consisting of ten-dollar bills and twenty-dollar bills, currency of the United States
of America, a more particular description of
which money Is unknown to the grand jury;
which said money was deposited with said
Ada Gady by Charles Reed, the property of
said Charles Reed, of the value of eighty dollars, and which the said Ada Gady received
as the bailee of said Charles Reed." A trial
was had on Issue joined on the plea of not
guilty, which resulted In a verdict of guilty
as charged, the value of the money embezzled being assessed at $60. A motion In arrest of judgment was made, on the ground
that the indictment "charges no otrense,-ls
too uncertain In the description of the money
alleged to have been embezzled;" which motion was overruled. "On the trial," as the bill
of exceptions states, "the testimony for the
state tended to prove that, about two months
before the finding of the Indictment In this
case, Charles Reed, the prosecutor ID this
case. gave to the defendant seventy dollars In
money, to be snfely kept by her, and to be returned to him when demanded; that this
occurred In said county of Jetrerson; that defendant returned but ten dollars of said money to said Reed, and had never paid the balance, although often demanded by him to
do so, but bad embezzled the same. Said
Reed, the witness, could neither read nor
write, did not know what kind -0f money he
had delivered to the defendant, and could not
tell the jury whether It was French or Spanish money, or currency of the United States
-0f America. The solicitor handed the witness
a ten-dollar bill, which he stated was a national bank-blll of the United States, and asked the witness If It looked Ilk" the money he
Jtave the defendant; and the witness answered that It looked like the money he delivered
to the defendant. To this question and an-.
swer, each, the defendant duly objected and
excepted. The defendant, then being examlnoo as a wltnE>ss, stated that she got sixty
dollars In greenbacks from said Reed. This
was, suhstantlally all the evidence In the C8Se.
The defendant thereupon asked the court to
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charge the jury that they must find a verdict
of not guilty, If they believed the evidence."
The court refused this charge, and the defendant excepted.
W. J. Callahan, for appellant. Thos. N. McClellan, Atty. Gen., for the State.
SOMERVILLE, J. 1. The amended return.
made In response to the certiorari Issued from
this court, shows that the grand jury was.
regularly organized and Impaneled in accordance with the requirements of the statute.
This obviates the objection In this particular
based on the original Imperfect record, conceding that the objection was well founded.
2. The judgment of the court sentencing the
detendant to bard labor to satisfy the costs
was perfectly certain, the number of days ot
imprisonment being specified, as well a,s the
amount ot the costs. In this relpect It was
more full and definite than the judgment of
sentence in Hiil v. State, 78 Ala. 1, and other
cases there cited.
3. Tbe Indictment was good without averring that the money alleged to have been
stolen was of any particular value. It being
averred to be "currency of the United States
of America," the court judicially knows that
the bills, as matter of law, were prime facle
of a commercial value equal to that Imported
by their face. Tbis obviated the necessity o!
either allegation or proof of such value.
Sands v. State, 80 Ala. 201; Whart. Cr. Pl.
(8th Ed.) §§ 216, 218; Duvall v. State, 63 Ala.
12; Grant v. State, 55 Ala. 201.
4. The evidence tended to show that the
money alleged to have been stolen was "greenbacks," and this was no variance from the
description given in the Indictment. Levy v.
State, 79 Ala. 259; Duvall v. State, 63 Ala..
12.
5. The testimony of the witness Reed, that
the money stolen from him "looked like" the
ten-dollar blll exhibited by the solicitor t<>
him, In presence of the jury, was relevant as
a mode of identification. As the witness could
neither read nor write, he could testify to
nothing more satisfactory than mere appearance or resemblance. The weight of such
testimony was for the jury to determine.
This testimony was competent whether the
blll exhibited was proved to be United States
currency or not.
6. The evidence tended to prove the d~
fendant's guilt, as charged In the Indictment,
and this fact authorized the refusal of the
general charge asked In behalf of the defendant.
The judgment of conviction le amrmed.

JUDICIAL :SOTICE.
JUD l CIAL N O'1‘ICE.

[Case No. 60

HANLEY et al. v. DO.\'OGHUI<J.

(6 Sup. Ct. 242, 116 U. S. 1.)

Supreme Court of the United States.

1885.

In error to the court of appeals of the

state of Maryland.

HANLEY et al.

T. DO~OGHUE.

(6 Sup. Ct. 242, 116 U. S. 1.)
Supreme Court of the United States. Dec. 14,
1885.
In error to the court of appeals of the
state of Maryland.
F. J. Brown, for plalntltfa 1n error. E. O.
Eichelberger, for defendant In error.

F. J. Brown, for plaintiifs in error. E. G.

Eichelberger, for defendant in error.

Dec. 14,

GRAY, J. This was an action brought

by Michael Hanley and William F. \Velch

against Charles Donoghue in the circuit

court for Baltimore county in the state of

Maryland upon a judgment for $2,000 re-

covered by the plaintiffs on June 4, 1877,

in an action of covenant against the de-

fendant, Charles Donoghue, together with

one John Donoghue, in the court of com-

nion pleas of Washington county in the state

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:07 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104925781
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

of Peiinsylvania, and there recorded. The

declaration contained three counts. The ﬁrst

count set forth the recovery and record of the

judgment as aforesaid in said court of com-

mon pleas, and alleged that it was still in

force and unreversed. The second count con-

talned similar allegations, and also alleged

that in the former action Charles Donoghue

was summoned, and property of John Donog-

hue was attached by process of foreign at-

tachment, but he was never summoned, and

never appeared, and that the proceedings

in that action were duly recorded in that

court. The third count repeated the al-

legations of the second count, and further

alleged that “by the law and practice of

Pennsylvania the judgment so rendered

against the two defendants aforesaid is in

that state valid and enforceable against

Charles Donoghue, and void as against John

Donoghue," and that, "by the law of Penn-

sylvania, any appeal from the judgment so

renlered to the supreme court of Pennsyl-

vania (which is the only court having juris-

diction of appeals from the said court of

common pleas) is required to be made with-

in two years of the rendition of the judg-

ment; neverthelcss no appeal has ever been

taken from the» judgment so rendered

against the said defendants, or either of

them.” The defendant ﬁled a general de-

murrer to each and all of the counts, which

was sustained, and a general judgment

rendered for him. Upon appeal by the

plaintiffs to the court of appeals of the

state of Maryland, the judgment was af-

firmed. 59 Md. 239. The plaintiffs there-

upon sued out this writ of error on the

ground that the decision was against a

right and privilege set up and claimed by

them under the constitution and laws of

GRAY, J. Thla was an action brought
by Michael Hanley and Wllllam F. Welch
against Charles Donoghue in the circuit
court for Baltimore county In the state of
Maryland UI>Qn a judgment for $2,000 recovered by the plalntltra on June 4, 1877,
1n au action of covenant against the defendant, Charles Donoghue, together with
one John Donoghue, 1n the court of commo11 pleas of Washington county in the state
of l'enni;ylvanla, a11d thf're recorded. The
declaration contained three counts. The first
t'(>Unt set forth the recovery aud record of the
judgment as aforesaid In said court of common pleas, and alleged that It was atlll in
force and unreversed. The second count contalned similar allegations, and also alleged
that 1n the former action Charles Donoghue
was summoned, and property of John Donoghue was attached by process of foreign attachment, but he was never summoned, and
never appeared, and that the proceedings
in that action were duly recorded in that
court. The third count repeated the allegations of the second count, and further
alleged that "by the law and practice of
Pennsylvania the judgme11t so rendered
ag11.lnst the two defendants aforesaid la ln
that state valid and enforceable agalnst
Charles Donoghue, and Yold as against John
Donoghue," and that, "by the law of Pennsylvania, any appeal from the judgment so
renlered to the supreme court of Pennsylvania (which ls the only court having jurisdiction of appeals from the said court of
common pleas) is required to be made with·
1n two years of the rendition of the judg·
ment; nevertheless no appeal has ever been
taken from the. judgment so rendered
against the said dcfendants, or either of
them." The defendant filed a general demurrer to each and all of the counts, which
was sustained, and a general judgmeut
rendered for him. Upon appeal by the
plaintiffs to the court of nppenls of the
state of Maryland, the judgment was affirmed. 59 Md. 239. The plalntltrs thereupon sued out this writ of error on the
ground that the decision was against a
right and privilege set up nud claimed by
them under the constitution and laws of
the United States.
'l'he question presented by this writ of
error Is whether the judgment of the court
of appeals of the state of ~laryland has
denied to the plaintiffs a right and privilege to which they are entitled under the
ft.rat section of the fourth article ot the con-
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stltution of the Unit<.'d States, which declares that "full faith and credit shall be
given In each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every
other state; and the congress may by general laws prescribe the manner 1n which
such acts, records, and proceedings shall be
proved and the etrect thereof;" and under
section 905 of the Revised Statutes, which
re-enacts the act of :May 26, 1700, c. 11, (1
Stat. 122,) and prescribes the manner ln
which the records and judlclal proceedings
of the courts of any state shall be authenti·
cated and proved, and enacts that "the said
records and judicial proceedings, so authenticated, shall have such faith and credit given to them In every court wlthln tl1e United
States as they have by law or usage ln the
courts of the state from which they are
taken."
By the settled construction of these pro·
visions of the constltutlon and statutes of
the United States, a judgment of a state
court, In a cause within Its jurlsdlctlon, and
against a defendant lawfully summoned,
or against lawfully attached property of
au absent defendant, ls entitled to as much
force and effect against the person sum·
m'>ned or the property attached, when the
question ls presented for declslon ln a court
of another state, as lt has In the state In
which It was rendered. Ma..xwell v. Stewart, 22 'Vall. 77; Insurance Co. v. Harris,
07 U. S. 3.31; Green v. Yan Buskirk, 7 Wall.
139; Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308. And
It ls within the power of the legislature of
a state to enact that judgments which shall
be rendered In Its com-ts ln actions against
joint defendants, one of whom has not been
duly served with process, shall be valld as
to those who have been so serYed, or who
have appeared In the action. :Mason v.
Eldred, 6 Wall. 231; Eldred v. Bank, 17
Wall. 545; Hall v. Lanning, 91 U. S. 100,
168; Sawin v. Kenny, 93 U. S. 2SD.
l\Iuch of the argument at the bar wns devoted to the dlscusslon of questions which
the view that we take of thla case ren·
ders lt unnecessary to consider; such as
the proper manner of impeaching or avoid·
Ing judgments In the state In which they are
rendered, for want of due service of process
upon one or all of the defendants; or the
effect which a judgment rendered 1n one
state against two joint defendants, one of
whom has been duly summoned and the oth·
er has not, should be allowed against the
former ln the courts of another state, with·
out allegation or proof of the eiTect whkh
such a judgment has against him by the
law of the first state. No court ls to ba
charged with the knowledi:e of foreign laws;
but thc:>y are well understood to be facts
which must, llke other facts, be proYed before they can be rc:>ceived In u court of justiC'e. Tnlbot v. ~eeman, 1 Cranch, 1, 38;
Church v. Hubbart, 2 Cranch, 187, 230;
Strother v. Lucas, 6 Pet. 763, 768; Dalnr:-ie

the United States.

The question presented by this writ of

error is whether the judgment of the court

of appeals of the state of Maryland has

denied to the plaintiffs a right and privi-

lege to which they are entitled under the

ﬁrst section of the fourth article of the con-

stitution of the Unitcd States, which de-
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v. Hale, 91 U. S. 13, 20. It is equally well

settled that the several states of the Union

are to be considered as in this respect for-

eign to each other, and that the courts of

one state are not presumed to know, and

therefore not bound to take judicial notice

01', the laws of another state. In Buckner

v. Finley, 2 Pet. 586, in which it was held

that bills of exchange drawn in one of the

states on persons living in another were for-

eign bills, it was said by Mr. Justice Wash-

ington, delivering the unnnimou opinion of

this court: “For all national purposes em-

braced by the federal constitution the states

and the citizens thereof are one, united un-

der the same sovereign autliority. and gov-

erned by the same laws. In all other re-

spects the states are necessarily foreign to

and independent of each other; their consti-
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tutions and forms of government being, al-

though republican. altogether diiferent, as

are their laws and institutions.” 2 Pet. 590.

Judgments recovered in one state of the

Union, when proved in the courts of anoth-

er, diﬂ’er from judgments recovered in a for-

eign country in no other respect than that

of not being re-examinable upon the merits,

nor impeachable for fraud in obtaining

them, if rendered by a court having juris-

diction of the cause and of the parties.

Buckner v. Finley, 2 Pet. 592; 1\IeElmoyle v.

Cohen. 13 Pet. 312, 324; D'Arcy v. Ketchum,

11 How. 165, 176; Christmas v. Russell, 5

Wall. 290. 30.'>;Thou1pson v. Whitman, 18

Wall. -I37. Congress, in the execution of the

power conferred upon it by the constitution,

having prescribed the mode of attestation

of records of the court of one state to enti-

tie them to be proved in the courts of anoth-

er state. and having enacted that records so

authenticated shall have such faith and

credit in every court within the United

States as they have by law or usage in the

state from which they are taken, a record

of a judgment so authenticated doubtless

proves itself without further evidence; and

' if it appears upon its face to be a record of

a court of general jurisdiction, the jurisdic-

tion of the court over the cause and the par-

ties is to be presumed, unless disproved by

extrinsic evidence or by the record itself.

Knowles v. Gas-Light & Coke Co., 19 Wall.

58; Settlemier v. Sullivan, 97 U. S. 4-14. But

congress has not undertaken to prescribe in

what manner the effect that such judgments

have in the courts of the state in which they

are rendered shall be ascertained, and has

left that to be regulated by the general rules

of pleading and evidence applicable to the

subject.

Upon principle. therefore, and according to

the great preponderance of authority (as ls I

shown by the cases collected in the mar-

gin 1). whenever it becomes necessary for

1 Scott v. Coleman. 5 Litt. 349; Thomas v.

Robinson, 3 \\'en<i. 267: Sheldon v. Hopkins,

7 Wend. 43-3; Van Buskirk v. Muiock, 18 X.

a court of one state, in order to give full

~o.
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,., Hale, 91 U. S. 13, ~. It la equally well
M'ttled that the several atatell ot the Union
are to be conaldt>red as In this respect torelgn to each other, and that the courts of
one state are not presumed to know, and
therefore not bound to take judicial notice
ot, the laws of another state. In BucknPr
v. Flnll'y, 2 Pet. :>86, ID which It was held
tbat bills of exchange drawn In one ot the
states on p<>rsons living In another wt>re torelgn bills, It was said by Mr.•Tustlce Washlngton, dt'llYl'rlng the unanimous opinion of
thls court: "For all national pul'l>Oees embmct'd by the federal constitution the states
and the cltlzt>ns thereof are one. united under the same sovereign authority, and governed by the BOme laws. In all other respects the states are neceBSarlly foreign to
and Independent of each other; their constltuttons and forms of government being, altbough republican, altogether dlft'erent, as
are their laws and Institutions." 2 Pet. 590.
Judgments recovered In one state of the
Union, when proved In the courts of anotber, dlfl'er from judgments recovered In a torelgn country In no other respect than that
of not being re-examinable upon the merits,
nor Impeachable for fraud In obtaining
them, If rendered by a court havlnir Jurisdl<'tlon of the cause and of the parties.
Buekner v. I<'lnley, 2 Pet. 592; M'cElmoyle v.
Collen, 13 Pet. 312, 324; D'Arcy v. Ketchum,
11 How. 16.i, 176; Christmas v. RuBSell, 5
Wall. 200, 30.i; Thompson v. Whitman, 115
Wall. -hli. Congress, In the execution of the
power conferred upon It by the constitution,
having prescribed the mode of attestation
of records of the courts of one state to entltie them to be proved In the courts or another state, and having enacted that reeords so
authentl<'ated shall have such faith and
credit In every court within the United
States as the:r have by law or usage to the
state from whleh they are taken, a record
ot a judgment so authenticated doubtless
pro'\"es Itself without further evidence; and
. If It appears upon Its face to be a record of
a court of general jurisdiction, the jurlsdtctlon of the court over the cause and tile parties ls to be presumed, unless dlsnroved by
extrinsic evidence or by tile record lt11elf.
Knowles v. Gas-Ught & Coke Co., 19 Wall.
US; Settlemler v. Sullivan, 97 U.S. 444. But
con1rress bas not undertaken to preseribe In
what manner the etl'ect that such jmlgments
have In the <'Ourts of the state In whl<'b they
are rendered shall be aecertalned, and has
left that to be regulated by the general rules
ot pleading and evidence applicable to the
subject.
c 110n principle• thPrefore• and according to
thl' great pre1mnderance of authority (as ts
shown by the <'llet>R colle<'ted In the margin 1) whene\"er It becomes necessary for

a court of one state, In order to give full
faith and credit to a judgment rendered In'
another state, to ascertain the eft'ect which
It has In that state, the law of that state
must be proved, like any other matter of
fact. The opposing decisions In Ohio v.
Hinchman, 27 Pa. St. 479, and Paine v. Scbenectady Ins. Co., 11 R. I. 411, are bast'd upon the misapprehension that this court, on
a writ ot error to review a decision of the
highest court of one state upon the faith
and credit to be allowed to a judgment rendered In another state, always takes notice
of the laws of the latter statt>; and upon the
consequent misapplication of the postulate
that one rule must prevail In the court ot
original jurisdiction and In the court of last
resort. \\'hen exercising an original Jori.sdiction under the constitution and laws of
the Unltt'd States, this court, as well as every other court of the national government,
doubtleBS takes notice, without proof, of the
laws of each of the United States. But In
this court, exer<'lslng an appellate jurlsdlC*
tlon, whatever was matter of law In the
court appealed from Is matter of law here,
and whatever was matter of tact In the
court appealed from ls matter of fact here.
In the exercise of Its general appellate jurl•
diction from a lower court of the United
States, this court takes judicial notice of the
laws of every state of the Union, because
thQse laws are known to the court below as
laws alone, needing no averment or proof.
Course v. Stead, 4 Dall. 22, 27, note; Hinde
v. Yattler, :> Pet. 398; Owings v. Hull, 9
Pet. 607, 62:>; U. S. v. Turner, 11 now. 663,
6ri8; Pennington v. Gibson, 16 How. 65;
Covington Drawbridge Co. v. Shepherd, W
How. 227, 230; Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall.
108; Jun<>tlon R. Co. v. Bank of Ashland,
12 Wall. 2'.?6, 230; Lamar v. Mlcou, 114 U.
S. 21R, u Sup. Ct. 8:i7. But on a writ of error to the highest court of a state, In which
the revlsory power of this court Is limited to
determining whether a question of law depending upon the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States has been erroneously decided by the state c8urt upon the facts
before It, while the law of that state, being
! known to Its courts as law, ls of course
I within the judicial notice of this court at
I the hearing on error; yet, as In the state
rourt. the laws of another state are but
tacts, requiring to be proved In order to be
considered, this court doe-R not takP judl<'tal
notice of them, unless made part of the record sent up, as In Green v. Van Buskirk, 7

J. Law, lSl; Elliott v. Ray, 2 Blackf. 31;
Cone v. Cotton, Id. 82; Snyder V:· ~n~·der. 25
Ind. 399: Prlton v. Plntni>r, 13 Oh10, 209: Hor. ton v. Critchfit>hl, 18 lll. 1:~: Rape v. lll'tlton.
1
9 Wis. 3!..>s: Crafts v. Clark, 31 Iowa. ii;
Taylor v. Barron. 10 FOllt. i8, end 3:i S. H.
'
4.~4; Knapp v. AIK'll, 10 Alli>n, 48j; !\lowry "·
Ohasc, 100 Mass. i9; Wright v. Andl't'\\'11, 130
1 Seott v. Coli>ruan. u Litt. 349; Thom11s v.
l\la11s. 149: Bnnk of U. S. v. Merchantll' Bank,
Rohinson, 3 ".t>ntl. 267; 8hl'ldon v. Hopkins, 7 Gill. 41U, 431; Coates v• .Mackey, U6 Md.
7 Wend. 43J; YllD Bmklrk v. Mulock, 18 ~. 416, 419

23~

JUDICIAL NOTICE.
JUDICIAL NOTICE.

[Case No. 80

Wall. 139. The case comes, in principle,

within the rule laid down long ago by Chief

Justice Marshall: “That the laws of a for-

eign nation, designed only for the direction

of its own affairs, are not'to be noticed by

the courts of other countries, unless proved

as facts, and that this court, with respect to

facts, is limited to the statement made in

the court below, cannot be questioned."

Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cranch, 1, 38. Where

by the local law of a state, as in Tennessee

(Hobbs v. Memphis & C. R. Co., 9 Heisk.

873), its highest court takes judicial notice

of the laws of other states, this court, also,

on writ of error, might take judicial notice

of them. But such is not the case in Mary-

land, where the court of appeals has not

only aﬁirmed the general rule that foreign

laws are facts which, like other facts, must
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be proved before they can be received in ev-

idence in courts of justice, but has held that

the effect which a judgment rendered in an-

other state has by the law of that state is a

matter of fact, not to be judicially noticed

without allegation and proof; and conse-

quently that an allegation of the eifect

which such a judgment has by law in that

state is admitted by demurrer. Baptiste v.

De Volunbrun, 5 Har. &. J. 86, 98; Wernwag

v. Pawling, 5 Gill & J. 500, 508; Bank of U.

S. v. Merchants‘ Bank, 7 Gill, 415, 431;

Coates v. Mackey, 56 Md. 416, 419.

From these considerations it follows that

the averment in the third count of the dec-

laration, that by the law of Pennsylvania

the judgment rendered in that state against

Charles Donoghue and John Donoghue was

valid and enforceable against Charles, who

had been erved with process in that state,

and void against John, who had not been so

served, must be considered, both in the

courts in Maryland and in this court, on

writ of error to one of those courts, an al-

legation of fact admitted by the demurrer.

Upon the record before us, therefore, the

plaintiff appears to be entitled, under the

constitution and laws of the United States,

to judgment on this count. It having been

admitted at the bar that the other counts

are for the same cause of action, it is unnec-

essary to consider them. The general judg-

ment for the defendant is erroneous, and the

rights of both parties will be secured by or-

derlng, in the usual form, that the judgment

of the court of appeals of Maryland be re-

versed, and the case remanded to that court

for further proceedings not inconsistent

with this opinion.
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Wall. 139. The case comes, In principle,
within the rule laid down long ago by Chief
Justice Marshall: "That the laws of a foreign nation, designed only for the direction
of Its own affairs, are not· to be noticed by
the courts ot other countries, unleBB proved
as tacts, and that this court, with respect to
tacts, Is limited to the statement made In
the court below, cannot be questioned."
Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Crnnch, 1, 38. Where
by the local law of a state, as In TenneBSee
(Hobbs v. Memphis & C. R. Co., 9 Helsk.
873), Its highest court takes judicial notice
ot the laws of other states, this court, also,
on writ of error, might take judicial notice
ot them. But such ls not the case In Maryland, where the court of appeals has not
only atllrmed the general rule tho.t foreign
lo.we are tacts which, like other facts, must
be proved before they can be received In evidence In courts of justice, but has held that
the etrect which a judgment rendered In another state has by the law of that stRte Is &
matter of fact, not to be judicially noticed
without allegation and proof; and consequently that an allegation of the effect
which such a judgment has by law In that
11tate ls admitted by demurrer. Baptiste v.
De Volunbrun, 5 Har. & J. 86, 98; Wernwag
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v. Pawling, 5 Gill & J. 500, 508; Bank of U.
S. v. Merchants' Bank, 7 Glll, 415, 431;
Contes v. Mackey, 56 Md. 416, 419.
From these considerations It follows that
the averment In the third count of the declaration, that by the law of Pennsylvania
the judgment rendered In that state against
Charles Donoghue and John Donoghue was
valid and enforceable against Charles, who
had been served with process In that state,
and void against John, who had not been so
served, mu'1; be considered, both In the
courts In Maryland and lo this court, on
writ of error to one of those courts, an allegation of tact admitted by the demurrer.
Upon the record before us, therefore, the
plaintiff appears to be entitled, under the
constitution and laws of the United States,
to judgment on this count. It having been
admitted at the bar that the other counts
are for the same cause of action, It ts unnecessary to consider them. The general judgment ffM' the defendant ls erroneous, and the
rights of both parties wlll be secured by ordering, In the usual form, that the judgment
of the court of appeals of Maryland be reversed, and the case remanded to that court
for further proceedings not Inconsistent
with this opinion.

PROOF.

Uase No. 81]
(Jase No. 81]

PROOF.

LLOYD v. MATTHEWS et ai.

(15 Sup. Ct. 70, 155 U. S. 222.)

Supreme Court of the United States. Dec. 3,

189-l.

No. 81.

In Error to the Court of Appeals of the State

of Kentucky.

Hattie A. Matthews held the demand note

of E. L. Harper for $5,000, on which the in-

terest had been paid to January 1, 1882.

June 21, 1887, Harper was the owner of some

shares of stock in the Fidelity Building, Sav-

ings & Loan Company of Newport, Ky.,

worth about $5,000, which he, being insol-

vent, transferred on the morning of that day

to Miss Matthews in part payment of the

debt, by blank indorsement in the building

company’s book. Afterwards the name of

J. H. Otten was inserted as a proper person
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to obtain the money, and for this reason he

was made a party to these proceedings,

though having no real interest therein. A

few hours after the transfer, Harper made

an assignment of all his property for the ben-

eﬁt of his creditors under the insolvent laws

of Ohio. and, the person named as ussignee

failing to qualify, H. P. Lloyd, the present

plaintiff in error, was appointed, by the prop-

er court, such assignee. Certain creditors of

Harper brought suit in the chancery court of

Campbell county, Ky., on their several debts,

and attached the stock as the property of

Harper. These cases were consolidated, and

while they were pending, September 16, 1887,

Miss Matthews and Otten ﬁled their joint

petition to be made parties defendant, which

was done. They alleged the ownership by

Harper of the stock; the transfer by indorse-

ment in the book. which was made an ex-

hibit; that Miss Matthews was a creditor of

Harper to an amount equal to the face value

of the stock; that the transfer of the stock was

made some h0_urs before the execution of the

deed of assignment by Harper, and was bona

ﬁde, and for a valuable consideration, and

passed all Harper's interest; that Harper

was a citizen and resident of the state of

Ohio at the time of the assignment and there-

tofore; that “by the laws in existence at that

time in said state of Ohio, debtors had the

right to make preferences in the payment of

their creditors, either in the deed of assign-

ment or by paying them theretofore, in such

a way as they saw proper"; that Lloyd had

been made a party as assignee, and was

claiming the stock as part of Harper's estate,

while the plaintiffs in the consolidated cases

asserted their claims under the attachments;

and praying that the stock be adjudgctl to

Miss Matthews. January 14, 1888, Miss .\Iat-

thcws and Otten ﬂied a joint amended an-

swer, attaching the note as an exhibit, and

making this and their former petition a cross

petition. On the same day Lloyd, assignee,

ﬁled a reply to the answer and answer to the
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This pleading contained ﬁve

paragraphs. The ﬁrst denied that Harper

LLOYD v. MATTHEWS et al.
(13 Sup. Ct. 70, lM U. S. 222.)
Supreme Court of the United States. Dee. 3,
189-1.

No. 81.
In Error to the Court of Appeals of the State
ot Kentucky.
Hattie A. Matthews held the demand note
ot E. L. Harper for $5,000, on which the Interest had been paid to January 1, 1882.
June 21, 18~7. Harper was the owner ot some
shares of stock In the Fidelity Building, Sav'tngs & Loan Company of Newport, Ky.,
worth about $5,000, which he, being Insolvent, transferred on the morning ot that day
to Miss Matthews In part payment of the
debt, by blank lndorsement In the bulldlng
company's book. Afterwards the name of
J. H. Otten was Inserted as a proper person
to obtain the money, and for this reason he
was made a party to these proceedings,
though having no real Interest therein. A
tew hours after the transfer, Harper made
an assignment of all his property tor the benefit of his creditors under the Insolvent laws
ot Ohio. and, the person named as assignee
falling to quality, H. P. Lloyd, the present
plaintiff In error, was appointed, by the proper court, such assignee. Certain creditors of
Harper brought suit In the chancery court of
Campbell county, Ky., on their several debts,
and attached the stock as the property of
Harper. These cases were consolidated, and
whlle tlley were pending, September 16, 1887,
Ml88 Matthews and Otten flied their joint
petition to be made parties defendant, which
was done. They alleged the ownership by
Harper of the stock; the transfer by lndorsement In the book, which we.a made an exhibit; that Miss Matthews was a creditor of
Harper to an amount equal to the face value
of the stock; that the transfer ot the stock was
made some ho,urs before the execution ot the
deed of assignment by Harper, and was bona
tide, and for a valuable consideration, and
passed all Harper's Interest; that Harper
was a citizen and resident of the state of
Ohio at the time of the assignment and theretofore; that "by the laws In existence at that
time In said state ot Ohio, debtors bad the
right to make preferences In the payment of
their creditors, either In the deed of assignment or by paying them theretofore, In such
a way as they saw proper"; that Lloyd had
been made a party as assignee, and was
claiming the stock as part of Harper's estate,
whlle the plaintlll's In the consolldatC'd cases
asserted their claims under the attachml'nt~;
and praying that the stock be adjudged to
Miss Matthews. January 14, 1888, :\Iiss ~Int
thcws and Otten flied a joint amended answer, attaching the note as an exhibit, and
making this and their former petition a cross
petition. On the same !lay Lloyd, assignee,
filed a reply to llie answer and answe1· to the
234

cross petition. This pleading contAlned five
paragraphs. The first denied that Harper
owed :\Ilse ~la tthews anything a.t the time the
stock was assigned; admlttE>d that at the time
of the execution of the a..o.;slgn111Pnt Harper
and Miss Matthews were both citizens and
residents of the state of Ohio; denied "that
at the time ot making said assignment debtors had by the laws of the state of Ohio the
right to prefer their creditors In the deed of
assignment." The seeond paragraph asserted that the transfer and conveyance ot the
st-OCk to Otten by Harper was made tor the
purpose and with the intent to defraud the
cre<\iton ot Harper of their just and lawtu?
debts, and that such transfer and nsslgnment
was fraudulent and void under and by virtue
of section 4196 ot the Re\"Jsed Statutes ot the
state of Ohio, which provided as follows, to
wit:
"Every gltt, grant, or conveyance ot lands,
tenements, heredltaments, rents, goods or
chattels, and every bond, judgment or execution made or obtalned with Intent to defraud
creditors of their just and lawful debts or
damages, or to defraud or to deceive the person or persons purch1u1lng such land11. tene·
ments, hereditaments, rents, goods or chattels, shall be deemed utterly void and ot n<>
effect."
The third paragraph denied any consideration for the transfer. The fourth alleged the
transfer to be fraudulent and done with Intent to hinder and delay Harper's creditors.
The fifth averred that the transfer was made
by Harper with the Intent to prefer Miss Matthews, If she was a creditor. which defendant denied, over his other creditors, and was
void under section f':.343 ot the Revised Statutes of the state of Ohio, which reads as follows:
"All assignments In trust to a trustee or
trustec>s, made In contemplation ot Insolvency, with the Intent to prefer one or more creditors, shall Inure to the equal benefit of all
creditors In proportion to the amount or their
respective claims, and the trusts arising under the same shall be administered In conformity with the provisions ot this chapter."
On May 18, 1888, Miss Matthews filed reply
to the original answer and cross petition or
Lloyd, trustee, as follows:
"The defendant Hattie A. Matthews, for reply to answer and cross petition or H. P .
Lloyd says she admits E. L. Harper was Insolvent when he assigned the building association stock to her.
"She admits that he assigned the stock t<>
her with the Intention to prefer her to the
exclusion of the creditors, but, as was stated
In her original pleadings, this was allowable
under the laws of Ohio.
"She denies that under the provisions or
the laws which are set out In said pleading
of Lloyd, to which this ls a reply, thNe is
anything which Invalidates the tran11ter of
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the stock to this defendant, the same involved

in the case.

“WVherefore the defendant prays as in her

original pleadings, and for general relief.”

The chancery court rendered judgment in

favor of Lloyd, trustee, for the full value of

the stock, amounting as a money demand

against the building association to the sum

of $4.91-1.89, and Miss Matthews and Otten

appealed to the court of appeals of the state

of Kentucky, which reversed the judgment of

the chanccry court, and remanded the cause,

with directions to render judgment in favor

of Miss Matthews, in conformity to the opin-

ion. Matthews v. Lloyd, 89 Ky. 625, 13 S.

W. 106.

To review this judgment a writ of error

from this court was allowed.

H. P. Lloyd and C. L. Raison, Jr., for

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:07 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104925781
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

plaintiff in error.

J. Helm, for defendant in error.

Mr. Chief Justice FULLER, after stating

the facts in the foregoing language, delivered

the opinion of the court.

The federal question upon which plaintiff

relies to sustain our jurisdiction is that, under

the statutory law of Ohio set out in his plead-

ing, the transfer of the stock in question was

void, and that the court of appeals of Ken-

tucky in rendering judgment did not give

that full faith and credit to the public acts,

records, and judicial proceedings of the state

of Ohio which the constitution and the law of ‘

the United States require.

Rev. St. § 905.

The ﬁrst error assigned is as follows: “The

court of appeals of Kentucky erred in the dc-

cision rendered in this case below, in failing

to give full faith and credit to the laws of

the state of Ohio which were presented in the

pleadings, in failing to give full faith and

credit to the judicial construction of such

laws by the highest court of said state, and

in failing to give full faith and credit to the

judicial proceedings of the probate court of

Hamilton county, Ohio, as set forth in the

pleadings.”

We do not ﬁnd that the record contains any

judicial proceedings of the probate court of

Hamilton county, Ohio, but suppose the refer-

ence to be to proceedings in insolvency upon

the ﬁling of the deed of assignment by Har-

per, under which Lloyd, trustee, claims, and

that such insolvency proceedings could have

no greater effect on the question of title than

allowed by the laws of Ohio in the matter of

the preference of creditors.

The court of appeals of Kentucky held that,

as the parties all resided in Ohio, and the en-

tire transaction occm-red there, its validity

was to be tested by the law in force there;

that at common law a debtor had a right to

prefer a. creditor, either by payment or an

express preference in a deed of assignment;

that he had a right to pay his debt, and it

was only by virtue of statutory law that such

Const. art. 4, § 1;

Chas. H. Fisk and Chas. 1

the stock to this defendant, the same involved
in the case.
''Wherefore the defendant prays as In her
original pleadings, and for general relief."
The chancery court rendered judgment in
favor of Lloyd, trnstee, for the tull value or
the stock, amounting as a money demand
against the building association to the sum
of $4,914.89, and :mas Matthews and Otten
appealed to the court of appeals or the state
of Kentucky, which reversed the judgment of
the chancery court, and remanded the cause,
with directions to render judgment In favor
of Miss Matthews, In conformity to the opinion. Matthews v. Lloyd, 89 Ky. 625, 13 S.
W.106.
To review this judgment a writ of error
from this court was allowed.
H. P. Lloyd and C. L. Raison, Jr., tor
plaintiff In error. Chas. H. Fisk and Chas.
J. Helm, for defendant in error.
Mr. Ch(et Justice FULLER, after stnttna:
the facts In the foregoing language, delivered
the opinion or the court.
The federal question UPon which plalntttr
relies to sustain our jurisdiction Is that, under
the statutory law or Ohio set out In his pleading, the transfer of the stock In question was
void, and that the court of appeals of Kentucky In rendering judgment did not give
that full faith and credit to the public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of the state
of Ohio which the constitution and the law of
the United States require. Const. art. 4, I l;
Rev. St. § 905.
The first error 11BSlgned ls as follows: "The
court of appeals of Kentucky erred In the decision rendered In this case below, In falling
to give full faith and credit to the laws of
the state of Ohio which were presented In the
pleadings, in falling to give full faith and
credit to the judicial construction of such
laws by the highest court of said state, and
In failing to give full faith and credit to the
judicial proceedings of the probate court of
Hamilton county, Ohio, as set forth in the
pleadings."
We do not find that the record contains any
judicial proceedings of the probate court of
Hamilton county, Ohio, but suppose the reference to be to proceedings In insolvency u1>0n
the filing or the deed of assignment by Harper, under which Lloyd, trustee, claims, and
that such Insolvency pr<><;eedlngs could have
no greater effect on the question or title than
allowed by the laws or Ohio In the mattci' of
the preference of creditors.
The court of appeals or Kentucky held that,
as the parties all resided In Ohio, and the entire transaction occurred there, Its validity
was to be tested by the law In force there;
that at common law a debtor had a right to
prefer a creditor, either by payment or an
l'Xpress preference in a deed or assignment;
that he bad a right to pay his debt, and it
waa only by virtue of statutory law that such

[Case No. 81

a payment could be held Invalid, and the
creditor be compelled to surrender his advantage; that ln the absence of any showing
or the existence or such a statute In another
state, it must be presumed that the common
law was In force there; that section 6343 of
the Revised Statutes or Ohio, set out in the
pleadings, did not appear "to embrace a case
like this one, but to relate alone to preferencee made In deeds of assignment to trustees
for creditors generally"; that this transfer
could not properly be held to be a part of the
deed of assignment; and that, tested by the
rules of the common law, the preference was
not Invalid.
Now, In arriving at these conclusions, the
court of appeals did not concur with the
views of Harper's asslgn<'e; but does It therefore follow that full faith and credit was dented to the la\vs of Ohio and to the construction of such laws by the highest court or
that state? The courts of the United States,
when exercising their original jurlsdlctlon,
take notice, without proof, of the laWB of the
several states; but In the supreme court of
the United States, when acting under its appellate jurisdiction, whatever was matter of
fact In the state court whose judgment or decree is under review ls matter of fact there.
And whenever a court or one state ls required
to ascertain what etrect a publlc act of another state has In that state, the law of such
other state must be proved as a fact. Chi·
cago & A. R. Co. v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 119
U.S. 615, 7 Sup. Ct. 398; Ha.niey v. Donoghue,
116 U. S. 1, 6 Sup. Ct. 242.
The court of appeals was obllgcd to determine the Cll8e on the record, and plaintiff in
error had failed to plead the construction
given the Ohio statutes by the courts of Ohio,
or to introduce the printed books of cases adjudged In the state of Ohio, or to prove the
common law of that state by the parol evl·
dence of persons learned in thnt law, or to
put in evidence the laws or that state as
printed under the authority thereof, or a
certified copy thereof, as provided by the law
of Kentucky. Gen. St.' Ky. 1888, c. 37, H 17,
19, pp. 5-16, 547.
The cow·t of appeals wns left, therefore, to
construe the parts or the Ohio laws that were
pleaded as It would local laws; and It ls settled that under such cll"CUmstances, whel"e
the validity of a state law ls not drawn in
question, but merely Its const:rUctlon, no
federal question arises. As was remarked In
Glenn v. Garth, 147 U. S. 360, 368, 13 Sup.
Ct. 350: "It every time the courts of a state
put a construction upon the statutes of another st.1te, this court may be required to determine whether that construction was or
was not co1Tect, upon the ground that If It
were concluded that the construction was Incorrect It would follow that the state courts
had refused to give run faith and credit to
the statutes Involved, our jurisdiction would
be enlarged In & manner never heretofore be235
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Case No. 81] PROOF.

lleved to have been contemplated." Banking than was given them by the court; of appeals

Co. v. Marshall, 12 How. 165; Cook Co. v. of Kentucky.

Calumet & C. Canal & Dock Co., 138 U. S. Writ of error dismissed.

635, 11 Sup. Ct. 435.

This record contains nothing to show as Mr. Justice HARLAN was of opinion that

matter of fact that the public acts of Ohio the writ of error should be retained and the

hud by law or usage in Ohio any other eﬁfect judgment aiiirmed.
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lleved to have been contemplated." Banking
Co. v. Marshall, 12 How. 165; Cook Co. v.
Cnlumet & C. Canal & Dock Co., 138 U. S.
63.1, 11 Sup. Ct. 435.
'l'hle record contalnB nothing to show as
matter of fact that the public acts of Ohio
ha.d by law or usage In Ohio any other effect
236

than was given them by the court of appeals
of Kentucky.
Writ of error dlsmls8ed.
Mr. Justice HARLAN was of opinion that
the writ of error should be retained and the
Judgment aftll•med.

JUDICIAL NOTICE.
JUDICIAL NOTICE.

[Case No. b2

STATE ex rel. THAYER v. BOYD.

(51 N. W. 96-i, 34 Neb. 435.)

Supreme Court of Nebraska. April 7, 1892.

On motion to reinstate. Motion denied.

M. B. Reese, Joseph H. Blair, and Chas.

STATE ex rel. THAYER v. BOYD.
(51 N. W. 964, 34 Neb. 435.)
Supreme Court of Nebraska. April 7, 1892.
On motion to reinstate. Motion denied.
M. B. Reese, J'oseph H. Blair, and Chas.
A. Goss, for the motion. J'. C. Cowin, opposed.

A. Goss. for the motion. J. C. Cowin, op-

posed.

POST, J. A suﬂiclent statement of the

facts in this case will be found in the sev-

eral opinions heretofore ﬁled (31 Neb. 682.'

48 N. W. T39. and 12 Sup. Ct. 375), revers-

ing the judgment of ouster against the re-

spondent in favor of the relator, and re-

mandlng the case for further proceedings in

this court. On the 15th day of March the

respondent ﬁled with the clerk of this court

the mandate from the supreme court of the

United States, and moved for judgment in

his favor on the pleadings. The motion
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aforesaid came on for hearing the next day,

in accordance with the practice of the court,

and was sustained, and the action dismissed,

the relator making no appearance. The re-

lator now, by the motion under consideration,

asks to have the judgment of dismissal set

aside, and for leave to reply and proceed to

trial on the merits of the case. It is claimed

by him that his failure to resist the motion

for judgment is not attributable to any fault

or negligence on his part, but to the fact that

he was at the time in question absent, in a

distant part of the state, and had no notice

of the respondent's intention to take any ac-

tion at that time. This claim, in my judg-

ment, is fully sustained by the aﬂldavits ac-

companying the motion, which are not con-

tradicted. If this were an ordinary proceed-

ing,—that is, one in which a cause of action

by a competent and proper party is con-

ceded,—I would say without hesitation that

the present motion should be sustained. It

could not, in that case, be denied, without

reversing the rule which has prevailed in this

court since my ﬁrst acquaintance with it.

The respondent as well as the court acted

upon the assumption that due and sufficient

notice of his motion had been given. The

neglect to give proper notice was occasion-

ed by a change of counsel for the relator. It

is evident that the parties were acting in

good faith, and we have no occasion to im-

pute blame to any one for the failure.

It is insisted by counsel for the relator

that the only question determined by the

supreme court of the United States is that

the naturalization of the respondent's fa-

ther is well pleaded in the answer; in other

words, that under the allegations thereof re-

spondent might prove that his father com-

pleted his naturalization during his (respond-

ent’s) minority; and he accordingly ten-

ders a reply in the nature of a general de-

nial of that part of the answer. It is not

necessary for the purpose of this motion to

consider the question of the citizenship of

the respondent, or to determine to what ex-

tent, if at all, the judgment of the supreme

court is conclusive on that question, since

POST, J. A sufficient statement of the
facts In this case wlll be found In the several opinions heretofore filed (31 Neb. 682,
48 N. W. 739, and 12 Sup. Ct. 375), l'P.verslng the Judgment of ouster against the respondent In favor of the relator, and remanding the case for further proceedings In
thlB court. On the 15th day of March the
respondent filed with the clerk of this court
the mandate from the supreme court of the
Cnlted States, and moved for Judgment In
his favor on the pleadings. The motlou
aforesaid came on for hearing the next day,
In accordance with the practice of the court.
and was sustained, and the action dismissed,
the relator making no appearance. '.fhe relator now, by the motion under consideration,
aaks to have the judgment of dlsrul881ll set
1181de, and for leave to reply and proceed to
trial on the merits of the case. It Is claimed
by him that his failure to resist the motion
for judgment ls not attributable to any fault
or negligence on his .part, but to the fact that
he was at the time In question absent, In a
distant part of the state, and had no notice
of the respondent's lntentlou to take any action at that time. This claim, In my JwlA·
ment, Is fully sustained by the affidavits accompanying the motion, which are not contradicted. If this were an ordinary proceedlng,-that Is, one In which a cause of action
by a competent and proper party ls conceded,-! would Blly without hesitation that
the present motion should be sustained. It
could not, In that case, be denied, without
reversing the rule which has prevailed In this
court since my first acquaintance with It.
The respondent as well as the court acted
upon the &Bsumptlon that due and sufficient
notice of his motion had been given. The
neglect to give proper notice was occasioned by a change of counsel tor the relator. It
Is evident that the parties were acting In
good faith, and we have no occasion to Impute blame to any one for the failure.
It Is Insisted by counsel for the relator
that the only question determined by the
supreme court of the United States Is that
the naturalization of the respondent"s father Is well pleaded In the answer; In other
words, that under the allegations thereof respondent might prove that bis father completed his naturalization during bls (re11pondent's) minority; and he accordingly tenders a reply In the nature or a general denial of that part of the answer. It ls not
nece11sary for the purpose of this motion to
consider the question or the cltlzl'nRhlp of
the respondent, or to determine to what ex-

[Case No. b2

tent, If at all, the judgment of the supreme
court ls conclusive on that question, since
the motion should be denied on other grounds.
Nor is It necessary to determine whether, In
case the respondent 18 not a eltlzen, and
therefore not eligible to the office of governor,
the relator or the lieutenant governor would
be entitled to the possession and emoluments
thereof. Whatever right the relator may
have had to Institute this action in the first
Instance, It ls clear to my mind that he has
now no authority to prosecute It further. It
appears from the records In tbls ease that a
writ of ouster was Issued from this court, by
virtue of which the respondent was removed from the otftce of governor, a.nd the relator Installed therein. It lw a fact or which
we must take notice that the respondent Is
now in possession of said office. and discharging the duties thereof. We know, too, from
our records, that no order h&B been allowed
or issued for restoration to respondent of the
ofllce from which he was ousted. The Inference ls. therefore, that the office was voluntarily surrendered by the relator. It ls not
necessary, however, to rest our conclusion
upon an Inference. That the relator, on the
8th day of February, 1892, voluntarily, and
on his own motion, surrendered the ofllce
In question to the respondent, Is a fact which
ought to be and ls generally known. It Is
a part of the political history of the state.
of which the courts will take notice without
proof. 1 Greenl. Ev. 6; Brown v. Piper, 91
U. S. 37, 12 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, lril.
It Is a rule well settled In this state that
a private person, having no direct inter•.st
In the otfl.ce In controversy, cannot maintain,
on his own relation, proceedings by quo warranto to test the title of another thereto.
State v. Stein, 13 Neb. 530, 14 N. W. 481;
State v. Hamilton, 29 Neb. 198, 45 N. W.
2W. Having voluntarily surrendered the office, the relator bas no better title thereto,
or right to prosecute this action, than any
other private citizen of this state. His title
ls possessory only. His right to hold over In
case the respondent Is Ineligible Is at most
an Incident to his prior possession of the office. The distinction should be kept In mind
between this case and one in which the state
In Its sovereign capacity Interposes In the
manner prescribed by law for the purpose of
testing the title of an Incumbent to an office. The statutory authority for this proceeding Is found In section 1, c. 71, Com1•.
Laws, as follows: "Section 1. 'When any citizen o! this state shall claim any office which
Is usurped, Invaded, or unlawfully held and
exercised by another, the person so clnhnlng such ofllce shall have the right to file
In the district court an lnfonnatlon In the
nature of a quo warranto, upon his own relntlon, and with or without the consent of
the prosecuting attorney. and such person
shall have the right to prosecute !<:li tl lnronnatlon to final judgment: provlllt•d, he
shall have first applied to the prosecuting at237
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PROOF.

torney to ﬁle the information, and the pros-

ecuting attorney shall have refused or neg-

lected to ﬁle the same.” The proceeding con-

templated by the section quoted is a contest

between two claimants for an oﬂice. It does

not diifer materially from any other conten-

tion involving private rights. Like other ca-

ses in which the plaintiff relies upon prior

possession as evidence of title, proof of a.

voluntary abandonment is a complete de-

fense. It is said in Shortt on Informations

(Am. Ed.) 133: “He alone is a competent

relator who has some interest other than

such as belongs to the community at large

in the question to be tried by the quo war-

ra.nto, and who has not by any of the meth-

ods already adverted to disqualiﬁed himself

from acting as prosecutor.” Among the acts

which are referred to above as disqualifying
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one to act as relator are the following (page

177), viz.: Where it is sought to impeach a

title conferred by a corporation election, in

which the relator has concurred. Where the

relator was present and concurred in the

election of the respondent as mayor. Where

it was claimed an election to membership in

a board of health was void for the reason

that the official ballots were informal, it was ‘

held that the relator was disqualified by rea-

son of having voted a similar ballot. This

case is clearly within the principle of these

authorities. The act of the relator in sur-

rendering the oﬂlce to the respondent, and

voluntarily retiring therefrom, disqualiﬂes

him to longer act as relator, and is in eifect

an abandonment of the action.

It is suggested that the surrender of the

oﬂice to the respondent was the result of

a misconception of the effect of the judg-

ment of the supreme court of the United

States, and of what issues are concluded

238

thereby. In his aﬂidavit he says, in sub-

stance, that on the 8th day of February he

was induced to believe that when the man-

date of that court was received it would con-

tain an order to this court to enter judg-

ment that the respondent had for more than

two years last prior to the general election

in 1890 been a citizen of the United States.

The records of the courts in this country are

always accessible to those interested in their

judgments and decrees. A mandate is a ju-

- dicial command, issued by a court or magis-

trate, directing the proper oﬁicers to enforce

a judgment or decree. Bonv. Law Dict. The

z relator was bound to know, and we must as-

‘ sume did know, that the mandate, when is-

sued, would be merely a direction to take

further proceedings in accordance with the

judgment of the supreme court. The judg-

ment of that court. if entered, was notice to

relator of what issues were concluded there-

by. If judgment had not been formally en-

tered upon the records of the court, he must

have known from the opinions ﬁled to what

extent his rights were determined by the

court. It is a fact within our knowledge that

PROOF.

torney to file the Information, and the pros- thereby. In his a.flldavlt he says, in subecutlng attorney shall have refused or neg- stance, that on the 8th day of February he
lected to file the same." The proceeding con- was induced to believe that when the mantemplated by the section quoted is a contest date of that court was received It would conbetween two claimants for an ofllce. It does taln an order to this court to enter judgnot dll'fer materially from any other conten- ment that the respondent had for more than
tion invo!Ylng private rights. Like other en- two years last prior to the general election
11es In which the plaintiff relies upon prior In 1800 been a citizen of the United States.
posseBSion as evidence of title, p1·oof of a The records of the courts in this country are
voluntary abandonment ls a complete de- always accessible to those interested in their
tense. It ls said In Shortt on Informations judgments and decrees. A mandate ls a ju{Am. Ed.) 183: "He alone is a competent 1 dlcial command, Issued by a court or magisrelator who has some interest other than trate, directing the proper officers to enforce
such as belongs to the community at large a judgment or decree. Bouv. Law Dict. The
in the question to be tried by the quo war- relator was bound to know, and we must asranto, and who has not by any of the meth· i sume did know, that the mandate, when !sods already adverted to disqualified himself sued, would be merely a direction to take
from acting as prosecutor." Among the acts further proceedings In accordance with the
which are referred to above as disqualifying judgment of the supreme court. The judgone to act as relator are the following (page , ment of that court, 1f entered, was notice to
1i7), viz.: Where 1t ls sought to Impeach a 1 relator of what Issues were concluded theretitle conferred by a corporation election, in 1 by. If judgment had not been formally enwhich the relntor has concurred. Where the tered upon the records of the court, be must
relator was present and concurred In the have known from the opinions filed to what
election of the respondent as mayor. Where extent his rights were determined by the
it wns claimed an election to membership In court. It ts a fact within our knowledge that
a board of health was void for the reason the substance of the opinions was made pubthat the official ballots were Informal, It wns I lie within a few hours of the time they were
held that the rel:ltor was disqualified by rea- filed. It Is not enough for relator to an·
son of having voted a similar ballot. This ewer that he was wrongly Informed as to the
case Is clearly within the principle of these eft'ect of the decision. He was bound at his
authorities. The act of the relato1· In sur- peril to know the law of the case as declared
rPndering the ofllce to the respondent, and by the court of last resort. Since It Is apyoluutarlly retiring therefrom, disqualifies parent that the relator Is without authority
him to longer act ae relntor, and is In effect to further prosecute. and that this pl'O('eedIng must for that reason result in a judg.an abandonment of the action.
It Is suggested that the surrender of the ment for the respondent, It Is evident that
-Office to the respondent was the result of the motion to set aside the judgment already
a misconception of the effect of the judg- rendered, and for leave to reply, should be
ment of the supreme court of the United denied. Motion denied.
States, and of what issues are concluded
The other judges concur.
238
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COMMONWEALTH v. DUNLOP.

[Case No. 83

(16 S. E. 273, 89 Va. 431.)
COMMON\VEALTH v. DUNLOP.

(16 S. E. 273, 89 Va. 431.)

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

1892.

Error to circuit court of city of Peters-

burgh. -

These proceedings were instituted by Mr.

Dunlop against the commonwealth to estab-

lish the genuineness of coupons tendered by

him in payment of taxes, and to recover back

the money collected from him for such taxes.

There was a judgment in plaintiifs favor,

and the commonwealth brings error. Af-

ﬁrmed.

W. H. Mann and R. Taylor Scott, Atty.

Supreme Oourt of Appeals of Virginia. Dec. 1,
1892.

Error to circuit court of city of Petersburgh.
These proceedings were Instituted by Mr.
Dunlop against the commonwealth to establish the genuineness of coupons tendered by
him in payment of taxes, and to recover bnck
the money collected from him for sueh taxes.
There was a judgment in plnlntllf's favor,
and the commonwealth brings error. Affirmed.
W. H. Mann and R. Taylor Scott, Atty.
Gen., for the Commonwealth. Maury &
Maury, for the defendant In error.

Gen., for the Commonwealth. Maury &.

Maury, for the defendant in error. -

Dec. 1.

l.E\YlS, P. This was a proceeding under .

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:07 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104925781
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

the statute for the veriﬁcation of coupons

previously tendered by the plaintiff in pay-

ment of taxes. At the trial the plaintiif

proved, as alleged in his petition, that no

part of the taxes for which the coupons were '

tendered were school taxes or liquor license

taxes. He also introduced a witness, who

exhibited for the inspection of the court and

jury the bonds from which the coupons had

been cut. The witness then testified, with-

out objection. that they were the genuine

bonds of the state; that he himself had cut

the coupons from them; and that the cou-

pons were genuine; and this was all the evi-

deuce in the case. The bonds, copies of

which are exhibited with the record, are reg-

ular on their face, purporting to be under the

seal of the state, and signed by the treasurer

and countersigned by the second auditor of '

the state. They all purport to have been

issued pursuant to the act of March 30, 1871,

commonly known as the "Funding Bill," ex-

cept one which purports to be under the act

of March 28, 1879. entitled “An act to pro-

vide a plan of settlement of the public debt."

The commonwealth demurred to the evi-

dence, but the court overruled the demurrer,

and gave judgment for the plaintiff.

It is contended for the commonwealth-

First, that, to prove the genuineness of the

coupons, it was incumbent on the plaintiff to

prove the genuineness of, the bonds; and, sec-

ondly, that this he has failed to do, because

the witness does not say that the signatures

to the bonds are genuine, or that he is an

expert in matters of handwriting. or that the

seal affixed to the bonds is the genuine seal

of the state. The circuit court decided that

the seal proved itself, and that, in the ab-

sence of evidence to prove that the bonds

were spurious, the evidence adduced estab-

lished the genuineness of the coupons. We

are of opinion that this ruling is correct. It

is a rule of evidence. universally recognized,

that the courts of a state take judicial notice

of its seals and of the signatures of the heads

of departments; nor will it be supposed, with-

out proof, that any particular seal is counter-

feit or irregularly impressed. The law as-

LEWIS, P. This was a proceeding under
the statute tor the verification ot coupons
previously tendered by the plalntltr In payment ot taxes. At the trial the plaintltr
proved, as alleged in his petition, that no
part of the taxes for which the coupons were
tendered were school taxes or liquor license
taxes. He also Introduced a witness, who
exhibited for the Inspection of the court and
jury the bonds from which the coupons had
been cut The witness then testified, without objection, that they were the genuine
bonds of the state; that he himself had cut
the coupons from them; and that the coupons were genuine; and this was all the evidence In the mse. Tl:ie bonds, copies of
which are exhibited with the record, are regular on their face, purporting to be under the
seal of the state, and signed by the treasurer
111ld countersigned by the second auditor of
the state. They all purport to have been
Issued pursuant to the act of M1m·h 30, 1871,
commonly known as the "1''nndlng Bill," except one which purports to be under the act
Of March 28, 1879, entitled "An act to provide a plan of settlement of the public debt."
The commonwealth demurred to the evldelletl, but the court overruled the demurrer,
and gave judgment for the plalntltr.
It Is contended for the commonwealthFlnrt, that, to prove the jg!nulneness of the
coupons, lt was incumbent on the plalntitr to
prove the genuineness of. tlhl bonds; and, secondly, that this he has failed to do, because
the witness does not say that the signatures
to the bonds are genuine, or that he ls an
expert In mattel'B of handwriting, or tbnt the
aeal atft.xed to the bonds ls the genuine seal
of the state. The circuit court decided that
the seal proved itself, and that, In the absen~ of evidence to prove that the bonds
were spurious, the evidence adduced establlsbed the genuineness or the coupons. We
are of opinion that this rullng Is correct. It
is a rule of evidence, unlvel'l!ally recognized,
that the courts of a state take judicial notice
of Its seals and of the slgnnturl:'s of the heads
of departments; nor wlll lt be supposed, with-
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out proof, that any particular seal ts counterfeit or Irregularly impressed. The law assumes that the seal of the state ls known to
all of her judicial oftlcel'B, and there is nothing in the statute requiring the production of
the bonds, in a proceeding llke the present,
which atrects the rule of the common law.
The statute now carried into section 412 of
the Code simply provides that upon the demand or the party contesting the genuineness
of the coupons the bonds from which they
were detached shall be produced by the plalntUf as a condltlon precedent to his right of
recovery. Nothing ls said about the burden
ot proving the genuineness of the bonds being
on the plalntltr, or that the seal of the state
I shall not, as in other cases, prove Itself; and,
I hnd the legislature intended to alter the rule
above mentioned, such Intention would surely
have been unmistakably ex1iressed. This was
virtually decided in Com. v. Hurt, 8.3 Va.
918, 0 S. E. 148. There the question was
whether, upon the production of the bonds b~·
the plalntltr, It was competent for the commonwealth to cross-examine the witnesses as
I to the genuineness of the signatures to the
I bonds. The trial court ruled that it was not,
I unless a plea of non est factum should be
I first filed. But this court reversed that rullng on the ground that the commonwealth
1 was entitled to show, if she could, without
ftllng such plea, whkh was not contemplated
by the statute, tb1tt the bonds were spurious,
and thereby to show tlmt the detached coupons were not genuine. It was not suggested, either by counsel or by the court In that
. case, that the statute required anything more
: than the production of the bom'. 1. On the
I contrary, It was assumed that the burden of
· proving that the bonds were not genuine was
on the commonwealth, and the statute ls the
same now In this partlculnr as it was when
that case was decided. It ls also contended
for the defendant in error (the plaintiff below) that the provision of the statute requiring the production of the bonds to prove the
genuineness of the coupons ls unconstitutional. And McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S.
662, 10 Sup. Ct. 072, ls relled on for this position. That, however, was a suit by the
state against the taxpayer, while the present
ls a suit by the taxpayer agnlnst the state;
and it Is an establlsbed prlnelple that, when
the sovereign consents to be sued, the terms
I and conditions upon which such consent Is
given must be observed. Nor can a party
avail himself of the benefit of a statute, and
at the same time contest its validity. Purcell v. Conrad, 84 Va. 557, 5 S. E. 545; Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U. S. 415. A taxpayer
whose tender of coupons Is refused may undoubtedly set up the tender as a defense In
any subsequent suit by the state against him
for the recovery of the taxes. But if, upon
the refusal of the tender, be cbOOl!es, as in
the present case, to pay in money, and then
sues the state to establish the genuineness of
the coupons, and to recover bnck the money
239
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so paid, he must conform to the conditions already stated, and without considering any

prosvribed by the statute, giving him per- other question disvussed at the bar, the judg-

mission to sue. For the reasons, however, ment must be afﬁrmed.
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so paid, he must conform to the condltlona
pres<'rlbed by the statute, giving him permlBSlon to sue. For the reasons, however,
240

I

already stated, IUld without considering any
other question d181'uased at the bar, the judginent must be afllrmed.
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PIERCE et al. v. INDSETH.

(1 Sup. Ct. 418. 106 U. S. 546.)

Supreme Court of the United States.

1883.

In error to the circuit court of the United

States for the district of Minnesota.

This is an action by the piaintiﬂ in the

court below, Ole A. Indseth, against the de-

fendants, composing the ﬁrm of Pierce, Sim-

mons & Co., on a foreign bill of exchange,

payable at sight to his order, drawn by them

at Red Wing, in Minnesota, on the Chris-

tiania Bank, in Norway, which is as follows:

“Exchange 15,441 50-100 kroner, per stamp 2c.

Pierce, Simmons & Co., Bankers.

"Red Wing, Minnesota, February 1, 1877.

"At sight of this original of exchange (du-

plicate unpaid) pay to the order of 0. A.

Indseth 15,4-ii 50-100 kroner, value received,
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and charge same to account of Sk. P. I. 8:

Co., Chicago, as per advice from them.

Pierce, Simmons & Go.

PIERCE et al. v. INDSETH.
{1 Sup. Ct. 418, 106 U. S. 546.)
Supreme C'.ourt of the United States. Jan. 8,
1883.
In error to the circuit court of the United
States for the district of Minnesota.
This ls an action by the plaintiff ln the
court below, Ole A. Indseth, against the defendants, composing the firm of Pierce, Simmons & Co., on a foreign blll of exchan&"e,
payable at sight to his order, drawn by them
at Red Wlng, ln Minnesota, on the Christiania Bank, In Norway, which ls as follows:
"Exchange 15,441 50-100 kroner, per stamp 2c.
Ple1'Ce, Simmons & Co., Bankers.
"Red Wing, Minnesota, February 1, 1877.
"At sight of this original of exchange (duplicate unpaid) pay to the order or 0 . A.
Indseth 15,441 50-100 kroner, value received,
and charge same to account of Sk. P. I. &
Co., Chicago, 88 per advice from them.
Pierce, Simmons & Co.
"To Christiania Bank of Kredit Kasee,
CbrlsUania, Norway."

“To Christiania Bank of Kredit Kasse,

Ghristiania, Norway."

Jan. 8,

The value of these kroners in our money

was $4,469.35.

Indseth resided at the time near Eidsvold,

in Norway, and the bill was purchased by

his agent in Minnesota, who forwarded it to

him. He received it February 27, 1877, and

retained it in his possession until April 12th

following, when he presented it to the bank

for payment, which was refused. He then

caused the bill to be protested by a notary

of Nor\\"a_v for non-payment. The drawers

were notiﬁed of its non-payment by letter

from the plaintiﬂf, which they received at

Red Wing as early as May 15, 1877, and also

by the original certiﬁcate of protest of the

notary, which, with a translation, was at

that time shown to one of them by the agent

of the plaintiff. to whom the document was

sent for that purpose.

it appears from the ﬁndings of the court

below that the drawers had no money to

their credit with the (Jhristiania bank when

the bill was drawn, but depended for its

acceptance and payment upon advices to the

bank by Skow, Peterson, Isberg & Co., bank-

ers, at Chicago. That ﬁrm failed and made

an assignment on the twenty-ﬁrst of March,

1877. It had, however, from February 28th

to that date, inclusive, to its credit with the

bank, money suflicient to pay the bill, but

no portion of it had been set apart for that

Purpose, and it has been since paid to the

assignee of the ﬁrm. On the ﬁfteenth of

February, 1877, the drawers wrote to the

Payee a letter stating that, fearing their

draft might not be paid. they had caused a

The value of these kroners ln our money
was $4,469.35.
Indseth resided at the time near Eidsvold,
In Norway, and the blll was purchased by
bis agent in :Minnesota, who forwarded lt to
him. He received it February 27, 1877, and
retained it in his possession until April 12th
following, when he presented lt to tile bank
for payment, w'11ch was refused. He then
caused the blll to be protested by a notary
ot Norway for non-payment. The drawers
were notified of its non-payment by letter
from the plalntltr, which they received at
Red Wing as early as May 15, 1877, and also
by the original certificate ot protest of the
notary, which, with a translation, was at
that time shown to one of them by the ngent
of the plalntltT, to whom the document wns
sent tor that purpose.
It appears from the findings of the court
below that the drawers had no money to
their credit with the Christiania bank when
the blll was drawn, but depended for its
acceptance and payment upon advices to the
bank by Skow, Peterson, lsberg & Co., bankers, at Chicago. That firm falled and made
an assignment on the twenty-first ot l\lnrch,
18i7. It had, however, from February 28th
to that date, lncluslve, to its credit with the
bank, money sutftclent to pay the blll, but
no Portion of lt hnd been set apart for that
purpose, and it has been since paid to the
assignee of the firm. On the fifteenth of
February, 1877, the drawers wrote to the
payee a letter stating that, fearing their
draft might not be paid, they had caused a
cable dispatch to be sent to Christiania directing payment, but there was no evidence
that the bnnk received such a dispatch, lf
sent. or gave them any credit on It.
Eidsvold, at or near which the plaintiff resided, la distant about 60 miles from Chris-

cable dispatch to be sent to Christiania di-

recting payment, but there was no evidence

that the bank received such a dispatch, if

Bent. or gave them any credit on it.

Eidsvold, at or near which the plaintiff re-

sided, is distant about 50 miles from Chris-

wmous, Ev-16

'\&tTT

nna .....,..,._1A

tlanla, the place where the bank was situated, and between them there W88 daily
communication by mall and by railway.
In proof of the presentment of the bill to
the bank and the latter's refusal to pay the
same, a copy of the notary's certificate of
protest was given in evidence by the plalntltr, the defendants having stipulated for the
admission of a copy with the like effect 88
the original, which was needed elsewhere.
Subsequently the defendants themselves produced the original for the purpose of show·
lng its character, insisting, at the time, that
lt had no authenticity as the act of the
notary, and was not, therefore, competent
evidence of the presentation and non-pnyment of the blll. To meet the objectlqn of
unnecessary delay ln presenting the bill the
plaintiff gave ln evidence, against the objection of the defendants, the deposition of a
lawyer of Norway as to the law of that
country respecting the presentation of bills
of exchange for payment. Ex<'eptlon was
taken to the ruling of the court in Its ad·
mission. It appeared, from the deposltlon,
that by the law of Norway, the holder of a
foreign bill of exchange, payable nt sight,
ls allowed a year after its date within which
to present lt to the drawee for payment; and
that the drawer Is not relieved from llablllty,
lf the presentation be not made within a
year, unless be <'RD prove that owing to the
delay he has suffered a loss In his accounts
with the drawee. E¥ldence was offered by
the defendants to show that the plalntl.tr,
himself, bad ndmltted hls negllgence in presenting the blll, but on objection of counsel
it was excluded, to which ruling an excep' tlon was taken. The court found in favor
of the plalntltr for the full amount of the
blll, and judgment having been entered on
the finding, the case was brought to this
court for review.

I
I

Chas. E. Flandrau, for plalntltTs ln error.
E. C. Palmer, for defendant in error.

1

Mr. Justice FIELD, after stating the facts
ln the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.
The certificate of the protest of the blll
of exchange by the notary in ~orway was
properly received ln evidence. It ls ln due
form, and bears what purports to be the seal
of the notary. The seal, lt is true, ls impressed directly on the paper by a die wltb
which lnk was used. This ls evident from
Inspection of the original, which has been
transmitted to us from the court below for
our personal examination. The use of wax,
or someotbet· ndheslve substance u11011 which
the senl of a public officer may be impressed, has long since ceased to be regarded as
Important. It ls enough, in the absence of
positlYe law prescribing otherwise, that the
impress of the sPal Is made upon the paper
Itself ln such a manner as to be readily identltted upon Inspection,
9d.1
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The language used in Pillow v. Roberts, re-

ported in 13 How. 72, as the suﬂiciency of

a seal of a court impressed upon paper in-

stead of wax or a wafer, is applicable here.

Said the court, speaking by Mr. Justice

Grier:

“Formerly wax was the most convenient

and the ‘only material used to receive and

retain the impression of a seal. Hence it

was said: 'Sigillum est cera impressa; quia

cera. sine imprcssione non est sigillum.’ But

this is not an allegation that an impression

without wax is not a seal, and for this rea-

son courts have held that an impression

made on wafers or other adhesive substances

capable of receiving an impression, will come

within the deiinltion of ‘cera impressa.' If,

then, wax be construed to be merely a gen-

eral term, including within it any substance
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capable of receiving and retaining the im-

pression of a seal, we cannot perceive why

paper, if it have that capacity, should not

as well be included in the category. The

simple and powerful machine, now used to

impress public seals, does‘ not require any

soft or adhesive substance to receive or re-

tain their impression. The impression made

by such a power on paper is as well deﬁned,

as durable, and less likely to be destroyed

or defaced by vermin, accident, or intention

than that made on wax. It is the seal which

authenticates, and not the substance on which

it is impressed; and where the court can

recognize its identity, they should not be

called upon to analyze the material which

exhibits it."

Here there is no difficulty in identifying

the seal. The impression, which is circular

in form, has within its rim the words. "No-

tarial Seal, Christiania." Besides, the court

will take judicial notice of the seals of no-

tarics public, for they are oﬂicers recognized

by the commercial law of the world. We

thus recognize the seal to the document in

question as that of the notary in Norway,

and as such authenticating the certiﬁcate of

protest and entitling it to full faith and

credit. Greenl. Ev. 5 5; Story. Bills, § 277;

Townsley v. Sumrall, 2 Pet. 179: Chanoine

v. Fowler, 3 Wend. 173; Carter v. Burley, 9

H. 559, 568; Holiiday v. McDougal, 20

Wend. 81. The certiﬁcate being admitted.

proved the presentation of the bill to the

bank on the twelfth of April, 1870, and its

non-payment. That this presentation was

made within the period allowed by the law

of Norway appears from the deposition of a

lawyer of that country, taken under a com-

mission from the court. That law allowed a

year after the issue of the bill for its presen-

tation; and on the question of timely presen-

tation the law of the place where a foreign

bill of exchange is payable governs, and not

the law of the place where it is drawn. In

giving a bill upon a person in a foreign coun-

try, the drawer is deemed to act with refer-

ence to the law of that country, and to ac-

cept such conditions as it provides with re-
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Till:' language used In Pillow v. Roberts, reported in 13 How. 4i2. as the suftlcleucy of
a seal of a court impressed upon paper instead of wax or a wafer, Is applicable here.
Said the court, speaking by Mr. Justice
Grier:
"Formerly wax was the most convenient
and the ·only material used to receive and
retain tlre Impression of a seal. Hence it
was said: '81gilluw est cera impressa; qula
cera. sine IW(>l"l:'ll81one 11.on est slglllum.' But
this ls not an allegution that an impression
without wax ts not a seal, and for this reason courts have held that an impression
made on wafers or other adhesive substances
ca.pable of receiving an lmpreBBlon, will come
within the deflnltlon of 'cera lmpressa.' It,
then, wax be construed to be merely a general term, lnl'ludlng within it any substance
capable of receiving and retaining the impression of a seal, we cannot perceive why
paper, if It have thal capacity, should not
as well be included In the category. The
simple and powerful machine, now uaed to
lmpreBS public seals, does· not require any
soft or adhesive substance to receive or retain their impression. The lmpreBSlon made
by such a power on paper '8 as well defined,
as durable, and less likely to be destroyed
or defaced by vermin, accident, or Intention
than that made on wax. It Is the seal which
authenticates, and not the substance on which
It is Impressed; and where the court can
recognize its Identity, they should not be
called upon to analyze the material which
exhibits It."
Here there ls no dlftlculty In Identifying
the seal. The Impression, which ls circular
In form, has within Its rim the words. '":Sotarlal Seal. Christiania." Besides, the court
wlll take judicial notice of the seals of notaries public, for they are oftlcers recognized
by the commercial law of the world. We
thus recognize the seal to the document lo
question as that of the notary in Norway,
and as such authenticating the certificate ot
protest and entitling It to full faith and
credit. Greenl. Ev. I 5; Story, Bills, I 27i;
Townsley v. Sumrall, 2 Pet. 179; Chanoine
v. Fowler, 3 Wend. 173; Carter v. Burley, 9
N. H. 559, 568; Holliday v. McDougal, 20
Wend. 81. The certificate being admitted,
proved the presentation of the blll to the
bank on the twelfth of April, 1870, and its
non-payment. That this presentation was
made within the period allowed by the law
of Norway appears from the depoaltlon of a
lawyer of that country, t11ken under a com·
mlS!llon from the court. That law allowed a
year after the Issue of the blll tor its presentation; and on the question of timely presentation the law of the place where a foreign
bill of exchange ls payable governs, and not
the law of the place where It la drawn. In
giving a blll upon a person ln a foreign country, the drawer ls deemed to act with reference to the law of that country, and to accept such conditions u It provides with re242

apect to the presentment ot the bill tor acceptance and payment. Thus, where days
of grace on bllls are different ln the two
countries, the rule of tbe place of payment
must be followed. In England and the united States thre£ days of grace are usually
allowed; In France there are none, and ln
some places the number of days varies from
three to thirty. Whatever ls required by
law to be done at the place upon which the
bill ls dmwn, to constitute a suftlclent presentment either ln time or manner, must be
done according to that law; and whatever
time la permitted within which the presentment may be made by that law, the holder
may take without losing bis rights upon the
drawer, ln case the blll ls not paid. So, also,
lf the blll be dishonored, the protest by the
notary must be made according to the laws
of the place. It sometimes happens that
the several parties to a blll, as drawers ot
lndorsera, reside in dltrerent countries, and
much embarrasBID,rnt might arise ln such
cases lf the protest was required to conform
to the laws of each of the countries. One
protest ls suftlclent, and that must be ln accordance with the laws of the place where
the blll la payable.
In this cue, the blll having been protested,
the drawers were notUled ot Its dishonor by
letter from the payee, received by them oo
the fifteenth of May following, and also by
personal delivery at about the aame time ot
the original certificate of the protest, with a
translation of lt Into Engllfh, to one ot the
drawers by an agent of the payee, to whom
they were transmitted for that purpose. No
question is made that this notice was not
suftlclent to charge the drawers. The testimony of the lawyer of Norway 88 to the law
ot that country was admlaalble under the
statute ot Minnesota, which provides tllat
"the existence and the tenor or effect ot all
foreign laws may be proved as facts by parol
evidence, but If It appears that the law In
question ls contained In a written statute or
code, the court may, In Its dlacretlon, reject
any evidence of such law that la not accompanied by a copy thereof." The general
rule as to the proof of foreign laws la that
the law which ls written, that ls, statute law,
must be proved by a copy properly authenticated; and that the unwritten law most
be proved by the testimony of experts, that
ls, by those acquainted wlth the law. Ennta
v. Smith, 14 How. 426. But this rule ma7
be varied by statute, and that ot Minnesota
leaves lt to the discretion of the judge to
require the production of a copy of the written law when the fact appears that the law
In question Is In writing. The discretion of
the judge here was not Improperly exerclaed,
even if In such case his action would be the
subject ot review, as contended by counsel.
The admission of the payee that he had
been negligent In presenting the blll was
properly excluded. His negllgence In that
respect could not bave aJfected his legal
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rights, if in point of fact the bill was pre-

sented wlthin the time allowed by the laws

of Norway.

‘We have thus far assumed that the draw-

ers were entitled to notice of the presenta-

tion and non-payment of the bill. But it

may be doubted whether such was the fact.

They had no funds with the bank in Norway

when the bill was drawn or at any other

time, and they relied for its payment upon

rights, lf in point of fact the bill wu11 presented within the time allowed by the laws
-Of Norway.
·we hnYe thus far aBSumed that the drawers were entitled to notice of the presentation and non-payment of the bill. But It
ma~· be doubted whether such was the fnct.
They had no funcls with the bank in Norway
when the bill was drawn or at any other
time, and they relied for Its payment upon
the advices of third parties. Although such
third parties had funds at the bnnk after the
bill ball been received by the payee in Nor-

[Case No. 84

way, there la no evidence that they ever advised the bank to pay the blll out of suc•h
funds. It ls found by tile court that the
bank never set apart any portion of theru to
meet the bllL The cable dispatch of the
drawers, of which the letter of February
15th speaks, If It ever reached the bank,
does not appear to have Induced it to give
them any credit. In the most favorable
view. therefore, which could be taken of the
position of the drawers, we see nothlngwblch
relieves them from liability.
The judgment ls, therefore, aftirmed.

the advices of third parties. Although such

third parties had funds at the bank after the

bill had been received by the payee in Nor-

way, there is no evidence that they ever ad-

vised the bank to pay the bill out of such

funds. It is found by the court that the

bank never set apart any portion of them to

meet the bill. The cable dispatch of the

drawers, of which the letter of I+‘ebruary
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15th speaks, if it ever reached the bank,

does not appear to have induced it to give

them any credit. In the most favorable

view. therefore, which could be taken of the

position of the drawers, we see nothing which

relieves them from liability.

The judgment is, therefore, aﬂirmed.
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PEOPLE v. WOOD.

(30 N. E. 243, 131 N. Y. 617.)

Court of Appeals of New York. March 1, 1892.

Appeal from court of oyer and terminer,

Warren county.

Indictment against Joseph Wood for mur-

der. From a judgment of the court of oyer

and terminer, ﬁnding the defendant guilty,

defendant appeals. Aﬂirmed. For former

report, see 27 N. E. 362.

James M. Whitman, for appellant. Ly-

PUOOF.

PEOPLE v. WOOD.
(30 N. E. 243, 131 N. Y. 617.)
Court of Appeals of New York. March 1, 1892.
Appeal from court of oyer and terminer,
Warren county.
Indictment against Joseph Wood for murder. From a judgment of the court or oyer
and termlner, finding the defendant guilty,
defendant appeals. Affi.rmed. For former
report, see 27 N. E. 362.
James M. Whitman, for appellant. Lyman Jenkins, Dist. Atty. (Charles R. Patterson, of counsel), for the People.

man Jenkins, Dist. Atty. (Charles R. Patter-

son, of counsel), for the People.

FINCH, J . Four unfounded objections,

admitting of brief and easy answers, and in

no respect justifying the delay of this ap-

peal, disclose themselves from a printed case

of 1,400 pages prepared at the expense of

the county of the trial. The prisoner’s coun-
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sel raises no question of fact. He concedes

explicitly that upon the proof the verdict is

not to be assailed, either as against the evi-

dence or as unsupported by it, and rests

his argument upon what he claims to have

been errors of law. Three of these are ex-

ceptions to the decision of the court upon a

challenge of individual jurors in cases where

the challenge was sustained, and the jurors

rejected. \Ve have looked at the rulings to

see whether any injustice has been done to

the prisoner of which we ought to take no-

tice. The juror Balcom was rejected be-

cause he had an opinion as to the guilt or

innocence of the prisoner which he describ-

ed as fixed, and of long standing, and which

would inﬂuence his conduct in the jury-box.

Complaint is made that the juror was re-

jected without opportunity for cross-exam-

244

ination by the prisoner’s counsel. It does

not at all appear that the right was either

asserted or denied, or in any manner sought

to be exercised. The jurors Dickinson and

Stewart were rejected because they had con-

scientious scruples against rendering a ver-

dict of guilty in a capital case. They

brought themselves fully within the provi-

sions of section 377 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure. The juror Cooke was rejected

on account of a present opinion upon the

question of guilt or innocence. Taking his

statement as a whole, his rejection appears

to have been proper. The fourth objection

is that, while the indictment charges the

commission of the crime in the town of

Stony Creek, in the county of Warren, and

while the proof shows the offense in the

town alleged, it does not show that such

town was in the county of Warren. No

such objection was raised at the trial, when

the omission could have been obviated. It

made its ﬁrst appearance after the verdict,

and on a motion for a new trial on the min-

utes. But, it made when it should have

been, it is a conclusive answer that the court

will take judicial notice of the fact that the

town of Stony Creek is in the county of War-

ren. People v. Breese, 7 Cow. 429; Vander-

FINCH, J. Four unfounded objections,
admitting of brief and easy answers, and In
no respect justifying the delay of this appeal, disclose themselves from a printed case
of 1,4-00 pages prepared at the expense of
the county of the trial. The prisoner's counsel raises no <iuestlon of fact. He concedes
explicitly that upon the proof the verdict ls
not to be assailed, either as against the evidence or as unsuvported by It, and rests
his argument upon what be claims to have
been errors of law. Three of these are exceptions to the decision of the court upon a
challenge of Individual jurdts In cases where
the challenge was sustained, and the Jurors
rejected. We have looked at the rulings to
see whether any injustice has been done to
the prisoner of which we ought to take notice. The juror Balcom was rejected because he had an opinion as to the guilt or
Innocence of the prisoner which he described as fixed, and of long standing, and which
would influence his conduct In the jury-box.
Complaint ls made that the juror was rejected without opportunity for croBS·exam244

inatlon by the prisoner's counsel. It does
not at all appear that the right was either
asserted or denied, or In any manner sought
to be exercised. The Jurors Dickinson and
Stewart were rejected because they had conscientious scruples against rendering a verdict of gullty In a capital case. They
brought themselves fully within the provisions of section 377 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. The juror Cooke was rejected
on account of a present opinion upon the
question of guilt or Innocence. Taking his
statement as a whole, his rejection appears
to have been proper. The fourth objection
is that, while the indictment charges the
commission of the crime In the town of
Stony Creek, In the county of Warren, and
while the proof shows the otrense In the
town alleged, It does not show that such
town was In the county of Warren. No
such objection was raised at the trial, when
the omission could have been obviated. It
made its first appearance after the verdict,
and on a motion for a new trial on the minutes. But, if made when It should ha'l"e
been, It Is a conclusive answer that the court
wlll take judicial notice of the fact that the
town of Stony Creek ls in the county or Warren. People v. Breese, 7 Cow. 429; Vanderwerker v. People, 5 Wend. 530; Chauman v.
Wilber, 6 Hlll. 475. We have examined the
testimony euffi.ciently to be satisfied that the
verdict was just. The prisoner admitted the
fact of the killing, and his counsel approved
and stood upon the admission. The defenseof Insanity was fairly submitted to the jury,
and it was hardly possible that the verdict
should have been dltrerent. The Judgment
must be affi.rmed
All concur.

JUDICIAL NOTICE.
JUDICIAL NOTICE.

[Case No. 86

CO1\iMON\VEALTH v. KING.

(22 N. E. 905, 150 Mass. 221.)

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

Hampshire. Nov. 30, 1889.

Exceptions from superior court, Hampshire

county; BRIGIIAM, Judge. -

This was an indictment charging the de-i

fendant with having run a steam-boat for the

conveyance of passengers on the Connecticut

river at South Hadley, in said county, and

landing and receiving said passengers'at said

South Hadley without having obtained any

license from the selectmen of said town of

South Hadley, as is required by Pub. St. c. 102,

§§ 120-122, which authorize the licensing of

persons to run steam-boats on waters not

within the maritime jurisdiction of the

United States, and punish by tine the run-

ning of such boats without ﬁrst obtaining a

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:07 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104925781
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

license. Before the jury were impaneled the

defendant duly moved to quash the indict-

ment against him for the following reasons:

First, because the Connecticut river is a navi-

gable river, and is not a lake, pond, or water,

covered by chapter 102, §§ 120-122, Pub. St.;

semndly, because said indictment, and each

count thereof, is bad for duplicity, inasmuch

as two distinct and separate offenses and

crimes are charged in each count; thirdly,

because it is not alleged in said indictment,

or in any count thereof, that said defendant

was a common carrier at the time of the

commissions of the offenses complained of;

fou-rthly, because it is not alleged in said in-

dictment, or in any count thereof, that said

defendant carried said passengers as afore-

said for hire; ﬁfthly, because no offense or

crime known to the laws of the land is fully

and plainly, substantially and formally, set

out or charged in said indictment. or in any

count thereof. The court overruled the mo-

tion, and the defendant excepted.

At the trial there was evidence tending to

show that upon the dates alleged in the in-

dictment the defendant was in possession of

a certain steam-boat, and carried persons_

from the city of Holyoke, and landed them at

a point about one and one-fourth miles above

Holyoke dam, on the east side of the river

alleged to be within the li its of said town

of South Hadley; that the efendant also

took persons from said point, and carried

them in said steam-boat to said Holyoke; that

on June 24, 1888, the defendant collected

fares of 25 cents from each person on board

said steam-boat, which was for the “round

trip.” including the right to enter the grove

leased by the defendant, and to which grove

said persons went from the landing place;

that the place of landing was at the water’s

edge, several rods from “high-water mark,”

on the easterly or South Hadley side of said

river; that the land on the opposite side of

said stream or river from the said place of

landing was in the city of Northampton; that,

for the purpose of proving that said point at

which said boat landed was in said South

Hadley, the statute incorporating South Had-

[Case No. 86

Hadley, the statute lnco1·porating South Hadley was put in evidence, and also a map of
(22 N. E. 905, 150 Mass. 221.)
the state of Massachusetts, purporting to be
made "by order of the legislature in 1844,
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Simeon Boruen, superintendent," was introHampshire. Nov. 30, 1889.
ducllll in evidence, subject to the defendant's
Exceptions from superior court, Hampshire objection; that several witnesses who had no
special knowledge of the boun<lary line, but
county; BRIGHAM, Judge.
'.Chis was an indictment charging the del who were residents of the vicinity, were
fendant with having run a steam-boat for the asketl whether they knew in what town the
conveyance of passengers on the Connecticu~ said point of landing on the east side of the
river at 8outh Hadley, in said county, fnd river was; each answering in the affirmative,
landing and receiving said passengers-at said they were asked and permitted to state that the
South Hadley without having obtaint>d any place was in South Hadley, and the defendlicense from the selectmen of s1tid town of ant excepted. It appeared that there were
South Iladley, a.sis required by Pub. St. c. 102, two dams erected between Hartford, in the
§§ 120-122, which authorize the licensing of state of Connecticut, and s11id Hadley, includpersons to run steam-boats on w11ters not ing the dam at Holyoke; that before said dam
within the mai·itime jurisdiction of the was built, in 1847, boats were accustomed to
United States, and punish by line the run- pass through the canal around the falls at
ning of such boats without first obtaining a South Hadley, to points further up the stream,
license. Before the jury were impaneled the to all towns above. It was admitted at the
defendant duly moved to quash the indict- trial that said defendant had not obtained any
ment against him for the following reasons: licen&e from the selectmen of said South HadFirst, because the Connecticut river is a na vi- ley to run said steam-boat. This was sub·
gable ri\'er, and is not a lake, pond, 01· w11ter, stantialiy all the evidence in the case. After
covered by chapter 102, §§ 120-122, Pub. St.; the evid1·nce was all in, the defen11ant asked
secondly, because said indictment, and each the court to rule and instruct the jury as folcount thereof, is bad for duplicity, inasmuch lows: ( 1) That the Connecticut river, between
as two distinct and separate offenses and SpringHeld and Hadley, is not a lake, pond,
crimes are charged in each count; thirdl11, or water, covered by chapter 102, ~~ 120-122,
because it is not alleged in said indictment, Pub. St. (2) 'fhat the Connecticut river, beor in any count thereof, that said defend11nli tween Springfield and Hadley, la within the
was a common carrier at the time of tho maritime jurisdiction of the United States.
comm1ssions of the offenses complulned of: (3) That there ia no evidence that the Confourthly, because it is not alleged in said in· necticut river between Springfield and Haddictment, or in any count thereof, that said ley is not within the maritimtl jurisdiction of
<lefendant carried said p&Ssengers as afo1·~ the Unitt!d St.at~a. (4) That there is no evisaid for hire; fifthly, because no offense or dence that the defendant ran a steam-boat for
crime known to the laws of the land is fully the convt>yance of passengers. ( 5) That tht>r!l
and plainly, snl>stnntially and formally, set is no evhlence that the defendant landed or reout or charged in said indictment, or in any cei ved passengers within the town of South
count thereof. The court ovnruled ihe mo- Hadley. (6) That, on the whole evidence, tho
tion, and the defendant excepted.
defendant can not be convicted. (7) That said
At the trial there was evidence tending to statute, if it applies to the C',onnecticut river
show that upon the dates alleged in the in· between Springfield and Hadley, is unconstidictment the defendant was in possession of tutional and void. But the COlll't refused so to
a certain steam-boat, and carrit>d persons. rule in form or substance, and upon the whole
fl-om the city of Holyoke, and landed them at case the court g1we full and appropriate in·
a point about one and one-fourth miles above struclions to the jury, to which no exct>plions
Holy(lke dam, on the east side of the river were t11ken siwe to the refusah1 to instruct as
alleged to be within the lilllits of said town above statt>d. 'fhe jnry returned a verdict
of South Hadley; thl,lt the 1lefendant also of guilty, and the defendant excepts.
took persons from s11id point, and carried
<ieorge M. i:itearns and J. B. O'Donnell,
them in said steam-!Joat to said Hol rnke; that for defendant. A. J. Waterman, Atty. Gen.,
on ,June 24, 1888, the defendant collected and H. A. Wyinrm, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the
fares of 25 cents from each person on l>oard CommonweC1!th.
said steam-boat, which was for the "round
FIELD, J. The only exceptions argued are
trip." including the l"ight to ente1· th~ grove
leased by the defendant, and to which grove the exception to the .admission of the map in
said persons went from the landing place; evidence, and the exceptions to the refusal of
that the place of landing was at the water's the court to rule "that them is no e\·idence
edge, several rods from "high-water mark," that the Connecticut river, betwePn Spring·
on the easterly or South Hadley side of said field and Hadley, is not within the maritime
river; that the land on the oppo::1ite side of jurisdiction of tbe United States," and to the
said stream or river from the said place of refusal of the conrt to quash the indictment,
landing was in thecityof Northampton; that, "because it is not alleged In said indictment,
for the purpose of proving that said point at or in any count thereof, that said defendant
which said boat landed was in said South carrhid said passengers as aforesaid for hirt>. ••
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PROOF.

The other exceptions taken at the trial must

be regarded as waived. If there was a map

of the towns and counties of the common-

wealth published by authority of the legis-

lature, pursuant to chapter 69 of the Resolves

of the year 1844, it was some evidence of the

boundaries of the town of South Hadley. See

Worcester v. Nortliborough, 140 Mass. 397,

5N. E. Rep. 270. The objection taken in

argument is that the map was allowed to

prove itself, and that it was not shown to

have been published by legislative authority.

Whether this was a genuine map, published

by order of the legislature, as it purported to

be, was a preliminary fact, of which, if dis-

puted, some evidence must have been exhib-

ited to the court before the map could be ad-

mitted iii evidence; but it does not appear

that this fact was disputed, or that the objec-
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tion to the admission of the map was taken

on this ground. If such an objection had

been taken, the commonwealth might per-

haps have been able to furnish evidence that

the map was what it purported to be. The

only objection stated in the exceptions is that

the map “was introduced in evidence subject

to the defendant’s objection,” and this must

be considered, not as an objection that sulﬁ-

cientevidence had not been introduced to show

that the map was what it purported to be,

but as an objection that a map such as this

purported to be was not evidence of the loca-

tion of a boundary line of a town of the com-

monwealth. '

In The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 563, it

is said in the opinion that “those rivers must!

be l‘ega1‘(l8d as public navigable rivers in law .

which are navigable in fact; and they are 5

navigable in fact when they are used, or are

susceptible of being used, in their ordinary

condition, as highways for commerce over

which trade and travel are, or may be con-

ducted in the customary modes of trade and ;

travel on water. And they constitute navi-

gable waters of the United States. within the 1

meaning of the acts of congress, in contra-

distinction from the navigable waters of the

states, when they form in their ordinary con-

dition, by themselves or by uniting with oth-

er waters, a continued highway over which

commerce is or may be carried on with other

states or foreign countries, in the customary .

modes in which such commerce is conducted

by water.” Pub. St. c. 102, §§ 120-122, were

ﬁrst enacted in 1876, (St. 1876, c. 100.)
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Then, as well as now, the statutes of the

United States, regulating steam-vessels, were

contained in title 52 of the Revised Statutes

of the United States. Section 4400 of these

statutes provides that “all steam-vessels nav-

igating any waters of the United States,

which are common highways of commerce, or

open to general or competitive navigation,

excepting public vessels of the United States,

vessels of other countries. and boats propelled

in whole or in part by steam for navigating

canals, shall be subject to the provisions of

PROOF.

The other exceptions taken at the trial must
be regarded as waived. If there was a map
of the towns and counties of the commonwealth published by authority of the legislature, pursuant to chapter 69 uf the Resolves
of the year 1844, it was some evidence of the
boundaries of the town of South Hadley. See
Worcester v. Northborough, 140 Mass. 397,
5 N. E. Rep. 270. '.rhe objection taken in
argument is that the map was allowed to
prove itself, and that it was not shown to
have boen published by legislative authority.
Whether this was a genuine map, published
by order of the legislature, as it purported to
be, was a preliminary fact, or which, if disputed, some evidence must have been exhibited to the court before the map could be atdmitted in evidence: but it does not appear
that this fact. was disputed, or that the objection to the admission of the map was taken
on this ground. If such an objection had
been taken, the commonwPalth might perhaps have been able to furnish evidence that
the map was what it purported to be. The
only objection stated In the exceptions ls that
the m1tp "was Introduced in e\·idence subject
to the defendant's objection," and this must
be considered, not as an objection that sufll.
cientevidence had not been introduced to show
that the map was what it purported to be,
but as an objection that a map such as this
purported to be was not evidence of the location or a boundary line of a town of the com·
monwealth.
·
In The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 563, Ill
is said in the opinion that "those rivers rnusll
be regarded as public navigable rivers in la\\·
which are navigable in fact; and they ar"
navignhle in fact when they are used, or are
susceptillle of being used, in their ordinary
condition, as highways for commerce over
which trade and travel are, or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and
travel on water. And they constitute navigable Witters of the United States, within the
meaning of the acts of congress, in contra·
distinction from the navigable waters of the
states, when they form in their ordinary con·
dition, by themselves or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which
commel'ce is or may be carried on with other
states or foreign countries, in the customary
modes in which such commerce is conducted
by water." Pub. St. c. 102, §~ 120-122, were
ft1·11t enacted in 1876, (St. '1~76, c. 100.)
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Then, as well as now, the statutes of th&
United States, regulating steam-vessels, wer&
contained in title 52 of the Revised Statute&
of the United States. Section 44-00 of these
statutes provides that "all steam-vessels navigating any waters of the United States,
which are common highways of commerce, or
open to general or competitive navigation,
excepting public vessels of the United States,
vessels of othercountl"ies, and boats propelled
in whole or in part by steam for navigating
camds, shall be subject to the provisions of
this title." See, also, St. U.S. 1882, c. 441;
22 ~t. at Large, 846. This title contains care·
ful provisions for the inspection of steamvessels, and for regulating the number or
passengers which they ar" permitted to Nrry.
The statutes of MaBSachusetts were intended
to regulate steam-boats used for the conveyance of passengers which were not subject to
regulation by congress, because they were·
not used in navigating waters of the United
Btatl's. We think that the superior court
might take judicial notice that the Connecti·
cut river, above the dam at Holyoke, does
not, either by itself or by uniting with other
waters, constitute a public highway over
which commerce may be carried on with oth·
er states or with foreign countries, althOUJ(h,
if the court had entertained any doubt on th&
subject, it might have required evidence to
be produced. 1t is WPll known that the waters of the Connecticut river, at the plac&
where it is alleged that the defend:mt's steamboat was employed, can be used by vessels
only for the transportation of persons and
property between different places in Massachusetts. They are therefore waters not
within the maritim-,juri11iliction of the TTriitet\
States. Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 568: Th&
Montello, 11 Wall. 411, 20 Wall. 4l:JO; Miller
v. Mayor, etc., 109 U. S. 385, 395, 3 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 22~.
The objection to the form of the indictment
cannot prevail. The indictment follows the
·words of the statute. The word "passengers"
:is used in the statute and in the indictment
in its ordinary sense, and has the same meaning in one as in the other. If, in order to
constitute a passenger, a person must be carried for hire,-upon which we express no
opinion,- thern was evidence that at least 011
one occasion, which was described in the indictment. the defendant collected fares of the
persons carried. Exceptions overruled.

JUDICIAL NOTICE.
CAREY et aJ.

T.

REEVES et al.

JUDICIAL NOTICE.

(26 Pac. 9M, 46 Kan. 571.)

[Case No. 87

CAREY et ai. v. REEVES et ai.

Supreme Court of Ka11111J1.

June 6, 1891.

(26 Pac. 951, 46 Kan. 571.)

June 6, 1891.

Error from superior court, Shawnee

county; W. C. Webb, Judge.

Carey and Bray commenced on October

26, 1883, this action to quiet title toa quar-

Error from 11uperlor court, Shawnee
coonty; W. C. Webb, Judy,t>.
Carey and Bray comwPnced 011 October
26, l81l3, thlM action to quiet. title to a quarter eectton of land In Shawnee county.
Thf'y alleged owne:n!hlp and actual pos~lon.

ter section of land in Shawnee county.

They alleged ownership and actual pos-

session.

The following are the legal conclusions:

“The questions of law in this action are:

First. Was the affidavit of Wilson Shau-

non, filed in theclc-rk's office of the district

court January 17,1861, described in con-

clusion of fact No. 4. in the action cum-

nienced‘ by Reuben H. Fnrnham againt

said James McCamman,forthe purpose of

reforming and foreclosing the mortgage
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hereinbelore described, sufficient in law to

authorize service by publication in said

action against the defendant, James Mc-

Cainman, under section 79.Code of Proced-

ure I859, (Compiled Laws of 1862, c. 26?)

Second. Wa the affidavit of J. T. Cum-

mings, publisher of the newspaper. suffi-

cient in law to show that the publication

notice was made ‘six consecutive weeks?‘

as required by law in such actions? Third.

If both these propositions are found in the

affirmative, then the plaintiffs must fail in

this action. Ifeitherof these propositions

are solved in the negative, then the court

did not have jurisdiction to decree a sale

of the land in controversy described in

The following are the legal conclusion&:
"The questions of law In thl11 Hetlon ure:
Flrllt. Was the atftdavlt of Wilson Rhannon. filed In thecle1·k'e otftee of the district
court Jnnnary 17, l!-C61, d1.11Cribed In conelnslon of fact No. 4. In the action commenced" by Reuben H. Fnroham against
said James McCammon, for the purpose of
reforming and foreclo&log the mortgage
herelnbelore described, sufticleot In law to
authorise service by publil'atloo In said
action agaloat the defeo1laot, James lttcCamman, under section 19, Cods ol Procedure 1859, (Compiled Lawa or 1862, c. 26?)
SPCond. Was tbl' afHdavlt or J. T. Cummlog11, publisher of the newspaper, sutft.
elent In law to 11how that the publication
not1ce was mocfo 'six consecutive weeks?'
u required by la\\' In such actions? Third.
If both these r1roposttlo1111 are found to the
affirmative, then the plalntlfts most fall In
this action. lfeltherol these propositions
are solved lo the ne11:atlve, then the court
did not have Jurisdiction to decree a 11&le
of the land in controversy det1crlb~ In
plalotlfra' petition, 11.od the plalntlfts are
entitled to n>eover In this action. Fourth.
That the Issue of law Is agaln11t the plalotlfts and In f'lvor of the defendants." To
the coocluslons of law In favor of the d6feodants and against lhe plAlntltts ~he
plaintiffs excepted, and bring the ca11e ht>re.
G. C. t.'/P.mens, for plalotlff111 In error. B.
R. Barrlll, for defendants In error.

plaintiffs‘ petition, and the plaintiffs are

entitled to recover in this action. Fourth.

That the issue of law is against the plain-

tiffs and in f'ivor of the defendants. " To

the conclusions of law in favor of the de-

fendants and against the plaintiffs the

plaintiffs excepted, and bring the case here.

G. C. Plemens, for plaintiffs in error. H.

H. Harris, for defendants in error.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

H()R'I‘ON,C.J. TheUnitedStatesissued

a patent to the land in controversy to

James McCamman on the lst day of June,

1860, and the ﬁndings are to the effect that

the plaintiffs are the owners by conveyan-

ces from .\icCamman, unless the judgment

of October 9, 1861, of Reuben H. Farnham

again.-t James Mctlamman and thesale of

the land thereunder divested Mc(Jamman

of his title. When this case was here be-

fore, (Carey v. Reeves. 32 Kan. 718, 5 Pac.

Rep. 22.l Mr. Justice VALENTINE, speaking

for the court, said: “When this affidavit

[for publication service] was ﬁled, is not

shown. it is alleged that the action was

commenced on January 17, liliil, and the

affidavit shows that the petition was filed

‘on the ——— day of January, 1861;’ but

there is nothing to show when the affida-

vit was in fact ﬁled. If it was ﬁled prior

to January 29. 1861, the region of country

known as ‘ Pike‘:-x Peak.’ or a portion

thereof, was in Kansas; but if the affida-

HORTON,C.J. TheUnitedStateal1111ed
a patent to "the land In controvel"l'ly to
Jan;es McCammon on th~ lst dfty of June,
lSOO, and the ftndlngB are to tbe effect that
the plalntlftK are the owner& by conv~9au
c~11 from McCammao, nnle11a the Jucl11:ment
of October 9, 1861, of Reubeu H. Farnham
agatn1<t James MeCammno and the sale of
the lRod thereunder 1llvested MeCo.mmnn
of bis tltle. Wheil this ease was here before, (Cruey v. Reeves. :12 Kan. 718, 5 Pac.
Rep. 2'.l, l Mr. Justice VALENTINE, speaking
for the court, said: "When this afftdaYlt
[for publication service] was ftled, la not
shown. It Is all~ged that the action watt
commenced on Jannary 17, 1861, and the
amdavlt shows thetthe petition was Hied
'on the - - day of January, 1861;' but
there Is nothlnfl: to show when the afllcla·
Tit was In far.t ftlelf. If It was tiled prLor
to Ja1mary 29, 1861, the region or collntry
known as •Pike's Peak,' or a portion
tbel't'of, wa11 In Kansas; but If the ufllclavlt was ftled after Januar9 :.!9, 1861, then
such region was not In Kansas, and no
part thereof was In Kansas. • ,. • ·we
suppose that when the plaintiffs lo this
action say that the lon>elosure Rctlon
was r.ommeneed on January 17. lRtil, thl'.V
mean that · the petition was ftled on that

[Oase No. 87

day. But wht'o the service was made Is
not shown: nor Is It shown when the
judgment was ren<lered. It may bave
been In 1861, or lo 1!'62, or lo some eub11equent Yf'Rr. We cannot say that the
court below erred In deciding against the
plnlntltts In this partlc·alar." At the lut
trial It was ebowo. and the ec>urt expressly found. that the affidavit for publil'ation
was tllt>d on the 17th day of Jannnry, 1861.
'l'hls was while Kansas existed as a territory and before Its all mission as .a Mtate
Into the Union. It was also shown, and
expressly found at the last trlul, that on
January 17, ltlfU, and for some time 11revfous thereto, James McCammao resided
lo Denver. and within the territory of
Ken11a!i and continued to reside there after the :ontth of January, 1861, when Ka1111a.s
was admitted as a state. The former decision of this court In this caBe at Its July
term, lss.i, (32 Kao. 718, 5 Pac. Rep. 2'l,) la
not decisive or contr.>lllng, beeause the
facts now presented In the record are materiully .~unerent from those which we
considered at the time the former opinion
was banded down. The affidavit for publication stated tbat the defendant, James
Mcl'amman, "bas removed from the said
county of ~ha wnee, and now reeldee in
that region of country known flll 'Pike's
Peak; and that service of summons l'anoot be made on him within this territory." At the time that Kansas was organized a11 a territory l'bl we11tern boundary extended "to the eastern boumhtry of
the territory of Utah, on the summit of
the Rocky mounto.ln11." We must take judicial not!ee or where "the region of ~oun
try known as •Pike's Peak' .. existed on
thl' 17th uf January, 1861. l::Jtate v. 'l'elssedre, 80 Kan. 476, 2 Pee. Rep. 650; 8tate v.
Baldwin, 86 Kan. 1, 12 Pt1c. Rep. lH8;
Hallroad Co. v. Burge, .W Kao. i36, 21
Pac. Rep. ~. Llpfllncott's Pronouncing
G11zetteer of the World, (lmhl11.d1ed in
l!S>6,) referring to Kansas, said : "It Is a
territory or the United 8tates of America,
formed by an act of congress pas11ed May,
1854, lying between 37° aud ·i0° N. lat., anll
betwtto about 94° 30' and 107° W. Ion.
About 100 miles of the W. 11ortlon lief! between 88° and 40° N. lat. It 111 bounded on
the N". by Nebraska Territory; E., by the
states of Missouri and Arkansas: S., by
Imllan Tf'rrltory and New Mexico : and
W., by New Mexico and Utah. 'l'hls territory ts About 680 miles In length from E.
to W., and 208 lo Its wlcleet, and 181J In Its
W. part, Including an areft of nearly 114,798 square miles. The Rocky mouotaln11
separate it from Utah, 1tnd the Missouri
rlvt>r forms a Rmall part of the N. E.
boundary." 'l'be New American l'yelopreclla ( volnme 10, p.103, published In lSGO)
described Kansas as foilo ws: "It 111 a territory of the United States. lying betwt-en
lat. :l7° and 40° N. and lon11:. 94° 40' and
106° 50' W., bounded N. by the territory of
.Nebrm1ka, E. by the 11tate of l\lls11ourl, S.
by the Indian •rerrltory and New Mexico,
and W. by New Mexico und Utah. With
the ex<.'eptlon of the N. J<~. corner of the
territory, where the boundary line follows the irregular eoun1e of the MiRsourl
river, Its shape le that of a parellelop:ram
as far W. as long. 10:J0 • The boundary
then follows thls meridian N. to lat. 38°,
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and runs W. along that parallel to long.

106° 50’: thence N. to about lat. 39° 20'.

E. to long. 105° 40’, and ﬁnally N. again

until it meets the Nebraska frontier.

Length, E. and W., 550 M.; breadth, E. of

long. 103°. 208 M.; W. of that line, 139 M.;

area. 114,798 Sq. M.” The Encyclopaedia

Britannica. (volume 23. p.4796.) in describ-

ing the Rocky mountains, says: “Gray's

peak (14.3-fl feet) is the highest pointin this

range. (the front, or Colorado range.)

but. although on the continental divide,

it is too far west to be visible from the

plains. This divide. which separates the

Atlantic water from those of the Pacific.

follows the front range as far as Gray‘s

peak, where it is deﬂected westward for

20 miles to the Sawatch range, which it

follows for about 75 miles. In this defiex-
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ion the divide passes between Middle and

South parks, the lowest pass in this part

being that called the ‘Tennessee,’ (10,418

_feet.) which icads from the head of the Ar-

kansas to the Grand River branch of the

Colorado. The Sawatch range is one of

the highest and best marked chains in the

Rocky mountains. It lies west of thehead

of the Arkansas; and its dominating

peaks, along the whole range, exceed 14,-

000 feet. The most northerly of these. the

Mountain of the Holy Cross, (14,176 feet.)

was so named on account oi the existence

on its eastern ﬂank of a large snow-field

lying in two ravines which intersect each

other at right angles, in the form of a

cross. and which in summer is conspicu-

ously visible from a great distance. The

highest point ls Mount Harvard, (145375

feet.) and the passes range from 12,000 to

13.000 feet. The continental dividefoilows

the Sawatch range to its southern cnd, in

lat. 38° 20', and then runs in a south-west-

erly direction for about 75 miles, overa.

high region without any distinctly marked

range. Here it turns, and, running south-

east:-rly, follows the crest of the San Juan

range, which at many points rises above

13,000 feet." Not only as a matterof factis

the summit of the Rocky mountains (the

western boundary of the territory of

Kansas) a. long distance west of Pike’s

Peak. but it was so generally mentioned

in the gnzetteers, geographies, and en-

cyciopuedias in general use in 1861.
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Therefore “the region of country known

as 'l’ii~:e’s Peak“ on the 17th of January,

1861. and until Kansas was admitted into

the Union,0n January 29.1861, was within

the territory of Kansas. and generally

known to he within the territory of Kan-

sas. The afiidavit for service by publica-

tion showed upon its face that James Mc-

Camman had removed from the county of

Shawnee and resided “in the region of

country known as ‘ l’lke's Pcak."‘ That

region was within. not without. the terri-

tory of Kansas at the date of the tiling of
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nncl runs W. along that parallel to long.
106° 50': thence N. to about lat. 39° 20',
E. to Ion~. 100° 40', and finally N. a,,;Rln
until tt meets the NPbraska frontier.
Leugth, E. and W .. 650 M.; breadth, E . of
long. 108°, 208 M.; W. of that line, 139 M.;
area, 114,798 Sq. M." The Eneycloruedla.
Britannica, (volume 23, p.4700.) In describing the Hoeky mountaln11, says: .. Gray's
r>ea.k ( 14,:Ul feet) Is the hlghl'Rt point In this
range. (the front, or Colorado ran11:e.)
but. although on tba continental dh·lde,
It Is too far weRt to bt1 vlRlble from the
plains. Thie divide. whll'h separatf's the
Atlantic water from those or the Pacific.
follows the front ranp;e us far as Gray's
peak, where it Is deftcctl•d wl•stward for
20 miles to the 8awatch rauge, which It
follows for al.wot 75 mlleH. In this deflexlou the divide p11s11eot between Middle and
South park11, the lowe11t pass In this part
being that called the • T1mnf'Bsee, • (10,418
. feet,) which leads from the head of the Arkamm1t to the Grand Rlveor branch or the
Colorado. The Sa watch ran11:e h; one of
the highest and bP.tit marke1l chains In the
Rocky mountains. It lle1t wet1tof the head
of the Arkansas; and Its dominating
peaks, along the whole range>, eic:ct'E.'d 14,000 feet. The most northerl.v of these, the
Mountain of the Holy Cro1111, (1.&,176 feet,)
was so named on account or the existenee
on its eastern flank or a large snow-field
lying in two ravines which intersect each
otbrr at right angle11, In the form or a
cross. and which lu summer Is conspl:!U·
ou11ly \ lsible from a great distance. The
hl1Chest point Is Mount Harvard, (14,375
feet.) and tile pu.sses renire from 12,000 to
13,000 feet. The continental divide follows
the Sa watch rangfl to Its southern eu1l, In
lat. 3S0 20', and then runs In a south-westerls direction for about 75 mllCH, over a
hlgb region without any dlstiuctly marked
ran11;e. Here It turns, and, running southeaHtt•rly, follows the crest of the Sun .Juan
range, which at many points rh1es above
13,000 feet." Not only as a matter of fact ls
the 1rnmmlt of the Rocky mountains (the
WeHtern boundary of the territory of
Kansas) a Jong dlstanee wE'tlt of Pike's
Peak, but it was so generally mentioned
.l o the i;razettet"rs, geographies, and encyclopa-<llas in general use In 1861.
0
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Therefore .. the region of coon try known
as 'Pike's PPak"' on the 17th of January,
1861. and until Kansas was admitted Into
the U11lon, on January 29, lSdl, was within
the territory of Kan11as, and generally
known to he within the territory of Kansas. 'l'he afflda vtt for service by 1mblicatlon showed upon its faetco that James McCamman had removed from the county of
Shawnee and resldt!d "In the region of
country known us• Pike's Penk.'~ That
region \Vas within. not without. the territory of Kansas at the date of the flllnJ( of
this aftldavlt: thPrefore McCamman was
not a non-resident of the territory of
Kansas at the time the service by publication was mncle; therefora1tuch publication
was volcl,-that Is, It was lnvaJl<I as a
construetlve servtre, because 1·he afftda \"It
for puhllcntlon afttrmatlvely showeod that
the deft-ndant ~1dded within the territory
of Kansas, and it was not st11tl'd that he ·
bad departed from the tPrrltory or thto
eounty of his residence with the Intent to
delay or defraud hie creditors, or to avoid
the service of a summons, or to kt"f'I' himself concealed. It has already bl:lt!n decided by thl11 court thnt It cannot beo shown
In a rolloternl attack that the> affidavit
for publl<'atlon 111 untrue. Oii;den v. Walters. 12 Kan. 282: Rowe v. Palmer. 29
Kan. 837: <'arev v. Ree\·es, 32 Knn. 7JM, 6
Pac. Re"l. 22. But that ltt not tbl11 ts1te.
Jn this Cilse the affidavit le lnsufflclPnt upon Its face. It doeoe not state facts to authorize any publication l!Prvice; tbeorefore
no per1wnal or eonstructlve service was
ever had upon McCamman prior to the
rf'nclltlou of the jud11:ment against him on
the9tb day of October,ltsfll. Comp.Laws,
c. 26, tit. 4, 5, I§ 62, 78, 79. See, also, title
11, § 31';), same chapter. Upon the tlndlngs
of fact the jullgment must be reversed,
and the cam~e remanded with dlreetton to
tho district court to render JudgmPnt for
the plaintiffs and against the dt.>fendants.
ThlH direction wlll not prevent the defendants from recovering any taxes t>ald by
them. if any have been paid, while the
land bas been in controvllrsy In any of the
courts of this state. Sess. Laws l!\76. e.
84, § H9. par. 7004, Gen. ~t. 18.'lU: Wood
v. Gruble, al Kan. 69, 1 Pac. Rep. 277. All
the justices concurring.

JUDICIAL NOTICE.
JUDICIAL NOTICE.

[Case No. 88

WETZLER v. KELLY et al.
(3 South. 747, 83 Ala. 440.)

WETZLER v. KELLY ct al.

(3 South. 747, 83 Ala. 440.)

Feb. 21, 1888.

Appeal from circuit court, Geneva county;

J. l\I. Carmichael, Judge.

This was a claim suit brought in the magis-

trate‘s court originally. S. A. Wetzler sued

one J. L. Wright in the justicé of the peace

court on a waive note, and obtained a judg-

ment against him, for which an execution is-

sued, and was duly levied on the cotton which

is now the subject of the present claim suit.

Upon the levy being made upon the cotton

which was in the possession of the defendant

in execution, the claimants, G. W. Kelly & Co.,

appellees in the present appeal, interposed a

claim to the cotton so levied upon. Whaley

was shown to be the authorized agent of the

claimants, G. W. Kelly & Co. Upon the evi-
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dence, which is suﬂiciently fully set out in

the opinion of the court, the plaintiff asked

the court to charge the jury in writing,“that,

if they believed the evidence, they must ﬁnd

for the plaintiif.” The court refused to give

the said charge, and the plaintiif excepted.

The claimants asked the court to give the fol-

lowing charge, which was in writing: “That,

if they believed the evidence, they must ﬁnd

for the claimants." The court gave the

charge, against the objection of the plaintiﬁ,

and the plaintiff duly excepted. The giving

of this charge at the request of the claimants,

and the refusal to give the charge requested

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Feb. 21, 1888.

Appeal from circuit court, Geneva county;
J. JU. Carmichael, Judge.
This was a claim suit brought In the magistrate's court originally. S. A. Wetzler sued
one J. L. Wright In the justice of the pence
court on a waive note, and obtained a judgment against him, for which an execution Issued, and was duly levied on the cotton which
ls now the subject of the present claim suit.
Upon the levy being made upon the cotton
which was In the possession of the defendant
In execution, the claimants, G. W. Kelly & Co.,
appellees In the present appeal, Interposed a
claim to the cotton so levied upon. Whaley
was shown to be the authorized agent of the
claimants, G. W. Kelly & Co. Upon the evidence, which is sufficieutly fully set out In
the opinion of the court, the plalntit'l asked
the court to charge the jury in writing, "ti.mt,
If they belleved the evideuce, they must find
for the plaintiff." The court refused to give
the said chru·ge, and the plaintiff excepted.
The claimants asked the court to give the following charge, which was In writing: "That,
if they believed the evidence, they must find
for the claimants." The court gave the
chnri;:e, against the objection of the plaintiff,
and the plaintiff duly excepted. The ltiving
of this charge at the request of the claimants,
and the refusal to give the chol'ge reque1>ted
by the plaintlfl', are here assigned us error.
Marcellus E. Milligan, for appellant. F. J.
Milligan and H. L. Martin, for appellees.

by the plaintiff, are here assigned as error.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Marcellus E. Milligan, for appellant. F. J.

.\Iilligan and H. L. Martin, for appellees.

STONE, C. J. It is manifest that the pres-

ent judgment must be reversed, unless the

facts which occurred when Whaley visited

Wright in September, or the act “to amend

section one of an act entitled ‘An act to

amend section 33-ll of the Code,”’ works a.

change of the rights of the parties. The stat-

ute was approved February 28, 1887 (Sess.

Acts. 150). Code 1886, § 3004; Iron-Works

Co. v. Renfro, 71 Ala. 577; Marks v. Robin-

son, 82 Ala. 69, 2 South. 292. Wetzler, the

appellant, claimed a lien on the cotton in

controversy, under an execution issued on a

judgment against one Wright, and which was

levied on the cotton as Wright's in October,

1886. The cotton when levied on was on the

land on which it was grown, the home or

Wright, the defendant in execution. The cot-

ton had been grown by Wright. Kelly & Co.

interposed a statutory claim to the property,

by aiildavit ﬁled that they had a just claim

to it. This claim was interposed October 1G,

1886. after the levy of Wetzlei-‘s execution.

Kelly & Co. had a nio1't;_'age on the crop to

be grown by \Vright in 18813, which was dat-

ed in January of that year. It is common

knowledge that crops of cotton are not plant-

ed in this state until after that time. The

crop not being planted when the mortgage

was made to Kelly & Co., they were without

legal title to it, and could not maintain their

STONE, C. J. It Is manifest that the present Judgment must be reversed, unless the
facts which occurred when Whaley visited
Wright In September, or the net "to ameud
IK'Mion one of an net entitled 'An net to
amend section 3341 of the Code,' " works a
change of the rights of the parties. 'l'he statute was approved Febl'uury 28, 1887 (Hess.
Acts, 150). Code 18Sli, § 3004; lron-Wol'ks
C-0. v. Renfro, 71 Ala. 577; ;\forks v. Robinson, 82 Ala. 69, 2 South. 2{)2. Wetzler, the
appellant, claimed a lien on the cotton in
controversy, under nu execution Issued on a
judgment against one 'Vright, and whkh was
leYied on the cotton as ·w1·i;.:ht's in October,
1886. The cotton when leYled on wns on the
land on which It was grown, the home or
"'right, the defendant In execution. The cotton had been grown by Wright. Kelly & Co.
interposed a statutory claim to the pro1lerty,
by affidavit filed that they had n jm1t claim
to it. This claim was iutel'posed. October lli,
18Sfl. ofter the levy ot' 'Vetzler's execution.
Iielly & Co. had a m01·ti:nge 011 the crop to
he grown by Wright in lS..'ili, which was <lated in January of that year. It ls common
knowledge that crops of cotton are not plant-
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ed In this state until after that time. The
crop not being planted when the mortgage
was made to Kelly & Co., they were without
legal title to It, and could not maintain their
claim at law, by mere force of the mortgage
Itself. Iron-Works Co. v. Renfro, 71 Ala. 577;
3 Brick. Dig. 776, ff 7, 8; Marks v. Robinson,
82 Ala. 69, 2 South. 292; Jackson v. Bain, 74
Ala. 328.
The testimony of Whaley neither proved,
nor tended to prove, a dellvery of the cotton
to him as the agent of the claimants. He
did not take possession, nor was It contemplated thut he should do so. The remurk of
Wright referred nlike to the ungathered crop,
and to that which had been gathered. He
said: "You have u mortgage. All that ls
yours; you can have it," referring to the
crop. Whaley Instructed Wright to haul the
cotton to the gin, have It ginned, and b11ng
It to Newton; but the cotton never came Into
the actual possession of \Vhaley, and was allowed to remain In possession of \Vrlght, defendant in execution and mortgagor. While
so In his possession, the levy ot' \Vetzler's
execution was made, out of which the present contest grew. The remurk of Wright had
reference alone to the Interest the mortgage
secured to Kelly & Co., and neither changed
the status of the property, nor was· it Intended to do so. Nor can the statute, enacted after the present claim suit was instituted, affect the rights of the parties. Colle 1886, §
3004. As we have shown, when the claim
was interposed by Kelly & Co., October 16,
1886, they were without a title which would
avail them In this character flf suit. We need
not inquire whether It was within the pule of
legislative power to heal this imperfection by
retroactive enactment... Trust Co. v. Boykin,
38 Ala. 510; Steamboat Co. v. Barclay, 30
Ala. 120. It Is suftlclent for the wants ot' this
case that In the act approved l~ebruury 28,
1887, (Sess. Acts 1;:;(),) no Intention is shown
to give It a retrospective operation. We feel
bound, therefore, to hold that that statute
can exert no influence In the decision of this
case. 2 Brick. Dig. 462, § 31; Farris v. Houston, 78 Ala. 2W; Warten v. l\lutthews, 80
Ala. 429; Security Co. v. Board, etc., 81 Aln.
110, 1 8outh. 30. As a rule, p111·tles cun maintain or defend suits only on the title they
have when the suit is commenced. In what
we have said, It Is not our Intention to declare that the legislature may not provide a
new remedy, which shall apply to existing
rights, as well as to those afterwards to nccrne. Anonymous, ~ Stew. :.!:.!8; Bartlett v.
Lang, 2 Ala. 401; Paschall v. Whitst>tt, 11
Ala. 472; Holman v. Bank, 12 Alu. 369.
What we do dedde is that when a suit Is Instituted, or a defense Interposed, which Is at
the time unauthorized by the law, n subsequent statute giving such remedy does not
operate on the existing suit, especially when
It does not provide It shall so operate. Reversed and remanded.
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SW.-\l.ES v. GRUBBS ct al.

25 N. E. 877, 126 Ind. 106.)

Nov. 19, 1890.

Appeal from circuit court. Dearborn

county; W. H. BANl$RlI)Gl~I, Judge.

Hugh D. Mclllullen and John K. Thomp-

(2S N. E. 871, 126 Ind. 106.)

Supreme Court of Indiana. Nov. 19, 1890. ,
Appeal from clrcnlt court, llearborn
county; W. H. BA:liURJDGE, ,Tudp;e.
llul(h D. l'tlcMullen and John K. Thompson, for appellant. N. S. Giv1Ju and Ro/Jt'rts ct Stapp, for appelleAB.

son, for appellant. N. S. Givan and Rob-

erts & Stapp, for appellees.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

MITCH ELL. J. This was a suitby Fran-

cis Swaies against the heirs and personal

representatives of James Grubbs, deceased.

The purpose of the action was to obtain

judgment against the decedent's estate

upon certain promissory notes. alleged to .

have been executed by the latter to the i

plaintiff in his life-time, and to set aside

certain conveyances alleged to have been ‘

fraudulently made by the decedent, in his
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life-time, to his children, who are made de-

fendants. It was found that the decedent

did not execute the note sued on, and a.

judgment for the defendants followed, nec-

essarily. it is contended that as only one

of the defendants pleaded non est fiuctum,

the execution of the notes was admitted, ,

and that the ﬁnding to the contrary was ‘

therefore outside of the issue. An answer

appears in the record which purports to

have been ﬁled by all of the defendants ex-

cept the administrator. in which the exe-

cution of the notes is denied. It is veriﬁed

by only one of the defendants, and it is

now insisted that, as to all the others,

the execution oi the notes was admitted.

The administrator answered, practically

admitting all that was alleged in the

complaint, and aver-ring that he had al-

lowed the claim. it has been held that a

joint answer by two defendants, who are

joint makers of a promissory note in suit,

alleging a material alteration oi the in- I

strument. which is veriﬁed by the affidav-

vit of only one oi them, is sufficient only

to put the plaintiff upon proof of the exe-

cution of the note by the one thus verify-

ing the answer. Feeney v. Mazelin, 87 Ind.

226. This decision was made in an action

where the note was the foundation of the

complaint. and where the makers were

parties in court. In the present case, the

action, so far as it affects the appellees. is

not founded on the notes,noris the maker

of the instruments a.part_\'. I<‘ormerly,the

statute read: “ Where a writing, purport-

ing to have been executed by one of the

parties. is the foundation of or referred to

in nnyplending it may be rcud in evidence

on the trial of the cause against such par-

ty without proving its execution. unless

its execution be denied under oath.” Un-

der this statute it was uniformly held that

neither the personal representu tive nor the

heir was within the language or spirit of

the statute. Riser v. Snoddy. 7 ind. 442;

Mahon v. Sawyer, lb‘ Ind. 73; Burnett's

Adm’x v.l.lnion,2$l lnd.254; \Vells v. Wells,

71 ind. 509. in the Revision of I881, (sec-

MITCH ELL. J. Thie was a salt by Fran- ,
cls Swales against the h~lrs and personal
repl'eflf'ntatlveaof Jamee Grubbs, deceased.
The purpose of the action was to obtain 1
JodJCment against the decedent's estate
upon certain promlBSory notes, alleged to 1
have been executed by the latter to the I
plaintiff In bis life-time, and to set aside
certain convey1\Dce& alleged to have been
fraudulently made by the decedent, In his
life-time, to his children, who are made defendunts. It was found that the dcct>dent
did not execute the note sued on, and a
Judgment for the defendants followed, neeeasarlly. It ts contenrled that as only one
of the defendants pleaded non est factum,
the execution of the notes wae admitted,
and that the ftndlu,; to the r.ootrary W88
tt.el'f'fore outside of the lsRue. Ao answer
&J>peare in the record which purports to
have been ftlPd by all of the defendants except the administrator, In which the executlon of the notes ls denied. It ls verifted
by only one of the defendants, and It Is
now insisted that, as to all the others,
the execution of the not.es was admitted.
The ~dmlnistrator answered, practlr.ally
admitting all that was alleged In the
complaint, and averring that he had allowed the claim. It hne been held that a
Joint an11wer b~ two defentlantM, who are
Joint makers of a promlsMory notA In suit,
allep;lng 11. material alteration of the Instrument, which le verified by the aftidavlt of only one of them, Is sufft1•lent only
to put the plalntln upon proof of the execation of the note by the one thus verifyIn~ the answer. Feeney v. Mazelln, 87 Ind.
226. 'l'bl11 decision wa11 made lu nn action
where the note waa the foundation or the
complaint, and where the makers were
parties In court. In the present cRse, the
actlon, so far as It affects the a11pellees, Is
not founded on the no tee, nor Is the maker
of the ln11truments a party. Formerly, the
statute read: "Where a wrltln1t, purportIng to have been exl'<.'otud by onP of the
parties. Is the foundation of or referred to
In nny )Jlf'adlng It may be n.>ad tn e,·hlence
on the trial of the cauHe against such party without proving Its execution, unless
lts execution be dented under oath." Under this statntt- It wa11 uniformly held that
neltherthept'rsonal representative nor the
heir was within the language or spirit of
the statute. Riser ''· 8noddy, 7 Ind. 442;
Mahon v. Sawyer, 18 Ind. 73; Bamett's
Adm'x ""·Union,~ Ind. 2"4; Welle v. Wells,
71 Ind. 509. In the Hevislon of 1881, (seetlon 364,) the language of the 11tntuw Is
more comprt'henslve, and provides that
"where a pleading ls foundPd nn a written
lnstrumt'nt, or su1·h lustl'nment ls therein
referred to, • • • such Instrument
• • • may be rend In evidence on the
trial of the cause without proving Its exe250

I

cutlon unles11 I b1 execution be denlec:l under
oath; • • • butexecntors,e.dmlnlstratore, or guardians need not deny the execu tlon of an lnKtrumcnt," etc. The t;iotee.
altbouarb referred to In the complaint, are
not the foun<latlon of the uctlon ; and
while, po88lbly, It may have been necessary that the execution of the Instruments
therein l't'ferred to11houlcl have been rlenled
under oath, (Belton v. ~mlth, 4!°> Ind. 291:
Carver v. Carver, 97 Ind. 497-:509, I It waR
not neeet:111nry thnt all the beh"H 11hould
verify the 11n11wer denylnir that tbetr anceatnr and grantor executed the notee referretl to to the complaint. Where an Instrument Is the found a tlon of or Is reft'rred
to In a pleading In au action against parties other than those who are alleged to
be parties to It. Joint answPrs by all or
any number of the defeudants, denying Its
exeeutlon, verified by the outh or any one
of the defendant11. potll the plalntlft upon
proof of the execution of the lnKtrnment.
as against all those \vho join in the answer. Indeed. we can Hee no substtmtlal
reason for requiring all of a number of
Joint makers of an Instrument, who join
In a plea of non t>st factum, to verify thPplea; \Jut we decide nothing npon that
subject now. The decisions of this court
seem to require that all of those who are
parties to an Instrument which Is the
foundation of a lllendlng should verify a
plea denylntr the execution of the lnstrument In order to require proof of Its executloo. We ure not willing to extt>nd this
role to heh11 or other persons not parties
tu the Instrument.
During the progress of the trial, th&
plalnttrr below Introduced the original
deeds In evlclence,coples of which had been
filed with the complaint. After the deeds
bad been thuR Introduced, the court permltted wltnf'BMes to compare the slgnatore of James Grubbs. a11 It appeared on
the several deeds, with hla signature on the
notes In suit, and, from · the comparison
thus made, to give their opinion as to th~
genuineness of the signature on the notes.
By Introducing the original deeds In evldence fortbe pnrposeof provlntr what bad
been char.red In the com1>Ialnt. vl1., that
James lJrobbs had conveyed certain land•
In severalty to the defendants, the appellant must be held to have admitted the
genulne11ess of the signatures to those tnstrument11; ancl the rule Is established by
numerous decisions that a comparison
may be made beotween a Rlgnature that Is
admitted by the opposite party to be gennine, and Is all'eady In evidence for some
otherpurpose,and hastbusbecomesnbject
to examination bytbejury,anclthe11l1rnaturf' wllm1e genulneuei,is ts tu qnl'Mtlon.
Walker''· Steele, 121 Ind. 4-'i6, 2'.? N. E. lteJ•·
142, 23 N. E. Rep. 271. and ca11es cited:
Shorh v. Kinzle, 100 Ind. 4~431. Th~ ca11e
wa11 one of equitable cognisance, and waa
so regarded and tried by the court, although a Jury was called to answer certaln que11tlpn11 propounded as advisory t<>
the court. It was a dlsputetl question
wbt-ther or not thenote11sued on had been
executed on Sunday. 'l'be court charged
the jury that certain dates, being the dates
fixed lo the nott.>B, each occurred on th.first day of the week, commonly C1'lled
"l::iunday." Courts take judicial notice ol
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the “days on which iall Sundays and holi-

days,” and it was, therefore. proper to

charge the jury that certain dates fell on

Sunday. 1 Whart. Ev. § 335. The jury

were, however. called ior the purpose of

answering certain questions oi iact pro-

pouuded to them by the court. In chan-

cery cases, the province oi the jury is _to

ﬁnd facts. and not to administer equities

in the light oi legul rules. This is ior the

court. when the mete are ascertained. It

is enough. therefore, to say that in a case,

like the present, of equitable cognizance,

general instructions as to the law applica-

ble to the (acts ol the case are not proper, .

and available error cannot be predicated

upon the giving or refusal to give instruc-

tions of a general nature. In that re-

spect. the rules which govern where the
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jury is required to ﬁnd a special verdict

are controlling. Ra.ilwa_v Co. v. Frawley,

110 Ind. 18, 9 N. E. Rep. 594.

Therc are some otherquestions oi minor

importance that are suggested on the ap-

peilant’s briefs. We have carefully consid-

ered all the questions, and ﬂnd no error

which \vouidjustli'y a reversal oi the judg-

ment. There was evidence which tends to

sustain the ﬁnding. The judgment is ai-

ﬁrmed, with costs.
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the" days on which fall Sunc.Iay" anti holidays," anll It was, therefore, proper to
charge the jury that certain dates fell on
~omllly. 1 Wlmrt. Ev. § 335. The jury
were, however. called for the purpose of
answering certain questions of fact propounded to them by th~ court. In chant.-ery cases, the province or the Jury le to
flJ1d facts. and not to administer equities
In the light or legal rules. This le for the
court, when the facts are ascertained. It
Is enough, there!ore, to eay that In a case,
like the present, of equitable cognizance,
general Instructions aH to the law applicable to the facts of the case are not proper,

[Case No 89

aniJ a \"llllable error cannot be pretllcated
upon tlJP. 11:h·lng or refusal to give ln11tructlons of a gi>nernl nature. In that respect. the rules which govern where the
Jury le required to flnd a special verdict
are controlling. Railway Co. v. l~rawley,
110 Ind. 18, 9 N. E. Rep. i'iU4.
The1·e are some otherquP.stlons of minor
Importance that nre s•1ggei,1ted on the appellant's brlcfa. We have carefully considered all tbe questions, and flnd no error
which 'vonldjuetlfy a. reversal of the judg·
ment. There wa11 evidence which tends to
11ustaln the flndlnir. The judgment is affirmed, with costs.
251
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FERRIS v. HARD et al.

(32 N. E. 129, 135 N. Y. 35-1.)

Court of Appeals of New York. Oct. 11, 1892.

Appeal from superior court of Buffalo,

general term.

Action by Peter J. Ferris, as trustee of

the city of Buffalo, against Samuel B. Hard

and Margaret Hard and others, to foreclose

a mortgage. From a judgment of the gen-

eral term affirming a judgment for plain-

tiff, defendants appeal. Reversed.

Geo. Wadsworth, for appellants. Price

A. Matteson, for respondent.

PECKHAM, J. This is an action to fore-

close a mortgage executed by defendants

Hard upon land owned by the defendant

Mrs. Hard. The amended complaint sets

forth the fact of the execution of the bond

by defendant Samuel B. Hard to one Jo-
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seph Bork on the 10th of September, 1874,

for the payment of $10,000 in four equal

payments of $2,500 on the 10th of Septem-

ber in each of the years 1876, 1877, 1878, and

1879, with interest semiannually on all

sums remaining from time to time unpaid.

To secure such payments the amended com-

plaint alleged that defendants Hard execut-

ed a mortgage bearing even date with the

bond, and whereby they mortgaged the

land described in the amended complaint.

‘lime mortgage was duly acknowledged and

certiﬁed, and it was delivered to Bork on

1he day of its date. On February 1, 1876,

Bork duly assigned the same LO plaintiff,

as trustee for the city of Buffalo, and the

city is the real party in interest, and the

sole and absolute owner of the bond and

mortgage. It is then further averred that

there is due and remaining unpaid the sum

of $10,000 and interest thereon from Sep-

tember .10, 1874, at 7 per cent. Further ap-

propriate and ordinary allegations for the

foreclosure of the mortgage were set torth

in the pleading. The defendant Margaret

Hard put in a separate answer, and set up

in the way of an independent allegation

that she was seised, on the 10th of Septem-

ber. 1874, and possessed in her own right,

of the lands described in the amended com-

plaint, and that on such day she executed

a mortgage of the premises mentioned in

the amended complaint, and delivered it

under the circumstances and upon the con-

sidcration and for the purpose then set

forth in her answer. She also therein al-

leged that she was, in September, 1874, in-

formed that her husband was indebted to

the ﬁrm of Lyon, Bork & Co. on account

of money loaned by the ﬁrm to him. and

she was requested to execute a mortgage

to Joseph Bork, one of the ﬁrm, upon her

land, for the purpose of securing such ﬁrm

against loss by reason of such loans there-

tofore made and thereafter to be made to

her husband. and she thereupon executed

a mortgage upon lands described in the

amended complaint, and delivered it for

such purpose. She believed the mortgage

PUOOF.

amended complaint, and delivered it for
such purpose. She believed the mortgage
set forth 1n the amended complaint to be
the same one thus executed and delivered.
The answer further stated that the firm
h!ld since that time recelved moneys which
should be applleO. on her husband's Indebtedness to the firm, but there had been
no accounting, and she denied any knowledge, etc., that the sum of $10,000 waa dne.
She then denied any knowledge or lnformatlon su11lclent to form a belief as to
the truth of the allegations of the amended complaint, "not berelnbefore admitted,
qualified, or denied, and therefore she dePECKHAM, J. Thie ls an action to tore- nies the same, and each and every of such
efaee a mortgage executed by defendauts allegations." No question appears to have
Hard upon land owned by the defendant been raised as to the form of thlB denial.
Mrs. Hard. The amended t.'Omplalnt sets The action was referred to a referee for
forth the fact of the execution of the bond trial, and he reported in favor of the plainby defendant Samuel B. Hard to one Jo- tiff for foreclosure and eaie of the premises,
seph Bork on the 10th of September, 1874, to pay the full amount of $10,000 and in·
for the payment of $10,000 in four equal terest at 7 per cent. from the execution of
paymeute of $2,000 on the 10th of Septem- the mortgage. Judgment was accordingly
ber In each of the years 1876, 1877, 1878, and entered, and the same has been a1D.rmed
1879, with lnt~reet semiannually on all upon appeal at general term of the superior
sums remaining from time to time uupald. court of the city of Bulralo, and from the
To secure such payments the amended com- judgment of aftlrmance the defendants
plaint alli!g•}d that defendants Hard exe<'ut- Hard have appealea to this court.
ed a mortgage "bearing even date with the
Upvn the trial Samuel B. Hard was called
bond, and whe1-eby they mortgaged the as a witness on behalf of the defendants.
land described in the amended complaint. It appears that bis· answer to the com~Jbe mortgage was duly ncknowledge<l 9.nd
plaint also contained the allegation that
eertlfied, and it was delivered to Bork on the mortgage bad been executed In order to
1he day of its date. On February 1, 1~6. secure the firm of Lyon, Bork & Co. tor
Bork duly assigned the same LO plaintiff, loans of money theretofore made and which
.as trustee for the city of Bulralo, and the might thereafter be made to the witness.
city is the real party In Interest, and the Upon that trial be testified that nothing was
sole and absolute owner of the bond and ever said between him and Bork (with
mortgage. It le then further averred tllat whom the whole transaction concededly
there ls due and remaining unpaid the sum took place) that the mortgage should stand
<>f $10,000 and Interest thereon from Sep- for anything be owed, nor that It was givtember 10, 1874, at 7 per cent. Further ap- en to secure any advances subsequently to
propriate and ordinary allegations for the be made by either of the firms or by Bork.
foreclosure of the mortgage were set torth Hard also testlfled that he told Bork that be
1n the pleading. The defenllant Margaret would get bis (Hard's) wife to execute a
Hard put ln a separate answer, and set up mortgage for $10,000 on a part of the creek
in the way of an Independent allegation property, and that be would give Bork his
that she was selsed, on the 10th of Septem· own bond, and that Bork should sell the
ber, 1874, and pof'sessed In her own right, bond and mortgage. Here was a direct
<>f the lands described in the amended com- contradiction between the evidence of Mr.
plaint, and tbci.t on such day she executed Hard and bis sworn answer. It would seem
a mortgage of the premises mentioned In that tbls contradiction was fully underthe amended complaint, and delivered It stood, and Its serious character appreciated,
un<ler the circumstances lllld upon the con- by the defendants and their counsel. The
si<leratlou and for the purpose then set record shows that the defendant Mrs. Hard
forth in her answer. She also therein al- offered to show by her husband, Mr. Hard.
leged that she was, In September, 1874, ln- the witness then on the stand, that when
fo1·med that her husband was indebted to his and llrs. Hard's answers were drawn
th.:! firm of Lyon, Bork & Co. on account Mr. Hard Informed the attorney who (lrew
or money loaned by the firm to him. and them that the bond and mortgage In quesshe was requested to execute a mortgage tion were executed and delivered to Bork
to Joseph Bork, one of the firm, upon her to be sold by him for the benefit of Mr.
la:t<l, for the purpose of securing such firm Hard, as absolute secm1tles, and not as
against loss by reason of such loans there- securities for any amount then owing by
tofore made and thereafter to be rua(le to hlm, or for advances thereafter to be made;
her husband, and she thereupon executed and the attorney advised him there wae no
a mortgage upon lands described in the legal dlfference,-that the mortgagee would

FERRIS v. HARD et al
(32 N. E. 129, 135 N. Y. 3M.)
Court of Appeals of New York. Oct. 11, 1892.
Appeal from superior court of Buffalo,
general terw.
Action by Peter J. Ferrie, as trustee of
the city of Buffalo, against Samuel B. Hard
and Margaret Hard and others, to foreclose
a. mortgngc. !from a judgment of the gen·
eral term a1!1.rming a judgment for plaintitr, defendants appeal Reversed.
Geo. Wadsworth, for appellants. l'rice
.A.. Matteson, for respondent.
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have the right to hold them as such secu-

rity, and that such was the legal effect of

the transaction; and that, relying upon

such advice, and supposing it to be correct,

he and the defendant Margaret H. Hard

answered the complaint as shown by their

answers herein. The plaintiﬂ objected to

this evidence as hnmaterial, incompetent,

and irrelevant, and the court sustained the

objection, and the defendants excepted.

We think this offer should have been al-

lowed to be proved. As the evidence stood,

a clear contradiction was shown between

the evidence and the sworn answer of the

witness, and any evidence which tended, if

believed, to explain such contradiction in a

manner consistent with the honesty of the

witness, the defendants were entitled to

give. If the plaintiff claims that the alle-
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gation in the answer was an admission of

a fact which concluded the defendants so

long as it remained a part of the pleading,

one answer to such claim is that it comes

too late. The plaintiff had permitted, with-

out objection, the evidence to be given

which showed the contradiction, and it was

then too late to interpose with an objection

which should preclude any explanation of

the contradiction. This is upon common

principles of fairness. If the plaintiff had

a conclusive objection to the proof of any

fact which would contradict the admission

in the answer, he was bound to state it when

the evidence in contradiction was oifered, and

he should not be permitted to acquiesce in

its admission without the least objection,

and subsequently present the objection when

the witness desires to explain this contra-

diction; otherwise the plaintiff obtains the

beneﬁt of the contradiction and its effect

as more or less of an impeachment of the

rest of the evidence of the witness, while at

the same time he secures the conclusive

character of the admission in the pleading.

This he should not be permitted to do.

Upon examination of the so-called "ad-

mission,” we are of the opinion that it is

not of such a. character as to prevent, on

that ground, evidence of an inconsistent fact.

It admits no allegation of the complaint.

That pleading made no allegation as to the

consideration of the bond and mortgage.

It alleged the execution of the bond in the

penal sum of $20,000, with the condition for

the payment of $10,000, as therein stated.

and that the mortgage was executed as se-

curity for the bond. The answer of Mrs.

Hard set up as an affirmative defense the

execution oi’ the mortgage for the purpose

of securing the ﬁrm of Lyon, Bork & Co. for

loans already made by that firm to her hus-

band, or which might thereafter be made

to him, and then stated the fufther facts

necessary to secure an accounting, and de-

nied the indebtedness of $10,000. The only

admission that could possibly be here claimi-

ed might consist in an admission of the

execution of a mortgage upon the lands de-

PLEADING~.

have the right to hold them as such security, and that such was the legal effect of
the transaction; and that, relying upon
such advice, and supposing it to be correct,
he and the defendant Margaret H. Hard
answered the complaint as shown by their
answers herein. The plalntur objected to
this evidence as immaterial, incompetent,
and irrelevant, and the court sustained the
objection, and the defendants excepted.
We think this offer should have been allowed to be proved. As the evidence stood,
a clear contradiction was shown between
the evidence and the sworn answer of the
witness, and any evidence which tended, It
believed, to explain such contradiction In a
manner consistent with the honesty of the
witness, the defendants were entitled to
give. If the plalntUr claims that the allegatton In the answer was an admission of
a tact which concluded the defendants so
long as It remainea a part ot the pleading,
one answer to such claim Is that it comes
too late. The plalntifl' had permitted, without objection, the evidence to be given
which showed the contradiction, and It was
then too late to lnterposf! with an objection
which should preclude eny explanation of
the contradiction. Thie ls upon eommon
principles of fairness. If the plaintiff had
a conclusive objection to the proof of any
fact which would contradict the admission
In the aUBwer, be was bound to state It when
the evidence In contradiction was olre1·ed, and
be should not be permitted to acquiesce ln
Its admlBSlon without the least objection,
and subsequently present the objection when
the wltm~ss desires to explain this contradiction; otherwise the plaintiff obtains the
benefit of the contradiction and its effect
as more -:>r less of an Impeachment of the
rest of the evidence of th~ witness, wblle at
the same time be secures the conclmilni
character of the admlssl.111 In the plendlng.
This he should not be permitted to do.
Upon examination of the so-called "admission," we are of the opinion that It is
not of such a character as to prevent, on
tl:at ground, evldene<! of an Inconsistent fact.
It admits no allegation of the complaint.
That pleading maae no nllegatlon as to the
cowiideratlon of the bond and mortgage.
It alleged the execution of the bond In the
J>l'Dal sum of $20,000, with the condition for
the payment of $10,000, as therein stated,
and that the mortgage was executed as security for the bond. The answer of lira.
Hard set up as an nftlrmatlve defen11e the
execution of the mortgage for the purpose
of 1:eecnrlng the firm of Lyon, Bork & Co. for
loall8 nln::=>.dy made by that firm to hP-r husband, or which might thereafter be made
to him, and then stated the futther facts
necessary to secure an ncrountlag. and denied the Indebtedness of $10,000. The only
admission that could possll>ly be here claimed might consist In an admission of the
execution of & mortgage upon the lands de-

[Case No. 9()

scribed in the amended complaint. It, In
fact, Is nothing but an allegation of the execution of a mortgage, coupled with and
forming part of the allegation as to Its consideration. An answer may contain & direct
or Implied admission of some fact alleged
In a complaint. The admission Ls Implied
when the fact alleged In the complaint is
not denied In the answer. It Is direct when
the admission le made In terms. Either
form of admission of an allegation contained
In the complaint Is conclusive upon a defendant so long as It remains In the pleading, and the plnintlll'. can point to It as conclusive proof of the truth of bis allegation.
Paige v. Willett, 38 N. 1'.. 28; Robbins v.
Cud.man, 4 E. D. Smith, 315, 325. An allP.~atlon contained In-an answer setting up an
affirmative defense, which bas no reference
to and dCJes not admit any allegation of the
complaint, Is of un entirely different nature.
Such allegation ls not nu admission contained In a pleading, which Is conclusive so.
long as it remains In the record. An admlselon which 80 concludes a party admits
something already alleged or set forth lo.
the pleading to which the pleading containing the admission Is an an<Jwer. In this
case the allegation as to the comliderntlon
of the mortgage admitted nothing as to that
consideration which was set forth ln complaint, for there was no allegation therein
as to the consideration, and consequeutly
the defendant was not concluded from showing a fact which waR Inconsistent with hlit
allegation of the consideration, on the
ground that he had admitted the consideration, and could not be heard to prove one
lnconitlRtent with such admission. The
plaintiff could ayall hlmirelC of the allegation as a declaration by defendant, and the
defendant could explain It by other evidence
so far as possible.
'.Che qucf!tlon whether this evidence of the
coueldcratlon, as testified to by Mr. 1111!..d,
was not objectionable on the ground thn.r 1t
changed substantially the defense (Code, f
723). ls not now here. No such question was
raised when the evidence was given. Subsequent to that time the defendants requested the referee to give them leave to amend
the answers by striking out the allegations as
to the consideration of the mortgn~e. and by
Inserting allegations In conformity to the
testimony of defendant Hard. This was objected to by the plaintiff upon the grouud
that such amendment would change the Issues, and also because the defendants hatl
l>een guilty lJf lacheit. The court dl'nled the
motion tor lack of jurisdiction, and not as
discretionary. I suppose the motion was
made so that the evidence already In without
objection might be regarded by the referee
as properly tnken upon a question raised l>y
the pleadings, and In order that he should
not Ignore the evidence as not material to
any Issue raised, although coming In without
ol>jectlon. Tbe defendants, of course, deslr253
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ed the beneﬁt of this evidence, if there was

any, and therefore naturally sought to have

it appear as material evidence otfered upon

an issue raised by their answers in the ac-

tion. As there must be a new trial because

of the error in refusing, under the circum-

stances already set forth, to allow the de-

fendant Hard to explain the apparent contra-

diction in his evidence when compared with

his answer, it is not necessary to decide

whether the referee was or was not correct

in his decision. The motion for leave to

amend can be now made at special term, if

defendants be so advised, before another

trial is entered upon, and the court can de-

cide the motion upon such terms as to it

may appear to be just. The rules for per-

mitting amendments to" pleadings before

trial, so as to have them present the case as
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the parties desire it, are very properly quite

liberal. and there is no fear that the defend-

ants will be treated with any injustice in

such a matter.

It would be quite unfortunate for the par-

ties if we should send this case back for a

new trial without deciding the real question

which appellants’ counsel has so ingeniously

argued. He says this mortgage was execut-

ed by the defendant Mrs. Hard as a surety

for her husband’s liability, and her contract

must be judged according to the strictest.

rules governing contracts of sureties. The

mortgage, he says, is in terms one to Joseph

Bork, and on its face purports to secure the

payment to him of $10,000; and it cannot be

enforced as security for the payment of Mr.

Hard’s debt to Lyon, Bork & Co., or any oth-

er firm, even though Joseph Bork were a

member thereof, and it can only be enforced

as a security for a debt owing to Joseph

Bork personally. He urges that the contract

is one to answer for the debt of a third per-

son, and must be in writing, and the writing

must govern, even though it do not express

the parol contract which in fact had been

entered into. Thus, if Mrs. Hard had agreed

by parol to secure by her mortgage the debts

-of her husband to Bork, or to any ﬁrm of

which he was a member, and the mortgage

was in terms to secure her husband's per-

sonal indebtedness to Bork alone, it could

not, he argues, be enforced for the ﬁrm in-

debtedness, because of the want of an agree-

ment ln writing to that effect. The prin-

-ciple claimed by the counsel is correct, but

it is not applicable to this case. It is true

that the indebtedness for which the land of

Mrs. Hard is to be heli liable is that of a

third person, viz., her husband; but her con-

tract in regard to it is in writing, and sign-

ed the benefit of this evidence, If there was
any, and therefore naturally sought to have
it appear as material evidence offered upon
an issue raised by their answers in the action. As there must be a new trial because
of the error 1n refusing, under the circumstances already set forth, to allow the defendant Hard to explain the apparent contradiction 1n bis evidence when compared with
bis answer, it is not necessary to decide
whether the referee was or was not correct
in his decision. The motion for leave to
amend can be now made at special term, If
defendants be so advised, before another
trial is entered upon, and the court can dedde the motion upon such terms as to it
may appear to be just. The rules for permitting amendments to· pleadings before
trial, so as to have them present the case as
the parties desire it, are very properly quite
liberal, and there Is no fear that the defend.ants will be treated with any injustice in
.auch a matter.
It would be quite unfortunate for the parties If we should send this case back for a
new trlnl without deciding the real question
:which appellants' counsel has so Ingeniously
argued. He says this mortgage was executed by the defendant Mrs. Hard as a surety
for her husband's liability, and her contract
must be judged according to the strictest.
rules governing contracts of sureties. The
mortgage, he says, ls 1n terms one to Joaeph
Bork, and on its faee purports to secure the
payment to him of $10,000; and it cannot be
enforced as security for the payment of Mr.
Bard's debt to Lyon, Bork & Co., or any 0th.er firm, even though Joseph Bork were a
member thereof, and it can only be enforced
as a security for a debt owing to Joseph
Bork personally. He urges that the contract
is one to answer tor the debt of a third peraon, and must be in writing, and the writing
must govern, even though it do not express
the parol contract which In fact had been
entered Into. Thus, It Mrs. Hard had agreed
by parol to secure by her mortgage the debts
-0f her husband to Bork, or to any firm of
which he was a member, and the mortgage
was in terms to secure her husband's per11onal Indebtedness to Bork alone, it could
not, he argues, be enforced for the firm Indebtedness, be<'ause of the want of an agreement in writing to that effect. The prin-clple claimed by the counsel ls correct, but
It ls not applicable to this case. It ls true
that the Indebtedness tor which the land of
Mrs. Hard la to be heU liable Is that of a
1hlrd person, viz., her husband; but her contnwt In regard to It ls In writing, and signed by her. The statute which forbids hold·
Ing hl'r liable for the debt of another unless
by virtue of her own contract In writing, and
fll$med by her, Is thus romplled with. Evidence of the renl and nctual consideration of
the mortga1ote mny always be gt\·en by parol.
Either party 111 always at liberty to show, for
any purpose except to prevent its operation

ed by her. The statute which forbids hold-

ing her liable for the debt of another unless

by virtue oi’ her own contract in writing, and

signed by her. is thus complied With. Evi-

dence of the real and actual consideration of

the Hlortzﬂtle may always be given by paroi.

Either party is always at liberty to show, for

any purpose except to prevent its operation
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as a valid deed or mortgage, that the consideration was different from that named in
the instrument. Murray v. Smith, 1 Duer,
412, and cases cited. '£bis principle ls not
affected because one of the parties to the
instrument Is a surety for some third person. Thus, in this case, It seems to me
plain that parol evidence la admissible to
show that the consideration for the execution of this written security for the payment ot •10,000 was the Indebtedness then
existing or subsequently to be incurred of
Mr. Hard, the husband of the mortgagor, to
Mr. Bork, or to any ftrm of which he was a
member. The mortgagor must be privy to
such consideration. The evidence of the real
consideration does not change the llabillty ot
the party signing the mor~ge. It shows
the reasons tor assuming tbi: obl~tion, and
the character thereof. While the lDSt:rument
might show a pecuniary consideration for
lts execution, parol evidence is admissible t.o
show that the consideration was other than
pecuniary; and this has been held not to
violate the general rule that parol evidence
ls not admlHlble to contradict a writing.
Case above cited. The same principle applies to the case of a surety. The consideration, whlle open to explanation, cannot be
enlarged so as to enlarge the liability beyond
that which the party has entered Into 1n writing. The amount of the Indebtedness of her
husband for which Mrs. Bard's property described In the mortgage could be .neld liable
cannot, in any event, exceed $10,000 and interest properly cast. She has only offered
her land as security to that extent, and she
cannot be held beyond It by virtue of any
parol agreement. She agreed to hold her
land liable to secure the payment of $10,000
In sums and at the times mentioned In the
mortgage, and her land ls not liable to secure the payment of any greater sum or at
any other times than as she promised. Any
Indebtedness, therefore, which her land could
secure, must have been incurred and have
become due not later than the times Indicated for the payment ot the moneys set out in
the mortgage. Within the principle permitting parol evidence as to the consideration
for which a written Instrument was executed, it Is entirely competent to sbow that the
consideration upon which the defendant Mrs.
Hard executed the mortgage to secure the
payment of $10,000 was the Indebtedness of
her husband then existing or thereafter to
be Incurred In favor of llr. Bork, or In favor of any ftrm of which be was a member.
The agreement by which Mra. Hard answers
for the debt of a third person la the written
mortgage signed by her. The consideration
for the written agreement may be proved by
oral evldellce. This consideration will be a
matter for proof upon the new trial which
must be had, and we will not anticipate further the questions which may possibly be
raised on such new trial.
One other question wW necessarlly be

ADMISSIOX8 IN PLEA.DINGS.
Al)MISSl()NS IN PLEADINGS.
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passed upon on the new trial, and that is the

question ot the rate of interest. It arises

now. and we think we should decide it The

referee gave judgment for the principal sum

as set out in the mortgage, with interest at

7 per cent. up to the entry of the judgment.

The mortgage contained a provision for the

payment of $10,000, as stated ill the com-

mencement of this opinion. This is not like

the agreement to pay interest on a principal

sum at 7 per cent. until the principal sum is

paid. such as the case of Taylor v. Wing, 84

N. Y. 471, 477. In the present case the

amount of principal was stated, and it was

agreed to be paid in installments oi.‘ $2,500 in

four annual payments, and the sums re1nain-

ing from time to time unpaid were to bear

interest at 7 per cent. This clearly meant

that the interest on the principal sum, which,
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by the terms of the mortgage, was not due,

was to be at 7 per cent. Thus the whole

principal sum of $10,000 was to he at an in-

terest of 7 per cent. from the time »ot the

execution of the mortgage until an install-

ment becarne due, and then, when the install-

ment was paid, the interest on the balance

remaining unpaid, but not yet due, was also

to be at the same rate. It an installment

was not paid when due, the contract was vio-

lated, and interest after that upon such in-

stallment could only be recoveredpas dain-

ages. and at the rate of interest authorized

by law. Bennett v. Bates, SH N. Y. 3541

O'Brien v. Young, 95 N. Y. 428. This leaves

the mortgage running at 7 per cent. interest

upon all sums unpaid up to the time when

the legal rate was reduced to 6 per cent.,

and from that time on at the reduced rate.

For the reasons above given the judgment

must be reversed, and there must be a new

trial, with costs to abide the event. All con-

cur.
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paeeed upon on the new trial, and that Is the
<1uestlon of the rate of Interest. It ruises
now. and we think we should decide it. The
refet-ee gave judgment for the principal sum
as set out 1n the mortgage, with Interest at
7 per cent. up to the entry or the judgment.
The mortgage contained a provision for the
payment of '10,000, as stated 1n the commencement of this opinion. This ls not llke
the agreement to pay interest on a prlnelpal
sum nt 7 per cent. until the prlnelpal sum Is
paid, such as the ease of Taylor v. Wing, 84
~. Y. 471, 477.
In the present ease the
amount of principal was stated, and It was
agreed to be paid In installments of $2,500 In
tour annual payments, and the sums remaining from time to time unpaid were to bear
interest at 7 per cent. This clearly meant
that the Interest on the principal sum, which,
by the terms of the mortgage, was not due,
wns to be at 7 per cent. Thu11 the whole

[C.1se X o. 90

principal sum of •10.000 wus to be at an interest of 7 per cent. from the time .of the
execution of the mortgage until an Installment bt><>ame due, and then, when the Installment was paid, the Interest on the balance
remaining unpaid, but not yet due, was also
to be at the same rate. If an Installment
was not paid when due, the contract was violated, and interest after that upon such Installment could only be recovered . as damages, and at the rate of interest authorized
by law. Bennett v. Bates, 94 N. Y. 354;·
O'Brien v. Young, 95 N. Y. 428. This leaves
the mort1nl11:e running at 7 per cent. Interest
upon all sums unpaid up to the time when
the legal rate was reduced to 6 per cent.,
and from tllat time on at the reduced rate.
For the reasons above given the judgment
must be reversed, and there must be a new
trial, with costs to abide the event. .All concur.

C1ase No. 91]
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JOHNSON v. RUSSELL.
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(11 N. E. 670, 144 Mass. 409.)
JOHNSON v. RUSSELL.

(11 N. E. 670, 144 Mass. 409.)

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

Suilolk. May 7, 1887.

Contract, upon an order drawn upon de-

fendant by one John Campbell in favor of

Supreme Judicial Court of Mauachuaetts.
Suffolk. May 7, 1887.
Contract, upon an order drawn upon defendant by one John Campbell In favor ot
the plalntltr, which was as follows:

the plaintiff, which was as follows:

“$600. Boston, March 13, 1%.

"Mr. D. W. Russell—Dear Sir: Please pay

to the order of Thomas J. Johnson six hun-

dred dollars, and charge the same to my last

payment. John Campbell.

“Dear Sir: This order is for amount due

on work done and furnished for your house.

Boston, March 13, 1882.
"$600.
"Mr. D. W. Russell-Dear Sir: Please pay
to the order ot Thomas J. Johnson six hundred dollars, and charge the same to my last
payment.
John Campbell.
"Dear Sir: This order Is tor amount due
on work done and furnished tor your houi>e.
"E. A. P. Newcomb."

“E. A. P. Newcomb.”

When said order was drawn, said Camp-

bell was building a house for defendant, and

Campbell was indebted to plaintiff for mate-

rial used in the construction of said house.
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Subsequently to the drawing of this order,

said Campbell brought suit against said Rus-

sell, claiming a balance due him on account

of said building. In his answer ﬁled in that

suit, with other defenses the answer set up

the order above set forth, with others drawn

by said Campbell, alleging that he had

“promised to pay them out of any funds of

the plaintiff in his hands," and claimed that

“the amount of said orders should be de-

ducted from plaintiff's claim." Russell tes-

tiﬁed that he had never seen the answer, and

did not know its gontents.

At the trial in the superior court, without

a jury, before Mason, J., the plaintiff offered

in evidence the answer of said Russell, above

mentioned, for the purpose of showing a con-

ditional acceptance of said order. The court

excluded this evidence, and plaintiff except-

ed. Plaintiff also offered to show an agree-

ment made in open court, at the trial of the

said suit of Campbell v. Russell, by the re-

spective attorneys, that the amount ot‘ the

Johnson order, with others, should be do-

ducted from any verdict recovered in favor

of said Campbell, and judgment entered for

the remainder; but it did not appear that

Russell knew anything about said agree-

ment, this action not having been brought at

that time. The court also excluded this evi-

dence. The plaintiff then offered in evidence

the judgment in said suit of Campbell v.

Russell, for the purpose of showing that the

verdict therein against said Russell was suiti-

cient in amount to cover this and the other

orders before mentioned; that execution is-

sue for an amount more than enough to

cover the Johnson order, and was returned

satisﬁed in full. No other evidence was 011'-

fered by either party as to whether or not

anything was due from defendant to Camp-

bell. This was also excluded by the court,

and defendant excepted. The court found

for defendant, and found specially “that

there was nothing due from the defendant

to Campbell," and plaintiff alleged excep-

tions.

John Herbert and George B. Upham, for

plaintiff. C. T. Gallagher and J. F. Wheeler,

When said order was drawn, said Campbell was building a house tor defendant, and
Campbell was indebted to plalntitr for material used in the construction of said house.
Subsequently to the drawing ot this order,
said Campbell brought suit against said Russell, claiming a balance due him on account
ot said building. In his answer filed ln that
suit, with other defenses the answer set up
the order above set forth, with others drawn
by said Campbell, alleging that he had
"promised to pay them out ot any funds ot
the plaintiff In his hands," and claimed that
"the amount ot said orders should be deducted from plalntltr's claim." Russell testified that he had never seen the answer, and
did not know its ~ntents.
At the trial In the superior court, without
a jury, before :Mason, J., the plalntltr otrered
in evidence the answer of said Russell, above
mentioned, tor the purpose ot showing a conditional acceptance ot said order. The cout't
excluded this evidence, and plalntltr excepted. Plalntltr also otrered to sh<>w an agreement made In open court, at the trial ot the
said suit ot Campbell v. Russell, by the respective attorneys, that the amount of tbe
Johnson order, with others, should be deducted from any verdict recovered in ta vor
of said Campbell, and judgment entered for
the remainder; but It did not appear that
Russell knew anything about said agreement, this action not having been brought u.t
that time. '.rhe court also excluded this evidence. The plalntllr then offered In evidence
the judgment In said suit of Campbell v.
Russell, for the purpose of showing that the
verdict therein against said Russell was sutflclent In amount to cover this and the other
orders before mentioned; that execution Issue for an amount more than enough to
cover the Johnson order, and was return~cl
satisfied in full. No other evidence was ottered by either party as to whether 01· not
anything was clue from defendant to Campbell. '!'his was also excluded by the court,
and defendant excepted. The court found
for defendant, and found specially "that
there was notWng due from the defendant
21)6

to Campbell," and plalntltr alleged exceptions.
John Herbert and George B. Upham, tor
plalntUl'. C. T. Gallagher and J. F. Wheeler.
tor defendant.
W. ALLEN, J. Having proved the order,
It lay upon the plalntltr to prove the acceptance of It by the defendant, and that there
was something due trom him to Campbell.
For the purpose of proving the acceptance,
he otrerecl In evidence the answer ot the defendant in a former suit brought against him
by Campbell to recover the payment, ln
which the order was set up, and which alleged that the defendant had promised !o
pay it out ot any funds in his hands, and
claimed that the amount of It should be deducted from campbell's claim. This was rejected by the court, solely tor the reason, M
was assumed at the argument, that It was a
statement made in the course of pleading.
The rule that the pleadings In a eause an!
not evidence on the trial, but allegations
only, Is limited to the suit In which they are
pleaded. Outside of that, admissions and
declarations of a party in his pleadings are
competent against him; but they must ap·
pear to be the act of the party, and not merely ot his attorney. When it Is his personal
act, as In an answer in chancery sworn to by
him, it ls competent. When It ls a pleading,
by attorney, of formal allegations, which
may be presumed to have been made without special Instructions from his client, it llJ
not competent. But particular and specltn?
allegations of matters ot action or defense.
which cannot be presumed to have been
made under the general authority ot the attorney, but obviously from specific Instructions ot the party,- are competent. Dennie v.
Williams, 135 Mass. 28, and cases there cited.
The answer otrerecl in evidence carries with
it the presumption that lt was made under
the Instructions ot the defendant; and the
testimony of the defendant, that he had never seen the answer, and did not know Its contents, without denying that he had given instructions tor It, does not overcome the presumption; especially In view ot the l'nct that
the cause proceeded to trial and Yerdict under the answer. We think that the eYldence
should have been admitted.
It ls contended for the defendant that the
evidence was Immaterial, because the ttndlng of the court that there was nothing due
from the defendant to Campbell made acceptance of the order Immaterial. After th.rejection of the evidence, In the course of the
trial, the plalntltr otrered other eyldence
which was incompetent, and was proper}~·
excluded, tor the purpose of proYlng thnt
there was enough due from the defendant to
Campbell to meet the order. There was no
other evidence offered by either party upon
the question whPther anything wa~ due from
the defendant to Campbell, and there was no

ADMlSSJO~S

IN PLEADINGS.

[Case No. Dl

ADMISSIONS IN PLEADINGS.

[Case No. 91

evidence before the court that anything was

due. Hence the special ﬁnding. Upon this

question the evidence of the answer of the

defendant in the former suit was competent,

and. if it had been considered by the court,

might have led to a diﬂfercnt ﬁnding; and it

would have been before the court but for the

erroneous ruling excluding it. If it should

be ar,':ued that the ﬁnding rendered the evi-

dence immaterial for the purpose for which

it was offered, the answer is that it was mate-

rial for that purpose, and competent as evi-

dence in the case until the ﬁnding was made;

and the defendant had the right to have it

before the court until then, and to have it

considered by the court on the question of

the ﬁnding. The fact that the evidence was

not offered for that particular purpose is not

material. It was offered for a purpose for
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which it was competent, and was excluded

for reasons that applied equally to an offer for

the other purpose. It was offered to prove

evidence before the court that anything was
due. Hence tbe special finding. Upon this
question the evidence of the answer of the
defendant ln the former suit was competent,
and, it 1t had been considered by the com;t,
might have led to a dl1rerent finding; and it
would have been before the court but for the
erroneous mling excluding it. It lt should
be argued that the finding rendered the evidence Immaterial for the purpose for which
It was offered, the answer ls that It was mat(lrlal for that purpose, and competent as evidence In the case until the finding was made;
and the defendant bad the right to have lt
before the court until then, and to have lt
considered by the court on the question of
the finding. The fact that the evidence was
not offered for that particular purpose Is not
material It was offered for a purpose for
which It was competent, and was excluded
for reasons that applied equally to an offer for
the other purpose. It was offered to prove
an acceptance of the order when the plaintiff
was proving that part of hie case, and the
ruling excluding It was, In effect, a ruling
that It was not competent for either purpose.

an acceptance of the order when the plaintiff

was proving that part of his case, and the

ruling excluding it was, in effect, a ruling

that it was not competent for either purpose.

wn.ous,r.v.—17

W'hen the plaintiﬁ reached the other part of

his case, and attempted to prove that there

was something due from the defendant to

Campbell, a renewed otfer of the rejected evi-

dence for the purpose of proving that fact

would have only been askiiig for a reversal

of the former ruling, and, at least, was un-

necessary.

The oh‘er to prove an agreement between

the attorney in the former suit seems to have

been properly excluded. It is not sutlicient-

ly deﬁnite and certain to show any admission

by the defendant’s attorney. It appears to

have been an agreement by the pl:1intiff’s

attorney to deduct from any verdict in his

favor the amount of the orders, and to take

judgment only for the balance. It does not

appear that the defendant’s attorney did any-

thing more than to receive the voluntary

promise of the plaintilf’s attorney. It is not

sufficient to prove any admission by defend-

ant’s attorney, much less any by which the

defendant himself should be affected.

The judgment offered was res inter allos,

and was properly excluded. Exceptions sus-

talned.

WILOUS,BV.-17

When the plalnttt'f reached the other part of
hie case, and atte~pted to prove that there
was something due from the defendant to
Campbell, a renewed offer of the rejected evidence for the purpose of proving that fact
would have only been asking for a reversal
of the former ruling, and, at least, was unnecessary.
The offer to prove an agreement between
the attorney In the former suit seems to have
been properly excluded. It Is not sufficient.
ly definite and certain to show any adml881.on
by the defendant's attorney. It appears to
have been an agreement by the plaintiff's
attorney to deduct from any verdict In hie
favor the amount of the orders, and to take
judgment only for the balance. It does not
appear that the defendant's attorney did anything more than to receive the voluntary
promise of the plaintiff's attorney. It b not
11ufftclent to prove any admission by defendant's attorney, much less any by which the
defendant himself should be affected.
The judgment offered was res Inter alloe,
and was properly excluded. Exceptions sustained.

Case No. 92]
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ULRICH "'· ULRICH.
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ULRICH v. ULRICH.

(32 N. E. 606, 136 N. Y. 120.)

Court of Appeals of New York. Nov. 29, 1892.

Appeal from superior court of New York

City, general term. See 17 N. Y. Supp. 721.

Action by Charles Ulrich against Edward

Ulrich, as executor of Barbara Ulrich, de-

ceased. Reversed.

Nelson Smith, for appellant. Edward P.

Orrell (Edward W. S. Johnston, of counsel),

(32 N. E. 606, 136 N. Y. 120.)
Court of Appeals of New York. Nov. 29, 1892.
Appeal from superior court ot New York
City, general term. See 17 N. Y. Supp. 721.
A<•tlon by Charles Ulrich against Edward
lilrlch, as executor ot Barbara Ulrich, deceased. Reversed.
Nelson Smith, tor appellant. Edward P.
Orrell (l~dward W. S. Johnston, ot counsel),
tor respondent.

for respondent.

GRAY, J. The plaintiff brought this ac-

tion against the executor of his mother’s

will to recover from her estate the value of

services, which he alleged had been render-

ed by himself and his wife to his mother at

her request. A jury rendered a verdict for

the defendant, and the only question which

demands our consideration, upon the plain-
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tiff's appeal from a judgment affirming the

defendants recovery, arises upon the eXcep-

tion of the plaintiif to a part of the trial

judge‘s charge. After stating what the

action was for, the trial judge said: "As

a general rule, children are bound to care

for their parents in their old age, and ﬁlial

atfection should prompt children to do so.

The consequence is that the presumption of

law is against such a. claim as has been ad-

vanced in this action.” The plaintiff except-

ed to this portion of the charge, and insists

that it was an erroneous instruction to the

jury. The trial judge, it is true, continued

by charging that “if the plaintiff has over-

come the presumption by proof, and has

clearly shown that the services sought to be

recovered for were rendered by himself and

his wife pursuant to his mother's express

promise, ' " " the plaintiff is entitled to

recover." Under the facts of the case, as

they had appeared in the evidence, the

charge relating to the obligations of chil-

dren, and as to the legal presumption, was

such as possibly to convey to the minds of

the jurors an erroneous understanding of the

law. It may well be that the trial judge had

before his own mind the moral aspect of the

case, and did not intend that his observa-

tions should have any other weight with the

jury than as moral reﬂections; but the na-

ture of the case, the sequence of the re-

marks. and the stage of the case, or the cir-

cumstances under which uttered. were such

as, in my judgment, to require us to grant

a new trial. There is no presumption of law

against the maintenance of such a claim. If

the plaintiit had established to the satis-

faction of the jury the existence of an agree-

ment between his parent and himself. un-

dcr which he and his wife were to attend

upon and to care for her, and she was to

pay for such services, he was entitled to

their verdict. as much as he would be upon

any other valid claim.

A “presumption” has been deﬁned to be a

rule of law that courts and judges shall

draw a particular inference from particular

facts, or from particular evidence, unless and

GRAY, J. The plaintiff brought this action against the executor of his mother's
will to recover from her estate the value ot
services, which be alleged had been render·
ed by himself and his wlte to his mother at
her request. A jury rendered a verdict for
the defendant, and the only question which
demands our consideration, upon the plalntlfr's appeal from a judgment aill.rmlng the
defendant's recovery, arises upon the exception ot the plalntltf to a part ot the trial
judge's charge. After stating what the
action was tor, the trial judge said: "As
a general rule, children are bound to care
for tl1elr parent.a In their old age, and filial
atfectlon should prompt children to do ao.
The consequence ls that the presumption of
law is 1111:11lnst such a claim as bas been advanced In this action." The plalntltf excepted to this portion of the charge, and Insists
that it was an erroneous instruction to the
jury. The trial judge, It ls true, continued
by <>barging that "if the plalntltf has overcome the presumption by proof, and has
clearly shown that the services sought to be
recovered for were rendered by himself and
his wife pursuant to his mother's express
promise, • • • the plaintltf ls entitled to
recover.'' l.:nder the fact.a ot the case, as
they had a11peared In the evidence, the
charge relating to the obligations of children, and as to the legal presumption, was
such as 1Jos11lbly to convey to the minds of
the jurors an erroneous understanding of the
law. It may well be that the trial judge had
before his own mind the moral aspect of the
case, and did not intend that bis observations should have any other weight with the
jury than as moral re1lectlons; but the nature of the case, the sequence of the remarks, and the stage of the case, or the clrcmnstnnces under which uttered, were such
as, in my judgment, to require us to grant
11. new trial. There Is no presumption of law
against the maintenance of such a claim. If
the plalntitl' had established to the sntlstnctlon ot the jury the exlstf'nce of an agreemt>nt betwt><'ll his parent and himself. undf'r whi<'h he and bis wlfE: were to attend
upon and to care for her, and she was to
pay tor 1n1C'h services, he was entitled to
their verdict. as much as he would be upon
any other valid claim.
A "presumption" has been defined to be a
258

rule of law that court.a and judges shall
draw a. particular inference from partlcula.r
facts, or from particular evidence, unless and
until the truth of the Inference lB disproved. Steph. Dig. Ev. c. 1, art. 1. No presumption existed here as a presumption of
law. The right to draw any presumption as
to the fact of an agreement havln.g been
made from the other fact of the relationship
between the parties was within the exclu81.ve
province of the jury. Justice v. Lang, 1>2 N.
Y. 328. There ls no rule of law which compels an inference, from the fact of such a
relationship, against the existence of an
agreement by the parent to compensate the
child for services to be rendered. The law
does presume, where there ls no proof of a
contract, under which the eervlces were performed, that there was no promise or agreement to pay for them; that Is, that they
were gratuitous. That Is t:lle general rule.
So far as the relation of parent and child ls
concerned, It ls quite as competent for the
parent to contract with hla adult child for
support and care, and a claim for the compensation due thereunder ls quite as valid,
as It would be In any other case between
individuals. The llablllty of a child to support lt.s parents, who are Infirm, destitute, or
aged, was created in England and here by
statute. Tbe statute in that respect created
duties unknown to the common law. Reeve.
Dom. Rel. 284; 1 Bl. Comm. 418: Edwards
v. Davis, 16 Johns. 281. Had the trial judge
conftned his observations to the suggestion
that filial atfectlon should prompt children
to take care of their parents in their old age,
I should find no reason for crltlclslng the correctness ot his charge. But the state of the
case was such as that, with the moral sense
alert, and naturally quick to respond to lmpl't'8sions adverse to the plalntlfr's claim, the
jury would readily attach great weight to all
expressions of the judge presldlng at the
trial which C'ast a doubt upon the validity
of the claim. In every case, to determine
whether the error pointed out has been such
as to prejudice the party, the court may consider the nature of the case, and bow dellcat~ly the scales were balanced between the
parties. Here the plalntltr bad shown by the
evidence of his wife that, after the death of
her husband, the testatrix, who was very
aged and feeble, told plalntltf and his wife
to stay on with her, and that she would pay
them for the work they did; that she gave
as a reason her helpless condition; that they
remained with her until her death, and during that time performed many more or Jess
Important services In nursing and carln~ for
her; and that she repf'atedly said Rhe would
pay them, without mentioning any amount.
Her evidence waR more o' leRs corroborated
by that of witne1!!1es who vat"iously testified
to hearing the old woman state that she
made the plalntltr and his wife stay with and
take care of her, and that she would pay
tht>w. or that Rhe would "make It all right

PRESUMPTIONS IN GENERAL.
PRESUMPTIONS IN GENERAL.
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with them.” In opposition, the defense gave

evidence to show that plaintiff and wife re-

ceived their board and lodging; that the de-

ceased was an active woman, and not de-

pendent upon others for services, or in need

of care; that plaintiff was a shiftless fel-

low, and would occasionally drink to excess;

and that, under the will of deceased, plain-

tiff received an equal interest in her estate

with the other children. When the evidence

was all in, and the case ready to be sent

to the jury for their verdict, while the plain-

tiff's evidence of an agreement that they

should remain and care for the deceased,

and that their services were to be paid for,

was uncontradicted by direct evidence, it

was seriously attacked by evidence of facts

which, if it did not make the agreement ap-

pear an improbable one, yet was of such a
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nature as might justify the jury in discred-

iting the evidence for the plaintiff. '

On the one side was positive evidence

which, if believed, entitled plaintiif to a ver-

dict. According to the evidence given for

the plaintiff, there were no rambling expres-

sions of a sense of obligation, or of prom-

ises to make compensation by testamentary

provisions. There was a request to remain,

and an agreement to pay for the work to be

done. On the other side, there was circum-

stantial evidence negativing, or tending to

negative, the making of the alleged agree-

ment, which the jury were at liberty to ae-

cept, and upon which they could base a ver-

dict for the defendant. In that condition of

"things, the just balance of their minds might

be disturbed, and their judgment easily led,

by any suggestion from the trial judge which

seemed to militate against the legality of

pla.intiﬂ!’s claim, and which would seem to

accord with an aversion of the moral sense.

It appears from the record that at the con-

clusion of the evidence but little time was

left, and that the trial judge hastened, as

he said, to “ﬁnish the case this evening,”

and he made a very brief charge, in which

he left it to the jury to say whether the

plaintiff had “made out a case which meets

every requirement of the law as he had laid

it down." He had in mind, I do not doubt

at all, that he had previously merely com-

mented upon the obligation from child to

parent, as such exists in nature, and not as

having led them to believe that any rule of

law stood in the way of such a claim in such

cases. But I am constrained to the belief

that prejudice may have been worked to the

plaintiffs case by the observations of the

trial judge. He had observed that it was “a

general rule that children are bound to take

care of their parents in their old age," and

that “the consequence" of that rule, and of

the promptings of ﬁlial aifection. was “that

the presumption of law was against such a

claim as had been advanced in this action."

Both statements were incorrect as legal prop-

ositions; for, of course, there is no such gen-

eral rule of law, nor such a presumption.

with them." In opposition, the defense gave
evidence to show that plaintur and wife received their board and lodging; that the deceased was an active woman, and not dependent upon others for services, or in need
of care; that plalnillr was a shiftless fellow, and would occasionally drink to excess;
and that, under the will of deceased, plaintiff received an equal interest in her estate
with the other chlldren. When the evidence
was all ln, and the case ready to be sent
to the jury for their verdict, while the plaintiff's evidence of an agreement that they
should remain and care for the deceased,
and that their services were to be paid for,
was uncontradlcted by direct evidence, It
was seriously attacked by evidence of facts
which, if it did not make the agreement appear an improbable one, yet was of such a
nature as might justify the jury In discrediting the evidence for the plnlntltr. ·
On the one side was 1>0sitlve evidence
which, lf belleved, entitled plaintllr to a verdict. According to the evidence given for
the plaintiff, there were no rambling expressions of a aense of obllga tlon, or of promises to make compensation by testamentary
p1·ovlslons. There was a :reciuest to remain,
and an agreement to pay for the work to be
-done. On the other side, there was circumstantial evidence negativing, or tending to
negative, the making of the alleged agreement, which the jury were at liberty to accept, and upon which they could base a verdict for the defendant. In that condition of
things, the just balance of their minds might
be disturbed, and their judgment easily led,
by any suggestion from the trial j.udge which
seemed to mtUtate against the legality of
plaintttr•s claim, and which would seem to
accord with an aversion of the moral sense.
It appears from the rec01·d that at the con·Clusion of the evidence but little time was
left, and that the trial judge hastened, as
he said, to "ftnlsh the case this evening,"
.and he made a very brief charge, In which

[Case No. 92

he left it to the jury to say whether the
plaintiff had "made out a case which meets
every requirement of the law as he bad laid
ft down." He had in mind, I do not doubt
at all, that he had previously merely commented upon the obllgatlon from child to
parent, as such exists In nature, and not as
having led them to belleve that any rule of
law stood in the way of such a claim in such
cases. But I am constrained to the belief
that prejudice may have been worked to the
plaintilf's case by the obsen·ations of the
trial judge. He had observed that it was "a
general rule that chlldren are bound to take
care of their parents in their old age," and
that "the consequence" of that rule, and of
the promptings of ftllal affection, was "that
the presumption of law was against such a
claim as had been advanced ln this action."
Both statements were Incorrect as legal prop·
osltlons; for, of course, there ls no such general rule of law, nor such a presumption.
Coming from the lips of the judge, from
whom they were to take the law appllcable
to the case, can we, and should we, say that
they bad no in1luence upon the minds of the
jury, or that, if they did have; the error was
cured by the subsequent instruction to the
elfect that, "If the plaintiff had overcome the
presumption by proof," he might recover?
I think not. This was essentially a case for
de<'islon by a jury upon the evidence before them, as they believed the facts and
weighed the probabllltles. They might well
have understood that there WWI a rule of
law, which amounted to a presumption,
against the validity of such a contract and
claim, and the plaintiff should therefore have
a new trial, In which a verdict may be reached without the possible inftuence of an erroneoul! idea leading to lts formation. ·The
judgment should be reversed, and a new
trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to
abide the event. All concur, except ANDREWS, FINCH. and O'BRIEN, JJ., dissenting.
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CHURCH, C. J. This is an action of eject-

ment to recover an undivided interest in

premises in the city of Albany, situated on

the corner of South Pearl street and Hudson

avenue. The plaintii! claims as devisee un-

der the will of James Hilton, Sr., who died,

as I infer, in December, 1836, by which he

devised and bequeathed his residuary estate,

real and personal, to Robert Hilton, Jr., a

nephew, and Catherine, his wife, and Rich-

ard Hilton, the plaintiff, who was also a

nephew of the testator. The defendant is a

daughter of Robert Hilton, Jr., and Cath-

erine, his wife, and by descent and a con-
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veyance from her brother is, in any event,

entitled to their interest under the will,

which interest is either an undivided one-

half or two-thirds, depending upon the con-

struction of the residuary clause, which will

be hereafter noticed. The defendant how-

ever claims title to the whole premises un-

der a lease for one thousand years, to one

John Hilton, by the corporate authorities of

the city of Albany, dated in March. 1836, up-

on a sale for an assessment, and by him,

through another person, to her; and also

under a like conveyance from the city au-

thorities, 1861, to one Paddock, and by him

to her. The plaintiff was nonsuited at the

trial, but the record does not state upon

what ground the nonsuit was granted. The

general term aﬁirmed the judgment upon

the ground of a title in the defendant to the

whole premises by adverse possession under

the assessment deed of 1836. This ground

is now abandoned by reason of the recent

decision of this court in Bedell v. Shaw, 59

N. Y. 46, holding that possession, to be ad-

verse so as to ripen into a title when long

enough continued, must be accompanied by

a claim of title in fee, and hence, that a

claim under such a lease is not sutlicient,

and is not in hostility to the title of the

owner. But it is insisted that the defendant

has aﬁirmatively and conclusively, in law,

established a title to the whole premises by

virtue of the two assessment deeds, and

especially by the ﬁrst one, dated in 1836.

The deed or lease only from the mayor is

produced. No other paper or proceeding

was proved on the trial. The authority for

making improvements and for levying and

collecting assessments therefor in the city

was derived from sections 4 and 5, chapter

16-1 of the Laws of 1828, which, in sub-

stance, were re-enactments of sections 30

and 31 of chapter 185 of the Laws of 1826.

By those sections it was made lawful for the

mayor, aldermen and commonalty of the

city "to order and direct” certain improve-

ments, including the opening of streets and

the making and repairing of sewers, drains.

etc., and upon the completion of any such

CHURCH, C. J. Tbis ls an action of eject·
meot to recover an undivided Interest lo
premises lo the city ot Albany, situated on
the corner of South Pearl street and Hudson
avenue. The plalotur claims as devlsee under the wfil of James Hilton, Sr., who died,
as I inter, lo December, 1836, by which he
devised and bequeathed bis residuary estate,
real and personal, to Robert Hilton, Jr., a
nephew, and Catherine, bis wife, and Rich·
ard Hilton, the plaintiff, who was also a
nephew of the testator. The defendant Is a
daughter of Robert Hilton, Jr., and Catherine, hie wife, and by descent and a conveyance from her brother le, In any event,
entitled to their lnterest under the will,
which Interest ls either an undivided onehalf or two-thirds, depending upon the construction ot the residuary clause, which will
be hereafter noticed. The defendant however claims title to the whole premises under a lease tor one thousand years, to one
John Hilton, by the corporate authorities of
the city of Albany, dated in March, 1836, upon a sale for an assessment, and by him,
through another person, to her; and also
under a like conveyance trom the city authorities, 1861, to one Paddock, and by him
to her. The plaintiff was noneulted at the
trial, but the record does not state upon
what ground the nonsuit was granted. The
general term aftlrmed the judgment upon
the ground of a title lo the defendant to the
whole premises by adverse possession under
the assessment deed of 1836. This ground
ls now abandoned by reason of the recent
decision of this court in Bedell v. Shaw, 59
N. Y. 46, holding that possession, to be adverse so as to ripen into a title when long
enough continued, must be accompanied by
a claim of title In fee, and hence, that a
claim under such a lease ls not eutH.cient,
and ls not In hostillty to the title of the
owner. But it Is Insisted that the defendant
bas affirmatively and conclusively, In law,
established a title to the whole premises by
virtue of the two assessment deeds, and
especially by the first one, dated In 183G.
The deed or lease only from the mayor ls
produced. No other paper or proceeding
was proved on the trial. The authority tor
making Improvements and for levying and
collecting assessments therefor lo the city
was derived from sections 4 and 5, chapter
16-l of the Laws of 1828, which, In substancl', were re-enactments of sections 30
and 31 of cha11ter l&i of the Laws of l82ll.
By those Sl'ctlons It was made lawful for the
mayor, ald1>rmen and commonalty of the
l'lty "to order a.od direct" certain lmprove-

:wo

ments, Including the opening of streets and'
the malting and repalrlng of sewers, drains,
etc., and upon the completion of any such
work SO ordered, to cause an account Of the
expense to be made by the city superintendent or other person or persons, to be appointed by them, and to apportion the same
under oath among the houses and lots Intended to be benefited in proportion to the
advantage which each was deemed to acquire, specifying the owner or occupant,
which apportionment was to be returned to
the mayor, etc., and when returned, they
were to cause public notice to be given ot
such apportionment for thirty days, and ff
no cause was shown against confirmation,
upon its approval It . was to be filed in the
omce of the clerk of the common council,
and then It was to be binding and a llen
upon the lands assessed. The mayor, etc.,
were then authorized to sue for and recover
such assessment, or In case of refusal to
pay, cause a notice of such apportionment
and of the amount forming a part thereof
to be published for three months, requiring
the owners of the respective lots to pay the
aSBessment, and in default, that such lot or
lots would be sold at public auction, and
they were authorized to sell accordingly.
I have thus briefly abstracted the requirements of the law to show that the legisla·
ture required official action and record evl·
dence of the principal steps preliminary to a
sale, so that the property rights of the cltl·
zen should not be sacrificed, except upon
compliance with these public and formal
acts.
It Is well settled that every statute authority in derogation of the common law to
divest the title of one and transfer it to another, must be strictly pursued. It Is not a
case for presuming that i>ubllc otH.cers have
done their duty, but their acts must be
shown and the onus Iles on the purchaser.
The recitals In the deed are not evidence
against the owner, but they must be proved
true. Sharpe v. Speir, 4 Hill, 86. The statute does not declare that the deed shall be
deemed prlma facle eddence of the regularity of the proceedings or the sale, and hence
these proceedings must be proved. The
clause that the purchaser shall "hold the
land against the owner and all persons
claiming It," does not obviate the necessity
of such proof. The clause ls based upon the
presumption that the statutory requirements
have been complied with and are merely
declaratory In that event of the nature ot
the interest which the purchaser Is entitled
to enjoy.
In tax sales there le a fundamental condition to their validity that there shoulll hal'e
been a substantial compliance with the law
In all the proc1>edlngs of whl<.>h the sale w:t.s
the culmination. "This wonltl be the J::'l'U·
eral rule lo all <.'88('S In which a mun Is to
be divested of bis freehold by adn'l"&lry
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proceedings, but special reasons make it

peculiarly applicable to the case of tax

sales.” Cooley, Tax’n, 324. The proceed-

ings are ex parte. The owner is to be de-

prived of his land. The price usually paid

is trifling, and hence it is peculiarly appro-

priate that strictness in observing the re-

quirements of the law should be exacted.

Brown v. Veazie, 25 Me. 359. These general

rules are now universally applied and do

not require elaboration, and if applied in

this case they would be plainly fatal to the

defense founded upon the assessment deed

of 1836.

It is insisted however by the learned coun-

sel for the defendant, that from the lapse of

time which has intervened since the deed

was given (more than thirty years) and the

alleged possession under it, a conclusive
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presumption may be indulged that all the

proceedings were regular and in accordance

with the statute. This position cannot be

sustained. The general rule laid down by

Mr. Greeuleaf in his work on Evidence that

“when an authority is given by law to ex-

ecutors, administrators, guardians, or other

oﬂicers, to make sales of land upon being

duly licensed by the courts, and they are re-

quired to advertise the sales in a particular

manner and to observe other formalities in

their proceedings, the lapse of suﬁicient time

(which in most cases is ﬁxed at thirty years)

raises a conclusive presumption that all the

legal formalities of the sale were observed,”

may be conceded, but this rule does not jus-

tify the position insisted upon in this case.

Greenl. Ev. § 20. The rule does not apply

to records and public documents which are

supposed to remain in the custody of the

otiicers charged with their preservation, and

which must be proved, or their loss ac-

counted for and supplied by secondary evi-

deuce.

The foundation of the proceeding in ques-

tion was the action of the common council

in ordering and directing the improvement,

and equally indispensable was the conﬁrma-

tion, approval and ﬁling of the apportion-

ment which made the assessment “bind-

ing” upon the owners. Without these oili-

cial acts the subsequent proceedings includ-

ing the deed were a nullity. The acts of the

mayor, aldermen and commonalty of the

city of Albany were matters of record.

They had a clerk, and the act speciﬁcally

directs the apportionment to be ﬁled in his

oﬂice. The presumption is that these rec-

ords and documents are in existence, and in

the absence of evidence, if they cannot be

found or their loss or destruction in some

way accounted for or explained, the natural

presumption is that they never did exist.

When the law exacts acts of record, and

provides for perpetuating documentary evi-

deuce, it is unreasonable, because against

the usual course of things, to presume with-

out proof that they once existed and have

been lost. A presumption is an inference of

proceedings, but special reasons make It
peeullarly applicable to the case of tax
sales." Cooley, Tax'n, 324. The proceed·
lngs are ex parte. The owner ls to be dep11ved of his land. The price usually paid
Is trifling, and hence it is peculiarly appropriate that strictness in observing the requirements of the law should be exacted.
Brown v. Veazie, 25 Me. 359. These general
rules are now universally applied. and do
not require elaboration, and If applied In
this case they would be plainly fatal to the
defense founded upon the assessment deed
of 1836.
It ls Insisted however by the learned coun·
ael for the defendant, that from the lapse of
time which has intervened since the deed
was given (more than thirty years) and the
alleged possession under It, a conclusive
presumption may be Indulged that all the
proceedings were regular and in accordance
with the statute. This position cannot be
sustained. The general rule laid down by
lir. Greenleaf in his work on Evidence that
"when an authority ls given by law to executors, administrators, guardians, or other
otllcers, to make sales of land upon being
duly licensed by the courts, and they are required to advertise the sales in a particular
manner and to observe other formalltlee In
tht>lr proceedings, the lapse of sufficient time
(which In most cases is fixed at thirty years)
raises a conclusive presumption that all the
legal formalities of the sale were observed,"
may be conceded, but this rule does not justify the position insisted upon In this case.
Greenl. Ev. § 20. The rule does not apply
to records and public documents which are
supposed to remain ln the custody of the
oftlcers charged with their preservation, and
which must be proved, or their loss accounted for and supplied by secondary evi·
dence.
The foundation of the proceeding In question was the action of the common councll
In ordering and directing the Improvement,
and equally Indispensable was the confirmation, approval and filing of the apportionment which made the assessment "binding" upon the owners. Without these official acts the subsequent proceedings Including the deed were a nullity. The acts of the
mayor, aldermen and commonalty of the
city of Albany were matters of record.
They had a clerk, and the act specift('ally
directs the apportionment to be filed In his
otllce. The presumption ls that these records and documents are In existence, and In
the absence of evidence, If they cannot be
found or their loss or destruction in some
way accounted for or explained, the natural
presumption le that they never did exist.
""hen the law exacts acts of record, and
provides for perpetuating documentary evidence, It ls unreasonable, because against
the usual course of things, to presume with·
out proof that they once existed and have
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been lost. A presumption ls an Inference of
a fact not known arising from Its necessary
or usual connection with others which are
known. To infer a record once existing and
lost, because not found, where the law requires It should be kept, would reverse the
rule and create a presumption of one fact
from another not usually connected with It.
Facts may be shown doubtless from which
the existence of the records and their subsequent loss or destruction might be inferred. No such facts were shown in this case.
The casual examination made during the
trial can scarcely be called a search. There
was no evidence, and certainly not sutll·
clent, that the records are not In existence,
and if not, there were no facts proved to
rebut the presumption arising In that event
that they never did exist. When a person
seeks, by a purchase of valuable property
for a trilling sum at a tax sale, to cut off the
title of the owner, It behooves him to see to
It that the proceedings have all been In substantial accordance with the requirements
of law, and that the proper evidence of the
same has been preserved, an41 there la manl·
fest propriety In applying this rule to a purchase by one sustaining the relations to the
owner which the evidence tends to show
that John Hilton did.
. Courts wlll not aid in supplying funda·
mental defects In such a case by presumptions. Again It appears, by a recital of the
deed, that the three months' notice of sale
was published in the Albany Argus, a paper
then and now published In the city of Albany, and no reason was adduced or fact
shown why ~he notice, as published, might
not be produced.
Presumptions of regularity may be indulged as to notices and other intermediate
steps not matters of record; but even thrn
they are not always conclusive, but often.
depend upon the circumstances pron~d.
\Vhen a purchaser at a tax sale has taken
possession under hie deed, and continued
undisturbed for a long period in the peace·
able enjoyment of the property, claiming by
virtue thereof, and the owner is in a position to contest the title, and especially if he
ls chargeable with knowledge of the claim,
the presumption is very strong, nnll as to
some facts after thirty years may be conclusive In favor of regularity. But If the
purchaser should lie by, before taking possession, until his deed was very old, he
would come with a poor grace into court to
ask for 11 presumption to supply facts which
he did not venture to put himself In a position to establish when It was practicable, if
they existed, to prove them. Cooley, Tax'n,
330. Between these extreme cases will be
found many others partnking more or less
of the elements of each. It is Impracticable•
to lay down a rule applicable to all cases.
Indeed there ls no fixed rule on the subject.
It ls clear that the age of the deed, while it
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may be important, is not decisive. In this

case, as we have seen, it could not be found,

as a question of fact, that the preliminary

steps had been taken, or that the record evi-

dence had ever existed, of the facts which

were matters of record, and no evidence

was given as to other facts from which an

inference could be drawn. There was other

evidence bearing in a greater or less degree

upon the character of the possession of John

Hilton and the defendant, which it was

proper to be considered. In the ﬁrst place

the plaintiff was in no position to contest

the title until the death of Rachel Hilton, the

surviving beneﬁciary under the will. His in-

terest was a remainder after two lives. It

does not distinctly appear when Rachel Hil-

ton died, but I infer from the evidence that

it was in the neighborhood of 1860, or later,
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and the action was commenced in 1871. The

plaintiff was then, and is now, a non-resi-

dent of the state, and there is no evidence

whether he had any knowledge of the

claims now presented or not. There was

evidence also tending to show that at the

time John Hilton bid oif the premises at the

tax sale and received the lease, he was in

possession as a tenant of the owner, and

also as an agent to some extent. This oc-

curred while the owner was living, in the

spring previous to his death. The character

of his possession afterward was somewhat

equivocal from the evidence. There was

evidence that he brought forward his assess-

ment deed when the will was read, but

when that was does not appear. The tes-

tator died in December, 1836, but the will

was not proved until 1839. It is quite prob-

able that he intended to claim the property

by virtue of the tax title, as it was talked of

in the family, and it was in evidence that

the defendant complained of his treatment

of the heirs in this respect, and yet there

was evidence tending to show that he after-

ward supplied the life beneﬁciaries with

groceries in payment for their interest in

the use of the premises. The executors are

both dead. and it does not appear that they

ever had possession. In 1852, John Hilton

made an assignment for the beneﬁt of cred-

itors, conveying, under general words, with-

out description, all his property, real and

personal, and in 1858 his assignees con-

veyed the premises to a third person for the

nominal consideration of $25, who, for a

like consideration, conveyed them to the

defendant. It does not appear that the as-

signees ever had or claimed possession of

this property during the six years interven-

ing between the assignment and their deed.

There is evidence tending to show that the

defendant has received the rents since 1857,

which implies that she has been in posses-

sion from that time. The deed from the as-

signees was not executed until 1858, and, if

she was in in 1857, it must have been by

virtue of her title under the will as co-ten-

ant with the plaintiff, or, if Rachel Hilton
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may be Important, ls not decisive. In this
case, as we have seen, It eould not be found,
as a question of fact. that the preliminary
steps had been taken, or that the record evidence had ever existed, of the facts which
were matters of record, and no P.vldence
was given as to other facts from which an
Inference could be drawn. There was other
evidence bearing In a greater or less degree
upon the character of the possession of John
Hllton and the detendant, which It Wll8
proper to be considered. In the first place
the plaintiff was In no position to contest
the title until the death of Rachel Hilton, the
surviving beneficiary under the will. His Interest was a remainder atter two ll'ves. It
does not dlstlnetly appear when Raebel Hllton died, but I Infer from the evidence that
It was In the neighborhood of 1860, or later,
and the aetlon was commenced In 1871. The
plaintiff was then, and is now, a non-resident of the state, and there Is no evidence
whether he had any knowledge of the
claims now presented or not. There was
evidence also tending to show that at the
time John Hllttn bid on' the premises at the
tax sale and received the lease, he was In
poeseBSlon as a tenant of the owner, and
also as an agent to some extent. This occurred while the owner was living, In the
spring previous to his death. The character
of his possession atterward was somewhat
equivocal from the evidence. There was
evidence that he brought forward his assessment deed when the will was read, but
when that was does not appear. The testator died In December, 1836, but the will
was not proved until 1839. It ts quite probable that he Intended to claim the property
by virtue of the tax title, as It was talked of
In the family, and It Wll8 In evidence that
the defendant complained of his treatment
of the heirs In this respect, a.n d yet there
was evidence tending to show that he afterward supplied the life beneficiaries with
groceries In payment for their Interest In
the use of the premises. The executors are
both dead, and It does not appear that they
ever bad possession. In 1852, John Hilton
made an assignment for the benefit of creditors, conveying, under general words, without description, all his property, real and
personal, and In 1858 his assignees eonveyed the premises to a third person for the
nominal consideration ot $25, who, for a
like consideration, conveyed them to the
defendant. It does not appear that the asSIA'DeeS ever had or claimed vossesslon of
this property during the six years lnterrenlng between the assignment and their deed.
There ls evidence tending to show that the
defendant has received the rents since 1857,
whkb Implies that she hns been In possession from that time. The deed from the assignees was not executed until 1858, and, If
she was In In 1857, It must have been by
virtue of her title under the will as co-tenant with the plaintiff, or, If Rachel Hilton
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was then living, possibly under some arrangement with her. The lnferenees to be
drawn from these facts, bearing upon legal
propositions, Involved as to the effect of the
purchases by John Hilton and by the defendant and as to whether the premises
were held under the tax title, and ha'\'e been
so held continuously since that period, are
to be drawn by the jury. And these facts
have some bearing upon the strength of presumptions which may be invoked to supply
facts not capable from lapse ot time of positive proof. Worthing v. Webster, 45 .Me.
270; 71 Am. Dec. 543; Cooley, Tax'n, 331,
332, and cases cited.
It ls not Intended to Intimate that the tax
sale may not be upheld, but only that there
was an entire failure of proof upon the trial,
and that It Is not a case for the application
of a eoncluslve presumption of regularity.
The assessment deed ot 1861 to William S.
Paddock Is void. The commissioners to assess the damages and recompense for widening Hamilton street, although appointed according to the statute then In existence
(chapter 86 ot the Laws of lSU), were not
appointed In aecordance with section 7 of
article 1 of the constitution. In this respect
the statute ls unconstitutional, as this court
decided In .Menges v. City of Albany, 56 N.
Y. 374. This defect appeared affirmatively
upon the trial, and as It was a substantial
link in the chain of legal requirements necessary to bind the lands of the owners supposed to be benefited, the defect Is fatal to
the validity of the entire proceedings. The
question In respect to the title of James Hilton, Sr., was not Insisted upon ln this court
The evidence would at least justify a fimling ot facts by the jury sufficient to estalr
llsh a good title. A nonsuit on that ground
would have been erroneous.
As there must be a new trial, It Is proper
to determine the extent of the Interest ot the
plalntltr In the premises under the will of
James Hilton. Sr. The will, after devhilng
and bequeathing the property of the tt>stator, to the executors in trust to apply the
Income, rents and profits to the support of
the son of the testator, James Hilton, and
bis wife, Raebel, and the survivor for life,
contained this clause: "I give, devise and
bequeath the residue and remainder of my
renl and personal estate, • • • to Robert
Hilton, Jr., son of my deceased brother
Robert, and Catherine, his wife, and Richard, son of my brother Derrick, as tenants
In common, and their heirs forever." There
ls nothing In the language Indicative of an
Intent to give Robert Hilton, Jr., and his
wife a half Interest and the plaintiff the other half. The devise to Catherine, the wife,
ls as specific as to either of the others, and
the language applies to her the same as the
others, and I can see no reason for any distinction. The devise Is to Robert, Cntherlne
and Richard, as tenants in common. and to
their heirs and ~signs forever. It follows

PRESUMPTIONS IN GENERAL.
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that the p1aintiﬂ's interest under the will is The judgment must be reversed and a

only an undivided third, instead of one-half new trial granted. with costs to abide the

as claimed. It is unnecessary to notice the event. Judgment reversed.

other points. All concur; RAPALLO, J., absent.
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that the plalntift''s Interest unde1· the wl,11 ls
only an undJvlde(l third, Instead of one-halt
as dnlmed. It ls unnecessary to notice the
other points.

[Case No. 93

The judgment must be re\·crsed and a
new trial granted, with costs to abide the
event. Judgment reversed.
All concur; RAPALLO, J., absent.
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UNITED STATES v'. ROSS.

(92 U. S. 281.)

Supreme Court of the United States. Oct.,

1875.

Appeal from the court of claims.

Edwin B. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gcn., for the

United States. George Taylor, contra.

Mr. Justice STRONG delivered the opinion"

of the court.

It is incumbent upon a claimant under the

captured or abandoned property act to estab-

lish by suﬁicient proof that the property cap-

tured or abandoned came into the hands of

a treasury agent; that it was sold; that the

proceeds of the sale were paid into the treas-

ury of the United States; and that he was

the owner of the property, and entitled to

the proceeds thereof. All this is essential to

show that the United States is a trustee for
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him, holding his money. That there is in the

treasury a fund arisen out of the sales of

property captured or abandoned, a fund held

in trust for somebody, and that the claim-

ant's property, after capture or abandon-

ment, came into the hands of a quartermas-

ter of the army or a treasury agent, is not

sufiicient. There must be evidence connect-

ing the receipt of it by the treasury agent

with the payment of the proceeds of sale of

that identical property into the treasury.

VVe do not say that the evidence must be di-

rect. It must, however, be such as the law

recognizes to be a legitimate medium of

proof; and the burden of proof rests upon

the claimant who asserts the connection.

In the present case, the court of claims has

not found as a fact that the claimant's cot-

ton came into the hands of a treasury agent,

that it was sold, and that the proceeds of

that cotton were paid into the treasury. No

connection between the cotton captured and t

the fund now held by the United States has

been established. Certain facts have been

found, and from them it was inferred, as

matter of law, that other facts existed; and

upon the facts thus inferred the court gave

judgment.

claimant owned, in May, 1864, thirty-one

bales of cotton, then in a warehouse in Rome,

Ga. On the 18th of that month, Rome was

captured by the United States forces; and

shortly afterwards the cotton was removed

on government wagons to a warehouse ad-

joining the railroad leading from Rome to

Kingston, and connecting there with a road

leading thence to Chattanooga. Whether it

was the only cotton in that warehouse is not

found; but it is inferrible from the other

facts found that it was not. Subsequently

(but how long afterwards docs not appear)

UNITED STATES

being then in the possession of the military

authorities. It is next shown that cotton

(some cotton) arrived in Kingston from Rome

before Aug. 19, 186-1, and was forwarded to

Chattanooga; that, on the 19th of August,

forty-two bales were received at Chattanooga

v.

ROSS.

I

before Aug. 19, 1864, and was forwarded to
Chattanooga; that, on the 19th of August,
forty-two bales were received at Chattanoogn
from the quartermaster at Kingston; that
Supreme Court of the United States. Oct.,
1875.
thence they were shipped to Nashville, where
Appeal from the court of claims.
they were received as coming from Kingston,
Edwin B. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the turned over to the treasury agent, and sold.
rhe proceeds of sale were paid Into the treasUnited States. George Taylor, contra.
ury, and no title to these forty-two bales bu
Mr. Justice STRONG delivered the opinion · been asserted by third persons.
of the court.
Such were the facts found; and from them
It le Incumbent upon a claimant under the the court deduced, not as a conclusion of
captured or abandoned property act to estab- tact, but as a presumption of law, that the
lish by sufficient proof that the property cap- thirty-one bales removed on government
tured or abandoned came Into the bands of wagons to the warehouse Immediately ada treasury agent; that it was sold; that the joining the railroad at Rome, shortly after
proceeda of the sale were paid Into the treas- May 18, 186-i, were a part of the forty-two
ury of tbe United States; and that he was bales received at Nashville on the 24th of Authe owner of the property, and entitled to I gust, four months afterwards, and there turnthe proceeds thereof. All this ls eBSential to ed over to the treasury agent. It ts obvious
show that the United States is a trustee tor that this presumption could have been made
him, holding bis money. That there ls in the only by piling Inference upon Inference, and
treasury a !und arisen out of the sales of presumption upon presumption. Because
property captured or abandoned, a fund held the thirty-one bales of the claimant were
In trust for somebody, and that the claim- taken to the warehouse alongside of the railant's property, after capture or abandon- road at Rome In May, 186i, and the cotton
ment, came Into the hands of a quartermas- ln that warehouse afterwards, at some unter of the army or a treasury agent, ls not known time (whether before or after Aug.
su:fll.clent. There must be evidence connect- 19 does not appear), was shipped on the road
ing the receipt of It by the treasury agent to Kingston, it Is inferred that the claimant's
with the payment of the proceeds of sale of cotton was part of the shipment. Because
that Identical property into the treasury. somebody's cotton (bow much or bow little
We do not say that the evidence must be di- 18 not shown) arrived at Kingston from Rome
rect. It must, however, be such as the law at some time not known, and was forwarded
recognizes to be a legitimate medium of to Chattanooga before the 19th of August,
proof; and the burden of proof rests upon 1864, it Is Inferred that the claimant's thirtythe claimant who asserts tbe connection.
one bales, presumed to have reached ChatIn the present C'ase, the court of claims bas tanooga, thus arrived, and were forwarded;
not found as a fact that the claimant's cot- and, because forty-two bales were received
ton came into the hands of a treasury agent, at Chattanooga on that day from the quarterthat lt was sold, and that the proceeds of master at Kingston, It Is Inferred that the
that cotton were paid into the treasury. No claimant's bales were among them. These
connection between the cotton captured and i seem to us to be nothing more than conthe fund now held by the United States has . jectures. They are not legitimate lnterences,
been established. Certain facts have been : even to establish a fact; much less are they
found, and from them it was inferred, as presumptions of law. They are Inferences
matter of law, that other facts existed; and from Inferences; presumptions resting on
upon the facts thus Inferred the court gave the basis of another presumption. Such a
Jmlgment.
mode of arriving at a conclusion ot fact ls
We think that in this there was error. The generally, if not universally, lnadml88lble.
claimant owned, ln May, 1864, thirty-one No Inference of fact or of law ls reliable
bales of cotton, then ln a warehouse In Romt.', · drawn from premises wbi<.>h are uncertain.
Ga. On the 18th of that month, Rome was · Whenever circumstantial evidence 18 relied
captured by the United States forces; and i upon to pro\"e a fact, the clf('umstances must
11hortly afterwards the cotton was removed 1 be proved, and not themselvt.>11 presumed.
on ~overnment wagons to a warehouse ad- Starkie, J<}v. p. 80, lays down the rule thus:
joining the railroad leading from Rome to "In the first place, as the very foundation
Kingston, and connecting there with a road : of indirect evidence ls the establishment of
leading thence to Chattanooga. Whether it ' one or more facts from which the Inference
was the only cotton ln that warehouse is not Is sought to be made, the law requires that
found; but it Is lnferrible from the other the latter should be established by direct
fa<•t11 found that lt was not. Subsequently evidenC'e. as If they were the very facts In Is(but how Jon~ afterwards does not appear) sue." It Is upon this principle that courts
all of the cotton ln that warehouse was ship- are dally <'ailed upon to exdude evidence as
ped on the railroad to Kingston, the road too remote for the consideration of the jury.
being then In the possession of the mllltary The law requires an open. visible conne<.>tlon
authorities. It le next shown that cotton between the principal and evidentlary facts
(some cotton) arrived In Kingston from Rome and the deductions from them, and doe8 not
(92

u. s.

281.)

I
I

I

all of the cotton in that warehouse was ship-

ped on the railroad to Kingston, the road
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permit a decision to be made on remote infer-

ences. Best, Ev. 95. A presumption which

the jury is to make is not a circumstance in

proof; and it is not, therefore, a legitimate

foundation for a presumption. There is no

open and visible connection between the fact

out of which the ﬁrst presumption arises and

the fact sought to be established by the de-

pendent presumption. Douglas v. Mitchell,

35 Pa. St. 440.

The court of claims thought the facts

found by them entitled the claimant to the

legal presumption said by this court to exist

in Crussell’s Case, 1-1 Wall. 1; and therefore

determined, as a conclusion of law, that the

cotton taken from the claimant wa a part of

that transmitted to Nashville, and turned

over to the treasury agent and sold. We

think Crussell’s Case does not justify such a. -
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conclusion. Because property was captured

by a military oﬂicer and sent forward by

him, and because there is an unclaimed fund

in the treasury derived from sales of prop-

erty of the same kind as that captured, be-

cause omnia prcsumuntur rite esse acta, and

ofiicers are presumed to have done their

duty, it is not the law that a court can con-

clude that the property was delivered by the

military ofiicer to a treasury agent, that it

was sold by him, and that the proceeds were

covered into the treasury. The presumption

that public ofiicers have done their duty, like

the presumption of innocence, is undoubtedly

a legal presumption; but it does not supply

proof of a. substantive fact. Best, in his

treatise on Evidence (section 300), says: “The

true principle intended to be asserted by the

rule seems to be, that there is a general -dis-

position in courts of justice to uphold judicial

and other acts rather than to render them in-

operative; and with this view, where there

i general evidence of facts having been le-

gully and regularly done, to dispense with

proof of circumstances, strictly speaking, es-

sential to the validity of those acts, and by

which they were probably accompanied in

most instances, although in others the as-

sumption may rest on grounds of public pol-

icy.” Nowhere is the presumption held to be

a substitute for proof of an independent and

material fact. The language of the opinion

in Crussell‘s Case would perhaps mislead.

were it not read in connection with the ﬁnd-

ing of facts. The question was, whether

seventy-three bales of cotton of the plaintiffs

had been forwarded, with a much larger

amount, to the oﬂicer in charge of military

transportation at Nashville, and by him turn-

ed over to the treasury agent. There was no

direct proof that the plaintiffs cotton was in-

cluded in the shipment; but there was proof

that the treasury agent forwarded the cotton

received by him to the supervising agent at

Cincinnati, where a sale was soon after

made, and some of the bales sold were mark-

ed with the plaintiff’s mark. The question,

therefore, whether the military officer who

shipped the large quantity had shipped with

permit a decision to be made on remote lnferBest, Ev. 95. A presumption which
the Jury ls to make ls not a circumstance ln
proof; and It ls not, therefore, a. legitimate
foundation for a presumption. There ls no
open and visible connection between the fact
out of which the first presumption arises and
the fact sought to be established by tbe dependent presumption. Douglas v. Mitchell,
~5 Pa. St. 440.
The court of claims thought the facts
found by them entitled the claimant to the
legal presumption said by this court to exist
In Crussell's Case, 14 Wall. 1; and therefore
determined, as a conclusion of law, that the
cotton taken from the claimant was a part of
that transmitted to Nash¥llle, and turned
over to the treasury agent and sold. 'Ve
think Crussell's Case does not justify such a
conclusion. Because property was captured
by a mllltary otttcer and sent forward by
liim, and because there ls an unclaimed fund
In the treasury derived from sales of property of the same kind as that captured, because omnla presumuntur rite esse acta, and
ofHcers are presumed to have done their
duty, It ls not the law that a court <·an conclude that the property was delivered by the
mllltary officer to a treasury agent, that it
was sold by him, and that the proceeds were
co¥ered into the treasury. The presumption
that public officers have done their duty, like
the presumption of Innocence, ls undoubtedly
a legal presumption; but It does not supply
proof of a substantive fact. Best, in his
treatise on Evidence (section 300), says: ''The
tme principle intended to be asserted by the
rule seems to be, that there ls a general ·disposition In courts of justice to uphold judicial
and other acts rather than to render them inoperative; and with this view, where there
ls general evidence of facts having been legally and regularly done, to dispense with
proof of circumstances, strictly speaking, essential to the valtdlty of those acts, and by
~nces.
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which they were pro~bly accompanied in
most Instances, although In others the assumption may rest on grounds of public policy." Nowhere ls the presumption held to be
a substitute for proof of an independent and
material fact. The language of the opinion
In Crussell's Case would perhaps mislead,
were It not read In connection with the finding of facts. The question was, whether
seventy-three }>ales of cotton of the plalntltT·s
had been forwarded, with a much larger
amount, to the officer In charge of mllltary
transportation at Nashville, and by him turned over to the treasury agent. There was no
direct proof that the plaintiff's cotton was included In the shipment; but there was proof
that the treasury agent forwarded the cotton
received by him to the supervising agent at
Cincinnati, where a sale was soon after
made, and some of the bales sold were marked with the plaintiff's mark. The question,
therefore, whether the mllltary officer who
shipped tlie large quantity had shipped with
It the cotton of the plalntllT, was not left to
depend upon the presumption that he had
done his duty. There was distinct and independent proof of It In the fact that some
of the plaintiff's cotton had reached Clnclnna tl, and had been sold there. · The presumption was only confirmatory of what had been
proved by evidence, and In confirmation ot'
that proof It might be Invoked. This ls all
that can fairly be deduced from the opinion
of the court as delivered by the chief justice.
No more need be said of the present case.
It ls not found as a tact that the ldentlcnl
cotton captured from the plaintiff e¥er came
Into the hands of a treasury agent, or that It
wa1:1 sold, and that the proceeds were pal<l
Into the treasury; and the presumption or
law adopted by the court, that the cotton
was a part of that transmitted and sold, was
unwarranted.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded
for a new trial.
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FLETCHER et al. v. FULLER.

(7 Sup. Ct. 667, 120 U. S. 534.)

Supreme Court of the United States. March 7,

1887.

In error to the circuit court of the United

States for the district of Rhode Island.

Wm. H. Greene and Jas. Tiliinghast, for

PR001''.

FLETCHER et al. v. FULLER.
(7 Sup. Ct. 667, 120 U. S. 534.)
Supreme Court of the United Statl.'ll. March 7,
1887.
In error to the circuit court of the United
States for the district of Rhode Island.
Wm. H. Greene and Jas. Tillinghast, for
plaintiffs In error. Livingston Scott and
Elisha C. Mowry, for defendant In error.

plaintiffs in error. Livingston Scott and

Elisha C. Mowry, for defendant in error.

FIELD, J. This is an action of ejectment

to recover possession of twenty-seven twen-

ty-eighths undivided parts of a tract of land,

containing about 14 acres, situated in the

town of Lincoln, formerly Smithville, in the

state of Rhode Island. The plaintiff, a cit-

izen of Connecticut, sues the defendants, cu.-

izens of Rhode Island, in his own right, and

as trustee for others.

The declaration contains several counts, all
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of which, except two, are withdrawn. In

these the plaintiff alleges that on the twen-

ty-ﬂfth of October, 1874, he was “seized and

possessed in his demesne, as of fee in his

own right and as trustee,” of twenty-seven

twenty-eighths undivided parts of the tract

of land which is described, and that the de-

fendants on that day and year, with force

and arms, entered thereon, and ejected him

therefrom, and have ever since withheld the

possession, to his damage of $1,000. The

two counts diﬁer merely in the description

of some of the boundary lines of the tract.

The defendants pleaded the general issue

and 20 years‘ possession under the statute

of possessions. Upon these pleas issues

were joined, and the case was tried; the par-

ties stipulating that the plea of the statute

should be held to apply to any period or pe-

riods of 20 years that could be covered by

any other like plea that might have been

ﬁled, and that either party might offer any

evidence and rely upon any matters that

would be admissible under such plea or

pleas, and any proper replications or other

proceedings thereon. The case was tried

three times, resulting the ﬁrst time in a ver-

dict for the defendants, and at the other

times in a verdict for the plaintiff. The

judgment on the last verdict is brought be

fore us for review by the defendants on a

writ of error. Numerous exceptions were

taken in the progress of the trial to the rul-

ings of the court in the admission and re-

jection of evidence, and to the instructions

given and refused to the jury; but the con-

clusions we have reached with respect to

the instructions given and refused, as to the

presumption of a deed to the ancestors in ti-

tle of the defendants, render it unnecessary

to consider the others.

It appears from the evidence at the trial

that the land in controversy was the west-

erly part of a tract of 33% acres, belonging,

in 1750, to one James Reed, and which, by

early conveyances, became divided into

three parcels, one containing 22% acres, one

5% acres, and the third 6 acres, as shown by

a diagram submitted, by consent of parties,

FIELD, J. This is an action of ejectment
to recover possession of twenty-seven twenty-eighths undivided parts of a tract of land,
containing about 14 acres, situated In the
town of Lincoln, formerly Smithville, In the
state of Rhode Island. The plalntltl', a citizen of Connecticut, sues the defendants, cuizens of Rhode Island, In his own right, and
as trustee for others.
The declaration contains several counts, all
of which, except two, are withdrawn. In
these the plalntltl' alleges that on the twenty-11.ttb of October, 1874, he was "seized and
possessed in bis demesne, as of fee In his
own right and as trustee," of twenty-seven
twenty-eighths undivided parts of the tract
of land which ls described, and that the defendants on that day and year, with force
and arms, entered thereon, and ejected him
therefrom, and have ever since withheld the
possession, to bis damage of $1,000. The
two counts dltl'er merely in the description
of some of the boundary lines of the tract_
The defendants pleaded the general Issue
and 20 years' possession under the statute
of possessions. Upon these pleas Issues
were joined, and the case was tried; the parties stipulating that the plea of the statute
should be held to apply to any period or periods of 20 years that could be covered by
any other like plea that might have been
11.led, and that either party might offer any
evidence and rely upon any matters that
would be admissible under such plea or
pleas, and any proper replications or other
proceedings thereon. The case was tried
three times, resulting the first time In a verdict for the defendants, and at the other
times In a verdict for the plaintiff. The
judgment on the last verdict Is brought before us for review by the defendants on a
wl'lt of error. Numerous exceptions were
taken In the progress of the trial to the rullni:s of the court In the admission end rejection of evidence, and to the l~structlons
i:tven and refused to the jury; but the conclusions we have reached with respect to
the Instructions given and refused, as to the
presumption of a deed to the ancestors In title of the defendants, render It unnecessary
to conRider the others.
It appears from the evidence at the trial
that the land In controversy was the westerly part of a tract of 33% acres, belonging,
In 1750, to one James Reed, and which, by
early conveyances, became divided Into
three parcels, oue containing 2'.?14 acres, one
266

51h acres, and the third 6 acres, as shown by
a diagram submitted, by consent of parties,
to the jury, of which the following ls a reduced copy. [See opposite page.]
A turnpike, running tln·ouirh the tract
nortbPrly and southerly, was opened in 1816.
The 2214-acre parcel was conveyed to Francis Richardson, of Attleboro, Massachusetts,
by deed dated April 10, 1750. The land in
controveray Is a portion of this parcel lying
west of the turnpike. The five and a half
acre parcel was conveyed to Ezekiel Fuller
by deed dated November 17, 1750. The sixacre parcel wu conveyed to Abigail Fuller,
wife of Ezekiel. and daughter of Francis
Richardson, by deed dated January 21, lir'6.
The plalntltl' claims to derive title under
the will of 1.<'rancls Richardson, dated :May
26, 1749, and the codicil thereof, dated August 10, 1750, which were admitted to probate ln Massachusetts, January 19, 1756. A
copy of the will and codicil, and of the Massachusetts probate, was produced and given
In evidence, together with a certificate of
their having been 11.led and recorded In the
probate omce In Lincoln on the twenty-seventh of August, 1881.
It does not appear that there was any direct evidence that Francis Richardson was
seized of the 2214-acre parcel at the time ot
his death. The presumption, In the absence
of any opposing circumstances, is undoubtedly that, being the owner at the date of the
codicil, August 10. 1750, be continued such
owner up to the time of bis death, which occurred some years afterwards. 'Whether sufficient opposing circumstances to rebut this
presumption are fotmd In the absence of all
claim to the land for three-quarters of a century by the devlsee or her husband, or her
heirs, and the continued claim of ownership
by the ancestors In title of the defendants
during that period, 111 a question to be hereafter considered.
It ls stated In the record that there was
evidence tending to show that Abigail Fuller, the devlsee, and her husband, entered
Into possession of the property devised under
the will and codicil, but what that evidence
was does not appear. Abigail died prior to
1766, leaving her husband surviving her.
He lett Smithfield some time In 1761 "for
parts unknown." It appears, also, that In
a deed executed by him on the eleventh of
April, 1761. of the 20-acre lot designated on
the diagram, he recited that such lot was
bounded on the north by "hie former land."
With the exception of the evidence tending
to show that the devlsee and her huRband
entered Into possession of the prop1>rty devised, and the reference by the husband In
his deed to the tract ae bis former land, there
was nothing to show that any claim of right
or title to the land had been made by them.
or by their heirs, for nearly three-quarters
of a century, either by the exercise of acts
of ownership over It, such as Its oceupntion
or the use of Its products, or by leasing or

'
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elling it, or by the payment of taxes, or in

any other way. And, tor over 40 years after

the lapse of the three-quarters of a century,

the only claim of title made by the heirs of

the devisee to any portion of the 221/[acre

lot consisted in the tact that in 1835 they

brought an action against certain persons,

with whom the defendants were not in priv-

ity of title or ancestry, for the recovery of

another portion of the 221/4-acre parcel, which

action was discontinued in 1838 on account

of the poverty and pecuniary inability of the

heirs to carry it on; and in the tact that,

at varying intervals between 1826 and 1851'

(not 1858, as stated in one part of the record),

they had been in the habit, under such claim,

0! cutting wood thereon openly for family

use, and the manufacture of baskets, in

which business some of them were engaged,

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:07 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104925781
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

and carrying it to their homes; and that on

three occasions. once in 18-10, once in 1845,

selling it, or by the payment of taxes, or ln
any other way. And, for over 40 years after
the lapse of the three-quarters of a century,
tht- only claim of title made by the heirs of
the devisee to any portion of the 221A,-acre
lot consisted in the fact that In 1835 they
brought an action against certain persons,
with whom the defendants were not in prlvity ot title or ancestry, for the recovery of
another portion of the 221/.-acre parcel, which
action was discontinued in 1838 on account
of the poverty and pecuniary inability of the
helrs to carry it oa; and in the tact that.
at varying Intervals between 1826. and 1857
(not 1858, as stated m one pa.rt of the record),
they had been in the habit, under such claim,
of cutting wood thereon openly for family
use, and the manufacture of baskets, In
which business eome of them were engaged,
and carrying It to their homes; and that on
three occasions. once In 1840, once in 1845,
and once ln 1852, some of them in contemplation of taking legal proceedings to establish
their title, had gone around and upon the
land, and pointed out its boundaries.

(Cue No. 9&

When Ezekiel Fuller depat'ted from Smithfield, in 1761, he left two children, Francis
and Abigail, without means of support. and,
at a meeting of the town council In September following, proceedings were taken to
provide for them. In a resolution reciting
that "Ezekiel ls gone, we know not where;"
that his children were then and likely to be
chargeable to the town; that little or nothing of Ezekiel's estate was to be found to
support them, but that it was assumed there
was some estate belonging to him,-e. person
was appointed to ou.ke proper Inquiry and
search for It, ''to know what land there is
belonging to the family of said Ezekiel, and
secure the same fo1 the support of the children." It would seem that the person thus
appointed, reported that there was a piece
of land-a six-acre parcel-which wos possessed by Ezekiel In right of his wife; for
the town council, at a meeting In March,
1776, after reciting that there was nothing
of said Fuller's estate left behind to maintain his children but a small piece of lond.
and that no provision for their snpport <>onld

and once in 1852, some of them in contempla-

tion ot taking legal proceedings to establish

their title, had gone around and upon the

land, and pointed out its boundaries.

When Ezekiel Fuller departed from Smith-

ﬁeld, in 1761, he left two children, Francis

and Abigail, without means of support, and,

at a meeting of the town council in Septem-

ber followlng, proceedings were taken to

provide for them. In a resolution reciting

that “Ezekiel is gone, we know not where;"

that his children were then and likely to be

chargeable to the town; that little or noth-

ing of Ezekiel’s estate was to be found to

support them, but that it was assumed there

was some estate belonging to hini.—a person

was appointed to make proper inquiry and

search for it, “to know what land there is

belonging to the family of said Ezekiel, and

secure the same for the support of the chil-

dren." It would seem that the person thus

EZEKIEL Fut,LER.

appointed, reported that there was a piece

of land—a six-acre parce1—which was pos-
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sessed by Ezekiel in right of his wife; for

the town council, at a meeting in March,

1776, after reciting that there was nothing
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tain his children but a small piece of land,
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be had without the favor and authority of

the general assembly to sell and give a deed

of it, appointed one Edward Mowry to lay

the matter before the assembly, and request

that it would pass an act to enable some

proper person to dispose of the parcel, and

clothe him with authority to give a deed

thereof. Mowry presented a proper petition

to the assembly, which granted the prayer,

and empowered the town treasurer, with the

consent and advice of the town council, to

sell the land, and apply the money received

for the purpose stated; that is, the support

of the children. A sale of the six-acre lot

for £30 was accordingly made by the town

treasurer under the authority thus confer-

red.

Abigail, the wife of Ezekiel, left five chil-

dren surviving her, all of whom died before
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their father except Abigail, J r., who was one

of the two supported by the town. The

father, who disappeared from Smithﬁeld in

1761. died in the poor-house in Attleboro,

Massachusetts, in 1800. Abigail, the daugh-

ter, was born December 29, 1757; became of

age, December 29, 1778; and was married

to Benjamin Fuller, December 1, 1779. He

died in 1832, and she died in 1835 intestate.

The plaintiff is the grandson of this Abigail,

and the parties for whom he is trustee are

her other descendants. They all derive

whatever title they have from her.

On the twenty-fourth of May, 1874, a cen-

tury and eighteen years after the probate of

the will of Francis Richardson, all the heirs

of Abigail Fuller, except one. executed a

power of attorney to Theodore C. Fuller, also

one of said heirs, authorizing him to sell to

Nathan Fuller, the plaintiff in this action,

all their title and interest in the tract con-

veyed by James Reed to Francis Richardson

by deed dntcd April 10, 1750. ‘and devised to

Elizabeth Fuller, wife of Ezekiel, by his last

will and testament probated January 19,

1756, to hold the same upon trust to pros-

ecute to ﬁnal conclusion legal proceedings

necessary to recover possession of the prem-

ises. to employ counsel for that purpose, to

conduct the proceedings, and to make such

compromises of the grantors‘ claims as to

him and his counsel might seem best. The

same grantors, by their attorney, on the

same day, executed a deed of the same tract

of land to Nathan Fuller. reciting a consid-

eration of $10. upon trusts similar to those

contained in the power of attorney. Both

documents were duly acknowledged by the

grantors. The delivery of the deed was made

by the attorney in this way: He and the

grantee went upon the land with three other

persons, and while upon it he delivered the

deed to the grantee. He also took up some

earth in his hands, and passed it to the

grantee. This he had been instructed to do

by his counsel as the form of delivering pos-

session. The parties were about 15 minutes

on the land. There was no evidence of any

notice to or knowledge by the defendants
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be bad without the favor and authority of
the general aSBembly to sell and give a deed
of It, appointed one Edward llowry to lay
the matter before the aSBembly, and request
that 1t would pasa an act to enable some
proper person to dlspoee of the parcel, and
clothe him with autbonty to give a deed
thereof. Mowry presented a proper petition
to the a88embly, which granted the prayer,
and empowered the town treasurer, with the
consent and advice of the town council, to
sell the land, and apply the money received
for the purpose stated; that Is, the support
of the children. A 11ale of the &ix-acre lot
for .£80 was accordingly made by the town
treasurer under the authority thus conferred.
Abigail, the wife of Ezekiel, left ftve children surviving her, all of whom died before
their father except Ablgall, Jr., who was one
of the two supported by the town. The
father, who di111lppeared from Smithfield In
17tll, died In the poor-house In Attleboro,
!\lasRBchusetts, In 1800. Abigail, the dauirh·
ter, was born December 29, 1757; became of
age, Derember 29, 1778; and was married
to Benjamin Fuller, December l, 1779. He
died In 1832, and she died In 1835 Intestate.
The plaintiff Is the grandson of this Ablgull,
anll the parties for whom he 18 trustee are
her other descendants. They all derive
wbnte,·er title they have from her.
On the twenty-fourth of May, 1874, a century and eighteen years after the probate of
the will of Francis Richardson, all the heirs
of Abigail Fuller, except one, encuted a
power of attorney to Theodore C. Fuller, also
one of said heirs, authorizing him to sell to
Nathan Fuller, the plalntltr In this action,
all their title and lntere11t In the tract conveyed by James Reed to Francis Richardson
by d!'i'd datcd April 10, li50, .and devised to
Elizabeth l<'ullPr, wife of Ezekiel, by his last
will and tPstument probated January 19,
1756, to bold the same upon trust to prosecute to final conclusion legal proceedings
nC<'C'R!!lary to rPCovPr posseRslon of the premlllPR. to employ rouns<:>l for that purpose, to
<>onduet the pro(•<•P<llngs, and to make such
c•om1>romlRes of the grantore' claims as to
him and his coum1el might seem best. 'nle
same grantore, by their attorney, on the
RBme day, executed a deed of the same tract
of land to Nathan Fuller, reciting a considc>rntlon of •to. upon trusts similar to those
<><>ntalned In the powpr of attorney. Both
documlc'nts were duly acknowledged by the
grantors. The delivery of the deed was made
by the attorney In this way: He and the
Jtr&DtPe went upon the land with three other
Jl<'ri<onR, and whll<:> upon It hP delivered the
d<"<'ll to till' grant<>t>. He also took up some
earth In his bands, and passed It to the
grantee. This he bad been Instructed to do
by his counsel as the form of dellverlng posSf'sslon. The parties were about 15 minutes
on the land. Tlwre wae no evidence of any
notice to or knowledge by the defendants
268

of these acts, and they testttled that they had
neither. This 18 the case of the plaintiff,
briefly stated.
The defendants trace their title to the
land in question by continuous claim of title
from a deed of the 22%-acre parcel, made by
one Jeremiah Richardson, a grandson of the
testator, Francis Richardson, to Stephen
Jencks, dated April 8, 1768, containing full
covenants of title and warraney, and recorded lo the records of Smlthfteld on Joly
10th following. Jeremiah Richardson was
the son of Francis Richardson, who was a
son of the testator, and ls named In the will
as having died. Jeremiah had a brother also
called Francis Richardson, who died prior to
March, 1706. Stephen Jencks, by deed
dated August 12, 1796, containing full covenants of warranty. to secure l!E'veral notes.
amounting to $3,000, mortgaged the land In
controversy, with adjoining lands to which
he had acquired title, making In all 50 acres;
of which the 20-acre lot designated on the
diagram was one parcel, which he had purchased In 1763 for £MO, and the 6-acre lot,
also designated pn the diagram, was another parcel, which be had purchased In 1768
for £46. He died In 1800, leaving a will, by
which be devised bis real estate In Smltbfteld and elsewhPre to bis children. Stephen
Jen<'ks, Jr., bis son, acquired· the Interests
of the othf'r heirs, and by deed dated llay
18, 1804:, conveyed the whole, Including by
specltl.c description the land in controversy,
to his brother, Jerahmael Jencks, who was
the grandfather and ancestor In title of the
defendants. Other portions of the 22%-ac·re
parcel were conveyed by ancestors In title of
the defendants, by deeds to dlft'erent partl<>s, containing full covenants of title and
warranty, dated, respectively, April 12, 1841,
December 3, 1845, and May 21, 1860, and
they entered Into possession of the respective
parcels, and lnclosf'd and Improved them.
In May, 184i4, tbe father of the defendants,
from whom they derive their title, surveyed
and platted into town lots the remaining portion of that parcel, being the land in controversy. In the partition of the estate of
the grandfather, Jerabmael Jencks, between
his heirs at law, In 1824, this land bad been
taken by him as part of his estate, and platted as such In the partition plat. He died In
1866.
The land was not lnclosed on the line of the
turnpike. In 1sas a fence wllB put up on the
westerly side by an adjoining owner. On the
southerly Ride there was at one time a fence
running from the turnpike westerly to the
other side of the ledge hereafter mentioned.
but It dl.snJ>peared In 18.1.J. On the north<:>rly
line there was only a brush-fern-e until 1&li.
wh·~n a purchaser of adjoining land cn'<'ted
one. The land has never been put umlt-r
cultivation. Prior to 1858 It wns covered
with wood, and every year from 1829 to 1857
the ancestors of the defendants cut wood upon It for fumlly use. In 1857 the father of

PRESUMPTIONS IN (}ENERA.L.
PRESUMPTIONS IN GEN ERAL.
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the defendants cut and applied to his use all

the wood of value then remaining. The land

had an extensive ledge of rock running across

its center from north to south, which was

opened by defendants’ ancestors as early as

1835. In 184-5 or 18-L6 large quantities of

stone were quarried and sold by them to

railroad companies; and from that time down

to the trial, with longer or shorter intervals,

never of more than a year or two, the ledge

was worked more or less extensively by the

defendants or their ancestors in title, or their

lessees and tenants, and the stone removed.

There is no evidence that any other person

had ever worked the ledge, or taken stone

oﬁ the land, or attempted to do so. The fa-

ther of the defendants put up a sign on the

laud, stating that all persons were forbidden

from taking wood or stone from it. In 1360
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or 1861 his lessee built a barn and tool-shed

on the land near the ledge, for his use in

quarrying; these structures being in full view

from Broad street, formerly the turnpike.

He also dug a well, from which he obtained

water for his business. The barn, with lofts

for hay. was of sufficient capacity “to accom-

modate, and did accommodate, six or eight

horsa, or more." It remained on the land,

with some additions, until some time in 1869,

when it was removed by the lessee. The

land was assessed for taxes to the ancestors

in title of the defendants, and paid by them,

for 20 years, between 1770 and 1805. The

tax-lists for the other years up to 1805 could

not be found. From 1805 to the time of the

trial, a period of 77 years, the land was as-

sessed to them, and the taxes were paid by

them. The statute of Rhode Island respect-

ing the assessment of taxes. in fo1'ce be-

tween 1798 and 1825, required the assessors

to assess taxes on real estate to persons who

held and occupied it. and the one in force

between 182-'5 and 1855 required them to as-

sess the taxes. to those who held and occupied

it, or to the owners thereof, and the one in

force after 1.855, to the owners thereof. No

taxes were ever assessed to the Fullers, or

paid by them. Neither plaintiff nor defend-

ants, nor their ancestors, ever resided on the

premises, and the land was occupied and pos-

sessed by the ancestors in title of the defend-

ants only in the way mentioned. .

Upon the case thus presented, and we have

not omitted. we think, any material circum-

stance in the statement, the defendants asked

an instruction to the jury as to the presump-

tion they might make of a lost grant to their

ancestor in title. which the court refused.

Its charge was thus: “Of course, gentlemen,

if you ﬁnd that you can presume a grant, if

you find from the testimony that there was

a lost deed which passed from Abigail Fuller

to Jeremiah Richardson, or to Francis Rich-

ardson, and the property was inherited by

Jeremiah, so that Jeremiah had a good title

to convey to Stephen Jencks, that makes the

title of the defendants here complete. * * *

But, gentlemen, you are to look into the evi-

the defendants cut and applied to his uae all
the wood of value then remaining. The land
had an extensive ledge of rock running acroes
its center trom north to eouth, which was
opened by defendants' ance11tors as early as
1835. In 1845 or 1846 large quantities of
stone were quarried and sold by them to
ralll'Ofld companies; and from that time down
to the trial, with longer or shorter intervals,
never of more than a year or two, the ledge
wns worked more or less extensively by the
defendants or their ancestors in title, or their
lessees and tenants, and the stone removed.
There ls no evidence that any other person
had ever worked the ledge, or taken stone
off the land, or attempted to do so. The father of the defendants put up a sign on the
land, stating that all persons were forbidden
from taking wood or stone from It. In 1860
or 1861 his lessee built a barn and tool-shed
on the land near the ledge, for his use In
quarrying; these structures being in full view
from Broad street, formerly the turnpike.
He also dug a well, from which he obtained
water tor his buslnees. The barn, with lofts
tor hay, was of suftl.clent capacity "to accommodate, and did accommodate, six or eight
horses, or more." It remained on the land,
with some additions, until some time in 1869,
when It was removed by the lee.see. The
land was assessed for taxes to the ancestors
in title of the defendants, and paid by them,
tor 20 years, between 1770 and 1805. The
tax-llflts tor the other years up to 1805 could
not be found. From 1800 to the time of the
trial, a period of 77 years, the land was assessed to them, and the taxes were paid by
them. The statute of Rhode Island respecting the assessment of taxes, lo force between 1798 and 1825, required the asse980l'8
to asseM taxes on re&! estate to persons who
held and occupied lt, and the one In force
between 1825 and 1855 required them to aslleBIJ the taxes. to those who held and occupied
It, or to the owners thereof, and the one in
force after 1855, to the owners thereof. No
taxes were ever aB!lessed to the F'ullers, or
paid by them. Neither plalntltr nor defendants, nor thelr ancestors, ever resided on the
premises, and the land was occupied and possessed by the ancestors In title of the defendants only in the way mentioned. .
Upon the case thus presented, and we have
not omitted. we think, any material cll"<'umetance In the statement, the defendants asked
an Instruction to the jury as to the presumption they might make of a lost grant to their
ancestor In title. which the court refused.
Its eharge was thus: "Of course, gentlemen,
It you flnd that you ean presume a grant, if
you find from the testimony that there was
a lost deed which passed from Abigail l!'uller
to Jeremiah Richardson, or to l•'rnncls Richardson, and the property was inherited by
Jeremiah, so that Jeremiah had a good title
to convey to Stephen ,Jencks, that makes the
title of the defenduntB here complete. • • •
But, gentlemen, you are to look into the evl-
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dence upon this question of a grant, and, If
the evidence in favor of the presumption Is
overcome by the e\'"ldence against such a
grant, then, of course, you will not presume
one. It le a question of testimony."
The defendants requested the court to Instruct the jury "that the presumption they
were authorized to make of a lost deed was
not necessarily restricted to what may fairly
be supposed to have occurred, but rather to
what may have occurred and seems requisite
to quiet title In the possessor." This Instruction the court refused to give, or to modify
its chal"ge In conformity with it. The defendants now contend that the court thus
erred, its charge being, In effect, that, in order to presume a lost deed, the jury must be
satisfied that such a deed had In tact actually
existed. Such seems to us to be the purport
of the charge, and therein there was error.
In such cases, "presumptions," as said by
Sir William Grant, "do not always proceed
on a belief that the thing presumed has actually taken place. Grants are frequently presumed, as I..ord. Mansfield says, mel"ely from
a prlnclple, and for the purpose of quieting
the possession. There le as much occasion
for presuming conveyances of legal estates;
as otherwise titles must often be imperfect,
and in mlllly cases unavailable, when from
length of time It has become Impossible to
discover in whom the legal estate (If outstanding) ls already vested." Hlllary v. Waller.
12 Vee. 239, 252; Eldridge v. Knott, Cowp.
215.

The owners of property, especially it it be
valuable and avallable, do not often allow it
to remain · 1n the quiet and unquestioned enjoyment of others. Such a course ls not in
accordance with the ordinary conduct of
men. When, therefore, poseesslon and use
are long continued, they create a presumption
of lawful ongtn; that Is, that they are founded upon such Instruments and proceedlng8 as
In law would puss the right to the possession
and use of the property. It may be, in point
of fact, that permission to occupy and use
was given orally, or upon a contract of sale
with promise of a future conveyance, which
parties have snbeequently neglected to obtain,
or the conveyance execute1i may not have
been acknowledged so as to be recorded, or
may have been mislaid or lost. l\lnny circumstances may prevent the execution of a
deed of conveyance to which the occupant of
land ls entitled, or may lead to Its loss after
being executed. It ls a matter of almost
dally experience that reconveyances of propel"ty, transfecred by the owners upon conditions or trusts, are often delayed after the
conditions are pel"formed or the trusts discharged, simply because of the pressure of
other engagements, and a conviction that
they can be readlly obtained at any time.
The death of parties may leave In the
hands of executors or helr!l papers eonstltutlng munlments of title, of the value of which
the latter way have no knowledge, and there269
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fore for the preservation and record of which

may take no action; and thus the documents

may be deposited in places exposed to decay

and destruction. Should they be lost, wit-

nesses of their execution, or of contracts for

their execution, may not be readily found, or,

if found, time may have so impaired their

recollection of the transactions that they can

only be imperfectly recalled, and of course

imperfectly stated. The law, in tenderness

to the iniirmities of human nature, steps in,

and by reasonable presumptions that acts to

protect one’s rights which might have been

done, and in the ordinary course of things

generally would be done, have been done, in

the particular case under consideration, af-

fords the necessary protection against possi-

ble failure to obtain or preserve the proper

muniments of title, and avoids the necessity
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of relying upon the fallible memory of wit-

nesses, when time may have dimmed their

recollection of past transactions, and thus

gives peace and quiet to long and uninter-

rupted possessions.

The rule of presumption, in such cases, as

has been well said, is one of policy, as well

as of convenience, and necessary for the peace

and security of society. “Where one uses an

easement whenever he sees ﬁt, without ask-

ing leave and without objection,” say the

supreme court of Pennyivania, “his adverse

and uninterrupted enjoyment for twenty-one

years is a title which cannot afterwards be

disputed. Such enjoyment, without evidence

to explain how it began, is presumed to have

been in pursuance of a full and unqualiﬁed

grant.” Garrett v. Jackson, 20 Pa. St. 335.

The same presumption will arise whether

the grant relate to corporeal or incorporeal

hereditaments. As said by this court in Ri-

card v. Williams, 7 Wheat. 108, speaking by

Mr. Justice Story: “A grant of land may as

well be presumed as a grant of a ﬁshery, or

of a common, or of a way. Presumpiions of

this nature are adopted from the general in-

ﬁrmity of human nature, the diﬁiculty of

preserving muniments of title, and the pub-

lic policy of supporting long and uninter-

rupted possessions. ‘They are founded upon

the consideration that the facts are such as

could not, according to the ordinary course

of human affairs, occur, unless there was a

transmutation of title to, or an admission of

an existing adverse title in, the party in pos-

session.”

It is not necessary, therefore, in the cases

mentioned. for the jury, in order to presume

a conveyance, to believe that a conveyance

was in point of fact executed. It is suffi-

cient if the evidence leads to the conclusion

that the conveyance might have been execut-

ed, and that its existence would be a solu-

tion of the difficulties arising from its non-

cxecution. In Edson v. Munsell, 10 Allen,

557. which was an action for obstructing the

cnjo_vment of an easement, the doctrine of

acquiring such rights by prescription or ad-

verse possession is elaborately considered;
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fore for the preserratlon and record of which
may take no action; and thus the documents
may be depOBlted In places expOBed to decay
and destruction. Should they be lost, witnesses of their execution, or of contracts for
their execution, may not be readily found, or,
If found, time may have so impaired their
recollection of the transactions that they can
only be Imperfectly recalled, and of c<>urse
Imperfectly stated. The law, In tenderness
to the Infirmities of human natul"(>, Rtf'ps In,
and by reasonable presumptions that acts to
protect one's rights which might have been
done, and In the ordinary course of things
generally would be done, have been done, in
the p8.rtlcular case under consideration, affords the necessary protection against Jl0881ble failure to obtain or preserve the proper
munlments of title, and avoids the necessity
of relying upon the fallible memory of wit·
ne88e8, when time may have dimmed their
recollection of past transactions, and thus
gives peace and quiet to long and uninterrupted possessions.
The rule of presumption, in such cases, as
has been well said, 18 one of policy, as well
as of conyenlence, and necessary for the peace
and security of 80C'lety. "Where one uses an
easement whenever he sees flt, without asking leave and without objection," says the
supreme court of Pennsylvania, "his adverse
nnd uninterrupted enjoyment for twenty-one
yf'ars Is a title which cannot afterwards be
·disputed. Such enjoyment, without evidence
to explain how It bei:an, Is presumed to have
been In pursuance of a full and unqualified
grant." Garrett v. Jackson, 20 Pa. St. 335.
The same presumption will arise whether
the grant relate to corporeal or Incorporeal
beretlltaments. As said by this court In Ricard Y. Williams. 7 Wheat. 108, speaking by
Mr..Justice Story: "A grant of land may as
well be prE>sumed as a grant of a fishery, or
of a ('ommon, 01· of a wuy. Presumptions of
this nature are adopted from the general infirmity of human nature, the dlfHculty of
preserving munlments of title, and the public policy of supporting long and unlnter·
rupted possessions. They are foundE>d upon
the consideration that the facts are such as
could not, according to the ordinary course
of human alfall"!I, occur, unless there was a
transnmtntion of title to, or an admission of
an existing adverse title In, the 1iarty In possession."
It ls not necessary, therefore, In the cases
mentioned, for the jury, In order to presume
a com·eyance, to believe that a co11YE>yance
waR In point of fact executed. It ls sufft<'i<'nt If the eYlden<'e leads to the conclusion
that the conveynn<'e might haye been executed, and that Its exlstE>nce would be a solution of the dlfft<'ultles arising from its nonexeeutlon. In Edson v. Munsell, 10 Allen,
5;;7, which was an action for obstructing the
enjoyment of an ea8<'ment, the doctrine of
nc·qulring llU<'h rlithts by pres<'rlptlon or ad·
verse possession ls elaborately considered;
210

and It ls there said that "the flctlon of presuming a grant from twenty years' poeseeston
or use was Invented by the English courts In
the eighteenth century to avoid the absurd·
ftles of tbelr rule of legal memory, and was
derived by analogy from the limitation prescribed by the statute of 21 Jae. I. c. 21, for
actions of ejectment. It ls not founded on a
belief that a grant has actually been made
In the particular case, but on the general
presumption that a man will naturally enjoy
what belongs to him, the dlfHculty of proof
after lapse of time, and the policy of not disturbing loog-continued poBBeBSlons."
In Casey's Lessee v. Inloes, 1 GUI, 503,
whl<'h was an action of ejectment, the court
of appeals of Maryland held that, where there
had been a continuous posseMlon of land for
20 years or upwards, by a party, or persons
claiming under him, the court was authorized
to Instruct the jury, In the absence of a deed
to such p8.rty, to presume that one had been
executed to him. It also approved the refusal of the court below to Instruct the jury
that before they could ftnd a title in the defendants, or any one of them, by presumption of a grant by the plaintUf or those under
whom he claims, they must believe on their
consciences, and find as a blct, that such
grant was actually made. "The granting of
such a prayer," said the court, "would have
a tendency to mislead the jury, by Inducing
them to believe that a presumption of a grant
could not be made unle88 the jury in point of
fact believed In the execution of the grant;
whereas It ls frequently the duty of the jury
to find such presumption as an Inference of
law, although in their COJlS('lences they may
disbelieve the actual execution of any such
grant."
In Williams v. Donell, 2 Head, 695, 698,
which was also an action of ejectment, the
supreme court of Tennessee, speaking on the
same point, said: '"It ls not indispensable,
In order to lay a proper foundation for the
legal presumption of a grant, to establlah
the probability of the fact that In reality &
grant ever Issued. It will be & suftlclent
ground for the presumption to show that by
legal possibility a grant might have lssut>d,
and, this appearing, It may be assumed, ln
the absence of clrcumstan<'es repelllng such
conclusions, that all that might lawfully
have been done to perfect the legal title was
In fact done, and in the form prescribed by
law."
In accordance with the doctrine thus expll<'ltly declared, thlf're <'an be no doubt that
the court below should l1ave Instructed the
jury as requested. It would seem from the
Instruction given that the deed which the
defendants insisted might be presumed was
one from Ezekiel and Abigail Fuller, or
from Abigail Fullf'r to Jeremiah Itlchardson. We think. howE>Yer, that the facts
point with equal dlrf'ctness to 11 conYeyan('C
from hts grandfatlier. The codicil to hlK
wlll, by which he devised the property to his
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married daughter, was dated several years

before his death, and there was no evidence

that he was seized of it at that time, except

the presumption arising from his having once

possessed it. It does not appear that either

the devisee or her husband ever exercised

any acts of ownership in any way, or ever

claimed to own it. After he left Smithﬂeld,

two of his children were supported by the

town; and the agent of the town, appointed

to search for any property belonging to the

father, from the sale of which the children

might be supported, reported that there was

only the six-acre parcel, which’ was held by

him in the right of his wife. He afterwards

went to the poor-house, where he died in

1800. During the 39 years after he left

Smithﬁeld, and notwithstanding his having

been part of that time in the poor-house, no
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word appears to have come from him assert-

ing that he had any interest in the property.

It is diﬂicult to reconcile his conduct or that

of his wife, the devisee, if in truth the testa-

tor continued the owner of the property until .

his death, and it passed under the codicil

to his will. \Vhile Ezekiel Fuller was still

living, and for several years after he had left

Smithtield, Jeremiah Richardson, the tes-

tator's grandson, asserted ownership of the

tract by its sale to Stephen J encks by a deed

with covenants of title and warranty, which

was recorded in the town records. No word

of opposition to this sale, or to the subse-

quent mortgage of the property by the gran-

tee, was ever made, so far as the record dis-

closes. The fact that Jeremiah Richardson

was a minor when his grandfather died does

not militate against the presumption of a

deed to him. Nothing would be more natural

than a deed of gift from the grandfather to

the grandson. It would also seem from the

charge of the court that in the deed from

Jeremiah to Jencks he recited that the prop-

erty had come from his honored grandfather,

or words to that effect.

If, however, the evidence which, as the

record says, tended toshow that the devisee

and her hrusband entered into the posses-

sion of the property devised, and the recital

in his deed of April 11, 1761, of the 20-acre

parcel, that it was bounded on the north by

his former land, can be considered as re-

butting the presumption of suclr a deed by

the testator, then the defendants may fall

back on the presumption of a deed to Jere-

miah Richardson by Ezekiel and Abigail

Fuller, the devlsee, and her husband. There

is nothing in the conduct or language of ei-

ther of these parties which in any way re-

pels such a presumption. Their silence and

non-claim of the property would rather in-

dicate that they had parted with their in-

terest. The minority of Jeremiah at the time

only shows his inability to purchase the prop-

erty; but those under whose charge he was,

could have purchased it for him. and had

the deed executed to him. His orphanage

may have induced such a proceeding. We

married daughter, was dated several years
~fore his death, and there was no evidence
that he was seized of It at that time, except
the presumption a1·islng from bis having once
possessed it. It does not appear that either
the devlsee or her husband ever exercised
any acts of ownersbip In any way, or ever
claimed to own it. .After he left 8mithfteld,
two of his children were supported by the
town; and the agent of the town, appointed
to sea.rcll' for any property belonging to the
father, from the sale of which the children
might be supported, reported that there was
only the six-acre parcel, which' was held by
him in the right of his wife. Ile afterwards
went to the poor·bonse, where be died in
1800. During the 39 years after he left
Smithfield, and notwithstanding his ho.vlng
been part of that time In the poor-house, no
word appears to have come from him asserting that he had any interest In the property.
It ls difficult to reconcile hie conduct or that
of his wife, the devisee, If In truth the testator continued the owner of the property until
his death, and It paRsed under the codicil
to his will. While E?..eklel Fuller was still
living, and for several years after he had left
Smithfield, Jeremiah Richardson, the testator's grandson, asserted ownership of the
tract by Its sale to Stephen Jencks by a deed
with covenants of title and warrnnty, which
was recorded In the town records. ~o word
of opposition to tb~s sale, or to the subsequent mortgage of the property by the grantee, was ever madl', so far as the record discloses. The fact that Jl'r<>mlah Richardson
was a minor when his grnmltath<>r died does
not militate against the prl'sumption of a
deed to him. Nothing would be more natuml
tbnn a deed of gift from the grandfather to
the grandson. It would also seem from the
charge of the court that In the deed from
Jeremiah to Jencks be rl'clted that the property bad come from bis honored grandfather,
or words to that effect.
It, however, the evidencl' wbleh, as the
record says, tended to· show that the devlsee
and her husband entered Into the possession of the property d(>vl11ed, nnd the recital
in hie deed of April 11, liGl, of the 20-acre
parel?l, that It was boumkcl on the north by
his former land, can be considered as rebutting the presumption of 1meh· a <leed by
the tPstntor, then the dPfPmlauts may fnll
ba<'k on the presumption of a dee<l to .Jeremiah Ri<'hardson by Ezekiel and Abigail
Fuller, the devlsee, and her husband. There
Is nothing In the condu<'t or language of el·
ther of these partleR whif'h In auy way r<>J:X>ls RU<'h a prrsnmption. Tlwit• sllrn<'e and
non-claim of the property would rather Indicate that they hod ported with their lntt>rest. The minority of Je1·emioh at the time
only shows his Inability to pnr<'hn11e thr property; but those under whose ehnrge he was.
could ban~ pur<'l11111ed It for him. and hnd
the dt>ed executed to him. Hi~ orphnnnge
may have Induced 1mch a proceeding. 'Ye
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do not, therefore, think that his minority at
the time can be urged agalnst the presumption of a deed to him.
For the refusal of the court below to give
the Instruction requested, the case must go
back for a new trial. We will add, moreover, that though a presumption of a deed
le one that may be rebutted by proof of
facts inconsistent with its supposed existence, yet where no such facts are shown,
and the things done, and the things omitted,
with regard to the property In controversy,
by the respective parties, for long periods of
time after the execution of the supposed
conveyance, can be explained satisfactorily
only upon the hypothesis ot its existence,
then the jury may be Instructed that It Is
their duty to presume such a conveyance,
and thus quiet the possession. How long a
period must elapse after the date of the supposed conveyance before it may be presumed to have existed has not always been
a matter of easy determination. "In general," said this court, speaking by Mr. Justice
Story, "It ls the policy of courts of law to
limit the presumption of grants to periods
analogous to those of the statute of limitations in cases where the statute does not
apply. But when the statute applies, it constitutes ordinarily a sufficient title or defense lndep<>ndently of any presumption of
a grant, and therefore It ls not generally
resorted to. But, It the circumstances ot the
case justify it, a presumption of a grant may
ns well be made In the one case as In the
other; and, when the other circumstances
are very cogent and full, there Is no absolute
bar against the presumption of a grant within a pPrlod short of the statute ot limitations." Ricard v. Wllllams, 7 Wheat. 59, 110.
The general statement of the doctrine, as
we have seen from the authorities cited, Is
that the presumption ot a grant ls indulged
merely to quiet a long possession which
might otherwise be disturbed by reason of
the Inability of the poRsessor to produce the
munlments of title which were actually given at the time of the acquisition of the property by him or those under whom Ile claims,
but have been lost, or which he 01· they wen•
entitled to have at thnt time, but bad
neglected to obtain, and of which the witnesses ha>e passed away, or their recollel'tlon of the transaction has be<>ome dimmed
and Imperfect; and ln•nc<', ns a general rule,
It Is only wh<'re the llOSses.<1ion has been
a<>tual. open, nnd exdnsl\·e for the pPrlod
prescrlbell by the statute of limitations to
har an action for the reeovery of lnnd, that
the presumption of n deed can be Invoked.
But the reason for attaching stwh weight to
a posseRslon of this character Is the notorietr
It gh'e~ to th<' claim of the occupant; and.
In <'Otmtries where land ls gen<'rnlly occupied
or cultivated, It is the most effective motle of
asserting ownership. But, as Mr. Justice
Story oh11erve!l In delivering the opinion or
this court In Grren v. Liter, 8 Cr:mch, 2411:
271
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“In the simplicity of ancient times there

were no means of ascertaining titles but by

the visible seizin, and, indeed, there was no

other mode between subjects of passing

title but livery of the land itself by the sym-

bolical delivery of turf and twig. The mo-

ment that a tenant was thus seized he had

a perfect investiture, and, if ousted, could

maintain his action for the realty, although

he had not been long enoughl in possession

even to touch the esplees. The very object

of the rule, therefore, was notoriety; to pre-

vent frauds upon the land, and upon the

other tenants.” There may be acts equally

notorious, and therefore equally evincive of

ownership, which, taken in connection with

a long possession, even if that possession has

been subject to occasional intrusion, are as

fully suggestive of rightful origin as an un-
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interrupted possession. Where any propri-

etary right is exercised for a long period,

which, if not founded upon a lawful origin,

would in the usual course of things be re-

sisted by parties interested, and no such re-

sistance is made, a presumption may be in-

dulged that the proprietary right had a law-

ful origin. The principle is thus stated by

Mr. Justice Stephen, of the high court of jus-

tice of England, in his Digest of the Law

of Evidence, using the term “grant" in a

general sense, as indicating a conveyance of

real property, whether corporeal or incor-

poreal: “When it has been shown that any

person has, for a long period of time, ex-

ercised any proprietary right which might

have had a lawful origin by grant or license

from the crown, or from a private person,

and the exercise of which might and natural-

ly would have been prevented by the persons

interested, if it had not had a lawful origin,

there is a presumption that such righ-t had a

lawful origin, and that it was created by a

proper instrument which has been lost.” Ar-

ticle 100.

This presumption may therefore, in some

instances, be properly invoked where a pro-

prietary right has long been exercised. ai-

though the exclusive possession of the whole

property to which the right is asserted may

have been occasionally interrupted during

the period necessary to create a title by ad-

verse possession, if in addition to the actual

possession, there were other open acts of

ownership. If the interruptions did not im-

pair the uses to which the possessor sub-

jected the property, and for which it was

chieﬂy valuable, they should not necessarily

be held to defeat the presumption of the

rightful origin of his claim to which the

facts would otherwise lead. It is a matter

"In the simplicity of ancient times there
were no means of ascertaining titles but by
the visible seizin, and, Indeed, there was no
other mode between subjects of pll88lng
title but livery of the land Itself by the symbolical delivery of turf and twig. The moment that a tenant was thus seized he had
a perfect Investiture. and, If ousted, could
maintain his action for the realty, although
he had not been long enough In possession
even to touch the esplees. The very object
of the rule, therefore, was notoriety; to pre\"ent frauds upon the land, and upon the
other tenants." There may be acts equally
notorious, and therefore equally evlnclve of
ownership, which, taken In connection with
a long possession, even If that possession has
been subject to occasional Intrusion, are as
fully suggestl\"e of rightful origin as an uninterrupted posseSBlon. Where any proprietary right ls exerdsed for a long period,
wblC'h, If not founded upon a lawful origin,
would In the usual course of things be resisted by parties Interested, and no such resistance ls made, a presumption may be indulged that the proprietary right had a lawful origin. The principle ls thus stated by
Mr. Justice Stephen, of the high court of justice of England, In bis Digest of the Law
of Evidence, using the term "grant" In a
general sense, as Indicating a conveyance of
real property, whether corporeal or Incorporeal: "When It has been shown that any
person has, for a long period of time, exercised any proprietary right which might
have had a lawful origin by grant or license
from the crown, or from a private person,
and the exercise of which might and naturally would have been prevented by the persons
not had a lawful origin,
Interested, If It
tbere ls a presumption that such right had a
lawful origin, and that It was created by a
proper Instrument which has been lost." Article 100.
This presumption may therefore, In some
Instances, be properly invoked where a proprietary right has long been exercised, although the exclusive possession of the whole
property to which the right ls asserted may
have been occasionally Interrupted during
the period necessary to create a title by adverse possession, if In addition to the actual
possession, there were other open acts of
ownership. If the Interruptions did not Impair the uses to which the posseMor subjected the property, and for which lt was
chle11.y valuable, they should not necessarily
be held to defeat the presumption of the
rightful origin of his claim to which the
facts would otherwise lead. It ls a matter
which, under proper Instructions, may be
left to the jury.
In the present case. acts of ownership over
the property In controversy by the ancestors In title of the defendants, so far as they
could be manifested by written transfers of
It. either ns C'onYeynnces of title or by way
of security, were exercised from 1768 for

nad

which, under proper instructions, may be

left to the jury.

In the present case, acts of ownership over

the property in controversy by the ances-

tors in title of the defendants, so far as they

could be manifested by written transfers of

it. either as conveyances of title or by way

of security, were exercied from 1768 for
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more than a century. The ftnt conveyance,
from which the defendants trace their Utle.
was duly recorded In the land records of the
town soon after Its execution In that year.
The all8eBBment of taxes on the property to
those ancestors, and their payment of the
taxes for 20 years between 1770 and 1805,
and the asseBBment of taxes to them or to
the defendants for 77 years after 180j, and
the payment of the taxes by them, such assessment being required to be made, under
the lawa of the state, to occupants or owners of the land, are circumstances of great
significance, taken In connection with their
constantly asserted ownership. In Ewing
v. Burnet this court speaks of the uninterrupted payment of taxes on a lot for 24 consecutive years as "powerful evidence of
claim of right to the whole lot." 11 Pet M.
Here, as seen, the taxes were uninterruptedly paid by the defendants or their ancestol'B
In title for a much longer period.
In St. Louts Public ·Schools v. Rlsley•s
Heirs the supreme court of Missouri said:
"Payment of taxes has been admitted in
questions of adverse possession, and may
have an Important bearing, 88 it is not usual
for one owning realty to neglect paying taxes for a period which would be sufticlent to
constitute a bar under the statute of limitations, or for one to pay taxes having no
claim or color of title." 40 Mo. 370.
In Davis v. Easley, which was an action
of ejectment, the supreme court of Illlnolll
held that receipts tor taxes paid by the
plalntltr were admissible, and said: "The
payment of taxes Indicated that the plalntUf
claimed title to the whole tract. It likewise tended to explain the character and extent of his possession." 13. Ill. 201.
In this case the ancestors of the defendants entered upon the land under claim of
title, and opened and worked the ledge of
rock running through it 88 early as 183S,
and from 1846 they or their tenants or lessees continued, with occasional intervals, to
work that ledge to the time of trial, In 1882.
a period of 36 years; and It does not appear
that during that time any one ever interfered with their work, or complained ot Jt.
To constitute an adverse possession, It-was
not necessary that they should have actually occupied or lnclosed the land. It was sufficient that they subjected It to such uses
as It was susceptible of, to .the exclusion of
others. Ellicott v. ·Pearl, 10 Pet. 442. That
subjection might be shown by the quarrying of the ledge and the removal of the
stone without disturbance or complaint from
any quarter. The exclusive work.Ing of the
quarry, under claim of title to the whole
traC't by virtue of conveyances In which It
was described, might operate In law to carry
the possession over the whole; and the payment of taxes thereon might authorize the
jury to Infer a continuous possession of the
whole. notwithstanding any, temporary and
occasional Intrusion by others upon a differ-
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ent part of the tract, which did not interfere

with the work.

The entry of the plaintiff with the attorney

of his co-heirs, in 1874, and the delivery of

the deed to him with a handful of earth, if

weight and consideration are to be given to

that proceeding under the circumstances in

which it was made, would only reduce the

period of undisturbed possession to 28 years.

The cutting of wood on a diﬁerent portion of

the land by the Fullers for family use, or

the manufacture of baskets, at occasional

intervals during a portion of this period.

though competent for the consideration of

the jury, was not necessarily an interruption

to the peaceable occupation of the land, so

far as quarrying of the ledge and the remov-

al of the stone were concerned, to which

uses the defendants and their ancestors in
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title subjected it, and which appear to have

constituted its principal value. Nor did it

necessarily change the legal effect of the

possession for quarrying the ledge with the

attendant claim to the whole tract.

In Webb v. Richardson, the supreme court

of Vermont, in speaking of interruptions in

the actual occupancy of real property as af-

fecting the claim of continuous possession,

said: “To constitute a continuous possession,

it is not necessary that the occupant should

be actually upon the premises continually.

The mere fact that time intervenes between

successive acts of occupancy does not nec-

essarily destroy the continuity of the pos-

session. The kind and frequency of the acts

of occupancy necessary to constitute a con-

tinuous possession depend somewhnt on the

condition of the property, and the uses to

which it is adapted in reference to the cir-

cumstances and situation of the possessor,

and partly on his intention. If, in the in-

termediate time between the different acts

of occupancy, there is no existing intention

to continue the possession. or to return to

the enjoyment of the premises, the posses-

sion, if it has not ripened into a title, ter-

minates, and cannot afterwards be connect-
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ed with a subsequent occupation so as to be

made available towards gaining title; while

such continual intention might, and general-

ly would, preserve the possession unbroken."

42 Vt. 465-473. That was an action of tres-

pass for cutting timber on the land of the

plaintiff, who was in possession at the time,

and offered testimony to prove that his pos-

session was earlier than the dei’endaut’s,

and also that he had acquired the land by 15

years’ adverse possession. The defendant

did not show a chain of title back to the

original proprietor of the land, but showed

that his grantors entered into possession in

1835, and cut timber and claimed to own the

land; and it was held that the question

whether this entry interrupted the plaintiffs

possession should have been submitted to

the jury under proper instructions, in con-

nection with the plaintiff's evidence of con-

ent part of the tract, which did not Interfere
with the work.
The entry of the plaintiff with the attorney
of his co-heirs, In 1874, and the delivery of
the deed to him with a handful of earth, If
weight and consideration are to be given to
tbat proceeding under the circumstances In
which It was made, would only reduce the
period of undisturbed possession to 28 years.
The cutting of wood on a different portion of
the land by the Fullers for family use, or
the manufacture of baskets, at occasional
Intervals during a portion of this period,
though competent for the consideration of
the jury, was not necessarily an interruption
to the peaceable occupation of the land, so
far as quarrying of the ledge and the removal of the stone were concerne<I, to which
uses the defendants and their ancestors In
title subjected It, and which appear to have
constituted Its principal value. Nor did It
necessarily change the legal effect of the
possession for quarrying the ledge with the
attendant claim to the whole tract.
In Webb v. Rl~hardson, the supreme court
of Vermont, In speaking of Interruptions In
the actual occupancy of real property as affecting the claim of continuous possession,
Bald: "To constitute a continuous possession,
It ls not necessary that the occupant should
be actually upon the premises continually.
The mere fact that time Intervenes between
succeMlve acts of occupancy does not necesaarlly destroy the continuity of the possession. The kind and frequency of the acts
of occupancy necessary to constitute a continuous posse88fon depend somewhat on the
condition of the property, and the uses to
wblch It Is adapted In reference to the circumstances and situation of the possessor,
and partly on his Intention. If, In the Intermediate time between the dll'ferent acts
of occupancy, there ls no existing Intention
to continue the possession, or to return to
the enjoyment of the premises, the possession. If It has not ripened Into a title, terminates, and cannot afterwards be conneetWILGUS,Bv.-18
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ed with a subsequent occupation so as to be
made available towards gaining title; while
such continual Intention might, and generally would, preserve the possession unbroken."
42 Vt. 465-473. That was an action of trespass for cutting timber on the land of the
plaintiff, who was In possession at tbe time,
and offered testimony to prove that his possession was earlier than the defendant's,
and also that he had acquired the land by 15
years' adverse possession. The defendant
did not show a chain of title back to thft
original proprietor of tbe land, but showed
that bis grantors entered into possession in
1&%, and cut timber and claimed to own the
land; and It was held that the question
whether this entry Interrupted the plaintiff's
possession should have been submitted to
the jury under proper Instructions, in connection with the plalntll'f's evidence of con·
tlnuous possession under those through
'\\'hom be claimed, and that It was error to
refuse to submit It.
Our conclusion ls that the claim to the
land In controversy by the defendants and
their ancestors In title for over a century,
with the payment of taxes thereon, and acts
of ownership suited to the condition of the
property, and Its actual use for 36 or 28
years, it matters not which, would justify a.
presumption of a deed to the original ancestor, Jeremiah Richardson, to quiet the possession of the defendants claiming under
him, and the jury should have been permitted to presume such a deed without finding
from the testimony that there was In point
of fact a deed which was lost. If the execution of a deed was established, nothing
further would be required than proof of Its
contents; there would be no occasion for the
exercise of any presumption on the subject.
It Is only where there Is uncertainty on this
point that the presumption Is Indulged to
quiet the possession.
The judgment of the court below must be
reversed, and the cause remanded for a new
trial.
273
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R. CORP. et al.
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R. CORP. v. BOSTON & L.
R. CORP. et al.
(10 Sup. Ct. 1004, 136 U. S. 356.)
Supreme Court of the United States. :May 19,
1800.

Supreme Court of the United States. May 19,

1890.

Appeal from the circuitcourt of the Unit-

.ed States for the district of Massachusetts.

APl'l'al from the circuit court of the Unit;.
.ed Stutes for the district of Massachusetts.
Francis A. Brooks and E. J. Phelps, for
appellant. ,1. H. Benton, Jr., for appellees.

Francis A. Brooks and E. J . Phelps. for

appellant. J. H.Benton,Jr., for appellees.

FIELD. J. This is u suit in egult_y to

compel the defendantthe Boston & Lowell

Railroad Corporation to account for va-

rious sums of money alleged to have been

received by it, and used for its beneﬁt. to

which the complainant was entitled, and

also to charge the defendant Hosford

personally with the amount diverted by

him to that corporation. The contro-

versy relates to certain transactions
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growing out of a ioint tratiic contract be-

tween the plaintiff and the defendant cor-

porations. The plaintiff. the Nashua &

Lowell Railroad Corporatlomis alleged in

the bill to have been duly established as a

corporation under the laws ofNew Hamp-

shire, and to be a citizen oi that state. It

will be convenient hereafter in this opin-

ion to designate it as the “Nashua. Corpo-

ration." On the lst of February, 1857, it

owned and operated a railroad extending

from i\'ashua.in New Hampshire, to Low-

ell, in Massachusetts, a distance of 13

miles,ofwhich 5 miles were in New Hamp-

shire. and 8 miles in Massachusetts. The

suit was brought not only against the

Boston & Lowell Railroad Corporation,

alleged in thehill to be a corporation duly

established by the laws of Massachusetts

and a citizen of that state, but against

Hocum Hosford,its ti-easurer.and Charles

E. A. Bartlett, of the city of Lowell, also

citizens of that state; but as to Bartlett

it has been dismissed. On the lst of Feb-

ruary, 1857, this corporation. which for

convenience \ve shall call the “Lowell

Corporation,” owned and operated a rail-

road extending from Boston to Lowell,

Mass., a distance of 26 miles, with a branch

to the town of \\'oburn a mile and a half

in length. On the 1st of February, 1857,

the two corporations entered into a con-

tract in writing with each other “ for the

promotion of their mutual interest

through a more ctﬁcient and economical

joint operation and management of their

roads, and for the better security of their

respective investments, as well as for the

convenience and interest of the public,”

that their roads. with their branches,

should be “ worked and managed as one

road, "under certain conditions and stipu-

lations which were stated at length. The

contract recited that a large portion of

the business of the two roads wasjoint

business passing over the roads and

through the branches of both parties.

making desirable a common policy, and

unanimity of management, and that, in

FIELD. J. This ls a suit In equity to
compt·I the defendant the Boston & LOwell
R11ilro111l Corporation to account for varlouK 1111mH of money alleged to have been
rect•tn!d hy it, and u11ed for its benefit, to
which the complainant was entitled, and
also to charge the defendant Hosfo1'd
personally with tbe amount diverted by
him to tlJ11t corporation. The controversy relates to certain trausactlons
growlnK out of R Joint traffic contract be·
twet•n the plaintur and the defendant corporations. The plalntltt, the Nashua &
Lowell Railroad Corporation, is alleged In
the bill to have been duly established as a
corporation under the laws of New Hampshire, and to be a citizen of that state. I~
will be convenient hereafter lo this opinion to designate It as the "Nashua Corporation." On the let of February, 1857, It
owned and operated a i·aill'oad extending
from !'\ashua. In New Hampshire, to Lowell, In Massachusetts, a distance of 13
miles, of which o miles wel'e In New Hamp.
shire. and 8 miles In Massachusetts. The
suit w&!I brought not only agaim1t the
Boston & Lowell Railroad Corporation,
alleged In the hill to be a corporation duly
established by the Jaws of Massachusetts
and a cltizeu of that state, but against
Hocum Hosford, Its treasurer, and Charles
E. A. Bartlett, of the c.'lty of Lowell, alHo
citizens of that state; but as to Bartlett
It haH been dlsmh~sed. On the 1Ht of February, 11:<:>7, this corporation. which for
convenlenc.'e we shall call the "Low1.>ll
Corporation," owned and operated a railroad extendlnK from Boston to Lowell,
Ma1u1., a distance of 26 miles, with a branch
to the town of Woburn a mile and a half
In leugth. On the let of .February, 1857,
the h\·o cori111ratlons entered Into a contract in writing with each other "for the
promotion of· their mutual Interest
through a more ctfklent and economical
joint operation aml management of their
roadR, and for the better security of their
resp1'<'ttve investments, as well as for the
conv1.>nlence n.nd tnteret1t of the public,"
that their roads, with their branches,
sbo uld be " \\ orke<J and managed as one
roud, "under certain conditions and stipulations which we1't' Htatell at length. The
contract recited thnt a lnrKe portion of
the business of the two roads was Joint
business paHslng ovPr the roads and
through the brancht>s of both parties,
making desirable a common policy, and
unanim!ty of nrnnagement, and that, in
the tl'ansactlon of their bm1ine!.l1:1, there
'WllH a mutual interest, both llH to the
mode of trammctlon, and to the tariff upon the same, as well aR in all other matters relating thereto, and that the two
corpor11tlons, by operating under a cow274

mon manar;ement, would thereby be enabled to do business with greater facllity,
greater regularity, and at a greater saving of expense.
The Nashua Corporation had at thi1
time lenses of the Stony Brook Hallroad,
extending from Its line at North UbelmRford to Groton Junction, about 14 mtll'8
In Massachusetts, and of the Wilton Railroad, extending from Nashua to Wilton,
about 18 miles In New Hampshire. The
contract was originally for three years,
but by a supplPmental agreement of October 1, 1H58, It was extended to !.!Cl years.
Among other things It provided that the
roads of the parties should be "operated
and managed by one agent. to be chosen
by the com~urrent vote of a majority of
the directors ol each party, an<l who
might be removed by a like vote, or by
the unanimous vote of either board," and
that the respective boards of directore
ehoulcl "by such concunent action exercise the same control over the management as ls usual with boards of railroad
directors In ordinary cases;" that the corporations should each surrender to the
Joint management thus eonstltuted "the
entire control of their respective roads,
shops, depots, furniture, machinery, tools,
or other property necessary for the proper
maintenance and working of the Joint
roads. " reserving only certain specified
property Del"el!Mary for the operation Of
the roads, consisting principally of real
estate; that the contracts of the Nashua
Corporation with the Wilton and Stony
Brook roads should be assumecl by the
Joint management, and rarrled out, and
that the contract wtth the Wilton road,
which wns to expire on the lRt of A11rll,
1808. might be renewed during the continuance of the Joint mnnagement; that the
Nashua Corporation should within the
year 1857. at Its own c.'ost, erect a frel1tht
depot, with the necessary approachee and
furniture. lo the city of Lowell, upon It.a
site at West<.'rn Bvenue, which during tha
continuance of the agreement might be
ueed for the accommodation of the Joint
buslneRs; that the Lowell Corporation
should complete within the year 1807, at
its own separate cost, the new passenger
depot at Causeway street in Boston. then
under construction, together wtt.h the
tracks, bridires, and all necessary fixtures
connected with the extension Into that
city, and at Its 11eparate PxpensP make
such alterations In the existing Boston
paseenger depot as bad been de11igned by
the Lowell Corporation lor converting lt
into a freight depot. end also without
charge to the Nashua Corporation, complete at the earliest practicable time the
crossing over the Fitchburg Railroad, and
the connection with the Grand Junction
Railroad; that the road-bed. bridges.
superstructures, depots. buildings. and
fixtures of each road should be kept Rs
11e11r as might be In like relative repair
from their then state aud condition, and
that all casualties aud damages to the
same, except fire risks on buildings, should
be at the common rl11k, and char&ed In
the <'UM't'nt Joint account, and. In case of
the deetrul'tlon hy fire of any buildings.
or injury to the same, that the ownent
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should rebuild or replace them at his own

cost: that the income and expense ac-

counts of the joint roads should be made

up. as nearly as conveniently might be, by

estimate to the close of each month, and

the net balance should be divided and paid

over, on account, to the respective treas-

urers of the two corporations,-31 per

cent. to the Nashua Corporation, and 69

per cent. to the Lowell Corporation,—sub-

ject to a ﬁnal adjustment at the semi-an-

nual closing of accounts, and that on the

lst days of April and October in each year

the said accounts should be accurately

closed and balanced by settlement with

each party, covering and adjusting all

previous payments on account,—the Na-

shua Corporation receiving as its propor-

tion. 31 per cent. of the said joint net in-
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come, and the Lowell Corporation receiv-

ing as its proportion 69 per cent. thereof;

that each corporation might separately,

and on its own account, declare such divi-

dends upon its own stock, and payable

from its own separate funds, as it might

deem expedient; it being distinctly pro-

vided that “the interest upon the debts of

either party must also be paid out oi such

separate share, and not from the common

fund.” As thus seen, the contract pro-

vided that the two roads and their

branches should be operated as a single

road by a common agent to be appointed

by the directors of both companies, and

removable by them, or by the unanimous

action of either; that the roads and prop-

erty oi each party should be kept in a

like relative condition and repair as they

then were at their joint expense: that the

Nashua Corporation should in 1857 erect

at its own expense a freight depot, with

necessary approaches, in the city of Low-

ell, and the Lowell Corporation, in the

same _vear, at its expense, complete a pas-

senger depot, with necessary approaches,

in the city of Boston, and alter the existing

passenger depot there, also at its own

expense, into a freight depot; that the in-

terest upon the debts contracted by either

party should be paid out of its own share,

and not from the common fund; and that

the net income should be divided in the

proportion of 31 per cent. to the plaintiff,

the Nashua Corporation, and of 69 per

cent. to the defendant the Lowell Corpo-

ra tion, payments on account of such divis-

ion to be made upon monthly estimates,

and ﬁnal settlement and adjustment to be

had semi-annually. The contract did not

provide that the property of either corpo-

ration should be improved, or other prop-

erty be acquired by either, at the joint

expense of both.

Under this contract, and during its con-

tinuance, the two corporations united

their business and conducted it with

marked success. By leases from other

companies and the acquisition of branch

[Case No. 96

should rebuild or replacC' them at hie own were adderl by the acqul1dtio11 of the Salem
coat: that the lnl'ome and expense ac- & Lowell and the J,owell & Lawrence
counts of the joint roads should be made roads In 1858, and 16 miles of It by the purup. ns nearly as conveniently might be, by cha11e of the Lt>xtngton & Arlington road,
t>etimate to the close of each month, aud In 1Sli9. Contracts were made for business
the net balance should be divided and puld with connecting llneH to such an extent
over, on account, to the retipective treas- that th~ two roadR, !luring the lute years
urers of 'the two corporations,-31 per of their joint operation, tran11ported ancent. to the Nashua Corporation, and 69 nually In tl\e neighborhood of 300,000 tone
per cent. to the Lowell Corporutlon,-sub- or freight and 200,000 passengers. The net
Ject to a ftnal adjustment at the semi-an- lnrome reRultlng from this extenderl businual elostng of accounts, and that on thft ness was satisfactorily apportioned purlst duys of April and OctolJer in each year snant to the ce>ntract, 31 per cent. going
the satll accounts should be nccumtely to the Nashua Corporation, and 69 per
closed and balanced by sr:ttlement with cent. going to the Lowell Corporation, exeach part:v, covering and adjusting all cept as they were RffPCtell by two tranRacprevious payments on account,-the Na · tlons of which the Nashua. Corporation
shua Corpora tion recei vlng as Its propor- complains. One of these transactions was
tion. 31 per cent. of the Raifl Joint net In- the Rlleged Illegal appro11rlatlon by the
come, and the Lowell Corporation receiv- Lowell Corporation of $181 ,962 for a. pasing as ltR proportion 69 per cent. thereof; seDJ~er <lepot at Boston erected by that
that each corporation might separately, corporation for Its own beneftt, and which,
and on its own account, declare l!!uch dh·l- complainant eontenrlH, it was entitled to
dends upon Its own stock, anll payable receive as Its share of the net earnings of
from Its own sepurate funds, as It might the joint managemE>nt. 'fhe other transdeem expedient; It being distinctly pro- action was the alleged Illegal Rpproprla·
vided that "the Interest upon the debts of tlon of $26.124 for interest on the amount
either party must also be paid out of such expenrled by the Lowell Corporation In
Reparate share, and not from the common buying a controlling Interest In the stock
fund." Ae thus seen, the contract pro- of two other railroad companles,-the
vided that the two roads and their Low1ll & Lawrence Company and the
branches should be operatert as a single Salem & Lowell l'ompany ,-which the
road by a common agent to be appolnt11d com11lalnent contendH It waH also entitled
by the directors of both companies, and to receive as Its share of the net earnings
removable by them, or by the unanimous of the Joint management. It ls to compel
action of either; that the roadH and pro]>- an accounting for these sums, and their
erty of each party should be kept In a payment to the complainant, that the
like relative condition and repair AH they present suit Is brought.
.
then were at their joint expense : that the
Before pas11lng, however, upon the valid:\'ashua Corporation shoulll in 1S57 erect ity of these claims a question raised a11 to
at Its own expense a freight depot, with the Jurisdiction of the circuit court must
neceHSary approache11, In the 1•ity of Low- be considered. Its jnrlttdlctton waH asell, and the Lowell Corporation, in the sumed upon the diverse cltizem1hlp of the
Mame year, at tts expense. complete a JUls- partlt>R, and. upon the allegations of the
senger depot, with necet1Hary approttchet1, hlll. rtl{htfully oRRumed. Althouith a t'orIn the city of Boston, and alter the existing 11oratlon ls not a eltl:i:en of a state, within
passenger depot there, also at Its own the meaning of many pr<H'islons of the
expense. Into a freight de}lot; that the In- nutlonal ronstltutlon, It le eettlt>d that,
terest upon the debbi contracte1\ by either where rights of property or of action are
party should be paid out or Its own 11JJare, sought to be enforced, It will be treated as
11nd not from the l'ommon fund; and that a citizen of the statewher11 created, within
th(' nE>t Income Hhould be dh·ided In the tht> rlnuRe extending the judicial power of
proportion of 31 per ernt. to the plaintiff, the Fnlted States to controversies between
the NaHhua Corporation, and of 69 per citizens of different states. 'L'he plaintiff
cent. to the aefemlant the Lowell Corpo- \\'as crt•ntrd a corporation by the le1dslnra tlon, payments on account of such divis- tnre or New Hampshire In June, 1835. It
ion to be made upon monthly estimates, is, therefore, to be treated as a citizen of
and ftnal settlement and adjustment to be that state. RRilway Co. v. Whitton, 18
bad 11emi·annuallv. The contract did not Wall. :nu, 283. But It also npJ)(>BrS that
provide that the propr.rty of either corpo- in April, 18::16, the Jeghllatnre of M11sH11.ration should be impro,·ed, or other prop- clmsetts constituted the same persons a
erty be acquired by either, at the joint corporation of that state, who had been
expense of both.
thui1 Incorporated In New Hamp!!hlre,gh··
l'nder this contract, and during Its con- Ing to them the same name, and authoriztinuance, the two corporations united ing the new corporation to build that
their business and conducted It with portion of the ratlroad between No11hua,
marked socces11. Dy leases from other In New Hampshire, a.nil Lowell . In MRssa.companies and tire acquisition of branch ch11Reth1, lying within the latt<>r state. It
roads a large mileage was adrled to their also appears that In April, l:S:JX, the leglslines, and acorrespondln~ly Increased busi- ature of Massachusetts paR11ed an act to
ness wu transacted by them . In 1S74 the unite the two corpprntlons,-the one
N1111hua Corporation reported to its st"ck- created by New HampHhlre, and the one
holderR that the two co"rporatlons then crpatcd by Massnchusetts,-the first Sf!Coperated under their Joint management tlon ofwhleh was as follows: "The stock135 mlles,- more than double the mileage holders of the NaRhua & Lowell Rnllronll
l\t the time the con truct wnH entel'('rt Into. ' ('orportttlon, Incorporated by the JegildaIt Is stated that aa miles of thiH distance ture of the state of New HampRhlre In the
275

PROOF.
Case No. 96]

PROOF.

year one thousand eight hundred and

thirty-ﬁve, are hereby constituted stock-

holders of the Nashua & Lowell Railroad

Corporation, incorporated by the legisla-

ture of this commonwealth in the year one

thousand eight hundred and thirty-six;

and the said two corporations are hereby

united into one corporation, by the name

of the ‘ Nashua 8.: Lowell Railroad Corpo-

ration;’ and all the tolls, ‘franchises,

rights, powers, privileges, and property

granted. or to be granted. acquired or to

be acquired, under the authority of the

said states, shall be held and enjoyed by

all the said stockholders in proportion to

their number of shares in either or both

of said corporations." There were other

provisions, designed to enable the two

corporations to conduct their business as
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one corporation. The act, however, de-

clared that lt should not take effect until

the legislature oi New Hampshire had

passed asimllaract unitingthe said stock-

holders in to one corporation. nor until the

acts had been accepted by the stockhold-

ers at a meeting called for that purpose.

In June of the same year, 1838, the legis-

lature of New Hampshire passed an act

authorizing the two corpora tions to unite,

and providing in such case that “all the

toll, franchises, rights, powers, privileges,

and property” of the two corporations

should be held and enjoyed by the stock-

holders in each and both in proportion to

their number of shares therein, and that

all property owned, acquired. or enjoyed

by either oi the corporations should be

. taken and accounted to be the joint prop-

erty of the stockholders oi the two corpo-

rations. and that the two corporations

should be one: the act to he in force when

accepted by the stockholders of the corpo-

rations at a meeting called for that pur-

pose. It does not appear, so far as dis-

closed by’ the record, except in the allega-

tions oi the defendant, that there was any

formal acceptance of this act by the stock-

holders of the two corporations. but it

would seem that the corporations acted

upon its supposed acceptance; for the

defendants pleaded to the jurisdiction oi

the court on the ground that. by the legis-

lation mentioned, the complainant was

not a corporuton oi New Hampshire, and

consequently a citizen oi that state, but

was a corporation oi Massachusetts, and

thus a citizen of that state.

In thebill as originally filed, the Nashua.

Corporation was the only complainant.

By a subsequent amendment, three per-

yee.r one thousand eight hundred and
thirty-five, are hereby constituted stockholders of the Ne.shoe. & Lowell Railroad
Corporation, Incorporated by the ley:IF1lature of thlscom.monwPalth In the year one
thousand eight hundred and thirty-six;
and the said two corporations are hereby
united Into one corporation, by the name
of the' Nashua & Lowell Railroad Corporation;' and all the tolls,' franchises,
rights, powers, prlvllegel'I, and pror>erty
granted, or to be gr1mted, acquired or to
bP acquired, under the authority of the
881d states, shall be heM and enjoyed by
all the said stocKholdere In r>ropm·tion to
their number of shares In either ur both
of said corporutlons." There were other
provisions, designed to enable the two
corporations to conduct their business
one corporation. The act, however, declared that It should not take er:eet until
the legislature of New Hampshire he.d
passed ashullara.ct unltingthe ea.Id stockholders Into one corporation. nor until the
acts had been accepted by the stockholders at a meeting called for that purpose.
In .June of the s1tme year, 1838, the legislature of "iew Hampshire passed an act
authorizing thetwocorporatlons to unite,
and provldluic In such cRBe that "all the
toll, franchlse11, rie;hts, powers, prl vlleges,
nnd property" of the two corporations
should be held and enjoyed by the stockholders In each and both In proportion to
their number of shares therein, and that
all property owned, acquired. or enjoyed
by either of the corporations should be
. taken and accounted tn be the Joint property of the etoclcholders of the two corporations, and that the two corporations
should be one; the act to be In force when
accepted by the stockholders of the corporations at a meeting called for th11t purpose. It does not appear, eo far ae disclosed b;v" the record, except In the allegations ol the defendant, that there was any
formal acceptance or this act by the stockholdArs of the two corporations. but it
would seem that the corporations acted
upon Its supposed acceptance; for thP
<JefendantR pleaded to the Jurisdiction of
the court on the ground that. by the legislation mentioned, the complainant was
not a corporuton of New Hampshire, and
consequently a citizen of that state, but
was a corporation of Massachusetts, and
thus a citizen of that stab~.
In the bill as originally tiled, the Nai;ihua.
Corporation was the only complainant.
By a snbeequent amendment, three persons. cltlzen11 of New Hampshire, stockholders of that corporation, were united
ae complainants. To the bill as thus
amended the defendants pleaded ue follows: "That this court ought not to take
furthrr COJtnlznnce of or sustain the said
bill of complaint, because they say that
they. the said defendants, at the time of
filing said bill, werP., and still are, all,
each. nnd every one, citizens ol the state
of 1'htf!Httchmwttll. and that sa.lrl plaintiffs,
at the time of filing said hill, were not,
nnrl Htill are not, all, each, and every one,
citizens ol another state, but that the said
Nashua & Lowell Hullrond Corporation,
one of i;iald plaintiffs, at the time of filing
111dd bill, was, and still is, a corporution

a•

sons. citizens oi New Hampshire, stock-

holders oi that corporation, were united

as complainants. To the bill as thus

amended the defendants pleaded us fol-

lows: “That this court ought not to take

further cognizance of or sustain the said

bill oi complaint, because they say that

they, the said defendants. at the time of
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duly established and existing under and
by virtue of the Jaws of the state of Massachusetts, e.nd a citizen of Hald state of
Ma1umchusetts, and at the time of filing
Raid bill WM not, and still Is not, a corpora tlon established and existing bv the
le.we of the state of New Ham11~hlre, and
a citizen of said state of New Hampshire.
All of which matters 11.nd things these defendun U! do aver to be true, and are ready
to Yerlfy. Wherefore th~y plf>ad the same
to the whole of said amended blll, amt
pray the judgment of this honorablecourt
whethPr they 11hould be compelled to •11Rke
any other or further an11wer to said bill."
Thie plea was ar~ued upon an agreement
as to the facts. This plea was overruled.
the court stating In its opinion thnt it
seemed "that the defendant corpora tlon
might go Into New Hampshire, and there
eue the plalntltt as a New Hampshire corporation, In the federal court. although It
could not bring such suit In the district of
MassacbusettH against the New Hnmgehire corporation. because no service upon
the New Hampshire corpor11tlon as such
could be got In this dlstrtct, If for no other
reason; .. aud adding that "If the dpfendant could sue the plu.lntlH In the federnl
court for New Hampshire. notwlthstnudlng the fa.ct of the plaintiff being chartert>d
under the laws of both eta.tee. there would
seem to be no good reason wh,v the plaintiff, chl.lrnlng under Its New Hampshire
charter, should not be allowed to sue the
defen,lnnt In the feder11l court for MaR8achnsetts, as It would be lmpoRRlble for the
defendant In sueh ca11e to deny the title of
the plaintiff us predkated upon the New
HampRhlre charter. or to deprive the
plaintiff of the benefit of Its New HampRhlre citizenship thus ·acquired." Ii Fed.
Rep. 458. A more satisfactory answer
would. perhaps, have been that. whe.te\'"er effect may be attributed to the legislation of Ma1:1sachusetts In creating a new
corporation by the same name with that
of the com!Jlalnant, or In allo\\·lng a union
of Its huslness and property with thut of
the complalne.nt, It did not change the existence of the complainant as a corpor&tlon of New Hampshire, nor Its character
ae a citizen of that 11tate, for the enforcement of ltR rlghtfl of action In the national
conrts agalm1t citizens of other states. Indeed, no other etute could by Its legislation change thl11 character of that corporation, however great the rights and privileges bestowed upon lt. 1'he new corpora tlon created by Mussacllut1E'tts, though
bearing the 1:1ame name. composed of the
same stockboltlers, and designed to accom11llt1h the 11ame purposes, le not the
same corporation with the one In New
Hampshire. Identity of the name, powers,
and purpoeeH does not create an Identity
of origin or existence, auy more than any
other Rtatutee alike In• lang-uugp. passed
by dlfferen t leglsln ti ve bod !es, cu n properly
he Sllld to owe their existence to both. To
each statute, and to the l'Orporatlou cre-ated by it, there can be but one Jegitilati'"e
paternity
·
But on this point we will herraftrr Rpeak
more at large. At present it is sufficient
to say that the dccli;lon of the court overruling tbe plea ln abatement upon the
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facts agreed upon disposed of thcquestion

of jurisdiction in the court below. It is

true the defendants, in their answers, sub-

sequently ﬁled, also made the same objec-

tion. Formerly the objection to the juris-

diction, from a denial of the com plainaut‘s

averment of citizenship, could only be

raised by a plea in abatement or by de-

murrer, and not by answer. De Sobry v.

Nicholson, 3 Wall. 420, 423; Sheppard v.

Graves, 14 How. 504, 509; Wickliffe v. Ow-

ings, 17 How. 47. This rule is modiﬁed by

the act of March 3, 1875, determining the

jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the

United States. 18 St. p. 472, § 5. That

statute provides that if, in any suit com-

menced in one of such courts, “it shall ap-

pear to the satisfaction of said circuit

court, at any time after such suit has been
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brought or removed thereto, that such

suit does not really and substantially in-

volve a dispute or controversy properly

within the jurisdiction of said circuit court.

or that the parties to said suit have been

improperly or collusively made or joined,

either as plaintiffs or defendants, for the

purpose of creatinga case cognizable or re-

movable under this act, the said circuit

court shall proceed no further therein, but

shall dismiss the suit, or remand it to the

court from which it was removed, as jus-

tice may require, and shall make such or-

der as to costs as shall be just. " By this

statute the time at which such objec-

tion may be raised is not thus restricted.

but may be taken at any time after suit

brought in thecases mentioned. The prin-

cipal object of the statute was to relieve

the national courts from the necessity of

passing upon cases where it was plain

that no question was involved within

their jurisdiction, and thus free them from

a consideration of controversies of a friv-

olous and questionable character, and to

prevent fraudulent and collusive attempts

to invoke the jurisdiction of those courts,

as had frequently been the practice, by col-

orable transfers of property or choses in

action from a citizen of one state to a citi-

zen of another, to enable the latter to go

into those courts; the original owner still

retaining an interest in the property or

choses in action transferred, or taking a

contract fora retransfer of the same to

himself after the termination of the litiga-

tion. ln such cases it is undoubtedly the

duty of the court below, of its own mo-

tion. to deny its jurisdiction, and of this

court, on appeal or writ of error, to see

that that jurisdiction has in no respect

facts agreed upon dtspuee<l of thcqueetton
of jurisdiction In the court below. It le
true the defendants, In their answers, tcubsequently filed, also made the same objection. Formerly the objection to the jurledktion, from a denial of the complainant's
aYerment of citizenship, could only be
raised by a phia. In abatement or by demurrer, and not by answer. De Sobry v.
Nichoh1on, 3 Wall. 420, 423; Rheppard v.
Graves, 14 How. 504, 509; Wickliffe v. Owin&'R, 17 How. 47. ThlH rule ts modified IJy
the act of March 8, 1875, determining the
Jurisdiction of the circuit C'ourts of the
Gnlted States. 18 St. p. 472, § 5. That
statute provlrles that if, In any suit commenced In one of such t~ourtH, "It shall aPpear to the satisfaction of said circuit
court, at any time after such suit has been
brou~ht or removed thereto, that such
suit does not really a11d sub11tantlally Involve a dispute or contron•r1:1y properly
within the jurtslllctlon of said circuit court,
or that the parties to said suit have been
Improperly or colluslvely made or jolJJed,
either as plaintiffs or defeullants, for the
purpoRe of creating a. case cognlzableorremo\•able under this a.ct, the so.Id circuit
court shall proceed no further therein, but
shall dllnnlss the suit, or remand It to the
court from which It was removed, as ju11tlce mav require, and shall make such order u to costs as shall be Just." By this
statute the time at which s11:ch objection may be raised Is not thus restricted,
but may be taken at any time after sutt
brought In the cases mentioned. The principal objt!Ct of the 11tat11te was to relieve
the national courts from the necessity of
pasRlng upon cases where it was plain
that no •1uestlon WM involved within
their Jurisdiction, and thus free them from
a consideration of contro\'el'llles of a frivolous and questionable character, and to
prevent fraudulent and collusive attempts
to Invoke the Jurisdiction of those courts,
u had frequently been the practke, bycolorallle trani;fers of property or choses In
action from a cltb;en of one state to a citizen or another, to enable the latter to tzo
Into those courts; the original owner still
retaining an Interest In the property or
cho- In action transferred, or taking a
contract for a retransfer of the samt- to
himself after the termination of the litigation. In such cases It Is undoubtedly the
dut.y of the court below, of ltH own motion, to deny Its jurisdiction, and or tbls
court, on appenl or writ of error, to Sl'e
that that jurisdiction has In no resp<•ct
been thus lmpoRcd upon. Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U.S. 315, 326, D Sup. Ct. Uep. 2811;
Farmington v. Pllb1hury, 114 U. 8 . 131-l, 143,
5 Sup. <.:t. Rep. 807. If the question of
jurisdiction ~ould be raised In thP ant1we1'8
of the defendants after the cleclRiun upon
the ls1rne on the plea In abatnnent, notwithstanding the decisions cltrd and the
thirty-ninth equity rule of this court,
the reHult In thl11 cnse, though not perhnf)l:I
In all cases. would be the 1mme. Replications were duly tiled to the anRwers, the
enect of which was to deny the allega.
tions respecting the acceptance of the acts
having for their object the union of the
two l'orporatlons, a.nil those allegations
were entirely unsupported hy the evidence
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or by anything In the record; and neither
in the final decrCP or the court, nor In its
opinion, was any allusion made to the
subject. The only evidence bearing upon
the question Is found In the ley;lsla tton of the
two states, New Hampshire and Ma88achusetts; and ltls plain, as already stated, that
no legl11latlon of Massachusetts could possibly affect the existence of the complainant as a corporation of New Hampshire,
or its <'liaracter aR a citizen of that state,
The act of New Hampshire of 1888, while
In terms authorizing the twocorporatlon11
to unite, did not confer any new franchise
or right upon either of them. All that It
!lid was to permit the funding or conversion of the separate interests of each stockholder lneach corporation Into a common
or joint or undivided Interest In both, and
to declare that, after the two corporations
were united, all property owned by either
should be considered the Joint property of
the stockholders or both. There is nothing
In the1:1e provisions looking to any abandonment of Its corporate chnrnetur as a
creation of New Hampshire, or its citizenship or that Htate.
'!'here are mnny decisions, both of the
federal and state courts, which establlHh
the rule that, howe\·er closely two corporations of different states may unite their
interests, and thon11:h even the stockholderR of the one may become the Rtockhold .
ere of the other, and their business be conducted by the same directors, the Reparate
Iden tlty of each as a corporation of the ·
state by which It was created, and as a
citizen· nf t)lat state. ls not the....,t-y hJst.
Jn Farnum v. Canal Corp., 1 ~um. 46,1 we
l1ave an Instance of this kind. It there appeared that In January, 1823, the leg1sla·
ture of Mal!llachusette created a corporation by the name of the Blackstone Canal
Company for the purpose of constructing
a certain <'anal In that Rtate. It also appearert that In June of that year the legislature of Rhode Island Incorporated a
company by the same name,-tbe Blackstone Canal Company,-and authorized It
to construct a certain canal within the
limits of tba t state. In May .1827, the Jegbdature of Rhode IRiand declared that the
Htockholder& of the MnRsachusctts company should be Rtockholders In the Uhode
Island company, as If they bad originally
snbHcrlbed thereto, If both corporations
should agree thereto, and that the books
and procet-dlngH of the original and associated stockholders should be deemed the
books or both; and the court held that,
though the two corporations were created
in adjacent HtateR by the same name, to
construct a canal In each of the stutes, respectlvPly, and afterwards, by subsequent
uct~. :were permitted to unite their interests, tbf'!r separate corporate existence
was not merged, anll thnt the leJ,:"lslature
only C't'l•ntl•d a unity of stock and intereflt.
Jn giving ltR decision the court, by Mr.
Justice S1·m1v, 1mld: "Although, In virtue
of theHe Heverul 11cts, the corporations
[one of Rhode lHland, and one of l\1asst1chusett1:1] uc4uirl'tl a unity of Interests, It
by no m~ans follows that they ceased tu
1
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been thus imposed upon. Morris v. Gil-

mer, 129 U. S. 315, 326, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 289;

Farmington v. Piiishury,]1-4 U. S. 13:4, 143,

5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 807. If the question of

jurisdiction could be raised in the answers

of the defendants after the decision upon

the issue on the plea in abatement, not-

withstanding the decisions cited and the
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exist as distinct and different corpora-

tions. Their powers, their rights. their

privileges. their duties. remained distinct

and several, as before, according to their

respective acts of incorporation. Neither

could exercise the rights, powers. or privi-

leges conferred on the other. There was

no corporate identity. Neither was

merged in the other. If it were otherwise,

which became merged? '1‘heacts of incor-

poration create no merger, and neither is

poin ted out as survivor or successor. We

must treat the case, then, as one oi dis-

tinct corporations acting within the

sphere of their respective charters for pur-

poses of common interest, and not as a

case where all the powers of both were

concentrated in one. The union was of

interests and stocks, and not a surrender
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of personal identity or corporate existence

by either corporation." In Muller v.

Dows. 94 U. S. 4-I-i,the bill averred that. of

the three complainants, two were citizens

and residents of the state of New York,

and one a citizen and resident of the state

of Missouri. The two original defendants

were corporations, namely, the Chicago 8:

Southwestern Railway Company. and the

Chicago. Rock Island & Paciﬁc Railroad

Company; and they were alleged to be

citizens of the state of Iowa. It was con-

tended that the Chicago & Southwestern

Railway Company could not claim to be a

corporation created by the laws of Iowa,

because it was formed by a consolidation

of the Iowa company with another of the

same name chartered by the laws of Mis-

souri ; the consolidation having been al-

lowed by the statutes of each state.

Hence it was argued that the corporation

was created by the laws of Iowa and of

Missouri; and. as one of the plaintiffs was

a citizen of Missouri,it was urged that the

circuit court had no jurisdiction. But

the court replied, speaking by Mr. Justice

STRONG! “ We cannot assent to this infer-

ence. It is true the provisions of the stat-

utes of Iowa respecting railroad consoli-

dation oi roads within the state with oth-

ers outside of the state, were that any

railroad company organized under the

laws of the state, or that might thus be

orga.nized.shouid have power to intersect,

loin. and unite their railroads constructed

or to be constructed in the state, or in any

adjoining state, at such point on the state

line, or at any other poin t, as might be mut-

ually agreed upon by said companies. and

exiRt aR distinct anll dtrfPrent corporations. ThPlr powers, their rlghtR, their
pri \'llegeR, their dutlPs, remained distinct
and several, as before, according to their
rPRpectlve acts of lnrorporatlon. Neither
could exerch1e the rlght11, powers. or privileges conferred on the other. There was
no corporate identity. Neither WllB
merg-etl In the other. If It were otherwise,
which be<:ame merged? 'l'heacts of Incorporation create no merger, and neither Is
pointed out as survivor or succes110r. We
must treat the case, then, as one of distinct corporatlon11 acting within the
sphere of their respective charters for purposes of common Interest, and not as a.
ca11e where all the powers of both were
- concentrated in one. The union was of
Interests and stocks, and not a l!urrender
of personal Identity or corporate existence
hy either corporation . " In Muller v.
Dows, 94 U.S. 444, the blll averred that, of
the three complalmmts, two were citizens
and resldentR of the state of New York,
and one a citizen and resident of the state
of .Misf!oorl. The two original dPfendants
were corporations, namely, the Chicago &
Southwestern Railway Company, and the
Chlcairo, Rock l11land &: Pacific Railroad
Company: and they were alleged to be
citizens of the state of Iowa. It was contended that the Chicago & Southwestern
Railway Company could not claim to be a
corporation created by the laws of Iowa,
because It was formed by a consoli<latlon
of the Iowa company with another of the
same name chartered by the laws of Mlt1sourl; the consolidation having been allowed by the statutes of each state.
Hence It "·as ari.rued tba t the corpora tlon
was rreated by the laws of Iowa and of
Mls1muri; and. as one of theplalntlffR was
a citizen of Missouri, It waR urged that the
circuit court had no jurisdiction. But
the court replied, apeaklng by Mr. Justlre
8TRO:SG: "We cannot assent to this inference. It Is true the provisions of the statu t~ of Iowa. resptoetlng railroad consollda tlon of roads within the state with others outJ!lde of the state, were that any
railroad company organized under the
laws of the state, or that might thus be
organized, should have powerto Intersect,
join , and unite their railroads constructed
or to be conRtructed In the state, or in any
adjoining state, u. t such point on the st& te
line, or at any otherpolut, as might he mutually agreed upon by said companleR. and
such railroads were authorized 'to merge
and consolidate the stock of the respective
companies, making one joint-stock company of the railroads thus connected.'
The Missouri statutes contained similar
provisions, and with these laws In force
the consolidation of the Chicago and
8outhwestern Railways was effe<>ted. The
two companies became one, but In the
state of Iowa that one was an Iowa corpol'ntlon, existing under thA laws of that
statP alone. The laws of l\Ilssvm·l bad no
operution In Iowa." 1'be case of St. Louis,
A. & 'J'. H. R. Co. v. Indianapolis & 8t. L. R.
Co., which waR before the circuit court of
the TJnited Sta tcH for the di~trict of Tndlana, Hnd Is reported In D Biss. 144,~ and

such railroads were authorized ‘to merge

and consolidate the stock of the respective

companies. making one joint-stock com-

pany of the railroads thus connected.’

The Missouri statutes contained similar

provisions, and with these laws in iorce

the consolidation of the Chicago and

Southwestern Railways was effected. ‘ The

two companies became one, but in the

state of Iowa that one was an Iowa cor-

l'UOOF.
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which came before this court under the
tltle of Pennsylvania R. C'o. v. St. Lou!R, A.
& T. H. R. Co .• and ls reported In 11S LT. S.
290, 6 8up. ('t. Rep. 10&4, bears a strong resembl1:1m·eto the one now before the court.
In the bill the plaintiff was alleged to be a
corporation creutecl under the laws of Illinois, and the defendants were alleged to
be corporations created under the laws
of Indiana. and of Pennsylvania. To the
blll a plea was Interposed In which It wa.e
alleged that. uuder various acts of the legislatures of Illinois and Indiana, two corporations wPre created,-one the plaintiff,
the St. Louis, Alton lie Terre Haute Railroad C'om1Jany, and the other the same
company In name In Indiana; that they
had been consolidated by those states,
and were so Inseparably connected to~ether that the plalntln was really a corporation as wull of Indiana as of Illinol11;
a.nd that, as some of the defendants were
corporations of the state of Indiana. tbe
court could not take jurisdiction of the
case. But the court held that the fact
that the two corporations created by different states bad been consolidated under
the laws of those states, 111111 that the railroad wae operated by virtue of that consolidation as one entire line of road. did
not prevPnt one of those corporatlon11
from bringing suit In the federal court, as
a corporation of the state where it wa.e
created. against the corporation with
which It was consolidated, which was created by the other state. Said the court,
speaking by J odJ[fl DRUMMOND: .. If the dt>fendant corporation, though consollda ted
with another of a different state, can be
sued in the federal court in the state of its
creation, as a citizen thereof, (referring to
the cases of Railway Co. v. Whitton, 13
Wall.270, and Muller v.Dows,94 U.S. 444,)
why can It not sue as a citizen of the state
which created lt ! I can see no difference
in principle. It seems to me that when
the plaintiff comes into the federal court,
If a corporation of another state, It ls
clothed with all the attributes of citizenship which the laws of that state confer.
and the shareholders of that corpor11tlon
muRt be conclusively regarded as clth:Pne
of the state whlrhcreated thecorporation,
precisely the same as If It were a defendant. So I do not see why, If the plaintiff
In this case alleges, as H does, that it Is a
corporation created by the laws of lllinols, It cannot Institute a suit in the circuit court of the United Sttttes of Indian&
a~alnst a corporation of that state."
'l'he case turned upon the point whether
the plaintiH corporation of llllnols had
become also an Indiana corporation, so
al! to lose Its existPnce or Identity and
citizenship as an Illinois corporation. 'l'he
court heill In the negative, that It stlll remained an Illlnols corporation, with ttll
Its rights of action as such In the United
8tates courts. When the case came to
this court the decision of the court IJPlow
was affirmed, but It would seem that
when It was considered here the plea to
the jurl11dlction filed In the court 1.Jelow
had been withdrawn. Tl1e question of jurisdiction was, however, examined by the
rourt of Its own motion. " It does not
seem, " said the court, ··to admit of quee0

PRESUMPTIO.YS IN GE:YERAL
PRESUMPTIONS TN GENERAL.
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tion that a corporation of one state, own-

ing property and doing business in an-

other state by permission of the latter,

does not thereby become a citizen of this

state also; and so a corporation of illi-

nois, authorized by its laws to build a

railroad across the state from the Missis-

sippi river to its eastern boundary, may,

by the permission of the state of Indiana,

extend its road a few miles within the lim-

its of the latter, or indeed through the en-

tire state, and may use and operate the

line as one road by the permission of the

state, without thereby becoming a cor-

poration or a citizen of the state of Indi-

ana. Nor does it seem to us that an act

of the legislature conferring upon this cor-

poration of Illinois, by its Illinois corpo-

rate name,such powers to enable it to use
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and control that part of the road within

the state of Indiana as have been conferred

on it by the state which created it, consti-

tutes it a corporation of Indiana.” And

again: “In a case where the corporation

already exists,even if adopted by the law

of another state, and invested with full

corporate powers, it does not thereby be-

come such new corporation of another

state until it does some act which signiﬁes

its acceptance of this legislation, and its

purpose to be governed by it. We think

what has occurred bet-ween the state of

Indiana and this Illinois corporation falls

short of this.”

Many cases might be cited from thestate

courts illustrative and conﬁrmatory of the

doctrine of this case. In Racine & M. R.

('0. v. Farmers’ Loan & 'I‘rust (‘-o., 49 Ill.

331, it appeared that in April, 1852, the leg-

islature of Wisconsin incorporated the

Racine, J anesville & Mississippi Railroad

Company. and that the legislature of Illi-

nois, in Febru:1r,\', 1853, incorporated the

Rockton & Freeport Railroad Company,-

hoth companies authorized to construct

-railways: that in February, 1854, these

two companies entered into an agreement

,t-o fully merge and consolidate their capi-

tal stock, powers, privileges, immunities,

and franchises. In February, 1855, both

the legislature of Illinois and the legisla-

ture of Wisconsinchanged the name of the

two companies to that oi the Racine &

Mississippi Railroad Company. It also

appeared that in 1851 the Savannah Bra uch

iiailroad Company was organized under

the general railroad law of Illinois, and

that in January, 1856, this company en-

tered into articles oi‘ agreement with the

Racine & Mississippi Railroad Company

by which its stock was consolidated with

that of the latterr-ompany; that a major-

ity in interest of the stockholders of the

Savannah Company ratiﬁed the articles;

and that in 1857 the legislature of Illinois

changed the name of that company to the

Racine& Mississippi Railroad Company.

Thus the names of three railroad com-

tlon that a corporation of one state, owning property and doing busluesR In another state by permission of the latter,
does not thereby become a citli:en of this
state nlso; aud so ft corporfttlon of Illinois, authorizel.I by its laws to build a.
railroad across the state from the Mississippi river to its eastern boundary, may,
by the permission of the state of Indiana,
extend Its road a few miles within the llm11:8 of the latter, or Indeed through the entire state, and may use and operate the
line aR one road by the permission of the
state, without thereby becoming a corporation or a citizen of the state of Indiana. Nor doeR it seem to us that an act
of the legislature conferring upon this corporation of Illinois, by its Illinois corporate name, such powers to enable It to use
and control thu.t pa1·t of the roftd within
the state of Indiana as have been ~oolerred
on it l)y the state which created It, constitutes it a corporation of I111.liana." And
again: "In a case where the corporation
already exlsts,evl'n If adopted by the law
of another state, and invested with full
corporate powers, It doe8 not thereby become such new corporation of another
state nntll it does some act which signifies
its acceptance of this legislation, and Its
purpose to be gonirned hy It. We think
what bas occurred between the state of
lndlftna and this Illinois corporation falls
short of this."
Many cases might be cited from the state
courts lllnRtrativeand confirmatoryof the
doctrine of tbis case. In Racine & M. R.
Co. v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 49 Ill.
331, It appearecl that in April, 1852, the legislature of Wl11eonsln Incorporated the
Racine, Janesville & Mississippi Rallroacl
Company, and that the legislature of 1111nols, In February, 1S53, Incorporated the
Rockton & Freeport Railroad Company,hoth companies authorized to construct
-railways: that In February, 1854, thet:tA
two companies entered into an agreement
to fully merge and consolidate their capital stock, powers, privileges, Immunities,
and franchisee. In February, ll:i55, both
the lelllelature of llllnols and the le11:lslature of Wisconsin changed the name of the
two companlPB to that of the Racine &
Missl881ppl Railroad Company. It also
appeare<l that In 1851 the Savannah Branch
Railroad Company was organized under
the general rt\llroad Jaw of llllnols, and
that in January, 1856, this com1mny entered Into articles of agreement with the
Racine & Mississippi Railroad Company
by which its stock was consolidated with
that of the latterrompany; that a. majority in interest of the stockhohlers of the
Sa\•anna.h Company ratified the article£;
and that In 1857 the legislature of Illinois
changed the name of that company to the
Racine & Mississippi Railroad Company.
Thus thfl names of three railroad companies. created by three different states,
were cha.nKed to the same name, and were
allow0(1 to be consolidated together and
act l\S one company. The suprem11 court
of Illinois held that thh1 consolidation did
not convert them Into one company in
fact. Said the court: "Our view of the
effect of the consolidation contr11ct between the Rockton Company [of lllinols]
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and the Wisconsin company, which we
hold to have been legally made, Is hrlefty
this: While it created a community of
stock and of Interest between the two
companies, It did not com·ert them Into
one company in the same wa~ and to the
same degree that mlghtfollow a consolidation of two companies within the 1mme
state. Neither Illinois nor WisconRin, in
authorizlngtheconsolldatlon,ca.n have intended to abandon all jurisdiction over its
own corpOl'atlon created by itself. Indeed, neither state could take Jurisdiction
over the property or proceedln11:e of the
corporation beyond Its own Umite; and,
as is said uy the court In Railroad Co. v.
Wheeler, 1 Black, 29i, a corporation 'can
have no existence beyond the limits of the
state or sovereignty which btinge it into
life, and endows it with its faculties and
powers.'" In Bridge Co. v. Adame Co.,
88 Ill. 619, thA plalntlft waR 11 cousollda.tefl corporation, so called, created by
the laws of Illlnoi11 and Missouri for
bridging the l\fisslSBlppl river between
those states. Tl.e plaintiff, a bridge company, to a void taxation In Illinois, claimed
to be a corporation of both states, and
not of either alone. The court In its opinion said: "It is ea.Id by appellants. this
corporation, althouJrh It derived some of
its powers, and In p1ut Its corporate existence, from this state, [Illlnols,] derh·ed
a.n equal part from the so\·ereign Htate of
Mls1murl, and the1·efore they a.re not a corporation created under the laws of either
state. To this It Is answered, aml we
think satisfactorily, that the legislatures
of this state and of MlsRourl cannot act
Jointly, nor can any legislation of. the lastnamed state have the least effect m creating a corporation In this state. Hence
the corporate existence of appellants, considered as a corporation of thi11 state,
must spring from the leglsla.tlon of the
state which by Its own vigor performs the
a.ct. The states of Illinois and Missouri
have no power to unite in passing any
legh1h1th·e act. lt le lmpoSBlble, In the
very nnture of their organizations. that
they can do so. They<'annot so fuse themselves Into a single sovereignty, and as
such create a body politic which shall be
a corporation of the two states without
being a corporation of ea.ch state or of
.elthf'r state." In Railroad Co. v. Auditor
General, 5a Mich. !ll, 18 N. W. Rep. 0811, it
appeared that the general railroad law of
Michigan made roads that lie partly within and partly without the state taxable
on so much of their gross receipts as corresponded to the ratio of thelrlocaltothelr
entire length. A local company was consolidated with a foreign onethatcontr•Jllecl
a number of other consolidated roads,
and s1weral leased lines besides: and in
considering the effect of the ronsolldatlon
the court 11ald, speaking by Chief Justice
CooL~;y:
"It is familiar law that each
corporation haR Its existence and domicile, so far as the te1·111 can be appllcuble to the artificial person, w~hin the
terl'itory of the sovereign creating it.
• * * It eomes into existence there l.Jy an
exercise of sovereignty will: and, though
it may be allowed to exercise corporate
functions within another sovereignty, It
2i9
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is impossible to conceive of one joint act,

performed simultaneously by two sov-

reign states, which shall bring a single

corporation into being, except it be by

compact or treaty. There may be sepa-

rate consent given for the consolidation

of corporations separately created; but,

when thetwo unite, they severally bring to

the new entity the powers and privileges

already possessed, and the consolidated

company simply exercises in each jurisdic-

tion the powers the corporation there

chartered had possessed, and succeeds

there to its privileges. ”

it would seem clear, from the decisions

we have cited, as well as on general prin-

ciples, that the plaintiff in this case must

be considered simply in its character as a.

corporation created by the laws of New
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Hampshire, and as such a citizen of that

state, and so en titled to go into the cir-

cuit court oi‘ the United States, and bring

its bill against a citizen of anyotherstate,

and that its union or consolidation with

another corporation of the same name,

organized under the laws of Massachu-

setts, did not extinguish or modify its char-

acter as a citizen of New Hampshire, or

give it any such additional citizenship in

Massachusetts as to defeat its right to go

into the circuit court of the United States

in that district. If the position taken by

defendants could be maintained,then they

could sue in the federal court in New

Hampshire the New Hampshire corpora-

tion, while that corporation could not en-

force its claims in the federal court of

Massachusetts against the Massachusetts

corporation. From the cases we have cit-

ed, it is evident that by the general law

railroad corporations created by two or

more states, though joined in their inter-

ests, in the operation of their roads, in

the issue oi their stock,and in the division

of their proﬁts, so as practically to be a

single corporation, do not lose their iden-

it_v, and that each one has its existence

and its standing in the courts oi’ the coun-

try only by virtue ol the legislation oi the

state by which it is created. 'l‘he union

of name, of oﬂ-lcers, of business. and of

property does not change their distinctive

character as separate corporations

We turn now to a. consideration of the

claims put forth by the plaintiff for a res-

toration to it of moneys appropriated to

the use and for the beneﬁt of the defendant

corporation. As seen by the provisions of

the joint traﬁic contract given above, the

Lowell Corporation was to complete the

construction of a passenger station, with

all necessary approaches, in the city of

Boston.in 1857, at its own expense, and to

alter the passenger depot then existing

thereinto a freight depot, also at its own

expense, and the Nashua Corporation was

at its own expense to erect a freight depot

at the city of Lowell for the accommoda-

PROOF.

le Impossible to conceive of one Joint act,
performed simultaneously by two eov1·<>lgn states, which shall bring a single
corporation Into being, except It be by
compact or treaty. There may be eepara te consent given for the consolidation
of eorpomtlons separately created; but,
when thetwounlte, they severally bring to
the new entity the poweN and privileges
alrt•ady possessed, and the consolidated
company shnply exercises In each jurisdiction the powers the corporation there
chartered bad pos!leffsed, and succeeds
thel'e to Its prlvtlegeR. "
It would seem clear, from the decisions
we have cited, as well ae on genera.I principles, that the plalntlft In thib case must
be consldenid simply In Its character as a.
corporation created by the laws of New
Hampshire, and as Ruch a citizen of that
atate, and so entitlt"d to go Into the circuit court of the United States, and bring
Its blll against a citizen of any otherstate,
and that Its union or consulldntlon with
another corporation of the same name,
o~anlzed under the laws of MaBBachueette, did not extinguish or modify Its character as a. citizen of New Hampshire, or
give It any such additional citizenship In
MaHRnchueetts as to defeat Its rlg:ht to go
Into the circuit court of the United 8tates
In that district. If the position taken by
defendants could be maintained, then they
could sue In the fe<leral court In New
Hampshire the New Hampshire corpore.tlon, while that corporation could not enforce ltR claims in the federal court of
Massachusetts against the Massachusetts
corporation. From the cases we have cited, it Is evident that by the general law
railroad corporations created by two or
more states, though Joined in their interests, In the operation of their roads, in
the Issue of their stock, and In the dh-ielon
of their profits, so as practically to be a
single corporation, do not lose their idenlty, and that ea.ch one bas its existence
and its standing In the courts of the country only by virtue or the legislation of the
11tnte hy which It Is created. The union
of name, of offlcers, of business, and of
property does not change their distinctive
chnracter as separate corporatlonR
·
\Ve turn now to a conRlderatlon of the
claims put forth lly the J>laintlff for a restoration to It of moneys appropriated to
the u11e and for the benefit of the defendant
corporation. As seen by the provlldons of
the Joint traffic contra.ct given above, the
Lowell Corporation was to complete the
construction of a passenger station, with
all nec<'SHary apvruaches. lu the city of
Bo11ton, In 18a7, at its own tlXpense, aml to
alter the pnHsenger depot then existing
therelnto a freight depot, also at its own
es1>t'nMe, and the Nashua Cor}lorntion wal!I
at ltH own expense to erect a freight depot
at the city of Lowell for the accommodation of the joint lnuliness; and in ca He of
det1tructlon of buildings belonging to either
pnrty, or damage to them by fire, thf'y
Wert' to be rebuilt or replaced by the owner. As observed by counsel, It would appear that, when ent~red Into, It was not
the Intent of thecontrnct that either party
8hould be ch11rgPcl for impro\'ementM, add Itlons, or even reHtora tlons In the reul es:!SO

ta.te or terminal facilities of the other.
Bnt, with the lncreaee of bnsiness under
the Joint m1magement, It became evident,
tf the busluettB was to be retained, that
larger terminal factlltlf'B a.t Boston were
necessary ; and th" character and extent
of the needed Improvements were the subject of frequent consideration among the
directors of the two companies. In the
mean time the construction of another
paBBenger station there was commf'nced
by the Lowell Company; and, at a meeting of the directors of the Nashua Corporation on the 23d of July, 1872, it was
voted as follows: "'rhat tllellxpendituree
made and to he made by the Boston 4:
Lowell Rullrottd Corporation for land and
building In Boston for a new station,
u.nd the expf'ndltures mnde 'lnd to be
made b) Maid corporation for the building
and comi>letlng the Mystic River Railroad,
and for the improvements In Winrhester
for a new station and land for railway
purposes, to the amount or f20,000, are to
be treated In the management of the business, under the Joint b11slnesH contract existing between suld corporation and the
Nashua &: Lowell Railroad Corporation,
as follows, vis.: 1.'hesaid Boston &Lowell
Rntlroad Corporation are to be paid the
Interest upon such expenditures made and
to be made at the rate of seven per ceut.
per annum, at the end of each six months.
out of the receipts of the joint corporations under said contract, and which Is to
be charged as a part of the expenses of
operating said railways under said contract; and the cashier of said two corporations, and treasurer of the Boston &
Lowell Railroad Corporation, ts hereby
directed to make up 11.n Interest account
upon such expenditures to April 1, 1~2.
and pay the amonnt found due to the
Boston & Lowell Railroad Corporation
out of the joint receipts of said two corporations. " Under the authority of this
vote, there was deducted from the net
earnings of the Joint management the interest on the expenditures Incurred In the
construction of the p8"8enger station In
the city of Boston at the rate of 7 per
cent.; the same being treR ted as operating expenses of the road. The amunnt of
the net earnings thus diverted from the
Nashua Company, being Bl per cent. of
the Interest on the whole expenditure incnrred, is alle,;ed to have been $181,962;
and the right to thus appropriate those
earnings depends upon the sufficiency 'of
that authority.
, The question thus presented Is not free
from dllftculty. As a genernl rnlP, we
should not hesitate to say that the directors of the Nashua Company could not authorize, without the previous approval of
its sto(·kholders, the construction of apassen2er 11tatlon at a. city In a state foreign
tu that In which it was created, and to
which ltM own road did not extend. or the
payment or any portion of the cost of tile
contructlon. Huch ex1>endltt1reH would not
be:: conHldered as f1dllng within the ordinary sc<>pe of their powers. See Railway
Co. v. Allerton, 18 Wall. 233; Davie v.
Railroad Cu .. 131 l\faRs. 2:18, and eases
there cited, parti<'ularly ('olnum v. Railway Cu.,10 Bea.v. l, and BagHIUlW v. Rall-
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way Co.,7 Hare, 114. But the fact that

the increased iacilities provided at Boston

were necessary to enable thejoint manage-

ment to retain its extended business, in

which the Nashua Company was oi course

directly interested,changes the position oi

the directors oi that company with refer-

ence to such expenditures, and brings

them within the general scope of the di-

" rectors’ powers. Such is the conclusion oi

a majority of the court. and therefore the

.suit cannot be maintained for the restora-

tion to the complainant oi moneys thus

expended, which otherwise would have

gone to it as net earnings of the joint

management. But the purchase oi the

controlling interest in the stock oi the

Lowell 8: Lawrence and oi the Salem &

Lowell Railroad Companies stands upon
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a diﬂerent footing. That we a matter

solely for the Lowell Corporation. The

purchase was never authorized by any

rote oi the directors of the Nashua Com-

pany. At the time those roads were un-

der lease to the Lowell Corporation, and

had been taken into the joint account,und

the net earnings divided between the two

corporations in the same ratio as were

the earnings of their own roads. This

gave to the Nashua Corporation all the

beneﬁts that could possibly arise irom the

ownership by the Lowell Corporation oi a

controlling interest in their capital stock.

The additional burden oi the purchase

could in no way, therefore, be cast upon

the Nashua Corporation without the con-

sent oi its stockholders: and no such con-

sent was given either by them, nor, as al-

ready said, was any given byits directors.

The pretense ior the purchase was that

the leases were invalid, and that other

parties might otherwise obtain control of

those roads, and thus injuriously affect

the business of the joint nianagenimt.

The charter oi the complainant did not

extend to the purchase ofeontrolllng inter-

ests in the railroads of other states under

the apprehension that such roads might

become business competitors. The com-

plainant is thereiore entitled to an account-

ing by the Lowell Company ior the net

earnings of the joint management which

were appropriated towards the interest

on the sums expended in the purchase oi

the stock of those companies, and to the

payment oi the amount found due to it

upon such accountinl.':. The decree oi the

court below will he reversed, and the

cause remanded for further proceedings in

accordance. with this opinion; and it is so

ordered.

BLATCHFORD, J.. did not sit in this

case, or tuke any part in its decision.

FULLER.C.J.,and GRAY and LAMAR,

JJ=, dissent on the question of jurisdiction.
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way Co., 7 Hare, 114. But the fact that
the Increased facutties provided at Boston
were necesearyto enabl~ theJolntmanagen1ent to retain Its extended buslneBS, lo
which the Nashua Company was of course
directly interested, changes the position of
the directors of that company with- reference to such expendlturul!I, and brings
them within the general scope of the di. rectors' powers. Such 1111 tne conclusion of
a majority of the court, and therefore the
,suit cannot be maintained for the restoration tu the complainant of moneys thus
expended, which otherwh1e would have
gone to It as net earnings of the joint
management. But the pun·ha.se of the
controlllng interest In the stock of the
Lowell & Lawrence and of the Salem &
I.uwell Railroad Companies stands upon
a different footing. That was a matter
solely for the Lowell Corporation. The
purchase was never autliorlzed by any
,·ote of the directorl!I of the Nashua Company. At the time thutte roadtt were under lease to the Lowell Corporation, and
had been taken into tbe Joint account, und
the net earnings divided between the two
corporations In the same ratio as were
the earnlmrs of their own roadR. This
gu veto the Nashna Corpora tlon all the
IJeneftts that could po881bly arise from the
ownerlllhip by the Lowell Corporation of a
euntrolllng interest in their capital stock.
The add I tlonal burden of tht1 purch1111e
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could in no way, therefore, be cast upon
the Nashua Corporation without the consent of its stockholders: and no Much consent was given either by them, nor, as already said, was any given bylts directors.
The pretense for the purchase was that
the lea.Pee wera invalid, and that other
parties might otherwise obtain control of
those roatls, and thus injuriously affect
the business of the joint managem~nt.
The charter of the complainant did not
exteud to the purchase ofeoutrolllng Interests in the rallroad11 of other t1tate11 under
the apprehension that such roads might
become buelnese competitors. The complainant le therefore entitled to nn accountln!J by the Lowell Company for the net
earnings of the Joint management which
were appropriated towards the interest
on the sums expended in the purchMe of
the stock of those companlel!I, and to the
11ayment or the amouut fouml due to it
upon such accountln11:. Thf! <lPCree of the
court below will he revenoed, and the
cause remanded for further (lroceedlnge In
accordencP. with thit1 opinion; am.I it i<J so
ordered.
BLATCHFORD, J., did not Rlt in this
case, or tuke any part In itt1 decision.
FULLER,C.J.,and GRAY and LAMAR,
JJ.,diseeoton the question of Juriedic.-tlon.
281
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MILLER v. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS et al.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

April 1, 1890.

(24 N. E. 228, 123 Ind. 196.)

Supreme Court of Indiana. April 1, 1890.

Appeal from circuit court. Hendricks

county; Jonx V. HADLEY, Judge.

Action by Catherine A. Miller against

the city of Indianapolis and another.

There was judgment for defendants, and

plaintiff appeals.

Wm. Watson Woollen and Wm. E. Nib-

Appeal from circuit court, Hendricks
county; Jon:s V. BADI.EY, .JndgP.
Action by Catherine A. '.\tiller against
the city of Indianapolis and nnother.
There was Judgment for defoudants, and
plaintiff uppe11.ls.
Wm. Watson Woollen and Wm. E. ~'/b
lack, for appellant. ll"m. L. Taylor, Denny & EJ/iott, and A. L. Mnson, for appellees.

lack, for appellant. Wm. L. Taylor, Den-

lny & Elliott, and A. L. Mason, for appel-

ees.

COFFEY, J. A controversy arosein this

case, in the circuit court, as to whether it

was an action to quiet title, or an action

to obtain an injunction. Acting upon the

theory that it was an action to obtain an

injunction, the circuit court refused the
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request of the appellant for a trial by jury.

and also overruled the application of the

appellant for anew trial as of right. The

complaint in the cause, omitting the cap-

tion and the description of theland in con-

troversy,is as follows: “Catherine A. Mil-

ler, plaintiff.-complains of the city of lu-

dianapolis, Leander A. Fulmer, and George

W. Seibert, defendants. and says that she

is the owner of the following described

real estate; ' “ " that said defend-

ants have unlawfully, wrongfully, illegal-

ly, and forcibly taken possession of the

same, and, without having condemned the

same, are threatening to do great and ir-

reparahle damage to the same, in this:

that they are threatening to cut down the

trees and vines that have been placed

thereupon and have been grown thereon

by the plaintiff, and are threatening to

plow the land and grade the same, and

arc threatening to make a street over and

upon it; and this she avers they are do-

ing without leave or license from her, and

with full notice that she is the owner

thereof, and under a claim that said real

estate is a public street in said city. She

therefore prays that, as against said de-

fendants, her title be quieted to said real

estate, and that said defendants may be

forever enjoined from further trespassing

thereon, and damaging the same. "

It is conceded by both parties, in their

briefs and in the argument of his cause.

that every pleading must proceed upon

some single deﬁnite theory, which must

be determined by its general scope and

character, and that the prayer for relief

does not determine the character of the

pleading, nor assign to it any particular

iheory. Bank v.Ro0t,107 Ind.224. 8 N. E.

Rep. 105; Houck v. Graham, 106 Ind. 195,

6 N. E. Rep. 594. This complaint is desti-

tute of some of the allegations found in

an ordinary complaint to quiet title. In-

deed, there is no pretense that any one or

all of the defendants make any claim to

the title to the land in controversy.

While it is true that cities, by their com-

COFFEY, J. A controversy aro11eln this
ctu1e, In the drcult court, as to whether It
was an action to quiet title, or an action
to obtain an Injunction. Acting upon the
theory that It was an action to obtain 11.n
Injunction, the circuit court refused the
requestnfthe appellant for a trial by Jury.
and also overruled the application of the
appellant for anew trial a.s of right. The
complaint In the cause, omitting the caption and thedeecriptlon of the land In controveniy,ls as follows: "Catherine A. Miller, plalntlff•. complalns of the city of ludlunnpolls, Leander A. Fulmer, and George
W. Seibert, defenrlants. and says that she
Is the owner of the following described
real estate; • • • that said defend1m ts have unlawfully, wrongfully, tllegally. and forcibly taken possession of the
same, and, without having condemned the
same, are threatening to do great and lrreparahle damage to the same, In this:
that they are threatening to cut down the
trees and vines that have been placed
thereupon nnd have been grown thereon
by the plaintiff. and are threatening to
plow the land and grade the 1mme, and
are threatening to make a. street over and
upon It; and this she avers they are doing without leave or license from her, and
with full notice that she ls the owner
thereof, and under u claim that said real
estate IK a public street In said city. She
therefore prays that, as against satd defendants, her title be quieted to said real
estate, and that ea.Id defendants may be
forever enjoined from further trespassing
thereon, and uamaglng the same."
It Is conceded by both parties, In their
briefs and In the argument of hlt1 cause,
that every pleading must proceed upon
some sln~le definite tl1eory, which must
be determined b_v its general scope and
charRcter, and that the prayer for relief
does not determine the character of the
pleading, nor assign to It any particular
1 heory. Bank v. Root, 107 Ind. 224. 8 N. E.
Rep. 105; Houck v. Graham, 106 Ind. 195,
6 N. E . Rep. 594. Thie complaint Is dewtitute or some of the allegntloni,i found In
an ordinary comvlalnt to quiet title. Indeed, there Is no pretense that any one or
all of the defendants make any claim to
the title to the lanrl In contl"Oversy.
While it Is true that cities, by their common councils. have the control of the
streets and allevs within their territorial
limlt11,.,t cannot"becorr~tlysnld thatthey
own such streets and alleys. A grant or
dedication of a street le a i!trant or dellicu282

tion to the public, and not to the city. ln
the case of Conner v. New Albany, I Blackf.
45, It was said by this court: "'!'hat which
le granted to New Albany cannot be 'public,' in the unqualified Hl'llflP of the word;
nor can that which is granted to the public be In any sense the exclusive property
of New Alba.ny. A grant of a public1:1treet
of high way. through either town or country, cannot be considered otherwise than
as a grant to the public." See, also, City
of EvanHvllle v. Evans, 37 Ind. 229.
The complnint, however, does contain
all the nece1111ary allegations for an injunc-tlon in cases of threatened Irreparable injury. High, Inj. §§ iOl. i02. It le to be
gathered from the complaint that the city
of Indianapolis claims that the strip of
ground In controversy le tt publtc street,
and that, acting upon that claim, the
other defendantH tu this 11.ctlon were procee<llna- to cut down the trees and vines
growh.1g thereon, plow up and grade the
same as a street, to the lrrcparnble injury
of the plaintiff. In such case the only adequate remedy of the appellant was by Injunction. In no other case would the
cha.rgc thatappelleeR were about to do the
appellant Irreparable Injury find an appropriate place. We are of the opinion
thRt this complaint must be regarded as
a complaint to enjoin the nppellees from
the commission of the threatened injury
therein set forth, and thR.t tt proceeds upon the theory tbat the appellant had no
other adequate remedy. It follows that
the clreult court did not err In refuslnar; the
request of the appellant for a jury trial,
as the trial of actions for Injunctions belongs exclusively to the court. Nor did
the court err tn overruling the application
of the appellant for a new trial as of right.
as such riitht does not extPnd to R<·tiomt
for lnjunctl ve relief. Liggett v. HlnklPy,
120 Ind. 3S7, 22 N. E. Rep. 206. The defense
relied upon by the a)Jpelleee was that the
strip of ground in controversy had been
dedicated to the public Rs a street, bycnmmlesiouers appointed by the Marlon county cl\·11 circuit court, In a partition suit
pending In that court In the year 1!'168. A
certified copy of the record and proceeding
In that cause was read In o\'ldence on the
trial of this cause, over the objection of
the appellunt.
It iR not seriously contended that the
court had 110 power to order the land Involved In that suit laid off In lots, blocks.
streets, and alleys, but, as t.heplatprepared
by the commlHsioners to plat the land
and make partition of the same le not set
out in this record, It Is earnr11tlycontcnded
that the decree In partition is void for uncertaint~·. It appears by the l't'Cord read
in e\·lden<>e that SllBRn L. DaYl<lson and
the appellant In this cause lnstitutetl, In the
Marton circuit court In the year 1868, a
partition suit against Noah N. Da\"ldtmn
and others, in which it was alleged that
the plaintiffs therein nnd the said NoRh
N. Davidson were the ownrrs and tenants
In common of a certain lle11eribcd tract of
land, Including the lan<t In controversy.
each of s11ld parties owning an undivided
one-third thereof. During the pendency
of the action the appellant Intermarried
with one Miiier, which fact was suggested
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to the court, and the said Miller was made

a party plaintiff with his wife, the appel-

lant herein. Upon a trial of the cause,

and after the court had entered an inter-

locutory decree ior partition, and had ap-

pointed commissioners to make partition,

the record recites that “it is further or-

dered, with the assent of all the parties,

that the commissioners be directed to lay

off said premises in to lots, blocks, streets.

and alleys, to facilitate such partition."

At a subsequent day in the term, being the

81st day of December. 1868, the commis-

sioners reported to the court that, after

being duly sworn, and having received a

copy of the order of the court, they pro-

ceeded. with the assistance oi a surveyor,

and laid off the land described in the order

into lots, blocks, streets, and alleys, and

that they had made a plat thereof, which
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they then reported to the court for ap-

proval. At the close of this report the fol-

lowing record entry was made: “ Where-

by it appears to the court that the said

commissioners have laid ofi the said prem-

ises into lots, blocks, streets, and alleys,

and it is now agreed to by the said par-

ties that said premises should helald off

into lots. blocks, streets, and alleys, the

same is hereby conﬁrmed; and the said

plat is ordered to be recordedin the record-

er’s office oi Marion county. Indiana, and

thereupon shall have the same validity in

law as if made by a legal proprietor oi

such land of full age.” On the same day

the said commissioners filed their report of

partition. in which they reported that they

had set off and partitioned to the said

Noah N. Davidson, blocks 3, 4, 7, 19, and

20.in Davidson’s third addition to the city

of Indianapolis; to Catherine A. Miller,

(this appellant,) blocks 5, 6, 8, and 15,

(hon1estead.) in the same addition; and

to Susan L. Davidson, blocks 10, 11, 12, 13,

14, 16, 17. and 18, in Davidson’s third addi-

tion to the city of Indianapolis. This re-

port was approved by the court, and a

judgment of partition was entered of rec-

ord accordingly. ’l.‘he court having juris-

diction oi the subject-matter, and of the

persons of the parties to this suit, it can-

not be reasonably contended that its judg-

ments and decrees in the premises are void,

unless they are so uncertain that it is im-

possible to ascertain therefrom what land

was set off and partitioned to each of the

parties. Douhtiess it would have been

much better to set out in the record the

plat prepared by the commissioners, divid-

ing the land into lots, blocks, streets, and

alleys, as that would have relieved the rec-

ord from any uncertainty,and would have

rendered the controversy we are now con-

sidering impossible; but still, if the record

furnishes the means by which it can be

deﬁnitely ascertained what the share as-

signed to each of the parties in the partition

thus made is. we do not think it is void.

Itis nottheofiice of a description to identi-

to the court, and the 11ald ~filler was made
a party plalntlrf with hl11 wife, the appellant herein. Upon a trial of the <'ause,
and after the court had entered an interlocutory decree for partition, and had appointed commlaisiuners to make partition,
the record recites that" It is further ordered, with the a11sent or nil the parties,
that the commlssloner11 be tllrected to lay
off said premlseH into lots, blocks, streets,
and alleys, to facllltate such partition."
At a subse1111ent day In the term, being the
31st day of December, JH68, the commissioners reported t.o the court that, after
being duly sworn, and having received a.
copy of the order or the court, they proceeded. with the ll8slstnn ce or n. sur,·eyor,
and laid on the land described in the order
Into lots, blocks, streetR, and alleys, and
that the.v had made a pint thereof, which
they then reported to the court for approval. At the close of thl11 report th(' followlnjl' record entry was made: "Whereby It appears to the court that the 11ald
commissioners hnve laid on the said premises Into lots, blocks, streets, and alleys,
aml It le now agreed to by the sal<1 partieR that !!Rid premlseR should be laid Oft
into lots, blocks. streets, and alleys, tho
11ame le hereby confirmed; and the said
plat ls ordered to be rec01·ded In the recorder's otflce of Marlou county, Indiana, and
thereupon sl1111l have the same validity In
law aR if made by a legal proprietor of
such land of full age." On the same day
the 1mld t•ommlssloners Hied their report of
partition, In which they reported that they
hRd set orf and partitioned to the said
Noah N. Davidson, blocks 3, 4, 7, 19, and
20.fn DRvld11on'ethlrd addition to the city
of Indlannpolls; to Catherine A. Miller,
(this appellant,) blocks 5, 6, 8, and 15,
(homestend,) In the 11nme a1dttlon; and
to Susan L. Davidson, blocks 10, 11, 12, 13,
14, 16, 17. and 18, In David1mn's third addition to the city of Indianapolis. Thie report was appro,·ed by the court, and a
Judgment of partition was entered of mcord accordlnglv. 'l'he court having Jurisdiction of the subject-mutter, and of the
person11 of the parties to this eult, It cannot be reuonablycontended that its judgments and decrees In the premises are void,
unless they are so uncertain that It Is lmpo88lble to asce1·taln ther_:efrom what land
wae set ott and partitioned to each of the
parttee. Doubtlees It would have been
much better to set out In the record the
plat prepan:-d hy the com1l'llBBlone:ni, dividing tbe land into lote, blocks, streets, and
alleys, RB that would ha ,.e n:-lleved the record from any uncertainty, and would have
rendered the controv~rsy we are now considering impossible; but still, If the record
fornlshee the means by which tt can be·
definitely ascertained what the share nsBigned to each of the parties In thepartlt!on
thue made ts. we do not think It Is void.
It iR not the otHce of a description to Identify property. but its office le to furnish the
mennH of Identification. Boyd v. Doty,~
Ind. 370; Peck v. Sims, 120 lnd. :>ta. :?~ N.
E. Rep. 313. For the means of ldentlfylug
the property set off to the respective parties to this suit, we are referred, by the record, to the plat prepared by the commissioners, under the order of the cuu1·t to Jay
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the land off into lots, blocks, streets, and
alleys, and we are to look for that pint In
the recorder's office of Marlon county,
where the same le ordered to be l"('{'Ol'ded.
If, when found and properly Identified, the
property set off to each can be ascerta.lnt>d,
we know of no reason why it should not
be as effectual as lf copied Into the record
or the partl ti on procPedlngs. The office of
a descrlptlou has been fulfilled, and the
means of l<lentlftcatlon are at hand. It
ts plnln, therefore, that the record of the
proceedln~e In partition now before us Is
.to be considered and construed In connection with the plat prepared by the commissioners, If that plat can be found und
identlfif'(J, for such plut Is, in Ju.ct, a plat
of the proceedings tn that caHe.
.
Over the objection or the appellant, the
appelleee rea<l In evidence, on the trial of
this cause, whet purported to be a certified copyof the record of th('I plateboYe J'&.
ferred to, us taken and copied from one or
the plttt-booke In the recorder's office of
Marion county. It ts contended by tile
appellant tba.t, as this plat 18 a part of
the proceeding in the partition suit, It
should hu·e appeared In the record In that
cause, and should have been recorded In
the deed record, under the pro,·i8ions
of the a.ct of March 5, 1&19, fouud on
pa.ge 760, 1 Rev. St. 1!!76, and that there
was no law In force authorizing its record
In the plat-book of the recorder's office.
When this evidence was offered by the uppelleee, It was objected to by the appellant
upon the p:rounlle-F/rst, that the recor1I
and certifieate Rhow that it i8 a cprtlfled
copy of the plat-book of Marlon county,
Ind.; second, that there 18 nu law lu this
state which authorizes the re~orrling of a.
plat In the plat-book; third, that under
the law In this state tlif're Is no such thing
known as a plat-b0ok to be kept by the
recorder; fo11rth, that the statutes of this
state require that when a plat le ma1le it
shall be recorded In the l'\!Cord of deed~ of
the county, and this does not purport to
be from such record; fltih, tba.t It was lrumaterlal, Irrelevant, and tncom1>etent, and
that there Is no leeue In the rnee under
which it ls admissible.
Au examination orthls plat dlsrloees the
fa.ct that it embraces the ea.me land described In the partition proceeding set out
above. It divides the land Into lote,
blocks, streets, and alleys, and J>Ur1>orts
to have been signed and acknowledged by
the commissioners ap)>olnted by the court
to di vlde the same, and make pttrtltlon.
It refers to the partition case by title and
number, and designates it as "Davld11on'e
Third Addition to t.he City of Indianapolis," and benrR date the 31st day or December, 1868, thedate on which the record in the
partition proceeding Informs us that it
was acknowledged and approved hy the
court. It was recorded In plat hook No.
3, In the omce of the recorder of Murion
r.ounty, on the 9th day of Junuary, 1869.
There Is little room for doubt that the
paper bcfure us Is a copy of the plat made
by the comrnh1sloners In the partition suit
to which the appellant WaB a. party. The
serious question ls as to whetllP.r It comes
to us In the shape of ll'gltlmate evidence.
Our ttttentlon bes not been called to any
283
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express statutory provision authorizing

what is known as a “plat-hook. ” While

the law not only authorizes, but abso-

lutely requires. that plats of towns and

cities, and additions thereto, shall be re-

corded,it seems to be silent as to the name

of records in which they shall be so re-

corded. We must take notice, however, oi

the fact. as part of the current history of

the public business of the state, that books

known as “plat-books” areand have been

for many years kept by the county record-

ers in the various counties of the state, in

which are recorded the plats of the towns

and cities, and the additions thereto, and

‘that such books are kept as public records.

In procuring such records, the county re-

corders no doubt acted upon the correct

presumption that, where the law required
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that a. particular class of instruments

should be recorded, and madeno provision

for any speciﬁc book in which they should

be so recorded, it was their duty to

procure suitable records for that purpose.

Indeed, frequent reference is made to such

records in the statutes of the state. and

they have frequently been recognized by

legislative enactment as legal public rec-

ords. With this knowledge before it, the

legislature enacted section 3253, Rev. St.

18b1, which provides that “the acknowl-

edgments oi all plats of towns and cities,

and of all additions thereto, heretofore

taken and certified by any officer provided

for in section 3374. are hereby legalized;

and the recording of such plats and addi-

tions as have heretofore been acknowl-

edged before and certiﬁed by any officer

provided for in said section is hereby de-

clared to be valid and effectual in law to

all intent and purposes.” In view of these

facts, and in view of the statute above

quoted, we are constrained to hold that

the plat-book from which the plat before

us was copied is a legal public record, in

which the plat prepared by the commis-

sioners in the partition suit before us was

properly recorded. To hold otherwise

would be to adjudge that most, if not all,

of the plats prepared in the last 30 or

40 years have never been properly re-

corded, and would tend to great confusion

and much inconvenience. We are of the

opinion that the certiﬁed copy of the plat

before us was properly admitted in evi-

dence. provided there was an issue in the

cause under which it was admissible.

The only pleading ﬁled by the appellees

was ageueral denial, and whether the plat

was admissible in evidence under that

plea depends upon what fact it tended to

prove. The appella.nt’s right to recover

in the action rested upon the assumption

that she was the owner of the strip of

land in controversyat thetime of the com-

mencement oi her suit. Whatever tended

to prove that she was not such owner was

admissible undera denial of the allegation
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express statutory prorlslon authorizing
what i1t known as a "plat-hook." While
the law not only authorizes, but absolutely requires. that plats of towns and
cities, and additions thereto, shall be recorded, It seems to be sllent a.s to the name
of records In which they shall be so recorded. We must take notice, however, of
the fact, as part of the current history of
thepubltc business of the state, that l>ooks
known 8S "plat-books" areand have been
for many years kept by the county recorders In the various counties of the state, in
which are recorded the plats of the towns
and cities, and the additions thereto, and
'that Huch books are kept 8S public records.
In J>rocurlng such records, the county recorders no doubt acted upon the correct
presumption that, where the law required
that n particular class of Instruments
should be recorded, and made no provision
for any speclttc book In which they s'1ould
be so recorded, It waa their duty to
proc11re suitable records for that purpose.
Indeed, frequent reference Is ma<le to such
records In. the statutes of the state, and
they have frequently been recognized by
legt1'1atl\"e enactment as legal publlc records. With this knowledge before it, the
legislature enacted section 3253, Rev. St.
l~l, which provides that "the acknowledgments of all plate of towns and cities,
and of all additions thereto, heretofore
taken and certlfle<l hy any officer provld~d
for In section 3374, are hereby legalized;
and the rt'Cording of such plats and additions as have heretofore been acknowledged hefore and certified by any officer
provided for lo said section ls hereby declared to be valld and effectual In law to
all intent and purposes." In view of these
fa.eta, anr\ In view of the statute abo'\'e
quoted, we are construined to hol<l that
the plat-book from which the plat before
us was copied Is a legal public ree6rd, in
which the plat prepared by the commissioners lo the partition suit before us was
properly recorded. To bold otherwise
would be to adjudge that moflt, if not all,
of the plats prepared In the last 30 or
40 years have ne\"er been properly recorded, an<l would tend to great confusion
and much ineonvenhmce. We are of the
opinion that the certlfled copy of the plat
before us was properly admitted in evidence, provided tllere was an lRBue in the
cause under which it was admissible.
The only pleading flied by the appellees
was a general denial, anti wbethe1· the plat
was admissible in evidence under that
plea depends upon what fact it tended to
prove. The appellant's right to recover
In the action rl-sted upon the assumption
that she was the owner of the strip of
land In controversy at the time of the commencement ot her suit. Whatever tended
to prove that. shewas not suchownerwas
admissible uHdera denial of the allegation
that Rhe was the owuer. We think the
plat read lo evidence, when taken lu connf'Ction with the other evidence In the
cauHe, tended to show that she was not
tmch owner. Porn. Rem. §§ 6~73. The
land in contro\"ersy consists of a strip GO
feet wide, extending east and westtbrough
the entire width of the tract of land desc1·ibed In the partition proceeding aborn
2~

set out. Its length Is lOU? feet, and Its
width Is 60 feet. As shown by the plat before us, tt is bounded on the north by a tier
of blocks,nombere<l,respectively,12, 13, 14,
aod 15, the last being the homestead and
one of the blocks assigned to appellant in
the partition procePdlng. It ls bounded
on the south by blocks numbered 5, 6, 7, 8,
ll, 10, and 11. The first lots ahove named
front south on this strip, and the last
named front north on the strip. It le not
named on the plat as a street, but It lntersects Preston st:reet on the west, and le
marked with the figures "60" at each end.
Upon the trial of the cause the appellant
proposed to prove, by competent oral testimony, that In laying oft this addition to
the city of Indianapolis It was not the Intention of the commissioners who platted
the same to de1Uclfte this strip to the public as a street, to which offered testimony
the court sustalne<l an objection, and the
appellant excepted. At the time this evidence wa11 offered by the appellant It was
In proof that all the property abutting on
this strip bad passed Into the hands of
third parties, either by way of direct conveyance, or hy mee.ns of mortgages executed by the parties to whom the blocks
had been assigned in the partition suit.
In these se\"eral conveyances and mortgages the land is described by blocks, as
it is described In the plat prepared by the
commissioners to plat the same, and as It
ts described In the report of partition made
by said commissioners. The city of Indianapolis, acting upon the assumption that
this strip had been <ledlca.ted to the public
as a .street, bad accepted it as sueh, and
was proceeding to grRde and improve It.
It le not contended by the appellant
that tblsetrlp of land is either a lot, block,
or alley. It IR neither a lot, block, street,
nor alley. It. ls a strip of land left by the
commlRsloners appointed to make partition, wholly undivided. ln their report
to the court the commissioners reported
that they had divided the land Intended
for partition into lots, blocks, streets, and
alleys, and in their report of partition
they Informed the court that they had assl!(ned to each of the parties Interested lo
sold land hlsorhersbareln the same, In severalty. No person examlnlnar these proceedings wo•lld be led to believe that any
portion of the land described therein was
left undh·lded, but, on the contrary, when
examining the plat in connection wltb
the report of the commissioners In partition, and the Judgment of the court thereon, would be led to the belief that the strip
In controversy was intended as a 60-fout
street, furnlshlnar an outlet for the blocks
abutting thereon. If the strip had been
deslgna ted "Mia.mi Street," or a street by
any other name, tt would not be contended that the appellant could not show by
parol testimony that it was not Intended
to <ledicutu It as a public street. Marking
e. 11tn>et upon a plat of an addlth>n to a
town or city, and selling lots with reference thereto, constltutt..'8 a dedication.
Faust v. City of Huntington, 91 Ind. 49.1;
City of Evansvllle v. Page, 23 Ind. 525;
City of Logansport v. Dunn, 8 Ind. 878;
City of lntllanapollsv. Kingsbury, 101 Ind.
200. As to whether a plat contains au ex-
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press dedication oi a strip oi ground to

the public, as a street, is a matter oi law

ior the court. Hanson v. Eastman, 21

Minn. 509; Yates v. Judd, 18 Wis. 118;

Sanborn v. Railway Co., 16 Wis. 19. In

City oi Indianapolis v. Kingsbury, supra,

it was said by this court: “But the in-

tention to which courts give heed is not

an intention hidden in the mind oi the

land-owner, but an intention manifested

by his acts. It is the intention which ﬁnds

expression in conduct. and not that which

is secreted in the heart of the owner, that

the law regards. Acts indicate the inten-

tion, and upon the intention. clearly ex-

pressed by open acts and visible conduct,

the public and individual citizens may

act. ” “The question whether a person in-

tends to make a dedication oi ground to

the public ior a street or other purpose
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must be determined irom his acts and

statements explana tory thereoi, in connec-

tion with all the circumstances that sur-

round and throw light upon the subject.

and not from what he may subsequently

testify as to his real intention in relation

to the matter." City oi Uolumbus v.

Dahn, 36 Ind. 330; Lamar Co. v. Clements.

49 'l‘ex. 347; City oi Denver v. Clements, 3

Colo. 487. An implied dedication may be

rebutted by parol testimony, but where

the dedication is express, evidenced by a

recorded plat, the intent, as expressed in

such plat,cannot becontradicted by parol.

City oi Indianapolis v. Kingsbury, supra,

and authorities there cited. When the

plat before us is construed in connection

with the partition proceedings oi which it

constitutes a part, as the same is ex-

plained by the report oi the commission-

ers in partition and the judgment oi the

court thereon,no other reasonable con-

clusion can be drawn than that the strip

oi land in controversy was intended as a.

60-loot street. ior the beneﬁt oi the block

abutting thereon, and as iurnishlng a

means oi ingress and egress to the same.

Relying on this dedication, the property

adjoining this strip has passed into the

hands oi third parties, and the city oi In-

dianapolis, accepting such dedication, is

proceeding to improve the strip as u.

street. To permit the appellant to say,

now, that this strip was left by the com-

missioners asundivided land, and was not

intended as a. street, would be obviously

unjust to those who purchased the prop-

erty on the ialth oi the plat and the pur-

tition proceeding. We do not think the

court erred in reiusing to admit this oi-

iered testimony. We ﬁnd no error in the

record for which the judgment should be

reversed. Judgment -afﬁrmed.

ELLIOTT, J.. took no part in the decis-

ion oi this cause.
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pl"E'Ss dl'dlcatlon of a strip of &:round to
public, as a Btreet, Is a. ma ttP.r of la.w
for the court. Haueon v. Eastman, 21
.Minn. 509; Yates v. Judd, 18 Wis. 118;
8anborn v. Railway Co., 16 Wis. 19. In
City of lndlunapolb• v. Kingsbury, supra,
It wa11 said by this court: "But the Intention to whil-h courts give heed le not
an lntentlCln IJldden In the mind of the
land-owner, hut an Intention manlfeflted
by his acts. It Is the In ten ti on which finds
expre88lon in conduct. and not that which
Is secreted In the heart of the o°"'ner, that
the law regards. Acts indicate the Intention, and upon the Intention. clearly expressed by open acts and visible conduct,
the public and individual citizens may
act." "The question whether a per11on Intends to make a dedication of ground to
the public for a street or other purpo110
must be determined from hie acts and
ete.tementsexplana tory thereof, In connection with all the circumstn.nces that surround and throw light upon the subjel't.
and not !rom what he may subeequ,.ntly
testify as to his real Intention In relation
to thl' matter.•• City of Columbuf! v.
Dahn, 36 Ind. 330; Lamar Co. v. l'lementll,
4\l Tex. 347; City of Denver v. Clements, 3
Colo. 487. An implied dedication muy be
rebutted by parol testimony, but where
the dedication le express, evidenced by a
recorded plat, the intent, as expressed in
tlu~
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such plat, cannot hecontradlctecl by p111·01.
City of IndlanapollR v. Kingsbury, euprn,
and authorities there clt~l. When the
plat before us Is construed in connection
with the partition proceedings of which It
constitutes a part, af! the same IR explained by the report of the comml11Hloncre in partition and the judgment of the
court thereon, no other reasonable conclusion can be drawn than that the strip
of land In controversy was intended us a
60-foot st1-eet, for the benefit of the block
abutting thereon. and as furniBhlng a
means of lngrt'f!S and ei.treSS to the same.
Relying on thlR dedlcntlon, the property
adjoining this strip bas passed into the
h11.nd11 of thircl parties, and the city of Indianapolis, accepting such dedication, ls
proceeding to improve the strip as .1.1.
street. To permit the appcllaut to say,
now, that this stl1p was left by the commisslonetR asundl~lded land, and was not
intended as a street, would ht' obviously
unjust to those who purchased the property on the faith of the plat and the purtitlon proceeding. We do not think the
court erred In refusing to admit this offered testimony. We find no error in the
record for which the judgment should be
reversed. Judgment ·afflrmed.

ELLIOTT, J., took no part in the decision of this cauee.
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BC'RTON v. TrITE, City Treasurer.

PROOF.

BURTON v. TI’I'l‘E, City Trcnsurer.

(45 N. W. 88, 80 Mich. 218.)

(43 N. W. 88, 80 Mich. 218.)
·supreme Court of Michigan.

April 18, 1890.

‘Supreme Court of Michigan. April 18, 1890.

On petition for mandamus.

Act Mich. ]R89. No. 205, provides that the

oiiicers having the custody of any county,

city, or town records shall furnish proper

and reasonable facilities for the inspection

and examination of the records and ﬁles in

their offices, and for making memoranda

-or transcripts therefrom, to all persons

having occasion to make examination of

them for any lawful purpose.

Hemjv A. Chaney, ior relator. John W.

McGra £11, for respondent.

MORSE, J. The respondent is city treas-

urer oi Detroit. The relator is engaged in

the abstract business in said city. We

held, upon application oi the relator for
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mandamus, (see Burton v. Tuite, -H N. W.

Rep. 282,) thatcertain records in said treas-

urer’s office were public records, and that

relator had a right to examinethem, and to

make memoranda ortranscripts therefrom

under Act No. 205, Pub. Acts 1889, subject

to such proper and reasonable regulations

as the treasurer might make consistent

with the public use of such records. Our

order in the case, as made and entered in

the journal on the 8th day of January, 1890,

-commanded the said Tuite not only to al-_

low the relator to inspect and examine the

particular records involved in that case,

but also to generally furnish to him and

his subordinates reasonable and proper fa-

cilities ior the inspection and examination

-of the records and ﬁles in his office, and for

making memoranda. and transcripts there-

from in compliance with said above-named

act of the legislature. In the opinion. as

well as in the order, oi this court we meant

to so express our views and commands as

that there should be no mistake or misun-

derstanding as to the rights and duties of

the respective parties to this controversy.

But we are now called upon to enforce our

order. January 13, 1890. a petition was

ﬁled in this court by the relator showing

the proper service of our writ of peremp-

tory mandamus upon respondent, and set-

ting forth that, not withstanding our order

and command therein contained, the re-

spondent had since said service refused to

allow relator to have access to or look at

certain other public records in said oﬁice

of the city treasurer, to-wit: One book

containing the record of the certiﬁcates of

tax-sales that have been canceled; one

book containing a list of such lots as have

been sold to the city of Detroit, or to indi- 1

viduals, for special city taxes, and have 3

been from time to time redeemed; and a »

book containing a list of such lots or par-

cels of land in the city of Detroit as have

been heretofore sold to said city for de|in- ,
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quent city taxes, said sales being after-

wards assigned by the city to individuals.

On pl'titton for mandamus.
Act Mich. 188\J, No. 205, provides that the
officers hal'ing the custody of any county,
city, or town records shall furnish proper
and reasonable faclllttes for the lnR11ectlon
and examination of the records and tlle11 in
their offices, and for making memoranda
-0r tranHcrl11ts therefrom, to all persons
having occasion to make examination of
them for any lawful purpose.
Henr,l· A. Chaney, for relator. John W.
McGrath, for reoJpondent.
MOR8E, J. The reapondentlllclty treasurer of Detroit. The relator Is engaged In
the abstract business In said city. We
held, upon application of the relator for
mandamus, tsee Burton v. Tuite, 44 N. W.
Rep. 282,) that certain i-ecurds In said treRBurer's office were public records, and that
relator had a rlghtto examine them, and to
make memoranda ortranl!C.'rlptstherefrom
under Act :So. 205, Puh. Acts 1889, HUbject
to such proper and rt'Monable regulations
as the treal'urer might make consistent
with the public uRe or such records. Our
ordt•r in the case, as made and entered In
the journal on the 8th day of January, 1890,
·commanded the said Tuite not only to al-.
low the relator to inspect and examine the
partl('ular records Involved In that case,
but also to generally furnish to him and
hie Rubordlnates reasonable and proper facllltl£>B for the Inspection and examination
-of the records and flies In his office, and for
ruaklng memoranda and transcripts therefrom in compliance with said above-named
Rct of the legislature. In the opinion, as
well as In the order, of this court we meant
"to so expre.ss our views and commandR as
that there should be no mlRta.ke or mlsun<lerstanding as to the rights and duties of
the respective parties tu this controverRy.
But we are now called upon to enforce our
order. January 13, 18110, a petition was
filed In this court by the relator showing
the proper service of our writ of peremp.
tory mand11m11s upon respondent, and settlng forth that, notwithstanding our order
and command therein contained, the re11pondent had since said serYke refused to
allow rela.tor to have acl'ees to or look A.t
certain other public records in said office
of the <'ity treasun>r, to-wit: One book
containing the record of the certificates of
tax-sales "that haYe been canceled; one
book containing o. U11t of such lots as ha¥e
bet>n 11old to the city of Detroit, or to Inellvlduale, for spedal city taxes, and haYe
b('('n from time to time red~med ; and a
hook contalnlnp; a list of such lots or par~els of land In the city of Detroit as have
bt:en heretofore i;iold to 11ald cltl' for dello-

quent city tuxe11, said sales being afterwards aSRlgned by the city to lndll'lduals.
'Cpon this petition, .January lo, 1800, we
hu111ed an order to the eald Thomas P.
Tuite. to show cause why he should not
be punished for contempt and disobedience
of the said writ of mandamus of dateJanuary 8, 1890. Respondent answered thla
order on the 28th day or January, 1890,denylng that the above-named books were
public records, or that the relator had any
right to examine them under the statute,
or our decision and order above stated.
The books In question were denominated
by the re11pondent as" Mtub Receipt Books."
and It was lnslste<l In said answer that the
same were not public records, but mere
memoranda for the convenience of the
office, and that all the data contained
therein ts entered In the" Record Books,"
which are acceRRible to relator. It was,
however, admitted urmu the argument.
that the transferring of the data upon
thet1e stub books to the record book11
might be ctelayed for days or weeks, at the
pleat1ure of the respondent. After hearing
both parties by coum1el upon the petition
and answer, we directed certain lnterrogatorlet1 to he served upon the respondent,
to be anl'wered by him under oath, and
that other proofs be taken touching the
truth of the matters lnvolt'ed In the petltlon and answer, as well as the nature and
character and use of said books. The anewers to said Interrogatories and other
testimony taken ha\·e been returned to us.
We do not Intend to again go Into the dlRcus11lon of the questions that were settled
by us In the first opinion flied in this caRe.
We are satisfied that the books referred to,
by whatever name they are called, are pubUc records In the treasurer's otllce. 1n the
full sense of the statute, and under tbe
opinion above refern>d to; that the respondent la guilty of ('Ontempt and dl&obedience of the order of thl11 court in refueln1r to the relator the privilege or examtnlng th<'m, "ncl making transcripts thereof. We think, howe,·er, that this dleobedlence has occurred, not so much from a
willful dlRregarcl of our command, as from
bad advice. Under the circumstances. we
are not disposed to Impose a heavy penalty, but we hope that our orders wlll bereafter be strictly complied with, and with·
out rlelay 01· attempted evasion, as the tine
in this c811e wtll not stand as a precedent
In any future cnRe of disobedience of the
mandatet1 or decrees of this court. An orrler will be entered adjudging the said
Thoml\8 P. Tuite guilty of contempt and
dli;iobedlence of our aforesaid writ of mandam.is, and that be pay to the peo11le of
the Rtate of Mkhlgnn a fine of $25, with
the coRtH of thlR proceeding to be taxed by
tne clerk of thl11 court; such payment to
be made to said clerk within 10 days
after a copy of snch order shall be served
, upon him. '!'he other Justices concurred.
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BLALOCK v. MILAND.

(13 S. E. 551, 87 Ga. 573.)

(13 S. E. 551, 87 Ga. 573.)

July 13, 1891.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

July 13, 1891.

Rsconmxo Dm-:n—G|r1'-—L0ss or DEED—-SECON'D-

new Evim:xci~:—No'r|vs T0 PRODUCE-DELIVERY

—DB(.‘l.ARATlONS or DONOR—1.\'STRUC'l‘lONS.

1. A deed saying nothing of delivery in the

attestation clause is nevertheless prepared for

record it attested by two witnesses, one of whom

was the clerk of the superior court, who signed

the attestation in his oﬂrlcial character.

2. In order for the heir of a deceased donee to

set up adeed of gift made to her by her father it is

not necessary that it should appear that the donee

or her heir ever had possession of the premises,

or that either of them ever had actual custody of

the deed.

3. When it appears that an original deed of

gift by a father to his daughter was never in the

actual custody of the daughter; that the father
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is dead; and that the deed was not among the

papers left by him,—the loss of the original is

sufﬂciently accounted for to admit a copy taken

from the record.

4. The donor, after making a deed of gilt,

having sold and conveyed the premises to other

persons, there is no presumption that the deed of

gift, which was adverse to their title, ever went

into their possession; and consequently, whether

a notice to one of them was properly directed, or

a subpoena duces tecum to the other was prop-

erly served, is immaterial, there being no dili-

gence to inquire of them incumbent upon the

party now claiming under the deod of gilt.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

5. Declarations of a vendor, now deceased,

made at the time of conveying to his rcndee,

that n previous deed of gift executed by the ven-

dor to his daughter had never been delivered, and

that he had destroyed the same, are not admissi-

ble in evidence in favor of the vendee against

the heir of the dauehter claiming under the deed

of gift; nor are declarations of a third person,

now deceased, that he knew the deed had not

been delivered, and that the donor destroyed it.

6. A written declaration, made by the donor,

and recorded in the record of deeds, to the effect

that he had not delivered to his daughter the

deed of gift, and that he revoked and an-

nulled the dccd, is not admissible in evidence in

favor of his vendce of the premises, the same be-

ing made several years after the deed ot gift was

executed and recorded.

7. It is not incumbent upon the court to spoo-

ify in his charge to the jury what facts and cir-

cumstances would negative the presumption that

a duly recorded deed was delivered, orto go over

the various facts and circumstances in the evi-

deuce tending to negative that presumption, there

being no request to do so, and the court referring

the jury in general terms to the evidence on the

subject. _

8. The evidence warranted the verdict.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

E1-rurirum superior court, Pikc county;

James S. Buyntnn, Judge.

S. N. Woodward, for plnintiﬂ in error.

Claude Worrill and B. F. McLaughlin, for

defendant in error.

RECORDIXO DRED-GIFT-Loss OP DEED-SECONDARY EvmEXCE-NOTICI! TO PKODCCE-DELIVERY

-DEcl.ARATIONs oF Doxoa-lxsTRUCTIO:ss.
1. A deed saying nothing of delivery in the

attestation clau~ is nevertheless prepared for
record iC attested by two witnesses, one of whom
was the clerk of the superior court, who signed
the attestation in his oftlcial character.
2. In ordtlr for the heir uf a deceased donee to
set up a deed of gift made to her by her father it is
notnec~arythat it should appearthat thedonee
or her heir ever had possession of the premises,
or that either of them ever had actual custody of
the deed.
3. When ft appears that an original deed of
gift
a father to his daugnter was never in the
actua custody of the dau~hter; thnt the father
is dead; and that the deed wwi not among the
papers left by him,-the loss of the original is
softlclently accounted for to admit a copy taken
from the record.
4. The donor, after making a deed of gift,
having sold and conveyed the premises to other
persons, there is no presumption that the deed of
!Oft. which was adverse to their title, ever went
foto thelrpoasession; and consequently, whether
a notioe to one of tnem was properly directed, or
a subpoona duce8 tecum to the other was properly served, is immaterial, there being no diligence to inquire of them incumbent upon the
party now claiming under the deed of gilt.

bf
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5. Declarations of a vendor, now deceased,
mooe at the tim~ of conveying to his \"endee,
that a previous deed of gift executed by the ven·
dor to bis daughter had never been delivered, and
that be had destroyed the same, are not admissible In evidence in favor of the vendee against
the heir of the dau5"hterclaiming under the deed
of gift; nor are declarations of a third person,
now deceased that he knew the tlecd had not
been delive;;d, and that the donor de.'\troyetl it.
6. A written declaration, made by the donor,
and recorded in the record of deeds, to the ell'ect
that be had not delivered to his daughter the
deed of gift, and that he revoked and annulled the deed, is not admissiblA in evidence in
favor of his vendee of the premises, the same being made several years after the deed of gift was
executed and recorded.
7. It is not incumbent upon the court to specify in his charge to the jury what fact\I and circumstances would negative the presumption that
a duly recorded deed was delivered, or to go over
the various facts and circumstances in the evidence tending to negative that presumption, there
being no request to do so, and the court.referring
the jury in general terms to the evidence on the
11ubjeot.
8. The evidence warranted the verdict..
(Syil.abus "Ill/ the Cou1-t.)

Error from superior court, Plkl' coon ty;
James 8. Buynt1•n, Judge.
S. N. Woodward, for plalntln In error.
('laude Wor1·lll and B . F. McLaughlin, for
defendant in error.
PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed .
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VVEAVER V. SHIPLEY et al.

(27 N. E. 146, 127 Ind. 526.)

Supreme Court of Indiana. March 31, 1891.

Appeal iroin circuit court. Tippecanoe

county; D. P. VINTHN, Judge.

Jay H. Adams and Cam-otli & Stuart.

ior appellant. Wallace & Baird, ior ap-

pellees.

MILLER, J. The appellees commenced

this action to enjoin the appellant, Elmore

Weaver, and one Bahlah W. Weaver. from

iuterierlng with certain premises which it

was alleged the appellees and one Under-

hill had leased lrom said Bahlah W. Weav-

er. The defendants answered by a general

denial. There was a trial by the court,and

ﬁnding against the appellant, Elmore

We-aver, and judgment rendered against

him enjoining him irom interfering with
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theleased premises, and ior $100 damages

and in in vor oi Bahlah W. Weaver ior his

costs. The appellant, Elmore Weaver,

assigns error as iollows: (1) Because the

court erred in overruling his separate de-'

murrer to the amended complaint; (2) be-

cause the court erred in its conclusions oi

la w, and each oi them; (3) because the

court erred in overruling his written mo-

tion ior a new trial; (4) because the court

erred in overruling his motion to modify

the judgment: (5) because the court erred

in overruling his motion in arrest oi judg-

ment; (6) because theamended complaint

does not state iactssutiicient to constitute

a cause oi action against him.

The material allegations oi the com-

plaint, omitting descriptions and i'ormal

parts, are that on the 1st day oi March,

1883. the plaintiiis and defendant Underhill

were desirous oi procuring ground upon

which to erect a tile-mill ior the manufact-

ure oi tile, and from which to obtain clay

to be used in such manufacture; that on

that day they applied to the deiendant

Bahlah W. Weaver, who was the owner oi

the real estate, to lease the same ior that

purpose; that, on said day the plaintiiis

and Underhill, and the defendant Bahlah

W. Weaver, entered into' an agreement,

whereby said Bahlah agreed to and did

lease to them ior the term oi 10 years, ior

the purposes aioresaid, three several tracts

oi real estate lying adjoining and contigu-

ous to each other, ior which they were to

pay him as rent $75 per yea:-,in tile, at the

market price; that, at and prior to the

making oi said lease, the plaintiiis and

said Weaver went upon and over the three

tracts oi land so leased, and mutually

pointed out and agreed upon the location

oi the same; that it was agreed as a part

oi the contract that the plaintiffs were to

have all the clay suitable ior tile upon the

three-cornered tract which they might use

during the terms oi the lease, and, ii they

needed it, all the clay on all the tracts oi

land, but they were to use and occupy no

more of the land or clay than they needed

PROOF.

land leaRed to them, and that they dtd sign
and execute a written agreement of lease
lu which the) attempted to dPScrlbe, amt
thou,,;ht they bud sufficiently described,
eucb of the tr11cts of land eo pointed out,
located, agreed upon, and leMed as aforesaid, which written contract le in the
words a11d figures following, to-wit:
"l\lltrch the first, 1883. Articles of agree .
ment made and entered Into between B.
MILLER, J. The appelleeii commenced W. Weaver and James Shipley, Allen
this action to enjoin the appellant, Elmore Shipley, and Wtlll11m Underhill, to-\vlt:
Weaver, and one Bahlab W. Weaver. from B. W. Weaver agreeH to rent to the parinterfering with certain premll!es wbkh It ties of the second part gronnd to set a
was alleged the appellef's and one Under- tile-mill and shedding and kiln, not to
btll hact leased from11aid Bahlah W. Weav- exceed (41 acres of ground, It being In
er. The defendants am1wered b,y a p:eueral the north-west corner of the north-eaAt
denial. There was a trial by the court, and quarttir of the south-east quarter of secflntllng against the appPIJant, Elmore tion 127,) town (24,) range (3) west; also
Wea \•er, a11<l judgment rentll'red against a strip of land ten feet wide, on the west
him enjoining him from Interfering with side of the east line runnh1g north and
the leRMed premlHes, and for $100 damageR. south, for the purpose of maklnK tile. it
and In fn,·or of Bahlah W. Weaver for his being east side of the north- weHt quarter
costs. '.rhe apµellant, Elmore Weftver, of the south-east ttuarter section (~,)
aHs!p:ns error as follows: (I l Beca11ee the town (24,) range (3) west; ttleo a threecourt erred In overruling bis se(Jarate de-· cornered piece In the north-east t:orner of
murrer to the amended complaint; (2) be- the last-described land; und to huve all
en use the court erred In Its concl1111lons of the clay they want for tlle In the threelaw. and each of them; (3) because the cornered piece, keeping south line parallel
conrt erred In overruling bis written mo- with the congressional sur,•ey oft he land;
tion for a new trial; (4) because the court and also one house and stable and 1rar:len
erred In o\·errullmr hie motion to modify and smoke-house, the last-described propthe judgment: (5) because the court erl'P.d erty In the south-west('orner or the southIn overn1Ung his motion In arrest of Jndg- east quarter icectlon 127, I town (24,) ran11:e
ment; (6) because thenmencled complaint (3) wtlBt. This leaHe ls to run ten years
does not state factesutflclent to constitute from date. The parties of thesecond part
agree to pay the party or the first part
a cause of action against blm.
The material allegations of the com- seventy.five dollars annually In tile, at
plaint, omitting descriptions and formal the market price of such tile at the kiln as
part11, are thut on the 1st c!uy of Murch, the party of the first part may choose.
18."!lJ, the plftlntlffs und defendttnt Uuderhlll If the parties or the second vart, falling to
were desirous of procurlnir ground upon pay the smo•mt, forfeit all rights to the
which to erect a tile-mill for the manufact- above-named premh1ee, sod the pnrtlet! of
ure of tile, and from which to obtain clay the second part want a way out to tht't
to be used In such manufacture; that on east road of tbewoods pasture, they mu11t
that day they applied to the ddendant hanK a KOOd and substantial gate, and
Buhlah W. Weaver, who was the owner of keep the 11ame shut. B. W. WEAVER.
the real estate, to lease the same for thit.t JAMES ~HIPLEY. ALI.F:N J. SHIPl.EY. WM.
purpose; that, on said day the plulntlffs UNDERBll,L." That lmmerllately after the
and Underhill, and the defendant Bahlab making of said contract, and the execuW. Weuver, entered into.an agreement, tion of said lease, and ln pursuance therewhereby said Bahlah agreed to and did of, they entered upon and took poBSesaion
lease to them for the term of 10 yeo1·H, for or all said real estate pointed out, and retl1epurposes aforesaid, three several tr11ctlt lying upon said contract, and their 11hllluf real estatf' lying adjoining and contigu- ty to hold all of said lands for the term
ous to each other, for which they were to ap:reed Dpon, they, with the knowledl(e
pay him BR rent$75 per yetir,ln tile, at the and consent of said Weaver, proceeded to
market price; tba t, at and prior to the and did erect vorlouR buildings of a permaking of said lense, the plaintiffs and manent nature, particularly described,
s1dd Weaver went upon and over the three and ulso constructed a barb-wire fence
tracts nf land so leased, and mutually around the tract, costing In the aggregate
pol11te1J out and agreed upon the location In the neighborhood of $2,700; that after
of the smue; that it was agreed as a purt the erection of said mill and other build·
of the contract that the plolntlffs were to luge, and during the yenr 1883, the plnln·
have all the clay suitable for tile upon the tlfts began to make, aud eorf'r 11ince have
three-cornered tract which they might use made and sold, large quantities of tile.
during the terms of the lease, and, U they ancl with the knowledge and consent or
needed it., all the cloy on all the tracts of said Bablah W. Weaver they entered upland, but they were to uHe and occupy 110 on the three-cornered truct, and have e\"er
more of the lun<l or clay than they neP.ded tilnce continued to take clay therefrom,
for Ul!P- d1Jring the term of the lease; that and use the same In tht1 construction of
after tlwy hud agrc.>ell u1mn the terms of tile, with the knowledp:e anrl consent or
eoM lease and had pointed out 11.nd Bahlnh W. Weaver and Elmore Weaver;
sgree1I upon and loc11ted by actual vif"W that they have only remu,·ed the clay
the three tracb1 of land, they attempted to from a. half acre of 11sld three~ornen.>d
reduce salll contract of lease to writing, piece; that last. fallBahlah W.for the first
and attempted to detjCrlbe therein tba said time Intimated that tbe plaintiffs bad no

WEAVER v. SHIPLEY et al.
(27 N. E. 146, 127 Ind. 526.l
Supreme Court of Indiana. March 31, 1891.
Appeal from C'lrcult court. Tippecanoe
county; D. P. V1NTO:'f, Judge.
Jay H. Ad11ms amt Caffroth & Swart,
for appellant. Wallace & Bulrd; for appellooR.
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right to remove clay from the so-called

three-cornered piece of land, but they con-

tinued without molestation to remove

clay therefrom until the close of the tile

season; that Elmore Weaver claims to

have purchased, in February, 188', from

Bahlah W.. twenty acres of land.covering

and including the so-called three-cornered

tract of land, and since that time he and

the defendant Bahlah have forbidden the

plaintiffs from removing clay therefrom:

that Underhill has sold and assigned his

interest in the contract and lease to the

plaintiffs; that Elmore Weaver, who is

the son of Bahlah W.. had full knowl-

edge of the making of the contract and

lease at the time of the execution thereof,

and oi the exact location of said three-

cornered tract, and knew where the same

was located and agreed upon by the par-
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ties. and had full knowledge of the im-

provements. and that they had made the

same on the faith of said contract and

lease, and full knowledge of the fact. that

it was absolutely necessary for them to

have this tract in order to carry on their

tile business. at the time he purchased the

land; that theplaintiffs had no otherpluce

from which to obtain clay for their tile-

miil. and that they cannot in that neigh-

borhood procure any other place from

which to obtain the same.and that unless

they can obtain said clay their contract of

lease will become wholly valueless, and

their tilc-mill and improvements will be

wholly lost; that their lease has six years

to run, and there is an abundance oi clay

in the three-cornered piece to last during

the time it has to run; that the defend-

ant Elmore Weaver forbade the plaintiffs .

from en tering on said three-cornered piece

of land, or removing clay therefrom, and

tore down the gate and in-ial|.r,c-way

which the plaintiffs had constructed for the

purpose of driving to said tract of land.

and set ﬁre to the bridize; and that he

now threatens that he will, by force and

violence. keep theplaintiffs nwayfrom said

tract, and from removing clay therefrom;

and that the defendants Weaver and

Weaver are, by force and threats of per-

sonnl violence, preventing the plaintiffs

from entering upon or removin,z4-lay from

said tract, and will continue to do so un

less enjoined by this court, to their irrep-

arable damage; that the plaintiffs have

fully complied with all the agreements

and stipulations on their part. and have

promptly and fully paid their rent as

stipulated for in said lease. and that they

have been damaged in the sum of $2.000.

't1;he prayer is for damages and an injunc-

on. '

The objection to the sufficiency of the

complaint pointed out by the appellant is

that the description oi the land leased

from Bahlah W. Weaver. as set out in the

written lease. is so indefinite and uncer-

tain as to render the contract void. More

right to remove clay from the Po-called
three-cornered piece of land, but they continued without molestation lo remove
clav therefrom until the cloHe of tht> tile
sea'eon; that Elmo're Weavet claims to
have purchased, In February, 18N7, from
Bahlah W •• twenty acres of land,coverlog
and Including the so-called three-cornered
tract of land, and since that time be and
the defendant Ba blah have forbidden the
plalotlftH from removing t'lay therefrom:
that Underhill hllH sold und aMHlgne<l hie
lnterePt In the contract and leaKe to the
plaintiffs; that Elmore Weaver, who le
the eon of Bablab W., had full knowledge of tba mRklng of the contract and
lease at the lime of the execution thl'reof,
and of the exact location of said threecornered tract, and knew whe~ the same
wae located and agreed upon tiy tht' partle11, and bad full k11owledge of the Improvements, and thRt they bad mude the
same on the faith of said contract and
Jeaee, and foll knowled3e of the fact that
Jt was ab1mlotely net.·e11eary fur them to
have this tract In order to carry on their
tile business, at the time he purchased the
land; that the plaintiffs bad no other place
from which to obtain clay for their tllemlll, and that they cannot In that neighborhood procure any other place from
which to obtain the same.and that unless
they can obtain said '!lay their contract of
lease will become wholly valueless, and
their tlle-mlll and Improvements will be
wholly Jost; that thl'tr leiu1e has six years
to run, and there le an alrnndance or cllly
In the three-cornered piece to lBRt during
the time It bas to ran; that the defendant Elmore Weaver forbade the r>laintlfffl
from l'nterlng on said th~-cornere1l piece
of land, or 1·emovlnp: cl11y thert-from, nnd
tore down the gate and brh11.r:t•-wey
which the plaintiffs hnd couetl'nl'tl'd for the
p111•pose of driving to Hald tract of laud,
and set ftre to the bridite: and that be
now threate1111 that he will, by force and
violPnce, keep the plalntlftH 11 wny from ea id
tract, and from removing clay tJ1ert-from;
and that the defendants Wea,·er 11ncl
Weaver are, by force and threats or personal violence, preventing the plalt1tiff11
from entering upon or removin~.day from
said tract, and will continue to do so un
leea enjoined by this court, to their lrrep.
arable dama11:c; that the plnlntlff11 have
fully complied with all the 11~1·c.-111eut11
and stlpulatiun11 on their part, and huvP
l'ro:nptly and fully Jl~ill tlwlr rent as
11tlpoluted for In said lease, and th11t they
have been damaged In the sum of $~.OllO.
'.rhe prayer le for dumagee and an Injunction.
·
The objection to the eufflclency of the
complRtnt pointed out by the appellant bi
tba t the description of the laud leaHed
from Bablab W. Weaver, as set out in the
written lease, ts so lndt•ftnlte and un~~r
tain as to render th~ contract void. More
fully titated, the position of the uppellant
le (1) that the lease le void because there
Is no description of the land provoee<l to
be leased, and that lhls dt>fPct cannot be
llltJlplled by parol evl!lence; and In eo11port
of their position thPy cite Dingman v.
Kelly, 7 Ind. 717; Howell v. Zerbt'e, 26 Jud.
214; l>ulse v. Miller, 81 Ind. UH; Baldwin
W1L6U8,BV.-19

v. Kerlin, 46 Ind. 426; Millt•r v. Campbell,
Ind. 12;;. And (2) that, the Jessee havlnir; takt>n pOllaeBsion by virtue of the written agreement, be becomes a tenant by
virtue of bis acts, and each ten!lncy la
from year to year. Ralh1back v. Walke,
81 Ind. 409; 1''riedboft v. Hmltb, 18 Neb.
5, 12 N. W. Rep. b20; Vinz v. Beatty, 61
WIH. 645, 21 N. w. Rep,. 7t(7. (8) 'J'hat llB
to the .. three-coruered ' tral't, the leas~ belnir; void, the right to take clay was a
mere Ucenee, not RHSigoable und revocnhle
at pleasure. Armstrong v. I.111 w1to11, 78
Ind. 498. The authorities chel1 establish
the proposition that a lease or contract
tor the convey•mce of land m1111t, to be enforced, conhlin a description of the land;
that where the desc11ption, so far ae it
p:oee, le consistent, bot dc>eti not appear
to be complt>te, It may be completed by
extrinsic parol evidence, l>rovlded a new
dP.Scrlptton ts not Introduced Into the
body of the contract: but that courts
ne\·er permit parol e\·hlence to bP. given
flret to deecrthe the land, and ther to 111>ply the deserlptlon, nor to contradict the
written agreement, but only In nld of it.
.Baldwin v. Kerlin. supra. Teste.l by this
rule, the description of the "three-cornered" tract of land Ret'mB to be so deficient as to require an entirely new descrir>·
tlon to Jdentlfy the land. and this cannot
be fornh1hed by pawl evidence, as It
would be substantially the making of !l
new c11t1tl'act by parol, which Is forbidden
by the Htatnte •>f fraudH. lf this suit wus
an action to enforce a contract entirely
executory In Its character, the authorltie•
cited would be conclusive ag;alnet the ap. pellees. It remains, therefore, to inquire as
to the effect of the partial performance
set out In the comtllalnt, and proven on
the trial. The complaint proceeds upon
the thPory thnt the purtles made a parol
contract for the leaYe or the landfl for tlte
I period of 10 yearfl; that the lanll to be
let was Identified and pointed out, and
1111 the terms and etl1111latione of tbP. contract fully understood 1:tnd agreed to, and
that afterwards the parties undertook to
re1luce their agreement to writing, bot
failed to sufficiently deeerlbe thP. land, and
thut, therefore, the contract, resting part·
ly In writing an•l partly by parol, was In
law a p11rol contract, (Pulse v. Miller, 81
lnd. 191; Board v. Sbtpley, 77 lnrl. 003;)
und us such pal'ol cunt1·act It w11e taken
out of the operation of the statute of
frnud11 liy part pel'lormnnce. 'l'he right,
In a proper case, to t>nloree such a contlw~t. ill lmr,lle<lly 1ulmltt<•1l In Railsback
v. \\'1tlke, 81 Ind. 400. In Porn. 81,ec. Perr.
§ 101, it le sui<l: "AK thP Htatute Kpeaks of
hmde, or any In ~ere1<t In or concerning
them, <'Ontructe tu lcnee are both lnrlmled
within Its terms, and are capnl>le of bdng
part 11t-rformed RO DH to he tukE'n out of the
operdtlon of the statute." The "ase of
Ft-ry v. Plelfft>r, 18 Wis. 535. Is much In
polo t, where an agreement for a leaum was
taken out of the operation of the statute
l.Jy partial performunce. Aleo St-aman v.
AHl'11erman, (Wis.) 8 N. W. Rep. 818: Wallace v.Scogi.rin, (Or. ) 21 Pac. Hep. 058: Morrison v. Ht-rrkk, 1:10 111. 631, :l'.l N. E . Hep.
537; !\iurtin v. Patterson, (R lJ.) 2 S. E.
Rep. 859. In the languuge of B1mKllHIRE, .J ••
6~

I
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in Swales v. Jackson, 26 N. E. Rep. 62,

(this term,) the appellees having “entered

into possession oi the real estate under

the contract, and having made lasting

and valuable improvements, it would be

inequitable and afraud to withhold the

title.” Inl \\'ood,Landl. & Ten. § 20U,it is '

said that “a. court of equity will decree a

speciﬁc performance of such contracts.not-

withstanding the statute of frauds. when

there has been such a part performance oi

the agreement that to refuse it would

work a fraud upon the party seeking its

speciﬁc execution. "

The only inﬁrmity in the written lease

is its failure to suiiiclently describe the

leased premises.

out and agreed upon at and prior to the

after the appeliees took possession of the
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same, and made lasting and valuable im-

provements. such as they would not have

made had they not relied upon the agree-

ment to hold the same for the full period

of 10 years. The agreement as to the

boundaries of the leased land, and its oc-

cupancy for four years. with the knowl-

edge and consent of the landlord,is anim-

portant element in the partial perform-

ance reiied upon; ior it furnishes clean-and

satisiactory evidence in favor of the appel-

iees. upon the only propmitlon not estab-

lished by the written instrument. The

misdescription oi the leased property

would not have furnished the tenants

with a defense, if they had been sued by

the landlord for rent for the time they oc-

cupied the property. Whipple v Shewal- .

ter, 91 Ind. 114. The practical location of

the boundaries of the leased premises.

coupled with the subsequent possession oi

the same by the tenants, by and with the

landlord's knowledge and consent, is a

suflicient location oi the property. Jack-

son v. Perrine. 35 N. J. La w, 137; Lush v.

Druse.-1 Wend. 313; Pierce v. Minturn, 1

Cal. 470; Richards \'. Snider, ll Or. 197. 3

Pac. Rep.177. While the rules oi construc-

tion to be applied in identifying bound- .

in Swalea v ••Jack1mn, 26 N. E. Rep. 62,
(thlll term,) the a(JpPllees ha\"lng "eutered
Into possession of the l"eal eHtRte undPr
tlie contract, and having mn1IP laHtlng
and valuahlo lmpron•o1l'11ts, It would be
lnequitnhlP and ll fraud to wlthhold the
title." Iul Wood,Landl. & Ten.§ 21.10,lt ls
said that" a court of equity will ck>eree a
specific pel"formanceof such cont1·nl·ti~. notwlthetundlug the Rtu.tute of frauds, when
there hos bt'(•n such a pnrt performunce of
the agreement that to refuse it would
work a fraucl 11111111 the party 11eekln.K' lt11
spe<:ltic execution."
The onl~· Infirmity In the written lease
le Its fnilu1·A to 11utficlentl.v describe the
lea!led premiee11. \Ve are Informed U;\' thP
complaint that the premhiee were pointed
out anrl agreed upon at and prior to the
maklni.c or the contract, and that ~oon
after the np11ellt>ee took poeeeeRion of the
same, oml made lasting and Yaluahle Improvements, such as tht'y would not have
macle hacl they not relied upon the agree.
ment to hold the same for the full pe1·lod
of 10 yenl'fl. '!'he agreement ae to the
boundaries or the lea,.ed land, and Its occupancy for four years, with the know).
edge and const'ot or the landlord, le an Important element In the part.Jal performance relied upon: for It furnishes clear and
satleractor.v evidence In favor of the a11velleet1, upon the onl:v propnllitlon not eetubllRhecl liy the written Instrument. The
mlsclt'Rcri11t.ion of the leased property
would not have furnished the tl'nnnts
Nitb a defense, if they had been sued by
the lanrllord for rent for the time they oecuplert l he 11ruperty. Whipple v 8hewalter, IH lmJ. 114. Tbe practical location or
the boundaries of th11 leused premises,
coupled with the suh,;equent 11ulll!eKsion of
the same by the tf'nunts, by and with the
luncllorcl'R knowledge and consent, Is a
eutltclent JocRtlon or the propnty. J11ckeon v. Perrine, 35 N. J. Law, 13i; Lmih \",
Druee, 4 Wend. 313; Pierce v. Minturn, 1
Cal. 470; Uicburclw \', 8uider, 11 Or. Hl7, 3
Puc. Rep. Iii. W hlle the rules of construction to be applied in Iden tlfyln;;i: boundaries In a lease are the same ue those a11plll•able to grants In fee. It le common, especially In the leu11lng of farm lands, to use
lees accuracy In the description or the premises, than In dee<li! conveying the f~; nnd
where the parties themseh·e11 put u practical construl·tlon on thecontract.aud the
premlweR are taken p"esession or and 1wcupled uncler the lease by the conHent of
both parties, it should be sufficient to
take the contract out of the operation of
the statute, where the only Infirmity In

aries in a lease are the same as those ap-

plicable to grants in fee. it is common. cs-

pecialiy in the leasing oi farm lands, to use

less accuracy in the description of the prem-

ises, than in deeds conveying the fee; and

where the parties themselves put a prac-

tical construction on theconti-act.and the

premises are taken possession oiand occu-

pied under the lease by the consent of

both parties, it should be suiiicient to

take the contract out oi the operation of

the statute, where the only inﬁrmity in
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We areiniormed by the i

complaint that the premises were pointed i

the contract is the insufliciency of the de~

scription of the land. The court did not

err in overruling the demurrer to the com-

plaint.

The court made a special ﬁnding of the
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the con tract le the lnsufficlPucy of the dtc"scrlr1tlon of thl' land. The court ctld not
err In overrullni: tbe demurrer to the complaint.
'l'he court macle a speelal ftndln~ of the
facts and conclusions of htw: hut, as the
record falls to show that It. WHH ut tne request of el th er of the pu rtle11, It i11 tu be
trenterl as a j{eneral fincllng, ( HnH,;eJman
v. Allen. 42 Ind. 257; 1 Work, Pr.§ 804;)
and conHequently the court did not err In
ft& COUCIU>llOllFI of law.
'!'he onl,\· utberpolnte urged In their brief
by counsel for the appellant are that the
rourt erred In admitting illpgul evidence.
The first relates to the Hction of the court
In permitting the a11r1elleP.e to read in evidence the exhibit p11r11ortln1r to be n eop.;
of the wrlJ:ten lease without first shuwin1'
the losri of the original. It a11pe11re lhat
orhrinally but one copy WAR executed, but
Rfterwar•lR the partiPs met, and rlrew off
a cop~· of the original, and all the parties
signed It, and the copy so made w ae dell vered to th1• appellees, helr.K the one
given In e\"l<lence. The uew paper thus
made was, tu all intents and pnrposee, a
duplicate, and was delivered to the appellees to eubserve the 1mrposes of an original
Instrument. At u.11 events, It wue a written Instrument ehine<l by BahlRb W.
Wea\'Pr, and a!lmls11ible against him and
hli! privies In estate.
Objeetton Is nl"o made to the action of
the court Jn r>ermlttlng wltnellReR to 11tate
what the parties to the lease saltl to each
other prior to the execution of the writ tPn
al(l'l'Clllent which led to Its execution. l'he
portion or the recorrl where theMe queat1nne aml answers are set out has not
bePn pointed out: but, If they bad been,
we are unable to see how the court could
have held the complaint good, nnd then
Jlreveutetl the plalntUfe from lntroducln,;
the only chteR of evidence by which It could
be proven.
Lastly, It le said that evidence should
not have been recel\"ecl showing that there
WllB no clay In the nelghborhoocJ Rultable
for making tile, l'xcept in one of the trftcts
lt>tuied. No ohjectlon Is pointed out, except that it was Immaterial. Tb11 evldt"11ce tended cl:r<'<"ll.Y to l'Rtal>llsh uue of
the 11111teriHI alh•gation11 or the complaint,
and was not only cumpeten t, bat lmrmrtunt, to ;ihow tlm condition the appellees
were lt>ft In b;r the luterferPnre of lhe R!I·
pellaor., and ab10 to fix the rtumageH they
were entitled to recover becHuse of the'interferl•nct' wl th lht'ir lensed prc.:miiseH. "e
tlnd no error In the recurll. Therefore the
judgment le nffirmed.

ATTESTED DOCUME.NTS TO BE PUOVED BY WITNESS.

[Case No. 101

‘ATTESTED DOCUMENTS TO BE PROVED BY W.lTNESS. [Case N0. 101

RICHMOND & D. R. CO. v. JONES.

(9 South. 276, 92 Ala. 218.)

Supreme Court of Alabama. April 16, 1891.

Appeal from circuit court, Jefferson

county; JAMES B. HEAD, Judge.

Action by I). W. Jones against the Rich-

mon.l & llanville Railroad Company for

personal injuries alleged to have been

caused by defendant's negligence. There

were three counts in the complaint. The

ﬁrst count sought to recover on the

ground that the injuries were caused by

reason oi defects in the condition of the

ways. works, machinery, or plant con-

nected with or used in the e|npl..»y oi de-

fendant. In the second count of the coin-

plaint the plaintiff based his right of re-

covery on the alleged negligence of the em-

ployes oi the defendant who had charge ‘

and control of the train by which plaiu- ‘
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tiff was injured. and at the time of the ac-

cident. The third count was for failure of

the ﬁreman on defendant's engine to

transmit plaintiff’s signal to the engineer.

The defendant pleaded the general issue,

and by special plea pleaded a written con-

tract of employment entered into between

the plainliff and the defendant on Febru-

ary l7, l&~9ll,—not quitetwo months before

the accident,-one of the terms of which

was in words as follows: “Rule 23. 'I‘he

conditions of employment by the compa-

ny are that the regularcompensation paid

for the services of elnployes shall cover all

risks incurred and liability to accident from

any cause whatever while in the service

of this company. If an employe is disa-

bled by accident or other cause, the right

toclaim compensation for injuries will not

be recognized. Allowances, when made in

such cases, will be as a gratuity, justified

by the circumstances of the case, and pre-

vious good conduct of the party. The

fact of remaining in the serviceol the com-

pany will be considered acceptance of

these conditions. All oﬁicers employing

men to work for this company will have

these conditions distinctly understood and

agreed by each employe before he enters

the service of the company.” A demurrer

to the plea was sustained. There was

judgment for the plaintiff, and defendant

appeals.

James Weatlzerly, for appellant.

man & Harsh, for appellee.

COLEMAN, J. The suit was brought by

appellee to recover damages for personal

injury. For defense to the action by way

of special plea the defendant set up rule

No. 21!, \\'hich will be found in the state-

ment of the facts of the case. To this plea

RICHMOND & D. R. CO. v. JONES.
(9 South. 276, 92 Ala. 218.)
Supreme Court of Alabama. April 16, 1891.
ApJ>f'nl h'om circuit court, Jefterson
count;·; JAMEi!' B. H~:AD, Judiie.
Action by D. W. Jones against the RlchmonJ & J>anvllle Railroad Company for
penmnal Injuries alle~e<l to have been
cause<! by derendan t'tt negligence. There
were tbree counts In the complaint. 'l'he
tlnit connt songht to n.>co\·er on the
ground that the lnjurlts were cRused by
reason of defects in thH con<lltlon of the
wa,\"K, works, machinery, or plant connected with or used in the empL,y of defendant. In the second count of the complaint the plaintiff based his right of recovery on the alleged negligence of the employet1 of the defendant who bud chnrge
and control of the train by which plalntllf was lnjurt'd, and at the time of tile accident. The third count was for failure of
the fireman on defendant's engine to
transmit pl11lntllf's signal to the engh;eer.
'l'he defendant plearled the general issm'!,
and by special plea pleaded a wrlttP.n contract of employment entered Into hetwt•en
the plaint lff an<l the defenllaut on February 17, 1~90,-uot quite two month11 before
the a.ccldent,-one of the terms of which
was In wor<ls as follow11: "Rule 2.'J. Tile
coru.litlons of employment by the company are that the regulorcompeosatlun paid
for the services of employee shall cover all
risks incurred and llablllty to accident from
any cause whatever while to the service
of this company. If nu employe Is disabled by acchlent or other cause, the right
toclalm compensation lor Injuries wlll nut
be recoJ(nlzed. Allowances, when mad .. In
such casP.B, will be as a gratuity, justified
by the circumstances uf the case, uud previous lE'OOd cond11ct of the purty. '!'be
fact of remaining lu the service or the company wlll be com1hleretl acceptance of
these conditions. All officers employing
men to work for this company will have
theRe conditions distinctly understood and
agreed by each employe before he enterH
the service of the company." A demurrer
to the plea was sustained. There was
judgment for the plaintiff, and defendant
appeals.
James H-·eat/Jerly, for appellant. Bowmau & Hal'Bl1, for a11pellee.
COLEMAN, J. 1'he suit was bron11:ht hy
appellee to recover damages for l'ersonul
Injury. For deh.>nse to the uctlon by way
or speclal plt>a the <lelendant set up 1·ule
No. 2:1, whl<·h will be found In thA stutement of the facts of the case. To this plea
a rlemurrer was sustained. In thl:' case of
RniJroad Co. v. Orr, !Ala.) 8 South. Rep.
360, ft h1 drclarerl that "rallroach1 cannot
stipulate for immunity from iiablllty for
their own wrougful TIPJdll(encP. A rul11
which lmpm1es upon an e111ploye to look
after and he respon11lblefor his own safety
contravenes the law Itself which flz:ps the
Jlahillty uf railroads for nejtllgence co us.
inst Injury or death to their e•uployes."
'l'he demurrer was lJropP.rl:v 1<U!ltttinerl.
It Is the duty of rallroa<111 tu lteep themseh·t>a reusouably abreast with lmprnvp<)
methods BO as to lessen thednnger attend-

ant on the service, and, while they nre not
l'PqufrPd to adopt evP.ry new Invention,
Jt le their duty to ndopt such aK are In ordinary use by prudently-conducted roads
engaged In like buslnese and surronnaed
by like clrcumstunces. Hallway Co v.
Propst, 83 Ala. fil8, 8 South. Hep. i64.
There have been such adnmcements In sc:ience for the control uf steam, and Im·
provements in the tna('hlnery and appllancPH used by railroads for the better security of life, limb, and property, It would
be liiexcusable to continue the use or old
methodK, machlner~· . an<l appllnnces
known to be attended with more or less
danger, when the dunger could be reason111.Jly avoided by ~he adoption of the newer, and which are In ge11eral used hy "ellregnlated railroads. Not that It IH requlre1I of them to adopt every new ln-reutlon u<ieful In the business. nlthough It
may serve to lessen danger; hut It 111 their
duty to discontinue old methcds which are
Insecure, and to adopt such lmprovemP.nte and advancements as ure in ordlnnry use by prudently-conducted roads
en1oru~erl In like buslne11s and surrounded
by like clrcnmstanres. Railroad Co.\', Allen, 71' Ala. 494. Apply Ing this principle In
the casf' of Railway Co. v. Propst, k3 Aln.
626, 3 8outh. Rep. 764, the court lleld that,
"If the drow-head11 aud bumpers usPd by
defendant were such as were employed by
many wPll·con<lucted roads, this would
repel nil Imputation of negligence rounded
on their mere structure, although other
roudM. even a majority of them, adopted
a rlllfereot pnttem . WltueHses who ha\•e
11uffklent kuowledgt- of the subject may
testify to the general rules of rnllroa<ls
un the subjrct." 'l'hH same generol principle IH tler·lured in the case of Rallro.od Co.
\". Hnll, 1'7 Ala. 722, 6 South. lfop.<ri7. Under tht>se rules. we think It wn'! proper to
Inquire whether thedraw-hearls UHt'lJ by 1lefentla11t when the Injury occmrred were
such
were usually used on well-re~ulot
ed rallro11<1s. The witnesses were shown
to be experts, and WP.re comptitent to irlve
1<11ch testimony. It may be laid duwn
generally that objections to el"idence,
wllich do not particularize or define the
Jl:l'ounrls of ohjectlou, muy be overruled.
The cuurt Is not bound to cast about for
the grounds upon which, in the minllt.1 of
rounsel, they are rested. Dryer v. Lewis,
5i Alo. 551; St~le v. Tutwiler, II.I. 113;
Oil Co. v. PP.rry, "5 Ala. 164, 4 8outh. Rep.
63:i. The rule Is equally well established
that 0 Jl;P.nerol Objection to evidence, R r111rt
of which is lea;al, may he overrule1l. .F'ont'llle v. 8tnte, (Ala. I S 8outh. Rer1. 6R'I; Glddrns v. l3olllng, (Alo.) 9 South. HPJJ. 274,
(present term;) Warren v. Wagner, 75
Ala. l8i'I; Chambers v. Ulngstaff, 69 Ala.
HO. Most of the objections to the evidence come under oue or the oth~r uf these
principles, 11nd thP.re was oo avalluble errur lo ovPrruling them.
DefP.ndunt's counsel. ha'f'lnic the paper,
Exhibit A. In bis hands, handed It to
plaintiff while 011 cro11s-examl11atloo us a
witnt>s1<, and asked him If he slgnecl It.
Plnlntlff'e couni>el requeHterl to 1we the
poper. which rec1uest derenclnnt'" eounisel
l'r'fllMf'tl, 11ayl11i;r; he hacl nut offert•d It In t•vldeuce. The court stated that It should be

"11

a demurrer was sustained. In the case of

Railroad Co. v. Orr, lAla.l 8 South. Rep.

1:61), it is declared that “railroads cannot

stipulate for immunity from liability for

their own wrongful negligence. A rule

which imposes upon an employe to look

after and be responslblefor his own safety

contravenes the law itself which fixes the

2Dl
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shown to plaintiff's counsel when the pa-

per was offered in evidence. Plaintiff then

answered that it was his signature. The

defendant afterwards offered the paper in

evidence, to which the plaintiff objected,

on the grounds that there was an attest-

ing witness. and the execution of the pa-

per had not been properly proven. Up-

posing counsel have the right to object to

improper questions to witnesses, and the

rules of practice require them to specify

the grounds of objection. Any advantage

1aken,b_v which a party is deprived oi the

exercise of this right in the trial of a case

without neglect or fault on his part,

should not he used to his prejudice. If de-

fendant did not purpose to introduce the

paper in evidence, the question to the wit-

ness was improper. If it was the inten-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:08 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104925781
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

tion to offer it in evidence, then it should

have been submitted to opposing counsel,

so that, if he wished to object. the objec-

tions.-ould be made in proper form. The

ruling of the court sustaining the objec-

tion to the introduction of the paper is

supported also on other principles. The

case of Elierson v. State, 69 Ala. 3, after

stating the general rule that the attest-

ing witness should be called to prove the

execution oi an instrument, declares that

the rule extends to every private writing

which the parties may have chosen to

cause to be attested. ’l‘he witness is con-

sidered as the person selected and referred

to for the purpose oi proving the fact of

execution, and the facts and circumstan-

ces attendlnc; it; citing 1 Greenl. Ev. § 569.

So long as the evidence oi the subscribing

witness can be produced. it_ is the hcst—

the primary and only—evidence of execu-

tion. 'l‘he udmissions or declarations of

the parties themselves to the instrument

(not made in open court. or in writing,

for the purpose of a trial. when they are

the parties litigant) are not admissible for

this purpose. Russell v. Walker, 73 Ala.

317. it is contended that Exhibit A was

not offered in evidence as a contract

binding upon plaintiff. but merely to es-

tablish the existence of rule '20. and notice

to plaintiff, and for this purpose it was

admissible. The proposition contended

292

for necessarily must be that, the rule be-

ing incorporated in the contract as a part

of it, its existence and materiality as evi-

dence against the plaintiﬂ may be estab-

lished by offering in evidence the contract

without legal proof oi its execution. The

reasoning is not sound. To establish the

existence of the rule and notice thereof the

defendant was forced to rely upon an un-

proven contract. lf the contract is ex-

cluded because its existence is not proven,

it cannot be said that admissions which

alone appear in the contract have been

proven. If plaintiff had not admitted his

signature. the paper would not have been

shown to plaintiff's counsel when the paJ)E'r was offered lu evldeure. l'lalutltt then
anMwered that It was hill Rl~nature. 'l'he
derendant nfterw11rd11 offered the paper lo
evidence, tu whh;h the plaintiff olJJl'CtPcJ ,
on the grounrl11 that there was an uttcstlnp: wltneea, and the execution of the ru1per had not been properly provPn. Op1>osi11g counsel have the ri,11.ht to object to
Improper questions to wltne>.1eeH, und the
rules of pra('tfce require them to tipecify
the grom11IH of objection. Any adva'1tage
taken, by which a party le deprived of the
exercise or th\," right In the trial of a case
without neglect or fault on his part,
should not be utit!d to hl11 prejudice. If defenllaut did not purpm1e to Introduce the
paper In evidence, the question to the wit·
ness was lrupropPr. If It wa11 the Intention to offer It In ev:llence, then It shoulrl
have been submitted to opposing counsel,
so that, If he wh1he1J tu object, the objection ':ould be ma Ile In proper form. The
ruling or the court eustnlnln1ot the objection to the Introduction of the paper le
supportell also on other prlncl11le11. The
C&He or Ellerson v. State, 69 Ala. 3, after
stating the ~eneral rnlfl th11t the attesting witness Hhould be callt>d to pro\·e thP.
execution or au Instrument, declares thut
the rule extends to every private writing
which the parties may have choMen to
cnuee to he attetited. 'l'he witness Is considered as the p~rson Helected and refe1•1·ed
to for the pur11ui;e of prm•lnJt the fitct of
execution, and the fucte und clrenmetanct>B attendln~ It; citing 1 Greenl. Ev.§ !'>69.
So long as the evidence of the 11ubMcrihing
wltneMs can b~ produced. It Is the lwHt...:..
tbe primary and ouly-e,· ldenc~e of execution. 'l'he 11dml11slonl!I or del'laratlonH of
the parties themselves to the Instrument
(not made in open court, or In writing,
for the p11rp0He of a trial, when they are
the parties lltil!l'unt) are not nllmlMSible for
thlH purpose. RUH1-4ell v. Wttlker, 73 .Ala.
317. Jt ls contended that Exhibit A wa1-1
not offered In e\·ldence as a contract
binding upon plaintiff, but merely to establlHh the existence of rule 20. and notice
to plnlntla, and for this purpoHe It wa11
admll!lslble. The proposition contended
202

for necessarily must be thnt, the rule 00.
ln1r Incorporated In the contract as a part
of It, Its existence and mnterlallty as C't'I·
dence ai:calnst the 11lalntur may be establlshPd hy offering In evidence the contract
without legal 1n·oor of Its execution. 'J'he
rea1mnlng is nut sound. To establish the
existence of the rule and notice the1"eof the
defendant was forced to rely upon nn unproven contract. Ir the cuntrnct lit excluded because Its exlstenr.e le not proven,
It cannot be said that aclmlel!lone which
alone appear In the contract have been
proYen. If pl11lntlff hod not admitted his
elgnnture, the paper would not have bt.<en
offered In evidence. Thendmlsslon having
been lmpropt'rly obtained, and the execution or the paper not pro\'eD, it WBH not
admissible for any purpoMe.
1'here la e-rldenrt- that the runnlngbonrd upon which the evidence tendl! to
show tlu~ plalutlft wall 11tandlng when Injured" was put there fur the 11wltchme11
to ride on. " If thl11 evlchince ls true, and It
wuR placed there to a11Slst switchmen In
the performance of their duties, and they
\\'~re t>xpected to use It for that purpose,
Rn<l the plaintiff In the discharge of hl11
duty aH switchman was upon the run·
nlng-honrd, rule No. 20 could not be Invoked to defeat plal11tlff'11 t1ctlon,so far a"
the rule prohibits switchmen from going
between the care to couple or uncouple
them. Hll!eong v. Railroad Co., (Ala.) 8
8outb. Rep. 776; Railroad C'o. v. Walters,
(Alo.) Id. 357.
The evidence tendNI to show thaL It wa11
the duty of firemen to receh·e 11ig11alH from
11wltchmen, aml tr1rnsmlt them to the euglm!t'r. If the Injury to plulntlft WBB
cauHed by negligence of the fireman In
transmitting the alp;nale to the engineer,
given to him for that pnrpuse hy the
plaintiff In the dlHchorge of hie duty as a
l!Wltchman, such Injury le clearly within
the provltilon of the e111ploye'e act.
There was nu error In the charge!! given
by the court, and thm1e asked for by tho
deren<lnnt, which were rerueed, were not In
ft('cord with the (ll'lncipleHof law herein declnrecl, and were properly refused.
Atfi rm ed.
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STEBBINS v. DUNCAN et al.

(2 Sup. Ct. 313, 108 U. S.

Supreme Court of the United States. March 5,

1883.

In error to the circuit court of the United

States for the Northern district of Illinois.

Geo. O. Ide and John W. Ross, for plaintiff

in error. Thomas Dent, for defendants in er-

(2 8111>. Ct. 313, 108 U . S. 32.)

Supreme Court of the United States. March 5,
'1883.
In error to the circuit court of the United
States for the Northt>rn district of llllnols.
Geo. O. Ide and John W. Ross, for plalntltT
111 error. Thomas Dent, tor defendants In error.

ror.

Mr. Justice WOODS, delivered the opinion

of the. court.

This was an action of ejectment, originally

brought by William B. Morris, in the circuit

court of the United States for the Northern

district of Illinois, against Howard Stebblns,

the plaintiff in error, for the recovery of a

quarter section of land, originally situate in

Madison county, Ill., but, when the suit was

begim, situate in Stark county. Before the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:08 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104925781
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

ﬂnal trial of the cause. to-wit, on January

22, 1879, the death of the plaintiif was sug-

gested, and the devisees named in the last

will were made parties, as appears by the fol-

lowing entry upon the record of the court:

“Now come the parties by their attorneys,

and Thomas Dent, Esq., the attorney of the

plaintiff, suggests to the court the death of

William B. Morris. and that Maria L. Dun-

can, Harriet B. Cooledge, and Helen Cooledge

are the devisees of said deceased; and, on mo-

tion of the plaintiffs attorney, it is ordered

by the court that said devisees, Maria L.

Duncan, Harriet B. Cooledge, and Helen

(foolcdge, be made plaintiffs herein.”

The defendant pleaded the general issue.

The cause was tried by a jury, who returned

a verdict for the plaintiffs. upon which judg-

ment was rendered in their favor for the

lands in controversy. To reverse that judg-

ment, the defendant in the circuit court has

brought the case here upon writ of error. A

bill of exceptions was taken upon the trial,

from which the following statement of the

case is made:

Disregarding the order in which the testi-

mony was introduced. and arranging it

chronologically. the plaintiffs below. to prove

title in themselves. offered the following evi-

deuce:

(1) An exempllﬁcation of a patent from the

United States to one John J. Dunbar for the

lands in controversy; (2) a certiﬁed copy of

a deed for the same lands from John J. Dun-

bar to William Prout, dated January 6, 1818,

said copy being certiﬁed to have been made

February 3, 1875; (3) a certiﬁed copy of a

deed for the same lands from William Prout

to Joseph Duncan. dated Hay 2, 183-l, and

recorded in said county October 29, 1838; (4)

certiﬁed copy of a decree in chancery in the

United States circuit court for the district of

Illinois, dated June 9. 1846. rendered in a

cause wherein the United States were com-

plainants and the widow and heirs of Joseph

Duncan defendants. and of the proceedings

under said decree by which the premises in

controversy in this suit were sold to the Unit-

ed States; (5) certiﬁed copy of the deed to

Mr..Justice WOODS, dell'\"ered the opinion
of the <"ourt.
This was an action of ejectment, originally
brouirht by William B. Morrie, In the circuit
<·om"t of the United Stntes for the Northern
dist11ct of Illinois, against Howard 8tebblns,
the plalntUr In eITor, for tbe recovery of a
quarter section of land, originally situate in
Madison county, Ill., but, wllen the suit was
begun, situate In Stru·k county. Before the
final trial of the cause. to-wit, on January
22, 1879, the death of the plnlntitr was suggested, and the devlsees named hr the last
wlll were made parties, as appPnrii by the following entry upon the record of the eout't:
"Now rome the parties by their attorneys,
and Thomm! Dent, l~sq., the attorney of the
plaintiff, suggPsh1 to the <'ourt the death of
William B. Morris, and that Marla L. Duncan, Harriet B. Cooledge, and Helen Cooll:'dge
are the de,·leees of said de1·1>11sed; and, on motion of the plaintiff's attorney, It ls onlered
by the court that said devleees, :'Ilaria L.
Dun<'an, Harriet B. Cooledge, and Heleu
CoolPdge, be made plalntlfl's herein."
The defendant pleade1l the general Issue.
The cause was tried by 11 jury, wl,lo returned
a verdict for the plalntlffi,.;. upon which judgment was rendered In their favor for the
lands In contro'\"ersy. To reverse that judgment, the defendant lu the circuit court bus
brought the case here upon writ of eft'or. A
hill of exceptions was taken upon the triul,
from whkh the following stntement of the
ease Is made:
Disregarding the order In which tile testimony was lntrodnc•ed, and arranging It
<'hronologlcully. thP 11lalutlfl's below. to pro\'e
title In themeeh·es. otfel'e<l the folluwlng evidence:
(1) An exempllfi<'atlon or 11 patent from the
United Stutes to one John J. Dunbar for tile
lands In c•ontroversy; (2) a certified copy of
a deed for the same lands from .Tchn J. Dunbar to William Prout. clatt>d Jnnuury 6, 1818,
Mid copy being certlli••tl to have been matle
J<'ebruary 3, 1875; (3) a certified copy of a
deed for the same lands from William Prout
to Joseph Dunc·an. dnted :\Illy 2, lS:H, and
recorded In said county October 29, 18:!8; (-1)
certified copy of a decree In chan<·ery In the
lJnlted 8tates circuit court for the district of
Illinois, dated June 9. 18-lf). 1·pndered in a
cauRe wherein the United Stutes were complainants and the widow and heirs of Joseph
Duncan defendantP., and or the proceedlng-s
under said decree by which the premises Ju

conh'Overey In this suit were sold to the United States; (5) certified copy of the deed to
the United Stutes under said decree for the
same prl'mlses. made by 'Vllllam Thomas,
commissioner, duted August 12, 18-16, and recorded January 17, 18-18; (6) certified copy
of a deed for the same premises, dated December 28, 1847, and recorded June 5, 18-18, to
Wllllam W. Corcoran, executed by R. H. Gillett, solicitor of the treasury, In behalf of the
United States; (7) certified copy or a deed for
the same premises, dated December 20, 1867,
and recorded March 12, 1868, from "\Vllllam
W. Corcoran to Wllllam B: Yorrls; (8) certified copy of the will of Wllllam B. Morrie and
of the probate thereof, from which It appeared that Marla L. Duncan, Harriet B. Cooledge, and Helen L. Cooledge, the plalntltrs,
were his residuary legatees.
To sustain the title, which the plalntltTs
contended that they derived through these
documents, they ottered other evidence, which
wlll be noticed hereafter, but they ottered no
evidence of the death of ·wmlnm B. '.\!orris,
the original plnlntlll', sh)('e tht> certified copy
ot hie will and of the probate thereof, and the
lettPrs testamentary Issued thereon.
The defendant Stebbins. to show title ln
hls lessor, oft'ered In evidence the following
title papers:
(1) An exempllftc·ntlon of a patent by the
United StatPs to .John .J. Dunbar, elated .January fl. 1818, f01· the ltmds In controversy; (2)
a eel'tified CO(IY from the recorder's office In
Stark county, Ill., ln whkh county the laml
ls situate, of a deetl, dated January 6, 1818,
from .John J. Dunbnr to John Frank, conveying said l:md In fee, and recorded In said
<'ounty .June 18, 1870; (3) other title deeds,
by which the title passed from the heirs of
John Frank to Benson S. Scott; (-1) the stipulation of plaintiffs that Stebbins, the defendant, was In possession of the land In controversy at the commencement of the suit under
salcl Benson S. Scott as hie tenant only, and,
at no time, under any other claim.
No exceptions were taken by the plaintiffs
to the Introduction of these title papers by
the defendant.
'fltl' 1·e11! <·ontest In the case was between
the title of the plalntllt'11 deduced through the
deed of Dunbar to Prout, and their subsequent muulments of title put In e'\"lden<'e, and
thP title of defendant derived through the
<lt•Ptl of Dunbar to F'rank, and the subsequent
eonveyancee put In evidence by him.
The defendant was In possession of the
prt>mlees sued for. His evidence, which wns
nut excepted to, gave him a prime faele title,
and. unl-e:;s the plnlntl1Isshowed 11 better title,
th <·~· should not h11ve recovered the lands
in t•ontroversy. It Is, therefore, only necest~ary to consider the title which the plalntlfl'e
clnim to ha'\"e shown In themselves. The errors nssigned all relate to the admission by
the court below of the el"ldence offered by the
)llalntiffs to sustain their title, and the charge
of the court to the ju1·y upon the effect ot
293
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that evidence. These assignments of error 1 We have been referred to no decision of the

we hall now proceed to consider.

The court admitted as evidence tending to

prove the death of \Villian1 B. Morris, the

original plaintiff, the duly-certiﬁed copy of

his will, and of the probate thereof in the

probate court of the county of Suffolk, in the

state of Massachusetts, and of the letters tes-

tamentary issued thereon, and the court char-

ged the jury, in effect, that this evidence, un-

contradicted, was suﬂicient to show the death

of Morris. The admission of this evidence

and the charge of the court thereon are as-

signed for error.

Wliether the evidence objected to was or

was not competent and suﬂicient to prove

the death of Morris, it was clearly compe-

tent, the death of Morris being proved, to

show title in the plaintiffs. The objection
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to its admissibility must, therefore, fall, if

there was other evidence to show prima

facie the death of Morris. We think that

the suggestion in the record of the death of

Morris, and the order of the court making

his devisees parties, was sutiicient for this

purpose.

Section 10 of chapter 1 of the Revised Stat-

utes of Illinois, p. ‘J4 (Hurd, 1830), provides

that “when there is but one plaintiff, peti-

tioner, or complainant in an action, proceed-

ing, or complaint in law or equity, and he

shall die before final judgment or decree,

such action, proceeding, or complaint shall

not, on that account, abate if the cause of

action survive to the heir, devisee, executor,

or administrator of such decedent; but an_v

of such to whom the cause of action shall

survive may, by suggesting such death upon

the record, be substituted as plaintiff, peti-

tioner, or complainant, and prosecute the

same as in other cases."

The Suggestion of the death of Morris, the

sole plaintiff, was made in this case, as the

record shows, by counsel for the devisees,

both parties being present, and the court-

made the order, '\vith0ut objection, that the

devisees be made plaintiffs in the case. We

think that this suggestion, made without ob-

jection, and the order of the court thereon,

settles prima facie, for the purposes of this

ease, the fact of the death of the original

plaintiff. The statute provides upon whose

suggestion of the death of a sole party plain-

tiff the court shall make his heir or devisee,

etc., plaintiff in his stead. It certainly can-

not be the fair construction of the statute

that a party may stand by and see the sug-

gestion of the death of the opposing party

entered of record, and his heir or devisee

substituted in his stead, and upon tlnal trial

require further proof of the death. at least

without some notice of his purpose to, raise

that particular issue. The death of the

plaintiff, after the order of the court, may be

considered as settled between the parties for

that ease, unless some motion is made or is-

sue ralsed on the part of the defendant by

which the fact of the death is controverted.

PHOOF.

that evidence. These aeslgnments of error
we shall now proceed to consider.
The court udmltted as evidence tending to
l>rove the death of William B. Morris, the
01·iginnl plaintilt', the duly-certified copy of
his will, and or the probate thereat In the
probate court or the county or Sult'olk, In the
state or Maesnchusetts, and of the letters testamentary Issued thereon, and the court charged the jury, In elt'ect, that this evidence, uncontmdlcted, was sufftclent to show the den th
of Morris. The admission of this evidence
and the charge of the court thereon are assigned for error. ·
Whether the evidence objected to was or
was not competent and suWclent to prove
the death of llorrls, It was clearly competent, the death of Morris being proved, to
show title In the plalntltrs. The objection
to Its admissibility must, therefore, fall, It
there was other evidence to show primn
tacle the death of llorrls. We think that
the suggestion In the ri>cord of the dt>uth of
Morris, and the order of the court muklng
his devlsees parties, was sumclent for this
purpose.
Section 10 of chapter 1 of the Revised Statutes of llllnols, p. V4 (Hurd, 18SO), provides
that "when there Is but one plaintiff, petitioner, or complalnnnt In an action, proceeding, or complaint In law or equity, and he
shall die before tlnal judgment or decree,
such action, proceeding, or complaint shall
not, on that account, abate if the cause ot
action survive to the heir, devlsee, executor,
or administrator of such dt.-cedent; but any
of such to whom the cause of action shall
survive may, by suggesting such death upon
the record, be substituted as plalntUr, petitioner, or complainant, and prosecute the
same as In other cases."
The suggestion of the death of Morris, the
sole plalntllt', was made In this case, as the
record shows, by counsel for the devlsees,
both parties being present, and the court
made the order, "without objection, that tllc
devlsees be made plaintiffs In the case. We
think that this suggestion, made without objection, and the order of the court thereon,
settles prlma facle, for the purposes of this
ease, the fact of the death of the original
plaiutllt'. The statute provides upon whose
suggestion of the death of a sole party plaintiff the court shall make his heir or devlsee,
E>tc., pin intltr In his stead. It certainly cannot be the f11lr com~truction of the statute
that a party may stand by and see the suggestion of the death of the oppoi-;lug party
entered of record, and bis heir 01· devlsee
substituted In his sti>nd, ancl upon tlnnl trial
require further proof of the death. ut l!'nst
without some notice of bis purpose to. rnlse
that particular lsime. The death of the
plaintiff, after the order of' the court, mny be
eonshlered as settlc>d between the parties for
that ease, unless some motion Is mnlle or Issue raised on the part of the defendant by
which the tact of the death Is controverted.
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We have been referred to no declslon of the
supreme court of Illinois where a dltrerent
rule has been announced. In the case of ·
Milliken v. llartln, 66 Ill. 17, cited by counsel for defendant, the court merely decided
that where a party plaintiff bad died and
his heirs were substituted In his pince, they
must pl'Ove that the person under whom they
claimed was seized of the title and that
they were his heirs. But the rE>port of the
case clearly shows that the point now under
consideration was neither deelded nor touched. We think, therefore, that the ruling and
charge of the court below did not prejudice
the defendant.
The next aBBlgnment of error relates to the
admlBBlon In evidence by the court of the
ce111tled copy of the deed from Dunmr to
Prout, and the testimony olrered by the
plaintiff to sustain such copy. The deed purported to be a conveyance, with covenants of
general warranty, by Dun'!Jar to Prout, of the
land In controversy, for the consideration of
~~It recited that Dunbar was the p&tentee thereof, and set out the patent In full.
The following Is a copy of the In testlmonlum
clause of the deed, of the signatures of the
grantor and witnesses, the acknowledgm<'nt.
affidavit of the grantor of his Identity, his
receipt for the purchase money, memorandum of registration, and certificate of the recorder of dee<is for Madison county, Ill.:
"In wltnees of all the foregoing I have bereunto atHxcd my hand and seal, at Washington city, In the county of Washington and
District of Columbia, this sixth day of January, one thousand eight hundred and eighteen.
John J. Dunbar. [Seal.}
"Signed, sealed, and delivered In th-: preeence of
"Sumuel :S. Smallwood.
"Joseph Cassin."
"DlstrlC:t of Columbia, County of - - , a.:
"Be It remembered that on this sixth day
of January, 1818, the above-named John J.
Dunbarr, who has signed, sealed, and delivered the above Instrument of writing. personally came and appeared before us, the undersl~ed justices of the peace, and acknowledged, In due form of law, the same to be
bis free act and deed, for the purposes therein set forth, and also gave bis consent that
the same should be recorded whenever lt
might be d('(>med ne<•es1<ary. In wltneM of
all which the · said - - has hereunto atHxed his name and has undersigned the same.
·
his
"John X J. Dunbe.rr.
mark.
"Acknowledged before
"Samuel N. Smallwood.
"Joseph Cassin."
"I, John J. Dunbarr, do declare upon oath
that I am the same person Intended and
numcd In the nbo'l'f' deed, (ffttt>d the 11lxth
day of January, lSlS, und more particularly
In the patent therein rl'Clted at length, aud

A'.rTESTED DOCUMENTS TO BE PROVED BY WITXE-:;s.
A'1"l'ES'i‘ED DOCUMENTS TO BE PROVED BY WITNESS.
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further, that I was duly placed in possession

of the patent for the land conveyed in the

above deed, by receiving the same from the

general land-otiice.

h's

“John Ill J . Dunbarr.

mark.

“Sworn and subscribed to before me this

seventh day ot January, 1818.

“Samuel N. Smailwood."

“Received, this sixth day of January, 1818,

from William Prout, the sum of $80, being

the consideration money expressed in the

above deed.

his

“John X J. Dunbarr.

mark.

“Witness: Joseph Cassin.

“Recorded June 23, 1818."
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"State of Illinois, Madison County, ss.:

“I, John D. Heisel, clerk of the circuit

court, and ex oﬂicio recorder of deeds within

and for Madison county, in the state of Il-

linois, do hereby certify the above and fore-

going to be a true, perfect, and complete

copy of an instrument of writing or deed of

conveyance now appearing of record at my

office in book E, pages 154, 155, and 156. In

witness whereof I have hereunto set my

hand and aﬁixed the seal of our said court,

at oftice in the city of Edwardsviile, this

third day of February, A. D.’ one thousand

eight hundred and seventy-ﬁve.

“[Seai.] John D. Heisel, Clerk."

The defendant below objected to the in-

troduction of said certiﬁed copy in evidence,

because the original deed was not so certiﬁed

and proven as to make a certiﬁed copy from

the record competent evidence, under the

laws of Illinois.

The court, without passing at that time up-

on the objection, and not then admitting said

writing in evidence as a certiﬁed copy, per-

mitted the plaintiifs, at their request, to

make the following proofs:

"And thereupon,” as the bill of exceptions

states, “the plaintiifs proved, to-wit:

"41) By Mr. Dent, one of the plaintiffs’

counsel, that said counsel had had in their

possession, prior to the great ﬁre of October

8 and 9, 1871, in Chicago, an original deed

corresponding substantially in contents to

the writing offered in evidence, except that

there was not attached to it the oﬁicial cer-

tiﬁcate, dated February 3, 1875; that he had

not compared said offered copy with said orig-

inal, but he believed from recollection that

it corresponded with the original, and that

he had not made said alleged copy ; that said

original deed had been sent to said counsel

in behalf of Wm. B. Morris, the then plain-

tiﬂ, for use in this suit, and had been offered

in evidence on the ﬁrst trial; that said orig-

inal deed had been burned up in the Chicago

ﬁre oi’ October 8 and 9, 1871; further, that

said original deed had been sent to Wash-

ington, and attached as an exhibit to the

original depositions of E. J. Middleton and

further, that I was duly placed In possession
of the patent for the land conveyed In the
above deed, by receiving the same from the
general land-otllce.
his
"John X J. Dunbarr.
mark.
"Sworn and subscribed to before me this
seventh day of January, 1818.
"Samuel N. Smallwood."
"Received, this sixth day of January, 1818,
from William Prout, the sum of $80, being
the consideration money expressed In the
above deed.
his
"John X J. Dunbarr.
mark.
"Witness: Joseph Cassin.
"Recorded June 23, 1818."
'"State of Illinois, Madison County, 111.:
"I, John D. Helsel, clerk of the circuit
court, and ex otllcio recorder of deeds within
and for Madison county, In the state of IlUnols, do hereby certify the above and foregoing to be a true, perfect, and complete
copy of an Instrument of writing or deed of
conveyance now appearing of record at my
otllce In book E, pages lM, loo, and 156. In
witness whereof I have hereunto set my
hand and afllxed the seal of our said court,
at office In the city of Edwardsville, this
third day of February, A. D .. one thousand
eight hundred and seventy-five.
John D. Helsel, Clerk."
"[Seal.]
The defendant below objected to the Introduction of said certilled copy in evidence,
because the original deed was not so certified
and proven as to make a certified copy from
the record competent evidence, under the
laws of Illinois.
The court, without passing nt that time upon the objection, and not then admitting said
writing In evidence as a certified copy, permitted the plaintUfs, at their request, to
make the following proofs:
"And thereupon," as the bill of exceptions
states, "the plalntll!'s proved, to-wit:
"(l) By Mr. Dent, one of the plaintiffs'
counsel, that said counsel had had In their
pa88esslon, prior to the great fl.re of October
8 and 9, 1871, In Chicago, au original deed
corresponding substantially In contents to
the writing otrered In evidence, except that
there was not attached to it the official certificate, dated February 3, 18i5; that he bad
not compared said ottered copy with snid orlgloal, but he believed from recollection that
It corresponded with the original, and that
he had not made said alleged copy; that said
original deed had been sent to said counsel
In behalf of Wm. B. Morris, the then plaintiff, for use in this suit, and had been offered
In evidence on the first trial; thnt said original deed had been burned up in the Chicago
fire of October 8 and 9, 18il; further, that
ruitl original deed had been sent to Washington, and attached as an exhibit to the
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original depositions of E. J. Middleton and
Ueorge Collard, hereinafter mentioned, and
had sul.lsequently been detached therefrom
by leave of the court, and retumed to Washington for use in taking the depositions of
Henrietta Boone.
"(2) The plalntlft's further oO'ered to read
in evidence a copy of the original depositions
ot E. J. Middleton and l~eorge Collarll, taken de bene esse on September 21, 1870, at
Washington, D. C., to which the defendant
lle.low objected. It was admitted that the
depositions had been correctly copied by an
attorney in the cause from the original dtlpositlons on file In the case; that the original
depositions, with the other files and records
ot the court, were burned up In the fire
nt Chicago ot October, 1871; that no order
ot the court bad ever been made authorizing
the fl.ling of said copy as a substitute for
the original depositions, and that no proceedings under any statute had been had
for the purpose of restoring said original,
but that after said fit·e the plalntl!Ts' counsel had procured said copy from the counsel of dt>fenda.nt, and, with his consent, bad
placed it on file In this cause as a copy of
the original depositions.
"The court thereupon overruled each of
said objections to the reading of said copy
ot the depositions, and permitted the contents of said copy to be rend In evldenctl,
which was done; to which decision ot the
court the defendant then and there excepted.
"The contents ot said copy so read were as
follows: 'That said Middleton and Collard
bad carefully examined the signatures of
Samuel N. Smallwood on snld original deed
purporting to be his In three different places,
and aver the said signatures to be the genuine handwriting of said Samuel N. Small·
wood; and that said original deed ls annt-xed to their depositions as Exhibit A; that
they were per!'IOnally acquainted with Samuel N. Smallwood In his Ute-time, and knew
his handwriting, having often seen him
write, and they have no hesitation In declar·
Ing said signatures to be his genuine signatures.'"
The plalntltf!I also ol!'ered in evidence the
deposition of William W. Corcoran, who testified that in 1847 be purcbuse<l the lands in
controversy from the United Rtntes at public
sale and paid the purchase mont-y tor them
into the treasury of the United Stntc>s, and
that. at the time of the purchase, he had no
notice of any adverse claim.
The plaintiffs further read In evldPnce a
certified copy of a commission from President Monroe, attested by Richard Rush, acting secretary of state, and the seal of the
United States, dated April 30, 1817, appointing Joseph Cassin, justice of the pence In the
county of Washington, in the District of Columbia, until the end of the next session o!
the United States senate, and no longer;
also a certlfl.ed copy of a like commission,
2W
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dated September 1, 1817 , appointing Samuel

N. Smallwood a justice of the peace of said

county until the end of said session, and no

longer.

The plaintiifs also olfered in evidence the

deposition of Anthony Hyde, who testified

that he was the business agent in Washing-

ton Clty of W. W. Corcoran; that he knew

of the purchase of the land in question by

said Corcoran in 1847, and of the payment

by him of over $22,000 into the treasury of

the United States for this and other lands;

that from February, 1848, up to the time

when his testimony was taken, February 24,

1875, he had attended to all matters touch-

ing the tract of land in suit, such as the

payment of taxes and the appointment of

agents, up to the time of the conveyance

thereof by Corcoran to William B. Morris;
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that he sent the original deed from Dunbar

to Prout, attached to the uapositions of E.

J . Middleton and George Collard, to the coun-

sel of plaintiffs below in Chicago, on Octo-

ber 11, 1870; that said deed was afterwards

returned to obtain a deposition oi‘. one Mrs.

II. H. Boone as to Joseph Cassin’s signature,

and was afterwards forwarded, attached_ to

a deposition of Mrs. Boone, to the clerk of

the United States circuit court at Chicago,

on or about January 26, 1871.

Hyde further testifies that he had paid

the taxes on said lands for Mr. Corcoran

from 1847 to 1864, mainly through agents

who lived in Illinois, but that he himself

had for a year or two paid the taxes direct-

ly to the county oﬂicers.

Assuming, for the present, that the evi-

dence oﬂ.’ered to support the deed from Dun-

bar to Pront was competent and properly

admitted, the question is presented whether

the deed itself, thus supported. was admis-

sible. We are of the opinion that it was.

The existence of the original deed and its

destruction in the ﬂre at Chicago, in October,

1871, was distinctly proved by the testimony

of Dent, counsel for» plaintitl’s. He testiﬁed

that it had been sent to the counsel in Chi-

cago of the original plaintiff in the case; that

it had been oifered in evidence on the ﬁrst

trial of the case, and had been burned with

the other papers and records of the court in

the ﬁre mentioned. It was therefore compe-

tent for the piaintiifs to prove its contents.

Thus, in Riggs v. Taylor, 4 Wheat. -LS6, this

court said:

“Tile general rule of evidence is, if a par-

ty intend to use a deed or any other instru-

ment in evidence he ought to produce the

original if he has it in his possession, or if

the original is lost or destroyed secondary

dated September 1, 1817, ap1>0lntlng Samuel
N. Smallwood a Justice of the peace of said
county until the end of llllld seSBlon, and no
longer.
The plaintUrs also oll'ered In evidence the
deposition of Anthony Hyde, who testlfle4
that he was the business agent In Washington City of W. W. Corcoran; that he knew
ot the purchase of the land In question by
Raid Corcoran In 18-!i, and of the payment
by blm of over $22,UOO Into the treasury of
the United States tor this and other lands;
that from February, 1848, up to the time
when his testimony was taken, February 24,
1875, he bad attended to all matters touching the tract of land In suit, such as the
payment of taxes and the a1,pol11tment of
agents, up to the time of the conveyance
thereof by Corcoran to Willlaw B. ~!orris;
that he sent the original deed from Dunbar
to Prout, atta<'hed to the u !positions of E.
J. Middleton and George Collard, to the counsel of plalntltl's below in Chicago. on October 11, 1870; that said deed was afterwards
returned to obtain a. deposition of one ~Irs.
II. H. Boone 88 to Joseph Casein's signature,
and was afterwards forwarded, attached to
a deposition of Mrs. Boone, to the derk· of
the L'nlted States circuit court at Chicago,
on or about January 26, 1871.
Hyde further testifies that be bad paid
the taxes on said lands tor Mr. Corcoran
from 1847 to 1864, mainly through agents
who lived in Illinois, but that he himself
had for a year or two paid the taxes directly to the county oftlcers.
Assuming, for the present, that the evidence otrert'<l to supt>0rt the deed from Dunbar to Prout was eompetent and properly
admitted, the question Is presented whether
the det-d itself, thus supt1orted. wns admissible. We a.re· of the opinion that It was.
The existence of the ol'iglnal deed nnd Its
destruction In the fire at Chicago, In ()<otober,
1871, was distinctly provPd by the tPstimony
of Dent, counsel for- plulntltl's. lie testified
that it had been sent to the counsel in Chl<"ago of the original pl11lntll1' in the caSP; that
It had been otrered In e\"ldence on the first
tlial of the case, and bad been burned \Vlth
the other papers and re<•ords of the <•ourt in
the fl.re meutloned. It wns therefor!' rompetent for the plnlntltrs to pro"re its contents.
Thus, in Riggs v. Taylor, 4 Wheat. 480, this
court said:
"'l'he general· rule of evidt'nee ls, It a party Intend to use a deed or any other tm1trument in evldPnce be ougoht to produce the
orlglnnl if he bns It In hl11 posst>i<slon, or If
the original IR lost or de8troyPd secondary
t>videll<'P, which li-i the bt'st the nature of
the c1111e allows, will, In that case, be admitted. 'rlw party, .eftl'r p1·ovlng any or thr11e
clrcumstnm•es to 11t•count for the absence of
the original, may read a counterpart, or If
there Is no countervart an examined copy,
or It there should not be an examlne<l copy
be may give parol evidence ot Its contents."

evidence, which is the best the nature of

the case allows, will, in that case, be admit-

ted. ’l‘he party, -after proving any of these

circumstances to account for the absence of

the original, may read a counterpart, or if

there is no counterpart an examined copy,

or if there should not be an examined copy

he may give parol evidence of its contents."
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In the present ease It does not appear that
there was in exlstenc-e any counterpart or
examined copy of the destroyed deed. The
only re110urce left to the plalntttrs was to
proT'e the contents of the original by a witness who knew its contents. This was done
by the deposltlon of Dent. He testified that
the original deed corresponded substantially
In contents to the certified copy otrered in
evltlence, except that there was not attached
to It the olflclal certificate of the court, dated l•'ebrunry 3, 1875. This evidence made
the copy competent for the purposes of the
trial.
Ho.vlnir thus established the fact of the
original dt>ed and Its contents, the plalntltrs
below were in the same position 88 If the
original deed was In their po88e88ion and
they bad otrered It in evidence. It remained for them to prove its execution.
It has been held by the supreme court of
llllnQls, that, under the act of February 19,
1819, for establishing a recorder's oftlee, and
which wu substantially the same as the act
of 1807, which was In force when the deed
from Dunbar to !'rout was executed, a deed
ls valid as between the parties to it without
being acknowledged. Semple v. Miles, 2
Scam. 315. See, also, McConnell v. Ueed, Id.
371.
Having established by proof the fact that
the deed had ~xlsted and had been dt>stroyed, and that the copy otrered In evlden<-e was
a copy of tht> original, It only remained to
prove the signing and seallng of the deed by
the grantor.
As the wltneSBes to the deed were shown
to be dead, the method pointed out by law to
establish the execution of the det-d was by
proof of the handwriting of the wltnes!M.'8 to
the deed. Clark v. Courtney, 5 Pet. 319;
Cook v. Woodrow, IS Cmnch, 13. And when
there was more than one wltneBB, proof of
the handwriting of one was BUftl<'lent. 1
Greenl. Ev. § ri7:i; Adams v. Kerr, 1 Bos. &
P. 360: 8 Prl'st. Abst. Tit. 72. 78.
By the depositions of Middleton and Col
lnrd, which the court admitted In evldenC(>, ·
the handwriting of Samuel X. Smallwood, ..
one of the subll('rlblng wltne11ses of the deed,
was fully proven. His signature also to the
acknowledgment of the deed as one of the
justl<•es of the peace before whom the D<'·
knowledgment was taken, and bis signature
to the jurat of an oath of Identity lndortll'd
on the deed, subscribed and sworn to before him by Dunbar, were proT'en by the
same testimony. The genuineness of the
handwriting of Smallwood as a wltne88 to
the deed was placed beyond all doubt by tbe
clPJJOBltions of these witneAAes. If, therefore,
the evidence by whkh tbl11 proof was made
was <'ompet<>nt and admissible, the exe<'Utlon of the deed from Dunbar to Prout was
e!<tablild1ed, and the deed Itself was proir
erly admitted In evidence.
We are next to consider tbe question
whether the copies of the depositions ot
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Middleton and Collard, by which the hand- , which were admitted by counsel for defend-

writing of Smallwood was proven, were prop-

erly admitted in evidence. 'l‘his evidence

was objected to by the defendant, and his

objection was overruled, to which he ex-

cepted.

The admission of the parties, as appears

by the bill of exceptions. showed the exist-

ence of the original depositions; that they

had been destroyed with the other records

of the court in the ﬂre of October, 1871; that

the copies were correct copies of the orig-

inal depositions, and had been furnished by

counsel for defendant. and with his consent

had been placed on tile in the cause as cor-

rect copies of the original. The objection

made to the introduction of the copies was

that the death of the witnesses was not

shown, nor was it proven that they were in-
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competent to testify, and that their deposi- ,

tions could not be retaken; therefore proof

of what they had testlﬂed in their deposi-

tions was not admissible.

The rule invoked to exclude copies of the

depositions is that in the absence of evi-

dence that the witness who testified in a

former trial is dead or incapable of testify-

ing, or that his deposition cannot be retaken,

it is not competent to show what his testi-

mony in the former trial was;

cannot be proved except after proof of the

death of the witness whose testimony it con-

tained. Stout v. Cook. 47 ill. 530; Aulger v.

Smith, 34 Ill. 537.

But if the witnesses had lived in another

state, and more thana hundred miles distant

from the place of trial, proof of the contents of

their deposition would have been admissible.

Burton v. Driggs, 20 Wail. 125. Therefore.

to have made the objection tenable, it should

have also been put upon the ground that

the witnesses were not shown to reside in

another state and more than a hundred miles

from the place of trial. This it did not do.

When a party excepts to the admission of

testimony he is bound to state his objection

speciﬁcally, and in a proceeding for error

he is conﬁned to the objection so taken. Bur-

tton v. Drlggs, ubi supra. The original dep-

ositions were taken in the city of Washing-

ton. It is, therefore, probable that the wit-

nesses resided there. If the copy of the

depositions had been objected to because it

was not shown that the witnesses resided

out of the district, and more than a hun-

dred miles from the place where the court

was held, the plaintiffs below might have

supplied proof of that fact. The objection,

as it was made, was not broad enough and

speciﬁc enough, and was, therefore, properly

overruled and the evidence admitted.

But we think the rule relied on by de-

fendant to exclude copies of the deposition

does not apply to the case in hand. The

plaintiffs did not offer oral evidence of the

contents of the depositions, but offered copies

and that ‘

when the deposition of a witness which was 5
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Middleton and Collard, by wblch the handwriting o! Smallwood was proven, were prop~rly admitted ln evidence.
'fhls evidence
wu objected to by the defendant, and his
objection was overruled, to whlch he exeepted.
The admission of the partles, as appears
by the bill of exceptions, showed the existence of the original deposlttons; that they
had been destroyed with the other records
of the court in the flre of October, 1871; that
the copies were correct copies of the origlnal depositions, and had been furnished by
counsel for defendant, and with his consent
had been placed on file ln the cause as correct coplt'S of the original. The objeetlon
made to the introduction of the cople11 was
that the death of the \\ ltneBRes waa not
ahown, nor wu It proven that they were lncompetent to testify, and that their deposltlons could not be retaken; therefore proof
of what they had testlfted ln their depoBI·
tloDH was not admissible.
The rule Invoked to exclude copies of the
depositions ls that In the absen<'f' of evl·
dence that the wltne88 who teRtlJled In a
former trial la dead or incapable of testifyIng, or that his deposition cannot be retaken,
1t ls not competent to show what his testl·
mony In the former trial was; and that
when tlte deposition of a witness which wnH
read upon a former trial la lost, Its contt>ntR
cannot be proved except after proof of the
death of the wltne11s wbol!t' testimony It contalned. Stout v. Cook. 47 lll. 530; Aulger v.
Smith, 34 Ill. M7.
But It the witnesses had llvt>d In another
atate, and more than a hundred miles distant
from the place of trial, proof of the contents of
their deposition would have been admissible.
Burton v. Driggs, 20 Wall. 12.;. Therefon>,
to have made the objection tenable, It sbouht
have also been put upon the ground that
the wltneuea were not shown to rl>Rhte In
another state and more than a hundred miles
from the place of trial. This It did not do.
When a party excepts to the ndmhu!lon of
tet1tlmony be la bound to state his objection
.specl.dcally, and In a proceeding for error
he 18 confined to the objection so taken. Bur·
.ton v. Driggs, ubl supra. The original depo&ltlons were taken In the city of Washington. It la, therefore, probable that the witnt'flllt>R relllded there. If the copy ot the
depositions had been objected to beeause It
waa not shown that the wltneBHes resided
out of the district, and mol'f' than a bundred miles from the pla<>e where the court
WIUI held, the plalntl!rs below might have
supplied proof of that fact. The ohje<.'tlon,
as It was made, was not broad enough and
lpeclftc enough, and was, thert>fore, properly
overrnled and the evlden<"c admitted.
But we think the rule relied on by defendant to exclude copies of the deposition
does not apply to the case In han<l. The
plaintiffs did not otrer oral evhlPnce of the
contentB of the depositions, but olfered copies
0

, which were admitted by counsel for defend·
ant to be true copies. It was, therefore. not
nece8811ry to retake the deposltlou or to
prove the death of the witnesses, or their
Incapacity to testlty. The copy of the deposl·
tlon was, by consent, substituted for the
original, wblch was proven to have been
destroyed, and, being admitted to be a true
copy, spoke for Itself. It was, -therefore,
1 properly rec·elved ln evidence.
I It was further objected to the admission In
1 evidence of the proof relating to the deed
I of John J. Dunbar to Prout, that as the teetlmony to establish Its execution was the
proof of the handwriting of subscribing wltnesses, It was necessary to prove the Identity
of the grantor ln the deed; that Is to eay,
that tile John J. Dunbar by whom the deed
purported to be executed was the same John
: .J. Dunbar named In the patent for the lands
I In controversy. In any case slight proof of
, Identity ls sutnclent. Nelson v. Whittall, 1
I Bam. & Aid. 19; Warren v. Anderson, 8 Scott,
; 384; 1 Selw. N. P. (18th Ed.) 538, note 7. But
: the proof of Identity ln this case was ample.
In tracing titles lllentlty of names ls prlma
facle evidence of tdentlty of persons. Brown
v. Metz, 33 Ill. 3."J9; Cates v. Loftus, 8 A.
K. Marsh, 202; Gitt v. Watson, 18 ~Io. 2i4;
· Balble v. Donaldson, 2 Grant (Pa.) 400;
! Bogue v. Bigelow, 29 Vt. 179; Ohamblee v.
. Tarbox, 27 Tex. 139. See, also, Sewell v.
I Evans, 4 AdoL & E. 626; Roden v. Ryde,
I Id. 629. There was no evidence that more
than one John J. Dunbar lived at the date
of the deed ln Matthias rounty, Virginia,
which the deed re<>ites was the residence of
the gmntor, nor In the District of Columbia,
where the deed was executed, and there was
no othl'r proof to rebut the prlma facle pre• suniptlon raised by the Identity of names ln
I tbe patent and deed. But, besides the Iden·
i tlty of names, there was other evidence
!' showing the Identity of persons.
The patent and the deed bore date the eame day,
and the patent was cited In hl!OO verba In
the deed. These circumstances tend strongly
to show that the party by whom the deed
was executed must have had poBBesslon of
the patent. The deed recites that the patent
was delivered to the grantor, John J. Dunbar,
and the aflldavlt of John J. Dunbar, sworn
to and subscribed on January 7, 1818, b<>fore
Smallwood, a justice of the peace, and one
of the subscribing witnesses to the deed,
who11e signature to the jurat Is shown to be
genuine, to the effect that he W88 the same
John J. Dunbar to whom the patent was
Issued, WllS lndor11ed Upon the deed.
After a lapse of 61 years, this evidence Is
not only admissible to prove the Identity of
the grantee ln the patent with the grantor In
the del'd, but, unC'ontradic'tecl, ls conclusive.
We are, therefore, of opinion that the deed
from John J. Dunbar to William Prout,
which formed a link ln the tltl<' of the plain·
tltrs, was sufflC'lently pro'\"en, and was properly admitted In evidence by the circuit
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court. The other muniments of title put in

evidence b_v the plaintiffs were admitted

without objection, and established prima

faeie their title to the lands in controversy.

But it will be remembered that the defend-

ant below had also shown a prima facle

title to the lands in question; that both par-

ties traced title through the patent of the

United States issued to Dunbar, and through

deeds apparently executed by him on the

same day, to-wit, January 6, 1818,—one to

William Prout, under which the plaintiffs

claimed, and the other to John Frank, under

which the defendant claimed.

The question, therefore,still remains, which

is the superior title? According to the juris-

prudence of Illinois, this must be settled by

the fact, which of the two deeds, apparently

executed by Dunbar, was first recorded.
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Section 15 of the act approved January 31,

1827 (Purple, Real Est. St. -180), provided as

follows:

“All grants, bargains, sales, etc., of or con-

cerning any lands, whether executed within

or without the state, shall be recorded in the

recorder’s oﬂice in the county where such

lands are lying, and being within 12 months

after the execution of such writings, and ev-

ery such writing that shall, at any time after

the publication hereof, remain more than 12

months after the making of such writing,

and shall not be proved and recorded as

aforesaid, shall be adjudged fraudulent and

void against any subsequent bona ﬁde pur-

chaser or mortgagee for valuable considera-

tion, unless such deed, conveyance, or other

writing be recorded as aforesaid, before the

proving and recording of the deed, mortgage,

or other writing under which any subsequent

purchaser or mortgagee shall claim.”

This act remains substantially in force.

Hurd, Rev. St. p. 271, § 30.

By an act, approved July 21, 1837 (Purple,

Real Est. St. 496, -197). it was provided that

the recording of any deed, " * " whether

executed within or without the state, by the

recorder of the county in which the lands

intended to be affected are situated, shall

b'e deemed and taken to be notice to subse-

quent purchasers and creditors from the date

of such recording. whether said writings

shall have been acknowledged or proven in

conformity with the laws of the state or not,

and that the provisions of the act shall ap-

ply as well to writings heretofore as those

hereafter admitted to record. This law is

still in force. See Hurd. Rev. St. 1880. p.

271, § 31.

It was held by the supreme court of Illi-

nois. in Reed v. Kemp, 16 Ill. 445, that an in-

strument atfecting or relating to real estate

may be recorded, though not proven or ac-

knowledged, and the record will operate as

constructive notice to subsequent purchasers

and creditors. See, also, Choteau v. Jones,

11 Ill. 320; Martin v. Dryden, l (-lilman, 213.

And in (‘aheen v. Breckenridge, 48 Ill. 9-l.

the court declared that, “as a general rule,
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court. The othE>r monlments of title put In
evidence by the plalnturs were admitted
without objection, and established prlma
tacle their title to the lands In contro¥ersy.
But It will be remembered that the defendant below had also shown a prlma facle
title to the lands In question; that both parties traced title through the patent of the
United States Issued to Dunbar, and through
deeds apparently executed by him on the
same day, to-wit, January 6, 1818,-one to
William Prout, under which the plalntllfs
claimed, and the other to John Frank, under
which the defendant claimed.
The question, therefore, still remains, which
ls the superior title? According to the jurisprudence of Illinois, this must be settled by
the fact, which of the two deeds, apparently
executed by Dunbar, was flrat recorded.
Set·tlon I!> of the act approved January 31,
1827 (Purple, Real Est. St. 480), provided a11
follows:
"All grants, barJ:Blns, sales, etc., of or concerning any lands, whether executed within
or without the state, shall be recorded In the
recorder's oftlce In the county where such
lands are lying, and being within 12 months
after the execution of such wrltlngs, and every such writing that shall, at any time after
the publication hereof, remain more than 12
months after the making of such writing,
and shall not be proved and recorded as
aforesaid, shall be adjudged fraudulent and
void against any subsequent bona dde purchaser or mortgagee for valuable consideration, unless such deed, conveyance, or other
writing be recorded as aforesaid, before the
proving and recording of the deed, mortgage,
or other writing under which any subsequent
purehaser or mortgagee shall claim."
This act remains substantially In force.
Burd, Rev. St. p. 271, § 30.
By an act, approved July 21, 18!~7 (Purple,
Real Est. St. 49<i, 497), It was provided that
the re<'ordlng of any deed, • • • whether
executed within or without the state, by the
recorder of the county In which the lands
Intended to be affected are situated, shall
be deemed and taken to be notice to subsequent purchasers and creditors from the date
of such recording, whether Mid writings
shall have been a<"knowledged or proven in
conformity with the laws of the state or not,
and that the provisions of the acl shall apply as well to writings hPretofore as those
hPreafter admitted to re<"ord. This law is
11tlll In force. See Hurd. Rev. St. 1880, p.

I

when the same person has executed twodeeds for the •me land, the first deed recorded will hold the title.''
The evidence shows that the deed of Dunbar to Fmnk, under which the defendant
claimed title, was not recorded until June 18~
1870. The plalntllfs contended that the deed
from Dunbar to Prout, under which they
claimed, was recorded on June 23, 1818, and
It was shown that the deed trom Prout to
Duncan was recorded October 29, 1838, and
the deed of Glllett to Corcoran, June 5, lst8,
and the deed of Corcoran to Morris. March
12, 1868. If, therefore, the contention ot the
plaintiffs that the deed of Dunbar to Prout
was recorded .June 23, 1818, 18 sustained by
competent proof, their title mUBt prevail.
But It ls Insisted for defendant that there
was no competent proof of the registration
of the deed of Dunba.r to Prout. The proo!
relied on was the testimony of Dent, that tbe
certlfted copy from the records of the counQ'
of Madison was a copy of the original deeQ;
the certlO.cate of the' recorder that the certl0.ed copy was a copy of a deed which appeared of record In bis ofllce; and the certlfted
copy of a memorandum at the toot of the
record of the deed as follows: "Recorded
June 23, 1818." Coneedlng that the certified
copy of the deed from the records of Madison county would not be proof of the contents of the original deed, because such original deed bad not been so acknowledged and
certified as to make a certifted copy competent evidence, yet the fact that such a record of the deed existed, was, by the law of
Illinois, as we have seen, notice to subsequent purchasers. A certifted copy from th&
record was, therefore, a proof that such a
deed and memorandum were of record in the
proper oftlce. For It Is a settled rule of evidence that every document of a public nature which there would be an Inconvenience
In removing, and which the party bas the
right to Inspect, may be proved by a dulyauthenticated copy. Saxton v. Nlmms, 14
:Mass. SID; Thayer v. Stearns, 1 Pick. 109;
Dunning v. Roome, 6 Wend. 6.'il; Dudley T.
Grayson, 6 T. B. Mon. 2.19: BlshOlll v. Cone,
3 N. H. 513; 1 Green!. Ev. S 484.
The memorandum at the foot of the I'l'COrd
was the usual record evidence, competent
and conclusive, that the deed had been recorded at the date mentioned. It was evidence of the date of the registration of the
deed, because It was the duty of the recorder.
by the nature of his ofllce and without special statutory direction, to note when the
271. § 31.
It was held by the supreme court of llll· record was made. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 483. But
nois, In Reed v. Kemp, 16 Ill. 445, that an In- we think it may be fairly interred from secstrument alfectlng or relating to real estate tion 10 of the act of September 17, 1807.
may be re<'orded, though not proven or ac- which was In force when It Is claimed thllt
knowlpdged, and the record wlll operate as the deed from Dunbar to Prout was recordconstru<'tlve notice to subsequent purchasPrs ed, that It was the duty of the recorder to
and <'retlltors. See, also, Choteau v. Jones, note the time when deeds left with him for
11 111. 320; Martin v. Dryden, 1 Gilman, 213. record were recorded. He was spcclO.rolly
And In CabPPD v. BrE><"kenrldgP. 48 Ill. 9-l, required to note the date when the deed was
the <"ourt declan.>d that, "as a general rule, received, and was liable to a penalty of $3()()
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tor recording any deed in writing “before an-

other ﬁrst brouzht into his oﬂice to be re-

corded." 1 Adams & D. Real Est. St. 63.

The making of a memorandum of the date

of record was, therefore, an otﬂcial act,

which naturally fell within the line of l1is

statutory duties, and a certiﬁed copy of it

would be competent evidence to prove the

lnemorandum and the date of the registra-

tion of the deed.

We are of opinion, therefore, that the fact

that the deed of Dunbar to Prout was re-

corded on June 23, 1818, was proved by com-

petent evidence, and that it therefore fol-

lows that the title of the plaintiffs was bet-

ter and superior to that of defendants. who

claimed under a deed for the same lands not

recorded until June 18, 1870, more than 50

years after its date, and long after innocent
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purchasers had bought the lands and paid a

valuable consideration for them.

The plaintiff in error contends that the act

of 1837, supra, cannot apply in this case, be-

cause at its date the lands in question were

no longer within the limits of Madison coun-

ty, but in the county of Putnam. But the act

expressly declares that it shall apply to writ-

ings theretofore as well as those thereafter

admitted to record. The deed of Dunbar to

Prout was recorded under the act of 1807,

supra, which required it to be recorded in

the county where the lands conveyed were

situated. It was so recorded. No law of

Illinois since passed has required any other

registration of deeds by the parties thereto.

or has changed the effect of the original reg-

istration. See act of February 27, 1841; 1

Adams & D. Real Est. St. 93, 94.

The view we have taken of the case ren-

ders it unnecessary to notice certain ques-

tions of local practice argued by counsel.

We ﬁnd no error in the record of the cir-

cuit court. Its judgment must therefore be

aﬁirnied. - -
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for recording any deed In writing "before another first broUKht Into hie omce to be recorded." 1 Adams & D. Real Est. St. 63.
The making of a memorandum of the date
of record was, therefore, an official act,
which naturally fell within the line of hls
statutory duties, and a certlfted copy of It
would be competent evidence to prove the
memorandum and the date of the registration of the deed.
We are of opinion, therefore, that the fact
that the deed of Dunbar to Prout was recorded on June 23, 1818, was proved by competent evidence, and that It therefore follows that the title of the plaintiffs was better and superior to that of defendants, who
claimed under a deed for the same lands not
recorded until June 18, 1870, more than r.o
years after lt8 date, and long after Innocent
purchasers had bought the lands and paid a
valuable consideration for them.
The plalntur In error contends that the act

(Ca.~e

No.

10~

of 1837, supra, cannot apply in this case, because at its date the lands In question wer~
no longer within the limits of Madison courity, but In the county of Putnam. But the flct
expressly declares that it shall apply to writings theretofore as well as those therea!te1·
admitted to record. The. deed of Dunbar to
Prout was recorded under the act of 1807,
supra, which required It to be recorded In
the county where the lands conveyed were
situated. It was so recorded. No law of
Illinois since passed has required any other
registration of deeds by the parties thereto,
or has changed the effect of the original registration. See act of February 27, 1841; 1
Adams & D. Real Est. St. 93, 94.
The view we have taken of the case rendel'B lt unnecessary to notice certain questions of local practice argued by counsel.
We find no error In the record of the circuit court. Its judgment must therefore be
affirmed..

Case No. 10:1)
(Jase No. 103]

PROOF.

GARRETT

T.

HA.NSHI:'E et ux.

PROOF.

GARRETT v. HANSHIT E et ux.

(42 N. E. 256.)

(42 N. E. 236.)
Supreme Court of Ohio.

Nov. 26. 189:>.

i

Supreme Court of Ohio. Nov. 26. 189-'3.

Error to circuit court, Rlchland county.

Action by W. II. Garrett against W. S.

Hanshue and another. Defendants had judg-

ment, which was affirmed by the circuit court,

and plaintii! brings error. Reversed.

The action in the common pleas was brought

by W. H. Garrett, plaintiff, against W. S.

Hanshue and Barbara iianshue, his wife, de-

fendants, to recover damages for breach of

covenants of title to certain lands in Iowa,

conveyed by them to one Mattie Shcphard by

deed of general warranty, and by her con-

veyed to the plaintiff by like deed. By written

assignment on the back of her deed to plain-

tiff, Mattie Shephard assigned and transferred
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to him her right of action against Hanshue

and wife for breach of warranty as to the

title of the Iowa lands, and this assignment

was set out in the petition. The defendants,

among other things, denied the conveyance

from Mattie Shephard to plaintiff, and also de-

nied the assignment of the cause of action,

and failure of title to the iowa lands. Plain-

tiff had an abstract of the title of the lands in

1l\1e$ti°I1- ﬂlld, for the purposes of the trial,

the attorneys of record of said defendants

placed upon said abstract the following writ-

ten agreement: "lt is hereby agreed that the

within abstract shows the true condition of

the title of the lands therein abstracted. Catn-

mings & McBride.” Upon the trial of the

case to a jury, the plaintiff, having proved by

.\Iattie Shephard, the grantor in the deed to

plaintiff, that she executed and delivered said

deed to him, oﬂ‘ered to introduce said deed in

evidence, to which defendants, by their coun-

sel, objected. upon the ground that. before the

deed could be received in evidence. its execu-

tion should be proved by at least one of the

subscribing witnesses, unless it should appear

L.-at the evidence of such witness could not

be procured. The court sustained the objec-

tion, and plaintiff excepted, and the deed was

ruled out. Plaintiff also offered to introduce I

said abstract in evidence to show the state of

the title to said lands, and to prove that de-

fendants had no title to the lands at the time

of their conveyance to Mattie Shephard. De-

fendants, by their counsel. objected to the in-

troduction of said abstract as evidence upon

the ground that, aside from the said agree-

ment of counsel, it was incompetent, and that

such agreement did not make it competent

when objected to on the trial. The court sus-

tained the objection, to which plaintiff except-

ed. The court instructed the jury to return a

verdict for defemlants, which was done. A

motion for a new trial was ﬂied, assigning,

among other things. the ruling out of said deed

and abstract by the court. Said motion was

overruled. and judgment entered on the ver- 1

dict, to all of which plainiiii’ excepted. The

circuit court aiiirmed the judgment of the com-

mon pleas, and thereupon plaintiff ﬁled his pe-

Error to circuit court, Richland county.
Action by W. H. Garrett against W. B.
Hanshue and another. Defendants had jmlgment, which was atftrmed by the circuit court,
and plaJntur brings error. Re"ersed.
The aetlon In the common 11leas was brought
by w. H. Garrett, plalntllf, agalll8t w. s.
Hanshue and Barbara Hanshue, his wife, defendants, to recover damages for breach of
(!()Venants of title to certain lands In Iowa,
ronveyed by them to one Mattie Shephard by
deed of general warranty, and by her conveyed to the plalntttr by like deed. By written
a11slgnm<'nt on tbe back of her deed to plaln1llf, Mattie Shephard assigned and transferred
to hlm her right of action against Hanshue
and wife for breach of warranty as to the
title of the Iowa lands, and this assignment
was set out In the petition. The defetulnnts,
among other things, denied the conveyance
from Mattie 8hepbard to platntllf, and also denied the al!Klgnwent of the cause of action,
and failure of title to the Iowa lands. Plain·
tiff had an abstract of the title of the lands In
question, and, for the pu1110ses of the trial,
the attorneys of rerord of said defendants
placed upon 81lld abstract the following wlitten agreement: "It Is hereby agreed that the
within abstract shows the true condition of
the title of the lands tberetn abstracted. Cummings & McBride." Upon the trial of the
case to a jury, the plalntllr, having proved by
llatUe Shephard, the grantor In the deed to
plalntUr, that she executed and delivered said
deed to him, oft.'ered to Introduce said deed In
evidence, to which defendants, by their counsel, objected, upon the ground that, before the
deed could be rt><'elved In evhJenC'P, Its PXl'C'lltlon should be proved by at least one of the
sulflcrlblng witnesses, unless It should appear
,~at the evidence of such witness could not
be procured. The court sustained the objection, and plafntltr excepted, and the deed was
ruled out. Plalntlfr also olTt>red to lntrodul'e
said absb"&ct In evidence to show t11e state of
the title to said lands, and to pro"e thnt defendants had no title to the lnn<ls at the time
of their conveyance to l\lnttl<> ~ht>phard. Defendants, by their counsel. objected to the Introduction of said abstract as evlden<'e upon
the ground thut, ai:ltle from the said agreement of coullllel, It was Incompetent, and that
such agre<>ment did not make It competent
when ohjectt>d to on the trial. The court f!Ulltalned the objection, to whll'b plnlntllr excepted. Tht! court lustnll'ted the jury to return a
verdict for defPmlunts, which wns done. A
motion tor a m•w trial was flied, al'lslgnl11g,
among other things. the ruling out of said d<>ed
and ab~tml't br the court. Said motion was
overruled. and judgment Pntered on the verdkt, to all of whkh 1ilal11lllT <>xcepted. The
drc·ult court affirmed the judgment of the com300

mon pleas, and thereupon plaintiff flied Ws petition In this court to reverse both judgments
below.
S. c. Parker and D. Dirlam, for plnlntllf In
error. Cummings & McBride and Lewis
Brucker, for defendants In error.
BPltKET, J. (after stating the facts). As far
back as we have been able to trace the matter, both In England and this country, It ha8
been uniformly held that the execution of a
deed or other written Instrument having one or
more attesting witnesses must, as to rights between the parties or their privies, be establl11hed by the testimony of at least ooe of the
subMcrlblng witnesses, and that other proof of
execution Is Incompetent, unless tt be first
shown that the e"ldence of such witness cannot be lwd. Starkie, In bis work on Evidence
(page 3:!()), states the rules as follows: "If
the deed or Instrument produced purports to
have been attested by one or more witnesses.
whose names are subecrlbed, the party must
call at least one of the witnesses; and, In
cas<>s where the Instrument labors under any
doubt or suspicion, be ought to call them all
The law J'e(1ulres the testimony ot the subscribing witness, because the partlee themselves, by selecting him as the witness, have
mutually agreed to rest upon his testimony in
11roof of the excc·ntlon of the Instrument, and
of the clrcumstanres which then took place,
and bec'Uu.se he knows those facts which are
probably unknown to others. So rigid ts this
rule that it 18 not superseded, in the case of a
deed, by proof of any adml1111lon or acknowledgment of the e:J:ecutlon by the party himself.
whether the action be brought against the
oblbcor himself, or against his assignees after
his bankruptcy; nor by proof of an admission
of the execution, made by the defendant In bis
answer to a bill In equity. The rule applies,
whether the question be between the parties
to the d<>t'd or strangers, whether the deed be
the foundation of the action or but collateral,
or whether It still exist ns a deed or has been
l'anet-led, and although the ls!!Ue be directed
by a court of equity to try the date, and not
tbe exlstence of a deed. Upon an Indictment
agn.lust nu app1·entlre for a fraudulent enlist·
ment, It was held that the Indentures must be
proved In the regular way. And the same
mle applies to all written agreements and other Instruments attested by a witness; as, for
lmrtauce, a notke to quit In ejectmeut, in
which case It was held tlwt proof of service
of the notice upon the tenant, and that It was
l'end over to him without his making any objectlou, was not sufficient." Greenleaf, in his
work on ·E'fldeuc•e (Rf.'<•tlon 569), states the rule
ns follows: "TI1e lnstrnnwnt, being thtll! prodUC'ed and ft•l!<'ll from suspicion, must he proved by the 11ub1wrlblng witnesses, If there IM"
any, or at lenst hy one of them. Yarlous 1•..!fl·
sons have IJN>n &!!Signed tor this rule, but that
upon which It seems best founded Is that a
fnct may be known to the s11bl!<·1ihloir wltn<'llll,
not within the knowledge or re<.'Ollectlon of tlte
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obligor, and that he is entitled to avail himself

of all the knowledge of the subscribing wit-

ness relative to the transaction. The party

to whose execution he is :1 witness is consid-

ered as invoking him, as the person to whom

he refers, to prove what passed at the time of

attestation." Wharton, in his work on Evi-

dence (section 723), states the rule as follows:

"By the strict rule of the English common law,

when there are subscribing witnesses to an in-

strument, such witnesses should be called to

prove its execution, or their absence should be

duly accounted for. The statutes allowing

parties to be witnesses do not of themselves

abrogate this rule." This rule was recognized

and followed by this court in Zerby v. Wilson,

3 Ohio, 43, and also in Warner v. Railroad

Co., 31 Ohio St. 269, and the same rule is found

in Swan, Just. p. 154.
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It is said that this rule is founded upon the

reason that a fact may be known to the sub-

scribing witness not within the knowledge or

recollection of the obligor, and that he is en-

titled to avail himself of all the knowledge

of the subscribing witness relative to the

transaction. This is the reason given by Le

Blane, J., in Call v. Dunning, 4 East, 54, and

followed by many Judges since without ques-

tion or investigation as to its soundness. That

this reason is unsound is clear from the con-

sideration that the competency of evidence

does not depend upon the fact of either knowl-

edge or recollection of a particular witness.

\Vhere two witnesses have equal means of

knowledge of a particular fact, both are equal-

ly competent as witnesses, although one may

have imperfectly comprehended the fact, and

but faintly recollects the transaction, while

the other may be clear as to the fact, and

perfect in his recollection. The want of com-

prehension and recollection will go as to the

weight, but not as to the competency, of the

evidence. Another reason given for the rule

is because the parties themselves, by se-

leeting the witnesses, have mutually agreed to

rest upon their testimony in proof of the

execution of the instrument, and of the cir-

cumstances which then took place, and be-

cause they know those facts which are proba-

bly unknown to others. This supposed mu-

tual agreement is a pure ﬁction, and rarely,

if ever, exists in fact. If in any case it has

a real existence, and can be shown, it may

perhaps be enforced; but the mere ﬁction is

entitled to no weight and to no respect. The

fact that such witness may know facts which

are unknown to others does not go to the com-

petency of the evidence of another witness as

to facts actually within his knowledge. It is

also said that the party to whose execution

he is a witness is considered as invoking him,

as the person to whom he refers to prove

what passed at the time of attestation. This

is also a pure ﬁction, but may have been well

enough when parties were debarred from tes-

tifying. The execution of written instruments

does not involve a sacred ceremony, hut a

business transaction, and should, like any oth-

obllgor, and that he le entitled to avail himself
ot all the knowledge ot the subscribing witness relative to the transaction. The party
to whose execution be ls 11 wltnPss le considered as Invoking him, as the perKOn to whom
he refers, to prove what paseed at tile time ot
attestation." Wharton, In bis work on Evidence (aectlon 723), states the rule as follows:
"By the strict rule ot the English common Ja.w,
when there are subscribing witnesses to an instrument, such witnesses should be called to
prove Its execution, or their absence should be
duly accounted tor. The statutes allowing
parties to be witnesses do not ot themselves
abrogate this rule." This rule was recognized
and followed by this court In Zerby v. Wilson,
3 Ohio, 43, and also In Warner v. Railroad
Co.. 31 Ohio St. 269, and the same rule ls found
In Swan. Just. p. lG-!.
It Is said that this rule Is founded upon the
reason thllt a tact may be known to the subscribing witness not within the knowledge or
recollectlon ot the obllgor, and that he Is entitled to a\'all himself of all the knowledi:e
ot the mbscrlblng witness relative to the
transaction. This 18 the renson glYen by Le
Blanc, J ., In Call v. Dunning, 4 Bnst, Gel, and
followed by many judges since without question or Investigation as to Its soundness. That
this re880n ls unsound 18 clear from the conaldera tlon that the competency of evidence
does not depend upon the tact of either knowledge or recollectlon ot a pnrtlcular witness.
"'here two wltnesRes have equal means of
knowledge ot a pnrtkular fact, both are equally competent as witnesses, although one may
have imperfectly comprehen<ll'd the tact, and
but faintly recollects the transaction, while
the other may be clear as to the tact, and
P<'rfect in bis recollection. The want ot comprehension and recollection wlll go as to the
weight, but not as to the C'ompeti>ncy, ot the
evldl'nce. Another reason glnm for the rule
ls because the parties themsel'l"es, by selecting the witnesses, ha \'e mutually agreed to
rest upon their testimony In proof of the
execution ot the Instrument, and ot the circumstances which then took place, and bf!cause they know those tacts which a;.<) probably unknown to others. This supposed mu·
tunl agreement Is a pure fiction, and 1·arel),
If ever, exists In tact. If In any cnse It has
11 real existence, and can be shown, It may
perhaps be enforced; but the mere fiction ls
entitled to no weight nnd to no respect. The
tact that such witness way know facts which
are unknown to others does not go to the competency ot the evidence of another wltne>s as
to facts actually within his knowledge. It Is
also Sllld that the pnrty to whose exe<"utlon
he Is a witness Is con:;;ldered as Invoking him,
as the person to whom be refe1'8 to prove
what passed at the time of attestation. This
Is also a pure fiction, but may have been well
enough when parties were tlebarrecl from testifying. The execution of written Instruments
<loes not involve a sacred ceremony, hut 11
businel8 transaction, and shoultl, like any oth-

er tact, be proven by the best evidence of
which it Is capable; that ls, by evidence
which tloes not presuppose the existence of
other eYldence of a higher character. As
this rule hall Its origin when parties to actions were not permitted to testify, when
deeds were not re<]ulred to be ack~owledged
before an officer, and when the execution of
such instruments was attempted to be proven
bY the admlssiollS of the grantors, there was
some reason for boltllng that the dil'ect eYldence ot the sub~crlblng wltnes8('8 was better
and ot a higher character than the admissions
ot the grantor, whether made orally or in a
written answer In chancery. The oral atlmlsslons were evidence only upon the presumption tba.t a mnn would not admit that
which was against bis Interest; but often the
establishment of the Instrument wns tor bis
lnte1·est, and then, ot course, be should not
be permitted to pro,•e it by bis admission.
The same was true ot an admission In an answer In chancery, with this adclltlonnl objection: that he should not be pe1·mltted to prove
a tact by an admission In his answer In
chnn<.-ery which he could not be allowed to
prove by his evlclenee In court. He could not
by his answer do Indirectly that which he
could not do directly by his sworn evidence
upon the trial. But as parties to al'tlons can
now testify, nnd deeds are t•equlred to be acknowledged before an officer, this reason of
the rule bas ceased. True, in ll<><lnett v.
Smith, 2 Sweeney, 401, 10 Abb. PJ'llc. (~. S.)
86, and 41 Ifow. P1·ac. 100, It was held tlmt the
statutes allowing parties to be witnesses do
not of themselves abrogate this rule. That
decision was by the superior court o! the
city ot New York, and the cn~es there dted
and relied upon a.re dt>eislons ot the courts of
common tilens ot the stnte ot New York, and
those courts followed the old rule without
que~tlon. ::'\ot helng by a comt of last resort,
the case 18 not ot controlllng weight here.
The q11e11tlon was not examined on prlnl'lple,
and, It it had bePn, a different conclusion
should haYe been reached. While a statute
making a party to an action a competent witness does not ot itself make that part ot bis
evide:;ce competent which was !)('fore Incompetent, yet If the e\'ldem•e was In Its na tur<:
competent before the statute, and wns made
unan1llahle by reason of the lncompetenl'y ot
the wltnes11. when such Incompetency Is removed by statute, the e\'ldence thereby becomes a\'alL'tble, and mny be Introduced
throu~h such newly-enfranchl!-'.ed witness. As
to the exC<:utlon of an lnst1'Ument, It was
Mid that the subscribing witnesses should be
first l·nlled, because they not only snw, but
pnrtlclpated In, the transa<'tlon, and had their
attention thereby specially called to the subject, while· mere bystanders, with equal opportunity to see and bear, would not so fully
untler;,tund the matter as those who actually
took part In the trnnsnl'tlon; and although
the grantor saw the tra111<nctlon, and partklpnted therein, and was in fact the prln301
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cipal actor, and had full information, yet, as

he was an incompetent witness, it was held

that the testimony of the subscribing wit-

nesses was the best evidence of the fact of

execution. On principle, it was not the evi-

dence of the grantor that was incompetent,

but it was the witness that was incompetent.

By removing the incompetency of the wit-

ness, his evidence, which in its nature was al-

ways competent, bccame available to prove

the fact of execution, and his evidence in such

case is as good and of as high a character as

that of the subscribing witnesses. True, he

may be interested, but that goes only to the

weight, and not to the character or compe-

tency, of the evidence. By section 310 of the

Code, adopted in 1853, parties to actions be-

came competent witnesses, but it was pro-

vided that their interest might be shown to
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affect their credibility. Later the credibility

part of the section was removed, and ever

since that parties to actions are competent

witnesses upon an equality with other wit-

ncsses, the credibility of all alike to be de-

termined by the jury in view of all the cir-

cumstances. As the evidence of tliosc who

were present and participated in the execu-

tion of the instrument was regarded as the

best evidence of its execution, and the incom-

petency of the grantor as a witness being

now removed by statute, it inevitably follows .

that he is now, equally with the subscribing

witnesses, competent to establish the execu-

tion of the instrument.

The rule requiring the execution of a deed

to be proven by the subscribing witness

would exclude the oﬂlcer before whom the

deed was acknowledged, when we all know

that such oﬁicer sees and knows all that the

witnesses do, and most likely much more.

The witnesses are usually hurriedly called 5

in, and give but slight attention to the mat-

ter, while the officer usually prepares the

deed and acknowledgment, shows the par-

ties where to afﬁx their signatures, sees

them sign the deed, and hears them ac-

knowledge it; and a rule which requires

such oﬂicer, and the party who signed the in-

strument, to stand aside until the testimony

of the subscribing witness is ﬁrst taken as

to its execution, cannot be sound in this day,

when all persons are equally competent to

testify to any fact within their knowledge,

unless otherwise provided by statute, as in 1

the case of wills. In Warner v. Railroad

Co., 31 Ohio St. 269, the grantor being dead .

at the time of the trial, it was proposed

to establish the execution of the instrument

by proving his signature, and his admission

that he had executed the instrument, witn-

out ﬁrst calling the subscribing witnesses or

accounting for their absence. This the court .

held could not be done. The testimony of

the subscribing witnesses, who saw the par-

ty sign his name to the instrument, was

better evidence and of a higher character

than the testimony as to his handwriting or

admissions. The case was therefore cor-

PROOJl'.

clpal actor, and bad full Information, 7et, a.
he was an Incompetent witness, It was held
that the testimony of the subscl'iblng witnesses wns the best evidence of the fact of
execution. On principle, It was not the evidence of the grantor that wa.s Incompetent,
but it was the witness that was incompetent.
By removing the Incompetency of the witness, his evidence, which in Its nature was always competent, became available to prove
the fact of execution, and his evidence 1n such
case 18 as good and of as high a character as
that ot. the subscribing wltneBSes. True, he
may be interested, but that goes only to the
weight, and not to the character or competency, of the evidence. By section 310 of the
Code, adopted in 18.53, parties to actions became competent wltne88e8, but It was provided that their Interest might be shown to
alrect their credlblllty. Later the credlblllty
part of the section waa removed, and ever
since that parties to actions are competent
witnesses upon an equality with other wit·
Dl.'8ses, the credlblllty ot all alike to be determined by the jury In view of all the circumstances. As the evidence of thos(' who
were present and participated In the execu·
tlon of the Instrument was regarded as the
best evidence of Its execution, and the Incompetency of the grantor 88 a witness being
now removed by statute, It Inevitably follows .
that he ls now, equally with the subscribing
witnesses, competent to establish the execution of the lnstl'Ument.
The rule requiring the execution of a deed
to be proven by the subscribing witness 1
would exclude the oftlcer before whom the
deed was acknowledged. when we all know ,
that such ofticer sees and knows all that the
witnesses do, and most likely much more.
The witnesses are usually hurriedly called
tn, and gtve but slight attention to the matter, whlle the oftict>r usually prepares the
deed and acknowledgment, shows the parties where to affix their signatures, sees
them sign the deed, and hears them acknowledge It; and a rule which requires
such offi.cer, and the party who signed the Instrument, to stand aside until the testimony
of the subS<'rlhlng witness ls ftrst taken as
to Its execution, <·annot be sound In this day,
when all persons are equally competent to
testify to any fact within their knowledge,
unleBB otherwise provided by statute, as In
the case of wills. In 'Varner v. Railroad
Co., 31 Ohio St. 200, the grantor being dead
at the time of the trial, It was proposed
to establish the execution of the Instrument
by proving his signature, and his admission
that he hnd exe<'uted the Instrument, wit.bout first calling the subscribing witnesses or
accounting tor their absence. This the court '
held could not be <lone. The testimony of
the subscribing wltnc11ses, who saw the party elgn his name to the instrument, wae '
better evidence and of a higher chnracter
than the testimony as to his handwriting or
admissions. The case waa the1·efore cor302

rectly decided, and the rule as to the subscribing witness was not necessary to sustain the deelslon. While the rule u to the
testimony of the subecrlbl11g witnesses waa
1n full force In this .state, tbls court held,
In the case of Simmons v. State, 7 Ohio, 116,
that the rule did not apply In a prosecution
for forgery wherein the signer of the forged
Instrument was a competent wltneBB. Wood,
J.,°used the following language: "In a case
arlsl11g between the parties to such an instrument having a subscribing wltneSB, and
where the obllgor, being Interested, ls excluded from testifying, the rule ls a good
one which requires such witness to prove Its
execution. • • • When the obllgor ls
comJJetent, he must be the best witness of
which the case wlll admit, and the subscribing witness, In such case, need not be call·
ed." As early 88 the case of Grey v. Smith·
yee, 4 Burrows, 2273, It was held that the
rule did not apply to third persons In a col·
lateral proceeding having no prlvity with
the grantor in the deed. The same was aft·
crwards held In Ayers v. Hewitt, 19 Me. 286.
'!'here are some other exceptions to the rule,
as ls shown by the notes to section 569 of
'1reenleaf on Evidence. In Maryland the
rule was regarded eo narrow that It was
changed by statute as early as 1825. We
think that the statutes requiring deeds to be
Acknowledged before an otD.cer, and permitting parties to testify, have so P-nlnl"ged
the rules as to the manner of proving the
execution of a written Instrument having
subscribing witnesses as to abrogate the old
rule, and to permit such execution to be
proven alike by the grantor, the subscribing
witnesses, or the otfirer before whom the acknowledgment was taken.
Whether or not the court erred In not per·
mlttlng the abstract to be received 1n evidence depends upon the question as to
whether the attorney of record bas power to
bind his client by agreement In writing before the trial, as to a matter of evidence. to
facilitate the preparation for trial, or to eave
expense or shorten the trial, and whether
what was written on the abstract made It
CPIHpl'tcut e\'ldence on the trial Rev. St.
I 52~. provides that either party may exhibit to the other or to his attorney, at any
time before the trial, any paper or do<'U·
ment material to the action, and reouest an
admission ln writing of Its genuineness;
and, lf the adverse pnrty or hls attorney
fall to give the admission, such party shall
pny the cost of proving the genuineness of
such paper or document. Thle section cleal'ly recosnlzes the authority of the attorney
to bind his client In such cases. In practice.
It ls a dally occurrence for attorneys to en·
ter into written stipulations as to matters
of evldenct:, and the unltorm current ot authorlties, both In England and this country,
ls In favor of the power so to do. In 1 Am.
& Eng. Enc. Luw, p. 9:>!, we find the following: "An attorney at law has autllority, by
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virtue of his employment as such, to do on

behalf of his client all acts, in or out of

court, necessary or incidental to the pros-

ecution or management of the suit,

which aifect the remedy only, and not the

cause of action. This includes the right to

demand and receive payment in money of

the client's debts; and part payments are

within his power to receive as well as pay-

ments in full. As long as he appears as

attorney on record, bona tide payments to

him discharge the debt. no matter what pri-

vate instructions he may have received from

his client. He may also sue out an alias

execution. He may receive livery of seisin

of land taken under an extent; may waive

objections to evidence, and enter into stip-

ulations for the admission of facts or con-

duct of the trial. and for release of bail;
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may waive notices, and give extensions of

time to ﬁle papers, and confess judgment;

and may open a default which he has taken

(whether improperly or not), and vacate the

judgment entirely, even though (it has been ‘

held) his client has instructed him to the

contrary." The authorities cited in support ‘

of the power here in question fully sustain

the text. Among others, the following are

cited: Lacoste v. Robert, 11 La. Ann. 33;

Stcph. Dig. Ev. 46; Moulton v. Bowker, 115

Mass. 36; Lewis v. Sumner, 13 Metc. (.\Iass.)

269; Elton v. Larkins, 1 Moody & R. 196;

Young v. Wright, 1 Camp. 139. In Ish v.

Crane, 13 Ohio St. 574. the case was sub-

mitted to the district court upon an agreed

statement of facts, signed by the attorneys V

of record, and the case was reserved to this

court;

fore the hearing, counsel for defendant in er-

ror attempted to revoke, withdraw, and an-

nul the agreed statement of facts, to which

the attorney for plaintiff in error objected.

This court refused to permit the withdrawal

of the agreed tatement, and, in deciding the

point, used the following language: “It has

long been the practice in this state. as well

as in the courts of other states, for counsel ‘

to mutually agree upon a state of facts, and

to reduce the agreement to writing, and ille

it in the case, instead of being to the trouble

and expense of taking proof by depositions,

or otherwise, to show the facts. And when

such agreement is reduced to writing. and

signed by the parties or their counsel, and

ﬂied in the case, I think the general under-

standing. both of the bar and court. has

been that the same was to be regarded, un-

til set aside by the court, as a special ver-

dict of a jury, expressing the result of the

proof made by both parties, and so belong-

ing to both parties that neither party could

withdraw the same. It is not doubted that,

in case of an agreed statement having been

so made and ﬁled by mistake, or misappre-

and ‘

and after such reservation, and be- -

1 hension of the existing state of facts by

‘ one of the parties, he might. consistently
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virtue ot his employment as such, to do on
behalt of his client all acts, ln or out ot
<!Ourt, necessary or Incidental to the prosecution or management of the sult, and
which affect the remedy only, and not the
enuse of action. This includes the right to
demand and receive payment In money of
the client's debts; and part payments are
within his power to receive as well as payments In full. As long as he appears as
attorney on reco1·d, bona llde payments to
him dlsl'lmrge the debt, no matter what private lnstruclions he may have received from
his client. He may also sue out an alias
execution. He may receive livery ot seisin
of land taken under an extent; mny waive
objections to evidence, and enter Into stipulations for the admission of facts or condnct of the trial, and for relP.ase of ball;
may waive notices, and give extensions of
time to file papers, and confess judgment;
and mny open a detault which he has taken
(whether Improperly or not), and vacate the
judgment entirely, even though (It has been
held) his client has instructed him to the
contrary." The authorities clted In support
ot the power here In question fully sustain
the text. Among others, the following are
cited: Lacoste v. Robert, 11 La. Ann. 33;
Steph. Dig. Ev. 40; l\loulton v. Bowker, 115
Mass. 36; Lewis v. Sumner, 13 Mete. (Mass.)
269; Elton v. Larkins, 1 Moody & R. 196;
Young v. Wright, 1 Camp. 139. In lsh v.
Crane, 13 Ohio St. 574, the case was submitted to the district court upon an agreed
statement of facts, signed by the attorneys
of record, and the case was reserved to this
court; and after such reservation. and before the hearing, counsel for defendant In error attempted to revoke, withdraw, and annul the agreed statement of tacts, to which
the attorney for plalntl1l' In error objected.
This court refused to permit thP. wlthdrnwal
of the agreed statement, and, in deelcllng the
point, used the following language: "It has
long been the practice in this state, as well
as In the courts of other states, for counsel
to mutually agree upon a state of facts, and
to reduce the a~eement to wrltlng, and file
It In the case, Instead of being to the trouble
and expense of taking proof by depositions,
or otherwise, to show the facts. And when
such agreement ls reduced to writing, and
signed by the parties or their coum1el, and
!lied In the case, I think the general understanding, both ot the bnr and court. has
been that the same was to be regarded, until set aside by the court, ns a special verdict of a Jury, expressing the result of the
proof made by both parties, and so belonging to both parties that neither party could
withdraw the same. It Is not doubted thut,
ln case ot an agreed statement having been
so made and filed by mistake, or mlsappre-
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henslon of the existing state of tacts by
one of tl1e parties, he might, consistently
with fair practice, upon nqtlce to the adverse party or his coum1el, apply to the
court for leave. on the .irround of such mistake or misapprehension, to wlthdmw from
the Illes such agreed statement, or such part
thereof as was, In fact, untrue, and had
been so assented to by mistake or misapprehension; and upon the merits of such
motion being sustained by p1'00f, Ratlstactory to the court, It Is not doubted the court
might grant such relief as the party should
show himself Justly entitled to." In view
of the11e authorities, we are of opinion, and
so hold, that an attorney of record has ample vower to do on behalf of his client all
nets, In or out of court, necessar;v or 111ctdental to the prosecution, management, or
defense of the action, and which affect only
the remedy, and not the right, and that this
includes the power to waive objections to
evidence, and enter Into stipulations for the
admission of facts on the trial In case the
court should, on motion, allow such agreeu
statement to be withdrawn, ample time
should be given for the preparation ot the
case on other testimony, so as not to tnke
either party by surprise. The spirit Is the
same as that of section 5286, Rev. St., which
requires exceptions to depositions to be
heard and disposed of before the commencement of the trial.
The abstract which was ruled out Is round
In the bill of exceptions, and seems to sustain the contention of the plaintiff. It was
therefore material, and, It the agreement
was sufficient, It should have been received
In evidence. The agreement states that the
abstract shows the true condltlon of the ti' tie ot the lands therein described, and tt
appears that the lands therein described are
the lands In question; but the agreement
falls to state that the abstract may be used
as evidence on the trial. But this was not
necesf'ary. Whatever Is true may, If rele-:
Yant, be received In evidence. The truth of
the abstract being allmltted, plnlntltr had a
right to use It as evidence, without the furth.er agreement of defendant that he might
do so.
It follows that tlle court ot common pleas
' er1·ed In ruling out the deed and abstract,
, and in overruling the motion for a new trial,
1 and that the circuit court erred In affirming
the judgment of the common plens. Both
jmlirments are therefore reYersed, and the
cause remanded to the court of common
pleas for a new trial. Reversed and remanded.
'
1
SPEAR, J., dissents, on the ground that
the facts clo not warrant the judgment of reversal on the second ground.
1
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APPLEGATE et al. •· LEXIXGTOX & CARTER COUNTIES MIN. CO. et al

APPLEGATE et al. v. LEXING'l'ON & CAR-

l6 Sup. Ct. 742, 117 U. S. 255.)
TER COUNTIES MIN. CO. et al.

(6 Sup. Ct. 742, 117 U. S. 255.)

Supreme Court of the United States. _\iarch 15,

Supreme Court of the United States. ll.arch 15,
1886.

1886.

In error to the circuit court of the United

States for the district of Kentucky.

The suit was in the nature of an action of

ejectmeut to recover possession of a tract

of land formerly in Mason county, but now

in Grceuup, Carter and Boyd counties, in

Kentucky. The plaintiffs in error were the

plaintiffs in the circuit court. They alleged

in their petition that they were the lineal

heirs of Carey L. Clark, who died seized oi’

a tract of 8,334 acres, part of a tract of 18,-

000acres granted by patent from the common-

wealth of Virginia, dated April 21, 1792, to

Charles Fleming, from whom their ancestor,
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Carey L. Clark, derived title by a regular

chain of conveyances; that the plaintiifs

were the owners and entitled to the posses-

sion of the land sued for; and that the de-

fendants had unlawfully entered upon and

unlawfully withheld possession of the same.

The defendants, by their answers, denied

these allegations, and averred that they were

seized of the premises by paramount title.

The answers were traversed by the plain-

tiffs’ reply.

There was a jury trial. The plaintiffs, to

sustain the issue on their part. olfered in evi-

dence the following documents as links in

their chain of title: (1) A copy, duly cer-

tiﬁed, from the land-oiiice of the state of

Kentucky, of the patent from the state of

Virginia. to Charles Fleming, for the tract

of land of which the land in controversy was

originally a part. (2) A copy of the will of

Charles Fleming, devising a moiety of said

tract of land to William Fleming, John Ber-

nard, Jr., and Richard Bernard. as trustees.

(3) A copy of a deed from Samuel Sackett

and wife to Joseph Conkling and others,

dated August 29, 1795, for the particular land

in controversy in this case, together with cer-

tain other tracts that had been patented by

the state of Virginia to Charles Fleming.

(4) A copy of a mortgage f l'\?lll Joseph Cank-

ling and others, the grantees above na med. to

Samuel Sackett. the grantor above named.

conveying the same lands as above, and

dated August ‘.20, 1705. (5) A copy of a deed

from \Villiam Fleming and the Bernards,

trustees as above under the will of (‘harles -

Fleming, to John Bryan, conveying to Bryan

the lands devised to them by the will of

Fleming, and dated December 31, 1796. (6)

The original of the deed last named. (7)

A copy of a deed from Jolm Bryan and wife

to Samuel Sackett, (latcd January 28, 1707,

conveying the same land conveyed to Bryan

by deed last above named. (8) The original

of the deed last above named. (0) The orig-

inal of a deed from Charles Fleming. dated

August 8, 178-L, to John and William Bryan,

conveying to them 13,300 acres of the land

that had been patented to said Charles Flem-

In error to the circuit court of the United
States for the district of Kentucky.
The suit was in the nature of an action of
ejectment to recover possession of a tract
of land formerly ln Mason county, but now
In Greenup, Carter and Boyd counties, In
Kentu<'ky. The plaintiffs In error were the
plaintiffs In the circuit court. They alleged
In their petition that they were the lineal
heirs of Carey L. Clark, who died seized of
a tract of 8,334 acres, part of a tract of 18,000 acres granted by patent ti-om the <'Owmonwealth of Virginia, dated April 21, 1792, to
Charles Fleming, from whom their an('elltor,
Carey L. Clark, derived title by a regular
chain of conveyances; that the plalntltrs
were the owners and entitled to the possession of the land sued for; and that the defendants had unlawfully entered upon and
unlawfully withheld poBBesslon ot the same.
The defendants, by their answers, denied
these allegations, and averred that they were
seized of the premises by paramount title.
The answers were traversed by the plalntitfs' reply.
There was a jury trial. The plalntHrs, to
sustain the issue on their part. offered In evidence the following documents as links In
their chain of title: (1) A copy, duly cer·
titled, from the land-oftlce of the state of
Kentucky, of the patent from the state of
Virginia. to Charles Fleming, tor the tract
ot land of which the land In contro>ersy was
originally a part. (2) A copy of the will of
Charles Fleming, devising a moiety of said
tract of land to Wllllnm Fleming, John IJ(>rnard, Jr., and Richard Bernard, as trustees.
(3) A copy of a deed from Samuel Sackett
and wife to Jol*'ph Conkling and others,
dated August 29, 1793, for the particular land
In contt-o,·ersy In this cn11e, together with certain other tracts that had been patented by
the state of Virginia to Charles l<~lemlng.
(4) A copy of a mortgage fl'.,111 .Joseph Conkling and others, the gTantees above named, to
Samuel Hn<'kett, the grantor above named,
conveying the same lands as above, and
dnted August 2!1, 1W:>. (ii) A <'OPY of a d~ed
from. William Fleming and the Bernards,
trustees as aboYe under the will of <'harles
Fleming, to John Bryan, con>eylng to Bryan
the lands devised to them by the will of
I•'leming, and dated December 31, 1796. (6)
The original of the deed last named. (7)
A copy of a deed from John Bryan and wife
to Samuel Sackett, dat<'d .lnnuary ~. 1707,
conveying the same land conveyed to Bryan
by deed Inst ahove namt>d. (8) The- original
of the deed last above named. (H) Tile original of a deed from Charles Flt•mlng. dated
August 8, 1784, to John and Wllllaw Bryan,
304

conveying to them 13,000 acres ot the land
that had been patented to said Charles Flem·
tug, and being part of the 18,000 a.ere tract.
ot whi('b tract the land to controversy iB
also a part. (10) A certified copy from the
Mason county circuit court of the record lo
the case of Carey L. Clark v. Joseph Conkling and others, in which Clnrk, as the assignee of the above-mentioned mortgage Of
Joseph Conkling and others to Samuel Sack·
ett, brought suit to foreclose the same.
ThE" court admitted lo evidence the first
four of the documents above mentioned. AU
the others were rejected, namely, the orlglnal
and a copy of the deed from William Fleming and the Bernards to John Bryan, the
original and the copy of the deed from Bry·
an to Sackett, the original of the deed from
Charles Fleming to John and William Bryan,
and the copy of the record from the .llason
county circuit court In the CIUle of Clark v.
Conkling and others. The court having ex·
eluded these docume.nts, the plaintiffs were
unable to tmce title to themselves for the
premises ln controversy. Thereupon the
jury, under the lnstru<'tlon ot the t'<>Urt, n>turned a verdict for the defendants. upon
wll'lch the court rendered Judgment, and tht>
plaintiffs sued out this writ of error.
Hr. Justice WOODS, after stating tfle fa<'tB
ln the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.
We shall first consider the exclusion of the
original deed from Fleming and the Bernarda
to John Bryan, and the original deed trom
John Bryan to ·Samuel Sackett. We are of
opinion that they should have been admitted to evidence. They have been certllled
to and Inspected by thlR court. Their appearance alrorda stron1r e-videnc.>e of their'
genuineness and antiquity, and they are trPe
from any badge that would ex<'lte susp:<·'on
of fraud or forgery. In support of their genuineneBS It was shown that a short time before the trial In the circuit court they were
discovered by one of the plalnturs' attorneys
ln the oftlce of the clerk of the circuit court
of Greenup county, Kentucky, among thtorlglnal papers of a suit in that court
brought 'by one James HughPs v. Ht•lrs or
Thomas Shore, on July 13, 1816. to quiet his
tltle to 16.000 8<'re!.I of land in Greenup rounty, part of the lnnds c•mveyed by the deed of
Wllllam l<'lemlng and the Bernnrds to John
Bryan. The deeds a'nd the original papers In
that suit were produced by a clerk of the
Greenup clrC'uit rourt In obedience to a aubpa>na duces teC'um. The record of this CBIM'
was admissible against persons, not }>artles
or privh•s, to prove the collah!ral f1t<'t of the .
antiquity of the original deeds offered in evldt>nce and to account for their custody. Barr
v. Gratz. 4 Wheat. :..>20. The bill of Hughes
awrred that he derived title under the patent
to Charles Fleming, and by virtue of the d~
vise In his will to Wllllam Fleming and tht>
Bernards, and the deeds of William ~'lemlng
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and the Bernards to John Bryan and of John

Bryan to Samuel Sackett. The complainant

Hughes oﬂfered by his bill “to produce said

patent and deeds showing the deduction of ti-

tle in proper time, or whenever the court

should require it.” The two deeds mentioned in

the billof complaint ﬁled by Hughes correspond

with and appear to be the two original deeds,

namely, the deed from William Fleming and

the Bernards to John Bryan, and the deed

from John Bryan to Samuel Sackett, offered

in evidence by the plaintiffs in this case,

which were found among the other papers

in the case of Hughes v. Heirs of Shore.

These deeds were necessary exhibits and

evidence in the case to entitle Hughes to the

relief prayed for.

the ﬁles of the highest court of the county

where the lands were situate, from the cus-
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tody of an officer charged by law with their

care and safe-keeping, where they had been

placed for a. necessary and proper use, and

from which they could not be withdrawn

without the order and consent of the court.

Their custody was therefore accounted for,

and was shown to be proper and beyond sus-

piclon.

It further appeared that upon the trial of

the case of Hughes v. Shore's Heirs, on July

8, 1825, the patent to Charles Fleming from

the commonwealth of Virginia. for 16,191

acres of land, the will of Charles Fleming.

and the said deed of William Fleming and

the Bernards, trustees, to John Bryan, were

oﬂered in evidence. The latter was rejected,

"because.” as the bill of exceptions states,

“the certificate and seal of the mayor of

Philadelphia” was “not suflicient to author-

ize it to be read, and because the same could

not be read as a recorded deed, not having

been recorded within the time prescribed

by law;" and “because, by rejecting this

deed, complainants’ chain of title was bro-

ken, and they could not further progress

with their evidence, the court rendered a de-

cree dismissing their bill." It is therefore

made clear by the evidence oﬂ'ered that at

least as early as the year 1825 the deed of

William Fleming and the Bernards to John

Bryan was on ﬁle in the circuit court of

Greenup county, and it may be safely in-

{erred that the other documents mentioned

by Hughes as his muniments of title were

also on ﬁle in the same court at the same

time. and that all the deeds remained in

the custody of the court down to the time

when they were produced by the clerk under

the subpozna duces tecum issued in this

case, a period of 55 years.

Another circumstance relied on to show the

genulneness of the original deeds was that

each bore, indorsed thereon, a certiﬁcate ap-

parently ancient and genuine, one with the

signature of the recording ofilcer, and the

other without signature, to the effect that the

deeds had been recorded in the year 1816. In

the case of Stebbins v. Duncan. 108 U. S. 50,

S. G. 2 Sup. Gt. 313. it was held that a cer-

DEEDS,

DOCUME~'r.:5,

llDd the Bernarda to John Bcyan and of John
Bcyan t.o Samuel Sackett. The complalnant
Hughes offered by his bill "to produce said
patent and deedB showing the deduction of title In proper time, or whenever the court
should require It." The two deeds mentioned In
the bill of complaint filed by Hughes correspond
with and appear to be the two original deeds,
Wl.Dlely, the deed from William l<~lemlng aud
the Bernards to John Bryan, and the deed
from John Bcyan to Samuel Sackett, oft'ered
ln evidence by the plalnturs In this case,
which were found among the other papers
In the case ot Hughes v. Heirs of Shore.
These deeds were necessary exhibits aud
evidence In the case to entitle Hughes to the
rellet prayed tor. They were produced from
the ft.lea of the highest court ot the county
wbere the lands were situate, from the custody ot an otllcer charged by law with their
care and ate-keeping, where they had been
placed for a nece88&cy and proper use, and
from which they could not be withdrawn
without the order and consent of the court.
Their custody was therefore accounted for,
and was shown to be proper and beyond suspicion.
It further appeared that upon the trial of
the case of Hughes v. Shore's Heirs, on July
8, 1825, the patent to Charles Fleming from
the commonwealth of Virginia tor 16,191
acres of land, the will of Charles Fleming,
and the said deed of William li'lemlng and
the Bernards, trustees, to John Bryan, were
oft'ered In evidence. The latter was rejected,
"because," aa the blll of exceptions states,
"the certlftcate and seal of the mayor of
Philadelphia" was "not autllclent to authorize It to be read, and because the same could
not be read as a recorded deed, not having
been recorded within the time pre11Crlbed
by law;" and "because. by rejecting this
deed, complainants' chsln of title was broken, and they could not further progreas
with their evidence, the court rendered a decree dlsmlaslng their bill." It ls therefore
made clear by the evidence offered thet at
least as early as the year 18~ the deed of
William li'lemlng and the Bernards to John
Bryan was on file In the circuit court of
Greenup oounty, and It may be safely Inferred that the other documPnts mPntioned
by Hughes as his munlments ot title were
also on file In the same court at the same
time. and that all the deeds remalned In
the custody of the court down to the time
when they were produced by the clerk under
the subpcpna du<'ee tecum Issued In this
case, a period of 55 years.
Another circumstance relied on to show the
genuineness of the original deeds was that
each bore, lndorsed thereon, a certlftcute apparentl:y ancient and genuine, one with the
signature of the recording otDcer, and the
other without signature, to the etrect that the
dPeds had been recorded In the year 1816. In
the <"ase of StebblDB v. Dunran. 108 U. S. 00,
8. O. 2 Sup. Ct. 313, It was held that a cerw11.0u1.Bv.-20
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tl1led oopy of n memorandum made at the foot
of the record of a det'd ''recorded June 23,
1818," and without signature, was competent
and conclusive evidence that the deed had
been recorded at the date mentioned. In
view, therefore, of the habit of recorders
of deeds, which ls universal, and matter of
common knowledge, to lndorae upon the
deeds themselves the fact and date of their
registration, the certificates appearing on the
deeds In question were competent and sufficient evidence of the fact that the deeds had
been put upon reoord during the year mentioned In the certificates. We think this evidence, supported by an Inspection of the
deeds, was StltDclent to justify their admission as ancient deeds, without dJrect proof of
their execution. The role 18 that an ancient
deed may be admitted In evidence, without
direct proof of lta execution, It It appears to
be of the age of at least 30 yt'Brs, when It Is
found In proper custody, and either possession under It la shown, or some other corroborative evidence of Its authenticity freeing
It from all Just grounds of suspicion.
Thus, In Barr v. Gratz, 4 Wheat. 220, a
deed from Craig to Michael Gratz, dated July
16, 1784, was offered In evidence, but was not
proved by the aobecrlblng witnesses, nor
their absence accounted for. Its admission
W8.8 alleged as error; but this court said that,
as the deed was more than 30 years old, and
waa proved to have been In the poesesslon of
the lessors of the plalntUr, and actually asserted by them as the ground of their title
In a prior chancery suit, It was, In the language of the books, sutDclently accounted for,
and on this ground, as well as because It waa
a pal't of the evidence In snp110rt of the decree In that suit, It was adml88lble without
the regular proof of Its execution. So, In Caruthers v. Eldridge, 12 Grat. 670, It was contended by the plalntlft' In error that In no case
conld a paper be admitted In evlden<'e as an
ancient deed, without proof of lta execution,
until It wu first shown that 30 years' quiet
and continued possession of the land had
been held under the deed. But the court held,
In substance, that an ancient deed may be
lntrodu<>ed In evidence without proof of Its
exe<'tttlon, though possession may not have
lx>en held for 30 years In accordance therewith, lf such n<><>ount be given of the deed as
may be rea111>0ably experted under nil the
clrcumstanC"eS of the case, and as will nft'ord
the pre11umptlon that It la genuine. In Ilnrlnn v. Howanl, 79 ICy. 373, the court of appeals states the rule In relation to the proof
ot ancient deed!! thus: "The genuineness of
suC'h lni;;trument11 may be 11hown by other
facts as wPll as that of po!1Messlon; and when
proof of POK!olPS!!IOn <>annot be bad, it ls within the Yery ei;sen<>e of the rule to admit the
Instrument, when no evidence justifying suspicion of lt11 gpnulneness Is shown, and It ls
found In the custody of those legally entitled
to It." See, also. Vin. Abr. "Evidence," A,
B, 5, ''.Ancient Deeds," 7; Com. Dig. ''Evl-
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deuce,” B, 2; 1 Greenl. Ev. Q 144, and note

1; Starkie, Ev. 524; Phil. Ev. (Cow. & H.

Notes, 3d Ed.) pt. 2, note 197, p. 368 et seq.;

Doe v. Passingham, 13 E. C. L. 309; In re

Parkyn’s Will, 6 Dow, 202; Winn v. Patter-

son,9Pet. 663; Jackson v. Laroway, 3 Johns.

Cas. 283; Hewlett v. Cock, 7 Wend. 371. In

the case last cited, Judge Nelson, afterwards

a justice of this court, said that there was

some confusion in the cases in England and

New York as to the preliminary proof neces-

sary to authorize an ancient deed to be read

in evidence; that possession accompanying

the deed was always sutiicient without other

proof, but it was not indispensable. He ap-

proved the decision in Jackson v. Laroway,

ubi supra, which he said had been recognized

as law in Jackson v. Luquere, 5 Cow. 221,

and had undoubtedly in its favor the weight
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of English authority. These authorities sus-

tain the rule as we have stated it.

The deeds in question, when offered in evi-

dence, purported to be over S0 years old, and

their appearance tended to prove their an-

tiquity and their genuineness. The testimony

offered in support of them proved their ex-

istence as far back as the year 1816, and that

in that year they had been placed upon the

public record of deeds. where, if properly ac-

knowledged, they would have been entitled

to registration. In the same year in which

they were recorded they were mentioned and

referred to in the bill ﬂied by Hughes v.

Shore's Heirs as muniments of his title, and

he offered to produce them when required.

There is no reason to doubt that they remain-

ed in the rightful custody of the clerk in

whose oﬂice they had become ﬁle papers, un-

til, after a lapse of at least 55 years, they

were found, and produced upon the trial of

the present case by the oﬂicer to whose cus-

tody they belonged.

But the proof of the genuineness of both

deeds was greatly strengthened by evidence

which applied directly to one only of the two,

namely, the original deed from John Bryan

to Samuel Sackett, dated January %, 1797.

This consisted of the record of a partition

made October 18, 1810, on the application of

James Hughes, by commissioners. under au-

thority of a general act of the legislature

of Kentucky approved December 19, 1796,

Hughes claimed the undivided half of the 18,-

000 acres conveyed to Charles Fleming bythe

governor of Virginia, by patent dated April

21,1792; and alleged as muniments of his title

the said patent, and the ‘deed of John Bryan

to Samuel Sackett. On the strength of the

title shown by Hughes the commissioners di-

vided the 18,000 acres, and set oft and con-

veyed to him the one-half thereof in several-

ty, and, in their deed of conveyance, referred

to the patent to Charles Fleming. and the

deed of Bryan to Sackett, as links in the title

of Hughes. The partition thus made is shown

to have been recognized by successive con-

veyances of parts of the land set off to

Hughes, and by possession held thereunder.
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dence," B, 2; 1 Greenl. Ev. I 144, and note
1; Starkie, Ev. 524; Phll. Ev. (Cow. & B.
Notes, 3d Ed.) pt. 2, note 197, p. 368 et seq.;
Doe v. Passlngham, 13 E. C. L. 309; In re
Parkyu's Will, 6 Dow, 202; Winn v. Patterson, 9Pet. 663; Jackson v. Laroway, 3 Johns.
Cas. 283; Hewlett v. Cock, 7 Wend. 371. In
the case last cited, Judge Nelson, afterwards
a justice of this court, said that there was
some confusion In the cases In England and
New York as to the preliminary r>roof necessary to authorize an ancient deed to be read
in evidence; that poBSession accompanying
the deed was always sumclent without other
proof, but It was not Indispensable. He approved the decision In Jackson v. Laroway,
ubi supra, which he said had been recognized
as law In Jackson v. Luquere, fi Cow. 221,
and had undoubtedly In Its favor the weight
of English authority. These authorltles sustain the rule as we have stated it.
The deeds in question, when oft'ered In evidence, purported to be over 80 years old, and
their appearance tended to prove their antiquity and their genulneneae. The testimony
oft'ered in support of them proved their existence a11 far back as the year 1816, and that
In that year they had been placed upon the
public record of deeds, where, If properly acknowledged, they would have been entitled
to registration. In the same year in which
they were recorded they were mentioned and
referred to In the bill filed by Hughes v.
Shore's Heirs as munlmente of bis title, and
be oft'ered to produce them when required.
There le no reason to doubt that they remained In the rightful custody or the clerk In
whose oftlce they bad become file papers, un- .
tll, after a lapse of at least 55 years, they
were found, and produced upon the trial of
the present case by the oftlcer to whose custody they belonged.
But the proof of the genulneneSB of both
deeds wu greatly strengthened by evidence
which applied directly to one only of the two,
namely, the original deed from John Bryan
to Samuel Sackett, dated January 28, 1797.
This consisted of the record of a partition
made October 18, 1810, on the ap1>1lcatlon of
James Bugbee, by commissioners, und1>r authority of a general net of 1hE' legislature
of Kt>11tucky !lpproved December 19, 1796,
Hughes claimed the undivided half of the 18,000 &('res conveyed to Charles l•'lemlng by the
governor of Virginia, by patent dated April
21, 1792; and alleged asmunlments of hlstltle
the said patent, and the deed of John Bryan
to Samuel Sackett. On the etrength of the
title shown by Hughes the commissioners divided the 18,000 acres, and set oft' and conveyed to him the one-half thereof In se\·eralty, and, In their deed of ('Onveyance, referred
to the patent to CharlE'B Fleming, and the
deed of Bl'ynn to Rackett, as links In the title
of Hughes. The partition thus made Is shown
co b1tve been recognized by successive conve~-anres of parts of the land set oft' to
Hughes, and by possession held thereunder.
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The testimony therefore shows that as early
as the year 1810 the deed of Bryan to Sackett was In existence; that It was recognized
as a genuine deed by public oftlcers whose
duty It was to scrutinize It, and was made
by them the basis of their oftlclal action; and
that possession has been held of a portion of
the land described therein by persons who
trace title through It to the patent to Charles
Fleming. These two deeds under consideration are shown by the record to have a common history, and to have been relied on as
links In the same chain of title. Testimony,
therefore, which is directly applicable to one
only tends to support the other. The facts,
therefore, which we have just stated In reference to the deed from Bryan to Sackett tend
to show also the genuineness of the deed from
Fleming and the Bernards to Bryan. We
are therefore of opinion that the genuineness
of both deeds was proven, and that the court
erred In excluding them from the jury.
The otrer In evidence of the original deed
from Charles Fleming to John and William
Bryan, dated August 8, 1794, stands upon substantially the same ground as the two deeds
already considered. The bill of exceptlona
states that the plalntlft's offered In support of
the competency of this deed the same evidence ae was oft'ered In support of the two
last-mentioned deeds; that It was found at
the same time and place, and produced from
the same custody. In further support thereof
the plalntlft's produced the clerk of the Mason
couni:y court, having with him DE'ed Book B,
containing deeds recorded In the clerk's oftlce
of that court, beginning February. 22, 1794,
and the two or three years next ensuing, and
oft'ered to show that there was recorded In
that book a deed Identical In terms with the
aforesaid original deed. They also oft'ered
and read In evidence a copy of the deed, duly
certified from the clerk's oftlce of the Mason
county circuit court, with a copy of the certificate thereto appended showing that the
original deed was recorded In the year 1791.
It follows, from what we have said in relation to the adml88lblllty of the other original
deeds, that this one, also, should have been
received In evidence, and that the circuit
court erred in excluding It.
It remain~ to consider . the exclusion by
the circuit court of the transcript of the
record In the ease of Clark T. Conkling.
This was a suit brought by Clark In the
district court held at Washington, In Mason
county, Kentucky, on June 13, 1798, as the
assignee of the mortgage from Conkling to
Sackett, to foreclose the same, and the record
was otrered only to show the orders and decrees of the ('OUrt In respect to the mortgaged premises situated within Its jurisdiction,
and not to pl'l'Ve any personal de<>ree against
the defendants. It appears from the record
In this case that a subpcena having been I~
sued and returned, with the lndorsE>ment
that the def~ndants were not lnhnbltnut~
of the commonwealth, the court made the
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following order at its November term, 1798:

“The defendants, not having entered their

appearance agreeably to an act of assembly

and rules of this court, and it appearing to

the satisfaction of the court that they are

not inhabitants of this commonwealth, on

the motion of the complainant, by his at-

torney, it is ordered that the defendants

appear here on the third day of our next

term, and answer the complainants’ bill;

and that a copy of this order be inserted in

the Kentucky Gazette or Herald for two

months, successively, another posted at the

door of the court-house of Mason county;

and that this order be published some Sun-

day at the door of the Baptist meeting-house

in \\'ashingtoli." ln J une, 1799, the bill was

taken as confessed, and an interlocutory

decree made requiring the defendants to
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pay the money due on the mortgage. The

money not having been paid, a decree of

sale was made at the February term, 1800.

The commissioners to make the sale report-

ed on July 19, 1802, that after public notice

they had sold the lands at public sale to

Carey L. Clark, the complainant. After-

wards a ﬁnal decree was made, foreclosing

the defendants of their equity of redemption

in the premises.

The defendants objected to the introduc-

tion of the record, and the objection was

sustained, and the defendants now insist

that the exclusion of the record was right—

First, because the court did not have au-

thority of law to hear and determine the

subject-matter of the suit, nor of suits of

the class to which it belonged; and, second,

because the record exhibits no proof of the

publication or posting of the notice to the

defendants, as required by the laws of Ken-

tucky.

We think the ﬁrst objection is answered

by reference to the statute laws of Ken-

tucky in force at the time. Section 8 of the

act of the general assembly of Kentucky ap-

proved December 19, 1795, “to establish

district court in this commonwealth,” pro-

vided as follows: “The jurisdiction of the

said district courts, respectively, shall be

over all persons, and in all causes, matters,

and things at common law or in chancery,

arising within their districts," excepting

actions of assault and battery, or suits for

slander, and subjects of controversy of less

than £50 in value. 1 Littell, Laws Ky. 293.

Section 4 of the act approved December 19,

1796, directing the method of proceeding

in courts of equity against absent debtors

and other absent defendants, provides for

constructive service by publication “in all

cases whatever when a suit is or shall be

pending in any court of chancery, concern-

ing any matter or thing whatever, against

any absent defendant or defendants." 1 St.

Laws (M. 8: B.) 93. These provisions of

the statute law are ample to confer juris-

diction on the court where the property in

controversy is within its territorial jurisdic-

following order at its November term, 1798:
"The defenclauts, not having entered their
appearance agreeably to qn act of assembly
and mies ot this court, nnd It appearing to
the satisfaction ot the court that they are
not inhabitants ot this commonwealth, on
the motion ot the complainant, by his attorney, It is ordered that the defendants
appear here on the third day of our next
t~rm, and answer the complainants' bill;
and that a copy of this order be inserted in
the Kentudi:y Gazette or Herald for two
mo::iths, successh·ely, another posted at the
door of the court-house of Mason county;
and that tbls order be published some Sundny at the door ot the Baptist meeting-house
in Washington." In June, 1799, the blll was
tak-m aa C·)nfeesed, and an Interlocutory
decree made requiring the derendauts to
pay the money due on the mortgage. The
money not having been paid, a decree ot
sale was made at the l<'ebruary term, 1800.
The commissioners to make the sale reported on July 19, 1802, that after public notice
they had sold the lands at public sale to
Carey L. Clark, the complainant. Afterwards a final decree was made, foreclosing
the defendants of their equity of redemption
in the premises.
The defendants objected to the introduction of the record, and the objection was
sustained, and the defendants now insist
that the exclusion of the record was rightFlrst, because the court did not have authority of law to hear and determine the
subJ~t-matter of the suit, nor of suits of
the claSB to which It t-elonged; and, second,
because the record exhibits no proof of the
publication or posting of the notice to the
defendants, as required by the laws of Kentucky.
We think the first objection Is answered
by reference to the statute laws of Kentucky In force at the time. Section 8 of the
act of the general assembly of Kentucky approved December 19, 1795, "to establish
district courts In this commonwealth," provided as follows: "The jurisdiction of the
said district courts, respectively, shall be
over all persoDs, and In all causes, matters,
and things at common law or In chancery,
arising within their districts," excepting
actions of assault and battery, or suits for
slander, and subjects of controversy of less
than £50 In value. 1 Littell, Laws Ky. 298.
Section 4 of the a.ct approved December 19,
1796, directing the method of proceeding
in courts of equity against absent debtors
and other absent defendants, provides for
constructive service by publication "In all
cases whatever when a smt is or shall be
pending ln any court of chancery, concerning any matter or thing whatever, against
any absent defendant or defendants." 1 St.
Laws (:\{, & B.) 113. These provisions of
the statute law are ample to confer jurisdiction on the court where the property In
controvers7 Is within its tenltorlal jurlsdlc-
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tlon, and are so clear as to require no discussion of the question; for, as was said In
Grlgnon's Lessee v. Astor, 2 How. 3a8, "the
power to bear and determine a cause ls
jurisdiction. It the law confers the power
to render a judgment or decree, then the
court has jurisdiction."
But lt ls objected to the record that It does
not show publlcatlon and posting of notice
to the defendants, as required by the order
of the court and by law. The law is found
in section 2 of the act of December 19, 1796,
ubi supra, antl ls as follows: "The court
shall also appoint some day In the succeeding term, for the absent defendant or defendants to enter his, her, or their appearance to the suit, and give security for performing the decree, a copy of which order
shall be forthwith published In the Kentucky Gazette or Herald, and continued for
two months successively, and shall also be
published on some Sunday, immediately after divine service, in such church or meeting-house as the court shall direct, a.ud
another copy shall be posted at the front
door of the said court-house."
'£he plalnturs In the present .case o!rered
evidence outside the record to prove the fact
that the order was published In the Kentucky Gazette, as required by the . statute,
by calllng the assistant llbrarlan of tbe public library at Lexington, "having with him,"
u the bill of exceptions states, "printed
newspapers which appeared to be of l.(rf'at
age, and which purported to be the original
fl.lee of the newspaper called the Kentucky
Gazette, published weekly, and plalntl!ra
showed, In nine successive ls~ueff of 68.ld
newspaper, weekly publlca.tlons, beginning
with De<'cwber 12, 1708. and ending with
February 7, 1799, of" the order of the court
above mentioned. But no proof was offered to show the publlcatlol\ of the order
at the church or meeting-house, or the posting of it at the front door of the courthouse. After the lapse of more than 80
years proof not of record of these facts was
clearly Impossible. The fact, therefore, that
aftH the lap~e of so long a time the plalntl!rs were able to show tbat the orller of
the court had been obeyed, by Its publlcath•n
in a newspaper, was persuasive evidence
that the other requirements of the order had
also been performed.
But the record contained no proof ot the
publication and posting of the notice as required by the statute, and It ls Insisted by
the defendants In this C'S.Se that the record
itself must show the publl<'atlon and posting
of the notice as required by law, otherwise
the jurisdiction of the court does not appear, and its decree 1s absolutely void.
While it must be conceded that, In order to
give the court jurisdiction over the persons
of the dl.'fendants, all the steps pointed out
by the statute to elT'ect constructl'\"e service
on non-residents were necessary, yet It does
not follow that the evidence that tbe steps
807
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were taken must appear in the record, un-

less, indeed, the statute expressly or by im-

plication requires it. The court which made

the decree in the case of Clark v. Conkling

was a court of general jurisdiction. There-

fore every presumption not inconsistent

with the record is to be indulged in favor

of its jurisdiction. Kempe's Lessee v. Ken-

nedy, 5 Cranch, 173; Voorhees v. Bank of

U. S., 10 Pet. 4-19; Grignon v. Astor, 2 How.

319; Harvey v. Tyler. 2 \Vall. 32$. It is

to be presumed that the court. before mak-

ing its decree, took care to see that its order

for constructive service, on which its right

to make the decree depended, had been obey-

ed. That this presumption is authorized

will appear by the following cases:

In Harvey v. Tyler, ubi supra, the court,

speaking by Mr. Justice Miller, said: "The
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jurisdiction which is now exercised by the

common-law courts in this country is, in a

very large proportion, dependent upon spe-

cial statutes conferring it. " * ' In all

cases where the new powers thus conferred

are to be brought into action in the usual

form of common-law or chancery proceed-

ings, we apprehend there can be little doubt

that the same presumptions as to the juris-

diction of the court and the conclusiveness

of its action will be made as in cases falling

more strictly within the usual powers of the

court.”

In Hall v. Law, 102 U. S. 461, the validity

of a. partition of lands made b_v a circuit

court of the state of Indiana was attacked.

This court, speaking by Mr. Justice Field,

said: “All that” the statute “designates as

necessary to authorize the court to act is

that there should he an application for par-

tition by one or more joint proprietors, after

giving notice of the intended application in

a public newspaper for at least four wccks.

When application is made, the court must

consider whether it is by a proper party,

whether it is sufficient in form and sub-

stance, and whether the requisite notice has

been given, as prescribed. Its order made

thereon is an adjudication in these matters."

The case of Voorhees v. Bank of U. S.. 10 Pct. 4-19, was an action of ejectment. and 5

the case turned on the validity of a. sale of

the premises in controversy under a judg-

ment of the court of common pleas of Ha1nil-

ton county, Ohio, in a case of foreign attach-

ment. The sale was attacked on the fol-

lowing among other grounds: (1) Because

the statute authorizing the proceeding by

foreign attachment required that an aﬁidavit

should be made and ﬁled with the clcrk

statute dircctcd three months’ notice to be

given, by publication in a newspaper, of

the issuing of the attachment,Vbcfore judg-

ment should be entered, and also required .
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15 days’ notice of sale to be given, neither

of which appeared by the record to have

been done; (3) because the statute required

PUOO}'.

were taken must appear In the record, unlcs.<J, Indeed, the statute expressly or by lruplication requires It. The court which made
the decree ID the case of Clark v. Conkling
was a court of general Jurisdiction. Therefore every presumption not Inconsistent
with the record ls to be Indulged In favor
<Jf Its jurisdiction. Kempe's Lessee v. Kennedy, 5 Cranch, 173; Voorhees v. Bank of
U. S., 10 Pet. 449; G1·lgnon v. Astor, 2 llow.
319; Ha1-vey v. Tyle1·, 2 Wall. 328. It I~
to be presumed that the comt, before making Its decree, took care to see that Its order
for const1·uctlve service, on which Its right
h make the decree depended, had been obeyed. 'l'hat this presumption ls authorized
will appear by the following cases:
In Harvey v. Tyler, ubl supra, the court.
speaking by Mr. Justice l\Illler, said: "'Ihe
Jurisdiction wi1lch ls now exercised by the
common-law courts In this country ls, In a
very large proportion, dependent upon speclal statutes conferring tt. • • • In all
cases where the new powers thus confet.Ted
are to be brought Into action In the usual
form of common-law or chancery proceedlngs, we apprehend there can be little doubt
that the same presumptions as to tbe Jurisdiction of the court and thr. conclusiveness
of 113 action wlll be made as In cases falling
more strictly within the usual powers of the
court."
In Hall v. Law, 102 U. S. 461, the validity
of a partition of lands made by a circuit
court of the state of Indiana was attacked.
This court, speaking by l\lr. Justice l•'leld,
sald: "All that" the statute "designates as
necessal"y to authorize the court to act ls
that tbere should be an application for partltlon by one or more Joint proprietors, after
glvlng notice of tbe Intended appllc•atlon In
a public newspaper for at least four wec>ks.
When application ls made, tbe court must
consider whether It ls by a proper party,
whether It ls sutlklent In form and substance, and whether the requisite notice bas
been given, as prescribed. Its order made
thereon Is a.n adjudication In these mattP.rs."
The case of Voorhees v. Bank of U. S., 10
Pet. 449, was an action of eJe<'tment, and
the case turned on the validity of a sale of
the premises In contron~rsy under a judgment of the court of common pleas of Hamilton county, Ohio, In a case of foreign attachment. The sale was attaC>ked on the following among other grounds: (1) Because
the statute authorizing the proceedln11: by
foreign attachment required that an affidavit
Khould be made and filed with thE' clerk
hefore the writ Issued, and no Emch nflldnvlt
w11s round In the record; (2) because the
1<t::itute dlrectl'd three month11' notlrc> to be
gl>en, by publication In a newspaper, of
the Issuing of the attnc·hment, ·before juclgment should be entered, and also required

before the writ issued, and no such aiﬁdavit

was found in the record; (2) because the
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15 days' notice of sale to be given, neither
of which appeared by the record to have
bt>en done; (3) because the statute required
that the defendant should be put lu default
at each of the three terms precelling the
Judgment, and the default entered of record,
but no entry was made of the default at the
last of the three terms. But the court overruled the objections, and sustained the valldlty of the Judgment and the sale. It said:
"But the provisions of the law do not prescribe what shall be deemed evidence that
such acts have been done, or direct that their
performance shall appear on the record.
The thirteenth section of the attachment
law, which gives to the conveyances of the
auditors the same effect as a deed from the
defendant In the attachment, rontalns no
other limitation than that It shall be 1D
virtue of the authority herein granted.' This
leaves the question open to the application of
those general principles of law by which
the validity of sales made under Judicial
process must be tested, In the ascertainment
, of which we do not think It necessary to
I examine the record In the attachment, for
I' evidenee that the acts alleged to have been
omlttetl appear therein to have been done."
The result of the authorities and what w&
decide Is that where a court of general juris! diction Is authorized In a proceeding, either
· statutory or at law or In equity, to bring
In, by publication or other substituted service, non-resident defendnnts Interested In
or having a lien upon property lying within
Its territorial .Jurisdiction, but ls not requlred to place the proof of service upon the rceord, and the court orders such substituted
service, It wlll be presumed In favor of th&
julisdlctlon, that service was made as or1 dered, although no evidence thereof appears
I of reeord, and the Judgmt>nt of the court,
1 so far as It affects such property, will be
, valid. The case of Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall.
350. cltt>d hy counsel for defendant, ls not
In confilc•t with this proposition. The Judgment l!'E't up on one side and attacked on the
ot!ler lu thut case was rendered on service>
by publication. The law permitted service
to be m:1de by publlcntton onl1 where cer: taln fa('ts were made to appear to the sat111I faction of the court, and the rourt by n
precedent order, whlell must nc>cesi.<arlly ap.
J pear of l"(>('Ord, authorized setTlee to bf.
made by publl<"atlon. But the record showl'd
no such order, and the publlC>ntion, tllet"efore, wns the> unauthorlz<>d net of the 1mrty.
and appenrt>d affinnatlwlr to be lnvalld and
ln<'fTec•tnnl, ~ee, also, Pennorer v. Xetr, 9.'l
T~. S. 727. 73-1.
It results from the views we have ex11r~ed. that the judgm~nt of the circuit ronrt
or Kentucky must be reversed, and the eam•e
rc>n111ncled, with dlruetlons to grant a new
trial.
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NITCHE et al. Y. EARLE.

(19 N. E. 749, 117 Ind. 270.)

Jan. 29. 1889.

l\'"ITCHE et al.

T.

EARLE.

(19 X. E. 749, 117 Ind. 270.)
~npl't'mt>

C-Onrt of Indiana. .Tnn.

:m.

1889.

Appeal from circuit court, Lake county; E.

C. Field, Judge.

Action by John G. Earle against J. A.

Nitche and others. Nitche appeals. Const.

Ind. art. 4, 5 19, requires that “every act

shall embrace but one subject, and matters

properly connected therewith, which subject

shall be expressed in the title. * * '” By

Rev. St. Ind. 1881, § 1065, which is included

in the article entitled “E_1ectment," and the

section preceding which provides for a new

trial of right. “if the application for a new

trial is made after the close of the term at

which the judgment is rendered, the party

obtaining a new trial shall give the opposite

party 10 days’ notice thereof before the term

next succeeding the granting of the applica-

Appeal from circuit court, Lake county; E.
0. Field, Judgt..
Action by John G. Earle against J. A.
Nltche and others. Nltche appeals. Con~t.
Ind. art. 4, § 19, requires that "every net
shall embrace but one subject, and mnttt>rs
properly connected therewith, which suhjt-ct
shall be expressed In the title. • • •" By
Rev. St. Ind. 1881, § lOC,;i, which is lnclmh•d
In the article entitled "Ejectment," and the
section precPding which provides ror a new
trial of right. "If the a1lt1llcatlon for a new
trial le made after the <·lose of the term at
which the judgment Is rendered, the Jlarty
obtaining a new trial t1hall gl\·e the oppoMlte
party 10 days' notice thereof before the tPrm
nE>xt succeN11ng the granting of the application."
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tion.”

Supreme Court of Indiana.

J. Kopelke, for appellant.
for appellee.

C. F. Griffin,

J. Kopelke, for appellant.

for appellee.

C. F. Gritiin,

OLDS, J. This action was commenced by

appellee against appellant on the 2d day of

March, 1881, in the Lake circuit court, to

recover the possession of, and quiet title to,

a tract of land in Lake county, Ind. Issues

were formed, and the cause tried by the

court at the November term, 1881, and judg-

ment rendered for appeilee upon a special

finding of facts. From that judgment ap-

pellant Nltche appealed to this court, and

the cause was reversed. Nitche v. Earle, SS

Ind. 375. Under the direction of this court,

the court below, at the September term, 1883,

entered judgment for appellant upon the

special ﬂnding of facts. At the February

term, 1884, the plaintiff obtained n new trial

as of right. At the April tcrm, 1884, appel-

lant appeared to the action, and moved the

court to vacate the order granting the new

trial for the insufiiciency of the bond, which

motion was overruled; and at the September

term. 1884, appellant moved to vacate the

order granting a new trial for failure of the

plaintiff below. the appellee, to give notice

thereof, which motion was overruled, to

which ruling appellant excepts. Another

trial was had at the February term, 1&86,

and judgment rendered in favor of appeilee.

Motion was made by appellant and his co-

defendants for new trial, and the motion

overruled, and excepted to by appellant. The

errors assigned are that the court erred in

overruling the motion of appellant to vacate

the order granting the appeilee a new trial.

for the reason that no notice was given there-

of. and the overruling of the motion for new

trial.

There was no error in overruling appel-

iant’s motion to vacate the order granting a

new trial. In the case of Stanley v. Holli-

da_v, 113 Ind. 525, 16 N. E. 513, this court

has placed a construction on section 1065,

Rev. St. 1881, and the court in that case

says: “The intention of the legislature in

OI,DS, J. Thie action wns commen<'e<l by
appellee against appellant on the 2d day of
March, 1881, In the Lake circuit court, to
recover the possession of, and quiet title to,
a tract of land In Lake county, Ind. Issues
were formed, and the cause tried by the
court at the November term, 1881, nnd judgment rendered for appcllee upon a special
llndlng of facts. From that judgment appellant Nltche appealed to this court, and
the cause was reversed. Nltche v. Earle, 88
Ind. 375. T1nder th!' <tlrl'<>tlon of this court,
the c•ourt helow, at the ~eptemlwr term, 18S3,
f'IltPrecl juclgment for apprllnnt upon the
t1peclal finding of fn<·ts. At the .l!'ebruary
t<•rm, 18S4, the plaintiff obtn lnro a new trial
ns of right. At the .April term, 1884, nppellnnt appeared to the action, and moved the
court to vacate the order granting the new
trial for the insufficiency of the bond, which
motion was overruled; and at the September
term, 1884, appellant moved to vacate the
order granting a new trial for failure of the
plalntltf below. the appellee, to give notl<•e
thereof, which motion was overruled, to
which ruling appellant excepts. Another
trial was had at the February term, 1886,
and judgment rendered In favor of nppellee.
Motion was made by a1ipellnnt and his codefendants for new trial, and the motion
ovprruled, and excPpted to by appellnnt. The
errors assigned are that the court e1·re1l In
oYerrullng the motion of appellant to vnente
the order granting the nppellee a new trial.
for the reason that no notice was given thneof, and the overruling of the motion for new
trial.
There was no error In oYerrullng ap)lellnnt's motion to '\"Dente the orcler gruutlug a
new trial. In the ruse of Stanley v. Holliday, 113 Ind. 525, 16 N. E. 513, this court
has placed a construction on section loo:;,

Rev. St. 1881, and the court In that case
says: "The Intention of the legislature ln
requiring thnt 'the perty obtaining a.· new
trial shall give the opposite party ten days'
noti<'I' thereof befQrn the term next succeeding the granting of the application,' as we
consh·ue such requirement lo connection
with the other p1-0¥isions of the statute relating to new trials as of right, was to prevent either party from forcing the opposite
party into trial at or during the term at
which the new trial was granted, or before
the term next succeeding. This provision. of
section 1065 was rendered necessary, we suppose, to prevent the plalntlfl'. in such a case
from forcing defendants Into trial during the
term at which the new trial was granted, •
under the provisions of section 516, Rev. St.
1881." Under this authority the action of
the court was right ln grnntlng the new
trial, and overruling appellant's motion to
vacate for failure of notice.
Several questions are presented upon the
ove1·rullng of the motlon for new trial. The
first Is admission by the court In evidence,
over objection of appellant, of a certified
copy of the record of a patent by the state
of Indiana to George Enrle for the real estate described In the compllllnt, which record of patent was c 0 rtlfled to by James H.
Hice, auditor of state. It Is urged that it is
shown on the face of the record not to be
the copy of any record; that for all It shows
on the face of It It may be the original pat·
ent; that It has the signnturee of the governor and secretory of state, nod nowhere
has a certificate of the secretary of state
that be recorded It, and counsel Insist that,
unless the instrument shows, by official entries or certificates by officers who made It,
that It ls a record, It le no record; that &
volunteer statement by the present keeper,
giving his opinion about It, will not make lt
a record; that by the original law these records were to be kept In the office of the secretary of state; that the certificate of the
auditor of state should show how he come
by the book.
The Instrument olTered and nrlmltted In
evl<len<'e was a <"l'rtltil'cl copy of letters patent to George Earle for the land In question
In this case, the auditor of state certifying
the same to be "a full, true, and complete
copy of the record of letters patent executed
nod Issued on the 12th day of January, 1&>7,
by the state of Indiana to George Enrle, for
the lands therein described, as the same appears on page 379 of the Re<'ord of Swamp
Lends, Vol 33, Itange West, now on file In
my office, and of which record I nm the legal
custodian,'' properly signed by the auditor
of state, and seal atta<'hecl. By s:>etion :>628,
Rev. St. 1881, nil records pPrtnlnlng to
swamp lands were tnmsfen·ed from the office of the secretary of state to the office of
the auditor of state. SPetlon 462 prescribes
the manner In whlC'l• nil copll'!I or records In
public offices shall be cc1·tlficd, nnd makes
309
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them admissible in evidence. The statute

makes the auditor of state the proper custo-

dian of the record of letters patent which

were formerly recorded by the secretary ot

state, and kept in his oﬂice, and this copy

of the record was properly authenticated.

Section 4, Gavin & H. St. 607, made it the

duty of the secretary of state to record these

letters patent in books to be kept in his

oﬂice. Thus it was ﬁrst provided by stat-

ute and made the duty of the secretary of

state to record the letters patent in a book

in his office, and afterwards this record was

by statute transferred to the oﬂice of the

auditor of state. Courts take knowledge ot

the public statutes of the state, and, in the

absence of evidence to the contrary, the pre-

sumption ot law is that the otlicers discharge

their duties; and the presumption in this case
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would be that the secretary of state record;

ed the patent, and that the record book con-

taining the same had been by him turned

over to the auditor ot state. Evans v.

Browne, 30 Ind. 514; Ward v. State, 48 Ind.

289: Evans v. Ashley, 22 Ind. 15.

The next question presented is that the ap-

pellant called one Johannes Kopelke as a

witness, and offered to prove that he had

examined the book from which the auditor

of state took his copy oi’ the pretended rec-

ord ot the Earle patent; that it contained no

oﬁicial certiﬁcate, and was not on the out-

side designated as a record book. The issue

of patents was required by statute to be re-

corded. The statute providing for the rec-

ord simply made it the duty of the secretary

of state to record them “in books to be kept

in his otlice.” It does not require the book

to be designated on the outside as a “Record

of Patents." or to have any indorsement

whatever on the same, or that the secretary

ot state shall attach any certiﬁcate to the

same. So the evidence excluded was im-

proper, and the ruling of the court was cor-

rect.

Appellant also offered to prove by A. D.

Palmer, a witness on his behalf, who had

also purchased the same tract of land of the

state. and obtained a patent therefor, May

2, 1866, and through whom appellant claim-

ed title, that before he purchased the land

in controversy of the state he made search

at the state and county oﬂices, and could ﬁnd

no previous conveyance of record. It also

appears in the record that appeliee offered in

evidence the deposition of Erasmus B. Gol-

lins, who testiﬂed in said deposition that

he was the same Collins who was secretary

of state of the state of Indiana, and signed

said letters patent to Earle, and that he re-

corded it in volume 33. Record of Swamp

Lands in the State of Indiana, on page 379,

and that said record was made January 12.

1857: also the deposition of James H. Rice.

the auditor of state, to show that said record

had been transferred to the oﬂice of the

auditor of state. and was in his possession at

the time of making the certiﬁcate; which

PROOF.

them admleslble In evidence. The et.atute depositions were objected to by counsel for
makes the auditor ot state the proper custo- appellant, on the ground that It was an at·
dian ot the record ot letters patent wWch tempt by said deposltloDS to prove matters of
were formerly recorded by the secretary ot record by parol evidence, and the ·objection
state, and kept In hi.a offtce, and thle copy was sustained, and the depositions excluded.
The evidence of Palmer was to show the
ot the record wae properly authentl<'nted.
Section 4, Gavin & H. St. 607, made it the absence of a record In the oftl'Ce of the secrednty or the secretary ot state to re<'ord tht'ee tary of st.ate which the deposition sought to
letters patent In books to be kept In hie show was made and was In said oftlce at the
office. Thus It was drat provided by stat· time and long before the making of the pat·
ute and made the duty ot the secretary ot ent to Palmer. It parol evidence was propstate to record the lettel'H patent In a book er to show there waa no such record made or
In his offtce, and afterwards thle record was kept In the offtce of the secretary ot state at
by statute transferred to the oftlce ot the a certain time, then certainly evidence to
auditor of state. Court.a take knowledge of show that such record was in fact made and
the public statutes of the state, and, In the was In the offtce at that time was proper.
• absence of evidence to the contrary, the pre- A party must be conslstent. It he objects
enmptlon of law Is that the oftlcers discharge and secures a rullnc against bis adnrsary
their duties; and the presumption In thl.8 case excluding evidence on a particular subject,
would be that the secretary of state recordi he cannot be heard to complain when the
ed the patent, and that the re<'Ord book con· ' court applies the same rule, and excludes
talnlng the same had been by him turned evlden<>e offt-red by him to establish the opover to the auditor of state. Evans v. posite of what his adversary hnd attempted
Browne, 30 Ind. 514; Ward v. State, 48 Ind. to prove by the evidence which was ex289; Evans v. Ashley, 22 Ind. 15.
cluded on hl.8 objection. In the case of Din·
The next question presented Is that the ap- wlddle v. Statt-. 103 Ind. 101, 2 N. E. 290,
pellant <'&lied one Johannes Kopelke as a this court says: "It Is settled by the ad·
wltneRfl, and offered to proYe that he had judlcatlons of this court that a party cannot
examined the book from which the auditor make available for the reversal of a judgof state took hie copy of the pretended rec- ment the exc.>luslon of evidence, where, upon
ord of the Earle patent; that It contained no his objection, like evidence wae excluded
oftlclal certlft<'ate, and was not on the out- when offered by the other party." Hinton
side designated as a record book. The Issue v. Whittaker, 101 Ind. 344. And this docof patents was required by statute to be re- trine applies with full force to the objection
corded. The Ktatute providing for the rec- raJeed by appellant to the exclll81on of the
ord simply made It the duty of the secretary testimony of Palmer. TJ>e law did not reof state to record them "In books to be kept quire these patents to be recorded In the
In his offtce." It does not require the book recorder's oftlce. It Is so dedded In case of
to be designated on the outside as a ''Re<'Ord Mason v. Cooksey, 51 Ind. 519, and le recof Patents," or to have any lndorsement ognized as the law by this court In the forwhatever on the same, or that the secretary mer decision of this case.
of state shall attach any certificate to the
It Is contended that the law providing for
same. So the evidence excluded was Im· the recording of letters patent In the ofHce
proper, and the ruling of the court wae cor- ot the Se<'retary of state le unconstitutional,
rect.
tor the reason that It doe& not come within
Appellant also oft'ered to prove by A. D. the provisions of section 19, art. 4, Const.
Palmer, a witness on his behalf, who bad We think otherwise. The title to the origalso purchased the same tract of land of the inal act to which this was supplemental was
state, and obtained a patent therefor, May entitled "An act to regulate the sale of
2, 1866, and through whom appellant claim· swamp lands donated by the United Statee
.ed title, that before he purchased the land to the state of Indiana, and to provide for
In controversy of the state he made search the draining and reclaiming thefe9f, in acat the state and county oftlces, and <'ould flnd <'Ordan<'~ with the condition of said grant."
no previous conveyance of re<'ord. It also The title Is broad enough to cover all thingtJ
appears In the record that appellee offered In done in connection with the sale, and In con·
evidence the deposition ot Erasmus B. Col· nectlon with the execution of the patent.
llns, who testlfled In said deposition that 1 The statute provides that tbe secretary of
he was the same Collins who was secretary state, one of the ofti<'el'8 wbo sbtns It, shall
of state of the state ot Indiana, and signed record It In his omce. It ls ordered recorded
said letterR patent to Earle, and that he re- In connection with the making of the patent,
corded It In volume 33, Record of Swamp and the title ls broad enougb to cover the
I.ands In the State of Indiana, on page 379, provisions ot the act r ul.rl g tbe record.
and that said record was made January 12, · It le claimed that l'Q n pe\lee never
1857; also the depoeltlon of Jamee H. Rice, had possession of th• as tbe aPtate It la lothe auditor ot state, to show that said record cumt 1ent on hi m. to e erea\es"'
to a recovery,
had been trnnsrerred to the offtce of the to show a. coml>I~te nt\tle hill) \e from the
auditor of state, and was In his possession at United States do-wn <'ha\n of ~111 tbe<>l'Y Is
the time of making the certificate; which not tenable l.n this <! to him.
tblB state
nae. Court!! o
310

·.1.f

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS PROVED BY CERTIFIED COPIES.
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS PROVED BY CERTIFIED COPIES. [Case N0. 105

take knowledge of the acts of congress grant-

ing to this state swamp land, which, taken

in connection with.the patent from the state,

makes :1 complete chain of title. In addi-

tion to this, it is a well-settled principle that,

when plaintiff and defendant claim through

a common source of title, it is suﬂicient for

the plaintiff to deduce his title from the com-

take knowledge of the acts of congress granting to this state swamp land, which, taken
In connection with. the patent from the state,
makes a complete chain or title. In addition to this, It ls a well-settled principle that,
when plalntltf and defendant claim through
a common source of title, it is sufficient for
the plaintlft' to deduce his title from the common source of title. In this case both plalnwr and defendant claim title from the state

(Case No. 105

of Indiana, and It was only Incumbent on
the pla1nU1f to show that he had the better
title from the state. Smith v. Lindsey, 89
Mo. 76, 1 S. W. 88; Mlller v. Hardin, 64 l1o.
545; Miller v. Surls, 19 Ga. 331; Barnard v.
Whipple, 29 Vt. 401.
The evidence supports the finding of the
court. ·we find no error for which the cause
ought to be reverRerl.
Judgment a11lrmed, with costs.

mon source of title. In this case both plain-

tiff and defendant claim title from the state

of Indiana, and it was only incumbent on

the plaintiff to show that he had the better

title from the state. Smith v. Lindsey, 89

M0. 76, 1 S. W. 88; Miller v. Hardin, 64 Mo.

545; Miller v. Surls, 19 Ga. 331; Barnard v.

Whipple, 29 Vt. 401.

The evidence supports the ﬁnding of the

court. YVe ﬁnd no error for which the cause

ought to be reversed.

Judgment aﬂirmed, with cots.
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UNITED STATES"· BELL et aL
(4 Sup. Ct. 498, 111 U. S. 477.)

UNITED STATES v. BELL et al.

(4 Sup. Ct. 498, 111 U. S. 477.)

Supreme Court of the United States. April 21,

1884.

In error to the district court of the United

States for the Nortiiern district of Missis-

sippi.

Asst. Atty. Gen. Maury, for plaintiff in er-

ror.

Chas. F. Benjamin and Richard McAllis-

Supreme Court of the United States. April 21,
1884.

Io error to the district court of the l'nlted
States for the :Sorthern dllltrlct of lllAAIRslppl.
Asst. Atty. Geo. Maury, for plalntltr in error.
Chas. F. Benjamin and Richard McAllister, for deft>ndants lo error.

ter, for defendants in error.

WAITE, C. J. This was a suit upon the

bond of a purser in the navy, and at the

trial a transcript from the books and pro-

ceedings of the treasury department was of-

fered in evidence, authenticated in the fol-

lowing form:

“Treasury Department, Fourth Auditor-‘s Of-

lice, Washington, D. C., Feb. 11, 1881.
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"Pursuant to section 886 of the Revised

Statutes of the United States. I, (“harles

Beardsley, fourth auditor of the treasury de-

partment, do hereby certify that thc annex-

ed is a transcript of the books and proceed-

ings of the treasury department, in account

with Miles H. Morris, late paymaster in the

United States navy, under bond of April 9,

1858. Charles Beardsley, Auditor.”

"Be it remembered that Chas. Beardsley,

I<lsq., who certiﬁed the annexed transcript,

is now, and was at the time of doing so,

fourth auditor of the treasury of the United

States, and that full faith and credit are due

to his official attestations.

“In testimony whereof, I, John Sherman,

secretary of the treasury of the United

States, have hereunto subscribed my name

and caused to be aiiixed the seal of this de-

partment, at the city of Washington, this

eleventh day of February, in the year of our

Lord 1881.

“[Sea.l of Department] John Sherman,

“Secretary of the Treasury."

An objection to the admission of the evi-

dence on the ground that the “transcript

was not certiﬁed as required by law," was

sustained by the court, and that is assigned

312

for error here. In our opinion the certiﬁ-

cate was suﬁicient. Section 886 of the Re-

vised Statutes provides that “when suit is

brought in any case of delinquency of a rev-

enue officer, or other person accountable for

public money, a transcript from the b00ks

and proceedings of the treasury department,

certified by the register and authenticated

under the seal of the department, or, when

the suit involves the accounts of the war

and navy departments, certiﬁed by the au-

ditors respectively charged with the exam-

ination of those accounts and authenticat-

ed under the seal of the treasury depart-

ment, shali be admitted as evidence, and the

court trying the cause shall be authorized to

grant judgment and award execution accord-

ingly." This suit involved the accounts of

the navy department. The fourth auditor

is charged by law with the duty of exam-

WAITE, C. J. This was a suit upon the
bond of a purser In the navy, and at the
trial a transcript from the books and proceedings of the treasury departmt>nt was offered In evidence, authenticated lo the following form:
"Treasury Department, Fourth Antlltnr"M Of·
ftce, Washington, D. C., Feb. 11, 18.~1.
"Pursuant to sectloo 886 of the Revised
Statutes of the United States, I, <'harles
Beardsley, fourth auditor of the tremmry department, do hereby <.>ertlfy that thc annexed Is a transcript of the books and proceedings of the treasury department, in account
with Miles H. Morris, late paymaster In the
United States navy, under bond of April 9,
Charles Beardsley, Auditor."
1858.
"Be It rPml•mbered that Chas. JWnrdMley,
Esq., who certified the annexed trauMcrlpt,
Is now, and was at the time of doing so,
fourth auditor of the treasury of the United
States, and that full faith and credit are due
to his otftclal attestations.
"In testimony whereof, I, John Sherman,
secretary of the treasury of the UnJted
States, have hereunto subscribed my name
and caused to be amxed the seal of this department, at the city of Washington, this
eleventh day of February, In the year of our
Lord 1881.
"[Seal of Department.] John Sherman,
"Secretary of the Treasury."
An objection to the admission of the evidence on the ground that the ''transcript
was not certified as required by law;• was
sustained by the court, and that ls a881pied
312

for error here. In our oplnJon the certificate was suftlclent. Section 886 of the Re-vised Statutes provides that "when suit 111
brought In any case of delinquency of a revenue omcer, or other person accountable for
public money, a tranB<'rlpt from the bookll
and prO<.'l'edlngs of the treasury department,
certlfll'd by the register and authentl<'llted
under the seal of the department, or, when
the suit Involves the accounts of the war
and navy departments, certified by the auditors re11pt'(>tlvely <•barged with the examination of thot1e ac<"ounts and authenticated under the seal or the treasury department, shall be admitted as e"rldence, and the
court trying the cauAe shall be authorized to
grant judgment and award execution accordingly." Tblll suit in\·olved the accounts of
the navy department. The fourth auditor
Is <"barged by law wlth the duty of examining all accounts accruing In that department. Rev. St. I 277, subd. G. He has certllled under his hand that the paper otrered
In evlden<"e "Is a transcript of the books
and prOl·t't'dlngs of the trea1mry department
In account with" the purser whose bond 18
In suit, and the secretary of the treasury
has certified, under the seal of the de11artment, to the oftlclal character of the auditor,
"and that full faith and credit are due to bis
otftclal attestations." What more need be
done to autbentl<"ate the trans<"rlpt under
the seal of the department we are at a 1088
to determine. The certificate of the proper
auditor la attached, and his certificate attested by the secretary of the treasury under the seal of the department. The form
of the certlficates and the mode of aftlxlng
the seal correspond exactly with what appears in Smith v. U. S., 5 Pet. 292, where It
was held, more than halt a century ago,
that the aeal aftlxed in thlll way was suftlclent tor the purposes of evidence under a ·
Atatute, of which section 8811 ls a re-enactment. The transcript Is et>rtltted by the auditor, and authenticated under the seal ot
the treasury department, amxed by the secretary, its lawful custodian.
The judgment 18 reversed, and the cause
remanded, with Instructions to set aside the
nrdlct and grant a new trlaL
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ALEXANDER

T. PEN~SYLV ANIA

CO.
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ALEXANDER v. PENNSYLVANIA CO.

(30 N. E. 69, 48 Ohio St. 623.)

(30 N. E. 00, 48 Ohio St. 623.)
Suprem~

Court of Ohio.

Dec. 8, 1891.

Supreme Court of Ohio. Dec. 8. 1891.

Error to circuit court, Mahoning coun-

t.

yThis action was brought in the court of

common pleas of Mahouing county by

Alexander, the plaintiff in error, to rc-

cover against the defendant in error, the

Pennsylvania Company, damages for in-

juries sustained by him while in its cm-

ployment. He recovered a judgment in

that court, which was reversed by the cir-

cuit court oi Mahoning county in proceed-

ings instituted for that purpose by the

defendant in error. whereupon this pro-

-ceeding \vas brought to obtain a reversal

of the judgment of the circuit court, and

to afiirm that of the court of common
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pleas. Atiirmed.

Error to circuit court, Mahoning county.
ThfR dctlon wo11 brought In the court of
~ommon pleaH of Mohoulog r.ounty by
Alexanrler, tho plaintiff In error, to re·
~over aJr;alnet the deft•ndont lu error, thP
Pennsylvania Company, damagee for lnjnrieti sustained by him while lo lte employment. He rt>covered a JncJgment In
that court, which w11R rever11t>d by the clreult court of Mahoning eotrnty lo proceedings tnetltuted for thut 1mrpose by the
defendant In error, whel't'upon this pro-eeedlng was brouarht to obtain a reversal
of the juditment of the circuit court, and
to amrm that of the court of common
pleas. Atllrmerl.
Jone11, Anderson & Terl'Pll, forpJalntlff lo
-error. Thoma11 W. Mandt>rson and J. R.
-Cuniy, for defentlant In error.

Jones, Anderson & Terrell,forplaintil‘f in

error. Thomas W. Sanderson and J. R.

Carey, for defendant in error.

BRADBURY, J. The record discloses that

the plaintiff in error, a boy ofabout 16 years

ofagc, was in the service of the defendant as

one of a gang of men engaged in relaying

the track of u branch of defendant's rail-

road. That his work mainly consisted in

carrying water for the other members of

the gang; occasionally, however, he as-

sisted in the. work they were doing. That

on the day he was injured a train oi cars,

loaded with cinders for bnllastlng the

track, was waiting to be unloaded; and

that, as he was climbing on one of the

cars. or perhaps had gotten on it, to help

unload the cinders, the train was started

forward, by reason of which he was

thrown from the car, under its wheels, re-

ceiving. besides other lcsser injuries. one

necessitating the amputation of a leg be-

tween the ankle and knee. The foreman

of the gang discharged and employed

men. had immediate control of them

while at work, and of the work being

done. Undoubtedly, according to the law

of this state, he was such a representa-

tive of the company as would render it

liable to one of the gang oi men antler his

control. who should be injured by his neg-

ligence. Atthis point there is a conﬂict

in the testimony respecting the conduct of

the plaintiff in error and the foreman, and

the immediate circumstances under which

the plaintiff went upon the cur and the

train put in motion; but there is evidence

from which the jury could ﬁnd that the

foreman ordered the plaintiff to assist in

unloading the cinders; that, in obedience

to this order, he attempted to climb upon

a car: that he did so in a reasonably

careful manner; and that the foreman

carelessly, even recklessly, ordered the

train to be moved forward beiore the

plaintiff had secured himself a safe footing

upon the car he was attempting to board,

thereby throwing him from it, and under

BRADBURY, J. The record dl11clm1e11 that
tbP plaintiff In error, a boy of about 16yeHrs
of age, waeln tht>eervlceofthedefendantaa
-0ne of a aang of men enaraged In relayln~
the track of a hranch of defendant's 1·allroad. 'l'bat hie work mainly consisted In
-earrylog water for the other members of
the gnog; occa~lonnlly, howevPr, ht' n11.slete1l In the work they were doing. That
on the day be was Injured a train of cars,
loaded with clntlere for ballaRtlog the
track, wa11 waiting to be unloaded: and
tbat, 011 he was cllmblnJr; on onfl of the
-care. or pt>rhape had p.ottt'n on It, to help
nnload tbe cinders, tbe train wns started
forward, by reason of which he was
tbro\\·n from the car, under Its wheels, l'f'<"elvlng. ht>Mldes other lesser lnj11rlee, one
oecee.iltatlng the amputation of ft leg between the ankle and knee. The foreman
of tbe gang discharged ftnd emJ>lnyetl
men. had Immediate control of thern
while at work, and of the work being
41one. Undoubtedly, accorctlnrr to the law
4>f thlR state, he was suc.-h a rPpreHentatlve of the company ae would render It
liable to one of the gang of men nuder his
-eontrol. who should he Injured by hl11 negligence. At thlK point there le a confiict
In the testimony reMpeetlug the conduct of
the plalntln In error ancl tht' foreman, and
the Immediate clrcum11tances under which
the plaintiff Wl'nt npon the cnr and the
t1·ain put In motion; bot there le evidence
from which the jury conld find that the
foremno unle1·ed the plalntln to a&Rlst In
unloading the cloder.i; th1t t, lo obedleuce
to this order, he attempted to climb upon
a cor: that be did eo In a rf'asonably
careful manner; and that the forenum
~arele•IY, even reckle1tely, ordered the
train to be moved forward before the
plalntlft bad secured hlnu•elf a safe footlnir;
upon tbe car be wait attf'mptlog to board,
thert>by throwing him from It, and under
lta wheellt, cauelnK the l11jury of wblch he
~omplalns; thu11 giving to the plalottrr,
according tu the law of Oblo, a right of
action against the railroad compttny.

(Case No. 107

The real qnHtlons In contention betwet>n the parties lo this conrt arise out of
the fact that the accident ocenrred In the
Rtate of Peonsylvaola. 'J'he defendant In
error (also defendant tu thP court of t'ommon pleas) lntprposed lo the laRt·namPrl
court. among other dE'feDflPB, the followIng: "For a second defen!Ce It s11yR that
88ld plalntlft entered Into Its t>mploy
within thE' Htate or PennHylvanla, 11nd
wae employed to eer\•e the dt>fendant
within thE' 1t11hl Rtate of Pennsylvanht,
and with l'flferent'e to the lawe of eald
l!ltRte or Penns~·h·anla. lt 11ays, further,
thttt under the law11 of said state of Penn·
eylvanla, within whic'h said contract was
madP, and where said plaintiff was acting as an employe of the defendant, the
plaintiff nml HJI the othPr employee, Including 1mld gnug boR11 named In plalntln's petition, enir;aired upon flllll about
the train la the unloadlnar of the same, are
held to be fellow-employeR, and for the
negligence of either rei,iultlng In Injury to
the othl'r the common master, to.wit,
the defendant, le heltl not to be llal1le to
the other. Wher1>fore this defen.d ant
aeka to hl' dlemleet>d, with ltfl costs." The
Hofflclenes of thle 1Jt>ferwe le denied by
connsel for plalnttn In error lo a forcible
and lngenloue arirument, In which tbPy
Rpeclally crltkll!e the avermt>nt, "are held
to be fellow·en.ployes," etc. It le true,
there is nu dlreet a vermPnt that any of thE'
courts of Pe11011yl\'anla 1110 held. but tbe
llheral roles applicable to 1 he com1tr11c·
tlon of plea1ll11gt1 In this statt>requlre UK to
lnfPr that the pleader eo lntendecl. No
objection, by motion or otherwise, was
made to thei form of this defense In the
r.ourt of common pleas, or, eo far ae the
record dl1tclo11ee, at any stn~e In the pro~
ress of the case, until made by couni;,el In
their b1'1el filed In tbl11 t'ourt. Uncler this
defenRe a number of the declRlonR of the
fllur1rt>me court or PenneylYa11t11 werf' Introduced lo evidence to eHtabllsh the rule
of law attempted to be set up by th:" tlll·awer. Wheth~r upon motion, ma1le at
the prop,..r time, the defense shouid have
b~en madP more certain and definite, we
neert not Inquire; for Ht thl11 late stage
In the procet>rlln~R, after R etroniz:ly contested trlal, mainly bud upon tbu Issues
mudt> by the very dt>fl:!nRe, and the rf'ply
df'nylng ltR tr1Jth, the clefenRe should recPh•e the most favorahle constr11ctlon itl!I
Janiruage will permit; and when the
pleu!lt>r haR aYerred, as In this deff'n11e,
that" unlll'r the lu ws of thti state of Penn
eylvanla • • • the plaintiff and tho
•gang boss' • • • are hold to bf' fellow-sP.rvan ts," It la entirely reasonable to
Infer that the alleged holding was by the
courts of that state, httvlng authority to
declare and announce the rules of la vr
operative therein.
The record of the proceedings In the cir·
cult court le amblguone. One of the 1111el;tnwente of error mttdo In that court by
the defendant In error hE"re was that the
coo1't of common pleas erred In o\•erruling
Its motion for a new trial, und ooe of
the p:round!I for a new trial stated Is that
the motion was that the \°erdlc.-t wne contrary to the weli.r:ht of tile e\•ltlence; so
that the circuit court had liefore It for de·
313
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cision that question; and, had it reversed

the judgment of the court of common

pleas on that ground, this court would

not have reversed its action,and the same

result would have followed from a gener-

al judgment of reversal,--tiiat is,one spec-

ifying no particular ground for the action

of the court,—f0r in that case, as thccourt

might have reversed the judgment on the

ground that it was contrary to the evi-

deuce, this court cannot say that was not

the ground oi its action. Titus v. Lewis,

33 Ohio St. 304. in the case at bar, how-

ever, there is an attempt to state in the

journal entry of the circuit court the

grounds of its action in reversing thejudg-

ment of the court of common pleas. as fol-

lows: " I-‘irst. The court ﬁnds from exam-

ination of record and bill of exceptions
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that it was notcontroverted in the trial

in the court below but that there were

ofiicers of the Pennsylvania Company su-

perior in authority to Frank Kennan,

who had the right and authority to con-

tract and supervise his action in conduct-

ing the work, and controlling the men

during the work in which the plaintiff be-

low was engaged at the time he received

the injury. Second. The court holds as

conclusion of law that the determination

of this case must be governed by the law

in the state of Pennsylvania. Third. The

court further ﬁnds as a conclusion of la w,

from the reports of the decisions of the

suprenlecourt oi Pennsylvania, contained

in the record, that said Frank Kennan

was a fellow-servant andco-employe with

said Alexander at the time he received his

injury; and, therefore. that plaintiff in

error is not liable for the alleged negligent

acts oi said Kennun, which caused the in-

jury to defendant in error. To all of

which holdings defendant in error except-

ed. " This is not, in the correct and legal

sense of the term, a ﬁnding oi the facts

in the case, and a statement of them sep-

arately from the conclusions of law ar-

rived at by the court, although it closely

resembles it in form; for it is not within

the province oi the circuit court, in a pro-

ceeding in error before it, to find from the

evidence contained in the bill oi excep-

tions the facts, and state them separately

from its conclusions of law. Senff v. Pyle,

46 Ohio St. 102. 24 N. E. Rep. 590: Young

v. Pennsylvania (‘0., 46 Ohio St. 558, 2-l N.

E. Rep. 595. Neither does it give as the

ground of the reversal any one of the er-

rors assigned in that court. Whatlt real-

ly does disclose is that the circuit court,

being oi opinion that the law of Penn-

sylvania should govern the case, the ver-

dict of the jury was against the weight of

the evidence, because from aconsideration

of the whole evidence it appeared that

the plaintiff in error was a fellow-servant

of the “gang boss,” by whose negligence

he was injured; and that in such case the

cfaion that question; and, had it reveraed
the judgment of the court of comruon
pleas on that gronof), this court woultJ
not have reversed Its actlon,und the same
result would havt> followed from a general Judgment of reversRl,·-that is, one specifying no particular ~round for the action
of thA court,-for in that cuee, as thecourt
might have re,·ereed the Judgment on the
ground that it was contrary to the evldt-nce, this court cannot suy thllt wao;i not
the ~rouu11 of Its action. Titus v. Lewis,
a:~ Ot1io 8t. 304.
lo the cao;ie at bar, 110wever, there ls an attempt to state In the
journal entry of the circuit court the
grounds of its al·tlon lo J'e\'erslng thejurli;tment of the con rt of common pleas, ae follows: "FirHt. 'file court finds from examination of recorll and bill of exceptions
that It was uot contt·o\·erterl In the trial
In the court helow but that there were
otflcere of the Pt>nnsylvaoia Company a;uperior In nutho1·ity to F1·1tnk Kennan,
who hal) the right and authority to contr1tct 11nd supervise hia ttctlon In conducting the work, and r.ontrolllog the mE'n
during the work In which the plain tiff below wee engaged ot thP. time he received
the Injury. Second. 'fbe court holds as
conelusloo of law thftt ~he dt!termlnatlon
of this case must be governed by the law
In the Plate of Pennsylvania. Third. The
court further ftndR as a conclusion of law,
from the reports of the del'lslone of the
supreme court of Pennsylvania, contained
In the record, that said Frank Kennan
w aH a fellow-een·nut end co-employe with
eaifl Alexander at the tlmt> he received hie
fujnr.v : and, therefore, that plaintiff In
error le not liable for tho alleged ne11:llgE>nt
aets of said Kennan, whleh caused the Injury to defendant In error. To all of
which holdings defendant lo error ncepted . " This le not, In the correct and legal
eenHP of the term, a .flnrtlng or the facts
in the case, and a statement of them separately from the conclusions of law arrh·ed at b,v the court, although It cl111wly
resembles It In form; for It Is not within
the province of the clrl·ult court, In a proceeding In error before It, to find from the
e\"ldence contained In the bill of exceptions the facts, and state them eepar1ttel.v
from lte conclusfonM of law. Heon v. P~·Je,
46 Ohiu St. 102. 24 N. E. Rep. 595: Young
v. Pennsylvania Co., 46 Ohio 8t. 5fi8, :.!4 N.
E. Rep. 595. Neither does it alve ae the
Krotmd of the re\'erHal any one of the errorM aHslicned In that court. What It really does disclose la that tl>e circuit court,
bel11~ or opl11lo11 thut the law of Peon1o1ylvnnia should govern the case, the verdict of the Jury was against the weight of
the evidence, because from a consideration
or the whole e\"ldence it appeared thut
the plaintiff In errm· wuH a fellow F1ervant
of the "gang hmis." by who11e negligence
lie wee Injured; and that In eurh c1111e the
Ju w or Pennsylvania would not permit a
recovery to be had aiialust the railroad
company, In whose service both wne at
the time en11:aged. It may be considered,
th1c-refore, 11s fairly shown hy the reeord,
that the circuit conrt would not have reveri;ed the jud~rut•nt of the court of common pleHe If It h11d uot hPld the raHe to IJe
governed by the law of that 11tute. lt
0

au

therefore becomes material to inquire If
the circuit court wfts right lo this ref!pect.
The first brunch of the Inquiry coucerns
the metholl by which the law of Peum~yl
vanlu la to be determined. Is It to be
found aK matter of fact by the ~ury from
the evidence, or judicially declared by the
court? That It 111 a tact to be determined
by the jury Is, we think, a well-eetablh1hect principle of law. Ingraham v.
H11rt, 11 Ohio, 255; Bank v. Baker. 15
Ohio St. 68; Wllllume v. Finlay, 40 Oblo
!St. 342. It does nut follow from this.
however, that where, ae tn the case at
bar, numerous declrdone of the several
courts of a state are Introduced Jn evidence to a jury as proof of the law of s11ch
state, the jury should be required to
search through them, and elucidate nnd announce the doctrine theyE>FJtablleh. Thh1ls
often a moetlllfficult and delicate duty fur
courts and judges of the greate11t skill,
learning, aml experit-nce to undertake.
'l'o submit Its performunce to a body of
men inexperienced in the examination
and construction of judicial decisions, aud
not familiar wltl1 the general doctrines
pertaining to the e11bject. would be to
submit the rlghtH of parties lnvol\"ed In
the c01:rrove1'lly to be detl'rmlned hy a
method little. If any, moro certain than
the cal:lt of a die. In Huch case It becowea
the duty of the court, as lu the caRe of
any other documentary evldPnce requi"log
eonetructlon, to construe the decisions.
the rulings of the trial court In thlR reepE>ct being subject to review hy other
courts having jurisdiction In error, tlaue
securln~ aFJ much certainty In ascertalulng
the lftw of unuther state or couutry aR
the nature o( the subject will admit. DI
Sora v. Phillippe. 10 H. L. C1ta. 624; Bremer
v. Freem1rn. 10 Moore, P. C. 306; State v.
Jackson, 2 Dev. fi63: Cobb v. 'l'r1tm1portatlon Co .• 87Mo. 90; Kline v. Baker, 119 !\foBR.
:!5H; 'J'homp. 'l'rluls, § 1054. The reeord dlecloeE's that the eon tract by which the plain·
tiff lo eri-or wa11 employell was made In
the state of Pennsylvania; that hie
services were to be rendered wholly within
that state, and that he waa lnJured therein. If the right of a servant to recover
damages from hla master on account of
an lnjnry recP.h·ed through the negligence
of a 1mperlor eerv1tnt of the same mt1eter
arhies out of contract, thPn the <'ao;ie of
Knowlton v. RAiiway Co., 19 Ohio St. 269,
ls der.1.-lve of the cm1e at hnr. The syllahuFJ of that ca11e reads: .. Tht> llefe11d1tnt le
a commou carrier or pa11Bengel's, incorporated by the lawe of New York. and was
sne!I as each com 1111111 carrier on accouo t
or loJurlee recel\•ed by the plaintiff whilst
being carried a11 a pa11senger from one
point to another on deleudant's ro1td, aud
wholly within said et ate. 'rhe lujury was
chnrged to hn ve been occ1:1slooed by defend1tnt'H negllgAnce. The pleadings show
tllE' plalntlH w1:1e heing carried gratultnualy n t the time or the nccldcn t, under a contr1tr t by which plnlotlft a11eurued all risks
of R<'cident ami Injury arising from negllgf!nce, etc., and such contract 111 valid Lly
the laws ol New York. Held, that the validity of the stipulation exempting the defend11nt from liabl!lty for neicllgt>nce mnst
be determined by the laws ol New York,

•
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within whose jurisdiction the contract

was made and to be executed; and as the

plaintiff. under his contrar-.t, could have

no right of action in the courts of New

York. so his action cannot be maintained

in this state."

in Railway Co. v. Ranney, 87 Ohio St.

665, l\IcIi.v1l1xs. J., said, lpage 669:) “The

principles of law in relation to the lla-

bility of a master for an injury to his serv-

ant while engaged in the performance of

duties under his employment have been

so frequently considered and declared by

this court, and upon such varied state-

ments of fact, that one might be justified

in assuming that the law upon this sub-

ject. in all its bearings, has been fully set-

tled. The respective rights and duties of

employer and employe sound in contract.

The employer implicitly engages to use
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reasonable care and diligence to secure the

safety of the empioye, and, among other

things, to exercise reasonable care in the

selection of prudent fellow-servants. He

also engages that every one placed in au-

thority over the servant, with power to

control and direct him in the performance

of his duties, will exercise reasonable care

in providing for his safety. whether such

superior be a fellow-servant or not, in the

ordinary sense." There is strong ground

to contend that Judge 1\IC]I.VAlNl') slates

the rule correctly. But however that:

may be, and whether the action of the

plaintiff i_n error sounds in contract or

tort, in either case we think ii: is to be

governed by the law of Pennsylvania. If

the acts of the parties impose no obliga-

tionson the one hand and confer no rights

upon the other. where they occur, no good

reason is apparent why they should

spring into active existence the moment

the parties pass into another jurisdiction,

where, if they had occurred therein, such

relative rights and obligations would

have resulted. An act should be judged

by the law ofthe jurisdiction where it was

committed. The party acting or omit-

ting to act must be-presumed to have been

guided by the law in force at the time and

1 place. and to which he owed obedience.

If his conduct. according to that law,

violated no right of another, no cause oi’

action arose. for actions at law are pro-

vided to redress violated rights. Nor is it

material that the rules of Pennsylvania

law that deny relief to plaintiff in error

result from the adjudications of thecourts

of that state, instead of being legislative

enactments. The rules of law established

by judicial decisions are as binding as leg-

islative enactments until modified or over-

turned by other decisions or legislative en-

actments binding within that jurisdiction.

In theory it may be true that there is no

common law of Ohio or oi Pennsylvania:

that the common law is one and the same

in every state acknowledging its obliga-

tions; and that the decisions of one state

DOCUME~TS
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within whose Jurlsdktlon the con tract have resulted. .o\n act should be judged
was made ttnd to be ex~uted; anc1 ae the by the luw of the jurlfldlctlon where It wae
plalntlH, under hl11 cuutrar.t, could have com111ltte1l. 'l'ne p11rty ac·ttng or omitno r1ght or action In the courtY or New ting to act mu11t hPpresumc>d to havebPen
York, 110 his action cannot be maintained. ~uirled h~ the law In force nt the time and
place, end to which he owed obrlllenrE'.
lo thl11 state."
In Railway Co. v. Ranney, 87 Ohio St. If hie conduct, uccordlnJ.t to that law,
665, MclLVAINE, J., salfl, I page 6611:) "The violated no right of another, no com'le of
prlnclpltl8 of law In relation to the lla- action aro11e, tor ectlon11 at law are problll ty of a master for an Injury to blt1 serv- ylfted to redress violated ri~hte. Nor Is It
ant while enp;AJl:f'd In the perfornumre of materh1l that the rules of Peno11ylvanla
duties unller his tim11lo.rment have bl'<!o law that deny relief to plalntift In error
so fre11fll'Dtly ronslllered and declared by refilmlt from the 11djudlcatlo11s of thecourte
this court, an1l upon such varied state. of that state, Instead or being IP~IHlatlve
men ts of fact, that one might be Justiflad enactments. 'l'he rulee of law established
In t1111mmlng that the law upon this sub· by judicial declslooe are as bhullng ae legject, In all lt.8 bearine;s, has L>een fully set- islative enactmenteuntll mod!Oed or overtled. The re11pectlve rle;hts and dutlee of turned by other dechlloos or leglelatlvE' enemployer aud emr1Ioye sound In contract. act.meuts binding within that jurietllctlou.
1'he <'mployer Implicitly engages to u11e Io theory It llll\Y he true that there 111 no
reasunable cure and diligence to secure the common law of Ohio or of Penneylvanla:
1111fety or tho employe, and, among other that the common law Is oue nncl the same
thln11:s, to exercl11t1 reasonable care In the In t.>very eta te acknowled~ing Its oblll(R·
selec·tlon of prudent fellow-servuots. He tions; and that the decisions of one !!ltate
also engages that every one plat!ed In au- are but evidence of It, not binding upon
thority over the 11ervunt, with power to the courts of any other etate; but, ae
control and direct him In the performanr.e matter or fact, we know tbat, lo the BP·
of his dutiee, will exercl11e ren1mnable rare pllcu tion of the rulee of the com mou law
In providing for bis safety. w ht!tlier such to the atfalr11 of men, there le, unfortu11npertor be a fellow-servant or not, In the nately, in the tteveral states, a wide dlver11:ence; and that It nect!esarlly follows
ordinary sense." 'l'here le strona~ ground
to contend that Judge l\kJl.VAINt~ l'llatet1 that ucte nod transactions sufficient In
the rule con-ectly. But however that one etate tu crente a ca11ee of action will
may be, nnd whether tne action of the not produce that reeult In another, and
plaintiff In error sounds In rontract or In the altmlnlstra11oo of justice mere
tort, In either cuee we think It le to be theory muttt be made to yield to the truth
governed by the law of Pennsylvania. If as established by facts and expE'rle11ce.
the acts of the parties Impose no obliga- Other QUP.l!tlnn11 were urged upon our ~on·
tions on the one hancl and confer no rights eldl'ratloo lJy counsel In argument, eome
upon the other, where thPY occur, no good or all of which may be material upon tbe
reason Is apparent why they should retrial of the action. but they are not presprln11: Into active existence the moment sented by the record In such manner a11 to
the partlt!B pass into another jurisdiction, authorize their cun111deratlon at thle time,
where, tr they hail occurred therein, such and wlll not be noticed. Judgment afrelative rlgbte and obllgatlooe would firmed.
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\‘\'ISE.\I.\N v. NORTHERN PAC. R. CO.

(26 Pac. 272, 20 Or. -125.)

Supreme Court of Oregon. March 31, 1891.

Appealfrom circuit court. Multnoniah

county; E. D. Si].-\TTi.'CK, Judge.

On March 19,1890,theplaintiff,J.J. Wise-

man, commenced an action in the circuit

court of the state of Oregon for the coun-

ty of Multnomah against the defendant.

to recover the sum of $398.72, the value of

certain household goods claimed to have

been lost by defendant in transit. The

complaint alleges that on or about the 8th

day of April. 1889, at Nunica, Mich., the

plaintiff delivered to the Detroit. Grand

1-la-vcn & Milwaukee Iinilway (‘onipany a

shipment of six boxes, one trunk, one roll of

carpet, and two barrels containing house-

hold goods, the property of the plaintiff,
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for transportation to Salem, Or.: that

said shipment was in duetime delivered in

good order to the defendant as a connect-

ing carrier: and t‘hat one of said boxes

and one of said barrels, with their entire

contents, were destroyed. and never de-

livered to plaintiff, w hich household goods

so destroyed were of the value of $373.05.

The defendant, in its answer to the com-

plaint, admits the shipment by plaintiff,

and the delivery to the Detroit, Grand

Haven & Milwaukee Railway (_‘ompany,

of the household goods in question, and

that the same was in due time received by

defendant from the Detroit. Grand Haven

& iililwaukee Railway Company, a. con-

necting carrier; admits that one of the

boxes and one of the barrels, with the con-

tents, were destroyed, but denies any

knowledge as to the contents or value

thereof. For a further and separate an-

swer and defense, defendant alleged that

the shipment of freight mentioned in the

complaint consisted of household goods,

and that the same was shipped by plain-

tiff, and received and accepted by the De-

troit. Grand Haven & Milwaukecliailway

Company, as well as the defendant, a con-

necting line. under a. contract with plain-

tiff that, if for any cause there should be

a total loss of said freight. and a liability

on the part of the common carrier receiv-

ing the same. or over whose line the same

was being or was transported, the total

liability therefor. ifany there should he,

would be the sum of ﬁve dollars per hun-

dred pounds weight of said freight, and

the same was rcceitcd and accepted by dc-

fendant and shipped by plaintiff on said

condition. The defendant, further an-

swering. and as a separate defense,allegcd

that at the date of shipment by plaintiff,

to-wit, April 8, 1889. in order to obtain

the beneﬁt of the reduced rate of freight

charges from the ordinary tariff rate

charged therefor, the plaintiff and the ile-

troit, Grand Haven & Milwaukee Railway

Company contracted and agreed in writ-

ing that. in consideration of such reduced

Wlf:E'.\I.\.X v.

PUOOF.
NORTHim~

PAC. R. CO.

to said i:omls; that said plaintiff WH
1rlvcn an1l obtained the benl'flt Qf said re<:!U Pac. 272, 20 Or. 420.)
d m·ed ra tt•s, a ud executed said cootruct
or relce1Je accordlnll'l.V. The reply denle1:1
Supreme Court of Oregon. March 31, 1891.
the new matter ulleged in theunswer. On
the trial the plalntlft gave evlclenctl tendAp1>eal from rirr.ult court, Multnomah ing to prove the l8Hoes on his part, and
-county; E. D. R11ATT1:cK, Judjl;e.
then rested. Defendant then gave eviOn l\larcb 19, l~!IO, the11lnlnt1n, J .J. Wlsl'- dence tending to pr1n·e the execution by
mnn, commencf'<l an ncttoo In the circuit plaintiff of the release and contraet 1J1e11court of the state of On>gon for the coun- tlo11ed In the answer; that It was~xeculed
ty of Multnomah &jtalnst the defendant, In duplicate, one copy being attached to
to recover the sum or f39~.i2, the value of the blll of lading, and the other w1111 by
certain household goo<l1:1 claimed to have the agent of the Uetrolt, Grand Haven &
b<'l'n lost by defendant In transit. The Milwaukee Railway, ut. Nunlca, Mich., forcomplaint alleJl;eK thuton or about the 13th warded to the traftlc manager of that
day of April. l~. at Nunica, Mkb., the road, at Chicago, Ill. Defendant then
plaintiff dellnired to the Detroit, Grand called AlfrPd Watts. who was then clerk
Htweu & Milwaukee Rnllwuy Company a of the Northern Pacific Railroad, at Portshipment of 11l:x boxes, one trunk, one roll or land, Or., who tei;itlHed that be wae t'lerk
carpet, and two burrPls containing hou11e- In the oftlce of Mr. Fulton, general freight
bold goods, the propl'rty of the plulntlff, agent of the defendant at Portland; that
for tran11portt1 tlon to Ralern, Or.: thn t he had telegraphed to the elalm agtmt of
sul<1 shipment "'as In due time delivered In the defendant at St. Paul to aseertuln ff a.
good order to the defendant as a t'onneet- re:ease had been made on the plaiutlff'ilng ~urrler: ancl t11at one of said boxes shlpment of goodR from Nunlca, and, U
and one of sahl barrels, with their entire : 110, to send the original release that was
contents, were dt-stroyed, and never de· · signed by Mr. Wl11eman; that tbe clal.m
livered to plaintiff,\\ hlcb household 11:oods a~nt at St. Paul telf'graphed back that
so destroyed were of the value of $3i3.05. the files in the oftice of the tr11.fftc manager
The defendant, In Its am1wer to the cnm- at Chlcaaco bad bt:en searched, and the replulot, admits the Mhlpment by plaintiff. lease could not be found; that ~he release
and the delivery to the Detroit, Grund never wae In his offtce l\t Portland, and
Ha\·en & Milwaukee Railway <.'ompnny, the partlP& who handled the way-bill of
of the household goods In queRtlon, and plaintiff's good11 ·sald there wae no relea.;e
that the same wos In due time received by attached to It wheu It reached Its destinadf'fendant from the Detroit. Grencl Haven tion. The defendant then offered the- dep.
& Milwaukee Rullw11y Company, a con- 011ltlon of the ugent at Nonie& to prove
11ec:ting t'&rrler; admit& that one of the the contents of the l"f'lease. hut the court
boxes und one of the barrels, with the t'on- refust-d to admit sec:ondary evidence of Its
ten tlJ, were de11troyed, but denies uny contents, to which ruling defendant duly
knowledge as to the contents or nllne excepted, and asslacns the same as error
thereof. J.<'or a further and separate an- on this appeal.
swer and defense, defendant alleged that
f)(l/ph, Bellinxer, .\lallory ct Simun, for
the 11h\pwe11t of freight mentioned In the appellant. J. N. Teal and &adersoa Reed,
complaint conelste<l of bousebold guo<ls, for respondent.
and tbot the same woe shipped by plaintiff, and received and m·repte<l by the DeBEAN, J., (after 11taUng the facts a11
troit, Grtmd Hu,·en & MllwaukecRallwoy
Company, ae well es the dl•fendRnt. a ron- 11bove.) By hectlon 691, Hiii's Cocle, It IM
nectlng line, umler a contract with plulo- pro\•l<led that "there shall be no evidence of
tttt that, If for any cuuse there Rhould be ' the contents of a writing, other than the
a total loes uf said freight, and a liability writing ltt1elf, except in the following
on the part of the rommon carrier re.!eh·- citses: • • • (2) When the original canlng thP. same, or over whose line the same not be produced by the party by whom
was being or was transported, the total the evldPnee le offered. In a reonsonable
liability thert'for. If any there should be, time, with· proper diligence, and Its abwould be the snm of fh·e dollars per hnn- st-nce le not owing to 11111 neglect or dedrf'd 1>000111:1 velght of eald f1·t-lgbt, und fault." This sP.Ctlon Is a cleclaratlon of the
the same wue receii-ed and &l'CelJtt-<l by de- common-law rule. 'l'he theory upon which
fendant and l'hlppe«l by plulntiff on 11uld eeron<lury evidence of the cuntentH of a
condition. 'l'he flefendant, further un- writing Is admitted Is that tile original
swerlng. and as a separate defense, nlle&eed writing cannot be prod u~ed by the party
that at the dote of shipment by plnl11tlft, bv whom the evidence Is olferc1l, within a
to-wit, April 8, 1889, In order to obtain reasonable time, by the exercise of reosouthe benefit of the reduced rate of freight able 1lillgence. The lJlll'stion is always onecharges from the ordinary tariff rote of tJlllgence In the effort to procure the
charged therPfor, the plaintiff and the De- orlginnl. No precise rule baas beeu or can
troit, Grand Haven & Milwaukee Railway be laid demo as to what shall be cousidCompany contracted and agreed In writ- ere<I a rt'asonnble 1·ftort, hut the pl\rty aling that, in con11i<leratlon of such reduced le1rlng the 101111 01· <lestrnctlon bf the docurate11, thP plaintiff, In cuse of any dumage , ment ls e:iq1cctetl to show "that he baa lo
01· loss to eald goods arising by damage
good fuitl1 exhaustPd, In a ree1mnohle de·
by fire while nt stutiong or In transit. gree, all the suurce11 of lnformution and
would an1I dlcl release 1:111ld company, end
means of discovery which the nature of the
each and every other com1>any o\·er whose · case would naturally sugi;est, and wblcb
lines ealJ goods might pn111J to deetlne- I were lll'CesMlhle tu hl111." 1 Greenl. Ev.
tlon, from any und all dumage occurring I § 6li8; l:ihnp11on v. Dall, 3 Wall. 460; John·
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son v. Arnwine, 42 N. J. Law, 451; Kelsey

v. Hanmer, 18 Conn. 310. Thus, in Mar-

iner v. Saunders, 5 Gilman, 117. the court

say: “From the nature of the subject

there is some dlﬁiculty in laying down a

general rule deﬁning the extent nnd vig-

ilance of the search which a party must

make before the court may conclude that;

the paper is destroyed or lost. " As a gen-

eral rule, however, we may say that when,

from the ownership, nature, or ohject of

a pa per, it has properly a particular place of

deposit, or where. from the evidence, it is

shown to have been in a. particular place,

or in particularhands, then that placemust

be searched by the witness proving the

loss, or the person produced into whose

hands it has been traced. The extent of

the search to he made in such place or by
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such person mustdcpend in a great degree

upon the circumstances. Ordlnarilyit is

not suﬁiclent that the paper is not found

in its usual place of deposit, but all papers

in the office or place should be examined.

()n the whole, the court must be satisfied

that the paper is destroyed. and cannot

he found. it is true the party need not

search every possible place where it might

he found, for then the search might be in-

terminable, bu he in ust search every place

where there a reasonable probability

that it may be found.” This rule is found-

ed on reason and justice, and to require

any less degree ofdillgence would be to de-

feat the object oi’ reducing agreements to

writing. As was said in Rankin v. Crow.

19 Ill. 629: “The party wishing to avail

himself of the beneﬁt of such secondary ev-

idence should be required to make at least

the same effort that is expected the party

would make if he were to lose the benefit

of the evidence if the instrument were not

found.” The degree of diligence which

shall be considered necessary, in any case,

will depend upon the character and im-

portance of the document, and the pur-

poses for which it is expected to he used,

and the place where a paper of that kind

may naturally be supposed to be found.

If the document be a valuable and impor-

tant one, which the owner would be likely

to preserve, a more diligent search will be

required than if the document is of little

or no value. The purposes for which it is

proposed to use it on the trial will also

have an important bearing in determining

the degree of diligence required. if the

cause of action or defense -is founded on

the supposed writing, the party offering

the evidence will be required to show a

greater degree of diligence in the attempt

to produce the original than if it is de-

sired to be used as evidence in some collat-

eral matter. The proof of search and

proof of loss required is always propor-

tionate to the character and value of the

pa per supposed to be lost. Insurance Co.

v. Rosenagle, T7 Pa. St. 514. The exist-

son v. Arnwine, 42 N. J. Law, 451; Kelsey celvt>d, as a common carrier, pht.lntift'tt
v. Hanmer, 18 Conn. 810. Thus. In .Mar- ~oodH, and that while In ittf possession
iner v. 8aunders, fl Gilman, 117. the court they were destroyed, but It seeks to essay: "From the nature of the subject cape liability by virtue of this contract.
Jt then became of the utmost lmportanre
there ls surue difficulty In laying down a
general rnle defining the extent nnd vlg· to both plaintiff and defendant that the
Hance of the search which a party must orlgluul t·ontract, If each a contruct was
make before the court may conclude that mudo u t all, be produced on the trlul, 1:10
the paper Is tlestru~·ed or lost." As a gen- that there ml~ht he nu contro\·e1·sy as to
eral rule. howe\'l'r, we mfty say that when. ltK t•untents, aud that the court ml~ht cle·
from the u \vnerMhlp, nature. or ohjl'Ct of C'lnre Its legal cHect to the Jury. Before
o po per, it has proprrlyapartlcnlar(Jlm·eof dt>fenilant should be permlttl'd to glt'e sec.
clepo1:1lt, or where. 1rum the evillencl', It iK • ondury evldt>nce of Its contents it shonlcl
shown to hn.t"l' been in a particular place, pro\'e that It bud exerclstid tbeutmost dilur In particnlarhnnds, then thnt place m nst igence to prncure the oril!'inal, (Kmlth v.
be Bl'Brt'hed by the witness proving the Cox, 9 Or. :127,) and this It failed to do.
loss, or the person i1roduced into whose No competent e\•ldence whatever was ofha111Js it has hl·en tracl'd. The extent of fered to prove nn.v H«'orch In the office of
the t<earch to he made In 1rnch place or by
the tra fHc manager n t Chlcuiru, where It
11uch person must depend in a great degree was shown tue document wos most likely
upon the clrcumHtunces. Ordinarily It Is to bA found. All that tire witness WattK
not sufficient that the paper Is nut found said about the supposed search was cll'arIn Its usual place of depuRit, but all papers ly hearsay and iocompptent e\•ideuce.
In the offire or place should he examined. Lawrence v . .Fulton, 19 Cal. 683. It did
On the whole, the court must l>e satisfied not In any way tend to prove thu.t any
that the paper Is destroyed. and cannot eHort lla<l been made In the Chicago offtce
he fouud. It is true the party need not to find the orl11:lnal paper. The teKtist>arch every possible place where It might mony of the trnlflc mnnagt•r, or 11ome r1erhe fouud. for then the search might be ln- sort In his otHee, having the custody of
terrulmtblP, llut he must search et"eryphtce such papers, 15hould ha \'e been bud, ur
where there I( a 1·t•vt1unbble probability Home pruper effort matle to obtain It,
that It may l>e found." This rule ls found- showlnlo\ what eHort,if any.had been macle
ed on reason and jnstlce, nod to rPqulre to flncl the original.
Indet>d, couu11el for dl'fenclant did not
any let111 degree of diligence would be to defeat the object of reducing agreements to seriously contend that It bod brought
\Vrltlng. As was said In R1rnkln v. Crow. Itself within the rule concerning thl'I ad111 Jll. 629: "The party wiRhlng to avail mi11Rion of secondary evlclence, If 11roof of
himself of tne benefit of each secondary ev- the loss of the original Is r·equlre1l, but he
idence should he required to make at least clnlmed that all thut wa11 ne<·e;;Rary for
the same effort that ts expected the party dt'ff'11dant to clo wal! to show that the
would mnke If he werl' to loRI' the benefit orlglnul was In the pos11es11lon of a person
of the evlclence If the instrument were not out11lde of thls state, and that no fu1·ther
proof was required; that, when It showl'd
found." Thi'! clegree of dillgPnce which
shall be conslclered nece11Rary, In any rnse,
that the orli.tlnnl contract was In Chkag;o,
will de11encl uimn the churucter nncl Im- It wuK entitled to give 11eco11dary evidence
portance of the document, and the pur- of Its contents without further JJroof; and
poHeH r01· which It Is exvet·tpd to he Oiled. In support :1f his puRltlon cites the followund the plat•e where a vapn of thut kind ing authorltlei<: Burton v. Drh?g!l, 20
Wall. 1:~; Gordon v. Scoring. H Cal. 49;
may naturally be suppuHed to be found.
If the document be a valuablf' and lmpor· Beattle v. Hilliard, 55 N. H. 4:.'8; Brown
tant one, which the owner would l>e likely
v.Woods, 19 .Mo.475; Shcparcl v.Glchllngs,
to preserve, a more diligent senrch will be 22 Conn. 2S2: Ralph v. Brown. 3 W1.tttH &
required than If the document Is of little H. :J9a; Gordon v. TWl'l'cly, 74 Ala. 232.
or uu value. The purposes for which It Is The broad doctrine Is stn ted In these auproposed to use It on the trial will also thorities that, If hook11 or papers ncceHsary
have ar1 Important bearing In cleterminlng UH e\•ldence In a court In one state be In
the dl'gl'ee of dlllirenc1• requh·ed. If the the poH11eselon of a persun llvln~ In anothca use of action or tl<:"fense .Is founclc•d on er state, 11econdary e\·ld1•m·e. without furthe supposed writing, the party offering ther showing, mny l>e given to pro\'e the
the evldt>uce will he required to show a
contents of surh papers. AiJ we hn\'e algreater degree of cllllp:cnce In the u tt1•111pt
ready snld, In effect, each cnse mm;t lttrgeto i1rodnce the original than If It Is de- ly clepend on Its own purticular circumsired to be used 011 evidence In some collat- stance!! os to what showing IH sulflcient In
eral mattf'r. The proof of Sl'ltrch and
Order to admit Se<•uniJury e\'iUt'llCe O( the
proof of los!l required Is always propor- contents of a wrltinic. anil the language
tiono te to the charncter nnd value of the uRed In thf> col'ieR nl10\·e cited must be inpaper 1mppot1ed to be lost. Insurance Co. tl'rprl'tecl In the light of the facts of each
v. Rm1en11gle, i7 Pa. St. 514. 'l'he exilit·
case. None of thti11e t•111w11 '1:0 so far as tu
ence and rontents of the l!UppoRecl t•on- hold that where a d<'f1·11clont relies upon
tract, ae well as the claim or clefen!lnnt the cuntentH or a "rltlng to l'xempt himb1uied upon It, Is deulc<l l>y the pluintiH in self from liability, and both the execution
the rase at bar. 'rhe· lssne thus being and contents of the snppoi;ecl writing are
joined, its execution and contents wer~ denied, and the ullegecl writing Is shown
t'ery material to <lelenclnnt to establ111hl11g i:o be In the p11Hse1111lon of u 11erson outHlde
lt11 defense. Indeed.defendunt seeks tu ex· of the 11ta tP., secnndu ry evlclt•nce of the conempt Itself from liability Holely by 1·emmn tPnts of ~uch writing h• uclmlt11ilble m1leKs
or this contract. It admits having re- an effort is mude tu prod nee It. AnJ, be317
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sides. the doctrine stated in these authori-

ties is denied by authorities of equal

weigllt. and even by some of the same

courts. '.i‘hns,in Turner v. Yates,16 How.

14, it was held that proof that an in-

voice of goods was in London was not

a sufficient showing to admit secondary

evidence of its contents, in the circuit

court of the United States for the district

of Maryland, the court saying: “Ii the

paper was in the hands of the consignees

in London,secondary evidence was not

admissible: if as parties, they were enti-

tled to notice to produce the paper; if as

third persons, their depositions should

have been taken, or some proper attempt

made to obtain it." To the same effect

are Hoyt v. McNeil, 13 Minn. 394, (Gil.

362;) Dickinson v. Breeden, 25 Ill. 186; Mc-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:08 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104925781
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

818

Gregor v. Montgomery, 4 Pa. St. 237;

Whnrt. Ev.§ 130. The rule laid down in

ihe authorities just cited, we think, is

founded on reason and justice, and im-

poses no hardship on the defendant. By

defendant’s own showing the last known

place of deposit of the contract it claims

plaintiff executed was in the office of the

tratiic manager in Chicago, and the law

provides an easyand simple method of

taking the deposition of a witness resid-

. in); out of the state. and his deposition

should have been taken or some proper

effort made to obtain it. The fact that

the person to whose possession the paper

was traced resided out of the state did not

excuse defendant from a diligent effort

to procure it. Judgment of the court be-

low is therefore affirmed.

PROOF.

sides, thP doctrine stated In theae autborl·

Gregor v. Montgomery, 4 Pa. St. 237;
tlt'S le lll'nled l.Jy 1rnthoritlee of equal
\Vhart. Ev. § mo. The rule laid dtJwn lo
weight, end even by some of the- snme
I he authorities Jast cited, we think, le
courts. Th1111, lo Tnrn•!r v. Yates, 16 How.
rounded on renson and Justice, nod Im·
14, It was held th1tt proof that un in- poses no hardship on the defendant. lly
voice of ~oocle wus in London was not defonllant'e uwn showing the last known
a safflclent showing to admit secondary plactt of deposit or the COD tract It claims
el-ldt>m•e of Its contents, In the circuit plaintiff executed was In the office of the
con rt of the l'nltt-d Sb1tes for the district tratttc manager in Chicago, and the law
of Maryland, the court saying: "If the provides an easy and simple. method of
paper was In the hands of the contd~nees takin11: the depu1dtion of a wltnes.,, residIn London, secondary e\·ldence was not inlo( out of the state, and his depo11itloo
admh1l'lble: If as parties, tht>y were entl·. should ha\"e be1m taken or some proper
tied to notice to prod ace the paper; if as erturt made to obtain It. The fact that
thir1l persons, their dcposltlonl!I should
the. person to whoKe possession the paper
have l.Jet>n tekeu, 01· some prop~r attempt was traced resided out of tile state did not
made to obtain it." To the same effect ~xcuse defendant f1·om a dlliu;ent Pffurt
ere Hoyt v. McNeil, IS Minn. ll94, (GU.
to procure It. JudgmPnt of the court 00362;) Dickinson v. Breeden, 2i> Ill. 186; Mc- low iB therefore aftirmed.
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ISLEY v. BOON et al.

(13 S. E. 795, 109 N. C. 555.)

Supreme Court‘ of North Carolina. Nov. 10,

1891.

Appeal from superior court, Alamance.‘

county; Edwin T. Boykin, Judge.

This was an action by Christian lsley

against John Boon and others to try title to

land. There was judgment for defendants.

and plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

On the trial it became material for the

plaintiff to produce in evidence the record of

a special proceeding, and the following is so

much of the case stated on appeal for this

court in respect thereto as need be reported:

“The plaintiff then introduced the letters

of administration issued to E. S. Parker up-

on the estate of Samuel Adams, deceased,

issued by the clerk of the superior court of
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Alamance county, under his oﬂicial seal of

the 8th day of November, 1875. The plaintiff

then proposed to show a sale of the laud in

controversy, by E. S. Parker, administrator

of Samuel Adams, deceased, on the 3d day

of April, 1876, (under special proceeding

taken by him in the superior court of Ala-

mance county, for the purpose of creating

assets for the payment of debt of his intes-

tate,) to John Ireland, the last and highest

bidder, and a deed made on the 5th of Janu-

ary, 1881, to the heirs at law of the said John

Ireland, who had theretofore died intestate,

after having paid the whole of the purchase

money for said land to the administrator,

Parker. To establish such special proceed- ,

ings the plaintiff put in evidence two sum-

monses issued by the clerk of the superior

court of Aiamance county under his oﬂiciai

seal, bearing date of November 27, 1875, en-

titled ‘E. S. Parker, as administrator of Sam-

uel Adams, against John Adams, John Boon

and wife, Robena, Jacob Hicks and wife, ,-

Piety,' commanding the sheriilf to summon

the defendants to appear at the office of the

clerk of the superior court of said county

within twenty-one days after the service of

summons on them, to answer the complaint

to be therein tiled, one of which summonses

was directed to the sheriff of Alamance coun-

ty, and was returned by the sheriﬂ? of said

county as served upon John Boon and wife,

Robena, on the 2-lth of January, 1876. The

other was directed to the sheriff of Forsyth

county, and was returned by the sherit! of

said county on the 2-ith of January, 1876, as y

served on Jacob Hicks and wife, Piety; also

the petition of I}. S. Parker, administrator of

Samuel Adams, deceased, against John

Adams, John Boon and wife, Robena. Jacob

Hicks and wife, Piety, ﬂied in said court,

praying for a license to sell the real estate 1

described in the petition, the same being the

land in controversy in this action, as the

property of Samuel Adams, deceased, to cre- '

ate assets for the payment of the debts of his

intestate, subject to the right of the dower of

the widow of said deceased, which said peti-

tion was veriﬁed before the clerk of said

ISLEY v. BOON et al.
(13 S. E. 79C>, 109 N. O. 555.)
Supreme Court· of North Carolina. Nov. 10,
1891.
Appeal from superior court, Alamance
county; Edwin T. Boykin, Judge.
This was an action by Christian Isley
ugalnst John Boon and others to try title to
land. There was Judgment for defendants.
and plalntltr appeals. Reversed.
On the trial It became material for the
plalntlfr to produce in evldtmce the record of
a special p1·o<'eedlng, and the following Is so
much of the case stated on appeal for this
court In respect thereto as need be repo1ted:
'"rhe plalntltr then Introduced the letters
of administration Issued to E. S. Plll'ker upon the estate of Samuel Adame, deceased,
Issued by the clerk of the superior court of
Alamance county, wider his otttclal seal of
the 8th day of November, 1875. The plalntitr
then proposed to show a sale of the land in
controversy, by 1'J. 8. Parker, administrator
of Samuel Adams, deceased, on the 3d day
ot AprU, 18i6, (under special proceeding
taken by him in the superior court of Alamance county, for the purpos1: of creating
assets for the payment of debts of his Intestate,) to John Ireland, the last and highest
bidder, and a deed made on the 5th of January, 1881, to the heirs at law of the said John
Ireland, who had theretofore died intestate,
after ha\·lng paid the whole of the purchase
money for said land to the administrator,
Parker. To establish such special proceedlnge the plalntltr put In evidence two summonses l118ued by the clerk of the superior
court of Alamance county under hie otnclal
seal, bearing date of November 27, 1875, entitled 'E. S. Parker, as administrator of Samuel Adame, against John Adame, John Boon
and wlte, Robena, Jacob Hicks and wife,
Piety,' commanding the eherltr to summon
the defendants to appear at the office of the
clerk of the superior court of said county
within twenty-one days after the service of
summons on them, to answer the complaint
to be therein flied, one of whleh 11ummonses
was directed to the sheriff of Alaman<'e county, and was returned by the sheriff of said
county as served upon John Boon and wife,
Robena, on the 24th of January, 1876. The
other wa.s directed to the sheriff of Forsyth
county, and was returned by the sheriff of
said county on the 24th of January, 1876, as
served on Jacob Hicks and wife, Piety; also
the petition of E. S. Parker, administrator of
Samuel Adams, deceased, against John
Adams, John Boon and wife, Holwnu. Jacob
Hicks and wife, Piety, tlled In 11ald court,
praying for a license to sell the renl estate
descrilwd In the petition, the same being the
land In controversy in this action, as the
property of Samuel Adnms, deceused, to create assets for the payment of the dehts of bis
Intestate, subject to the right of the dower of
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the widow of said deceased, which said petition was verlfied before the clerk of said
court on the 20th day of January, 18i6.
l'lnlntlff also lntrodnl'ed an order directing
publication to be made In the Alamance
Gleaner, a paper publi11hed in Alamance
county, for six weeks.
"The plaintiff Introduced A. Tate, and
showed by him that he was the clerk of the
superior court of Alamance county from 1878
to the drst Monday in December, 1890, who
testified that the two summonses, together
with the_ petition of E. S. Porker, administrator of Samuel Adams, deceased, and the order of publication, which were Introduced
by the plalntltr, were (records) found by him
In the office of the superior court of Alumauce county. He also proved that W. A.
Albright was his Immediate predecessor In
the clerk's otllce of said county, and that he
well knew his handwriting, and that the
signature to the two summonses, and al110 to
the verlflcatlon to the petition and the signature to the order for publication, were his
handwriting. Witness also testified that the
case of E. 8. Parker, administrator of Samuel
Adams, deceased, against John Adams, John
Boon and wife, Robena, Jacob Hicks and
wife, Piety, appeared In the summons docket
of sald superior court; and, further, that he
had made diligent search in his office for the
order of sale, the report of sale, the decree
confirming the sale by E. S. Parker as administrator to John Ireland, or any other papers
or records belonging to Bald case In aid
otnce, but was unable to find such. Witness
testified that he found no other entry of the
case upon docket or records than the statement of the case and the Issuing of tile summonses. He stated that he found no minutes,
or memorandum, or order upon said records.
"The plalntltr then introduced E. S. Parker,
the administrator of Samuel Adams, deceased, and, after exhibiting a written notice to
the defendants that the plaintiff would offer
parol evidence of the existence of the records and orders and proceedings In the special proceeding for the sale of the laud of
the said Samuel Adams, deceased, and the
loss or destruction of said reeords, and of the
plalntllI's purpose to show the contents
thereof by parol, proposed to prove by him
tht> 1~1mlng ot the summonses be1-einbefore
mt>ntioned and the fact of the filing hy himself, in the otnce of the clerk of the supel"lor
court, of the petition, herelnbefore mentioned, for the sale of land to make as11ets, and
an order for publication, and that the said petition and order were in his handwriting, and
signed by him as attorney and petltlont>r,
and were the original pnpers they purportt>d
to be. Plaintiff further proposed to prove by
snld witness the existence of an order adjudging that publication had been made for
the defendant .John Adnms. u non-resilient,
and of a decree or the 11nid court In the 11altl
special proceeding directing him, as the ad319
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ministrator of Samuel Adams, to sell the

land described in his petition at public auc-

tion at the court-house in Graham, to the

highest bidder, for cash, after duly adver-

tising the same, and that the proceeds of the

sale be assets in his hands for the payment

ot debts; it being adjudged that there was

no personal estate of said intestate with

which to pay debts; also that he made said

sale, after due advertisement, on the 3d day

of April. 1876, at the court-house in Graham,

when and where John Ireland became the

purchaser at the price of $-'>0.‘."»il, and paid the ‘

purchase money down, and that he made no

report ot’ said sale to the court; also a de-

cree ot the court made, conﬁrming said re-

port aud sale, and directing the said admin-

istrator to make title in fee to the purchaser;

and further proposed to prove by said wit-
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ness that, the said John Ireland having died

soon thereafter, after having paid for said

land, he made and executed a title deed to .

the heirs at law of the said John Ireland, de-

ceased, being the grantors named in the said

administi-ator’s deed, which deed was made

on the 5th ot January, 1881. And plaintiff

further proposed to prove by said Parker -

that he afterwards saw on several occasions

said special proceeding, petition, and other

orders. order of sale, report of sale, and de-

cree contirming said sale, etc., in the clerk‘s

otﬁce as records ot said court, and knew that

all of said orders did exist and were on ﬁle

in said otlice, and that diligent search has

been made since in said oﬂice for them. Up-

on objection by the defendants to the pro-

posed evidence of the witness E. S. Parker,

as hereinbefore set forth, the court sustained

the said objection, and refused the proposed

evidence, to which ruling of the court the

plaintiﬂ’ excepted. The plaintlﬁ’ then pro-

posed to introduce in evidence the deed ex-

ecuted by E. S. Parker, administrator of

Samuel Adams, to J. R. Ireland. W. Ii‘. Ire-

land, Samuel Ireland, \V. S. Caffey and wife,

Caroline, C. Isley and wife, Louisa. i’or the

land in controversy, bearing date 5th day of

January, 1831, which deed has been duly

proven and registered, and insisted upon the

title derived from said deed. as well as re-

citals containcd therein, as evidence of the

existence of the record and other proceed-

ings recited in said deed under the law and

the maxim, ‘omnia praesumuntur rite esse

at-ta.’ The court, upon objection of the de-

fendants, refuscd to admit the evidence offer-

ed. and the plalntiﬂ! excepted. Upon the in-
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tlmatiou of the court the plaintiff submitted

to a nonsuit and appealed."

L. M. Scott, for appellant. J. A. Long, W.

P. Bynum, Jr., and Batchelor & Devereux.

for appellees.

‘.\II€l{lli.\[0I\', C. J. The evidence proposed

and i'e_iected on the trial must be accepted

for the present purpose as true, because it

was material; and, it it had been submitted

to the jury, they might have believed and so

PHOOF.

mlnlstrntor of Samuel Adams, to sell the tlmatlon of the court the plalntltr submitted
land desc•ribed In his petition at public auc- to a nonsuit and appealed.·•
tion at the court-house In Graham, to the
L. ll. Scott, for appellant. J. A. Long, W.
highest bidder, tor casb, after duly adver- P. Hynum, Jr., and Bat<'helor & Devert>ux.
tising the some, and that the proceeds of the for nppellt"e8.
sale be 11ssets In bis hands for the payment
of debts; It being adjudged that there was
:\UmHDION', 0. J. The evlclence propo11ed
no personal estate of said Intestate with and rejectt>d on the trial must be accepted
which to pay debts; also that he made 1111ld for the pre11ent purpose ae true, because It
sale, after due advertisement, on the 3d day , was material; and, If It had been submitted
oC April. 1870, at the court-house ln Oraham, to the Jury, they might have believed and so
when u111I wht>re John lrelnn<l bt'l·uwe the treutt'd It. The facts showed that muterlal
put'l·bu11c•r nt tht> prl<'e of $:"10.r10, and paid the pu rts of the record of the special proceeding
purchase money down, and that be made no referred to had been lost or destroyed. The
rt>port of said sale to the court; also a de- clerk of the court, the proper custodian of
c1-ee of the court made, con11.rmlng said re- the record, made diligent search In his oftke
port and sale, and directing the said admin- for su<'h 11arts or It as were al11>ged to hove
istrator to make title ln ree to the purchnse1·; been 1011t, and he was unable to find them.
and further proposed to prove by said wit- It must be taken that be made such search
ness that, the said .Tohn Ireland having died where, regularly, they ought to be, and genaoon thereafter, after having paid for said erally through hls otftce, where he might
land, be made and executed a title deed to hope to find them. Ile tailed to 11.nd them, If
the beh·s at law of the said John Ireland, de- th<•y ever existed. They were lost or deceOBed, being the grnntors named In the said stroyed. It ls not suggested that they were
admlnlstl'Stor's deed, which deed was made not, nor did the court found Its opinion upon
on the 5th of January, 1881. And plalntur such supposition. Then, If the parts of the
further proposed to prove by said Parker record sp<'<'ltted were lost or destroyed, It
that be afterwords saw on several ocenslons was clearly competent to prove on the trial
said special procet'<llng, petition, and other by s('(•ondary evldt>nce such 1068 or destru<'orders. order of sale, report of sale, and de- tlon. and also what the nature, meaning. and
cree coulirmlng said sale, etc., In the clerk's purport of SU<'b lost parts were. It has been
otftce OJI records of said court, and knew that so expressly <leclded. In :\Iobley v. Watts,
all of said orders did exist and were on 11.le 08 :S. C. 281, 3 S. E. 677, Justice Davis said:
In snld oft\ce, and that diligent search bas "If the record ls lost, and le ancient, Its exbeen made since In said otftce for them. Up- istence and contents may sometimes be preon objection by the defendants to the pro- sumed; but, whether It be ancient or reposed evidence of the witness I<~. S. Parker, cent, after proof of the loss Its contents IWl1
ns berelnbt'fore set forth, the <'OUrt 11ustalned be proved, like any other document, by secthe said obje<'tlon, and refused the proposed ondary evidence, where the c•ase does not
evidence, to which ruling of thr c·ourt the from Its nature disclose the existence of
11lalntllf eX<'l'llted. The plnlntllf then pro- other and better evidence." This case, It
posed to lntrodu<'e fn e\"ldenee the deed ex- seems to us, plainly <'onie11 within what ls
ecuted by K S. Parker, admlnlstrntor of Mid and de<•lded In the <'m;e just cited. InSamuel Adams, to J. R. Ireland, W. F. Ire- deed, It Is well settil>d that where the record
land, Samuel Ireland, W. S. Cnft't>y an<l wife, ls lost, that It existed, and Its purpose and
Caroline, C. Isley and wife, I.<mhm. tor the contents, may be proven, on the trial of any
land In controYersy, bearing date 5th <lny of a<'tlon "'here It becomes material, by seeondJanu11ry, 18.'il, which dN>d hos been duly ary evldenct>. The loss or destruction ot tilt>
proven and rt>glstered, and Insisted upon the record shoulcl. how<'ver, be made to appear
title derived from said deed. u!I well as re- <'lt'arly before re<'Clvlng su<'h secondary evlcitals contained then•ln, a11 evldenl'e of the denee. ~tnnly v. Musiodnglll, u.'i N. C. ;,;-.._<;;
exlsten<'e of the reeord an<l other prO<'Ped- Yount v. lllller, 91 X. C. :{:Jl; Hare v. Hollolngs re<'ltt•d In said deed umler the law and man. 94 :S. C. H. There ls error. The Judgthe maxim, •omnla prresumuntur rite esse ment of nonsuit must be set aside, and tht>
1wtn.' The court, upon objec•tlon of the de- case dl~posed of R<'<'Ordlni;: to law. To that
fendants, refused to admit the evidence offer- end let this opinion be certified to the supeed, and the plalntllr excepted. Upon the ln- rior court. It ls so ordered.
:l20
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GOODRICH v. WESTON.

(102 Mass. 362.)

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

\Vorcester. Oct. Term, 1869.

(J. H. B. Snow, for plaintiffs. G. A. Tor-

DEGREES OF SECONDARY EVIDENCE.

GOODRICH v. WESTON.
(102 M888. 362.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Ma1181lchusetta.
W orceeter. Oct. Term, 1869.
O. H. B. 8now, ,for plaintltrs. G. A. Torrey, tor defendant.

rey, for defendant.

\\"I'}I.LS, J’. The defendant, by giving no-

tice to produce the original letters written by

him to the plaintiffs, had entitle.d himself to

prove their contents by secondary evidence.

He produced copies, made by his wife from

his letter book, into which the originals

had been ﬁrst copied by a machine press;

and testiﬁed that he had compared these

copies with those in the letter book, and that

they were correct. He also testlﬁed that he

deposited the originals in the postoﬁice, di-

rected to the plaintiffs. The offer to send

for the letter book, and produce it in court, if
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deired, must be taken at least to relieve the

defendant from any suspicion that the letter

book was improperly kept back. The objec-

tion to the admissibility of the copies stands,

therefore, strictly upon the legal ground stat-

ed, namely, “that they were not copies of

the originals, and that the letter book itself

would be the best evidence."

Whenever a copy of a record or document

is itself made original or primary evidence,

the rule is clear and well settled that it must

be a copy made directly from or compared

with the original. If the ﬁrst copy be lost,

or in the hands of the opposite party, so

long as another may be obtained from the

WELLS, J. The defendant, by giving notice to produce the original letters written by
him to the plalntUfs, hnd entitled hlmselC to
prove their contents by secondary evidence.
He produced copies, made by hie wife from
his letter book, Into which the originals
had been 11rst copied by a machine press;
and testlfted thnt he had compared these
copies with those in the letter book, and that
they were correct. He also tesUfted that he
deposited the originals ID the postotllce, di·
rected to the plalnUtrs. The otrer to send
for the letter book, and produce It In court, 1f
desired, must be taken at least to relieve the
defendant from any suspicion tllat the letter
book was Improperly kept back. The objection to the admlBBlblllty of the copies stands,
therefore, strictly upon the legal ground stated, namely, "that they were not copies of
the orbdnale, and that the letter book lteelf
would be the beet evidence."
Whenever a copy of a record or document
le Itself made original or primary evidence,
the rule Is clear and well settled that It mUttt
be a copy made directly from or compared
with the original. It the ftrst copy be lost,
or In the hands of the opposite party, so
long aa another may be obtained from the
same source, no irround can be laid for resorting to evidence of an Inferior or seC'ondary cbamcter. The admlBBton of a transcript

same source, no ground can be laid for re-

sorting to evidence of an inferior or second-

ary character. The admission of a transcript

wn.oL's,nv.-21

from the record of a deed or other private

writing, for the record of which provision is

made by law, is not an exception to, but only

a modiﬁcation of, the same rule. But when

the source of original evidence is exhausted,

and resort is properly had to secondary proof,

the contents of private writings may be prov-

ed like any other fact, by indirect evidence.

The admissibility of evidence oﬂfered for this

purpose must depend upon its legitimate ten-

dency to prove the facts sought to be proved,

and not upon the comparative weight or

value of one or another form of proof. The

jury will judge of its weight, and may give

due consideration to the fact that a less sat-

isfactory form of proof is offered while a

more satisfactory one exists and is withheld,

or not produced when it might have been

readily obtained. But there are no degrees

of legal distinction in this class of evidence.

Although there has been much diversity of

practice, and the decisions are tar from uni-

form, more frequently turning upon special

circumstances and facts than upon a general

principal. the tendency of authority is, as

we think, towards the establishment of the

rule here stated. 2 Phil. Ev. (4th Am. Ed.)

568; 1 Green]. Ev. §§ 8-L. 582; Stetson v.

Gulliver, 2 Cush. 494; Robertson v. Lynch,

18 Johns. 451; Winn v. Patterson, 9 Pet. 663;

WJLGCB,KV.-21
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from the record of a deed or other private
wrltlng, tor the record of which pro'flelon ls
made by law, la not an exception to, but only
a modification of, the same rule. But when
the source of original evidence 18 exhausted,
and resort 18 properly had to secondary proof,
the contents of private writings may be proved like any other fact, by Indirect evidence.
The admissibility of evidence offered for thla
purpose must depend upon Its legitimate tendency to prove the facts sought to be proved,
and not upon the comparative weight or
value of one or another form of proof. The
jury will judge of Its weight, and may give
due consideration to the fact that a less satisfactory form of proof la oitered while a
more satisfactory one exists and Is withheld,
or not produced when It might have been
readily obtained. But there are no degree11
of legal distinction In this class of evidence.
Although there has been much diversity of
practice, and the declslona are far from uniform, more frequently turning upon special
circumstances and facts than upon a general
prln<'lpal, the tendency of authority Is, ae
we think, towards the establishment of the
rule here statccl. 2 Phil. Ev. (4th Am. Ed.)
568; 1 Greenl. Ev. H &l. 582; Stetson v.
Gulliver, 2 Cush. 404; Robertson v. Lynch,
18 Johns. 4iil; Winn v. Patterson, 9 Pet. 663;
Brown v. Woodman, 6 Car. & P. 206; Doe v.
Ro88, 7 Mees. & W . 10'.l.
In this case the letter book. If produced,
would have been only secondary evidence.
We are eatlafled that the copies, admitted by
the court below, were eutDclently verified to
justify their a(lmtsslon ae competent evldcuce of the CO'ltente of the original letters.
Exceptions overruled.
321
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FORD et al. v. CUXNINGHAM et al.
12,044.)

FORD et al. v. CUNNINGHAM et al. (No.

(No.

(25 Pac. 403, 87 Cal. 209.)

12,044.)

(25 Pac. -103. 87 Cal. 209.)

Supreme Court of California. Dec. 20, 1890.

Department 1. Appeal from superior

court, Santa Cruz county; F. J. i\IcCann,

Judge.

J. M. Lesser, Spalsbury & Burke, and

Supreme Court of California.

Dec. 20, 1890.

Department 1. Appeal from lilUflerlor
rourt, Santa Cruz county; F. J. Mcl'unn,
Judge.
J. M. Lel!Rer, Spall1bury & Bnrke, and
Garber, Boa It & BIHhop, for appellants. A.
S. KittrtdgP., for respondeotll.

Garber,B0alt& Blshop,fora_opellants. A.

S. Kittridp,-c, for respondents.

PER CURIAM. The only question liti-

gated in the court below was whether

the barley was sold by the plaintiffs to

the defendant Cunningliani, or to the ﬁrm

of Cunningham & Co., of which he was a

member. The appellants contend that

the evidence is insufficient to support the

findings, but we think there was sufficient

evidence on behalf of the defendants to
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create a. substantial conflict, and under

the well-established rule we should not in-

terfere with the ﬁndings of fact.

The plaintiffs, to establish their case

against the copartnership, relied mainly

on documentary evidence, some of which

they claimed was in possession of the de-

fendants, who were asked at the trial to

produce the same. Mr. Morey, one of the

plaintiffs, was permitted by the court to

state the contents of certain bills and let-

ters which he claimed had been addressed

and sent to Cunningham & Co. Objec-

tion was made by the defendants to the

introduction of oral testimony as to the

contents of the bills and letters, and the

objection was overruled. We think the

court erred in its ruling. The witness

322

stated that he had no personal knowledge

that the communications addressed to

Cunningham & (lo. were mailed. except

that copies thereof appeared in the plain-

tiffs‘ copy-book, and that it was a general

custom of his firm to placeietters in a box

in the store, from which they were taken

to the post-office. No foundation, there-

fore, was laid for the introduction of the

evidence. Assuming that secondary evi-

dence could under such circumstances be

introduced, the press copies were the best

evidence next to the originals themselves.

The ruling was on a material matter, be-

cause the defendants testiﬂed that they

never received the communica tions referred

go. Braiisford v. Williams, 74 Amer. Dec.

62.

Mr. Middleton, one of the defendants,

was called as a witness. and identiﬁed the

ledger of the copartnership, showing the

account of Ford & Co. with Cunningham

& Uo. from September 1, 18%. to the date

of trial. It was admitted by the plain-

tiffs that the entries therein were original

entries, but they objected to the introduc-

tion of the same as evidence on theground

that it was irrelevant, immaterial, and

incompetent. The objection was sus-

tained by the court. to which ruling the

PER CURIAM. The only 11ue11tlon litigated in the court below was whether
the bar)ey was sold by the plnlntiffH to
the defendant Cunningham, or to the fl rm
of Cunningham & Co., of which be was a
member. The appellants contend that
the evidence is insutficlent to snprwrt the
findlng11, but we think there was Rutflclcnt
evidence on behalf of the derendauts to
create a subRtnntlal conflict, and under
the well-eMtahllshed rule we should not Interfere with the findings of fart.
The plaintiffs, to eHtal.Jlh1h tht:ir ca11e
against the copartnershlp, relied mainly
on documentary evidence, some of which
they claimed was In posice!lslon of the defendants, who were al'lkej at tbe trlnl to
;1roduce the same. Mr. Morey, one of the
plaintiffs, was permittPd by the court to
Rtate tbe contents of certain bills and lettPrH which he claimed had been addrt>s11ed
aml sent to Cunningham & Co. Objection wns made by the defendantR to tbe
m trolluction of oral testimony as to the
.~onte>nb1 of the bills and l~tters, and the
ubjet•tlun was overruled. We think tbe
eourt erred in Its ruling. The witness
322
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etated that be had no penonal knowledge
that the comu1uuicatlons addressed to
Cunningham & Co. were malled, except
thut copies thereof app~ared in the platntlfft1' co11.v-book, and that It was a general
custom of his flrm to µlace letters in a bo:c
in the sto1·e, from which they were taken
to tbe post-otflce. No founlla.tlon, therefore, was laid for the introduction of the
evldem:e. Ast1umlng that secondal'y evidence could unller such clrcumi;1tances be
Introduced, the i1retts copies were the betit
e\•l<lence next tQ the 01·lglot1ls themselveH.
The ruling was on a material matter, because the defendants testified that they
neverrecelverl tbecomruunic11tlons referred
to. Brailsford v. Williams, 74 Amer. Dec.
562.

Mr. l\Ilddleton, one of the defendant.s.
was called as a. wltm~ss, ancl identlfled the
ledgt!r of the copartuershlp, showing the
nccuunt of Ford & Co. with Cunningham
& Oo. from Septl'mber 1, 18"14, to the date
of trial. It wus admitted by the plaintiffs that the entries therein were original
en triPB, hut they objl'Cted to the introlluetlon of the same as evldencl'on theground
that it wus irrelevant, lmmateria!, and
incompetent. 'fhe objection was sustained by the court. to which ruling tbe
defendants excepted. There was no item
of barley In the account offered. The ruling, we think, was error. The witness
had stA.ted that the ledger showed the
true state of account betwePn plaintiffR
and defendants, and that the Items bad
been entered by him at the time of the sneral transnctlons therein mentior.ed. Landis v. 'l'nrner, 14 Cal. 1">78. Judgment and
order reversed, and cause remanded for
a new trial.
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CORNETT v. WILLIAMS.

(20 Wall. 226.)

Supreme Court of the United States.

1873.

Error to the circuit court of the United

States for the Western district of Texas.

C. S. West, G. F. Moore, and John Han-

cock, i'or plaintiff in error. A. J. Hamilton,

J. A. Buchanan, and Mr. Jackson, for de-

fendant in error.

Oct.,

Mr. Justice SWAYNE delivered the opin-

ion of the court.

There was no error in admitting in evi-

dence the two depositions of H. H. Williams.

The objections that he was a party to the

record, and interested in the event of the

suit, were obviated by the third section of

the act of July 2, 1864. 13 Stat. 351. He
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was thus placed upon a footing of equality

with all other witnesses, and it was compe-

tent for him to testify in the case orally or

by deposition. The depositions were taken

and certiﬁed in conformity to the thirtieth

section of the act of 1789. 1 Stat. 89. If the

deponent was not satisﬁed with his ﬁrst

deposition, he had the right to give a second

one. No order of the court was necessary in

either case. The only objections insisted up-

on are that the statute does not authorize a

party to testify by deposition if h_e can oral-

ly, and that if he can by deposition, the right

was exhausted by the ﬁrst one, and that

the second one was taken without authority

of law. Both objections are without founda-

tion. The statute is remedial and to be con-

strued liberally. We are aware of no case

in which it has been held that where a wit-

ness has given one deposition in an action

at law, he cannot for that reason give un-

other without the sanction of the court.

Such a proposition has the support of nei-

ther principle nor authority.

The instruction given to the jury touch-

ing the trust deeds executed by W. H. and

J. H. Williams to Wildbahn, the notes they

were given to secure, and the sale by Cor-

nett of the slaves, which was in part the

consideration of the notes, was well war-

ranted by thc state of the evidence and was

correct. It was objected to only upon the

ground that the evidence did not tend to

prove that the slaves were removed from

Missouri to Texas for the purpose of selling

them in the latter state, and that hence the

instruction, even if correct as matter of law,

was, with reference to the case, an abstrac-

tion, and must necessarily have had the ef-

fect of confusing and misleading the minds

of the jury. An examination of the record

has satisfied us that the evidence was abun-

dantly suiﬂcient to raise the question of in-

tent in the removal of the slaves, and to

make it the duty of the court to say to the

Jury what was said upon the subject. It is

not objected that the rule of law was not

-1-orroctly stated.

. accomplished.

Case N 0. 112]

PROOF.

vides for putting in a permanent form proof

of the contents of judicial records lost or

destroyed, such proof to take the place of

the original records for all purposes. The

statute of Texas upon the subject of proof

in cases of lost records,“ has also been re-

ferred to in this connection. There is noth-

lug in either the act of congress or the stat-

ute in conﬂict with the action of the court

we have been considering.

The most important question in the case

relates to the proceedings of the county

court of Galveston county, touching the sale

and conveyance of the premises in contro-

versy by the administrator of Samuel M.

Williams to H. H. Williams. The plaintiffs

in error insist that those proceedings were

coram non judice and void. The defendant

in error maintains that they were regular
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and valid, and that if there be any error or

defect, the court having had jurisdiction, its

proceedings could not be collaterally assail-

ed upon the trial of this cause in the court

below. This renders it necessary to exam-

ine the case in this aspect. The record shows

the following facts: On the 28th of June,

1850, H. H. \Villiams recovered in the dis-

trict court of the United States held at Gai-

veston, against Samuel M. Williams, then

living, a judgment for $26,736. And on the

12th of July, 1858. another Judgment for the

sum of $43,936.34. The second judgment was

founded upon the ﬁrst one, and was for the

principal and interest due upon the latter.

At the January term, 1866, of the Galveston

county court, H. H. Williams. by his coun-

sel, applied for an order that the administra-

tor of Samuel M. Williams be cited to ap-

pear and show cause why "he should not

make application to the court for an order

to sell enough of the property of said es-

tate to pay a judgment obtained by the said

Henry Williams against the said Samuel M.

Williams, to the amount of $40,000; which

said judgment was allowed and approved as

a valid claim against said estate, in October,

1859, with eight per cent. interest per an-

num,” &c.

The administrator appeared at the same

term, and answered that the plaintiff recov-

ered the judgment ﬁrst hereinbefore mention-

ed; that it was presented for allowance

against the estate with the usual aﬂidavit

and allowed; that he could not say whether

it was approved by the chief justice of Gal-

veston county; that it had never been paid,

and that the reason he had taken no meas-

ures to pay it was that the plaintiff had told

him that, being against his brother, he did

not intend to enforce it. The court there-

upon, at the same term, made an order as

follows:

"On this day came on to be heard in this

cause the motion of Henry Williams, by his

agent, J. H. Williams, asking that the ad-

ministrator be required to sell sufficient prop-

-'- Pasch. Dig. art. 4969.

erty of the estate to pay a certain judgment
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argument at the bar, and are of such a char-

acter as to require no observations from the

court. One was pressed upon our attention

with earnestness and ability, and to that one

our remarks will be conﬁned.

A statute of Texas requires all claims‘

against the estate of a decedent to be pre- .

sented to his legal representative and to be

allowed by such representative, and to be ap-

proved by the probate judge. Until so ai-

lowed and approved they have no legal va-

lidity and cannot be recognized as debts

against the estate. If disallowed, or not ap-

proved, they must be sued upon within three

months. if sued without a refusal to allow

or approve, there can be no recovery. The

absence of such fact is fatal to the action.T

The order of sale sets forth that the claim

had been allowed by the administrator, but
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is silent as to its approval by the judge.

The plaintiffs in error argued that this omis- -I

sion rendered the order a nullity.

The application of the judgment-creditor

and the answer of the administrator gave

the judge jurisdiction over the parties and the

real estate of the deceasedﬂ Jurisdiction is

the power to hear and determine.

the order of sale required the exercise of this

power. It was the business and duty of the

court to ascertain and decide whether the T

facts were such as called for that action. .

The question always arises in such proceed-

ings—-and must be determined—whether, up-

on the case as presented, affirmative or nega-

tive action is proper. The power to review

and reverse the decision so made is clearly

appellate in its character, and can be exer-

cised only by an appellate tribunal in a pro-

ceeding had directly for that purpose. It

cannot and ought not to be done by another

court, in another case, where the subject is

presented incidentally, and a reversal sought

in such collateral proceeding. The settled

rule of law is that jurisdiction having at-

inched in the original ease, everything done

within the power of that jurisdiction, when

collaterally questioned, ‘is to be held conclu-

sive of the rights of the parties, unless im-

peached for fraud. Every intendment is

made to support the proceeding. It is re-

garded as if it were regular in all things and

irreversible for error. In the absence of

fraud no question can be collaterally enter-

TPasch. Dig. arts. 1309. 1311; Danzey v.

S\vinnc_v. 7 Tex. 625; Martin v. Harrison, 2

Tex. -156.

5 Pasch. Dig. art. 1305.

tained as to anything lying within the juris-

dictional sphere of the original case. Inti-

nite confusion and mischiefs would ensue if

the rule were otherwise. These remarks ap-

ply to the order of sale here in question.

The county court had the power to make it

and did make it. It is presumed to have

been properly made. and the question of its

propriety was not open to examination upon

the trial in the circuit court. These proposi-

tions are sustained by a long and unbroken
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LEESER v. BOEKHOFF.

(38 Mo. App. 445.)

Court of Appeals of Missouri. Dec. 24, 1889.

Christian & Wind, for appellant. Lubke

& Muench, for respondent.

BRIGGS, J’. On the twenty-third day of

February, 1887, the defendant in this case

instituted an attachment suit against one

Caroline Gruhner. In the attachment suit,

Boekhoﬂ claimed that Mrs. (lruhner was in-

debted to him, and that she had fraudulent-

ly conveyed her property for the purpose of

defrauding her creditors. ilnder the writ

of attachment Boekhoff caused a stock of

groceries to be seized as the property of

Mrs. Grulmer, and the goods were subse-

quently sold by the oiiicer. and the proceeds,

after deducting costs. were applied to the

discharge of Boekhoi'f’s debt.
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The plaintiff in the present suit claims that

the stock of goods so levied on and sold he-

longed to him, and he asked a Judgment

against the defendant for damages for the

unlawful conversion of his property. The

defendant, in his answer, denied that the

plaintiff was the owner of the ;;oods, and

he averred that the plaintiff claimed to be

the owner of the property through a fraud-

ulent purchase from Caroline Gruhner. The

defendant attacked this sale, and alleged its

invalidity as to him, for two reasons: First.

The pretended purchase was fraudulent in

fact, and was contrived to defraud the cred-

itors of Hrs. Gruhner. Second. The sale

was inoperative and void as to the defend-

ant, for the reason that there was no such

change of possession as would satisfy the

interpretation placed by the supreme court

on the ﬁrst clause of section 250-'3, Rev. St.

1879. That portion of the statute referred

to reads as follows: “Every sale made by

a vendor of goods and chattels in his Dos-

session or under his control, unless the same

be accompanied by delivery in a reasonable

time. regard being had to the situation of

the property, and be followed by an actual

and continued change of the possession of

the things sold, shall be held to be fraud-

ulent and void, as against the creditors of

the vendor," etc. The case was submitted

to a jury, and the plaintiﬂ obtained a ver-

dict for ﬁve hundred dollars, and the court

entered judgment accordingly. The suit

was originally againt the defendant and

the Haase Fish Company, but, at the con-

clusion of the testimony, the plaintiff dis-

missed as to the ﬁsh company. The de-

fendant in due time moved the court to

grant him a. new trial, and, his motion hav-

ing been overruled, he has prosecuted this

appeal.

The defendant assigns numerous errors,

and he presents many arguments why the

judgment ought to be reversed. He com-

plains chieﬂy of the action of the court in

refusing to take the case from the jury. He

also complains of the instructions, and the

admission and rejection of evidence.

PROOF.

LEEBER v. BOEKHOFll'.
(38 Mo. App. 445.)
Court of Appeals of Milsouri. Dec. 24, 1889.
Christian & Wind, for appellant. Lubke
& Muench, for respondent.

BRIGGS, J. On the twenty-third day ot
February, 1887, the defendant In this case
lnstltuted an attachment Rult nJttllnst one
Caroline Grubner. In till' atta<'hment suit,
Boekholf <'lalmed that MrM. Hruhner waH Indebted to him, and that she had fraudulentJy conveyed her property tor the purpose ot
defrauding her creditors. Under the writ
of attachment Boekbolf caused a stock ot
gro<'('rlt'8 to be seized as the prorerty of
Mrs. Hruhner, and the goods were subsequently sold by the otttcer. and the l>roceeds,
after deducting costs, werP aJ>plled to the
dl8cbarge of Boekbotr's debt.
The plaintiff In the present suit claims that
the stock of good~ Ro levied on and 110ld helonged to him, and he asked a judgment
against the defPndant for damages for the
unlawfnl con,·erslon of bis property. The
defendant, In his answer, denied that the
plalntlfl' was the owner of the i:oods, and
be aven-ed that the plalntllf clahnt>d to be
the own<'r of the property through a fraudulcnt purchase from Caroline Gruhuer. The
defendant attacked this sale, and alleged Its
Invalidity as to him, for two reasons: First.
'rhe 1>retPnded purchase was fraudulent ln
tact, and was contrived to defraud the cred!tors of llrs. Grubner. Second. The sale
was Inoperative and void as to the defendant, for the reaRon that there was no such
('hange of posseeslon as would satisfy the
Interpretation placed by the supreme court
on the ftrst clause of BE"Ctlon 2;j():i, RPv. St.
1879. That portion ot the statute referred
to reads as follows: "Every sale made by
a vendor of goods and chattels In his 1>0sfleRSlon or under bis control, unless the same
be accompanied by delivery lo a reasonable
tlm<'. regard being had to the situation of
the 1n·oP<'rtY, and be followed by an actual
and f'ontlnuP<l change of the possession of
the things sold, shall be held to be fraudulent and yold, as against the creditors of
the vendor," etc. The case was submitted
to a jury, and the plalntltr obtained a verdl<'t for ftve hundred dollars, and the court
Pntl•rt>d judgment accordingly. The suit
was originally against the defendant and
the Haase Fish Company, but, at the con<·luslon of the testimony, the plalntUr dismissed as to the fish company. The detendant In due time moved the court to
graot him a new trial, and, bis motion havIng been O'\'Prrnled, he has prosecuted this
appeal.
The defendant nssignR numerous errors,
and he 1>resents many ar1rnments why the
judgment ought to be re'\'Prsed. He complains chiefly of the action of the court In
refusing to take tbe <'ase from the jury. He
326

also complains of the instructions, and the
admission and rejection of evidence.
The case bas been here before. Leeser v.
Boekbolr, 33 Mo. App. 228. When tbe case
was before this court on the former appeal.
the plalnttlr had obtained a joint judgment
against the defendant and the Haase Flab
C'ompany as joint trespassers. The dlsmlssal of the case as to the fish company ellmlnatcs trom the case all questions as to the
I fact of a joint trespass, and the joint llabUl1 ty of the original defendants therefor.
On
1
the former appeal the defendant urged, as
be does now, that the court ought to have
declared as a matter of law that the sale
ot the goods by Caroline Gruhner to the
plaintiff was Invalid tor the reason that the
evidence did not show such a change of possesalon as the Jaw contemplated and required. The opinion of the court on the former
hearing <'Ontalns a full recital of all subetantlal facts, showing the extent to which this
poSResl'llon was open, notorious, and nnequivO<'aL This obviates the necessity of a restatement of the evidence by us, as our examlnatlon of the present record leads us to
the conclusion that on the last trial the evl<lence bearing on this Issue was not substantlally dUferent from that contained In the
former record. '£here were some addltlonal facts shown on the last trial by both parties, which had a tendency to strengthen
their respective theories, bot this addltlonal
evidence was merely cumulative, and la not
of such a character as to authorize us to
hold that there has been a material change
lo the evidence. However, we are justified
lo saying that the plaintiff's evldcn<>e on
the last trial was as satisfactory as that
passed on by this court on the former hearIng.
On the former hearing Judge Thompson
disposed of the objection now urged by the
defendant as follows: "We have already recited the substantial facts showing the extPnt to which the change of possession was
open, notorious, and unequivocal, within the
I meaning of the statute. Certainly, several
acts of possession were done by the plalntur
of an unequivocal character. He took poesesalon by his own agent, who bad not prevlously been ln the employ of his vendor.
He also began the purchase of goods ln bis
own name, having the goods billed to him,
and hanging the bllls on a hook openly In
the store, and also Informed them that be
had succeeded to the business. The fact
that he did not do the other thin~ which
he might have done,-cbange the sign, the
name on the wagons. and the revenue 11censes, and the other clreumstances ot an
equivocal character, already detalled,-were
matters tor the consideration of the jury.
but were not of such a character that we
can separate them from the things which
were done, tending to a11prlse the communl·
ty of the change of possession, which the
statute requlr<'s." From this lt appears that

I
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this court expressly held that the plaintiff’s

evidence, bearing upon the circumstances at-

tending the purchase, and the subsequent

acts of‘ the parties looking to u change of

possession, were suﬂicient to carry the case

to the jury, and it must now be held that

the conclusion, arrived at by them, must be

the law in this case. What was there de-

cided is not now open for discussion, and

must be held to be res adjudicata. This

question involved the only substantial de-

fense made by the defendant, and, unless

the court has committed error in the in-

structions, or has admitted or rejected evi-

dence which was prejudicial to the defend-

ant‘s case, the judgment will have to be af-

firmed.

On the trial the plaintiff asked, and the

court gave, the following instructions, to
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wit:

“.\'un1ber 1. The court instructs the jury

that in this state a debtor, even though in-

solvent, has the right to prefer one creditor

over another; and if the jury believe, from

the evidence, that the sole purpose of plant-

tiif in making the purchase in question was

to secure payment or satisfaction of a debt,

then due him from Caroline Gruhner, then

the transaction is not aifected by the fact

that said Caroline Gruhner may have also

been indebted to other creditors, or that the

necessary effect of such purchase and sale

may have been to hinder or delay such other

creditors, provided the property so transfer-

red and delivered to plaintiff, upon a fair val-

uation thereof at the time of the delivery,

did not exceed the debt actually owing from

.\Irs. Gruhner to him at said time.

“l\'uu1ber 2. The court further instructs

you that if you ﬁnd the facts called for by

the preceding instruction, and also believe,

from the evidence, that within a reasonable

time after the execution of the bill of sale

read in evidence, regard being had to the

situation of the property therein conveyed,

the plaintiff took actual, exclusive, open, no-

torious, and unequivocal possession of said

property, and as called for in the instruc-

tion given for defendant, and thereafter con-

tinued ln such possession to the date of the

levy in question, and if you further ﬁnd,

from the evidence, that the defendant Bock-

hoﬂ' caused said property to be taken, or aid-

ed and abetted in the taking thereof, and to

bring about the loss thereof to plaintiff, then

your verdict should be for the plaintiﬂf.”

The court, on its own motion, gave the fol-

lowing instruction, to wit:

“The court instructs the jury that, if you

believe and ﬁnd from the evidence that the

sale from Caroline Gruhner to the plaintiff

was not accompanied by delivery, and fol-

lowed by a change of possession within a

reasonable time, as stated and called for by

the other instructions of the court. then said

sale is void as against the defendant Bock-

hoff, even though you may ﬁnd from the evi-

dence that afterwards, and before the levy,

this court expressly held that the plalnwr's
evidence, bearing upon the circumstances atten~ the purchase, and the subsequent
acts of the parties look.lng to a change of
possession, were sumclent to carry the case
to the jury, and lt must now be held that
the conclusion, arrived at by them, must be
the law ln this case. What was there decided ls not now open for discussion, and
must be held to be res adJudlcata. This
question involved the only substantial defense made by the defendant, and, unleBB
the court has committed error ln the instructions, or has admitted or rejected evidence which was pn>Judlclal to the defendant•s <'&se, the judgment will have to be affirmed.
On the trial the plaintiff asked, and the
court gave, the following lnstructlons, to
wit:
"Xumber 1. The court instructs the jury
that in this state a debtor, even though insolvent, has the right to prefer one creditor
over another; and it the jury believe, from
the evidence, that the sole purpose of plamwr in making the purchase in question was
to secure payment or satisfaction of a debt,
then due him from Caroline Gruhner, then
the transactl<>n is not affected by the fact
that said Caroline Gruhner may have also
been indebted to other creditors, or that the
necessary effect of such purchase and sale
may have been to hinder or delay such other
creditors, provided the property so transferred and dellvered to plaintiff, upon a fair valuation thereof at tbe time of the delivery,
did not exceed the debt actually owing froin
llrs. Gruhner to him at said time.
"Number 2. The coort further Instructs
you that it you tlnd the facts called tor by
the preceding instruction, and also believe,
from the evidence, that within a reasonable
time after the execution of the blll of sale
read in evidence, regard being had to the
situation of the property therein conveyed,
the plaintiff took actual, exclusive, open, notorious, and unequivocal possession of said
property, and as called for in the lnstn1ctlon given for defendant, and thereafter eontlnued in such posaesslon to the date of the
le>y In question, and if you further find,
from the evidence, that the defendant Boekhotr caused said property to be taken, or aided and abetted In the taking thereof, and to
bring about the loss thereof t<> plaintiff, then
;your verdict should be for the plaintiff."
The court, on Its own motion, gave the following Instruction, to wit:
"The court instructs the jury that, lt you
believe and tlnd from the evidence that the
Bille from Caroline Gruhner to the plaintur
was not accompanied by delivery, and followed by a change of possession within a
reasonable tlm<', as stnted and called for by
the other instructions of the court, then said
sale ls void as against the defendant Boekhotr, even though you may find from the evl·
dence that afterwards, and before the lev;y,
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such change of possession was made. And
it you find and believe from the evidence

that such dellvery and change of possession
was not made within a reasonable tlme after
said sale, as called tor In the other Instructions of the court, you should find tor tbe
defendant:•
The defendant asked the court to instruct
as foll<>ws:
"~umber L Unless the jury are satisfied
from the evidence that Charles Leeser lu1.1t
actual possesalon of the goods in question;
that the change In possession was visibl.-,
continuous, and exclusive as against Carollne, such change of poSBesslon as to Indicate
to the public (purchasers) at large that Caroline Gruhner no l<>nger had poSBesslon of or
control over said goods, then said sale was
fraudulent and void as against creditors,
even though the jury belleve from the evidence the sale from Caroltne Gruhner to
Charles J..eeser was made In good faith lind
tor a valuable consideration."
This instruction the court gave after strlklllg out the word ''public" and inserting
"purchasers."
·
"Number 2. The court instructs the jury
that, to render the Bale valld, it was necessary that it should be accompanied by dellveey withln a reasonable time., regard being
had to the situation of the propert;y, and to
be followed by an <>Pen, notorloUB, visiblr.,
and unequivocal change of possession, such
as to indicate to persons visiting su.ch store,
at sight, that the ownership had changed.
And If the jury find that such dellYl"l"Y and
change was n<>t made, they mUBt find a verdict for the defendant, notwithstanding they
may believe and find from the evidence that
the sale was bona fide."
Thl8 Instruction the court gave, after striking out the wordR "at Right," and also striking all the se<'ond pa.1·t and inserting In lleu
thereof the following:
"And lf the · jury find from the evidence
that such delivery and change of possession
was not made within a reasonable time after the sale by Caroline Gruhner to the plalntllT, regard being had to the situation and
character of the property, and not the mere
eonvenlence ot the purchaser, then yoo muat
find a verdict fo1· the defendant, e\·en thougl'l
you may al..llo beHeve and find from the evidence that the sale was made In good faith."
The defendant also asked the court to instruct the jury that unless the sale was ac·
companied by delivery, and followed by a
change of possession on or before the day
after the sale, then it was not done within a
reasonable time; which instruction the court
refused to give.
We can see no substantial objection to the
instructions. Every phase of the case was
presented to the jury In a way that was
quite favorable to the defendant, and the Instructions are in harmony with the ndJudtcatlons In this state. The defendant"s instructions, as asked, were calculated to mis327
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lead the jury, and the court was justiﬁed in

refusing them.

The defendant asserts, as a matter of law,

that a failure by a purchaser to take posses-

sion of property purchased within twenty-

four hours will vitiate the sale, and that the

trial court erred in refusing to so instruct

the jury. The statute requires the posses-

sion to follow the purchase within a reason-

able time. It is generally for the jury to de

termine what time would or would not be

reasonable. It is impossible to formulate a

detinite rule on the subject. The question

in each case must be determined by the cir-

cumstances attending the sale, and the char-

acter and situation of the property.

The defendant also assigns for error the

refusal of the court to discharge the jury

when notiﬁed of improper conduct on the
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part of one of the jurors. Whether this ac-

tion of the court was prejudicial to the de-

fendant or not, we cannot stop to inquire.

for the reason that the record fails to show

that the defendant excepted to the action of

the court. Under well-established rules of

appellate practice, we are prohibited from

passing on the question.

The court permitted a witness, who had

examined the account between the plaintiff

and Mrs. Gruhner, to state the balance due

the plaintiff. The defendant objected to this

evidence for the reason that the books were

not produced. It appeared that the otficer

levying _the attachment in the suit of the

defendant against Mrs. Gruhner had seized

the book and carried them away. It has

been held that a witness who has inspected

the accounts between parties may be per-

mitted to testify as to a general balance, but

will not be allowed to give evidence of the

particular contents of the books. 1 Greenl.

Ev. (14th Ed.) 5 93. But, aside from this,

the defendant was not prejudiced by this

evidence, for the reason that the plaintiif

and Mrs. Gruhner both testiﬂed to the

amount of the indebtedness. and there was

no countervailing evidence tending to prove

that .\lrs. Gruhner was not indebted to the

plaintiff in the amount claimed. We do not

gather from the record that this fact was

seriously controverted by the defendant on

the trial of the case.

The next assignment of error relates to a

claim of exemption made by Hrs. Gruhner

in the attachment suit. It appears from the

defendant's otfer of proof that some time

after the goods had been seized under the at-

tachment Mrs. Gruhner ﬁled a claim of ex-

emption with the sheriff, in which she de-

manded a return of the property to her. The

defendant offered this paper in evidence, and,

on the plalntitfs objection, it was excluded.
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The authorities cited by the defendant in

support of this assignment are to the effect

that admissions and declarations of parties,

while in possession of property, are to be

regarded as verbal acts, and are received as
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lead the jury, and the court was justified in The authorltle& cited by the defendant In
retuetng them.
su1>port of this assignment are to the eftect
The defendant asserts, as a matter of law, that admissions and de<>laratlons of parties,
that a failure by a purchaser to take po884!8- while lo possession of property, are to be
sloo of property purC'hased within twenty- regarded as verbal actB, and are received as
four hours will vitiate the sale, and that tha explanatory of the nature of their possestrial court erred in fefuslng to so Instruct sion. This rule cannot be applied to the
the jury. The statute requires the poi,;ses- act of Yrs. Gruhner In clalmln' a right of
slon to follow the purchase within a reason- exemption ln the property held under the
able time. It ls generally for the Jury to de
attachment, for the simple reason that she
termlne what time would or would uot be was not nt the time In possession of the
reasonable. It ls imposslble to formulate a pro1K'rty. '!'his asidgnment will have to be
detlolte rule on the subject. The question ruled llkewl1!1e' against tile defendant.
in each e&St' must be determined by the cirAnd, lastly, thl! defendant complulns of
cumstances attending the sale, and the char- the act:lon of the rourt In excluding the tesacter and situation of the property.
timony •lt the plnlntiff and lire. Gruhne1· nt
The defendant also assigns for error the the form<>r trial, which had been preserved
refusal of the court to discharge the jury lu a bill of excl!ptlons. We do not underwhen notified of Improper conduct on the stand upon what prln<'lple tWs evidence
part of one of the jurors. Whether this ac- <~mid be held admlsslbll'. Such evidence
tion of the court was prejudicial to the de- must be placed ln the <:11tegory of heareay
fendant or not, we cannot stop to inquire, 1 t•~1:1tlmony. If the testimony of a deceased
for the reason that the record falls to show witness 111 thus preserved, It may be read In
that the defendant excepted to the action of el"ldence. ·.rhls forms the exception to the
the court. Under well-established rules of general rule. Coughlin v. Haet1Psler, 50 llo.
appellate practice, we are prohibited from 126. All tbe 'Nltne!lt'es In thb1 case were
passlng on the question.
alive and present In coun. In the case or
The court permitted a witness, who had Bogle v. Xolan, 96 Mo. 85, 9 S. W. 14, the
examined the account between the plalntltr deposition or one of the parties was read
and Mrs. Gruhner. to state the balan<'e due In evidence, although the parties were presthe plalntltr. The def~ndant objected to this I ent lo court. The trial court permitted It
evidence for the reason that the books were to be read as an admission of the party,
not produced. It appeared that the offtcer and tile supreme court sustained the ruling,
levying the attachment In the suit of the and ln doing so expressly overrull'd the case
defendant against Mrs. Gruhner bad seized of Priest v. Way, 87 Yo. 16. There ls quite
the books and carried them away. It has a difference between the evidence of a party
been held that a witness who has Inspected as preserved In a deposition and that conthe accounts between parties may be per- tained ln a bill of exceptions. The deposimitted to testify as to a general balance, but tion ls signed by the party, and duly auwtll not be allowed to give evidence ot the thenticated by an offtcer, and from It can be
particular contents of the books. 1 Greenl. as(-ertalued with certainty the extent and
Ev. (14th Ed.) § 93. But, aside from tWs, character or any declaration or admission;
the defendant was not prejudiced by this but this cannot be said of a bill of excepevidence, for the reason that the plaintiff tions. We know of no rule of law which
and ~Ire. Gruhner both testified to the would authorize the testimony of a party or
amount of the indebtedness. and there was witness contalned In a bill of exceptions to
no countervailing evidence tending to prove be received as Independent. evidence, except
that ~lrs. Gruhner was not Indebted to the in cases coming within the exception stated.
plaiutlfl In the amount claimed. We do not It has been held that an abandonl'd pleading,
gather from the record that this fact was signed by an attorney professing to represeriously controverted by the defendant on sent the party, may be read In evidence as
an admission or declaration or the client.
the trial of the case.
The next assignment of error relates to a Dowsl'lot v. Rawlings, 58 Mo. 7o. But It ls
claim of exemption made by Mrs. Grubner only prima fa<'le admissible. The evidence
ln the attachment suit. It appears from the of the attorney that the party did not emdefendant's offer of proof that some time ploy him In the c·ase renders the pleadlnit
after the goods had been seized under the at- ineompet-"nt evidence. Audenmn v. ll<'Pike.
tuchment Mrs. Gruhner tiled a claim of ex- SG Mo. :.'ll:l. We wlll have to rule thl11 asemption with the sherllf, In which she de- signment •tgalnst the defendant.
manded a return of the property to her. The
'l'he judgment of the trlul court will be
dl'femlant offered this paper in evidence, and, nftlrme<l.
on the plaintiff's objection, It was excluded.
All tile Judges concur.
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BARNES et nl. v. PA(,‘K\V(,)OD et al.

(38 Pac. 857, 10 \\'ash. 50.)

(:J8 Poe. 8.')7, 10 Wash. 50.)

Supreme Court of Washington.

Nov. 10, 1894.

Nov. 10, 1894.

Appeal from superior court, Kittitas coun-

ty; Carroll B. Graves, Judge.

Action by S. W. Barnes and another. par-

ties doing business as Barnes & 1\icCandless,

against S. T. Packwood and others. There

was a judgment for defendants, and plain-

tiffs appeal. Reversed.

Ralph Kauffman, for appellants. Pruyn &

A1>peal from superior court, Kittitas couney; Ca!-'?oll B. Graves, Judge.
Action by S. W. Barnes and another, parties doing business as Barnes & McCandless,
against S. T. Packwood and others. There
was a judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal. Reversed.
Ralph Kauffman, for appellants. Pruyn &
Ready, for respondents.

Ready, for respondents.

Supreme Court of Washington.

DUNBAR, O. J. This is an action on a

promissory note. The note sued upon is as

follows: ".$i,50J.00. Ellensburgh, Wash.,

Qct. 8, 188%. One year after date, without

grace, at 12 o’cl0ck m., we, or either of us,

promise to pay to the order of Barnes & Mc-
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Candless, for the use of the Agricultural

Fair Association, ﬁfteen hundred dollars, U.

S. gold coin, value received, with interest

from date at the rate of one per ccnt. per

month, interest payable when due, and, if

not so paid, to become a part of the princi-

pal. and to bear like interest until paid.

And further agreeing that if the same be not

paid when due, and suit be brought to col-

lect the same, or any portion thereof, to pay

ten per cent. on the amount due as attor-

ney's fee for collection. S. T. Packwood.

Walter A. Bull. J. M. Shelton. A. B. Whit-

son. Thomas Haley. S. R. Geddis.”

The defendants, answering the complaint,

alleged that the note was signed in its pres-

ent form through mistake; that the agree-

ment and intention was that the note should

be signed by the signers thereof as trustees

of an association known as the “Agricultural

i~‘air Association"; that they were not to be

held individually responsible; that it was

with this understanding that they signed it,

and that it was the understanding of Barnes

& McCandless, the plaintiffs, that it was so

signed; that on the day the promissory note

-set out in the complaint was executed there

was a meeting of the board of trustees of

said corporation, at which meeting the de-

fendants were present, and at said meeting

41 resolution was passed to borrow from said

Barnes 8: Mcflandless, for and on behalf of

said corporation, the said sum of $1,500, and

that the money was borrowed and the con-

tract entered into in accordance with said

-agreement and resolution; alleging that the

-defendants received no beneiit from said

money; that it was turned over to the associ-

ation, and that no consideration passed be-

tween the defendants and said Barnes &

McCandless for said note. The plaintiffs ob-

iected to any testimony being heard under

this answer, for the reason that it did not

state facts slliﬁeient to constitute a defense

to the complaint. The court, however, over-

ruled the objection, and the case went to

trial. Plaintiffs oifered the note in evidence,

proved its execution, and rested their case.

The defendants’ testimony was in accord-

DU:SBAR, C. J. This Is an action on a
ttromlssory nob•. The note sued upon fa as
follows: ..$1,r.14.>.>.00. Ellensburgh, Wash.,
pct. 8, 188~. One year after date, without
~. at 12 o'clock m., we, or either of us,
promise to pay to the order of Barnes & McCandl~. for the use of tht> Agricultural
Fair Association, fttteen hundred dollars, U.
.S. gold coin, value received, with Interest
Crom date at the rate of one per cent. per
month, Interest payable when due, and, If
not so paid, to become a part of the prtnclval. and to bear like Interest until paid.
And further agreeing that It the s1ime be not
paid when due, and suit be brought to collect the same, or any portion thereof, to pay
ten per cent. on the amount due as attorney's fee for collection. S. T • .Packwood.
Walter A. Bull. J. M. Shelton. A. B. Whlt90n. Thomas Haley. S. R. Geddl~."
The defendants, answering the complaint,
allt>ged that the note was slgnPd In Its Preti·
~nt form through mistake; that the agreement and Intention was that the note should
be signed by the signers thereof as truste!'R
of an association known as the "Agricultural
Jt'alr Association"; that they were not to be
held Individually respon1dble; that It was
with this understanding that they signed It,
.and that It wes the understanding of Barnc>s
.& McCandless, the plaintiffs, that It was so
'lllgncd; that on the day the promissory note
11et out In the complaint was executed there
was a meeting of the board of trustees or
1lald corporation, at which meeting the defendants were present, and at said meeting
.a resolution was passed to borrow from said
Bamea & McCandless, for and on behalf of
:said corporation, the said sum of $1,r>OO, and
that the money was borrowed and the contract entered Into In accordance with said
·agreement and resolution; allPglng that the
-defendants received no benPfit from said
money; that It was turned over to the assocl:atlon, and that no consideration passed between the defendants and Mid Barnes &
McCandless for said note. The plaintiffs objected to any testimony being hE>nrd under
this answer, for the reason that It dl<1 not
state facts sufficient to constitute a dt>fense
to the complalnt. The court, however, overruled the objection, and the case went to
trla1. PlalntUra offered the note In evidence,

proved Its execution, and rested their case.
The defE>ndants' testimony was In accord·
ance with the all<>irattons of the answer, so
that the question arises ht>re, was the testimony for the defense sufftrlt>nt to overcome
the presumption arising from the execution
of the note, the execution of which was admlttt>d? The case was tried by the court,
and a judgment rendered tor costs for the
defendants. It was contended by the appellants that the court erred In allowlng tlle defendants to amend their answer at the trial,
and In not giving judgment for the plalntltrs
on the pleadings, Inasmuch as three answers
had already bet>n tlled In the cause, and that
It wes a clear abuse of the court's discretion
to permit the filing of the fourth; that even
that was lnsuftlclent. as ft <'ontalns no allt>gatlon of a mutual mistake and such an allegation ls necessary.
We think the answer substantially contains
the allegatlon of mutual mistake, although
not In so many words; and, the court having such a large discretion under our law and
practice In matters of amendments, we do
not think we would be justified In reversing
the case for this reason. There Is no allegation of fraud In the answer. The general
rule laid down by the text writers ls that
parol evidence ls not admissible to contradict, quallty, extend, or vary wrlttPn Instruments, but that their interpretation must
depend upon their own terms. But, to relieve parties from the distress of accident or
mistake or fraud, courts of equity wlll admit parol e11ldent-e to qualify and correct,
and, necessarily, sometimes, to even defeat.
the terms of written Instruments. "One of
thP most common classes of cases," says Mr.
Story In bis Equity Jurisprudence (volume 1.
I 152), "In wblch relief ls sought In equity
on account of a mistake of facts Is that of
written agreements, either executory or ex·
ecuted. Sometimes by mistake the written
agreement contains less than the parties In·
tended, sometimes ft contains more, and some·
times ft simply varies from their Intent by
expressing something different In substance
from the truth of that Intent. In all such
cases, ft the mistake ls clearly made out by
proofs entirely satisfactory, equity will reform the contract so as to mnke It conforma·
ble to the precise intent of the parties. But
If the proors are doubtful and unsatisfactory,
and the mistake Is not made entirely plain,
equity wlll withhold rellef, upon the ground
that the written paper ought to be trented as
a full and correct expression of the Intent
until the contral'y Is established bt>yond reasonable controver11y." It would certnlnly be
a dangerous doetrlne to announce that the
terms of n written Instrument should be
varied, and Its elft>ct changed or destroyed,
by any slight tei<tlmony, or mere prE>ponder·
nnce of testimony. The vPry object of reducing nJ:l'<>emcnts to writing ls to prevl'nt
trouble arising from the defects of memory.
All the agreements which have been talked
329
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about by the parties leading up to the ﬁnal

agreement are presumed to be merged in the

writing; and the object of this precaution

would be destroyed, and it would have a

tendency to encourage perjury, if upon slight

testimony the sacredness of the written in-

strument could be destroyed. And such is al-'

most the uniform holding of the courts. In

Townsend v. Stangroom, 6 Ves. 339, Lord

Eldon says that those producing evidence of

a mistake undertake a case of great dith-

culty, and that the evidence must be irre-

fragable. In Sable v. Maloney, -18 Wis. 331.

4 N. W. 479, the court held that a written in-

strument would not be reformed on the

ground of alleged mistake unless the party

complaining move promptly after discovery

of the mistake. and not then without clear

proof. Said the court: “If the proofs are
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doubtful and unsatisfactory, and the mistake

is not made entirely plain, equity will with-

hold relief upon the ground that the written

paper ought to be treated as the full and cor-

rect expression of the intent, unless the con-

trary ls established beyond reasonable con-

troversy. The parties to the deed, who ap-

pear to be equally credible, are in direct con-

ﬂict, and there was no other direct evidence

nor any surrounding circumstances in cor-

roboration of the testimony of the grantor of

the deed.” So in the case at bar. The tes-

timony of the defendants and the plaintiffs .

is in direct conﬂict. It matters not that there

are four defendants and two plaintiffs. Even

the burden of proof does not depend upon the

number of witnesses who testify on the re-

spective sides of the case. It was held in

Mead v. Insurance Co., 64 N. Y. 453, that, to

justify the court in changing language of the

written instrument souglit to be reformed

(except in case of fraud). it must be establish-

ed that both parties agreed to something dif-

ferent from what is expressed in the writ-

ing, and the proof upon this point should be

so clear and convincing as to leave no room

for doubt. In Stiles v. Willis, 66 Md. 552, 8

Atl. 353, it was held that where application

is made to a court of equity to have a mort-

gage deed reformed, by having a personal

covenant inserted therein, as to one of the

parties, alleged to have been omitted by mis-

take of the draughtsman. the proof must be

of such a character as to leave no doubt what-

ever in the mind of the court that mistake

has intervened, and that the instrument is

variant from the actual contract of the par-

ties; that it is not enough to show the inten-

tion of one of the parties to the instrument

only, but the proof must establish incontro-

vertibly that the error in the instrument al-

leged was common to both parties. In other

words, it must be conclusively established

that both parties understood the contract as

it is alleged it ought to have been expressed,

and as in fact it was, but for the mistake

alleged in reducing it to writing. This case

is on a dead levcl with the case at bar, and,

with the other cases above quoted, seems to

PROOF.

about by the parties leadtug up to the tlnal us to go to the extent of holding that the
agreement are presumed to be merged In thl• mistake must be established beyond a reawrlttug; and the object o~ this precaution sonable doubt In StOl'kbrldge lron Co. v.
Hudson Iron Co., 102 Mass. 45, the court said:
would be destroyed. and It would have a
tendency to encourage perjury, It upon slight "By the common law, parties who execute
testimony the sacredness ot the written ln- written lnstrumt>nts are bound by them, and
strun1ent could be destroyed. And such ls al-"' parol evidence Is not admissible to add to
most the uniform holding of the courts. In or diminish or vary their terms. The rule ls
Townsend v. Stangroom, 6 Ves. 339, Lord of great practical Importance for the protecEldon says that thoee producing evidence ot tion of the Interests ot the citizen, and It
a mistake undertake a case of great dlftl- ls the more so since parties and interested
culty, and that the evidence must be lrre- witnesses are permitted to testify. The writfragable. In Sable v. Maloney, 48 Wis. 331. ing must be regarded, prlma facle, as a
4 N. W. 479, the court held that a written tu- solemn and deliberate admission of both parstrument would not be reformed on thl' ties as to what the terms of the contract acground of alleged mistake unless the party tually were·•; citing Babcock v. Smith, 2Z
complaining move promptly after dlS<.'OVery Pick. 61, where the court held that "the powof the mistake, and not then without clear er of rectifying and reforming solemn writproof. Said the court: "It the proofs are ten contracts ls one which by courts of gendoubtful and unsatisfactory, and the mistake eral chancery jurisdiction ls exercised very
sparingly, and only upon the l'leare11t and
Is not made entirely platu, equity wW withhold relief upon the ground that the written most B:ltlsfactory proof of the Intention df
paper ought to be treated as the full and cor- the parties." And It ls also asserted tu Stockrect expression of the intent, unless the con- bridge Iron Co. v. Hud11<>n Iron Co., supra.
trary ls established beyond reasonable con- that "the ordinary rule of evidence tn civil
troversy. The parties to the deed, who ap- actions, that a fact must be proved by a prepear to be equally credible, are In direct con- ponderance of e'\"ldence, does not a11ply te>
1llct, and there was no other direct evidence such a case as this. The proof tll:1t both
nor any surrounding circumstances In cor- parties Intended to have the predst• agreeroboration of the testimony of the grantor of ment set forth Inserted tu the dePd. nm! omitthe deed." So In the case at bar. The tes- ted to do so by mistake, must be mnde betimony of the defendants and the plalnturs yond a reasonable doubt."
The logic of thl' eases cited. eYen wht•re It
ls In direct conflict. It matters not that there
are tour defendants and two plaintiffs. 1'~ven ls not so spel'lftcally expressed. Is that tht>
the burden of proof does not depend upon the proof of a mistake must be bt>yond a ren1mnnumber of witnesses who testUy on the re- able doubt. But we might still go beyond
spective sides of the case. It was held In the question of mere preponderance, and yet
Mead v. Insurance Co., 64 N. Y. 453, that, to not go to the extent of requiring the proof
Justify the court tn changing language of the beyond a reasonable doubt. That a mt>rl'
written Instrument sought to be reformed prP1mnderance of the testimony will not be
(except tu case of fraud), It must be establish- sulfil'lent to overcome tile presumption that
ed that both parties agreed to something dif- the partlt>s have expreAAt'll their agreement
ferent from what is expressed in the writ- in the contract has been decided by this
tug, and the proof upon this point should be com1: tu Voorhlt>S v. Hennessy, 7 Wash. :!4'J.
so clear and convtuclng as to leave no room 34 Pac. 931. In that case there was an
for doubt In Stiles v. Wlllls, 66 Md. 552, 8 attempt to prove by parol evidence that an
Atl 3:i3, It was held that where application absolute bill of sale was given as a chattel
Is made to a court of equity to have a mort- mortgage; and the court, In speaking of th~
gage deed reformed, by having a personal testimony In that <'IHI!'. says: "In such cases
covenant Inserted therein, as to one of the the solt>mnlty of the writing ls not to be
parties, alleged to have been omitted by mis- overcome by a met'l' 1m~ponderance of evitake of the draughtsman, the proof must be dence. The writing lt:;t>lf stands as the clearof such a character as to leave no doubt what- ly-stated and dellberntt'IY ascertained Intenever In the mind of the court that mistake tion ot the parties, which must be enforced
has tutervened, and that the Instrument ls unless It Is shown by clear, positive, and
variant from the actual contract of the par- <'om·lnclng evidence that the mutual tutenties; that It Is not enough to show the Inten- tlon was something else, and that It was
tion of one of the parties to the Instrument with such different intention understood by
only, but the proof must establish tucontro- both parties that the Instrument was delivvertibly that the error In the Instrument al- ered and accepted. This ls the rule In eqleged was common to both parties. In other uity, where <"ases of this kind are most frewords, it must be conclusively established quently heard; and when submitted to a
that both parties understood the contract as jury the same rule applies."' The role Is
lt ls alleged It ought to have been expressed, laid down In Jone,; on Mortgages (~ctlon
and as In fact It was, but for the mistake 3:lu) thut one who allc>~t'S that his deed lo
alleged in rc>duclng It to writing. This case absolute form was tutcuded as a mortgagP
is on a dead level with the case at bar, and, only ls required to make strict proof of tht.>
with the otl.lcr cases above quoted, seems to fact; that the proof must be clear, unequl.v·
330

ORAL EVIDENCE TO VARY OR EXPLAIN DOCUMENTS.

(Case No. 114

ORAL EVIDENCE TO VARY OR. EXPLAIN DOCUMENTS.

ocal, and convincing; that the fact

[Case No. 114

ocal, and convincing; that the fact that

the grantor understood the transaction to

be a mortgage is not alone suﬁicient to prove

it to be so. but if the evidence is doubtful

and unsatisfactory—if it fails to overcome

the strong presumption arising from the

terms of the absolute deed by testimony en-

tirely clear and‘ convincing beyond reason-

able controversy—the deed must have effect

in accordance with its terms; that the un-

supported testimony of the plaintiff. contra-

dicted by the defendant, is insufficient to

convert an absolute deed into a mortgage.

Here it will be observed that it is the un-

supported testimony ot the defendants. con-

tradicting that of the plaintitfs, which is

relied upon to relieve the defendants from

the obligation imposed by the written in-

strument. In Purington v. Akhurst, 74 Ill.
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490, it was decided that where a bill of sale

is made of vessels for one-halt interest there-

in it will require evidence of the clearest

character to show that it was intended only

as a mortgage to secure a loan or advances.

To the same effect is Sewell v. Price's

Adm‘r, 32 Ala. 97. “To show by parol that

a deed absolute in form is a mortgage. the

evidence must be clear and convincing.“

Mt-Cormick v. Herndon, 67 Wis. 6-18, 31 N.

W’. 303. “The rulc in cases of this kind,”

said the court in Cadman v. Peter, 118 U. S.

73, 6 Sup. Gt. 957, “is well settled. It the

conveyance was in fee. under covenant of

warranty, and there is no dcfcasance, ei-

ther in the conveyance or collateral paper,

parol evidence to show that it was intended

to secure a debt, and to operate ‘only as a

mortgage, must be clear, unequivocal, and

convincing, or the presumption that the in-

strument is what it purports to be must pre-

vail." See, also, Howiand v. Blake, 97 U.

S. 624; Coyle v. Davis, 116 U. S. 108. 6 Sup.

Gt. 314; Tilden v. Streeter, 45 Mich. 533,

8 N. W. 502. It a mere preponderance of

the testimony were all that was required to

destroy the force of a written instrument,

there would be very little use in reducing

an agreement to writing; for the preponder-

ance of testimony is required in any case

to establish tho affirmative propositions as-

serted. So that it must be seen that it any

effect at all is given to a written instrument

the rule of me1'e preponderance cannot at-

tach.

In this case it had been several years from

the time the note was given until the action

was tried, and the testimony of the defend-

ants satisﬁes us that their recollection of

events which transpired at the meeting tes-

tiﬁed of could not be very deﬁnite or certain.

Neither is the testimony of the defendants

entirely harmonious. It is testified by the

defendants that a resolution was passed by

the board of trustees authorizing the borrow-

ing of the money in question from Barnes &

.\i<-(Iandless; that the trustees were called to-

gcther for that purpose, and at the instance

of Barnes, who was present when the reso-

that
the grantor understood the transaction to
be a mortgage Is not alone sufiiclent to prove
It to be so, bnt If the evidence ls douhtfuJ
and unsatisfactory-If It falls to overcome
the strong presumption arising from the
terms of the absolute deed by testimony entirely clear and convincing beyond reaaronable controversy-the deed must have etrect
In accordance with Its terms; that the unsupported testimony of the plalntltr, contradicted by the defendant, Is lnsutftclent to
convert an absolute deed Jnto a mort:;ai:c.
Here It wfll be obserred that It Is the unsupported testimony of the defendants, contradicting that or the plnlntllrs, which Is
relied upon to relieve the detendant1;1 trow
the obllgatlon Imposed by the written Instrument. In Purington v. Akhurst, 74 Ill.
400, It was decided thnt where a bfll ot sale
ls made ot vessels for one-halt Interest therein It will require evidence of the clearest
character to show that It was Intended only
as a mortgage to secure a loan or advances.
To the same effect 1.8 Sewell v. Price's
Adm'r, 32 Ala. 97. ''To show by parol thn.t
a deed absolute In form Is a mortgage. th<>
evidence must be clear and convlnl'lng."
McCormick v. Herndon, 67 Wis. 6-18, 31 N.
W. 303. "The rule In cases of this kind,"
said the court In Cadman v. Peter, 118 U. S.
73, 6 Sup. Ct. 957, "ts well settled. If the
conveyance was In fee, under covenant ot
warranty, and there ls no deten11ance, either In the conveyance or collateral pa}l<'r,
parol evidence to show that It was Intended
to secure a debt, and to operate "only as n
mortgage, must be clear, unt>qulvocnl, and
convincing, or the presumi;>tlon that the lntstrument la what It purports to be must prevail." See, also, Howland v. Blake, 97 U.
8. 624; Coyle v. Davia, 116 U. 8. 108. 6 Sup.
Ct. 314; Tilden v. Streeter, 45 Mich. 533,
8 N. W. 002. If a mere preponderance ot
the testimony were all that was required to
destroy the force of a written lnstrnment,
there would be very little use In reducing
an agreement to writing; for the pre11omlerance of testimony Is required IB any case
t.o establish the afilrmatlve propositions asaerted. So that It muat be seen that it any
eifect at all Is given to a written Instrument
the rule of mere preponderance cannot attach.

In this case It had been several years from
the tiwe the note was given until the action
was tried, and the testimony of the defendants satisfies us that their recollection ot
events which transpired at the meeting tes·
tlfled of could not be very deOnlte or certain.
Neither la the testimony ot the defendants
entirely harmonious. It Is testified by the
defendants that a resolution was po11Sed by
the board of trustees authorizing the b01·rowlng of the money In question from Barnes &
McCandless; that the trustees were called together for that purpose, and at the Instance
of Barnee, who was present when the reso-

lutlon was passed. This resolution ls not
even brought to bear In this case, but depends also upon the memories ot the wttnesses, for the records of the society bad
been burned befween the time of the alleged
passage ot the resolution and the bringing
of the action. One of the witnesses testified.
in relation to the matter, that they all went
down to the ofilce ot Barnes & l\lcCandless
and signed the note. Others are not certalu
where the note was signed, but think probably It was there, and are not able to remember who was present at the time of the
signing. They all say that It was the understanding that they were not to be held
liable as individuals, but as trustees, but tile
utterances which brought about the unde1·stnndlng are draggOO. out ot the wltnesges
by direct and leading questions. Referring
to the testimony of Walter A. Bull, tor Instance, when asked whether there was any
talk about Individual llablllty: "A. I thlnli
there was. Q. What was said about that?
A. We wouldn't sign only for the corporation. Q. What did Barnes say about that?
A. All right. Q. How much money do you
remember was to be loaned? A. $1,500. Q.
You have heard the no~e In controversy there
read? A. Yes. Q. Did yon sign this note?
A. Yes. Q. How did you come to sign this
note? A. I signed the note for the aasoclatlon. Q. Was this note given In pursuance
of the a1Tnngement had there with Mr.
Barnes? A. Yes. Q. :Sow, who drew up
this note? A. I don't know. Q. Where did
you sign the note? A.. I think It was In Mr.
Barnes' otflce. Q. When you signed It,
whom did you lnti>.nd to bind? A.. '.l'he fall·
association. Q. Anybody else? A. No. Q.
Did you Intend to bind yourselM A.. No.
Q. Did you get any part ot this money? A.
No. Q. Any benefit directly or Indirectly
from It? A. No. Q. What was done with
the money? A. I don't know. I think It
was used tor the fair association." So that
It seems the memory of the witness ts so
faulty about the transaction that he Is not
even <'ertaln what use the money was put to
for which he made himself N>sponslble; 1LD1l
lt Is not suftlclent that bis intention was, at
the time he signed the note, that be should
not be bound Individually; but to escape the
responsibility ot the Individual note which he
signed, under the plea of a mistake, It must
not only plainly appear that it was his Intention that he should not be bound, but It
must as plainly appear that It was the lutentlon ot Barnes & McCandless. During the
testimony given by Thomas Haley the following questions were answered: "Q. Do
you remember any resolution being passed
there? A. Yes. Q. Do you remember who
drew It up? A. I don't remember who drew
It up. I don't remember who was secretary.
Q. Xow, what else occurred there at that
ml>ctl11g·1 \Yas there any agreement mad<between the 1n·esldent nnd llr. Barnes? A.
Yes, sir. Q. State what that agreement was.
0
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A. .\Ir. Barnes was to loan the association

money, if the board of trustees would sign

the note. Q. Sign the note how? A. As an

association. Q. Was anything said about

personal liability? A. No, sir. Q. Was there

any talk there about the members of the

board not wanting to be personally liable?

A. There was talk about the members say-

ing they wouldn't be personally liable."

This testimony contradicts itself. for if there

was nothing said about personal liability

there could not have been anything said

about the members of the board being per-

sonally liable. The witness testities, how-

ever, that Hr. Barnes was to loan the asso-

ciation money if the. l)oard of trustees would

sign the note as an association. So it stands

to reason, if this question of personal re-

sponsibility had been called to the minds of
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the defendants at that time, and the_v had

refused to sign individually, but had espe-

cially agreed to sign as trustees, that they

would have carried that agreement out by

signing as trustees, instead of signing as

individuals.

from the testimony of A. B. \Vhitson: “Q.

You can state how you know this meeting

was called for the purpose of passing this

resolution. (0bjected to.) Q. Did you hear

.\lr. Barnes talk about this matter? A. No,

sir. Q. Did he say anything at the meeting

about it‘! A. I don't remember what he said

at this meeting. It was discussed at this

meeting. Q. He was present at it?

Q. Now, what was said there, in his pres-

ence, about why the resolution had to be

passed‘! (Ubjected to. Sustained.) Q. Now,

state what transpired at this meeting. A.

We passed this resolution that we would

borrow this money of Barnes & McCandiess.

Q. What were the contents of that resolu-

tion? Do you remember? A. I don't re-

member its contents exactly. Q. What was

the substance of it? A. Well, the resolu-

tion was passed that we should borrow the

money from him. Q. Do you know who pro

pared that resolution? A'. The secretary. Q.

Now, was there any agreement entered into

there between the trustees for the corpora-

tion and Mr. Barnes‘! A. There was. Q.

State what that agreement was. State what

Mr. Barnes did. A. 1 don‘t know what .\lr.

Barnes said, but it was mutually understood.

ttlbjected to “mutually understood.") The

Court: You can state what the effect was of

what was said. State in substance. A.

'l‘here was a mutual understanding that we

were to sign this note and get the money

from Mr. Barnes. Q. IIow were you to sign

it? A. Sign it as trustees of the association."

So it will be seen from this testimony that

the witness, instead of stating the facts from

which a conclusion could be drawn by the

jury or by the court, simply stated the con-

clusions, thereby making himself a judge of

what state of facts would warrant Barnes

in coating to the conclusion that he should

look to the trustees instead of to the indi-

PROOF.

A. lir. Barnes "·ns to loon the aSBoclatlon vlduals who signed the note. Continuing:
money, lf the board of trustt'et! would slgn "Q. Was there anything said there about the
the note. Q. Slgn the note how? A. As nn Individual Jlablllty of the trustees? A. Y~'ll.
aiu10<'1atlon. Q. Waa anything said about sir. Q. Wlmt was eald? A. I remember It
pt>nil<>nal liability? A. No, slr. Q. Was there wag 11poken of whether we would be lndlany talk there about the members of the vldunlly llnble tu this or not. Q. Wu that
board not wanting to be personally Un ble? f.1Poken of by the trustees? A. It was. In
A. There was talk about the meml>Prs say- 'open ml'l•tlng. Q. Was ~Ir. Barnes there?
ing they wouldn't be pet·sonally llable." A. Yes. (,l. Did Mr. Barnes say anything In
'l'hls testimony contradicts Itself, for lf tbere answer to that? A. I don't remember as be
was nothing eald about personal liability dl<l." In Rnswer to the question, "How did
there could not have been anything 11ald you come to sign this note sued upon here aa
about the membeni of the board being per- Individuals?" tbean11werwas: "I dldn'tslgn
sonally liable. The wltnese testlfiPS. how- It as an Individual. I signed It as trustl.'<',
ever, that :Mr. Barnes was to loan the asso- ls my understanding. Q. Did any one adciation money lf the board of trustees would vlee you that this was the way to bind a
sign the note as an nssoclatlon. So It standa
corporation, and make a statement tQ thnt
to rea1mu, If this qoastlon of penional rP- eff..ct? \Objected to. Overruled.) A. I don't
11pouslblllty bad bet>n ('Riled to the minds of know as 1 had any advice on the subj1•<'t.
the defendants at that time, and tbt-y had Q. Who drew up thl8 note? A. I don't
refused to sign Individually, but bad eepeknow." So that, so far as Wbltson's test!·
elally agreed to slim as trustees, that they
mony ls roncerned, It ls simply con<'lusl\"e
would have cnrrled that agreement out by of what his underst:mdlng was at the tlml'
signing as trustee>&, Instead of signing as the note was signed, without proving or
lndh·iduals. The following exeerpt ls taken tending to prove In any way the understandfrom the testimony of A. B. Whitson: "Q. ing of the lJlalntltrs.
You can stat<' bow you lmow thl11 meeting
The testimony of ::\lc<'andless, on the other
Wal' called for the purpose Of paMlng thl!!
hand ls to the effect that he was present at
resolution. (Objected to.) Q. Did you bear the time of the drawing up and signing of
:Ur. BuruPs talk about this matter? A. No, the promissory note ln suit. He testifies
sir. Q. Did he say anything at the meeting that the president of the association came to
nbout It? A. I clon't remembPr what be said the plain titre to know If they would loan the
at this meeting. It was dlseu11sed at this 88110cl11tlon some mont>y, and the plalntl.ll's
meeting. Q. He was present at It? A. Yes.
told him they would not loan It a dollar.
Q. Now, what was said there, In bl11 pres- 1 "He then snld, 'Wlll you loan It to us lndlvldually ?' I told him we· would, and be
eu~. about why the resolution bad to hP
passed 1 (Objected to. Sustained.) Q. Now, went ln abd came back, and we drew up a
atate what transpired at this meeting. A. ' note, and he took It and had It signed. Q.
We pai;sed this reROlutlon that we would ·wht>n you eay you would loan It to th~w
borrow tllfe money of Barnes & .McCandless. Individually, to what lndlvlduals did you refer? A. Well, during the conversation ht>
(J. What were the contents of that resolution? Do you remember? A. I don't re- mentioned the Individuals who would sign
membt>r its contents exactly. Q. What was the note, If we would let them have the
the sub11tance of ft? A. Well, the reeolu- money,-llr. Packwood, .Mr. Bull, Mr. Haley,
tlon was p:u~.<ied that we should borrow the Mr. Whitson, .Mr. Geddis, and hlmself,-and
we told him we would loan those gentlemen
money from him. Q. Do you know who prepared that resolution? A~ 1.'he secretary. Q. the money. Q. And you told him you would
Now, was there any agreement entered Into not loan the 8880Cl11tlon a dollar? A. Yes.
there between the trustees for the corpora- slr; that we would not loan It a dollar."
tion and Mr. Barnes? A. There was. Q. This testimony Is objected to by the respondState whnt that agreement was. State what ents on the alleged ground that It does not
refer to the same transaction. The wltne1111
Mr. Blll'llt>ll did. A. 1 don't know what :Mr.
Barnes snit.I, but It was mutually undt•rstoocl. states that lt was on the sume day-the day
lObjected to "mutually understood.") The prior to the signing of this note-that this
Court: You can state what the etrect was of conversation occurred, and It ls certainly as
what was said. State in substan<·e. A. near the transaction as 18 the testimony of
There W88 a mutual understanding that we the dt>fE>n<tants; for, according to tht>lr testl·
were to sign this note and get the money mony, the resolution and agreement f.1POken
from Mr. Barnes. Q. How were you to sl~ of here were made from one to thn>e days
it? A. Sign 1t as trustet•s of the a1111oclatlon." befot·e the signing of the note. The posiSo it will be 11een from this te11tlmony that tive testimony of Mr. Barnes ls that, when
t11e witness, instead of stating the facts from asked by the pre1ddent of the association to
which a conclusion could be drawn by the loan snld a88oclatlon money, be told him that
be would not loan the fair aseoclatlon any.
Jury or by the court, simply stated the conclusion11, thert>by making hlm11elf a judge of thing at all: "That we would not loan It
what state of facts would warrant Harnes a dollar. But thl•n he !18.ld he couhl lilet an
In coming to the conclusion that he 11hould lndlvhlual note, and named ovPr c<'rtnln par
look to the tl'llstees instead of to the lndf· ties he thought would sign the note, and
332
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asked if he could get the money if those

parties would go on the note [mentioning

the names of the parties who now appear

on the note]. I told him, while we were all

there together, if he would get a note signed

by those parties individually we would let

him have the money. I made out the note

myself, and he took it, and afterwards

brought it back with those names on there.

Q. Did you pay out the money on the note?

A. I did." The witness also testiﬁed that

he knew of the ﬁnancial condition of the as-

sociation; that there was a mortgage on its

property for $2,500, and he knew that it

would not be a safe investment to loan it

money. This witness testifies, besides, that

the note was not signed in his oiiice at all.

but that it was delivered to the president of

the society, who obtained the signatures.

It can be readily gathered from the testi-
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mony of the witnesses for the defense that

they are not certain where the note was

signed. Some of them testiﬁed that they

thought it was signed in the office of Barnes

& McCandless. In fact, there is a mist of

uncertainty hanging over their testimony in

regard to the whole transaction; just such

uncertainty as might be expected where men

are relying upon their memories concerning

the transaction of several years before, un-

certainties which it is the special oﬂlce of a

written agreement to avoid.

There is another circumstance in this case

which strengthens the theory of appellants.

and that is that certain signers of this note.

some years afterwards, when they were

pressed for payment, individually agreed

each one to pay the one-fourth of this note..

'i‘his agreement is testified to by Kalli-Tlmill.

a disinterested witness, and is a pertinent

circumstance in the case. Again, the form

of the note itself indicates that the under-

standing was as testiﬂed to by Barnes. If

these parties had intended to sign a note

binding the corporation only, they would

have signed it as they did, adding after their

names, “Trustees of the Agricultural Fair

Association." Such a signing as this would

simply have been held to have been descrip-

tivc of the names _of the signers, and would

probably not have bound the association;

but it would have indicated the intention of

the parties to bind the association, and

would have been such a. signing as the or-

dinary citizen, not acquainted with technical

law, would have executed. But here the

note not only is not signed, “The Agricul-

tural Fair Association, by Packwood et ai..”

nor “Pack\\'0od et al., for the Agricultural

Fair Association," nor “Packwood et al.,

Trustees of the Agricultural Fair Associa-

tion“; but is signed in such a manner that

it indicates that there was no attempt or

thought of binding the association in any

way. It is true that there occurs in the note

this language, “For the use of the Agricul-

tural Fair Association." This is explained

by the testimony of Barnes that they told

him they wanted that inserted so that it

EVlDE~CE

TO VARY OR

asked if he could get the money it those
parties would go on the note [mentioning
the names of the parties who now appear
on the note]. I told him, while we were all
there together, lf he would get a note signed
by those parties indlvldually we would let
him have the money. I made out the note
myself, and be took It, and afterwards
brou,ght It ba<'k with those names on thrre.
Q. Did you pay out the money on the note?
A. I dld." The witness also tPstUled that
be knew of the ftnanclal condition of the association; that tht>re was o. mortgage on Its
property for $2,500, and he knew that it
would not be a safe Investment to loan ft
money. This witness testifies, bPsldes, thnt
tho note was not signed In his oftlce at all.
but that It wns dellvered to the president of
the society, who obtained the signatures.
It can be readily gathered from the testimony of the witnesses for the defense that
they are not certain where the note wa"
signed. Some of them testified that •bt•y
thought It was signed In the oftlce of Bnl'llr.s
& McCandless. In fact, there ls a mist of
uncertainty hanging over their testimony In
regard to the whole transaction; just such
uncertainty as might be expected where men
are relying upon their memories concerulng
the transaction of several years b!'fore, uncertainties which It ls the special oftlce of a
written agreement to avoid.
There Is another circumstance In this case
which strengtheDB the theory of appellants,
and that Is that certain signers of this note,
some years afterwards, when they were
pressed tor payment, Individually agreed
each one to pay the one-fourth of this note. _
'rhls agreement Is testified to by I~auA'11111n,
a disinterested witness, and ls a pt•rttnent
circumstance In the case. Again, the form
of the note Itself Indicates that the understanding was as testified to by Barnes. It
these parties had intended to sign a note
binding the corporation only, they would
have signed It as they did, adding after their
names, "Trustees of the Agricultural Fair
Auociatlon." Such a signing as this would
simply have been held to have been descriptive of the names of the signers, and would
probably not have bound the association;
but It would have Indicated the Intention of
the partlea to bind the association, and

EXPLAl~
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would huve been such a signing u the ordinary citizen, not acquainted with technical
law, would have executed. But here the
note not only Is not signed, ''The Agricultural Fair .Association, by Packwood et al."
nor "Packwood et al., tor the Agricultural
Fair Association," nor "Packwood et al.,
Trustees of the Agricultural Fair Association"; but ls signed ln such a manner tlmt
It lndlcn.tes that there was no attempt or
thought of binding the association ln any
way. It ls true that there occurs In the note
this language, "For the use of the Agricultural Fair ASBOClatlon." This ls explained
by the testimony of Barnes that they told
him they wanted that inserted so tnat It
would show w)lere the money went, as the
money was actually for use of the fair aBSoclatlon, and &Bslsted them ln keeping their
books with the said aSBOclatlon. It ls also,
no doubt, true that the resolution was paBSed
authorizing these trustees to borrow money
for the association. In tact, It ls not likely
that they would have borrowed It under
any circumstances had not such a resolution
be<•n passed, and the wlll ot the aBBOClatlon
been thereby expressed. But, In our Judgment, that was all tli.e effect that the resolution had, and from that resolution the
trustet-s felt warranted in borrowing money
for the use of the association, 8Jld made
themsel\'es personally liable tor the same,
looking to the society for their pay, and relying upon the resolution as authority tor borrowing the money. It ls true that there are
four witnesses who testify here In favor or
the contention of the reti(loudents, and only
two ln favor of that of the 11.ppellants. lsut
this, as we have said before, can go no rurther than a preponderance of the testimony,
conceding the witnesses to be all of equal
credlblllty. We think thel'e are no cases sustaining the doctrine that the p1·esumptlon
that a Wl"ltten Instrument expre&8ell the true
agreement of the parties can be overcome by
a mere preponderance of the testimony. The
judgroent wlll be reversed, and the cause remanded with Instructions to give judgment
to the plalntUrs for the amount asked for In
the complaint.
SCOTT, ANDERS, STILES, and HOYT,
JJ.. concur.
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(27 N. E. 961, 127 N. Y. 133.)

PROOF.

THOMAS et al. v. SCUTT.

(27 N. E. 961, 127 N. Y. 133.)

Court of Appeals of New York, Second Division.

June 2, 1891.

Appeal from a. judgment of the general

term of the supreme court. in the fourt.h

iudicial department, affirming a judgment

entered on the report of a referee. Action

to recover the sum of $800 alleged by the

plaintiffs to be due them from the defend-

ant upon the sale of a quantity of lumber.

The defendant denied the purchase. and

alleged that all the lumber that he had of

the plaintiffs‘ was turned out to him to se-

cure advances that he had previously

made to them, under the express agree-

ment that it should be rafted to market,

and sold as his lumbcr.and thathe should

account to them for the proccetls thereof
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when received, after deducting all ex-

penses and the amount of their indebted-

ness to him. The defendant further al-

leged that,owing to low water in the Del-

aware river, the lulnber could not be got

to market without great expense, neces-

sarily incurred in taking it out of the river

and rerafting it, and that the proceeds

received by him were much less than the

actual expenses and the amount of his

claim against the plaintiffs. The action

was tried before a referee. who found that

June ll, 1883. the lumber in question was

sold by the plaintiffs to the defendant for

the sum of $728, \vhich was to be applied

by him upon a chattel mortgage given

by them upon said lumber and other

property to secure a debt of $l.60’l,and

that soon after the balance of the mort-

Court of A)lpeals of Xew York, Sl'cond Division.
June 2, 1891.

Appeal from a judgment of the genera.I
term of the supreme court, in the fourth
judil'lnl de1>11rt111ent, affirming a judgment
entered on the report or a rf:'feree. Action
to recover the Hurn or f~oo alleged b:\' the
plalnttfJs to I.le due them from the defendant upon the 1mle ore quantity of lumbPr.
The defendant denied the purchase. and
alleJ(el! that all the lumber that he had or
the plaintlffR' was turned out to hlm to ee·
curP. aclvnnl'es tlu1t he bed pre,·lo111ily
made to them, under the exr1re11H ngrt>ement chat It 11hould b~ rartl'd to mnr·krt,
an1l 1ml<.! n11 hh1h1111ht•r,11111I tlrnt he Rliould
accom• •. to the Jn for ttw pr"'=""' I" thPreof
when received, eftflr deducting t1ll exp£n11es and thP amount of their lnclt•bte11oeHe to him. The defentlunt further allt'ged thnt,owlng to low water In thP Delaware river, the lumber r.011111 not be got
to murket without great expense, nel'l'R ·
Hurll,v hu:m·red In taking it out of the rlv1~1·
end rernftlng It, an<l that the procee1le
rec~lve1I by him were much lees than the
artunl ex11ensea eo1l thP amount of his
claim against the plalotiff.i. 'l'he action
wus tried hefore a rderee, who found thttt
.rune 11, 1~~1. the lumher In queHtlon wee
eol<l hy the plnlntiff11 to the cleft!ndant for
the Rnm of fi:!8, which was to be applied
by him upon a l'huttel mortgage gl \•en
by them upon tmld lumher and other
property to .....·ure u dt>l.Jt of $1.60'I, anll
thu t Moon after the balanl'e of the mortgage was paid In ca11h. It appeared that
the defemhmt, at abont the date of the
alleged sale, took p0Hfol~1111lon of the lumbe", and, after some delay. solrl It; bur,
owing to the u11us1Jal tllftlcnlty of getting
it to mnrket. little or nothing was 1·eallzed uhovp, t•xpen11e11.
W. J. l-l'Plsll. for a1>pellant. A. Taslor
ttnd Joll11 B. Gle11srm, fur respondents.

gage was paid in cash. It appeared that

the defendant, at about the date of the

alleged sale, took possession of the lum-

ber, and,after some delay. sold it; but,

owing to the unusual difficulty of getting

it to mnrket.little or nothing was real-

ized abovs expenses.

W. J. Welsh. for appellant. A. Taylor

and John B. Gleason, for respondents.

VANN, J., (after stating the facts as

above.) Upon the trial, the plaintiffs put

in evidence a. written instrument. dated

June ll. 18823, duly signed by them, of

which the following is a copy, viz.: “For

the consideration hereinafter named, we

VANN, J., (nfter stating the facts· 88
above.) U111111 tlw trlnl, the pl&lnliffH put
In evlrlence a written ln11rrument. rla te1I
June 11. lSX:l, duly Hl1rned l.Jy them, of
which thP folluwl111t le a copy, viz.: "For
thP con11l<leratlon herPlnnfter namccl. we
hereby 11ell, asHlgu, transfer, and dellvl'r
to Milo Scutt one raft of ltemlock toagle
timber. and loading thereon, ni>w lvi11g
at F.qulnunk Eddy, ju11t below the Ifol'k,
In Hul'kin~luuu towuship, Pa., the suicl
lumber being covered by a chattel mortgage of which the mortgage hereto attal'hed le a 1·opy, viz.:
4.000 feet cherry boards, at S12 . . ...••••••• g 411 oo
115,000 maple plank, about, at i10......... •• a;-)(J oo
11,000 feet of toggle timber, at Sc......... 8 O 00

hereby sell, assign, transfer, and deliver

$728 00

to Milo Scutt one raft of hemlock toggle

timber. and loading thereon, now lying

at Equinunk Eddy, just below the Rock.

in Buckingham township, Pa., the said

lumber being covered by a chattel mort-

gage of which the mortgage hereto at-

tached is a copy. viz.:

4,000 feet cherry boards. at $12.. . $ 48 00

85,000 maple plank, about, at $l0 350 00

11,000 feet of toggle timber, at 3 .. , 3 0 00

$728 00

—The same to apply on the amount due on

said chattel mortgage, and, if any mis-

take in amount of lumber, same to be

-The11ume toup11lyontbe nruount <1111• on
said d1u ttel mort~ngP, and, If nny 111h1take in nmonnt of lumb..r, same to Lie
t•orrl'Ctecl." A c·hattPI mortgn~e WUR a111wxe1l to thlH writing-, dated l\f11rd1 2'J,
11S~3. given by the pluintiffs to dl•fenchmt

a:H

to 1tecure the payment of fl,600 on the
flrHt or Muy following. It CO\'ered a !urge
qunntlty of lumber In addition to tlrat
mPntloned In the written agreemt'nt. 11nd
stated tilnt it was all at Peas Eddy. a.
plal'e within the state of New York. 'l'he
lmlt-btedueeH of the plalntlff11 to the defendu ot on the 11th of .June, 1&!3. amounted to the sum or $2.100, Including that. secured by the chattel mortJrRJrf'. The
ple1ntlff'4 111110 showe1I that, Hhnrtly ofter
the wl'ltten Instrument was given, tlley
paid to the defendant enough monE>y to
fnlly equal the amount unpuid upon the
mortgui.:e, provided Knlcl 1111111 of $728 hnrl
Hr11t been tttiplled. Tt1ereupon the dPlencl·
ant, in due form, offered to show" what
wue sahJ hetwet•11 the pnrtlE>R in reference
to the I.Jiii of tlnle," but the offer was exclullP1]. upon the grounCI tha ~ the writing
was the best evhJenct', an1l tllftt It could
not be contradlctecl or &'rold~d by parol.
The de!(•ndunt furthe1· sought to prove
"the t, prll•r to an cl at the time of the
druwl11i; of the blll of Hall', the plaintiffs
re!usl'd to make an aheolute dlHposltion
or the lumher; that they were Informed
thnt flUl'h wa"' not Intended, bnt that the
raft was In Pcnni'yh•ania, 1rnd that the
chattel m•>rtgage dicl not protect dl'feoclan t u~alnHt e le\'Y npon or dlspuRltlon of
the lumher hy the )llalntitte In that state;
that plulntlttH should have the full bPnetlt
of the lumber, and what It brouv:ht on
the sale when marketed, after paying the
plalntlffe' claim, anti the expemie uf running and markPtlng It; Uta t plaintiffs said
tlwy were enti11fiNl with that, and would
make thP. bill of i,1nle on this basis. and
tlwreupon did Rlgn the hlll of sale." This
evltlence wue 11lso objected to and excluded upo11 the folll me ground. At a litter
stage of tbR trial the defe11d1int, under the
11nme ohjectlon, was permitted to teHtlfy
111 refe1.,.nce to what was 11ald betwePn him·
self anil on11 of the plaintiffs juHt bt'fore
tht' written lnetrnment, calle1l for cotn•enlenl'e a··• bill of sale," w11s executed; hut It
waR Huhseqnently stril'ken out on motion
of the plain tlff11, and against the ut.)PC·
tion of the clefendnnt, upon the 1mme
ground that Imel p;ovemed the prlor rul·
Inge. Excr•ptlons to the11e declsiooM of
the referee pre1>ent the ouly question that
the learoell con11Rel for the defendant bu.s
a11kPcl ue to decide. It le a general rule
that evlilPnce or what woe eald between
the parties to a valid lnstrumPnt In writing. either prl1Jrto or at the time of Its ex·
ecutlon. cannot he receh·ed to contrnclll·t
or vury Its termH. '!'hie rule le not unlVP.real In Its application, because the
courts, In thdr effort to prevent fraud
and lnjm~tlcE>, havt> lald down c~rtaln exCt'l•lions. which, altho111{h correct in prlnclpll'. al'e so•netlmes so looRely Appllecl In
Jll'ltctit'e as to threaten the integrity or the
rule lti,;elf. J Ureenl. Ev. § 21'411. The
reul exceptions may be groupPrl In two
clm111eR. the flrHt of which lnclnde11 thoRe
cuHes In whlrh 1mrol evidence haH bePn rcct>i'red to show thnt thnt which purports to
hea written contract iR In fal't no contract
at all. 'l'hus, fraud, Illegality, want or
cun11iclerntion, rll'livt>r.v u11011 an unperforml'd co1111ltion. and the like, muy be
shown b,y pa1·ol, not to contradict or

ORAL EVIDE111CE TO VARY OR EXPLAI:S DOCUMENTS.
ORAL EVIDENCE TO VARY OR EXPLAIN DOCUMENTS. [Case N0. 1l5

vary, but to destroy, a written instru-'

ment. Such prooi docs not recognize the

contract as ever existing as a valid agree-

ment, and is received. from the necessity

of the case, to snow that that which ap-

pears to be is not. and never was. a con-

tract. Illustrations oi this class may be

iound in the following citations: Beet-ker

v. Vrooman, 13 Johns. 301; Hammond v.

Hopping. 13 Wend. 50.5; Johnson v. Miln,

14 Wend. 195; Benton v. Martin. 52 N.

Y 570; Grierson v. Mason. 60 N. Y. 39-i;

I Greenl. Ev. § 284: Phil. Ev. (2 Cow. &

H. notes) p. 665. note 49-l. The second

class embraces tliose cases which recog-

nize the written instrument as existing .

and valid, but regard it as incomplete,

either obviously. or at least possibly. and

admit pnroi evidence. not to contradict

or vary. but to complete, the entire agree-
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ment, of which the writing is only a. part.

Receipts. bills oi parcels, and writings

that evidently express only some parts oi

the agreement. are examples of this class,

which leaves the written contract un-

changed. but treaisit as a purtoi an entire

oral agreement, the remainder oi which

was not reduced to writing. Two things

however. are essential to bring a case

within this class: (1) The writing must

not appear. upon inspection. to be a com-

plete contract, embracing all the particu-

lars necessary to make a periect agree-

ment. and designed to express the whole

arrangement between the parties, ior in

such a case it is conclusively presumed to

embrace the entire contract. (2) The pa-

rol evidence must be consistent with, and T

not contradictory oi, the written instru-

ment. Chapin v. Dohson, 78 N. Y. 74, is an

instance oi this class. nnd. although near

the border line, illustrates thetworcquire-

ments just mentioned. In that case it

was held competent to show by parol ev-

idence that a. written contract to iurnish

machinery oi a speciﬁed kind. at a deiinite

price, within a certain time, and to deliv-

er it in a particular way, was part oi an

entire verbal contract, which provided

that the machines should be so made that

they would do the work oi the person

who ordered them to his satisiaction.

'l"he ground oi the decision was that

there was nothing on the lace oi the in-

strument to show that it was the whole

_agreement between the parties, and that

the oral guaranty did not contradict and

was not inconsistent with the written

contract.

In Eighmie v. Taylor. 98 N. Y. 288, the

court bad under consideration a written

instrument that was regarded as, upon

inspection, appearing to be a full, deli-

nite. and complete agreement oi’ bargain

and sale, and therefore held that evidence

oi a verbal warranty in that r-use was

inadmissible. ln the course oi‘ the opin-

ion. comment was made upon (‘hapin v.

Dohson, supra, in this way; " It was said

[Case No. 115

Tary, but to 11estroy, a written lnl!tro- ., tlon of law a rleP.s that the written lnstrumeut. Such proof dot's not rt'COJtnlze the mi>n t cont11i1111 the whnlt> of the Agree-contract as ever exl11th1Jt as a ,·ull!l agree- ! ment, and that, where there l1t 11uch formment, und Is received. from the net•e!!slty al rontruct of barp;a In and 11ale e:recntt-d
-Of the cBBe, to Hhow that that which up- In writing, there cau be no question hut
pea1'8 to be Is not, and never was. a conthat the parties lnteuded tbu writing as
nact. lllustratlor111 or this class may be a re1>u11ltory Jf the agreement ltseU;"
found In the followlnJt cltatlom1: Beecker <.'ltlng Filkins v. Whylanll, 24 N. Y. 838. A
v. Vrooman, 13 .Johns. 301; Hammond v. further lllustration or the inttexlbllity of the
Bopping. rn Wencl. 5Ua; Johmmn v. Milo, first of the two reqnlremt>nts mentioned
14 Wt>nd. l!I;;; Benton v. Martin. 52 N.
muy be seen In the 11tlll lotercnse of lfarHb
Y 5711; Grlemon v . .Mfl11on. 60 N. Y. 394; v. McNalr, 99 N. Y. 174, 1 N. E. Rep. 660.
where the written ln11trument wall In
1 Green!. Ev. § 284; Phil. Ev. (2 Cow. &
H. notes) p. 6(1i,, note 49.J. 'fhe Recoml
these words: "Thie Is to certify that, In
class embract•s tHm1e caKe11 which recog- con11hleratlon or <.'l'edltlng C.H. Mar11h at
nize the written lnstr11ment BK existing ' the Exchange Bunk of Limn, $3fi3.i2, 11ayand valid, I.Jut reg11rd lt as Incomplete, , lnJC mortgage (on prope1·ty for1only deedeither obviously, or at leaRt posMlbly, and ed I>.\' J. fl. MarRh, lo Al'on, to C. W. Glbad:11lt pnrol evidence. not to contradict 11on) gh·en hy \\'illinm F. Hu1<sell to(', H.
Marsh, $110.46, and lndorslng $35.82 upon
~Jr Y'lry. but to <.'omplete, the entire ugreemeut, of which the writing i'I only a part. a note made by C. H. Marsh, .June 8. um,
Recel(Hl!I, l.Jill11 ol 11urcelM, und writings for $:-!00, we Join Uy and severally SPll, a~
that evidently ex1n·e11s only 1mme parts of slgn. and transfer all onr right title, and
the ogreement. are example" of thl11 clat1s, lntel"C'st In two poll<.'les, Nos. 4.277 and
which leaves the written r.ontract un- 4,!!S7. upon the lh·es of Churle11 H. Marsh
chanl(ed. but tren1sltaR a part of an entire ' and .John R. '.\iart!h. l11sued by the Nationoral ugreement., tbe rema!nder of which al Life Insurance Company of the United
was not reduced to writing. Two things Stntr•s of AmPrka to ('huum·~.\· W. OlbHon,
howe,·er, are e11sentlal to bring a c11ee of 1 .1ua, N. Y." It was heitl that, In the
within tble clnse: (1) The wrltlnJr must 11hHence of any claim or fraud or mutiJal
not ap11ear. upon Inspection, to be a com- 111i11t11ke as to the contents of the a11slgn.
plete contrn<.'t, t>mhradng all the particu- ment, It wa11 conclu11lve, llml that oral evilars neces1mry to make a perfect agree- dence was lneompetent to 1thuw that it
ment, und dPslgned to expresR the whole was ext>cuted as collateral security only.
The or1lnlon re<.'ognlzes as well St>ttled
~rrangement between tbt> 11artleF1, for In
14UCb a ca11e It Is conclusively pretrnmed to that an ln11trument as11lgnlng or conVl',Vf'mbrnee the entire contra1~t. (2) 'fhe pa- in~ real or pl'nional prl)pcrty In al•solnte
rol e\'irleuce muRt be consistent with, tmd ternu1 may, by parol e\•ldence, be sh•nvn
J1ot contradictory of, the written ln1Jtru- to have been lntPnde<I ae secur:ty mtorement. Chapin v. Dohson, 7~ N. Y. i4, le an- ly; etatPs the hlswry or the exception,
lnst11nce of this cittss. 11111!, nlthough uear anll ltR theory; but declares, In wordH t1J1·
the border line, Illustrates thetworl•quire· pllrHble to the ca11e In hood, that" thh1 lnments juHt mentioned. In that caHe It tttrument le more than an aRslgnment. It
watt held compett>ot to 11ho\V l.Jy par:.il ev- <.'ontah111 what both parties HJtree1I to rlo.
idenre that a written contract tu furnish It 11hows thnt the a'lslgoment was mnde
machinery of a 11pecltled kind. at a definite ror the porposP lllt'lltlonNI, Bild precl1<cly
prict!, within a cPrtaln tlnw. anll to dellv- what Ci!h!lon waR to do In consldt>rntlon
t.-r it in a particular way, wait part or 11n thereol. He llel'ame bou111l to do preclHely
t.'nth-e vt>rbal contract, which p1·ovlllerl what was 11r1eclt1Pd for him tn do, and he
that the machlneH should he so mude thut could hove been sued by the 81JRlgnor11 for
they would do the work of the person damages If he h!ld failed to perform.
who orden>d tht>m to hlK satlld11ctlon. Hence the lnstrnml'nt Is not a mere aR'fbe ground or the drcl11lon was that Elgnment or transfer of the pollc.v. It Is a
there waR oothlug on the race of the lri- contra<.'t In writing, within the rule which
strumt>nt to show that It was the whole prohibits parol e\•hlence to explain. varv.
.11~rt>e111ent betwt>en the parties, anti th11t
or contradict 1mch contracts." 'l'he authe orel guaranty dlcl nut <.'ontralllct and thorities cited In the opinion apply with
w11s not lncon11l11tent wltb the written equul force to the case now under consldcontract.
erlltlon.
In Elghmle v. Taylor, 98 N. Y. 288, the
The principle upon which 11arol evldt>nee
C?onrt bnd under consldt>ra tlon a written Is held a1lml11Hlhle to Flhow that a simple
instrument that wu11 rt>ganled as, upon aR11i11;nmcnt. althongh ul.>11olnte In tt>rms,
inHpectlon, appearing to l.Je a full, '!Pfl- wus lnt.-nded as securlt,v merl•ly Is the SUJI·
nlt.-. and complete uirree111Pn t of bar~aln poKPd lncumplt>teueHH of thP Instrument.
and sale, nod the1·efore hclil t hut evldPm·e end It ls not rep-ar!led a11contraulctlnic thfl
of a \'erhal warrunty In thnt rn14c waR wrltlnJl;, hut as 11howl1111: Its pur1m11e.
Inadmissible. Jn the com·He of the opln· Tr1111cott v. King, 6 N. Y. 147. 161; l'lwster
ion. comment waR made upon f'hapln v. v. Bn11k. 16 N. Y. :l.'J6, :Ha: Horn v. KetelDob1<on. supra, lu thiK way: "It waH t<llld tas, 46 N. Y. ll05, 610. \',··lwre. however, tnof the instrument then In queHtlon that stt>nd of a mere trunsrl'r or HKBlgnment,
there Wllll nothing upon Its fact> to 1:1how there Is a contr11ct, n 11peurlng on lt11
that it wns lntendt'd to e:rpl'f'Hi4 tlw whole fnce to be complete, with mutual ohllgacun tro<' t bet WPen the pa rtleR; tlw In rl'r- tlons tu be Jlt'rf >rnw11. "~·ou can no more
,.nce bt>lng;, aR watt declared In an earlit>r ailtl to or con tra1lll't ltH IPgal erfP<.'t hy pat•ase, that where a contract does lt11lk11te rol 11tlpnlntlons. pr<.'1'l'tll11:.:- or at•compnny.
Moch Intention untl th'llll.\"n. 11n1l ill one 1·on- lnJt its t-Xt>Cutlon, thRn you e1111 alter It.
Hummated by the wilting, the prt>1:1u111p- through tbe same m'.!uns, In any other l'l'335
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spect."

668; Renard v. Sampson. 12 N. Y. 561:

Shaw v_. Insurance (‘o.. 69 N. Y. 286; Long

v. Iron Co.. 101 N. Y. G38, 4 N. E. Rep. 735;

Snowdcn v. Guion. 101 N. Y. 458, 5 N. E.

Rep. 322; Gordon v.Niemann,1l8 N.Y.153,

23 N. E. Rep. 454: Humphreys v. Railroad

t?o..121 N. Y. 435. 24 N. E. Rep. 695; En-

gelhorn v. Reitlinger, 122 N. Y. 76, 25 N. E.

Rep. 29". In the foregoing classiﬁcation

collateral agreements are not included, be-

cause they are separate. independent. and

complete contracts. although relating to

the same snblect 'l‘he_v’ are allowed to

be proved by pa.rol, because they were

made by parol. and no part thereof com-

mitted to writing. Evidence to explain

ambiguity, establish n custom, or show

the meanin,<.>: of technical terms. and the
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like, is not regarded as an exception to

the general rule, because it does not con-

tradict or vary the written instrument.

but simply places the court in the posi-

tion of the parties when they made the

contract, and enables it to appreciate the

force of the words they used in reducing

it to writing. It is received where doubt

arises upon the face of the instrument as

to its meaning, not to enable the court to

hear what the parties said, but to enable

it to understand what they wrote, as

they understood it at the time. Such evi-

dence is explanatory, and must be incon-

sistent with the terms of the contract.

Dana v. Fiedler, 12 N. Y. 40: t‘ollender r.

Dlnsmore. 55 N. Y. ‘200: Newhall v. Ap-

pleton. l14 N. Y. 140, 21 N. E. Rep. 1C5:

ismith v. (Jlews, 114 N. Y. 190, 21 N. E. Rep.

60.

Returning. now. to the written instru-

ment executed by the plainliffs in this

case, and it appears. upon analyzing its

provisions. to be nn agreement of a com-

plete and comprehensive character. There

is, ﬁrst, a transfer in formal terms by the

plaintiffs to the defendant of a draft of

hemlock lumber lying at a place named.

followed by the statement that such lulu-

bcr is covered by the chattel mortgage nn-

nexed. Three ditferent kinds of lumber

are then enumerated. with the quantity

in feet of each, the price per foot or per

thousand, and the amount that each kind

comes to at the pricenamed. Those sums

are added. and the amount thereof, con-

stituting the purchase price, the defendant

expressly agrees to apply on his chattel

mortgage, and both parties agree to

correct any mistake there may be in the

amount of the lumber. The method of

correcting‘ mistakes is not provided, but

it is clear that. if the lumber overran the

amount stated. the plaintiffs were to have

the beneﬁt of it, while, if it fell short. the

$36

Phil. Ev. (2 Cow'en & H. notes.) '

defendant was to have the deﬁciency made

good to him in some way. We regard

PROOF.

spttt." Phil. Ev. (2 Cowen & H . notPA.)
6flS; Uenu1l v. Sampson. 12 N. Y. 561:
Shn w v. Insurunce <.'o •• 69 N. Y. 286; Long
v. Iron to., 101 N. Y . fi3~, 4 N. E. Rep. 785;
lilnowden v. Guion. 101 N. Y. -tr>S. 5 N. E.
Rep. 32'2; Gorilon v. Niemann, 118 N. Y . lr>8,
23 N. E. Rep. 4.'>4; Humphreys v. Railroad
Co., 121 N. Y. 435, 24 N. E. Rep. 695; EnJeelhorn v. Reltllnger, 122 N. Y. 76, 25 N. E.
Ut'p. 297. In the foregoing classification
rolla terttl a11;reementR ure not induded, bec:11 t1Rl' they are separRte, lndP(lendt>nt. und
cnm11lete e.mti•acts. although n>lat.lng to
tho same KnbJect . '!'hey Rt~ allowt>d to
be proved by parol, because they were
made by parol, und 110 ))llrt thereof committed to writing. E\•ldeace to explain
ambiguity, e11tal>ll11h n t'ustom, or show
the meanlug of technical terms. and the
like, ill not rt'11;arded aR an exception to
the i;teneral rule, because It does not contradlet or vary the written lustrument,
but simply ph1ces the court In the position Of the partleH When they JDUde the
contract, and enablee It to appreciate the
force of the words they ui1ed In redudng
It to writing. It Is J'e(."elved where doubt
arises upon the face of the Instrument as
to lbt meaning, not to enable the court to
bear wbat the parties said, but to enable
It to uno:JerHtand what they wrote, as
they undel'fltood It at the tlmf'I. Such evidence le explanatory, and must be loc~on
slstent with the term111 of the contract.
Ilana v. Fiedler, 12 N. Y. 40: Collender ""·
Dinsmore; 55 N. Y. 200; Newhall v. Appleton, 114 N. Y. 140, 21 N. E. Rep. 1C5:
Hmlth v. Clews, 114 N. Y. 1110, 21 N. E. Rep.
100.
Returning, now. to the wrlt~en Instrument executed by the ph1l111UfM In this
case, and it appears. upon analyzing ltet
provisions. to be ,,n agl'et'ment of a complete and c·om1wehenslve character. There
Is, first, a transfer lo fornrnl tt>rmti by the
plalntnrs to the defendant of a draft of
hemlock lumber lying at a plare named,
followed by the Htatement that such Jom·
ber le covered by the chattel mortgage annexed. Three dlfft>reot kinds of lumber
are then eoumerat<:'ll. with tbe quantity
111 feet of t>ach, the price per foot or per
thousaml, ond the nmouot that each kind
<·omes tu at the price named. Thoiw. sums
are added. and the amount thereof, confltltutlng the purcha11e price, the defendtt'l'lt
expretisly agrees to a1111ly on bis chnttel
mort11:Rge, itud both parties agrett to
correct any mlstflke there may be lo the
umount of the lumber. "rhe mt>thud or
c·orrectlng mlstnkett ls not provided, bot
It Is clear that, If the lumber ov<:'rrao tbe
amount stated. tbe plaintiffs were to have
the benefit or it, whUe, H lt fell Bhort, the
.136

<lC:'fendant was to have the deftcl<:'ncy made
good to him In some way. We re11;1•rd
this contract as t'omplete upon Its face.
What element Is wanting? If such a writing can l>e undermined by parol evld1mce,
what written lnstr11ment ls safe? How
can a man, however prudent, protect blmaelf against perjury, Infirmity or meworJ',
or th" death of wltnelftfeS"! What stipulation was omitted that should have heen
losert.ed ln 01·der to bring the lnstrurnent
within the gt>neral rule? What will be
left of the rule If It h1 etttabllshed that It
does not rnntrol such a contract? Will
anythlnsr of value be left, If It Is held that
a writing which contnlns the full and deftolte terms of a contraet, apparently comJ>lete, may be shown by parol evidence to
be simply part performaD1·e of an t"Dtlre
verbal agreement preYlously made? We
think that the writing In quf'Ktloo Is govPrne11 by the rule, not by the exception.
Ae wu said by tble court In Elghmle v.
Taylor. suprfl, 296. It contains a definite
agrreml'nt of bar{laln and sale. s11eclftes
th" com1lderatlon, desrrlbee the eubJect,
contains mutual covenants for the protection of each party, and leaves nothing
of a compleh', perft>et, and consummated
agreement to be SUIJplled. On Its ftt.ce,
Mno elt>ment ls wanclng of an entire con·
tract. exhRu11tlng fhe final Intentions of
both partil'tl. It Is therefore sur.h n paper
as fitlls within the pr.-:.tectlou of Lhe rule,
'lDd most be conclusl\'ely presumed to
.onteln the wlw•~ contract 8IJ made.•
Moreo\'er, &Rid\• lt•om the presumption
11rl<1ln~ from an lm1pectlor• or the pRper,
HUch a parol arrangement . '4 tht> defend·
••nt tried to prove would he .ncom1istent
with the wrlttC:'n instrument. hecause tbe
purchase 11rlce wae oot arcurdlng to tbe
former, tu be appllt>d as provided In the
latter. Indeed, It would be taken bodily
out of thl' writing. anti an arrangement
of a different and loconsll~tent character
substituted. Be11idC:'s, thl' ngrePment that
any mistake In the amount of the lumber
Hhoulr\ he l'Orrec:ted, while coueletent
with an absolute salt>, IA Inconsistent with
" tran14fllr, tor the l>Dl'llo11e or securing a
.ebt. We think that the writing ln quee. 'on Imports on Its face a complete ex pres·
1>1on of what the parties agreed to, and
henre that It Is ronclmdvely preHumed to
contain all that they egret'd tu. We ere
further of the uulnlon that the pared evldenre sought to ·he Introduced was lnconsl11tent with and coutradlctory or tbe
written e11:reement, and waa hence Inadmissible on that ground also. It follows
that the rullngs of the referee were correct, and that the Judgment should be
a11lrmed. All concur•

ORAL EVIDENCE TO VAllY OH EXPLAlN DOCUMENTS.
ORAL EVIDENCE TO VARY OR. EXPLAIN DOCUMENTS. [Case N0. 116

STATE (CUMMINGS, Prosecutor) v. CASE.

(18 Atl. 972, 52 N. J. Law, 77.)

Supreme Court of New Jersey. Dec. 28, 1889.

Certiorari to court of common pleas, Es-

sex county.

Argued June term. 1888, before Sounmsu

and REED, JJ.

Franklin M. Olds, for plaintiff in cartin-

STATE (CUllUIXGS, PrOllt"cutor) v. CASE.
(18 Atl. 972, 52 N. J . Law, 77.)
Supreme Court of New Jersey. Dec. 28, 1889.

Certiol'ari to court of common pleas, Essex county.
Argued .June term, 1888, before SCUDDER
and RE~:D, J.J.
Franlt'lin M. Olds, for plaintiff in certiorari. Robe1·t H. McCartw, tor defendant.

rari. Robert H. McCa1-ter, for defendant.

action against Samuel Cummings, Jr.,'in the

second district court of Newark, for the re- i

covery of the sum of $125, the price which ,

she had paid for a horse purchased by her of

Cummings. The gravamen of the demand

of the plaintiff was that such sale was brought

about by the fraudulent representation of the

defendant, which fraudulent conduct con-

ferred upon her the right of rescission, and

that. in the exercise of such right, she ten-

dered back the animal, and demanded a return
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of the consideration paid, and that the defend-

ant refused to comply with such demand.

The case was tried before a jury; and, under

the law, as charged by the court, the jury

found the facts to be such as to entitle the

plaintiff to a verdict for the full amount paid.

The judgment entered upon this verdict was

taken to the Sussex county common pleas,

and thercadirmed. Thatjudgmentis brought

up by the present writ.

The representations, the falsity of which

constituted the ground of the verdict against

the defendant, appears, by the state of the

case agreed upon by the attorneys, to have

been made as follows: One Van Buskirk, as

the agent of thc plaintiff, inquired of defend-

ant about a certain brown horse owned by

defendant. Van Bnskirk asked if the brown

hoise could travel seven or eight miles an

hour, and stated that a horse that could do

that was required. The defendant said that

the brown horse was too slow for that pur-

pose, but pointed Van Buskirk to a gray

horse, stating that he could easily go seven

or eight miles an hour, as it had formerly

been a very fast horse, and attached to the

salvage corps wagon, but that. meeting with

an accident one day, while going to a lire, it

had injured one legalitlle, making it unﬁt

for the work required of it by the salvage

corps. On another occasion, Mr. Cass, in

the presence of his wife, the plaintiff, stated

to defendant that they desired a horse that

could make the distance between Roselaud

and Orange Valley, between seven and eight

miles, in one hour. or one and a half hours,

and stated that, if the horse could not do that,

they did not want to buy him; to which de-

fendant replied that the horse could easily do

that. Plaintiff sought to try the horse by

driving him one evening; but the defendant

refused to allow said trial, stating that the

horse had already, on that day, been to Har-

lem and Orange, which statement was true.

The next morning plaintiff purchased the

horse for $125, paid $50 in cash, and gave a

wrneos, EV. —22

I
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REED, J. Catharine E. Case brought an
action sgainst 8smuel Cummings, Jr.; in the
second cij,strict court of Newark, for the recovery o( the sum of $125, the price which
she hail paid for a horse purchased by her or
Cummings. The graMmen of the demand
ot the plaintiff was that such sale was brought
about by the fraudulent representation of the
defendant, which fraudulent conduct conferred upon her the right of rescission, and
that, in the exercise of such right, she tendered back the animal, and de111a11ded a return
ot the consideration paid, and that the def1mdant refused to comply with such demand.
'fhe case was tried before a jury: amt. under
the law, as charged by th11 court, the jury
found the facts to be such as to entitle the
plaintift to a verdict for tlle full amount paid.
'fhe judgment entered upon this verdict was
taken to the Susse>e county common pleas,
and therealflrmed. Thatjudgment.is l>rought
up by the present writ.
The r11presentatlons, the falsity of which
constituted the ground of the verdict against
the defendant, appea1·s, by the state of the
case agreed upon by the attorneys, to have
been made as follows: One Van Buskirk, as
the agent of the plaintiff, inquired of defendant about a certain l>rown horse owned by
defendant. Van Buskirk asked If the brown
ho1se could travel seren or eight miles an
hour, and stated that a horse that could do
that was required. 'fhe defendant said that
the brown horse was too slow for that purpose, but pointed Van Buskirk to a gray
horse, stating that he could easily go seven
or eight miles an hour, as it had formerly
been a very fast horse, and 11tt.ad1ed to the
salvage corps wagon, but that, meeting with
1111 accident one d11y, while going to a fire, it
had injured one leg 11 litlle, making it unfit
for the work required of it by the salvage
corps. On another occasion, Mr. Cuss, in
lhe presence of bis wife, tl.1e plaintiff, staled
to defendant that thev desired a horse that
could makll the distance between Roseland
and Orange Valley, betwe~n seven and eight
miles, in onll hour, or one and a half hours,
and st11ted that, if the horse could nut do that,
they did not want to l>uy him; to which defendant replied that the horse could easily do
that. Plaintiff sought to try the hor:ie by
driving him one evening; but the defendant
refused to llllow said trial, stating that the
horse had already, on that day, been to Harlem and Orange, which statement was true.
The next morning plaintiff purchased the
horse for tl25, paid $[10 in cash, and gave a
WYLOUS.EV.-22
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promissor.v note of four months, imlorsed by
~Ir. Van Buskirk. The1·e was evidence that
the horse was not able to travel seven or
i-ight miles in one hour, 01· in one hou1· and a
half, and was not fit for the purpose for
which he had been bought. 1t appeared on
the cross-examination of the plaintiff that at
the time of the sale a written warranty of the
horse had been given, in the following form :
"Newark, April 6th, 1887. To one gra~·
horse, Charley, which I warrant to be sound
!In~ kind, with the exct~ption of straining of
muscle of left hind leg." The counsel for
defendant thereupon moved that all evidence
as to representations made by the defendant,
other than those contained in the written
warranty, be stricken out, on the ground that,
the agreement of the parties having been re·
:luced to writing, such writing could not be
varied or enlarged by parol evidence. The
court denied t.lle motion, and allowed an exception. When the plaintiff rested his case,
the counsel for defendant moved for a nonsuit, upon the ground that, a written wa1·ranty having been proved to have been given
on the sale of thE horse. and there being no
evidence that the horse did not correspond
with this Wl\ITanty, the plaintiff had not made
out any case for damages. This motion was
denied, and an exception was allowed. At
the close of the summing up of counsel, the
counsel for the defendant requested the court
to clrnrge the jury that, there l>eing no warranty, the jury cannot consider any testimony
as to any representation not contained therein.
'fltis request 'fVHS refused, and an exct>ption
allowed. The court charged the jury that if
they believed that the representations alleged
to have beeq made in relation to the speed of
the horse were made, and that the plaintiff,
relying upon them, purchased the horst>, and
that such 1·epresentaLions were in fact not
true, and the horsi- was therefore nnftt for
the purpose tor which it was bouf{ht, that
plaintiff could recover the purchase money,
she having offered to return the horse, on the
ground of fraud or deceit, which was lndependt.>nt and irrespective of the so-called warranty. To this portion of the charge an flxception was allowed. The counsel for the
dttfend1rnt also requested the court to ch1uge
that, if the jury should find for the plaintiff,
the measure of damages must be the difference in value betwet>n what the horse was actually worth in the condition he was in at the
time of the sale and what he would have been
worth if the representations m1&de by the defendant had been true; winch request the
court refused to charge, and allowed an exception. The court, to the contrary, charged
the jury that if they found for the plaintiff
they must find in the sum of $12!>, that being
the price she bud paid fur the horse. An exception was allow I'd to this part of the charge.
UeW:1011s covering the above exceptions were
assigned for the reversal of I.he judgment
below.
The primary question raised by the exceptions, and argued with elaborate care, is one

........\.-
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of evidence. It involves the correctness of

the judicial ruling by which the testimony in

respect to certain representations made by

the vendor previous to, and at the time of,

the sale, were admitted in evidence. These

representations, as already appears, were

made in respect to the traveling qualities of

the animal sold. It also appears that there

was a written warranty in respect to the

quality of soundness and quietness. It is

insisted by the counsel for the defendant be-

low that the admission of the verbal repre-

sentations enlarged and varied the written

contract. Ile therefore invokes the inexora-

ble rule of evidence that, when parties have

put their contract into Writing, oral testi-

mony cannot be substituted for, or added to,

the written evidence of the agreement. 1

Greenl. Ev. § 88. This principle has. from
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the earliest period of jurisprudence, been rec-

ognized as a wholesome and necessary rule

of public policy. Id. § 275; Wright v. Rem-

ington, 41 N. J. Law, 48. 43 N. J. Law, 451;

Naumberg v. Young, 44 N. J. Law, 331.

But this rule of evidence is not infringed

by the admission of parol testimony which is

not intended as a substitution for, or an ad-

dition to, a written contract, but which goes

to show that the instrument is void or void-

able, and that it never had any legal exist-

ence, or binding force, either by reason of

fraud, or for want of due execution and de-

livery, or for the illegality of the subject-

niatter of the contract. 1 Greenl. liv. § 284.

Nor is the admission of parol evidence for

the purpose of avoiding a written contract

on the ground of fraud conﬁned to such tes-

timony as goes to show that a party was lured

to make a contract other than that intended,

as by the suhstitutioii of one contract for an-

other by trickery, or by misreading a contract

to an illiterate person. Parol testimony may

be admitted to show that the execution of a

written contract was brought about by a

fraudulent representation. The force given

to a seal, which formerly excluded testimony

in respect to the failure of consideration in a

specialty, is now abolished by legislation.

So that the rule above stated, respecting the

admissibility of fraudulent representation, is

now applicable to all contracts. The ele-

ments essential to constitute such fraudulent

representation will be considered later; and

it is now necessary only to remark that such

evidence as will lay a foundation for an ac-

tion of deceit, or a ground for the rescission

of the contract. is always receivable, although

it consists of oral representations. This

point was strenuously denied in the argu-

ments submitted by the counsel for the de-

fendant. His contention was that fraud in

the execution of the instrument could be

shown, but that oral representations, going

to u failure of consideration only, could not.

The seeming strength of his contention lay

in the likeness between the written and the

oral facts in the present case, both concern-

ing the quality of the animal sold. The

PROOF

It involvPS the correctness of
the judicial ruling by which the testimony in
respect to certain representations made by
the vendor previous to, Hnd Ht. the time of,
the sale, were admitted in evidence. These
representations, aa already appears, were
made in respect to the traveling qualitiPs of
the animal sold. It also appears that th!'re
was a written warranty in respect to the
quality of soundness and quietness. It is
insisted bv the counsel for the defendant below that the admission of the verbal representations enlarged aml varied the written
contract. Ile therefore invokes the inPxorable rule of evidence tlult, when parties ha\'e
put their contract into writing, oral testimony cannot be substituted for, or 11.dtled to,
the written evidence ot the agreement. 1
Green). Ev. § 88. This principle has, from
the earliest period of jul'i8pr111lence, been recognized as a wholesome Rnd necessary rnle
of public policy. Id.§ 275; Wright v. Remington, 41 N.J. Law,48, 43 N .•J. Law,451;
Naumberg v. Young, 44 N. J. J,aw, 331.
But this rule of evidence is not infringed
by the admission of parol testimony which is
not intended as a substitution for, or an ad<lition to, a written contract, but which goes
to show that the instrument is void or voidable, and that it never had any legal existence, or binding force, either by reason of
fraud, or for want of dne execution and delivery, or for the illegulity of the suhjectmatter of the contract. 1 Green!. Ev. § 2t:!4.
Nor is the admission of parol evidence for
the purpose of avoiding a written co11tract
on the ground of fraud confined to such testimony as goes to show that 11 party was lured
to make a contract other than that intended,
as by the substitution of one contract for another by trickery, or by misre11ding a contract
to an illiterate person. Parol testimony may
be admitted to show tLat. the execution of a
writlen contract was brought about by a
fraudulent representation. The force glvl'n
to a seal, which formerly excludetl testimony
In respect to the failure of consideration in a
speciRlty, is now abolished by legislation.
So that the rule above stated, respt>cting the
admissibility of fraudulent represent.ation, ir.
now applicable to all contracts. The elements l's~ential to constitute such fraudulent
representation will be considered later; and
it is now necessary only to remark that such
evidt>nce as will lay a foundation for an action of deceit, or a ground for the rescission
of the contract, is always receiv11ble, although
it consists of oral representations. This
point was strenuously denied in the argumen~ submitted by the co1ms!'l for the uefe.ndant. His contention was that fraud in
the execution or the instrument could be
shown, but that oral representations, going
to a failure of consid1•ration only, l'011hl 11ot.
The seeming strength of his conte11tion lay
In the lihness betwPen the written and the
oral facts in the present casP, both concernin~ the quality of the animal sold. The
written warranty applied to the soumlness
of evi1!Pnce.
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and kindness of the horse, ancl the oral testimony to the speed of the animal. The danger of permitting parol declarations to be
pro,·f'd which were so nearly related to the
subject-matter of the written wananty wu
strongly pressed as an evil which the rule of
evidence already stated seemed especially designed to prevent. nut the distinction between such representations as add to the contract and such as avoiJ the contract, because
of their fra11dulent character, Is too firmly
estalJlished In our jnrispru1lence to be now
Ehaktm. As an additiom\I warnmtv, thut is,
113 an addition to the contract, tlte pl'!'SE"nt
rE"presentations were clP.arly lnadmi~sihle.
8o soon, however. as they displayed s11ch features as went to show that through them the
contract had been fraudulently induced, and
so w11s unenforceal>le, for that reason, at the
election of the defraudf'd party, the rule excluding pal'Ol testimony to enlarge a written
contract l>t>c11me inopP.rati ve. It is, of course,
obvious that the fact that there was a written
warranty in respect to the soundness nnd
klndne!ls of the animal would be a forcible
argument that no other representations as to
quality were made. The existt•nce or the
written warranty would be useful in determining the probability of the truth of the
counter-statements of the parties as to the
exi~t!'nce 01· non-existence of the pa.rol declaration; but when the frnudulent affirmation
is once proven to 11xist the written contract
becomes unimportant. This seems to ht> an
elt>mentary principle of the law of evidence.
'.fhe right to pro,·e fraud, in whatever shape
it ma\• exist, to avoid written contracts, has
bern °so uniformly recognizrd that it can
hardly be said to have been the subject of serious judicial discussion. The power to consider parol evidence, in regard to its elfects
upon contracts in respect to the question of
fraud, has beeon passed over .mb .<tilmtio, and
the courts hnva gone on to consider the probative force of Lhe testimony. No caRe was
discovt>red by lhe industry of counsel which
excluded such testimony, and all the casf'S in
which judges have touched upon the subject
have 11ssumed the aclmissihility of tt".slimony
setting up fraudulent representathins to
a.void a written contract. l>ohell v. Ste\·ens,
8 Barn. & C. 6:.!3; Hutson v. Browne, 9 C. B.
(N. 8.) 442; Steward v. Coes\'elt, 1 Car.
& P. 2;i; Koop v. Handy, 41 Darb. 454; Prentiss v. Ru~. 16 Me. 30; Van Buskirk v. Day,
32 Ill. 260; Eaton v. }~at.on, 35 ~. ,J. Law.
290. 1 conclude, then•fore, that if the evidence established fraudult:'nt conduct on the
part of the dl'fendant the testimony was properly admitted.
'i'his conclusion !Pads to the consirleration
of the te.'ltimony r!'cehed and submitted to the
jury. 'rllis considl·ration inrnlves two qu~
tions: Fir., t. 'Vas th~ testimony properly
sub111ittl'd to the jury at all? Se•ond. lf su,
was it s11bmit11·d 11n1l ·r proper instructions!'
As alremly rem11rkt>d, the aumi~sibility ot' the
te11t1mom·, aml lherPfore its submission to the
jury, depends for its sanction upon the ques-
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tion whether it was sufficient, in any aspect

in which the jury might view it, to establish

fraud. The general character of a fraudulent

representation which will lay a foundation for

an action for deceit, or a ground for adefense

against a counter-action upon a contract, or a

basis for the rescission of a contract-, are well

settled,‘ 0 far as general rules can settle any

legal question. The representation must be

concerning a material fact, must induce to

the execution of the contract. and must he

made falsely. The falsity constitutes the

scienter, which is an essential element in every

fraudulent representation. This falsity may

consist in making a representation of a ina-

terial fact, knowing it to be false; or it may

consist in making a representation which is

untrue, without knowledge whether it is true

or false. and by coupling with the representa-
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tion an expressed or implied alﬁrmation that

it is known to be true, of personal knowledge.

The instances in which representations can

be said to be fraudulent, as they a.re cogniza-

ble in a. court of law, are conlined within the

limits of the above statement. The case of

Bennett v. Judson. 21 N. Y. 238. which at-

tempted to extend the limits of this rule be-

yond that stated, and import into it the equita-

ble doctrine laid down by Judge Story, has

been repudiated by subsequent cases in the

courts of that state, (0berlander v. Spices. 45

N. Y. 175; Stitt v. Little, 63 N. Y. 427;

Wakeman v. Dalley, 51 N. Y. 27;) and this is

the rule of the common-law courts of Eng-

land and Massachusetts, and our own state,

as shown by Mr. Justice DEPUE in the case

of Cowley v. Smyth, 46 N. J. Law, 380. The

.s-cie'nter, therefore, must be proved in one or

the other of these shapes. In the present

case, it was not proven in the ﬁrst shape;

for proof of a knowledge of the falsity of the

statement on the part of a vendor of the horse

was not attempted, nor was the question sub-

mitted to the jury. The question arises,

therefore, whether ascienter appears in the

second possible shape. It does not appear

that the defendant expressly stated that the

facts atﬁrmed were true, of his own knowl-

edge. In examining the cases. however, we

discover that an express atlirmance of per-

sonal knowledge is not always requisite, as

such aﬂirmance may be implied. Nor, on the

other hand, does it appear that an express af-

ﬁrmance of personal knowledge is to be taken

as ﬁxing conclusively the defend-ant‘s liabili-

ty;- for it may be so qualiﬁed by the facts

stated as to convey a modiﬁed impression.

Indeed, the test seems to consist not so much

in the absence or presence of an expressed as-

seri ion of personal knowled_-e as in the char-

acter of the facts alleged to be true. The rule

of discrimination stated by Mr. Justice DE-

PUB in Cowley v. Smyth, 46 N. J. Law. 350. is

this: “If the party adds to a representation

an atﬁrniation that he made the representa-

tion as of his own knowledge, the force and

effect of the evidence will depend in a great

measure upon the nature of the suhjet-t con-

tion whether it was sufficient, in any aspPct
in which the jury might view it, to establish
fraud. The genernl character of a fraud11l1>nt
representation which will lay a fo1mrlation for
an action for deceit, or a ground for a defense
11gainst a counter-action upon a contract, or a
basis for the rescission of a cont1"act, are well
settled,- so far as general rules t•an settle any
legal question. 'fhe representation must be
concerning a material fact, must ln1l11ce to
the execution of the contract, 11nd must be
made falst'ly. The f1th1ity constitutes lhe
scienter, which is an essential element in every
fraudulent rt>presentation. This falsity may
consist in n111king a reprt>senb1tion of a material fact, knowing it to he false; or it may
consist in making a representalion which i~
untrue, without knowledge whether it is true
or false, and by coupling with the representation an expressed or implied affirmation that
it is known to he true, of personal knowledge.
The instances in which r11presentations can
IJe said to be fraudulent, as they are cognizable in a conrt of law, are conHned within the
limits of the above statement. The case of
Bennett v. Judson, ~l N. Y. 238, which attemptoo to extend the limits of this rule 00yond tb1lt stated, and import into it the equitable doctrine l11id down by Judge l::it.ory, hllll
been repu1liated by sub~equent cast>s in the
courts of that state, (Oberlander v. Spiess, 45
N. Y. 175; Stitt v. Little, 63 N. Y. 427;
Wakeman v. Dalley, 51 N. Y. 27;) and this is
the rule of the common-lnw courts of England and Massachusetts, and our own state,
as shown by Mr. Justice Dm>UE In the case
of Cowley v. Smyth, 46 .N. J. Law, 380. The
.YCienter, therefore, must be provt>d in one or
the other of these shapes. In the present
case, it was not proven in the tirst shape:
for proof of a knowledge of the falsity of the
<!tattlment on the part of a vendor of the horse
was not attempted, nor was the quest.ion submitted to the jury. The question am1es,
therefore, whether a scienter appears in the
•ecuncl possiule shape. It does not a11pt'ar
that the defendant expressly stated that the
facts affirmed were true, of bis own knowledge. In examining the cases, however, we
discover that an express atllrmance of personal knowleJge is not always requ;site, as
such affirmance maybe implied. Nor, on the
other hand, does it appe11r that an express afflrmance of penional knowledge is to be taken
as Hxing condusively the d1·fendant's liability;. for it may be so qualified by the faets
stated u to convey a modifiPd lmpre~sion.
Imlt>eJ, th" test seems to consist not so mu\!h
in th ... a[)'4ence or presen•·eof an expres~ed asser1 ion of personal knowled..;e as in the characl er of the facts alleged to tie true. The rule
of discrimination stated by Mr. Justice Di.:PUE in CnwJ ..y v. Smyth, 46 N. J. L1w, ilt:>O. is
this: "IC the party adds tn a reprt>Sl'ntation
an atfirmation that he maJe tl1t' repre~enta
tinn as of his own knowl1>1lgP, the force anti
effecl or tl:e evid•·nce will d1•pend in a great
mea,.ure upon the nature of tl1'• s11hjec·t con..cerniug which the representation was made.

If it be with respect to a specific fact, or facts
susceptible of t>Xact knowled~e, and thP subject-matter be such as that the atl1rmation of
knowledge is to be taken in its st1ict sense,
and not merely as a strong expression of balief, lhe f11lsehood in such a represt>ntation
lies in the defendant's affirmation that he had
the requisite knowledge to vouch for the truth
of his as>1ertiuns, anJ that, being nntrul', the
falsehood would be willful, and therefore
fraullult>nt. But, where the represe11lat1on
is concerning a condition of nfiuil's not susceptible or exact knowledge, • • • the
assertion of knowledge is to be taken sec11ndtim 1n~jectam materiam, ns meaning
no othPr th1m a strong belief fo11nded upon
what appeared to the defendant to be reasonable and certain grounds." '.rherefore, without rc•gard to wlll'the1· the atHrnrnnce of personal knowh·dge was express or otherwise,
the existence of such affirmation depends
upon the form of the alHrmation of far.t, and
of t:1e character or subject-matter, concerning
which the affirmation was made. From these
circumstances, it must be consitlered, in the
language used in Marsh v. Falker, 40 N. Y.
562, whether the party assumeJ, or intended
to convey the impression, thttt he had actual
knowledge, thongh conscious that he had not.
In the following cases there was no express
affirmance of personal knowledge: Ila1ard
v. Irwin, 18 Pick. 95: .Milliken v. Thorndike,
103 Mass. 382; Litchfield v. Hutchinson, 117
Mass.195; Wakeman v. Dalley, 51 N. Y. 27.
'rhe question whether there is an alDrmation of personal knowled~e Is sometiml's one
of law, but oftfiner one of fact. In the line
of cases of which Cowley v. Smyth is a
samplt>, it is treatPd as a question of law,
arising from the character of the facts which
were the subject-matter of the representations. It was le)Cally concludeJ that the representations could only be those of belief.
On the other hand, there mil(ht be express
am1:mance or personal knowledge with respect to facts so obviously the subject of ac·
curate knowledge that it could be legally
concludt>d that it was not an exprf'ssion of
belief or ooinion, and that, tlwri·fore, the
falsity of the facts stnted would imply 11
scimter. In a wide range of casPS the q uestion of the existence of an affirmation of pt>r·
sonal knowlt!tlge was submitted as one of
fact, and it wa>1 either in support or reversal
of the finding of jurie>i or reports of referees
that the legal rull's applicable to such rc•presentations were laid down. This will be observl'd by ref,.renc:e to the follol\'i11g cases:
Tucker v. White, 125 Mass. 3-14; Milllkon
v. Thorndike. 103 Mass. ~2; Page v. Hent,
2 Mete. 371; and cases already ciled upon the
preceding points. In the p1·81!ent case, it appPan1, to my mind, clPar that it could not ue
IPl{ally infened that tlwre wa 1 an as3ertion
of per~unal knowleJ;;e or the truth of the
fact~ slate•l: The whole convnsalion helwPen vendor anti purcha:1er Sll)Ci;rests tlte opposite. It implietl that the V•·ndor's knowledge of the traveling ability of the horse
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rested upon what he knew of the previous

history of the animal, and perhaps, in some

degree, from the use of a horse by other per-

sons. The animal seems to have been used

for livery purposes. The horse had been ad-

mittedly driven to Orange and Harlem the

day before the sale was consummated. The

vendor did not say that he had driven

the horse the alleged distance in the time

. representations in the sale of a horse.

stated. He does not say he had driven him l

at all. His statement that the horse could

easily do that, for he had been a very fast

horse, and had been used to the salvage

corps wagon, implied that his knowledge

was grounded upon such information, rather

than upon personal knowledge. Therefore

it seems to me that it was clearly a mistake L

for the court to say that the representation

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:08 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104925781
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

was so~obviously of a fact susceptible of .

exact information, made as of the personal

knowledge of the vendor. that this question

was not one to be left to the jury.

seems to me that the representations, as they -

appear in the case, and as they were treated

at the trial, amounted to something more

than an allirmation that the horse was able

to travel the distance named within the time

mentioned on a single occasion, but they im-

plied that the animal could habitually do so.

The idea conveyed was that the horse was to

be ﬁt for the service required, namely, to

convey the purchaser from Rockland to

Orange Valley, in the course of his business.

horse’s ability to perform that service con-

tinually. Now, it seems apparent that when

the representation not only covers the pres-

ent ability to perform a service once, but also

its ability to do so frequently and continu-

ously, it extends beyond the realm of exact

inforlnation, if it does not cease to be a rep-

resentation of a subsisting fact at all. and

become a mere promise for future perform-

ance. But, without regarding this feature

of the case, I am convinced that, in assum-

3-£0

It also 1

ing that the present case was one in which

the falsity of the representation raised the

legal inference of fraud, the court was in er-

ror. The case of Searing v. Lum, 5 N. J.

Law, 785, was an action for deceit, brought

in a jnstice’s court, upon the ground of false

The

gracamen of the action was that the vendor

had represented the horse to be so nd and

kind. The justice charged that it was un-

necessary to prove that the defendant had

any knowledge of the unkindness of the horse.

The court above held this to be error. The

case of Allen v. Wanamaker, 31 N. J. Law,

370, was an action for false representations.

in that the defendant represented certain

peach trees to be good. The court charged

that the defendant was liable for such rcp-

resentations, if false, whether he knew them

to be true or not. This was held error. I,

however, incline to the opinion that in this

PHOOF.

rested upon what he knew of the previous
history of the animal, anll perhaps, in some
degree, from the use of a hors~ by other pel'sons. The animal seems to have heen used
for livery purposes. The hol'se had been admittedly driven to Orange an<l Harlem the
day before the sale was consummated. The
vendol' did not say that he had driven
the horse the alleged distance in the time
11tated. He does not say he had driven him
at all. His statement that the hol'se could
easily do that, for he had been a very fast
horse, and had been used to the salvage
corps wagon, implieJ that his knowledge
was gl'ounded upon such information, rather
than upon personal knowledge. 'fhel'efore
it seems to me that 1t was clt>1u-ly a mistake
for the court to say thnt the rt>prt>sentation
was so· obviously of a fact susceptible of
exact information, made as of the personal
knowledge of the vendor, that this question
was not one to be left to the jury. It also
seems to me that the repre11entations, as they
appear in the case, and as they were treated
at the trial, amounted to something more
than an altirmation that the horse was able
to travel the distance named within the time
mentioned on a sinirle ocCRSion, but they implied that the animal could habitually do so.
· The idea conveyed was that the horse was to
be fit for the service required, namely, to
convey the purchRser from Rockland to
Orange Valley, in the course of his business.
This seems to involve the question of the
horse's ability to perform that service continually. Now, it seems apvarent that when
the representation not only covers the present ability to perform a service once, but also
its ability to do so frequently and con ti nuously, it extends beyond the realm of exact
infor111ation, if it does not cease tQ be a representation of a subsisting fact at all, and
become a mere promise for future pel'formance. But, without regarding this l'eature
of the CW1e, I am conviuct!d that, in assu1n340

' ing that the present case WM one in which
falsity of the representation raised the
I legal inference of fra11d, the court was in error. The case of Searing v. Lum, 5 N. J.
: Law, 785, was an aclion for deceit, brought
in a justice's court, upon the ground of false
representations in the sale of a horse. The
gra~amen of the action was that the vendor
• had represented the horse to be so nil and
! klnd. The justice charged that it was unnecessary to prove that the defendant had
any knowledge of the unkindrwss of the hon1e.
The court above held this to be error. The
case of Allen v. Wanamaker, SI N. J. Law,
370, was an action for false representation8,
In that the defenrlant repl'esented certain
peach trees to be good. 'fhe court charged
that the defend;mt was liable for such rep·
resentations, if false, whether he knew them
to be true or not. This was held error. I.
however, incline to the opinion that In this
case the question whether there was an afftrmation of personal knowlf!dge of the truth
of the representation was not one for the jury;
but l think that this is so because the representations were of a kind concerning which
the judge could say lt was legally inff'lrable
that tlu~y were the statement of a strong be·
lief only in the truth or the facts ae!lerted.
The feature of the case already mentioned,
which led me to the conclnsion that the assumplion of the trial judge was a mistake,
leads me to the opposite conclusion, that the
legal inference Lo be drawn is that it would
not have been underetooll by the vendor and
the vendee, at the time of the sale, that there
was coupled with the representations conceming the horse a representation that the vendor
had personal knowledge concerning them, but
that it WHS nnderi;tood that he expressed his
stmng belief in their truth, resting upon his
knowledge of the previous history of the ani..
mai, 1tnd his use as 1\ Ii vton horse. For these
reasons, I think the judgtnt!llt below should
be re\·erseu.
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DURKIN v. COBLEIGH.

(30 N. E. 474, 156 Mass. 108.)

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

folk. Feb. 27, 1892.

Exceptions from superior court, Suffolk

county; James M. Barker, Judge.

Action by Patrick Durkin against Benj. F.

Cobleigh for breach of agreement. A verdict

was rendered for defendant by direction of

the court, and plaintiff excepts. Exceptions

sustained.

F. W. Kittredge and W. H. Drury, for

plaintiﬂ. F. Hutchinson, for defendant.

Dl'UKIN v. COBLEIGH.
(30 N. E. 474, 156 Ma88. 108.)

Supreme Judicial Court of Mnivmchusetts. Suffolk. Fe.b. 'n, 1892.
Exceptions fl'Om superior court, Sutiolk
county; James M. Barker, Judge.
Action by Patrick Durkin against Benj. F.
Coblel,i:h 1'01· bn>ach of agreement. A verdJct
was rendered tor defendant by direction ot
the court, and plalntiiT excepts. Exceptions
sustained.
~·. W. Kittredge and W. H. Drury, tor
plalntltI. F. Hutchinson, tor defendant.

Suf-

ALI.l~}.\', J. This is an action of contract.

The plaintiff had taken i’rom the defendant a

deed of land described as bounded on a

street, and referring to a plan on which the

street was shown. This street was upon

land owned by the defendant. The deed
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contained no covenant that the defendant

would build the street, or cause water to be

introduced therein. The plaintilI‘s case rests

upon the proposition that, in order to induce

him to buy the lot, the defendant orally

promised to grade and build the street so

as to connect with a certain public street

already built and open, and also to cause the

city water to be put into the street by a

certain speciﬁed time. The question is

whether such an oral agreement may be

shown. The plaintiff gained a right of way

by estoppel over the land owned by the de-

fendant, and described as a street. Howe V.

Alger, 4 Allen, 206; Insurance Co. v. Cousens,

127 Mass. ‘.558; Crowell v. Beverly, 134 Mass.

98. And this right would extend for the

entire length of the street, as indicated, pro-

vided the defendant owned the same. Tobey

v. Taunton, 119 Mass. 404; Fox v. Sugar

Reﬁnery, 109 Mass. 292. But the defendant

would not be bound by his deed to build and

maintain the street ﬁt to travel. Ilennessey

v. Railroad Co., 101 Mass. 540. The obliga-

tion of the defendant to do the acts now in

question depends wholly on his alleged oral

agreement. A rule has been established

which may be stated in general terms to be

that an agreement by parol. which is col-

lateral to the written contract and on a dis-

tinct subject, may be proved. It is rather

tlitiicult to lay down a precise formula to

deline in advance for all cases what will

come within this rule. In Steph. Dig. Ev.

(Am. Ed.) 163, this is attempted as follows:

"The existence of any separate oral agree-

ment as to any matter on which a document

is silent, and which is not inconsistent with

its terms, if from the circumstances of the

case the court infers that the parties did not

intend the document to be a complete and

ﬁnal statement of the whole transaction be-

tween them," may be proved. Where the

oral agreement is on the face of it incon-

sistent with what was written, it is plain

that the writing must prevail. Flynn v.

Bourneuf, 143 Mass. 277, 9 N. E. 650, and

Knowlton v. Keenan, 146 Mass. 86, 15 N. E.

127, were cases of this kind. But the more

ALLKX, J. This Is an action of contract.
The pl11inttrr hnd taken from the defrndunt a
deed of land described as bounded on a
Mtt·eet, and referring to a plan on whkh the
street was shown. This 11treet was upon
land owned by the defendant. The deed
contained no covenant that the defendant
would build the street, or cause water to be
introduced therein. The plulntltI"s cuse rests
upon the pro1>0sltlon that, In order to Induce
him to buy the lot, the dPtendant orally
promised to grade and build the Mtreet so
as to conneC't with a certain public street
alreac.ly bunt and open, and also to cause the
<'ity water to be put Into the street by a
certain speelflec.1 time. The question Is
whether such au oral agreement may be
shown. The plalntltr gained a right of way
by estoppel over the land owned by the defendant, and described 1111 a 11tr1>et. Howe v.
Alger, 4 Allen, '.!00; Insm·um'I' Cu. v. Cousens,
127 MaAA. :.i.-18; Crowell v. Be,·erly, 134 Mm1s.
98. And this rlgllt would extend for the
entire length of the street, as Indicated, pro'1ded the defendant owned the sumP. Tobey
v. 'raunton, 119 Mass. 40!; Fox v. Sugar
Refinery, 109 Mass. 29'2. But the defPndant
would not be bound by his deed to build and
maintain the street flt to travel. Hennessey
v. Hailrond Co., 101 l\la11S. 540. The obligation of the defendant to do the actl!I now In
question de)lends wholly on his alleged oral
agreement. A 111fo has been established
which mny be Rtated In general tPt'ms to be
that an ngrPt>nwnt by parol, which ls c·ollu tPral to the written contract und on a dlstlm·t sul>jeet, n111~· be proved. It Is rather
ditlicult to lny down a precise formula to
dt>tlne In mh'ance for nil cn11es what will
<~m1e within thi!l rule. In Steph. Dig. Ev.
(Am. Ed.) 163, this Is atterupted as follows:
'"Tht> existence of 11ny separate oral agreement as to any watter on which a document
Is silent, and which Is not lnC'onslst1>nt with
Its terms, It from the circumstances of the
case the court Inters that the parties did not
Intend the document to be a complete and
final statement of the whole transaction between them," may be ~roved. Where the
ornl agreement Is on the tace ot It lncon·

slstt>nt with what was wrltte~. It Is plain
that the writing must prevail. Flynn v.
Bourneuf, 143 1\lass. 277, 9 N. E. 650, and
Knowlton v. Keenan, 146 Mass. 86, lo N. E.
12i. were cases of this kind. But the more
dlm<·ult question arises where the oral agreement relied on relates to something not
specltled In terms In the writing. It must
then be determined whether the written document ls to be deemed to contain all that
wa11 agreed between the parties. There are
many cases In which this question has been
presented, and the decisions are not entirely
harmonious. Thus In Naumberg v. Young,
44 ~- J. Law, 331, the court dlsn.pproved ot
the decisions In Morgan v. Griffi.th, L. R. 6
Exch. 70, and Erskine v. Adeane, 8 Cir. App.
766, ln which cases It was held that an oral
agreement by a lessor to destroy the rabbits
might be proved. In an early Massuchusetts
case It was held that a lessor ls not bound
by an oral agreement to provide other and
better accommodations than those stipulated
tor In the lease. Brigham v. Rogers, 17
Mass. 571. And on a written contract of
sale ot goods an additional warranty cannot
be proved by pnrol. Whitmore v. Iron Co.,
2 Allen, 52, 58; Elghmie v. Taylor, 98 N.
Y. 288. So where one, by a. written Instrument, agreed to sell out his business stand
and stock of goods, It cannot be shown by
parol that he also agreed not to engage In a
similar business in the same town. Doyle v.
Dixon, 12 Allen, 576; Wilson v. Sherburne,
O Cush. 68. On the other hand, In several
cases more nearly resembling the present
In their tacts, It has been held that an additional oral agreement might be proved. Thus
oral agreements by vendors ot land requir-.
Ing to be filled, that they would pay tor the
filling, have been held to be independent collateral agreements which might be enforced.
Page v. llonks, 5 Gray, 492; McCormlch v.
Cheevers, 124 Mass. 262. Also an oral agreement by a grantor to pay tor building a
sewer In the street. Carr v. Dooley, 119
Mass. 294. The case of GraiTam v. Pierce,
143 Mass. 386, 9 N. E. 819, was deemed to
come within the samP doctrine. It wns dPtermlnetl In Ayer v. ~lnnutacturlng Co., Hi
Mass. 46, 16 N. E. 754, that a manufacturer
of goods who accepted a written order, with
stipulations as to quality, price, and rebate
or claims for allowance, might be held on
an oral agreement to adYertlse the goods.
See, also, Willis v. Hulbert, 117 Mass. 151;
Rennell v. Kimball, 5 Allen, 3..'i6; Tayl. Ev.
§§ 1135, 1147. It seems to us that the case
tails within the last class of decisions, and
that the alleged agreement of the defendant
Rhould be treated as an Independent collateral agreement, which need not be included
in the deed. 'fhe result Is that the plaintiff
wns entitled to have hts case submitted to
the jury. Exceptions sustained.
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GILBERT et al. "'· llcGIXXIS et al.
(28 N. E. 38'2, 114 Ill. 28.)
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GILBERT ct al. v. 1\IcGI.\'NlS et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois. May 15, 1885.
Appeal from appellate conrt, Second
district; G•:onoE W. ~TIPP, Judgt'.
Action by Herbert S. Gilbert & Co.
against Pa'trlck McGlnnlR anrl others to
rPCover on a contract for the nun-delivery
or <:orn. There was a judgment !or de·
fendanb.1 In the circuit court, which WRS
affirmed in the appellate court, and 1>lalnttrr11 ttppeal. The Judgment le again artirmed.
lJull, Strawu tf Ruger, for appeJlanta.
Duuc1w ct O'Cormor, for appellees.

(28 N. E. 382, 114 Ill. 28.)

Supreme Court of Illinois. May 15, 1885.

Appeal from appellate court, Second

district; Gl-zonol-: W. STIPP, Judge.

Action by Herbert S. Gilbert & Co.

against Patrick McGinnis and others to

recover on a contract for the non-delivery

ofcorn. There was a. judgment for de-

fendants in the circuit court, which was

affirmed in the appellate court, and plain-

tiffs appeal. The judgment is again af-

firmed.

Bull, Straivu & Ruger, for appellants.

Duncan & O'Connor, for appellees.

MULKEY, J. On the 16th of February,

18M, Patrick Mt-Glnnis, the appeliee, sold

to the appellants, Herbert S. Gilbert &

Co., 7.000 bushels of corn. at 39 cents per
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bushel, to be delivered in the months of

August and September following. As a

part of the sa,mo agreement, the appel-

lants promised to make advances on the

contract to appellee of what money he

might, from time to time, require. A

short time alter the making of this agree-

ment, appellee called on the appellants, at

their business house in Ottawa. and re-

quested an advance on the contract, as

per agreement. 'l‘he clerk in charge of

their business told him he could have the

money, and commenced writing a note

for the amount, whereupon appeliee stat-

ed to the clerk he would not sign a note,

remarking, in effect, that if he wanted to

obtain money in that way he could get

it from the hank. Appellants refused to

make the required advance unless appellee

would give his note for the amount.

This he declined to do, and informed the

clerk at the time he would not let appel-

lants have the corn. 'l‘he corn not having

been delivered within the time speciﬁed in

the agreement. the appellants, on the 3d

day of ()ctober,1881, commenced an action

of assumpsit against appellec-,in theclrcuit

court of La Salle county, to recover dam-

ages for the non-delivery of the corn,

which resulted in ajudgment in favor of

the defendant for costs. This judgment

having been affirmed by the appellate

court for the second district, the plaintiffs

appealed to this court.

On the trial the plaintiffs offered to

show there was a general custom among

grain merchants to take notes from the

seller for the amount of advances made

under contracts for the sale of grain, like

the one in question. They also proposed

to prove that on previous occasions there

had been contracts and dealings similar

in character to the one sued upon, and

that the manner of dealing between the

parties was, when an advance was made,

memoranda or notes should be taken for

the money advanced. The court declined

to admit evidence to thejury in support

of either of these positions, and the rui-

'

MULKEY, .J. On the 16th of February,
181.'11, Patrick McGlnnlK, thti appellee, 1mlll
to the appellon ts, HE'rbert 8. Gilbert &
Co., 7,000 bushels of corn, at 39 cents per
bushel, to be delivered in the montha of
August and Reptember following. As a
part of the eiync 84!-'ref'ment, the appellant& promised to make odvanceR on the
contract to appellee of what money he
might, from time to time, require. A
11hort time nftt'r the making of this agreement, appellee cnll<'d ou thP nppellantK, at
their bulllne@s house In Ottawa. ancl requested an advance on thf' contract, 8.!I
per agreement. The clerk in <'harge of
their huelness told him he could have the
money. and commenced 'vrltlng a note
for the amount, whereupon a(Jpellee stated to the clerk he would nut sign a note,
remarking, in effect, that If be ~anted to
obtain money in that way he could get
It from the honk. Appellants refused to
mukP the req•1ired advance unless appellee
would give his note for the amount.
ThlM he declined to do, and informed the
clerk at the time he would not let appellants have the corn. 'J'he corn not havln~
been delivered within the time speclfled In
the agreement. the apfJelhrnts, on the 3d
day of October, 1881, com•uenced an uctlor1
of 11.Ssumpslt against appellet', In the circuit
court of La Salle county, to reccn·er dam·
ages for the non-delivery of the corn,
which reflulted In a judgment In favor uf
tbA <lefendant for costs. This jud,nnent
hu·ing been affirmed by the appellate
court for the second district, the plaintiffs
appealed to this court.
On the trlRl the plaintiffs offered to
show there was a genl'ral cu11tom among
grain merchants to take noteM from the
Meller for the amount or advances made
uudt'r contracts for the sale of grain, like
the one In question. Tht'Y also propoeecl
to prove that on previous or.cuslone therl'
h1td bPen contracts and dealings slmllnr
in churncter tu the one sued upon, anrl
that the manner of dealing between the
parties was, when an advance was nwde,
memoranda or notes ghould be taken for
the money advnnced. The court derllned
to admit evidence to the jury In support
of <'lther of these positlune, and the ruling of the conrt In this reHpect presents
the only question for determination. The
same qnestlon IH ralwed by certain refused
lnstructlonR 1111ked on hehalf of the appellants. 'l'he rule le well recognized that
where a commercial contract is lo any
342

respect ambiguous, a particular custom
or usnge of trade known to the parties,
or which, under the clrcumstunces, they
are presumed to know, or any prevluu11
course of dealing between them that wlll
ho.\"e a tendem•y to dhll"I08c the real lnten·
tlons or the parties, and to aid the court
In arrlv.lng at its true con11tructlon, will
be admls~lble in evidence. Such evidence
I& not only admissible for the purpo11e of
e.ltplnlnlng the terms of a contract, but
also for the pnrpose of lngraftlog, aa It
were, new tpr1m1 Into It, subject, however,
to the quallllcatlon that 1mch new terms
are not expressly or lmplleltly excluded
by the expr~!Jll agreement. 1 ~mlth, Lead.
Cas. •307 et seq. To ha vc thl11 effect, howE:ver, the osage must be rea110011ble, and
not In conftlct with any general role of law.
Macy v. Insurance Co., 9 Mete. (llasa.)
854. The proof oflert!d In this case W8.t'
clearly not for the purpo!!e or explaining
any ambiguity In the contract, or for the
purpo11e of showing that some particular
word or phraRe In it Is used out of Its ordinary shcnlftcatlon. No claim of thlP
kind 111 made. It 18 concPded by both par·
ties that appellants \Vere to make ad·
vances,-thnt la, let appellee haT'e money.
from time to time. as he might need It.
under the contract. 80 far there ls· no
contro'ferHy. But appellants contend
that a custom or usage prevailed, not ad·
verted to In the express agreement, which
required the app<>llee to glvP to them hl11
note upon receiving any such odvan1:e11.
The usa1;te here s•Jugllt to be shown, It 111
clPar, was for the purpose of adding a
stipulation on the part of appellee, which.
It Is con<'edcd, 111 not found In the expreea!
agreement. 'l'hls, as we have already
seen, may sometimes be done; bot whether It could be done lo this partlculRr case
depends upon whether the 11tipulatlon
thus to be added Is inconsistent or In conOlct with that r1art of the agl'l't'ment
wbl<'h Is expressed,a.nrl about which there
la no contro\·ersy. We are clearly of opinion that It Is, and that the trlPI court,
therefore, ruled properly In excluding the
evidence and in refm1lng the instructions
complained of. An advance orpayment of
monPy on a contract of sale, without
doubt, is altogether a different thing from
that of obtaining money from the purchaser on the seller'H own note. The lPgal
effect of the trnnsactlon In the first r.aee le
to extlngulRh, pro tnnto, the seller's claim
and the purchaser's corre!!pondlng llabillty. In the second, no part of either Is ex·
tlnguished. Instead of collecting something on his corn, as provided by the
agreement, the seller lit ottered a. loan of
money on his individual note, which
woultJ he a complete change of the le1tnl
relations of the parties. Wbe:"eas the sell·
er was before a mere creditor of the purchaser. he at oncP, upon ttlvlng such a
note, become& the dPbtor Of the purt•has•
er, and no part of the debt due him on UC·
<'ount of the tiale is thereby discharged.
ThuM it is seen the Jpgal effect in the one
cuse Is practlrall.v the very opposite of
what It ls In tht'other,aud might In nurny
cal!eti result In the grosite~t Injustice. l''or
Instance, had appellee given his note for
the required ad vauce, the appellants

ORAL EVIDENCE TO VARY Oli EXPLAIN
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[Case No. 118

might, the next hour thereafter, have

transferred it to another for value, and

appellee would have been compelled to

pay it, whether he ever got a cent ior his

corn or not. This is appuren t. That one

will not be permitted to prove acnstom

or usage the eiiect of which will be to add

to an express agreement a condition or

limitation which is repugnant to or incon-

sistent with the agreement itseli, will

hardly be questioned. This is not only

the universally received doctrine on the

mll(ht, the next hour thereafter, have
transferred It to another for vRlue, and
appellee won Id have been compelled to
pay It, whether he ever got a cent for his
corn or not. This ls ar1parent. That one
will not be permltte(} to prove a. c11stom
or nsau;e the effect of which wlll be to add
to an express agrePment a condition or
limitation which Is repngnant to or inconsistent with the agreement lbielf, will
harl1ly be questlo11ed. Thht 18 not only
the unl\•erK1dly received doctrine on the
a11bject, but It has been often fully rt..'(!ognlzerl IJy this court. Cadwell v. Meek, 17
Ill. 220; Bh1sell v. Ryan, 23 Ill. 566; Deshler v. Beers, 32 Ill. 368; WUson ,., Bauman, 80 m. 493. In the editor's note to

DOCUME~T.-l.

[Case Xo. 118

Wlgglc1nvortb v. Dallbmn, 1 Smith, Leud.
Cea. SUD, It 111 said: "Evidence of usage,
though sometime.. admissible to add to
or explalu, ls never to vary or to contradict, eitner expre1111ly or by Implication,
the terms of a written Instrument;" citing, In 1mpport of the proposition, Magee
v. Atklmmn, 2 Mee11. & W. 442; Adams v.
WordlPy, 1 Mees. & W. :174; 'l'rueman v.
Loder, 11 Adol. & E. 5~U; and Yates '"·
Pym, 6 Taunt. 446. The rule here stated
Is equally applicable to a verbal contrllct,
where the terms of. It are deftnltely flxed,
as they are In the present ca11e. ltfollows
from what we have said, and the. aotborltlee cited, the joilgmeot of the appellate court must be affirmed.

subject, but it has been oiten iully recog-

nized by this court. Cadweil v. Meek. 17

Ill. 220; Bisseil v. Ryan, 23 Ill. 566: Desi!-

ier v. Beers. 32 Iii. 368; Wilson v. Ban-

man, 80111. 493. In the editor's note to

Wigglesworth v. Dallison, 1 Smith, Lead.

Gas. 309, it is said: “Evidence of usage,
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though sometimes admissible to add to

or explain, is never to vary or to contra-

dict, eitner expressly or by implication,

the terms oi a written instrument;" eit-

ing, in support of the proposition. Magee

v. Atkinson, 2 Mees. & W. 442; Adams v.

Wordiey, 1 Mees. & W. 374; Truenlan v.

Loder, ll Ado]. & E. 589; and Yates v.

Pym, 6 Taunt. 446. The rule here stated

is equally applicable to a. verbal contract,

where the terms 01- it are deﬁnitely ﬁxed,

as they are in the present case. Itfolio ws

from what we have said, and the-au-

thorities cited, the judgment oi the appel-

late court must he aiﬁrmed.
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COONROD v. lfADDEN'.
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(25 N. E. 1102, 1:?6 Ind. 197.)

COONROD v. MADDEN.

(25 N. E. 1102, 126 Ind. 197.)

Nov. 25, 1890.

Appeal from circnitcourt, Knox county ;

Gi~:ono1~: A. Biclmi-:Ll., Special Judge.

Supreme Court of Indiana. Nov. 25, 1890.
Appeal from clrcuitcourt, Knox county;
GEOHOE A. BICKNELi., Special Judge.
Geurge C. Reily, for appellant. Cobb ct
Cobb, for appellee.

George C. Reily, for appellant. Cobb &

Cobb, for appellee.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

COFFEY, J. This was a suit by the ap-

pellee against the appellant upon a prom-

issory note. Answer, payment. Reply,

general denial. Trial by the court. Find-

ing and judgment for the appellee, over a

motion for a new trial,for the full amount

of the note, with reasonable attorney's

fees. The assignment of error calls in

question the propriety of the ruling of the

circuit court in overruling the motion for

a new trial. No brief is ﬁled in the cause
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on behalf of the appellee, and by reason of

that fact we are not informed as to the

ground upon which the court made its

several rulings in his favor. On the trial

of the cause the appellant introduced and

read in evidence a certain check executed

by him to the appellee, and also testified

that such check was given and received in

part payment of the note in suit. The ap-

pellee, over the objection of the appellant,

was permitted by the court to testify that

the check was received by him in part pay-

ment of another and different note from

the one in suit, giving the date and

amount of said note, and its rate oi’ inter-

est. He also testiiied that thcappellant

had paid the note to him in full, and that

it had been surrendered to the appellant.

The objection to this evidence, stated by

the appellant to thecourt at the time of its

introduction, was that it was secondary,

and that the appellee could not give evi-

dence of the contents of such note without

ﬁrst proving its loss, or serving notice up-

on the appellant to produce it in court. to

be used in evidence in the cause. It is un-

doubtedly the general rule that, before

parol evidence can be received of the con-

tents ol a written instrument, it must be

shown that such instrument is lost or de-

stroyed, or that such instrument is in the

hands of the party against whom the evi-

dence ls offered; and that, upon proper

notice so to do, he has failed to produce

the original in court, to be read in evi-

dence. Smith v. Reed. 7 Ind. 242; Mum-

ford v. Thomas. l0 Ind. 167; Manson v.

Blair, l5 Ind. 242: Bridge Co. v. Apple-

gate, l3 Ind. 331); Fra zee v. State, 58

Ind. 8; McMakin v. Weston, 64 1110.270.

But there is a well-deﬁned and well-estab-

lished exception to this general rule. The

general rule has no application where the

written instrument is merely collateral to

the issue; as where the parol evidence re-
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lates to matters distinct from the instru-

ment ol writing, although the same fact

could be proved or disproved by the writ-

COFFEY, J. Thie was a eutt by the appellee aatainet the ap(>elhmt upon a promissory note. AnKwer, payment. Reply,
general denial. •rrlal by the court. lt'lndlng 11nd judgment for the a1>11ell1.."f', over a
motion for a new trial, for the full amount
of the note, with reasonable attorney's
fees. The assignment of error calls in
question the propriety of the rullnar of the
circuit court In overruling the motion for
a new irial. No brief ls filed In the cause
on behalf of the apprllee, a~d by reason of
that fact we nre not Informed ns to the
ground upon which the coul"t made Its
several rnllngR In his favor. On the trial
of the cauHP the appellant Introduced and
read In evhlence a certain check executed
by him to the appellee, and also teetlfted
that such check was given an<l received In
part payment of the note to suit. The appellee, over the objection of the ap11ellant,
was permitted by the cuurt to testify that
the check was received by him in part payment of another and different note from
the one tn 11utt, giving the date and
amount or said note, and lte rate or fnterest. He al110 teellfte<J that the appellant
bad paid the note to him tn full, and that
It had been 1rnrrendered to the appellant.
The ol>jectlon to this evidence, stated by
the appellunt tothecourt at the time of its
Introduction, was that It was sccondury,
and that the nppellee could not give evidence of the contents of such note without
first proving Its loHs, or serving notice upon the apprllant to procluce it In court, to
be used tn C\'idence In tbfl cam~e. It 111 undoubtedly the general rule that, before
parol evidence can be received of the con·
tents or a wl'lt~n Instrument, It muRt be
shown that such ln11trn1nent le lost or destroyed, or that such instrument ls In the
hands of the party ugalm~t whom the evidence le offered; and that, upon proper
notice so to do, he has failed to produce
the original to court, to be rrud In evidence. ::;mtth v. Recd, 7 Ind. 2*2; .Mumford v. Thomas, 10 Ind. 167; Maoeon v .
Blall', 15 Ind. 242; Bridge Co. v. Applegate, 13 Ind. :la!l; l<'ra zee v. State, 58
Ind. 8; Mc!\fukin v. We11ton, tU Ind . 27U.
But there Is a well-defined and well-established exception to this general rule. 'l'he
general rule has no oppllcatlon where the
written Instrument Is merely collnte ral to
the l11sue; ae where the parol evidence re344

h\tee to matters distinct from the Instrument of wrltln1t, although the same fact
could be proved or disproved by the writing. Wood , Pr. Ev. p. 4. In the case of
Dtrnlel v. JobnHon, 29 6a. 207, It was held
that payment might be pro\'ed by parol
to have been me.de tn promlesory notee,
without the production of the notea. The
rule ls that, where the parol evidence 18
ae near the thing to which thewitnt.'88 testlftee as the written e\•ldence, then each is
primary. Whart. Ev. § 77. The case or
Hewitt v. State, 121 Ind. ~5, 23 N. E. Rep.
83, le analogous In prlncl11le to the case under consideration. Jn tlutt cuee Hewitt
was charited with mallclou11ly killing a
dog. The state was 1.1ermltted to prove
by parol that the dog lo qm'Btion bad
been listed for taxation, over the objection
of Hewitt that the tax-list returned by the
aeeeseor was the beet ttvldence of that
fact. Jn Hnawer to this objection, this
court said: '"The eubstentlve fact to be
provecl was that the dog killed bad been
llRte<l for tnxatlon, and tile rule 111 that.
where purol evidence le as near the fact
testified to ae the written. then each le
primary. The rule which requires the production of written Instruments In e¥1dence
bas no application when tbe luetrumPot la
merely collateral to the Issue, and whf're
the fact to be prov~ relutes to a subject
distinct from the writing." In this t•ase,
had the note upon which the appellre
claimed the check read In Pvldence had
been applied been produced in court, the
parties would have been ae far from the
real cnntro\·ersy between them ae thP.y
were before tte producttoo; namely, the
question a11 to whether the check was applied on that note or the note In suit. For
this reason, we think the cue falls within
the exce1>tlon to the general rule above
stated. 'fhe plea of payment flied by the
appellant was no notice to the ap11ellee
that he would h1slet that the check read
In evidence was a payment on the note in
suit; and eo thl:'re was no occaelou to
serve notice to produce, to be reall In evidence, the note on which It was actually
applied. To hold that notice must bo
served In ordP.r to authorize evidence or
the existence of a written Instrument coming collaterally In q nestlon like the case
bl.'fore us would result in mur.h Inconvenience. and would often result lo defeating
the ends of justice. It will be ob1ter\"ed
that the cc•ntente of 1he note which bad
bt->en paid was tmma.terlal to the controversy, 11a ve a11 it furnished evidence of the
existence of a debt to the payment of
which the check read In evidence might
have been applied. In oor opinion, the
court did not err in admtttingthe evidence
of which complaint 18 made. Judgment
afDrmed.
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WHITCOMB et al. v. RODlf.\N Pt al.

WHITCOMB et al. v. R()D.\I.\N ct al.

(40 N. E. 553, l::i6 l11. 116.)

(40 N. E. 553, 156 Ill. 116.)

Supreme Court of Illinois. April 2, 1895.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 2, 1800.

Appeal from circuit court, Mcliean county;

Owen T. Reeves, Judge.

Bill by Edward L. Rodman and others

against Lucinda Whitcomb and others. Com-

plainants obtained a decree. Defendants ap-

peal. Aiiirmcd.

This is a bill brought by Edward L. Rod-

man, Joseph L. Rodman, and .\lary J. Rod-

man against the heirs and other devisees of

John Rodman, deceased, to construe the will

of deceased, and to grant title to certain lands

alleged to have been devised by the will.

John ltodman died testate July 30, 1889. At

the time of his death he owned in fee the N.

W. 1,4, of the N. E. 1/4 of section 27, 60 acres

oi‘! of the west side of the S. E. 1/4 of section

22, the S. W. 54 of the N. E. 14 of section 22,
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and the S. E. 1/4 of the N. E. 1/4 of section 22,

all in township 23 N., range 3 E., in McLean

county. He left surviving him Mary Jane

Rodman, his widow, and his only heirs at

law, his children, Ann Eliza Boyce, Joseph

L. Rodman, Edward L. Rodman, Lucinda

lvhitcomb, and his grandchild, Mary Eveline

King. the sole heir and child of his deceased

daughter, .\iary A. Craig. The will was ex-

ecuted October 17, 1888, and admitted to pro-

bate July 19, 1889, and was as follows:

“First. I will to my daughter Ann Eliza

Boyce forty (40) acres of land, being the

northwest quarter of the northeast quarter

of section twenty-seven (27). Second. To my

son Joseph L. Rodinan I will and bequeath

one hundred acres of land (100),-sixty acres

(60) oli of the west side of the southeast

quarter of section twenty-two (22), forty

acres (40) being the northwest quarter of the

southeast quarter of section twenty-two (22).

Third. To my son Edward L. Rodman I will

and bequeath forty acres or land, being the

northeast quarter of the southeast quarter of

section twenty-two (22). I<‘ourth._ I give to

my daughter Lucinda Whlt('OlHb two thou-

sand dollars ($2.000). Fifth. To my grand-

daughter, Mary Eveline King. I give two hun-

dred dollars ($200). The above legacies to be

paid out of moneys and credits on hand, and

proceeds of the sale of personal property. >All

oi.’ the above land being in town twenty-three

(23) north, range three (3) east of the third

principal meridian." The will contained a

sixth clause, in which certain personal prop-

erty was devised to the widow, and she was

also given the control of the above-described

lands during her life. It will be observed

that the two 40-acre tracts (S. W. 14 N. E. 1/4

section 22 and S. E. 1/4, N. E. 1/; section 22)

owned by the testator are not mentioned in

the will, and that the testator never owned

the N. E. 1,-3 of S. E. 1,4 section 22, which is

devised to Edward L. Rodman, and that the

40 acres devised to Joseph L. Rodlnan laps

onto the 60 acres devised to him, and includes

within it the north 30 acres ot the 60 acres,

and that he did not own the east 10 acres of

the .\'. WV. 1/4 of the S. E. 1/,,, which is devised

Appeal from circuit court, McLean county;
Owen T. Reeves, Judge.
Blll by Edward L. Rodman and others
against Lucinda Whitcomb and others. Com·
pla1D4Dts obtained a decree. Defendants appeal.

[Case No. 120

within It the north 30 acres of the 60 acres,
and that he did not own the east 10 acres of
the X. W. 1i4 of the 8. E.
which ts devised
to Jose1>h. The situation will be better understood by the following plats of the land; No.
1 being the land owned by the testator, and
No. 2 that specifically named tn the will:

v...

AWrmt>d.

Thia ts a blll brought by Edward L. Rodman, Joseph L. Rodman, and Mary :r. Rodman against the heirs and other devisees of
.Tohn Rodman, deceased, to construe the wlll
of de<'t'llsed, and to grant tltle to certain lands
allt>ged to have been devised by the wm .
•Tolw Rodman died testate July 30, 1889. At
tht> time of his d('nth be owned in fee the N.
W. 14 of the N. 1'~. 14 of section 27, 60 acres
olf of the west sldP of the S. E. 1A, of section
zi, the S. W. % ot the N. E. 1A, of sectlon 22,
and the S. E. 14 of the N. E. 1A, of section 22,
all in township 23 N., range 3 E., in McLean
<.'Ounty. He left 81ll'Vlvlug him Mary Jane
Rodu1an, his widow, and his ouly heirs at
law, his children, Ann Eliza Boyce, Joseph
L. HO<lman, Edward L. Rodman, Lucinda
'Vltltcomb, and his grandchild, Mary Eveline
King, the sole heir and child of his deceased
da1111:hter, llary A. Craig, The will was execnt~ll October 17, 1888, and admitted to probate July 10, 1889, and was as follows:
..1''1rst. I will to my daughter Ann I~llzn
Boyce forty (40) acres of land, being the
northwest quarter of the northeast quarter
of se<·tlon twenty-seven 127). Second. To my
son Joseph L. Rodman I will and bpqueath
one hundred acres of land (100),-slxty acres
(00) olf of the west side of the southeast
quarter of section twenty-two (22), forty
a<."l"e8 (40) being the northwest quarter of the
southeast quarter of section twenty-two (22).
•rhlrd. To my son Edward L. RO<lman I will
.and bequeath forty acres of land, being the
nortl1east quarter of the southPast quarter of
section twenty-two (22). Fourth. I give to
my daughter Lucinda WhltC'omb ·two thousand dollars ($2.000). I<'lfth. To my granddaughter, Mary Eveline King, I give two hundred dollars (1$200). 'J'he above legacies to be
paid out of moneys and credits on hand, and
proceeds of the sale of personal property. ·All
of the above land being In town twenty-three
(23) north, range three (3) east of the third
principal meridian." The will contained a
sixth clause, in which eertaln personal property was devised to the widow, and she was
.also given the control of the above-described
lands during her Ute. It will be observed
that the two 40-acre tracts (8. W. 1A, N. E. IA.
section 22 and S. E. % N. E. % section 22)
owned by the testator are not mentioned in
the will, and that the testator never owned
the N. E . 1A. of S. E. 1A. section 22, which le
devised to Edward L. Rodman, and that the
40 acres devised to JosPph L. Rodman laps
onto the 60 acres devised to him, and includes

'•

-

I ,

The testator, when he executed the will, and·
at the time of his death, was In posseBSion of
the lands owned by him. He owned no oth·
er lands. The bill prayed tor a construction
of the will, and that the lands be held to have
veste<l under the will, the S. E. % ot N. E. %
of section 22 In Edward L. Rodman, and the
S. W. % of N. E . 1i4 In Joseph Rodman, and
that the wl<low be held to have a lite estate
in all the lands. The answer practically admitted the taets set up In the bill, but denied
thnt it was the Intention of the testator to devise the two 40-acie tracts In the N. E. % ot
section 2'i, or that the wm was capable of
construction, and claimed that said lands descended as lnte>1tate estate. The court, on the
hearing, decreed substantially as prayed for
in the bill.
Kerrick, Ln<.'fls & Spencer, tor appellanta.
Benjamin & Morrissey, tor appelleea.
ORAIO, ;r, (after Rtatlng the tacts). In the
construction of a will the Important 'fll<'Stlon,
always, Is to as<'ertnln the Intention or the testator. As was well said by Chief Justice Marshall In Finlay v. King's Lessee, 3 Pet. 346:
"'!'he intent of the testator ls the cardinal rule
In the construction of wills, and If that Intent
can be clearly perceived, and Is not contrnry
to some posltl-re rule of law, It must prevail,
although, In giving el!ect to It, some words
should be rejected, or so restrained In their
application as materially to change the llte1'11l
meaning of the particular sentence." See,
also, Decker v. Decker, ,121 Ill. 354, 12 N.
E. 750. It wlll be presumed that a person,
when he makes and publishes a · wlll, Intends
to dispose of his whole estate, unless the
presumption 18 rebutted by Its provisions, or
345
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evidence to the contrary. Higgins v. Dwen.

100 Ill. 556; Society v. Mead, 131 ill. 358.

23 N. E. 603; 2 Redf. Wills, 35. Upon an

examination of the will in this case, nothing

will be found tending in the least to establish

an intention on the part of the testator to

leave any portion of his property to descend

as intestate estate. On the other hand, in

view of the property owned by the testator, it

is manifest from the language of the will that

the testator intended to devise his entire es-

tate. When the will was executed, and at tin-

time of the testator's death, he owned 180

acres of land, and no more. Of this the tes-

tator, as is manifest from the will, attempted

to devise 100 acres to his son Joseph, 40 acres

to his son Edward, and 40 acres to his daugh-

ter Ann Eliza Boyce, making 180 acres,—ali

the land possessed by the testator. But.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:08 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104925781
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

while it is manifest that the testntor intended

to dispose of all the lands he possessed, yet

the language of the will, as found in the

second and third clauses, if construed liter-

ally as written. will defeat the plain inten-

tion of the testator. Shall that be done, or

shall resort be had to extrinsic evidence to

ascertain the real intent of the testator? In

the consideration of a question of this char-

acter, in Decker v. Decker, supra, it was

held: “While the general rule is that the

intention of the tcstator is to be gathered

from an inspection and consideration of the

will, and from no other source, yet, in case

of latent ambiguity, courts do and must listen

to extrinsic evidence, not for the purpose of

contradicting or adding to the terms of tin-

wlll, but for the purpose of determining

the existence or nonexistence of latent am

bigulty, and to enable the court to look upon

the will in the light of the facts and circum-

stances surrounding the testator at the time

the will was made, whereby to determine the

intention of the testator." In Wig:-am on

Extrinsic Evidence, on the interpretation of

wills, after citing cases to prove that ex-

trinsic evidence may be resorted to, the au-

thor says “they might be multiplied without

end." and adds, “They appear to justify the

conclusion that every claimant under a will

has a right to require that a court of con-

struction, in the execution of its oﬂice, shall.

by means of extrinsic evidence, place itself

in the situation of the testator, the meaning

of whose language it is called upon to de-

clare." Quoted with approval in Society v.

Mead, 131 Ill. 362, 23 N. E. 603. In Patch

v. White, 117 U. S. 210-217, 6 Sup. Ct. 617.

710, it is said: “A latent ambiguity in a

will, which may be removed by extrinsic

evidence, may arise: (1) Either when it

names a person as the object of a gift, or a

thing as the subject of it, and there are two

persons or things that anwer such name or

description; or (2) when the will contains

a misdescription of the object or subject. as

where there is no such person or thing in

existence, or, if in existence, the person is

not the one intended, or the thing does not

PROOF.

evidence to the contrary. Higgins v. Dwen, belong to the testator." After citing cases.
100 Ill. M>G; Society v. Mead, 131 Ill. 3,j8, the court concludes: "By merely striking23 N. E. 603; 2 Redf. Wills, 30. Upon an ' out the words 'six' nnd 'three' from the deexamination of the wlll In this case, nothing scription of the will, as not applicable [unless.
lnterl'hanged] to any lot which the testatorwill be found tending In the least to establish
an Intention on the part of the testator to owned, • • • the residue of the descripleave any portion of bis property to descend tion, In view of the context, so exactly apas Intestate estate. On the other hand, In plies to the lot In question that we have no
view of the property owned by the testator, It hesitation In saying that It was lawfully devised to Henry Walker." Page 220, 111
Is manifest from the language of the will that
the testator Intended to devise hl1 entire es· U. S., and pages 617, 710, 6 Sup. Ct. Ill
tate. When the will was executed, and at thl! Moreland v. Brady, 8 Or. 303, In conslderlnaJ"
time of the testator's death, he owned 180 a question of this character, the court said:
acres of land, and no more. Of this the tes· "'We apprehend there can be no question of
tator, as Is manifest from the will, attempted the admlRSlblllty of extraneous oral evidence
to devise 100 acres to his aon Joseph, 40 acrE'S to show the state and extent of the testator'•
to his son Edward, and 40 acres to his daugh· property, In order to place the court In th•
ter Ann Elim Boyce, making 180 acres,-all same position the testator was at the time
the land J>Os."lessed by the testator. But. be made the will In question. This, we think.
while It Is manifest that the testator Intended ls unquestionably the rule established by th~
to dlspoSt> of all the lands he posst>KKed, yet decided cases. This being done, It appears
the language of the will, as found In tbe that the testator bad no such lots as those
second and third clauses, If construed liter· described as lots 1 and 2 lD the particular
ally as written, will defeat the 1>laln lnten· block named. This renders It certain that
tion of the testator. Shall that be done, or the lot11 named were erroneous, and the wordashall resort be had to extrinsic evidence to descrlblng them can have no possible oper1r
ascertain the real Intent of the testator? In tlon, and must be rejected." In Decker T.
the consideration of a question of this char· DPCker, supra, by the terms of the will theacter, In Decker v. Decker, supra, It was
testator devised 20 acres off the W. ;(. of N.
held: "While the general rule Is that the E. % of N. E. 1.4 of section 33, township lS
N., range 11 W. The evidence, however,
Intention of the testator Is to be gathered
from an Inspection and consideration of the showed that the testator never owned N. E.
will, and from no other source, yet, in case 14 of N. E. 1.4 section 33, or any part of It.
of latent ambiguity, courts do and must llstl•n but be did own N. W. 1.4 of N. E. % of theto extrinsic evidence, not for the purpose of se<-tlon. Held, that there was a latent amcontradicting or adding to the terms of thP
biguity In the devise, the descriptive words
wlll, but for the purpose of determlnln~ of the land devised being In part false; that
the existence or nonexistence of latent am
the false description might be stricken out.
blgulty,. and to enable the court to look upon
and the devise sustained, as embracing th•
the will In the light of the facts and clrcum·
land owned by the testator.
stances surrounding the tL'lltator at the tlnw
Keeping In view the fo1 egolng rules of conthe will was made, whereby to detel'mlne tlw struction, It aeems plain that the testator did
in«,ntion of the testator." In Wlgram on not Intend to leave the two 40-acre tracts In
Extri11Slc Evidence, on the Interpretation of N. E. % of section 22 to descend as lntestatewills, aft;?r citing casPs to pro'\"e that ex· estate. Be, In plain words, devised to Jotrlnslc evidence may be resorted to, the au· seph 100 acres of land, and then follows with
thor says "they might be multiplied without a particular description; that la. 60 acres ofr
end," and adds, "They appear to justify thP of the west slde ot S. E. % of section 22, and
conclusion that e'\"ery claimant under a will 40 acres, beln1: the N. W. 1.4 of 8. E. % o~
bas a right to require that a court of con· section 22. Thereby tbe~cre tract waa mad&
stru<'tlon, In the execution of its ofilce, shall. to overlap the north 30 acres of the 60 a.ens
by mPans of extrinsic evidence, place Itself which was to be a part of the 100 acres devlsecl
In the situation of the testator, the meaning
to Joseph. The east 10 acres of the 40 devilled
of whose language It la called upon to de· to Joseph the testator ne'\"er owned. So that
clnre." Quoted with approval In Society v.
the general purpose to devise to Joseph 100
Mead, 131 Ill. 362, 23 N. E. 603. In Patch acres would be defeated, and be would tak&
v. White, 117 U. S. 210-217, 6 Sup. Ct. 617, but 60 acres, under Nie (levlse, and the ad710, It ls said: "A latent ambiguity In a
joining 40 acres on the north of the 60 acres
will, which IDay be removed by extrinsic ls left undevlsed, and the general Intent for
evidence, may arise: (1) Either when It the disposition of the entire tract would be
nnmes a pel'l!On as the object of a gift, or a
defeated. It ls also apparent that the purthing as the subject of It, and there are two pose of the testator, as expressed In the will,
pPrsons or things that answer such name or was to give bis son Edward L. Rodman 40
description; or (2) when the will contains acres of land. Indeed, the wlll says, "I will
a mlsdescrlptlon of the object or subjt~t. as and bequeath 40 acres of land to my son Edwhere there Is no suc·h pel'l!on or thing In
ward L. Rodman." The land ls then descrlbo
exh1tence, or, It In existcnt•e, the person Is ed. as the N. E. % of the S. E. 1.4 of eectioo
not the one Intended, or the thing does not
22,-land wbleh the testator never ownedi
346

ORAL EVIDENCE TO VARY OR EXPLAIN DOCUMENTS.
ORAL EVIDENCE TO VARY OR EXPLAIN DOCUMENTS.

[Case No. 120

but he did o\vn 40 acres lying directly north

of the 40-acre tract described, which was

known as S. E. 1/T of N. E. 1,4 of section 22.

If the will is to be construed as contended

for by plaintiffs in error, the devise of the

40 acres of land to Edward will be defeated

entirely, and the intention of the testator will

be disregarded. If, therefore, by any of the

recognized rules of construction, the will may

be so construed as to give the language of the

testator effect, and thus tarry out the evident

intention, not only to dispose of his entire

estate, but to give to his sons, Joseph and Ed-

ward. the land intended to be devised to tizem,

it is the duty of the court to adopt that con-

struction. Redf. Wills, p. 469, says: “Where

the testator misdescribes his estate as being

in different localities from the fact,—putting

one estate in the locality of another, and
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vice versa.—it was held that where suflicient

appeared upon the face of the will, as applied

to the subject-matter, to show that such mis-

descrlption was a mere mistake. either of the

testator or the person who drew up the will,

that it would not have the effect to defeat the

obvious intention of the testator." While

words cannot be added to a will, yet in arriv-

ing at the intention of the testator, as has

been shown by the authorities, so mucn as is

false in the description of the premises devis-

ed may be stricken out; and after Sirlking

out the false description, if enough remains

to identify the premises intended to be de-

vised, the will may be read and construed

with the false words eliminated therefrom.

Adopting that rule here, the second and third

devises will read as follows: “Second. To

my son Joseph L. Rodman I will and be-

queath one hundred acres of land (100),—sixty

acres (60) oi! of the west side of the south-

east quarter of section twenty-two (22), forty

acres (40) being the‘ quarter of the

quarter of section twenty-two (22). Third.

To my son Edward L. Rodman I will and be-

queath forty acres of land, being the

quarter of the quarter of section twen-

ty-two (22)." Bearing in mind that the tes-

tator owned two 4()acre tracts in N. E. 1/, of

section 22, and reading the two clauses of the

will in the light of surrounding circumst'an-

ces, we think all difficulty is removed, in re-

gard to the lands devised by those two provi-

sions of the will. The testator, owning two

quarters of a quarter of section 22, devised

one quarter to his son Joseph. and the other

quarter to his son Edward, and the two sons

took and held the two tracts undivided. The

circuit court, in its decree, held that the two

40-acre tracts were devised by the will; the

S. W. 40 to Joseph, and the S. E. 40 to Ed-

ward. In this respect, we think the court

erred; but as the error was one which did

not affect plaintiffs in error, they having no

interest whatever in the premises. the error

was one which did no harm, and hence no

ground for reversing the decree. The decree

of the circuit court will be atlirmed. Ailir1n-

ed.

bot he. Jld O\VD 40 acres lying directly north
of the 40-aere tract described, which was
known as S. E. 1.4 of ~. E. % of sa·tlon 22.
It the will ls to be construed as contended
for by plaintiffs In error, the devise or the
40 acres of land to Edward will be defeated
entirely, and the Intention of the testator will
be disregarded. It, therefore, by any of the
recogn17.ed roles of construction, the will may
be so construed as to give the language of the
testator effect, and thus rnrry out the evident
Intention, not only to dispose of his entire
estate, but to give to hie son11, Joseph nnd Edwartl. tlte laud Intended to b<? devised to tl:em,
It Is the duty of the court to adopt thnt construction. Redf. Wills, p. 400, says: "Where
the testator mlsdescrlbes his estate as being
In dltrerent hx:ulltlee from the fact,-puttlng
one estate In the locality or another, and
vice vel'88,-lt was held that where suftlclent
appeared upon thP race or the will, as applied
to the subject-matter, to show th11t such mis-·
description was a mere mistake, either of the
testator or the person who drew up the will,
that It would not have the effect to defeat the
obvious Intention of the te<Jtator." "While
words cannot be added to a wlll, yet In arriving at the Intention of the testator, aa has
been shown by the authorities, so mucn aa t&
false In the description of the premises devised may be stricken out; and after strtk111g
ont the false des:-rlptlon, tr enough remains
to Identify the p1·emlses Intended to be devlsoo, the will may be read and construed

(Clllle No. 120

with tile falst- words eliminated therefrom.
Adopting thnt rule here, the secor.d and third
devises will read as follows: "Second. To
my son Joseph L. Rodman I will and bequeath one hundred acres of land (100),-slxty
acres (60) off of the west slcle of the southeast quarter of section twenty-two (22), forty
acres (40) being the'-- quarter of the - quarter of section twenty-two (22). Third.
To my eon Edward L. Rodman I will and be·
queath forty acres of land, being the - quarter of the - - quarter of section twenty-two (22)." Bearing In mind that the tell·
tator owned two 40-acre tracts ln N. E. 1.4 of
section 22, and reading the two clauses of thP
will In the light of surrounding clrcumsfances, we think all difficulty ls removed, In regard to the lands devised by those two provleloWI of the wlll. The testator, owning two
quarters or a quarter of section 22, devised
one quarter to his eon Joseph, and the other
quarter to his son E;dward, and the two sons
took and held the two tracts undivided. The
circuit court, In Its decree, held that the two
40-acre tracts were devised by the wlll; the
S. W. 40 to Joseph, and the S. E. 40 to Ed·
ward. In this respect, we think the court
erred; but as the error was one which did
not affect plaintiffs In error, they having no
Interest whatever In the premises, the error
was one which did no harm, and hence no
ground for reversing the decree. The decree
of the circuit court wW be a111.rmed. Atllrmed.
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PROOF

GOODE v. RILEY.

(28 N. E. 228, 153 Mass. 58.1.)

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

dlesex. May 19, 1891.

Exceptions from superior court, Mid-

dlescx county.

Bill by George F. Goode against Pat-

rick J. Riley to reform a deed. Decree for

laintiff. Defendant brings exceptions.

xceptions overruled.

Geo. F. Ricbanlson and John Davis, for

plaintiﬂ. C’. S. Lllley, A. G. Lamson, and

John J. Hogan, for defendant.

HOLMES, J. This is a hill in equity for

the reformation of a deed. The judge

who tried the case found the following

facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt:

The parties, just prior to the execution

and delivery oi the deed, made and com-
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pleted an oral agreement, the plaintiff to

sell and the defendant to buyalot of land,

situate on the southerly side of Summer

street, in Lowell, bounded and described

as testified to by plaintiff, and a warranty

deed thereof was to be executed and deliv-

ered; the parties were upon the land to-

gether, and then hoth saw and examined

the same, and knew the location, descrip-

tion, and bounds thereof, and the rear

line of the premises was theta marked by a

hoard fence five feet high, and other monu-

Mid-

I

i

ments, and both parties understood and =

knew its exact location and limits; the

deed, when executed and delivered, de-

scribed more laud,

square feet more. to the rear and beyond

said board fence, land not owned by the

plaintiff, and so much more than was bar-

gained ior; and both parties then errone-

ously supposed and believed that said

deed described the land orally agreed up-

on, and no more. This mutual mistnkeof

the parties was not discovered until two

months or more thereafter.

The court also found that the plaintiff '

had not been guilty of negligence or

inches, and that he was entitled to the

relief prayed ior,—a decree to reform and

rectify said deed.

The only question argued is raised by

the defendant’s exception to the refusal

of a ruling that. if both parties intended

that the description should be written as

it was written, the plaintiff was not enti-

tled to a reformation. It would beasu’rfi-

cient answer that the contrary is settled

in thiscommonwealth. Uanedy v. 1\iarc_v.

13 Gray, 373. 377; Glass v. Huibert, 102

Mass. 24, 34; Stockbridge iron (Yo. v. limi-

son Iron Co., 107 Mass. 290, 319; Wilcox v.

Lucas, 121 Mass. 21; Johnson v. Taber, 10

N. Y. 319; Bush v. Hicks,60 N. Y. 298;

Andrews v. Andrews, 81 Me. 337,17 Atl.

Rep. 166; May v. Adams,58 Vt. 74. 78. 3

Atl. Rep. 1-ST; Fuchs v. Treat, 41 Wis. 40-i.

PUOOF

words of their previous agreement, and
have uBfld words supposed by them to tie
apt for their purpose, but In fact detWrlhSupreme Judicial Court of Ma888cbm1ettll. Mid· fnJr that parcel, and something more, the
full purport of all their ac•ts. taken to·
dlesex. Ma7 19, 1891.
gPther, le only to convey the parcel InKxceptlone from superior court, Mld- tended; and yet that result cannot be
reached by way of construction merely,
dlesox county.
Bill by George F. Goode agftlnet Pat- for you ctuinot prove a mere private conrick J. Illley to reform a deec'I. J>ecree for vention between the two parties to give
platntlft. I>efendant brings exceptions. laogualleadlfterent meaning from Its common one. Waterman v. Johneon.13 Plt•k.
Exceptions overruled.
Geo. F. Rlcbardt1on and John Davia, for 21st, ~. 267; Paine v. Woode, 1118 Ma811.
plRlntllf. c. s. Lll/ey, A. a. L&IDBOD, ancl 160, 170: Flynn v. Bourneuf, 143 MWlti.
277, 278, 9 N. E. Rep. 650; Millard , .. llalJobo J. HogMD, for tlefendant.
ley, L. R. 1 Eq. 378, 882; Hhore v. Wilson,
HOLMES, J. Thlte Is 11 hill In equity for 9 Clark a: F. 355, 565, 566; Drummond v.
the reformation of a deed. 'l'he Jndge Attorney General, 2 H. L. (.'as. 837, 862,
who tried the ca'*' found the followin1r 863. It would offer too gre,at risks If evldeonce were admlHllible to sbow that when
facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
'rhe parties, Juet prior to tbe execution tbPy said 50U feet they agreed It should
and delivery of the deed, made and com- mesn 100 Inches, or that Bunker Hill Monpleted an oral agreement, the plaintiff tt> ument should signify the Old South
sell and the defendant to buyalot of Ian•:., Church. A11 an artlftclal construction cansltoatP on the southerly elde of Summer not be ~lven to plain words by expl't'llll
street, In Lowell, boondecl and descrlhecl agreement, thf> eame rule IH applied when
ae teetllil'd tu by plalutlft, and a warranty then> le a mutnal mistake, not apparent
deed thereof was to be executed and deliv- on the face or the Instrument.
Since, thPo, the lnittrument must be conered; tbe parties were upon the land togeth1>r, and then both saw and exRmlnecl strued to mean what the words wonld
the eame, and knew the location, detirrlp- mean If there were no mistake, evldl'nce
tlon, and bounds the1-uof, and the rear of the mletake shows that neither party
line of t11e premise& wee the:? marked by a hne purported or been understood to exboard f1>ocettve feet high, and other monu- ' preseaSHenttothecnnveyanttae It stands.
ments, and both parties uoderetootl and It le not neceesa.rlly fat11I that the eviknew Its exact lm~ntioo and limits: the dence Is parol which le relied on to show
deed, when executed and delivered, lie· that the contract waR out mu de ae It pnrscribed more IRncl, to-wit, about 1,031 porte on the face of the document to ha \•e
11quare fPet more, to the rear and beyuncl been ma•le. There was a time when a
ealil board fence, land not owned by the> man wus bound if hie seal wa11 afHxed to
pleln~lft,and so much more than wae bar- ' an Instrument by a stranger and against
gained lor; and both parties then erro1,e- hie will. But the notion that one who
has gone through certain fonm1 of thl11
011HIY euppoerd and believed that said
deed deecrlbe<l the land orally agreed up- Hort, even In his own person, is bound alon, and no more. Thie mutual mletukeof ways and uocondltlonally,gave way long
the parties wae not tllecovered untll two ago to more delicate conceptions. 8ee, e.
months or more thereafter.
g., Woll v. Hickey, JUI .Maes. In; McTbe court also found that the plnintltt clurg v. Terry, 21 N. J, Eq. 226.
So It le Nettled, at least In equity, that
bad not been gullt.v ur neitllgence or
laches, and that he wee entitled to the this particular kind of parol evldencerelief prayed for,-a decree to reform and t11at le to say, evidence of mutual mistake
rectify said deed.
a11 to tht> meaning of th6 words use:l-111
The only question argued le rallied by admteeible for the negative purpose we
the defendant'1:1 exception to the refusal have mentioned. And this principle le en·
of a ruling thdt, If both parties Intended tirely coneletent with the role that you
that the deecrlt)tlon ehoultJ be written as cannot set up prior or contemportmeoue
It wa1:1 written, the plaintiff wa11 not enti- oral dealings to modify or overrl1le whRt
tled to a reformation. It would beaMnftt- you knew was the eft'er.t of your writing.
clent answer that the contrary iH Hl'ttlecl Batchelder v. Insurance Co .• 13!> M888. 449.
In thlecommonwealtb. ~anf'dy ,.. :\lnn•y,
But the eftPCt of the evldeol'e le not to
13 Gray, 373, 377; Olaes v. Hulbert, JO:! 1 show that no coo\·eyance was made. It
MaRH. :U, 84; Stockbridge Iron Co. v. Hnd· 111 only to 11how that no ~onveyance w1111
eon Iron Co., 107 MRse. 290, 319; Wilcox v. made of part of the land embracep In the
Lucas, 121 Maes. 21; Johnson v. Ta her, 10 dl'Hl'rlptlon.
Obviously, therefore, It
~. Y. SIU; Bush v. Hicks, 60 N. Y. 298;
would be most 1mjuet simply to reticlnd
An1lrewe v. AndrewH, 81 A~e. 337, 17 Atl. the wbole traneaction, and, In 01·clt•r to
Re1•. 166; May v. AdamH, 58 Vt. 74, 7R. 3 do CClmplete justice, the grRntor who hss
Atl. Rep. 1157; Fuchs v. Treat, 41 WIH. 404. uel'd too exteneh·e language .Jhould have
lu view of these, among other, caHe1:1, we a recon\'eyauce to eet his title right on
shall not follow the elnhorate argument the fal'e of the Instrument; for, as things
which wae addressed to ue In favor of a stand, a purchaser without notice could
different rule, but we will add a few words hold him tu the words which he has used.
to explain our opinion somewhat more Crose v. Hean, 81 Me. 52:;, 17 Atl. Ueo.
fully.
710; O'nonnell v. Clinton, l* Maes. 461,
When both parties toacouveyance have 463, 14 N. E. ReJ>. 747. If a purchaser were
Intended to 1leHc·rlhe a certain pnrcel of attempting to Insert a parcel left oat unlaud ldentifteu by their seneeit, au<l b,y the der similar clrcuwetancee, be would be
GOODE T. RII,EY.
"(28 N. E. 228, 153 MRBa. ;)8."i.)
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met by the statute oi iru ud. But there is

no such diﬂicuity here. Glass v. Huibert,

102 Mass. :54,

The defendant’s testimony. although

met liy the 11tntute or frnml. But there la
no Rlll'h dlfficnlty here. Gloss v. Hulbert,
102 MlW!. :!.J, 35.
The defendant's testimony. althon,;h
amblguouR. lookerl to\Hll'dH the concluadon that the price was Oxed by the num-

ambiguous. looked tmun-(ls the conclu-

sion that the price was tixed by the num-

ber oi feet; but this was denied by the

plaintiff, and it does not appear what

thejudge found to be the fact, or what

he did. and no question as to whether an

allowance should he made to the defend-

ant is before us. Exceptions overruled.
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her of f~t: but tble was denied by the
plaintiff, and It does not appear what

the Judge found to be th~ fnct, or whot
he did. and no question as to whPther an
nllowa111•t:' should lw made to the defendant Is before us. Exceptions overruled.
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PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

FARMERS' LOAN & TRUST CO.
SIEFKE.

Case No. 122]

PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

FARMERS‘ LOAN & TRUST CO. V.

(39 N. E.

T.

358. 144 N. Y. 354.)

SIEFKE.

(39 N. E. 358, 144 N. Y. 354.)

Court of Appeals of New York. Jan. 15, 1895.

Appeal from common pleas of New York

city and county, general term.

Action by the Farmers‘ Loan & Trust Com-

pany, as 'committee for Frederick Siefke.

against Henry Siefke. From a judgment of

the general term (22 l\'. Y. Supp. 546) affirm-

ing a judgment for defendant, plaintiff ap-

peals. Affirmed.

David McClure, for appellant. Brainard

Court of Appeals of New York.

Jan. Ui, 1895.
.Appeal from common pleas ot New York
city and county. general term.
Action by the !•'armers' Loan & Trust Company, as "commltteE' for Frederick Siefke,
against Henry Siefke. From & judgment of
the general tl'rm (22 N. Y. Supp. 546) aftlrmlng a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
David 1\-IcClure, for appenant. Brainard
Tolles, for respondent.

Tolles, for respondent.

ANDREWS, C. J. The complaint alleged

that the note sued upon was given for value,

and was under the hand and seal of the de-

fendant. The answer contained a general

denial of the allegations in the complaint, and
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in separate paragraphs, stated to constitute

separate defenses, alleged that the note was

without consideration, and that it was altered

in material parts, and, among other things,

by aﬁixing a seal thereto without the consent

or privity of the defendant. On the trial the

note was offered in evidence by the plaintiff,

and he then rested. The execution of the

note by the defendant seem to have been ad-

mitted, as no proof was given upon the sub-

ject. It purported to be signed by him, and

a seal was attached to his signature. The

defendant thereupon entered upon the de-

fense. The question of consideration was lit-

igated, and the defendant also gave proof

tending to show that the seal wa attached

without his knowledge or consent, by the

plaintiﬁ, after the execution and delivery of

the note. The evidence on the part of the

defendant, as to the alteration by the addi-

tion of the seal, was met by evidence in be-

half of the plaintiff that the seal was at-

tached before execution. The case was sub-

mitted to the jury, under a charge of the

judge, and the jury rendered a general ver-

dict for the defendant. Judgment was en-

tered on the verdict, from which the plaintiff

appealed to the general term, which afllrmed

the judgment, and this appeal is from the

judgment of aﬁfirmance.

The allegations of error are founded main-

ly upon the charge to the jury. The judge

charged, in substance, that if the seal was at-

tached to the note by the plaintiff after ex-

ecution and delivery, without the knowledge

or consent of the defendant, it constituted a

material alteration, and the note was void.

There was no exception to this part of the

charge, and it must be taken, on this point,

to have correctly stated the law. We are not

to be understood, however, as dissenting from

this view, but it is unnecessary now to con-

sider it. The court further proceeded to

charge that the plaintiff was bound to estab-

lish, by a preponderance of evidence, that the

seal was not att:u-in-d after the signature to

the note. This was qualiﬁed afterwards by

the statement that this burden rested upon

the plaintiff after testimony had been given

.ANDREWS, C. J. The complaint alleged
that the note sued upon was given for value,
and was under the hand and seal of the defendant. The &DBwer contained a general
denial of the allegations In the complaint, and
In separate paragraphs, stated to constitute
separate defenses, alleged that the note was
without consideration, and that It was altt>red
In material parts, and, among other things,
by &nixing a seal thereto without the consent
or privlty of the detendant. On the trial the
note was otrered In evidence by the plalntltr,
and he then rested. The execution of the
note by the defendant seems to have been admitted, as no proof was given upon the subject. It purported to be signed by him, and
a seal was attached to his signature. The
defendant thN·eupon entered upon the de·
tense. The question of consideration was lltlgated, and the defendant also gave proof
tending to show that the seal was attached
without bis knowledge or consent, by the
plaJntltr, after the execution and delivery of
the note. The evidence on the part of the
defendant, as to the alteration by the addl·
tlon of the seal, was met by evklence In behalf of the plalntltr that the seal WalS attached before execution. The case was submitted to the jury, under a charge of the
judge, and the jury rendered a general verdict for the defendant. Judgment was entered on the verdict, from which the plaintiff
appealed to the general term, which atDrmed
the judgment, and this appeal ls from the
judgment of atDrmnnce.
The allegations of error are founded mainly upon the charge to the jury. The judge
charged, In substance, that It the seal was attached to the note by the plnlntltf after execution and delivery, without the knowledge
or consent of the defendant, It constituted a
material alteration, and the note was void.
There was no exception to this part of the
charge, and It must be taken, on this point,
to have correctly Ktnted the law. 'V\-'e are not
to be understood, however, as dissenting from
this view, but It ls unnecessary now to consider It. The court further proceeded to
charge that the plalntll'f was bound to establish, by a preponderance of evltlence, that the
1<1>111 wn11 not nttm·lwd after the signature to

a;.o

the notA!. This was quali11.ed afterwards b7
the statement that this burden rested upon
the plalntltr after testimony had been given
to show that the seal was attached aft.er the
Inception of the note. The plalntllf's counsel
excepted to the charge, as made and ex·
plained. This exception presents the prln·
clpal question In the case. We think the
charge was correct. Upon the pleadings., n
general denial having been Interposed by the
answer to the whole complaint, the plalntur
was bound to establish every material tact
therein alleged. The primary IBSUe was the
execution or nonexecution by the defendant
of a sealed Instrument. The plaintiff alleged
the making by the defendant of a speclaicy
creating a pecuniary obligation, and, Issue
having been taken on this allegation, the
plalntll'f was bound to establish the allegation by proof. If It had turned out on the
trial that the allegation had been made by
mistake, and that the Instrument was not
sealed, but was a simple contract only, or
that the seal had been attached after execution, by a stranger, without the prlvlty or
knowledge of the plalntur, it would have
been In the power of the court to have per·
mitted an amendment of the pleadings upon
such terms as It should deem just. But, as
the pleadings stood, the question whether the
defendant had executed a sealed Instrument
was an Issuable fact, which was asserted on
one side and denied on the otlier, and which
the plaintiff was bound to establish, aa a
part of his case. The defendant, under a
general denial, may adduce evidence to controvert what the plalntltf Is bound to prove
In the first Instance. Milbank v. Jones, 141
N. Y. 345, 36 N. E. 388, and cases cited. And
the general rule Is well established that whatever a plaintiff Is bound to prove In the first
Instance, as part of bis case, he ls bound to
esta bllsb by a ·preponderance of evidence.
The burden of proof upon the Issue of a material alteration of a written Instrument, sued
upon in Its existing condition, presents no
anomaly, but Is governed by the general rule
that the party alleging that the Instrument
sued upon Is the act and deed of the defendant must establish it by proof. The case of
Schwarz v. Oppold, 74 ~· Y. 307, ls a precise authority for the proposition that, under
a general denial In an answer In a suit
brought upon a written obligation, a material
alteration may be proved. Under . this authority, we see no escape from the conclusion that evidence of alteration, which goes
to the Identity of the Instrument, controverts
a fact which a plaintiff Is bound to prove In
the first lnstance,-that the ln8trument Is the
act of the defendant.
There Is confusion, sometimes. lo treating
of the burden of proof, arising out of unexact definitions. The burden ls upon a
plaintiff to establish his cause of action, when
lt Is, lo proper form, denied by the other
party. In actions upon a promls..'lory note,
this burden Is, In the first Instance, dis-

BURDEN OF PROOF.
BURDEN OF PROOF.

[Case No. 12.’

charged by giving evidence tending to show

that the note was signed by the defendant.

Proof of signing also identiﬁes and proves

the seal, when the action is upon a sealed

instrument. This, prima facie, establishes

the cause of action. But a defendant is not

concluded. He may give evidence, under a

general denial, to show that the signature is

a forgery, or that the note had been material-

ly altered by the plaintiﬂ without his con-

sent, or many other things which might be

mentioned, showing that the plaintiﬂ never

had a cause of action. It is very common to

say, in such cases. that the burden is upon

the defendant to establish the fact relied up-

on. All that this can properly mean is that.

when the plaintiff has established a prima

facie case, the defendant is bound to contro-

vert it by evidence; otherwise, he will be
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cast in judgment. When such evidence is

given, and the case, upon the whole evidence,

—that for and that against the fact asserted

by the plaintiﬂ',—is submitted to court or

jury, then the question of the burden of

proof as to any fact, in its proper sense,

arises, and rests upon the party upon whom

it was at the outset, and is not shifted by the

course of the trial; and the jury may be prop-

erly lnstructed that all material issues ten-

dered by the plaintiff must be established by

him by a preponderance of evidence. Sec

Davis v. Jenney, 1 Metc. (Mass.) 221; Simp-

son v. Davis, 119 Mass. 269; Periey v. Per-

ley, 144 Mass. 104, 10 N. E. 726. The general

rule of pleading, which also accords with

reason, is that defenses which assume or ad-

mit the original cause of action alleged, but

are based upon subsequent facts or transac-

tions which go to qualify or defeat it, must

be pleaded and proved by the defendant;

and, on the other hand, the cause of action al-

leged by the plaintiff, and all its material

incidents, must be asserted and proved by

him; and, in both cases, the ﬁnal event must

be supported by a preponderance of evidence

in favor of the party tendering‘ the issue.

This is illustrated in cases somewhat ger-

mane to the one before us. It is held by the

weight of authority that the alteration of a

bill or note need not be pleaded, when the in-

strument is declared on in its altered state,

but, where the declaration is on the instru-

ment in its original condition, the alteration

must be speciﬁcally pleaded. Hirschma-n v.

Budd, L. R. 8 Exch. 171; Byles, Bills (7th

Am. Ed.) 328. In the latter case, the plain-

tiff sues on the actual contract made, and the

defendant is seeking to defeat a recovery be-

cause lt had been subsequently tampered

w~ith, and this defense must be pleaded and

sustained by a preponderance of proof.

The appellant, in support of his contention

that the charge as to the burden of proof was

erroneous. cites some cases in other states,

which, to some extent, sustain his view. But

it seems to us they are opposed to sound prin-

ciple, and, at least. cannot be followed in this

state, in view of our decision in Schwarz v.

-charged b7 gtvlng evidence tending to show

that the note was signed by the defendan.t.
Proof of algnlng also ldentlftes and pron!!
the seal, when the action ls upon a sealed
instrument. This, prima facle, estnbllshes
the cause of action. But a defendant Is not
concluded. He may give evidence, under n
general denial, to show that the signature ts
a forgery, or that the note had been materially altered by the plalntUr without his consent, or many other things which might be
mentioned, showing that the plalntltr never
had a cause of action. It Is very common to
say, In such cases, that the burden Is upon
the defendant to estnbllslt the fact relied upon. All that this can properly mean Is that.
when the plalntltr has established a prlma
facle case, the defendant Is bound to controvert It by evidence; otherwise, he will be
cast In judgment. When sueh evidence Is
given, and the case, upon the whole evidence,
-that for and that against the fact asserted
by the plalntltr,-ls submitted to court or
Jury, then the question of the burden of
proof as to any fact, In its proper sense,
arises, and rests upon the party upon whom
It was at the outset, and Is not shifted by the
course of the trial; and the jury may be properly Instructed that all material bJ.~ues tendered by the plalntttr must be establ111hed by
him by a preponderance of evidence. RN"
Davis v. Jenney, 1 Mete. (Mass.) 221; Simpson v. Davl!I, 119 Mass. 200; Perley v. Perley, 144 Ma88. 104, 10 N. E. 726. The general
rule of pleading, which also accords with
reason, Is that defenses which assume or ad·
mlt the original cause of action alleged, but
are based upon subsequent facts or transactions which go to qualify or dereat It, must
be pleaded and proved by the defendant;
and, on the other hand, the cause of action alleged by the plalntltr, and all Its material
Incidents, must be alll!erted and proved by
hJm; and, In both cases, the final event must
be supported by a preponderance of evldenc<'
In favor of the party tendering· the Isam>.
This ls Illustrated In cases somewhat germane to the one before us. It ls held by the
weight of authority that the alteration of a
bill or note need not be pleaded, when the Instrument Is declared on In Its altered state,
but, where the declaration Is on the Instrument In Its original condition, the alteration
must be specifically pleaded. Hirschman v.
Budd, L. R. 8 Exch. 171; Byles, B111s (7th
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Am. Ed.) 328. In the latter case, the plain·
tltr sues on the actual contract made, and the
defendant Is seeking to defeat a recoveTy because It had been sub11equently tampered
with, and this defense must be pleaded and
sustained by a preponderance of proof.
The appellant, In support of his contention
that the charge as to the burden of proof was
erroneous. cites some cases In other states,
whJch, to some extent, sustain his view. But
it seems to us they are opposed to sound principle, and, at least. cannot be followed In this
state, In view of our decision in Schwarz v.
Oppold. The remark quoted from the opinion In the <'8Be of Wllliamsburgh Sav. Bank
v. Town of Solon, 136 N. Y. 465, 32 N. E.
10""J8, was In a case where the supposed addition of the seal made the Instrument what
1t was Intended to be, both by the legislature
and the town. The case, however, was decided wholly Irrespective of the question of
nlt~tlon, on the ground of a former adjudication. Our conclusion Is that the charge
was not et'l'oneous. In putting upon the plalntttr the burden of proof as to the existence of
a seal when the note bad Its Inception.
One other question, only, needs special reference. The plalntltr was not present on the
trial, and bis counsel, early In the case, Introduced a witness to account for his absence; and the reason given was that he
was partly paralyzed. and, although mental·
ly sound, was not able to attend the trial.
It seems that the fact that the plaintiff had
not appeared as a wltuess was commented
upon by counsel, and the court, In the charge,
referring to the subject, said, "It Is true,
of course, that his testimony ml11:ht have been
taken at his house." This statement was
subsequently excepted to, and It ls claimed
by the pla1nturs counsel that It was prejudicial, because an examination of a party before trial, on his own behalf, could not be
taken. This Is a clear mbiapprehen11lon of
the Code provision (section 872, subd. 5),
as It now stands. The last clause In the subdivision was Inserted to except a party to the
action from the restriction In that subdivision. .A. party complying with the provisions
ot the other sections Is permitted to perpetuate his own testimony In the case by an
examination before trial. We think the judgment ls right, and 1t should therefore be affirmed. All concur, except HAIGHT, J., not
r sitting. Judgment atllrmed.
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PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

PEOPLE v. DOWNS.

(25 N. E. 988, 123 N. Y. 558.)

Court of Appeals of New York. Dec. 2, 1890.

Appeal from supreme court, general

term, third department.

Lewis E. Gritﬁth and John P. Kelly,

Dist. Atty., for the People. Orin Gmnbelf

and J. K. Long, for respondent.

FINCI-I,J. Thedefendantwasconvicted

of manslaughter in the first degree, but

the general term has reversed that con-

viction for alleged error in the charge to

thejury; and from that reversal the peo-

ple have appealed to this court, insisting

that the charge, fairly construed, was cor-

rect and violated no established legal rule.

The prosecution proved the corpus delicti,

the death of Logan.and the violence which

caused it, by direct evidence which was in
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no respect disputed. His dead body was

found upon the premises of the prisoner

shot through the heart. The bullet had

penetrated his clothing and entered his

breast in a manner indicating that he was

facing his antagonist when the shot was

ﬁred. The absence from the clothing of

the deceased of anything like scorch or

stain oi powder was claimed to indicate

that the weapon when ﬁred was not in

contact with his person, but at some dis-

tance from hlm,greater or less. The bullet

was taken from the body. A pistol was

found in the prisoner's room. under his

bureau, having 10 chambers, the central

one carrying a bullet of 32 caliber, and the

9 surrounding it of 22. A discharged shell

was found in the central chamber, which

the bullet taken from the body of the de-

ceased iitted, while the9smaller cartridges

remained undischarged. On the day of

the homicide, at about midnight, the pris-

oner aroused a neighbor named Morey,

and Dr. Harvie, saying to each that he

had shot his best friend, or was afraid he

had shot his best friend, but giving no ex-

planation of the circumstances; and they,

going with him to the house, found Lo-

gan lying dead near the entrance to the

summer kitchen. The prisoner was pale

and nervous, and on ﬁnding Logan dead

was taken with aﬁt of vomiting,but made

no effort to escape, and quietly surren-

dered himself to the officers who were

summoned and took him into custody.

He was entirely sober. and there was no

evidence of intoxication. His previous

relations with Loga.n,wh0 was a. married

man, were those of intimate friendship

without anything to mar or disturb it.

That was the case made by the prosecu-

tion, and it presented to the jury a prob-

lem with very slight material for its solu-

tion. That Logan met his death from a

pistol discharged in the hands of Downs

was sufficiently proved, but whether the

shot was fired intentionally or accident-

ally, and, if intentionally, for what rea-

son, did not appear. The evidence dis-
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jury. They would aHk how Logon cameto lie at the rear of the bunse, ne11r the en"trance to itH living roomH, at midnight;
Court of Appeals of New York. Dec. 2, 1890. amt what he was doing there when be
should have heen at borne with hie wife
Appeal from supreme court, general and chtldren. 'fhe saloon was in the
tem1, third department . .
front part of the houHe openln11: onto the
LeV1ri.<J E. Gr/tilth an•t John P. Kelly, 11treet. It was closed for the night, and
Dist. Atty., for the People. Orin G111nbel( thne had been no brawl or quarrel or
and J. K. Long, for respondent.
disturbance there during the evening.
The (lresence of Logan In the l'('HI" of the
FJNCH, J. ThedefendantwRsconvlctf'tl houtte, at or nl'ar mi<lnl~ht, and the abof manslaughter to the first degree, hut sence of a.ny previous quarrel or difficulty,
the jl;eneral te1·m haa reversed that con- would make it reasonably c...rtain that
viction for alleged error In the charge to something due to his presence, and eufflthe Jury; and from that revenial the peo- c;eotly grave and serious to account for an
ple have appenlf!d to tbla court, Insisting In tentlonal or aecJ,dental homicide, bad actthut the charge, fairly construed, was cor- ""'llY occurred. What that wa11 we have no
rect and violated no estiihllshed legal rule. means of knowing except through thl' exThe p1·osecutlon proved the corpus delir.tl, phmatlon given by Downs and his wife.
the death of Logan.and the violence which He tet1tfftes, In brief, thot he was aroused
caused it, by direct evidence which was In by the noise of a scume to the back kitchno re11pect disputed. His dead body woa en; that be seized the pistol, whleb lay
found upon the premises of the prisoner upon a stand near bis berl, and ruMhed out;
shot through the heart. The bullet had thut he found Logan and MrH. Downe on
JJE>netrated bis clothing and t:ntered hie the floor in the act of adultery or rape,
breast In a manner Indicating that he was according as the woman WRB consenting
facing blK antagonist when the Rhot wue or ret!lstlng: that ho selzell Logan, who
tired. The absence from the clothing of at once attacked him, and In the atrup;gle
the deceased of anything like scorch or the pistol went off; and that this Wa.tl
t1taln of powder was claimed to Indicate aftl.'r the woman had lt>ft the room, and.
that the weapon when fired was not In as she says, while she wae at the front
contact with bis penion, but at some <lls- <loor going out for help or escapt'. l'ibe
ttmce from lllm,jl;reater or less. '£he bullet testifies thnt Logan selzl'il her and threw
was taken from the body. A pistol was her down. but does not say whether with
found In the prisoner's room. under his her consent, or why 11he matle no outcry.
bureau, having 10 chambers, the central Of course this ex plan a tlon ~as 01Jen to
one carrylnK a bullet of 32 caliber, and the the critlcllm1 of the prosecution and the
9 surrounding It of ~2. A discharged shell consl<leratlon of the Jury. 'J'be principal
was found In the centl'al chamber, whkb fact sworn to bas a strong probability In
the bullet taken from the body of tbP dl'- Its favor. It accounts for the preMeoce of
ceased lltted, while tbe98maller cartridges Lognn, at midnight, on the premises
remoined undischarged. On the day or where be had no right to be, eud rurnlttbet!
the homicide, at about midnight, the pris- the needell motive and explanation of the
oner arouHed a neighbor name+l Morey, liomiclde which occurrell. Without it we
and Dr. Harvie, saying to Pach th1tt hl' cannot understand the event: with It we
had shot his best rrload, or Wtlt! afraid he can easily t1ee how it did occur, or how It
had shot bis beat friend, but &{lvlnJ!: no ex- might havl'! happened. It supplies both
planation of the clrcumt1tancea; and they, motive and OC"<'l\Hlon. But granting t!O
goinJ!: with him to the house, found Lo- much, the l'eHt does not n~es1mrllyfOJIOW,
gan lying dead ne1tr the entrance to the and it waR still for the Jury to say whether
summer kitchen. The prisoner was pale the shooting was accidental or inten·
and nervous, and on finding Logan deUtl tlonal, whether jm1tlfta hie or excusable,
was taken with a fit of \'omitlng, but made whether with deliberate purpose, or In
no effort to t>acupe, and quietly em·ren- the heat of passion, and without Intent to
dered hiWNPlf to the officers who were kilt. It ls ob,·ious that In their conl41dera11ummooed and took him tnto custody. tlon of these queAtlons very much would
He was entirely solwr. and then! waK no depend on the charge of the court a11 to
evidence of lntoxlcutlon. · Hie prevlouN the burden of proof and the operation and
relations with Loga.n, who was a marriell extent of thP rule relating to a reaaonablt>
man, were those of Intimate frlendHhfI> doubt. That such doubts . might eB.Hlly
without anything to mar or 1lh1t11rb ft. arise lo mRny and dlffPJ'ent directions le
That was the case mu1le by the prosecu- quite app11n>nt from the fuc>ta to which we
tion, und It preHented to the jury a 1•rob- have adverted. Take, for example, the
lem with very slight material for itt1 soln- prisoner's ~tatement that tbe pu1tol extton. '!'hat J.,ogan met his death from a plodt'd In a flght between him and Lngan,
t>lstol discharged In the hands of Downe and without his eonsetous act. Jf that be
was sufficiently proved, but whether the true, while tluire was a homicide tht>re
shot was tired Intentionally or a<·clclent- was no crime; for the killing would b<'ally, and, If intentlonully, for what reu- come merely an aecident or mls1uh·e11ture.
1m11, llld not nppeur. The e\'ldence dls- If, now, the burden ls UilOD the rrl1mnf'r
cloRPd no pm1Hihle motive for an intentlon- to Flatlsfy the Jury or that fact, and unless
Rl homl!•ide, and left the cburacter and they al'e so satb1fled they must deem thtgrade of the crime, if one had been com- homiclde Intentional, a verdict of ~uilty
mitted, an unexplained mystery. One cir- ml~ht eRslly result. But If th1:1t burd1•n IH
cumstance, htnf·ever, wonld be sure tc not upon the prhmner, If thf' jury are told
nttract the attention of un Intelligent thu.t it rema;ne with the prosecut1011,-t1111t
PEOPLE
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(25 N. E. 988, 123 N. Y. 558.)
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if the evidence leaves in their minds a rea- ' own, but within the deﬁnitions

sonable doubt whether the killing may

not have been an accident or misadvent-

ure, the prisoner must have the beneﬁt of

the doubt, because it goes directly to the

vital elements of the people's case, and

leaves it uncertain whether n. crime has

been committed at all,—the verdict of the

jury might be entirely different. A similar

result might attend a defense of justifiable

homicide, and so the question of thc bur-

den of proof a.nd the scope and effect of a

reasonable doubt, became in the case at

bar of very great importance. We have

decided so recently as to make further ci-

tation needless that the rule that in crimi-

nal cases the defendant is entitled to the

beneﬁt of a. reasonable doubt applies not

only to the case as made by the prosecu-
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tion, but to any defense interposed. (Peo-

ple v. Riordan, ll7 N. Y. 71, 22 N. E. Rep.

455;) and we had earlier held under the

statute deﬁning, the different classes of

homicide that whether it was murder .or

manslaughter in one of the degrees, or

justifiable or excusable. and o no crime

at all, depended upon the intention and cir-

cumstances of its perpetra tion. and there-

fore mere proof of the killing raised no

legal implication of the crime of murder,

(Stokes v. People, 53 N. Y. 177.) I think

the charge in this case ran counter to

these rules. and was calculated to impress

upon thejury a conviction that proof of

the homicide carried with it a. legal im pli-

cation of crime which shifted the burden

of proof upon the prisoner. and required

him to satisfy the jury that the killing

was either justifiable or excusable. at the

peril of a conviction if he should fall in his

attempt.

The learned trial judge began his charge

with-the definitions of the statute, and

very fairly and correctly explained its clas-

siﬁcation of the different forms of homi-

cide. Having done so he approached the

rules which should govern the jury in de-

ciding between them, and in so doing used

expressions to which exceptions were

taken. He said: “Now it is for you to

say to which one of these classes of crime

this evidence points. Herc has been a

homicide. Herc has been a human life

taken. It becomes a serious question as

to whether or not a man shall execute the

law or execute vengeance upon his fellow.

If he does he must do it at the peril of

either being punished for it or being able

to excuse himself when called upon to an-

swer to the wrong within one of the ex-

cuses that is ﬁxed and given in the law.

If he is not he must be iound guilty of one

or the other of the crimes which are im-

puted to him by reason of the homicide."

A jury could hardly fail to understand

from this language that a homicide. thc

fact of u. human life taken.invoivcd a legal

implication of murder which must compel

ff the evidence leave11 In their minds areasonable donbt whether the killing may
not have been an accident or mlsadvP.nture, the prisone1· must have the beneHt or
the douht, because it goes directly to the
vital elements of the people's case, and
leuves lt uncertain whether R crime bas
been committed at all,-the verdict of the
Jury might be entirely dllferent. A similar
result might attend a defense of Jm1tltlable
homicide, and so thfl question of tht• burden of proof and the BCQ(.>e ttnd eftect or "
reasonable doubt, became In the case at
bor of very great lmportunce. We have
decided so l'f!Cently as to make further clta tton needless that the rnle that In criminal calfe& the defendant Is entitled to the
benefit of a reasonable doubt applll!I! not
only to the case as made by the t>l'osecutlon, but to any defense lntei:eoRed. (People v. Riordan, 117 N. Y. 71, w2 N. E. Rep.
4.'>ii;) and we bad earlier held uoder the
.stptute deftnlog . the dllferent clasllt.'S of
homicide that whether It was murder .or
mamllaughter in one of the deg-rees, or
jostlfiahle or excm1able, and so no crime
at all, depended oprm the Intention and clrcum11tanr.eR of Its perpetrH tlon, and therefore mere proof of the killing rah1f'd no
leiral tmpltcatloo of the crime of murder,
(Stokes "· Peoplt1, 6S N. Y.177.) I think
the charge lo this case ran counter to
theee rules, and was calculated tu tmprei'11
upon the Jury a conviction that proof of
the homMde earrlecl with It a legal Implication of crime wbleb shifted the burden
of proof upon the prisoner. aud required
him to satisfy the Jury that the killing
was either Justifiable or exeusabl<>, at the
peril of a conviction lf he should fall In hlB
attempt.
The learned trial Judge began bis cbanre
with. tbe deftnltlone of the statute, and
very fairly and correi•tly explained Its clafl·
slftcatlon of the diflert>nt forms of homicide. Having done&•> he approached the
rules which should govern the Jury lo c.le~iding between them, and lo 80 doing used
expre&ffluna to which exceptlonll were
taken. He said: "Now It i8 for you to
11oy to whlr.b one of these classes of crime
this evidence points. Here has been a
homicide. Here hos been a humon life
taken. It becomes a serious question aEt
to whether or not a man shall exec·ute the
law or execute vengeance upon bis fellow.
If be doe11 be must do It at the peril of
either being punished for It or beh1g abl~
to excuse himself wbt'n coiled upon to an·
ewer to the wrong within one of the excusP.S that ts fixed a.nd given In the law.
If he ts not be must be found guilty of one
or the other of the crimes whkh are Imputed to him by reuson of the homklde."
A Jory euuld hardly fall to unclenitand
from tbt11 lami:uap;e that a homicide, tbt>
fact of a human lire taken . Involved a legal
tmplkatton of murder which muHt compf'I
a verdict of guilty JnleKM the prisoner iK
able to excu110 himself within the 1tatu·
tory deftnitiona. If th~re wa11 room to
doubt about tht> mt-anlnic It became plalner from what followed. 'l'be learned Judgt>
added: "If yon reach the conr.luslon that
ht' w1:1a Jnatlfled to toking the ltfe of this
man within the deftnltlons given in the
books, not within any notions of your
WlLGl18,BV.-28
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own, bnt within the definitions given In
the law, U you reach the conclusion that
be was J11stlfled, then your verdict will be
one of acquittal." Here the some idea ta
conveyed In 8nother form. To acquit, the
jory must .. reach the conclusion" tbnt a
JustUlcation bas been e.st11ull11hed. It is
evident th8t the prisoner's eoum1el so understood the char.,;e, and, after exceptinJP:
to It, made a series of requests with a view
of more clearly aKCertalnlng the meaning
of the charge, or prol·urlng d modification
of ltl'I term11. He asked the court 1o charJl,"tl
"that no 8tate of proof ever clurngeH the
burden or proof: the burcJen remains
throughout the triu.I upon the people;"
to whlc·h tile learned Juctge replied: "1 decline to eharge tt In those words. I quaUfy it by sa~·tng that If the people establ111h
the homlchle by the llRe of a deadly weapon, committed by the defendant intentionally and with deliberation. that then
any excuflP. for the commlHsiuo of that
crime or the couunlsaion of that act must
come from the drfendant." The un<lerstan<ling of the Jury of the position of tht•
court was quite likely to be that the burden did not always rest on the prosecution: but when a prlma facle case of murder bad been made the burden sbtlted to
the defendant, who sought to excuse or
justify. And this ls In prt>else accord with
the previouscharge thatwbere a bomldde
was shown to have been committed by
the prlsouer he mm~t be convteted unles!!
he le "able" to Justify or excuse the act.
and onleaR the Jury" reach the conclusion"
that there Is lt'J(RI ncuse or Justlfic11tlon.
And then, to further test the attitude of
the court, the defendant's counsel asked
for a charge" that there Is no legal Implication from the fact of the shooting that
the defendnnt Intended to take the life of
Logan." 1'hat waM dt>t•llned, and an exception tt1ken.
Now. construing together what the
court said, anc.1 what tt refused to say, 1
think It Is obvious tbat the jury wert• llke1.v to act under the lmp~>1lon that a
homicide proved Implied crime on the part
of the slayer; that a convktlon must follow unless the prisoner Justified or excused
the uct: that the hnrdPn of that defense
wa11 upon him: and that to 8et"ure ucqutttal he must be able to show a legal Justlfl:!8tlon or excuae, and the jnry must reach
tnat conclusion tr It would acquit. The
IP.urned district attorm•y, however, insists
that the court did charge that the guilt of
the pl.'leoner must be establl11hed beyond
a reasonable doubt, and 1-eferR to several
pas1mgeH In which that was said. A rere1·enee to them Indicates that none of them
rf'lated to the defense of Justification or
e:iccUHP, nor did the.) lndlcnte that a rt-usonable doubt would operate In the prlsunt>r's favor bl'yund the cast' mnde by tbe
prosecution. Th1111, tn descrlhlng the character of the proof requisite to establl11h
the corpus dell<·tf as distinguished from
the guilt of the prisoner, the court said the
form~. muflt be pr·wed by direct evidence,
and thl:' lntterhe.\·ond a reasonable duul1t
In deflcrlbu.J~ the ;c1111np; of Logan. the
coort said· "I do n'lt know that It ts
controverted on eltbe.. side that he came
to bis death by a bullet, a pistol shot, M
8Cl3
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almost conceded , ‘butyou are to ﬁnd that

fact. If there is any doubt about it, of

course the defendant has the beneﬁt of the

doubt." Upon request of the prisoner’s

counsel, the court also charged “that it is

incumbent upon the people to prove ai-

firmatively beyond a reasonable doubt

what grade of crime, if any, was com-

mitted;” and also, upon the like request,

“that if upon the Whole evidence of the

people and the defendant taken together

there is a reasonable doubt in the minds

of the jury as to whether or not the de-

fendant discharged the pistol at Logan

with intent to kill him, they must acquit

the defendant of the crime of murder in

both degrees." I am unable to see that

almost conceded, 'butyou are to find that
fact. If tbt-re le any doubt about It, of
coUt"Me the defendant hne the benefit of the
do11bt." Upon requeHt of the prisoner's
counsel, the court ahm charged "that It Is
Incumbent upon the people to prove artirmo.tl vely beyond tt reasonable doubt
what grade of crime, If any, waK committed;" and also, upon the like request,
"that If upon the whole evidence of the
peo1>le and the defendant taken togethPr
there Is R reasonable doubt In the minds
of the Jury as to whether or not the de-fen<111nt discharged the pistol at Logan
with intent to ktll him, they must acqnlt
the defendant of the crime of murder In
both degreei;." I am unable to see that
these expretnlions at all modify or control
what was daid 1md refused to he charged
as to the burrten of proof, and the manner
In which JuKttflcatlon or excuse should be
proved. They fall very far short of a cure
for the error which was committed. 'faking the charge toKether, and construing It

these expressions at all modify or control

what was said and refused to be charged

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:08 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104925781
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

as to the burden of proof, and the manner

in which justitication or excuse should be

proved. They fall very far short of a cure

for the error which was committed. Tak-

ing the charge together, and construing it

354

as a whole, I am unable to resist the con-

viction that in the minds of the jury it

shifted the burden oi‘ proving his defense

upon the prisoner. and deprived him as to

that defense of the beneﬁt of a reasonable

doubt. While there is no l<-gal implica-

tion of the crime of murder from the bare

fact of a homicide, the jury may infer it as

a fact. and may do so even though no mo-

tive is assigned for the act, and the case

is bare of circumstances of explanation.

People v. Conroy, 97 N. Y. 77. But the in-

ference is one of fact which the jury must

draw if such seems to them to be their

duty. nnd not one of law which the court

may impose upon their deliberation, and

then upon that assumption shift the bur-

den upon the prisoner and require him to

prove that no crime has in fact been com-

mitted. We think, therefore, that the or-

der of the general term, reversing the iudg-

ment of conviction, was right, and should

be affirmed. All concur, except RUGEB, C.

J., not voting.
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SM

as a whole, I am unable to reMlst the conviction that In the minds of the Jury It
shifted the bt11'den of proving hie defenM
upon the prisoner. and deprl\"ed him as to
that defenRe of the benefit of a reasonable
doubt. While there is no lPgal Implication of the crime of murder from the hare
fact of a homll'lde, the Jury may Infer It ss
a fact, and may do so even though no motive le aselg-ned for the act, and the case
le bare of circumstances of explanation.
People v. Conroy, 97 N. Y. 77. Bot the Inference Is one of fact which the jury must
draw If such seems to them to be their
duty, nn<l not one of law which the court
may Impose upon their deliberation, and
then upon that atl8umptlon shift the burden upon the prh1oner. Rnd require him to
pro\·e that no crime has tn fRct been committed. We think, therefore, that the order of the general term, rEveralng t be Judgment of conviction, was right, and should
be affirmed. All concur, except Roosa, C.
J., not voting.
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COLORADO COAL 8: IRON CO. et al. v.

UNITED STATES.

(8 Sup. Ct. 131, 123 U. S. 317.)

Supreme Court of the United States. Nov. 21,

1887.

Appeal from the circuit court of the Unit-

ed States _f0r the district of Colorado.

Lyman K. Bass, B. H. Bristow, and David

Willcox, for appellants. Sol. Gen. Jenks, for

the United States.

MATTHl~)\\'s, J. This is a bill in equity

filed in the name of the United States by the

attorney general on January 22, 1880, the ob-

ject and prayer of which are to declare void

and cancel 61 patents for as many distinct

pieces of land, situated at different places in

Las Animas county, in the state of Colorado,

amounting in the aggregate to 9,565.95 acres.

To the original bill the Southern Colorado
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Coal & Town Company, a corporation or-

ganized under the laws of Colorado, was the

sole defendant. The patents in question

were issued at different times between Octo-

ber, 1S73, and October, 1874, upon pre-emp-

tion claims, under the act of 1841. In each

case there appeared to be filed all the neces-

sary and proper affidavits, duly veriﬁed be-

fore the register or receiver of the land-of-

ﬂce at Pueblo, showing that the pre-emptors

had entered and settled in person upon the

land on a day named, and had made im-

provements thereon, the nature of which

were set out in detail, and that the lands in

question were non-mineral lands, and subject

to pre-emption under the acts of congress re-

lating thereto. Between May, 1873, and De-

cember, 1875, warranty deeds in the names

of the pre-emptors and patentees were made,

acknowledged, and recorded, apparently con-

veying the premiscs to William S. Jackson,

as trustee, who represented a number of in-

dividuals who had deposited money in his

hands to be used in the purchase of lands in

Colorado. On June 1, 1876, by deed duly

acknowledged and recorded, but without

covenant of warranty. Jackson conveyed and

released all these lands to the defendant. the

Southern Colorado Coal & Town Company.

On January 20, 1880, that corporation was

consolidated with other corporations under

the name of the “Colorado Coal & iron Com-

pany," to which, upon that date, the lands in

question were conveyed. Under date of Feb-

ruary 1, 1880, the coal and iron company

made a mortgage covering the premises in

the time to the proper oii1cer,—$1,813.1-1 in

cash, and the remainder in certificates

known as “Agricultural College Scrip,” which

by law was receivable for that purpose.

It is charged in the bill that these patents

were procured by means of a fraudulent con-

spiracy entered into by and between Irving

W. Stanton, register of the land-office, Charles

A. Cook, receiver for the land-district, at

Pueblo, in Colorado, Alexander C. Hunt, and

others unknown, who, it is alleged, organized

and had incorporated the Southern Colorado

Coal & Town Company. In furtherance of

the time to the proper otncer,__.1,813.H In
cash, and the remainder In certl11cates
known as "Agricultural College Scrip," which
(8 Sup. Ct. 131, 123 U. S. 317.)
by law was receh·able for that purpose.
Supreme Court of the United States. Nov. 21,
It le charged In the blll that these patents
1887.
were procured by means of a fraudulent conAppeal trom the circuit court of the Unit· spiracy entered Into by and between Irving
W. Stanton, register of the land-omce, Charles
ed States .t.or the district of Colorado.
A. Cook, receiver for the land-district, at
Lyman K. Bass, B. H. Bristow, and David Pueblo, ln Colorado, Alexander C. Hunt, and
Wlllcox, for appellants. Sol Gen. Jenks, for others unknown, who, It ls alleged, organized
the United States.
and had incorporated the Southern Colorado
Coal & Town Company. In furtherance of
MATTHEWS, J. This Is a bill lo equity this conspiracy, and as the means of actlled In the name of the 'Lnlted States by the complishing lte purpose, It Is alleged "that
attorney general on January :t'.:?, 1880, the ob- neither of the supposed pre-emptors of the
ject and prayer of which are to declare void land as aforesaid described by their names,
and cancel 61 patents for as many distinct as 11tated In said several proof• of p1-e-emp.
pieces of land, situated at different places In tlon, or In the said certlfl.cates of location,
Las Animas county, lo the state of Colorado, ever settled upon the said lande, or Im·
amounting In the aggregate to ~.a65.9a acree. proved the same, u represented lo said sev·
To the original bill the Southern Colorado eral proofs of pre-emption, and that no per·
Coal & Town Company, a corporation or- son or peraons whatsoever, aa represented
ganized under the laws of Colorado, was the ln either of said certificates of location, ap.
l901e defendant. The patents In question peared or presented himself before said
were lBBued at different tlmea between Octo- Stanton or Cook, or either of them, at any
ber, 1873, and October, 1874, upon p~mp time, and made proof of pre-emption or
tlon claims, under the act of 1841. In each agricultural college scrip location, either u
case there appeared to be filed all the neces- pre-emptor or as witness for any pre-empsary and proper amdnvlts, duly verified be· tor as afol"eS&ld deecrlbed, aa In and by
fore the register or receiver of the laud-of- said proofs of pre-emption and location cerfice at Pueblo, showing that the pre-emptors Wlcates, or either of them, as aforesaid, la
had entered and settled In person upon the aupposed, but that the same, and each of
land on a day named, and had made Im- them, are false and fraudulent. and were
provements thereon, the nature of which designed, made, and executed by said Stanwere set out ln detail, and that the lands In ' ton and Cook and said Hunt, and the uld
question were non-mineral lands, and subject persons to your orator unknown, or some one
to pre-emption under the acts of congress re- or more of them, In the manner aforesaid,
lating thereto, Betw-n May, 1873, and De- and for the purpose of fraudulently depriving
cember, 1875, warranty deeds ln the nameFI your orator of its title to the said pieces of
of the pre-emptors and patentees were made, land."
acknowledged, and reeorded, apparently conIt le further alleged that all the eald 1upTeylng the premises to William 8. Jackson, poeed pre-emptors are ftctitloue persons, and
as trustee, who represented a number of ln· their names are ftctltlous names, and that the
dlvlduals who had deposited money In hie supposed names that appear as witnesses to
hand8 to be ueed ID the purchase of lande In the said several proofs of pre-emption are
Colorado. On June 1, 1876, by deed duly fictitious names, and that no such person or
!lcknowledged and recorded, but without persons, either llR pre-emptore or as witcovenant of warranty, Jackson conveyed and nesses, have ever lived or been known In the
released all these lands to the defendant, the county of Las Animas, where said pieces and
Southern Colorado Coal & Town Company. pa1"Cele of land are located, and, In fact, that
On January 20, 1880, that corporation was no such persons exist.
It Is f.urther alleged ln the blll "that the
consolldated with other corporations under
the name of the "Colorado Coal & Iron Com- aforesaid pieces and parcels of land are not
pany," to which, upon that date, the lands In agricultural land, and are not suitable for
question were conveyed. Under date of I<'eb- agricultural or grazing pul"pOBe&, and are of
ruary 1, 1880, the coal and Iron company no value for any purpose ex~\)t tor the coal
made a mortgage covering the premises In deposits therein contalneu. • • • That
question, with other11, to Louie H. Meyer, ae the said several pleees and \larce\s ot \and
trustee, to secure an Issue of bonds amount- contain large and valuable de\)QB\\s ot con\,
ing to $3,500,000. On January 7, 1882, an and that the said deposU:s ot ~~n::~
amendment to the bill wae fllE>d, making the known to the said StantoJ> ~~~
\)etsoug to
Colorado Coal & Iron Company, the consoll- ' Hunt, and to the sa\d per -WTG\e ou\, g\v.ned,
dated corporation, together with Meyer, the your orator unknown, w\.10 ~ be 'llt\\\en out,
trustee In the mortgage, parties defendant. and executed, or caused t S.e...,l!'tll.\ \)t<i11ts ot
The purchase price of the lands to the gov- slgnl'1l, and executed, tne
I
a.~'1\\1!. a\\\\~
ernment was ,11,997.45, wbl<'h wns paid at pr1•-P111ptlon nnd non-m\uet'9~
COLORADO COAL & IRON CO. et al.
UNITED STATES.

T.

C:
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time the said several proofs of pre-emption

and non-mineral aiiidavits were made out,

signed, and executed."

It is also charged in the bill that the said

Hunt was a stockholder in the Southern Col-

orado Coal & Town Company, and general

manager of its business, and that the in-

corporators of said company and the trustees

thereof, including William S. Jackson, “knew

at the time the aforesaid described land was

conveyed to said company by said William

S. Jackson, as hereinbefore described, that

the several patents to said several pleces and

parcels of land had be.en fraudulently ob-

tained from your orator, and knew that the

said several supposed pre-emptors and pat-

entees were myths and ﬁctitious persons, and ,

holders for value." Mcader v. Norton, 11

Wall. 442, 458. It is, indeed, an elementary
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knew that the said Jackson had no right, ti-

tle, or interest in said land, or any part

thereof.”

The answer of the Southern Colorado Coal

& Town Company, tiled November 2, 1881,

speciﬁcally denies all the allegations of the

bill alleging fraud, and denies that the said

lands, or any portion of them, were mineral

lands in the sense of not being lands capable

of being acquired under the pre-emption

law, and sets up by way of further defense

that it was a purchaser of all the said lands

in good faith for a valuable consideration

without any knowledge or notice whatever

of any or either of the pretended fraudulent

acts and conspiracies in the bill alleged.

‘Louis H. Meyer, on June 5, 1882, answered

to the same effect, and by a stipulation the

answer of the Southern Colorado Coal &

Town Company was directed to stand as the

answer of the Colorado Coal & Iron Com-

pany. Beplications were duly ﬁled, and the

cause was heard on a large amount of proofs,

resulting in a decree in favor of the‘ com-

plainant, declaring all the patents in the bill

mentioned, and the subsequent conveyances

of the land therein described to the defend-

ants, to be fraudulent and void, and decree-

ing that they should be held for naught, and

be delivered up to be canceled. The present

appeal is from that decree.

It was held by the circuit court that the

charge in the bill that the supposed pre-

emptors and patentees were ﬁctitious per-

sons, having no existence, was sufficiently

proved; that, consequently, there being no

grantees, no legal title passed from the Unit-

ed States; and that, as the defendants ac-

quired no legal title by virtue of the sup-

posed conveyances to them, they cannot

claim protection as bona ﬁde purchasers for

value without notice of the fraud. 18 Fed.

273.

It is fully established by the evidence that

there were in fact no actual ettlements and

improvements on any of the lands, as falsely

set out in the aﬂidavits in support of the

pre-emption claims, and in the certificates is-

sued thereon. This undoubtedly constituted

PRODUC'rlON AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

time the said several proofs of pre-emption
and non-mineral atlidavlts were made out,
slgned, and executed."
It Is also charged In the bill that the said
Hunt was a stockholder in the Southern Colorado Coal & Town Company, and general
manager of Its business, and that the incorporators of said company and the trustees
thereof, Including William S. Jackson, "knew
at the time the aforesaid described land was
conveyed to llllld company by said William
S. Jackson, as herelnbefore des<•rlbed, that
the several patt>nts to said sevt>ral p.eees and
parcels of land had been fraudulently obtained from your omtor, and knew that the
said se'l"eral supposed pre-emptors and pat.entees were myths and fictitious persons, and
knew that the said Jackson had no right, ti·
tie, or Interest in said land, or any part
thereof."
The answer of the Southern Colorado Coal
It Town Company, ftled November 2, 1881,
specifically denies all the allegations of the
bill alleging fraud, and denies that the said
lands, or any portion of them, were mineral
lands In the sense of not being lands capable
of being acquired under the pre-emption
law, and sets up by way of further defense
that 1t was a purchaser of all the said lands
In good faith for a valuable consideration
without any knowledge or notice whatever
~r any or either of the pretended fraudulent
·acts and conspiracies In the blll alleged.
·L ouls H. Meyer, on June 5, 1882, answered
to the same effect, and by a stipulation the
answer of the Southern Colorado Coal &
Town Company was directed to stand as the
answer of the Colorado Coal & Iron Company. Repllcatlons were duly filed, and the
cause was heard on a large amount of proofs,
resulting In a decree in favor of the· complalnant, declaring all the patents In the blll
mentioned, and the subsequent conveyances
ot the land therein described to the defendants, to be fraudulent and void, and decreeIng that they should be held for naught, and
be dellvered up to be canceled. The present
appeal ls from that decree.
It was held by the circuit court that the
t'harge in the bill that the supvosed preemptors and patentees were ftctltlClus persons, having no existence, was sumelt>ntly
proved; that, eo'1sequently, there beleg no
grantees, no legal title passed from the Unit·
ed States; and that, as the defendants acquired no legal title by virtue of the supposed conveyances to them, they cannot
clalm protection as bona fide purchasers for
value without notice of the fraud. 18 Fed.
273.
It Is fully established by the evidence that
there were In fact no actual settlements and
Improvements on any of the lands, as falsely
set out In the amdavlts in support of the
pre-emption claims, and In the certificates Issued thereon. This undoubtedly constituted
n fraud upon the United States sumclent In
equity, as aimlnst tile parties perpetrating
R:"Jt

It, or those claiming under them with notice
of it, to Justify the cancellation of the patents issued to them; but It ls not such a
fraud as prevents the pa&1lng of the lepl tltle by the patents. It follows that, to a bill
In equity to cancel the patents upon these
grounds alone, the defense of a bona fide purchaser tor value without notice la perfect.
In reference to su~h a case, It was said by
this court in U. 8. v. Minor, 114 U. 8. ~.
243, 5 Sup. Ot. 836: "Where the patent Is
I the result of nothing but fraud and perjury,
I It ls enough to hold that It conveys the legal
title, and 1t would be going quite too far to
say that It cannot be assailed by a proceedIng in equity, and set aside as void, lt the
: fraud ls proved, and there are no innocent
1 holders for value." Meader v. Norton, 11
' Wall. 442, 458. It ls, Indeed, an elementary
doctrine of" equity that, where a granter bait
been Induced by fraud to part with the legal
title to his property, he cannot reclaim It
fl'om subsequent Innocent purchasers tor
value. Hence It becomes necessary, to supI port the decree of the circuit court, to mainI taln, as that court declared, that the legal
title to the lands ID question did not pass
from the United States by virtue of the patents, because there were In fact no grantees.
And It was that proposition of fact which, by
the proofs Introduced Into the cause, the
United States undertook to establish. The
evlden<.'t' on that point Is tound in the deposltlons of 14 persons examined as witnesses.
They were called to prove, and did prove, in
the first pla~. In respect to the several tracts
of land In' controversy, the facts that they
had not been settled upon, and that no Im~
1 provements had been made upon them by
j any person. ThPy also testified, In substance, that they were acquainted, at the
time of the tnmsa<'tlons, with the lands, and
were acquainted with the people then llvlng
In Las Animas county, some of them stating
that they knew every white man residing at
that time therein; that with the exception of
one person, named Martine, there ·were no
persons In the county at the time bearing
the names specified as pre-emption claimants,
and no pers0ns bearing the names subscribed
as wltot>sst>s to their statements; and that
tht>y never saw or heard of persons residing
In the county having such names. This ls
the extent of this descrlp~lon of evidence,
the weight of which ls to be estimated ID
conne<>tton with the fact that the county of
Las Anlmaa, although sparsely settled, embraces an area extending about l:iO mil~
from east to west, and about 40 miles from
north to south. In corroboration of It, tt>stlmony was Introduced, on behalf of the United States, of experts in handwriting. with a
view of establishing, by a comparison of th1•
documents, that they were fabricated; which.
however, was met by the opposing opinions
of other experts called on the part of the defendants. This evidence we think not only
Inconclusive, but entitled to no weight, not at

I

I

BURDEN OF PHOOF.
BURDEN OF PROOF.

[Case No. 124

all supporting the inference sought to be

drawn, that the same handwriting is trace-

able in the signatures of the various names.

The conclusion, if warranted at all, must de-

pend upon the statements of the other wit-

nesses, the substance of whose testimony

has already been given, and such presump-

tions of fact or law as legitimately arise

thereon. _

It is charged in the bill that these title

papers were falsely and fraudulently made

by the register and receiver, combining with

Hunt and others unknown in a conspiracy

for that purpose; but there is no direct

proof of such a conspiracy. It is sought to

be inferred from the fact that the pre-emp-

tion statements were falsely nlade, and

from the evidence tending to show that the

persons named were ﬁctitious. There is no
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proof to connect the register and receiver

with such a conspiracy, except the fact that

the affidavits purport to have been made be-

fore them, and were certified to by them.

Hunt’s connection with it rests upon the

fact that he procured deeds from the sup-

posed patentees, conveying the lands to

Jackson in pursuance of a bargain with him.

It may well be admitted that if there were

no actual persons who made applications as

pre-emption settlers, none who made and

signed the necessary declarations and aili-

davits, and no persons as witnesses who at-

tested the same, the register and receiver

must have known the fact; but the fact of

the conspiracy depends upon prior proof that

the alleged transactions were mere ﬁctions.

The proof necessary to justify that conclu- -

sion is supposed to be found in the facts

testiﬂed to by the witnesses, a summary of

which has been given.

It certainly does not follow that no such

persons in fact existed, as a necessary con-

clusion from the testimony of these witness-

es that they knew no such persons as named

in these papers. The utmost that can be

said, as was said by the learned judge of the

circuit court in delivering judgment in the

case, is that “if none of them were ever in

the county, and no improvements were ever

made upon the land, then the proofs upon

which the patents issued were false, and

the inference that the papers were manu-

factured without the presence of any per-

sons bearing or assuming the names of the

patentees is not more unreasonable than

would be the inference that til actual per-

sons committed perjury themselves, and sub-

orned as many others to pcrjure themselves

as wltneses. in order to acquire the title.”

This, it is argued, establishes at least that

it is more probable that the grantees were

iictitious than that they were real persons,

and that, in view of the diﬂiculty, if not the

impossibility, of proving the negative propo-

sition that no such persons existed, and of

the fact that the defendants connect their

title and right with a transaction which

must have occurred with these grantees if

supporting the Inference 80\tght to be
drawn, that the 1111.me handwriting 18 traceable in the signatures of the various names.
The conclusion, 1f warranted at all, must depend upon the statements of the other wlt•
nesaea, the substance of whose testimony
has already been given, and such presumptions of fact or law as legltlmately arise
thereon.
It 18 chareed In the bill that these title
papers were falsely and fraudufontly made
by the register and receh-er, combining wlth
Hunt and others unknown In a conspiracy
tor that purpose; but there ls no direct
proof ot such a conspiracy. It ls sought to
be Interred from the fact that the pre-emption statements were falsely made, and
from the evhlence tending to show that the
persons named were fl.ctltlous. There ls no
proof to connect the register and receiver
with such a conspiracy, except the fact that
the affidavits purport to have been made before them, and were certified to by them.
Hunt's connection with It rests upon the
fact that be procured deeds from the supposed patentees, conveying the lauds to
Jackson In pursuance of a bargain with him.
It may well be admitted that It there were
no actual PN'flODS who made applications as
pre-emption settlers, none who made and
signed the ne<>eseary dedarations and atlldavits, nod no persons as witnesses who attested the same, the register and receiver
must hnve known the fact; but the fact of
the conspiracy depends upon prior pt'Oof that
the alleged trall88ctfone were mere fictions.
The proof necessary to justify that conclu- ·
slon Is supposed to be found In the facts
testlfled to by the witnesses, a summary ot
which bas been given.
It certainly does not follow that no such
persona In fact existed, as a necessary conclusion from the testimony of these witnesses that they knew no such persons as named
In these papers. The utmost that can be
said, as was said by the learned judge of the
circuit court In delivering judgment In the
case, la that "If none ot them were ever in
the county, and no Improvements were eyer
made upon the lantl, then the proofs upon
which the patents Issued were false, and
the inference that the papers were manufactured without the presence of any peraons bearing or assuming the names of the
patentees ls not more unreasonable than
would be the Inference that 61 actual persons committed perjury themselves, and suborned as many others to perjure themselves
ae witnesses, in order to acquire the title."
This, lt la argued, establishes at least that
It ls more probable that the grantees were
llctltloue than that they were real persons,
and that, In view of the dlMculty, lf not the
Impossibility, of proving the negative proposition that no such persons existed, and of
the fact that the defendants connect their
title and rlitbt with a transaction which
must have occurred with these gmntees If
~ll
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they had an actual existence, the burden ot
proof ls shifted from the United States to
the defendants, and that, as the latter Introduced no evidence tending to show the
fact as they claimed It to be, the case ot the
complainants must be considered as establlehed by a preponderance of proof.
· We have bad recent occasion to consider
the question of the character and degree of
proof nece81181'y In such cases to Invalidate
titles held by purchasers In good faith tot
value, and without notice, under patents
lseued by the United States. In Maxwell
Land-Grant Case, 121 U. S. 32:>, 379, 7 Sup.
Ct. 1015, It ls said: "The deliberate action
of the tribunals to which the law commits
the determination ot all preliminary questions, and the control of the processes by
which this evidence of title ls lsaued to the
grantee, demands that to annul such an In·
strument, and destroy the title claimed under it, the tacts on which this action ls
asked for must be clearly established by
evidence entirely satisfactory to tbe court,
and that the case Itself must be entirely
wlthln the cl888 ot causes for which such
an instrument may be avoided. • • • We
take the general doctrine to be that when,
in a court of equity, It la proposed to set
aside, to annul, or to correct a written Instrument for fraud or mistake In the execution of the Instrument Itself, the testimony on which this Is done must be clear,
unequivocal, and convincing, and that It
cannot be done upon a bare preponderance
of evidence wblcb leaves the lBBue In doubt.
It the proposltlon, as thus laid down In the
cases cited, ts sound In regard to the ordinary contracts of private Individuals, how
much more should lt be observed where the
attempt ls to annul the grants, the patents,
and other solemn evidences of title emanat·
Ing from the government of the United
States under Its oftfclnl seal. In this clasa
of cases, the respect due to a patent, the
presumptions that all the preceding steps
required by the Jaw had been observed before its lBSue, the immense Importance and
necessity of the stablllty of tltlel!I llepl'ndent
upon the'*' otftclal ln11t rnments, demand that
the eJrort to set them aside, to annul them,
or to correct mistakes In them should only
be successful when the allegations on which
this ls attempted are clearly statect, and
fully sustained by proof. It ls not to be admitted that the titles by which so much
property in this country and so many rights
are held, purporting to emanate from the
~uthorltatlve action of the ofDcers of the
government, and, as In this <'ase, under the
seal and signature of the president of the
United States himself, shall be dependent
upon the hazard of successful resistance to
the whims and caprices of every person
who chooses to attack them In a court ot
justice; but it should be well understood
that only that class of evidence which com·
mands respect, and that amount of It which
~7
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produces conviction, shall make such an at-

tempt successful."

It thus appears that the title of the de-

fendants rests upon the strongest presump-

tions of fact, which, although they may be

rebutted, nevertheless can be overthrown

only by full proofs to the contrary, clear,

convincing, and unambiguous. The burden

of producing these proofs, and establishing

the conclusion to which they are directed,

rests upon the government. Neither is it

relieved of this obligation by the negative

nature of the proposition it is bound to es-

tablish. It is, indeed, sometimes said that

a negative is incapable of proof, but this is

not a maxim of the law. In the language

of an eminent text writer: “When the

negative ceases to be a simple one,-when it

is qualiﬁed by time, place, or circumstance,
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—much of this objection is removed; and

proof of a negative may very reasonably be

required when the qualifying circumstances

are the direct matter in issue, or the atiirma-

tive is either probable in itself, or supported

by a presumption, or peculiar means of

proof are in the hands of the party assert-

ing the negative.” Best, Ev. (Am. Ed.) 1883,

270. So, also, Id. § 273: “When a pre-

sumption is in favor of the party who as-

serts the negative, it only affords an addi-

tional reason for casting the burden of proof

on his adversary; it is when a presumption

is in favor of the party who asserts the

affirmative that its effect becomes visible,

as the opposite side is then bound to prove

his negative.” Also Id. § 276: “This appears

from the cae of Doe v. Whitehead, 8 Adol.

& E. 571, which was an ejectnient by a land-

lord against a tenant on an alleged forfei-

ture by breach of a covenant in his lease to

insure against ﬁre in some oﬂlce in or near

London, in which it was contended that it lay

on the defendant to show that he had in-

sured, that being a fact within his peculiar

knowledge. The argument ab inconvenienti

was strongly urged, viz.,‘ that the plaintiff

could not bring persons from every insur-

ance oﬂice in or near London to show that

no such insurance had been effected by the

defendant, and Rex v. Turner, 5 Maule & S.

206, Apothecaries’ C0. v. Bentley, Ryan &

M. 159, and some other cases of that class,

were cited. But Lord Denman, (T. J., in de-

livering judgment, said: ‘I do not dispute

the cases on the game laws which have been

cited; but there the defendant is in the

ﬁrst instance shown to have done an act

which was unlawful unless he was qualiﬁed,

and then the proof of qualiﬁcation is thrown

upon the defendant. Here the plaintiff re-

lies on some thing done or permitted by the

lessee, and takes upon himself the burden

of proving that fact. The proof may be dif-

ﬁcult where the matter is peculiarly within

the defendant's knowledge, but that does

not vary the rule of law.’ And in the same

case Littledale, J., said: ‘In the cases cited

as to game, the defendant had to bring him-
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produoea conviction. shall make such an attempt euccesstul."
It thus appears that the title ot the defendante rests upon the strongest presumptlons ot fact, which, although they may be
rebutted, nevertheless can be overthrown
only by full proofs to the contrary, clear,
convincing, and unambiguous. The burden
ot producing these proofs, and establishing
the conclusion to which they are directed,
rests upon the government. Neither 18 It
relleved of this obligation by the nP.gatlve
nature of the proposition It ts bound to establlsh. It Is, Indeed, sometimes said that
a negative Is Incapable of proof, but this Is
not a maxim of the law. In the language
of an eminent text writer: "When the
negative ceases to be a simple one,-when It
Is qualified by time, place, or clrcumfltance,
-much of this objection Is removed; and
proof of a negath·e may very reasonably be
requtred when the quallfylng ctrcuru11tances
are the direct matter In 188ue, or the atfinnatlve Is either probable In Itself, or eu11ported
by a presumption, or peculiar means of
proof are In the hands of the party IUISf'!rtIng the negative." Best, Ev. (Am. Ed.) 1883,
I 270. So, also, Id. I 273: "When a presumptlon ts In favor ot the party who asserts the negative, It only affords an addltlonal reason tor casting the burden of proof
on his adversary; lt ts when a presum11tlon
Is In favor of the party who asserts the
amrmative that its effect becomes visible,
as the opposite side le then bound to prove
his negative." Also Id. I 276: "This appears
from the case of Doe v. Whitehead, 8 Adol.
& E. 571, which was an ejectment by a landlord agalwit a tenant on an alleged torfeiture by breach of a covenant In his lease to
Insure against 11.re In some otllce ln or near
London, ln which It was contended that it lay
on the defendant to show that he had In·
sured, that belnir a tact within his peculiar
knowledge. The argument ab lnconvenientl
was strongly urged, viz.,_that the plalntlff
could not bring persons from every Insurance oftlce In or near London to show that
no such Insurance had been effected by the
defendant, and Rex v. Turner, o Maule & S.
200, Apothecaries' Co. v. Bentley, Ryan &
M. 159, and some other cases of that cla88,
were cited. But Lord Denman, C. J., lo delivering judgment, said: 'I do not dispute
the.cases on the game laws which have been
cited; but there the defendant ls In the
first instance shown to have done an act
which was unlawful unless he was qualified,
and then the proof ot quallfi<'atlon Is thrown
upon the deft>ndant. Here the plaintiff relies on some thing done or permlttt>d by the
lessee, and takes upon himself the lnml<>n
of proving that fact. The p,root may be dlfflcult where the matter Is peculiarly within
the defendant's knowledge, but that does
not vary the rule of law.' And In the same
case Llttledale, J., said: 'In the cases cited
as to game, the deft-mlant had to brln1: him358

self within the protection ot the statutes;
and a like obeervatlon applies to .A.Pothecaries' Co. v. Bentley. But here, where a
landlord brings an action to defeat the eetate granted to the lessee, the onua of proof
ought to Ue on the plaintiff.' And tb1B rulIng has been upheld by subsequent caaee.
Tolewan v. Portbury, L. R. 5 Q. B. 288;
Wedgwood v. Hart, 2 Jur. (N. S.) 288; Price
Worwood, 4 Hurl. & N. 512."
Mr. Greenleaf states the rule In P.Qulvalent terms. He says (1 Greenl. Ev. I 78):
"To this general rule, that the burden of
proof Is on the party holding tlle aftlrmatlve,
there are some exceptlone, In which the
proposition, though negative In Its terms,
must be proved by the party who states It.
One class of these e:r:ceptlons will be found
to Include those <'ases In which the plaintiff
grounds hie right of action upon a negative
allegation, and where, of course, this negatlve Is an essential element In his. case."
And In section 80: "So, where the negative
allegation lnl"olves a charge of criminal neglect of duty, whether ottlclal or otherwise,
or fraud, or the wrongful violation ot actual
lawful possession of property, the party
making the allegation must prove It; tor In
these cases the presumption of law, which
ls always ln favor of innocence and Quiet
possession, Is In favor of the party charged."
In the present case the facts shown are,
ln our opinion, not sutllcient to overcome
the presumption of Innocence on the part of
the register and receiver ot the land-oftlce.
It ls Quite consistent with these facts that
real persone, whether under their own or
under a88uined names, did actually appear
before them and make pre-emptlon claims.
There Is no testimony whatever tending to
establish directly any complicity on their
part with the fraud which may have been
practiced upon them, and not through them.
It Is certain that there were real persons
acting In the matter. The purchase price
I due on the entry of the lands was In fact
paid. There ls no proof of any actual fabrlcatlon of the papers, the genuineness ot
which Is not negatll"ed by any internal evldence. The allegations In the bill that they
were In tact manufactured by the register
and receiver and Hunt, or by any one with
their connivance, are entirely unsupported
by direct evidence.
It le allea:ed In the bill, also, that "by the
rules and regulations which then and since
have g°'·erned it In the Issue of patents for
land located with agricultural college scrip,
no patent was Issued by your orator except
on presentation at Its geneml land-otfice by
the person making such location, his agent
or hh1 assin, of the duplicate certificate BR
aforesaid delivered to the IO<'ator for the land
for which a patent ts claimed," and "that
after the forwarding by the said Stanton and
Cook of said "Supposed proofs of pre-emption.
said agricultural college scrip, said money.
said non-mineral amdavlt, and said dupll·

v.
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cate certiﬁcate, in each of the said pretended

pre-cmption claims as aforesaid mentioned,

to your orator’s general land-oﬁice at Wash-

ington, the said Alexander C. Hunt, pretend-

ing to act as agent of each of said supposed

pre-emptors, presented to the oﬂicers of the

geneml land-oﬂice such other duplicate certiﬁ-

cates of location, and requested said oiﬁcers

to cause a patent for each of the said several

pieces of land to issue from your orator to the

said supposed persons in each case purport-

ing to claim and apply for the same.” And

it is added that the oﬂicers of the general

land-oﬂilce, conﬁding in the honesty of the

register and receiver, and believing the state-

ments contained in the proofs to be true, did

issue its patents therefor. ‘The allegation is

that the patents were issued to Hunt. In

point of fact, it appears from the evidence
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that a number of patents were delivered to

Britton & Gray, W. P. Dunwoody, and W. W.

Cowling, respectively, through whom the du-

plicate certiﬁcates were presented to the gen-

eral land-oﬂice for that purpose. There is no

allegation that these were not real persons,

nor are any charges made against them as

participants in the fraud. They professed to

represent the parties entitled to the patents;

they must have known for whom in fact they

were acting. There is nothing to show that

they were not accessible as witnesses. From

the correspondence in the record it appears

that Britton & Gray were transacting busi-

ness in the city of Washington, and that Cow-

ling was also a resident of the District of

Columbia. None of these parties were called

by the government as witnesses. Whatever

may be said as an excuse for the failure to

call Hunt and Stanton and Cook, on the

ground that they are charged with being the

actual conspirators in the fraud, no reason

can be assigned for not calling Britton 8.:

Gray, Dunwoody, and Cowling.

Neither do we think the reason assigned as

an excuse, on the part of the government, for

not calling the register and receiver as wit-

nesses, is valid or satisfactory. One of them,

it was said at the bar, had died. But the oth- -

er might and ought to have been examined.

He was one of its own oﬂicers, through whom

the government had received the price of the

lands sold, and which it has ever since re-

tained. If his oﬂicial conduct was impugned,

nevertheless his misconduct. if proved, was

not imputable to the defendants, and they

should not be prejudiced by the odium of an

accusation, against him. The United States

had trusted him, and, inspired by that con-

ﬁdence, the defendants also had relied upon

his otiicial acts. In this faith they had paid

full value for what they had reason to be-

lieve was a perfect title. They were not ac-

cused of any complicity with, nor had they

any knowledge oi’, the fraud charged. In the

absence of direct proof of his guilt, the gov-

ernment could not properly treat the defend-

ants as his confederates, nor deprive them of

any defense which as a witness he might be

eat.e cert:Ulcate, in each of the said pretended
pre-emption clalms as aforesaid mentioned,
to your orator's general land-oftlce at Washington, the said Alexander C. Hunt, pretending to act as agent of each of said supposed
pre-emptora, presented to the offtcel'll of the
general land-offtce such other duplicate certlftcates of location, and requested said offtcers
to cause a patent for each of the said several
pieces of land to l&Bue f1-om your orator to the
llBid suppoaed pel'llODs in each case purporting to claim and apply for the same." And
It ls added that the offtc.1!1'8 of the general
land-offtce, confiding in the honesty of the
register and receiver, and believing the staterut-nts contained in the proofs to be true, dld
lssue Its patents therefor. The allegation is
that the patents were IBSued to Hunt. In
point of fact, It appears from the evidence
that a number of patents were delivered to
Britton & Gray, W. P. Dunwoody, and W. W.
Cowling, respectively, through whom the duplicate certificates were presented to the general land-offtce for that purpose. There is no
allegation that these were not real per11ons,
nor are llJl3' charges made againat them as
participants In the fraud. They professed to
represent the parties entitled to the patents;
they must have known for whom in fact they
were acting. There ls nothing to show that
the)' were not accessible as witnesses. From
the correspondence In the record it appeara
that Britton & Gray were transacting buslnet111 In the city of Washington, and that Cowling was also a resident of the District of
Columbia. None of these parties were called
by the government as witnesses. Whatever
may be said 88 an excuse for the failure to
call Hunt and Stanton and Cook, on the
ground that they are charged with being the
actual conspirators in the fraud, no reason
can be assigned for not calling Britton &
Gray, Dunwoody, and Cowllug.
Neither do we think the reason assigned as
an excuse, on the part of the government, for
not calling the register and receiver as witnesses, ls valid or satisfactory. One of them,
lt waa said at the bar, had died. But the otb- ·
er might and ought to have been examined.
He was one of its own omcen, through whom
the government bad received the price of the
lands sold, and which 1t has ever since retained. If his offtclal conduct was Impugned,
nevertheless his ml!1comluct, It proved, was
not Imputable to the defendants, and they
t1bould not be prejudiced by the odium of an
accusation, against him. The United States
had trusted him, and, Inspired by that confidence, the defendants also had relied upon
bis offtclal acts. In this faith they had paid
full value for what they bad reason to believe was a perfect title. They were not ac(•used of any complicity wltll, nor had they
any knowledge of, the fraud charged. ID the
abaence of direct proof of hie guilt, the government could not properly treat the defendants as his confederates, nor deprive them of
any defense which as a witness be might be
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able to malce for himself. The Uulted States
had no higher interest at stake than to establish the truth and Justice of the transaction.
It was due from It to these parties, whose
estate thlll Bult was Instituted t.o defeat, to
produce and examine ns witnesses those who
must have bad the best knowledge of the
facts, so as not to force the defendants to explanations which, by the very theory ot thelr
Innocence and Ignorance, they were Incapable
of making. To raise a SllllPlclon, however
strong, of the fraud and wrong-doing of Its
own offtcers ls not enough to justify the government In casting upon the defendants the
burden of establlsbing their title.
In addition warranty deeds, made to Jackson as trustee, were put tn evidence by the
government, reciting a consideration In each
case, amounting lo the aggregat.e to '52,200,
to the payment of which Jackson also testifies. Each of these deeds was executed, acknowledged, and recorded in conformity with
law. They were regular on thelr face, the
acknowledgments purporting to have been
taken by public offtcers before whom, It ls
recited, the grantors severally appeared and
acknowledged their execution. 'l'hese offt.
cers, If called and examined as witnesses,
would probably have tbrowu some light upon the transaction, and should have been examined upon the points in Issue. It ls to be
presumed that they could have testlfted
whether any persons in fact appeared before
them at the times and places named In their
certificates, and whether, If so, they were
identified as being the persons named as
grantors in the deeds. None of them were In
fact called on the part of the United States,
and no reason ls assigned for not having
done so. It thus appears that the govemment did not make all the proof of which the
nature of the case was susceptible, and which
was apparently within Its reach.
On the other hand, the defendants, by their
evidence, have fully established all the steps
by which they became connected with the
transaction. The lands were bought and paid
for at their full value by Wllllam S. Jack·
son, acting for himself and a880clates, who
united together for the purpose of making
purchases of land in that region, upon Jackson's belief and assurance of Its ultimate
value. expecting It to Increase by the building
of railroads and general growth of the country. lie arranged with Hunt, who was engaged In dealing In lands, ·and bad been governor of the territory, to pay for titles to such
lands as he might accept. Hunt submitted
to him descriptions of lands which he said
be could control, from which Jackson made
selections. For these Hunt sent to Jackson
deeds duly executed, attested, and acknowledged, accompanied by receiver's certificates
ID regular form, showing that the party named as grantor was entltled to a patent. These
be wa11 advised by coumiel to accept, and did
accept In good faith, 88 being equivalent to
patents. In many instances the patents were
!U'..!I.
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issued before the deeds were executed. Jack-

son had no connection whatever with making

the proofs of pre-emption, and had no knowl-

edge in reference thereto, except such as was

disclosed by the deeds and certiﬁcates, in re-

liance upon which, and without visiting the

lands, or having them examined, he bought.

The deeds to Jackson were duly acknowledg-

ed before competent ofiicers by persons cer-

tified to be the grantors therein named. The

transactions were several, as regards the vari-

ous tracts of land, and successive, during

more than two years, the deeds being deliver-

ed within a period extending from May 2,

1873, to May 21, 1875. The circumstance that

many of the acknowledgments of the deeds

were taken in Arapahoe county before a no-

tary in Hunt's oﬂice, while the grantors pur-

ported to be residents of Las Animus county,
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was not calculated to raise any suspicion of

fraud, as Jackson supposed that Hunt was

dealing with the pre-emptors, and was pro-

curing their deeds to be executed for delivery

to him, nnd it was natural to expect that this

would be done at Hunt's own oﬂice. In fact,

14 of the acknowledgments were taken be-

fore other oﬁlcers, and some of them in Las

Animus county. That Jackson and his as-

signs, the coal and town company, and its

successor, the coal and iron company, in good

faith believed that they had acquired a valid

title to these lands, is manifest from their

subsequent dealing with them. They not on-

ly paid full value for the lands in the con-

dition in which they were, but they made

large investments thereon in the way of im-

provements. At the time of the organization

of the consolidated company there were up-

on the premises described in the bill coke-

ovens, and machinery in connection there-

with, buildings constituting the town of El

Moro, and coal-mine improvements, consist-

ing of entries, rooms, gangway, tracks,

chutes, repair-shops, houses, and store build-

ings. Coal was then, between 6 and 7 years

after Jackson's purchase, being mined upon

one quarter section, and the town of El Moro

covered 30 or 40 acres, comprising 20 to 25

buildings, erected by various individuals, to

whom the company had sold lots, in accord-

ance with a regular survey and map of the

town-site. The entire value of the mine and

coke improvements was estimated to be about

$2-.'>(I,O0(). The property was used by the com-

pany in connection with works which they

had established at South Pueblo for the manu-

facture of iron and steel. on which there had

been an expenditure of from one to two mil-

lions of dollars, the coal and coke necessary

for carrying on which was obtained from the

coal mines on part of the premises in dis-

pute. As against interests of this magnitude

and value vested upon a clnim of title, the

good faith of which on the part of the defend-

ants is absolutely unimpeached, the proof of

a fraud which renders their title absolutely

void should be stronger than the legal pre-

sumptions on which it may rightfully rest.
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Issued before the deeds were executed. Jackson had no connection whatever with making
the proofs of pre-emption, and bad no knowledge In reference thereto, except such a11 was
disclosed by the deeds and certificates, In reliance upon whlcli, and without visiting the
landB, or having them examined, he bought.
The deeds to Jackson were duly acknowledged before competent omcera by pel'llOns cer-tltied to be the grantors therein named. The
traDBactlons were several, u regardB the various tracts of land, and successive, during
more than two years, the deed.a being deliverE'd within a period extending trom May 2,
1873, to May 21, 1875. The circumstance that
many of the acknowledgments of the deeds
were taken In Arapahoe county before a notary In Hunt's omce, while the grantors pur·
ported to be. residents of Laa Animas county,
was not calculated to raise any suspklon of
fraud, as Jackson supposed that Hunt was
dealing with the pre-emptors, and wa11 procuring their deeds to be executed for delivery
to him, and it was natural to expect that this
would be done at Hunt's own omce. In fact,
14 of the acknowledgments were taken before other otncers, and some of them In Las
Animas county. That Jackson and his uslgns, the <.'Onl and town company, and Its
successor, the coal and Iron company, In good
faith believed that they had acquired a valid
title to these IandB, Is manifest from their
subsequent dealing with them. They not only paid full value for the lands In the con·
dltlon In which they were, but they made
large Investments thereon In the way of Improvements. At the time of the organization
of the consolidated company there were upon the premises described In the bill cokeovens, and machinery In connection therewith, buildings constituting the town of EI
Moro, and coal-mine lmprovements, consisting of entries, rooms, gangways, tracks,
chutes, repair-shops, houses, and store buildings. Coal was then, between 6 and 7 years
after Jackson's purchase, being mined upon
one quarter section, and the town of El Moro
<'OTered 30 or 40 acres, comprising ~ to 25
bulldlngs, erected by various Individuals, to
whom the company had sold lots, In accordance with a regular survey and map of the
town-site. The entire value of the mine and
coke improvements was estimated to be about
$200,000. The property was used by the com1>any In connection with works which they
had established at South Pueblo tor the manufa<'ture ot Iron and steel, on whll•h the1·e had
been an expenditure of from one to two millions of dollars, the coal and coke necessary
for carrying on which was obtained from the
coal mines on part ot the premises In dispute. As against lnterest11 ot this magnitude
and value vested upon a claim of title, the
good talth ot which on the part ot the defendants is absolutely unimpeached, the proof ot
a fraud which rernters their title absolutely
void should be stronger than the legal pre11umptlons on which it may rightfully rest.
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It ts urged in ari."llment by the solicitor general that this c·ase cannot be distinguished
from that ot Moffat v. U. S., 112 U. 8. 2-l, ;;
Sup. Ct. 10. The two cases are undoubtedly
similar In their general aspects, but, nevertheless, differ In some particulars most material to the de<:lslon. It Is stated in the report of the case cited that "the testimony
taken fully established the truth of the allegations and charges, eilcept as to the knowledge by Moffat and Carr of the alleged
fraudB." The charges proven, or to be taken
as proven, therefore, as set torth in the blll,
were that the title papers In the case were
manufactured by a clerk In the oftice of the
receiver, and that the recelTer was also the
owner of the agricultural college scrip used
to pay tot the landB located, and that, tor the
purpose of lO<'atlng the land with It In the
name ot Quinlan, the register and receiver
had inserted In a blank indorsement his fictitious name and residence, and In that name
had located the scrip on the land, there being
no such person, nor any settlement and improvement on the land; and that the duplicate cerWlcate on which the patent tssued
was presented to the general land-ofDce by
the defendant himself, who was thus brought
Into direct connection with the omcers who
had committed the traud, and with the transaction before the issue of the patent. In that
case Motrat did not offer his deed In evidence,
was not examined as a witness, and attempted no proof either of his own Innocence, or
of the payment of value, but stood without
explanation aa to who his immediate grantol'B
were, or how he came In contact with them.
The receiver was examined as a witness, but
wholly failed to meet the charges alleged
against him. There was further proof tending to show that the acknowledgments of the
deeds to :Motrat had been taken without Identification of the grantors from whom Moffat
received his deeds directly, and In respect to
whom he must have had some knowledge.
These circumstances, In our opinion, clearly
distinguish that case from the present one.
There is, however, another ground on
which it is contended by the government
that the patents described In the bill are
void. It ls alleged that the lnnds In controversy were not subject to settlement and
sale under the pre-emption laws, being
"known mines" within the description .of
those laws. The act of September 4, lSU
(:'.; Stnt. 455, c. 16, f 10), provided that no preemption entry should be made on "lands on
which are situated any known salines or
mines." By the act of July 1, 1864 03 Stat.
343, c. 205, t 1), it ls enacted "that where
any tracts erubra<'lng coal-beds or conl-ft<'lds
com1titutlng portions of the public domain,
and which as 'mines' are excluded from the
pre-emption act ot 1Sl1, and which under
past legislation are not liable to ordlnarr
private entry, It shall and may be lawful
for the president to cause surh trac-ts, In
suitable legal subdivisions, to be otr(•red at

BURDEY OF PROOF.

[Case :No. 124

BURDEN OF PROOF.

[Case No. 124

public sale to the highest bidder, after pub-

lic notice of not less than three months, at

:1 minimum price of twenty dollars per acre;

and any lands not thus disposed of shall

thereafter be liable to private entry at said

minimum.”

'1‘he language of the pre-emption act of

1841 is preserved in section 2258, Rev. St.

"The act of 1864 and its supplemental act of

March 3, 1865 (13 Stat. 529, c. 107), were sub-

stantially re-enacted by the act of March 3,

1873 (17 Stat. 607, c. 279), now embodied in

section 2347, Rev. St., and the sections im-

mediately following. The force and mean-

ing of the original legislation remains un-

changed. The subsequent provisions relate

to the classiﬁcation and terms and mode of

entry and sale of the coal lands excluded

from pre-emption by the laws on that sub-
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ject. In reference to coal lands, which are

noted on public surveys and plats as such, of

1'Olll‘S(! it is not to be disputed that their char-

acter is thereby made known so as to with-

draw them from entry under the pre-emp-

tion and homestead acts. Where this is not

done it remains, as in the present case. to

determine how the character of the lands

is to be ascertained, so that they may be

classiﬁed as those “on which are situated

any known salines or mines.”

it is argued by the solicitor general, upon

the facts as disclosed by the evidence in

this record, that the lands covered by tin-se

patents embraced “known mines" or coal,

and that, as such lands are expressly ex-

cepted out of the pre-emption laws, the pat-

cnts issued therefor were void for want of

power on the part of the oﬁicer to issue

them, as decided in Polk v. Wendall, 9

Cranch, 87; Minter v. Crommclin, 18 1-low.

87; Reichart v. Felps, 6 Wall. 160; Morton

v. Nebraska, 21 Wall. (560. In the last-nam-

ed case, Morton v. Nebraska. it was said

(page 674): “The salines in this case were

not hidden as mines often are, but were so

incrusted with salt that they resembled

‘snow-covered lakes,’ and were consequently

not subject to pre-emption.” In McLaugh-

lin v. U. S., 107 U. S. 526, 2 Sup. Ct. 802,

the decree of the circuit court canceling

the patent, on the ground that it purported

to convey lands as part of a railroad grant,

which were excepted therefrom as mineral

lands, was affirmed. The court say (page

528): “It is satisfactorily proven, as we

think, that cinnabar, the mineral which car-

ries quicksilvcr, was found there as early

as 1863; that a man named Powell resided

on the land, and mined this cinnabar, at

that time, and in 1866 established some form

of reduction-works there; that these were

on the ground when application for the pat-

ent was made by the defendant McLaugh-

lin, as agent of the Western Paciﬁc Railroad

Vompany, and that these facts were known

to him. He is not, therefore, an innocent

purchaser." See Railroad Co. v. U. S., 108

U. S. 510, 2 Sup. Ct. 802.

public sale to the blgbellt bidder, after public notice of not leas than three months, at
.a minimum price of twenty dollars per acre;
and any lands not thus disposed of shall
thereafter be liable to private entry at Mid
minimum."
The language of the pre-emption act of
1841 Is preserved In section 2258, Rev. St.
"The act of 18tl4 and tts supplemental act of
March 3, 1800 (13 Stat. 529, c. 107), were sub'ltantlally re-enacted by the act of March 3,
1873 (17 Stat. 607, c. 279), DOW embodied in
.section 2347, Rev. St., and the sections immediately following. The force and meaning of the original legislation remains un<'hanged. The subsequent provisions relate
to the classi.ftcatlon and terms and mode of
-entry and l!lllle of the coal lands excluded
from pre-emption by the laws on that subject. In reference to coal lands, which are
noted on public surveys and plats as such, of
<'<>Urse It is not to be disputed that their char.acter is thereby made known so as to withdraw them from entry under the pre-emp.
tlon and homestead acts. Where this ls not
-done It remains, as In the present case. to
-determine bow the character of the lands
Is to be ascertained, so that they may be
-classi.fted as those "on which are situated
.any known l!lllllnes or mines."
It Is argued by the solicitor general, upon
the facts as disclosed by the e\"ldence In
this record, that the lands covered by tht>se
patents embraced "known mines" ot coal,
and that, as such lands are expressly ex--cepted out of the pre-emption laws, the patents lasued therefor were void for want of
power on the part of the omcer to luue
them, as decided In Polk v. Wendall, 9
Crancb, 87; .Minter v. Cromruelln, 18 How.
87; Reichart v. Felps, 6 Wall. 100; Morton
v. Nebraska, 21 Wall. 660. In the lallt-nam-ed case, Morton v. Nebmska, It was said
<page 674): ''The salines in this case were
not hidden as mines often are, but were so
lncrusted with salt that they resembled
"snow-covered lakes,' and were consequently
not subject to pre-emption." In McLaughlin v. U. S., 107 U. S. 526, 2 Sup. Ct. BO'l,
the decree of the circuit court cancellns
the patent, on the ground that It purported
to convey lands as part of a railroad grant,
which were excepted therefrom as mineral
lands, was afllrmed. The court say (page
-028): "It Is BBtlsfactorlly proven, as we
think, that cinnabar, the mineral which carries quicksilver, was found there as early
aa 1863; that a man named Powell resided
on the land, and mined this cinnabar, at
that time, and in 1866 elltabllshed some form
i>f reduction-works there; that these were
i>D the ground when application tor the patent was made by the defendant McLaugh!ln, as agent of the W e11tern Pacific Railroad
<'ompany, and that these facts were known
to him. He ls not, therefore, an Innocent
purchaser." See Railroad· Co. v. U. S., 108
U. S. 510, 2 Sup. Ct. 802.

In the case of Mullan v. U. S., 118 U S.
271, 6 Sup. Ct. 1041, atter referring to the
acts of congress above recited, . the court•
speaking of tht- act of July 1, 1864, say (page
277, 118 U. S., and page l<Wl, 6 Sup. Ct.):
''This Is clearly a legislative declaration that
'known' coal lands were mineral lands within the meaning of that term as used In statutes regulating the public lands, unless a
contrary intention of congress was clearly
manifested. Whatever doubt there may be
as to the effect of this declaration on past
transactions, ft Is clear that, after It was
made, coal lands were to be treated as mineral lands. That the land now In dispute
was 'known' coal land at the time It was
selected no one can doubt. It had been
worked as a mine for many years l>PforP.
and it had upon Its surface all the appliances neceSBary for reaching, taking out, ar:d
delivering the coal. That Barnard knew
what It was when he asked for Its location
for his use Is absolutely certain, because he
was one of the agents of the coal company
at the time, and undoubtedly acted In Its
behalf In all that he did. If llullan and
Avery were Ignorant of the tact when thPY
acquired their respective Interests In the
property, It was he<'nuse they willfully shut
their eyes to what was going on around
them, and purposely kept themselves in lgnomnce of notorious tacts. · But the evidence satisfies DB entirely that they were
not Ignorant."
It will thus be seen that, so far as the decisions of this court have heretofore gone, no
lands have been held to be ''known mines"
unless at the time the rights of the purchaser accrued there was upon the ground an
actual and opened mine, which bad been
worked, or was capable of being worked.
In the case of Delfeback v. Hawke, 115 U.
S. 392, 6 Sup. Ct. 95, the legislatton on the
subject was reviewed at length. It was there
held that no title from the United States to
land known at the time of sale to be valuable for Its ~lnerals of gold, silver, cinnabar, or copper can be obtained under the
pre-emption or homestead laws, or tbe townslte laws, or in any other way than as prescribed by the laws specially authorizing the
sale of such land, except in the states of
Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Missouri,
and Kansas. The court say (page 404,
115 U.S., and page 95, 6 Sup. Ct.): "We say
'land known at the time to be valuable for
Its minerals,' as there are vast tracts of publlc land In which minerals of different kinds
are found, but not in such quantity as to
justify expenditures In the effort to extrnct
them. It is not to such lands that the term
'mineral,' In the sense of the statute, ls applicable. • • • We also say lands known
at the time of their sale to be thus valuable,
In order to avoid any possible conclusion
against the validity of titles which may be
Issued for other kinds of land In which years
afterwards rich deposits of mineral may be
Rm
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PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

discovered. It is quite possible that lauds

settled upon as suitable only tor agricultural

purposes, entered by the settler, and patent-

ed by the government, under the pre-emp-

tion laws, may be found, years after the pat-

ent has been issued, to contain valuable min-

erals. indeed, this has often happened. We

therefore use the term ‘known to be valua-

ble at the time of sale,’ to prevent any doubt

being cast upon titles to lands afterwards

found to be diiterent in their mineral char-

acter from what was supposed when the en-

try of them was made and the patent is-

sued."

It is not suiiicient. in our opinion. to con-

stitute “known mines" of coal. within the

meaning of the statute, that there should

merely be indications oi’ coal-beds or coal-

ﬁelds of greaitn-1' or less extent, and oi’ great-
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er or less value, as shown by out-croppings.

The act of 186-1 evidently contemplates a

distinction between coal-he(ls or coal-ﬁelds

excluded from the pre-emption act of 1841

as “known mines.” and other coal-beds or

coal-ﬁelds not coming within that descrip-

tion. We hold. therefore. that to constitute

the exemption contemplated by the pre-emp-

tion act undcr the head of “known mines "

there should be upon the land ascertained

coal deposits of such an extent and value as

to make the land more valuable to be work-

ed as a coal mine, under the conditions ex-
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isting at the time, than for merely agricul-

tural purposes. The circumstance that

there are surface indications of the exist-

ence ot veins of coal does not constitute a

mine. It does not even prove that the land

will ever be under any conditions suﬂicient-

ly valuable on account of its coal deposits to

be worked as a mine. A change in the con-

ditions occurring subscquently to the sale.

whereby new discoveries are made, or by

means whereof it may become proﬁtable to

work the veins as mines, cannot affect the

title as it passed at the time of the sale.

The question must be determined according

to the facts in existence at the time ot the

sale. It upon the premises at that time

there were not actual “known mines" capa-

ble of being proﬁtably worked for their

product, so as to make the land more valu-

able for mining than for agriculture. a title

to them acquired under the pre-eniption act

cannot be successfully assailed. In the

present case, the testimony. in our opinion,

does not justify us in ﬁnding that at the

time Jackson acquired his title there were

upon any part of the premises in controver-

sy any "known mines" of coal. in the sense

of the statute.

For these reasons the decree of the circuit

court is reversed, and the cause remanded,

with a direction to dismiss the bill; and it

is so ordered.

PRODUCTION A.ND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

discovered. It ls quite poHlble that lands
settled upon 118 suitable only ror agricultural
purposes, ~ntered by the settler, and patented by the government, under the pre-emptlon laws, may be found, years after the patent has heen l88ued, to conqln valuable minerals. lt1dl'ed, this has ofteu ha11pened. We
therefore use the term 'known to be valuable at the tlme of sale,' to pl"event any doubt
being cat upon titles to lands afterwards
found to be dUlerent In their mineral character from what was 11upposed when the entry of them was made and the patent lssnoo."
It ls not sufHclent, lo our 011lnlon. to C'ODstitute "known mines" of coal, within thl'
meaning of the 11tatute, that there should
merely be lndlrntlou11 of C'Oal-bed11 or coal11.elds of i:reutl'r or leKS extent, and of greater or less value, as shown by out-cropplngs.
The net of 1804 evidently contemplates a
distinction between coal-becls or coal-fields
exduded from the pre-t>mptlon act of 1841
as "known mines." and other coal-beds or
coal-fldcls not coming within that desc>rlptlon. We hold. therefore, that to constitute
the exemption <·outempluted by the pre-emptlon a~t und<•r the head of "known mines ''
thl'l"l' 11hould be upon the land o.scertalned
coal deposits of such an extent and value as
to make the land more valuable to be worked as a coal mine, under the conditions ex302

!sting at the time, than for merely agricultural purpoBeB. The clrcumatance that
there are surface lndlcatlolll!I of the existence of veins of coal does not constitute a
mine. It does not even prove that the land
will ever be under any condltlons sufH<'lently valuable on account of Its coal dl'poslts to
be worked as a mint'. A change In the conditions occurring sub8<'Quently to the sale.
whereby new discoveries are made, or by
means whereof It may become profitable U>
work the veins as mines, cannot affect the
title as It passed at the time of the sale.
The question must be determined a<.'COrdl.ng
to the facts In exlRtence at the time of the
sale. If upon the premises at that time
there were not actual "known mines" capable of being profitably worked for their
product, so BB to make the land more valuable for mining than for agri<'ulture. a title
to them acquired under the pr~mptlon act
cannot be suc<'t"RSfully aSBalled. In the11resent case, the testimony, ln our opinion,
does not justify us In finding that at the
tlm.- J1wkson ecqulrt><l bis tltlt> there wereupon any part of the premlees In controversy any "kJ:\OWn mines" of coal, In the aen~
of the statute.
For these reasons the decree of the circuit
eourt ls reversed, and the cause remanded,
with a direction to dlstniss the bill; and It
ls so ordered.

RIGHT TO OPEN AND CLOSE.
RIGHT TO OPEN AND CLOSE.

[Case No. 125

LAKE ONTARIO NAT. BANK v. JUDSON.

(25 N. E. 367. 122 N. Y. 278.)

Court of Appeals of New York, Second Divi-

sion. Oct. 7, 1890.

Appeal from supreme court, general

term, fourth department.

The action was brought to recover the

a mount offour promissory notes, which by

the complaint the plaintiff alleged were

made by the defendant. payable to the or-

der of E. M. Fort, delivered to the payee,

and by him indorsed and transferred to the

plaintiff. And the plaintiff also thereh_va»l-

leged that the defendant was indebted to it,

in asum stated,for money advanced on his

checks drawn upon the plaintiff for an

amount in excess of his deposits there.

The defendant by his answer alleged that

he and Fort purchased of the plaintiff
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sonlecanal-boats; that they were induced

to make the purchase by the warranty of

the plaintiff, particularly speciﬁed, and

gave for them their joint notes; that, aft-

erwards, the plalntiff took up those notes,

and the makers gave their individual

notes for their respective interests in the

purchase to the plaintiff, which notes

were received by the plaintiff “in place of

and in payment of said first-mentioned

notes, and which notes last gifen are the

notes and the renewal thereof set forth in

the complaint.” The defendant alleged a

breach of this warranty and damages as

the consequence, which he claimed should

be allowed to him. He also alleged b_v

way of counter-claim that the plaintiff

was indebted to him in a further sum for

services performed by him for and at the

request of the plaintiff. for which, with the

amount of damages for the alleged breach

ofwarranty, he demanded judgment. And

for further answer. he denied the com-

plaint, and each and every allegation

therein contained, except as thereinbefore

admitted. The plaintiff by reply put in

issue the new matter of the answer con-

stituting the alleged counter-claims. The

trial court directed judgment for the

amount of the notes and of the overdraft

mentioned in the complaint.

H. C. Benedict and Miller. Lewis &

Judson, for appellant. S. C. Hunting-

ton, Jr., for respondent.

BRADLEY, J., infter stating the facts

as above.) Thecontest on the trial mainly

had relation to the defendant's alleged

counter-claim for services. upon which

claim he gave evidence to the effect that

they were performed by him pursuant to

an agreement with the plaintiff, b_v which

the latter undertook to pay him $'_’_5l)0, of

which $160 had been paid. This claim,

and the evidence on the part of the (lcfen(l-

ant tending to support it, were disputed

by the evidence on the part of the plaintiff,

and the trial court found the facts against

the defendant. For the purpose of this re-

view, the ﬁndings and determination of

[Cue No. 125

The role that the party having the afI.AKE ONTARIO NAT. BA....~K v. JUDSON.
llrma tive of the Issues in an action shall
(2G N. lll. 367, 122 N. Y. 278.)
have the opportunity to make the openCourt of .Appeals of New York, Second Dll'l- lng and closing presentntlon or hilt case la
d~med founded upon a substantial right,
lion. Oct. 7, 1890.
the denial of which la error. ConRelyea v.
APIM'RI from 11Upreme court, general i:lwlft,
103 N. Y1 6114, 9 N. E. Rep. ~9. In
tf"rm, fourth department.
Its application to trials by jury, It has orThe action was brought to reeovPr the 'd lnurlly morepracticalimport&nt'ethun In
11 monnt offoor proml111eory note,., which by
those ber01-e the court without a jury, a111l
the complaint the plalntlft alleged were before refereee. If It appears that a party
made by the defendant, payable to the ur- could not have heen prejudiced by the fnllder ot E. M. l<'ort, dellvt>red to the payee, ure or the court to observe the rnle, the erand by him lndorsed and trA.neferred to the ror would not be available; aocl In trials
platntln. And the plaluttn also thereby al- by the court without jnry, or before
leged that the dcfendan twas Indebted to It, referl'f's, thnt question would be dependlnaaumstated,for money advanced on his ent upon the clrcumetance8 of each c1111e.
checks drawn upon the plalntlft for an In the present case, the view or the court
amount In excess ot bis tteposlta there. evidently was that the amrmatlve or the
The defendant by hie answer alle~ed that entire laeueR was not with the defendant;
be and Fort purc•based of the plaintiff and that is the question presented for coneomeeanal-boata; that they were Induced sideration. 'l'be denial by the dcfendRnt
to mnke the purchnse by the warranty of In his answer, except as therein admitted,
the plalntln, particularly specified, and
eftch and every allegation of the comgave for them their Joint notes; that, aft- of
plo.lnt, put in Issue any material allt"gatlon
erwards, the plaintiff took up those notes, of the complaint not distinctly admitted
and the makers gave their Individual bv the answer. Allie v. Leonard, 46 N. Y.
notes for their reepPCtlve lntereKU. In the 6ii8; Calhoun v. Hnllen, 25 Hun, 166. The
porcbaRe to the plalntln, which notes cbar,,;e In the complaint, In due form, of
were received by the plalntln "In plaee of the lndebtedneRR of the defendant to the
and In payment of said first-mentioned plaintiff fur the amount advanced to him
notes, and which noteR last grten are the npon his check, In eXCCH8 or the balance or
noteti and the renewal thereof set forth In
account with the plalntlft, wa11 not adthe complaint." The defendant alleged a hie
mitted by the anRwer, but was controbreach of this warranty and damages as verted by such dt>nlal. It appears that
tbe consequence, which be claimed should ' after the trial bad been moved, and the
be allowed to him. He also alleged by plalntlft by ltM counsel had, by Rtatcruent
way of counter-claim that the plaintiff of It, made the opening of the ca11e to the
was Indebted to him In a further sum for court, the defendant orally admitted the
services performed by him for and at the count of the complaint altf'Jrfng the overrequest of the plalotlft, for which, with the draft. The plalntlft then procee<led to
amount of damag;ee for the alleged breach prove the slgnuture of the defendant to
of warranty, be demanded Judgment. And the notes, and the lndoreement by the
for furth~r answer, he denied the com- payee, and rested. Iteeemsthat the plainplaint, and each and every allegation tiff rleemed It nece1111&1-y to make this proof,
therein contained, escept as thf'reinhefore perhapt4 for the reason that the allegation
admitted. The plaintiff by reply put In In the answer of the making and delivery
l1t1oe the new matter of the anBwer eon- or the notes by the defendant to the plalnPtltotlng the alleged counter-claims. The tnr was treated as not sumctent upon
trial court directed Judgment for the which to rest, conpled aR it waR with the
amount or the notes and of the overdraft further allegation of their consideration
mentioned In the complaint.
as the foumJailon of the counter-claim, alR. C. Bf'nedlct and MI11er, Ltrn·ls 41' leged t<I hnve arlF1en out of a warranty
Judson, for appellant. S. C. Hunting- and Its breach. The apprehension may
ton, Jr., for respomlent.
have bet-n thnt the adoption of the admission In the answer of the making and deBRADLEY, J., laftP.r 11t11tlng the facte ll very of tbe not.e11 could not be 11cvered
811 above.) Thecontetiton the trial mainly
from what was allPged as the eom1lderabad nolatlon to the defendant's alleged tlon out of which they nrose, within the
connter-clalm for services, upon which principle thnt when an ndmll!lilon of a fact
claim he ga n• evidence to the effect that is made In connection with thut ol anoththey were performed by him pursuant to er, which nulllflee the effect of It, the entire
an agreement with the plalntln, by which statement must be tnkeu togetber. Gilthe JattPr undertook to pny him $:!,500, of dersleeve v. Landon. 73 S. Y. 609. As11umwhich $160 had been lmid. This claim, lng, as we do, that such rule of construcand the evidence on the lUlrt of the ddend- tion wne not appllcahle to this 1ulml11slon
ant tendlnK to sup11ort It, were dl1111t1t('() In the an11wPr, und that no proof of the
by the evidence on the part of the plalntlrf, execution or lndorsPmt•ntof the notes was
and the trial court found the ractenjlalm1t neceHi.iary. the que11tlon arises whf!tber the
the defendant. For the purpose of thlH re- oral aclmlM11lon11 at the trial or the plalnview, the flndlnge and determination or tln'11 claim for the amount of thf! defend·
the court below must be deemed conclu- ant's overclrnft entitled him to the right
sive. lipon the trial, the question as to of clOF!lng the argument on the tlnal aubwhich party waH entltl<'cl to the do1dnjl ar- mlsHlon of the case to the court for detergument woe raised. '£he court held that mlnatlon. And that d<'pPnds upon the
the plaintiff hntl the right to lt, and the •1uestlon whether the att11·m11tlve of the l111llefendant excepted.
11ue, with a view to such right, muHt lie ae-

!
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Case No. 125]
Case No. 125]

PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

certained from the pleadings, or may arise

from admissions orally made at the trial.

The issues to be tried can be ascertained

only by reference to the pleadings; and

they must govern so far as relates to the

right of the parties to open the case at the

beginning and conclude the argument at

the close of the trial. When the parties

go to trial, they respectively assume the

burden oi establishing that which they

have affirmatively alleged as a cause oi’ ac-

tion or counter-claim, if it is controverted

by allegation sufficient to put it in issue.

The admission of a fact upon the trial is

evidence meiely. It may obviate the

necessity of furi her trial of the issue to

which it relates. but does not change it as

represented by the pleadings. That can

be done by amendment only. It is true
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the admission made at the trial may re-

duce the controversy to matter as to

which the allirmative is with the defend-

ant. Such would be the effect of evidence

of any character undisputed and indisput-

able of the facts constituting the alleged

cause of action. The right under consid-

eration does not depend simply upon the

admission of those facts unless they are

admitted or uncontroverted by the an-

swer; otherwiseltis evidence only. There

is no occasion to extend the rule so as to

give effect, for such purpose, to conces-

sions at the trial. This might lead to the

adoption of such a course. when further

dispute oi the facts upon which a plaintiff

relies may appear hopeless to a. defendant,

for the purpose oi’ obtaining the right of

closing the trial. There is no apparent

reason for applying such rule to any one

more than to any other stage oi the trial.

364

The defendant who may wish to take the

right oi opening and concluding the trial

must frame his pleading with that view,

and so as to present no issue upon any ai-

legation of the complaint essential to the

plaintiff's alleged cause of action. if the

defendant fail to do that, no matter how

little proof the remaining issues require. or

how easily or in what manner it may be

established by evidence, the right of the

plaintiff to open and close the case is not

denied to him. Mercer v. \\'hall, 5 Ado].

& E. (N. S.) 447. The test is whether,

without any proof, the plaintiff upon the

pleadings is en titled to recover upon all

the causes of action alleged in his com-

plaint. If he is, and the defendant alleges

any counterclaim controverted by the

plaintiffs pleading, or any affirmative

matter ofdefense in avoidance of theplain-

tifi‘s alleged cause of action. and which is

the subject of trial. the defendant has the

right to open and close; otherwise not.

Huntington v. Conkey. 33 Barb. 218; Ei-

well v. Cha|nberlin. 31 N. Y. 614; Murray

v. insurance (.‘o.,85 N. Y. 236. The pro-

duction of the note sued on and the com-

PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

certatned from the pleadings, or may arise
from adml881ons orally made at the trial.
The l88lle& to be tried can be IUK'ertalned
only by refere11ce to the pleadings; and
they mu11t go\"ern so far us relates to the
rip:ht of thepurtll'S to open the c&Ae at the
beginning and conc.-lude the argument ut
the l'lmie of the trial. When the pa rtles
go to trial, tlwy l"effpectln•ly aMMume the
burden of estubllshiug that which tlil'Y
have affirmatively alleged as a cause of action or counter-claim, if It ill contro\"erted
by allegattou sufflclt>nt to put It In IS1tue.
The admlBBion of a fact upon the trial ls
e\'ldence me1ely. It may obviate the
necessity of further trial of the ll!Rue to
which it relatt'S, hut c1oe11 not changt> It BR
represented by the plcacllnp:M. That can
be done by amendment only. It Is true
the admission made at the trial may reduce the contro\"ersy to matter as to
which the afH1·matlve Is with the defendant. Such would be the enect of evhlence
of nny character undisputed and lndls)>utable of the fac·tK constituting the alleged
cause of action. The right under consideration does not depend simply upon the
admission of those facts unlesR they are
admlttP.«J or uncontrm·erted by the answer; otherwise It is evidence only. There
is no occ1111lon to extend the rule HO WJ to
gl\'e eftect, for Ruch purpose, to concE'Msluos at the trial. This might lead to the
a<1or1tton of 11uch a course, when furtht~r
dl>4pute or the factK upon which a. plalntlft
relies may a11pe11r bopelettR tu a defend11nt,
for thfl purpose of obtaining the right of
cluaing the trial. There IR no apparent
reason for applying such rule to any one
more than to any other atage of the trial.
364

The dPlendant who may wlMh to takfl the
right of opening and concluding the trial
muHt frame his pleading with that vll'w.
and 110 aa to present no IMue upon any al)l'gatlon of the l'omplalnt essential to the
plalotlft's alle~ed eause of action. If the
defendant fall to do that, 110 matter how
little proof the remaining Issues require. or
bow easily or lo what manner It may be
established by evidence. the rl~ht of the
plalotlft to open aml close the caHe ls not
denied to him. Mercer v. \\'hall, 5 Adol.
& E. (N. S.) 447. The tt'Bt Is whetller,
without any proof, tl1e plulnttn upon the
11leadlngtJ iR entitled to recover upon all
the causes of action alleged in his complaint. If he ls, and the defendant alleges
any counterclaim controverted by thE'
plalntlft's pleading, or any affirmative
J11atter 0Jcleft>n11e In avoidance of thet>lttlntlfl'R allegtd cau11e of actlou, and which hJ
the subject of trial. the defendant h&11 the
right to open and clo11e; otherwise nut.
Huntington v. Conkey. 88 Barb. 21~; Elwell v. Chamberlin. 31 N. Y. 614; Murray
,., InRurance Co., R5 N. Y. 236. The production of the note suPd on and the computation of Interest proved are not em.
braced In the facts essential to the cause
of action. If the defendant, by permlMlon
of the court, had stricken out the denial In
hiR answer, or amended tt by Inserting the
adml1111luo orally made, a dlfterent que&tlon would ha\•e been prt'ffented at the
trial upon the r.lalm or the defendant to
the right to conclude It. No other question req ull"l'B the expres11lon of conidderatlon. The Jm:Jgment should be afftrmed.
All concur, except FOLLETT, C. J., nut
sitting.

RIGHT TO OPEN .A.XD CLOSE.
RIGHT TO OPEN AND CLOSE.

[Case No. 126

ST. LOUIS, I. M. & S. RY. CO. v. TAYLOR.

(20 S. W. 1083, 57 Ark. 136.)

Jan. 7, 1893.

Appeal from circuit court, Jefferson coun-

ty; John M. Elliott, Judge.

Action by E. S. Taylor against the St.

Louis, iron Mountain & Southern Railway

(Jompany to recover the value of a mule

killed through defendant's alleged negligence.

Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

Atiirmed.

In proving ownership of the mule for

which damages were sought to be recovered,

plaintiff was asked, “How long had you

owned the mule?" and he answered, “I

think about a month or two." Wlfen asked

how much he originally paid for the mule,

he said: “I did not pay for him until after

he was killed. I bought the mule from a
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party. I do not remember his name. After

he had been killed, I then paid for the mule."

He also testlﬁed that he had possession of

the mule on trial. He had not paid for it.

“As soon as the mule was killed, and the

man wanted his money, I gave him $90, and

promised to pay him the balance as soon as

I collected it.”

Dodge & Johnson, for appellant.

-Bridges,-for appellee.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Bell &

COCKRILL, C. J. 1. Construing the evi-

dence most strongly in favor of the appel-

lant, Taylor had a special property in the

animal killed, which empowered him to re-

cover its full value. Railway Co. v. Biggs,

50 Ark. 169, 6 S. W. 72-L. No prejudice re-

sults to the railway, therefore, in permitting

him to maintain the action.

2. The statute declares that railroads oper-

ated in this state shall be responsible for

all damages done or~ caused by the running

of their trains. Mansf. Dig. § 5537. In a

suit against n railway company to recover for

an injury done to property by a running eu-

gine or tmin, this statute casts upon the

company the burden of showing due care

on its part. That is not the express pro-

vision of the statute. but it is the nearest

approach to the legislative intent that the

court was able to extract from it, consistent

with the constitution. Railway Co. v. Payne,

33 Ark. S16; Tllley v. Railway Co., 49 Ark.

535, 542, 6 S. W. 8. The statute has found

application in our courts mainly in cases

where live stock, when running at large, has

been injured by railway trains; and we have

ruled many times that proof of injury by

the railway in such cases raises a presump-

tion of negligence against the company.

There is nothing in the terms of the statute

to warrant a change in the construction of it

when the proof shows that an animal was

under the control of its owner or his agent

at the time of the injury. The statutory

policy of casting the burden of proof on the

railway to show care when the injury is

proved may have had its origin in the fact

(Case No. 1:!6

ST. LOUIS, I. II. & B. RY. CO. T. TAYLOR. proved may have had Its origin In the fact
that the company's employ~ are most likely
(20 s. w. 1083, 57 Ark. 136.)
to know the facts, while the owner of the
Supreme Court of A.rbDBU. Jan. 7, 1893.
lnj1ll'ed property ls Ignorant of them; but
Appeal from circuit court, Jefferson coun- the enactment does not limit the operation
of the rule to that state of tacts. '..1.'he arguty; John M. Elliott, Judge.
Action by E. R. Taylor against the St. ment that the party having the best means
J..oula. Iron llouutaln & Southern ltallwuy of Information should bear the burden of
Company to recover the value of a mule proof might well be addressed to the poll(')'
killed through d~fendant's alleged negligence. of enacting such a statute, but not to Its
Judgment for plalntllf. Defendant appeals. construction when Its language will not admit of the distinction. When the proof
.Affirmed.
In proving ownership of the mule for shows that the act of the owner, having
which damages were sought to be recovered, control of the animal when Injured, has
plalntllf was asked, "How long had you contributed to the Injury, the statute ts Inowned the mule?" and be answered, "I operative, be<.·anse the contributory negli·think about a month or two." wlien asked gence of the owner would bar a recovery.
how much he originally paid for the mule, Thus, If the plaintiff here, In developing his
he said: "I did not pay for him until after case, had shown that he was wrongfully ushe was killed. I bought the mule from a ing the track of the railway as a highway
party. I do not remember his name. After for his mule and vehicle, and had shown no
he had been kllled, I then paid for the mule." other fact save that the property was InHe also testified that he had possession of jured by the defendant's moving train, he
the mule on trial. He had not paid for It. would not have established a prlma facle
"As soon as the mule was killed, and the case under the statute, because, upon the
man wanted his money, I gave him ,00, and c:nse thus proved, he could l'e<'Over only for
promised to pay him the balance as soon as a wanton Injury, and the statute raises no
pl'esumptlon of wantonness. Railway Co.
I collected It."
v. l\londay, 49 Ark. 257, 264, 265, 4 S. W.
Dodge & Johnson, for appellant. Bell & 78'2. But In this case the plaintiff adduced
·Brldgee,-.tor appellee.
eYldence tending to show that at the time
of the Injury he wns using the right of way
COCKRILL, C. J. 1. Construing the evi- between the main and side tracks by tht•
dence moet strongly Jn favor of the appel- license and Invitation of the company. If
lant, Taylor had a special property In the that was true, he was not a trespasser, but
animal killed, which empowered him to re- was there as of right, and the company owed •
cover Its full value. Railway Co. v. Biggs, him the duty to observe ordinary care to
00 Ark. 169, 6 S. W. 724. No prejudl<'e re- preserve his property from Injury. The fact
sults to the railway, therefore, In penuttttng of Injury ls, therefore, evidence of the want
of such care; that Is, of negligence. The
him to maintain the action.
2. The statute <lecl:i.res that railroads ope~ charge to that effect was not erroneous. The
ated In this state shall be rusponsfble for court's charge upon the subject of contribuall damages done or· caused by the ruunln~ tory negllgence by the owner was full, and
of their trains. llansf. Dig. I 5537. In a It was favorable to the defendant. The jury
lmlt aJ(alnlrt n rallwa.y company to recover for found, upon eonfllctlng testimony, that he
an Injury done to property by n running en- was not gullty of contributory negligence,
gine or train, this statute casts upon the and that the railway did not use due care.
com1:mny the burden of showing due care The verdict ls conclusive.
.
011 Its part. 'l'hnt ts not the express pro3. The party having the "burden of proof
\1slon of the statute. but It ls the nearest In the whole action" has the right to· open
approach to the legislative Intent that the and conclude the argument. Manet. Dig. f
t"lUrt was nble to extract from It, consistent 5131. Such a burden lies on the party who
with the constitution. Railway Co. v. Payne, would be defeated If no evidence were given
33 Ark. 816; Tilley v. Railway Co., 49 Ark. on either side. Id. § 2871. Upon the defendU.'l:'i, 542, tl S. W. 8. The statute bas found ant's admission of the killing only, If the
application In our courts mainly In cases plaintiff could have recovere1t at all, his
where live E.tock, \\hen running at large, has recovery would have been confined to nombeen Injured by railway trains; and we have inal damages, because the defendant specifruled many times that proof of Injury by ically denied the extent of bis Injury. But
the railway In such cases raises a presump- a recovery of substantial damages, and not
tion of negligence agaln&t the company. of the costs only, was what the plaintiff
There ls nothing In the terms of the statute sought. The burdeu of proving the extent
to warrant a change In the construction of It of bis Injury remained upon him throughout,
when the proof shows that an animal was and gave him the rlght to begin and reply.
under the control of Its owner or his agent Itallway Co. v. Rhea, 44 Ark. 258, 264; 1
at the time of the Injury. The statutory Thomp. Trials, ff 228, 229. No other objecpoll<>y of casting the burden of proof on the tion ls urged by the appellant. Finding no
railway to show care when the Injury ls error, the judgment Is afftrmed.

Case No. 127]
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CRABTREE v. ATCHISON et aL

Case No. 127]

PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

(20 S. W. 200, 93 Ky. 838.)

CRABTREE v. ATCHISON et al.

(20 S. W. 260, 93 Ky. 338.)

Court of Appeals of Kentucky. Oct. 1, 1892.

Appeal from circuit court, Daviess county.

Action by J . D. Atchlson and others against

Moses Crabtree. Judgment for plaintiffs.

Defendant appeals. Reversed.

Sweeney, Ellis & Sweeney, for appellant.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky. Oct. 1, 1892.

Appeal trom circuit court, Daviess county.
Action by J. D. Atchison and others against
Moses Crabtree. Judgment for plaintiffs.
Defendant appeals. Reversed.
Sweeney, Ellis & Sweeney, tor appellant.
Weir, Welr & Walker, for appellees.

Weir, Weir & Walker, for appellees.

BE.\‘l\'l<JTT, J. The appellant executed to

J. McDanrich & Co. a promissory note for

$102.60. McDanrich & Co. assigned the note,

before its maturity, to the appeliees. They

brought suit on it. The appellant answered

that the note was obtained from him by the

fraud of the pa yees, and that it was without

consideration, having been executed for a

lightning rod that was utterly worthless.

The appeliees, replying, traversed these alie-
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gations. They further alleged that when the

appellant executed and delivered the note to

McDanrich & Co. he executed and delivered

to them two writings. The one deemed ma-

terial to the question at issue is as follows:

"To all whom it may concern: This is to ._

certify that a note executed by me to J. Mc- I

Danrich & Co., for $102.60, is a bona ﬁde

debt against me. There is no offset, dis-

count, or defense against the same, and the

same is good against me for the full amount

thereof, and will he paid to the said J. .\1c-

Danrich & Co., or to such persons as they

may assign said note to." (Signed, etc.) The

appeliees further alleged that they purchas-

ed said note for value, and without notice

of the alleged fraud or want of considera-

tion, and that at the time of the negotiation

for the note the writing, supra, was exhibited

to them, and they purchased the note upon

the faith of the assurances therein contain-

ed. The appellant rejoined, denying that ap-

pellees knew of the contents of said writing,

or that they purchased the note upon the

faith of the assurances therein contained.

On the trial of the case the lower court rul-

ed that the burden was on the appellees; con-

sequently they were entitled to conclude the

argument. The appellees obtained judgment

on the note, and the appellant has appealed.

Under the instructions of the court, to

which there is no serious objection, the jury

was authorized from the evidence to ﬁnd

that the said writing was exhibited to ap-

peliees at the time they purchased the note,

and that they purchased it upon the faith of

the assurances therein contained. But it

does not appear that the appellant issued

and delivered the writing with the purpose

of defrauding or deceiving the appellees, or

any one else. So the question is, there being

BEXNKTT, J. The appellant executed to
J, McDanrlch & Co. a promiBBOry note for
$102.60. l\lcDanrlch & Co. aBSlgned the note,

before Its maturity, to the appellees. They
brought suit on lt. The appellant answered
that the note was obtained from him by the
fraud of the payees, and that lt was without
consideration, having been executed for a
lightning rod that was utterly worthless.
The appellees, replying, traversed these allegations. They further alleged that when the
appellant executed and delivered the note to
McDanrlch & Co. he executed and delivered
to them two writings. The one deemed material to the question at lBBUe ls as follows:
"To all whom It may concern: This ls to
certify that a note executed by me to J. McDanrlch & Co., for $102.60, ls a bona fide
debt against me. There ls no offset, discount, or defense against the same, and the
same ls good against me for the full amount
thereof, and will be paid to the said J. McDanrlch & Co., or to such persons as they
may assign said note to." (Signed, etc.) The
appellees further alleged that they purchtlsed said note for value, and without notice
of the alleged fraud or want of consideration, and that at the time of the negotiation
for the note the writing, supra. was exhibited
to them, and they purchased the note upon
the faith of the assurances therein contain·
ed. The appellant rejoined, denying that appellees knew of the contents of said writing,
or that they purchased the note upon the
faith of the assurances therein contained.
On the trial of the case the lower court ruled that the buraen was on the appellees; consequentl~· they were entitled to conclude the
arguml'nt. The appellees obtained judgment
on the note, and the appellant bas appealed.
Under the Instructions of the court, to
which there Is no serious objection, the jury
was authorized from the evidence to find
that the said writing was exhibited to appellees at the time they purchased the note.
and that they purchased It upon the faith of
the ll88Urances therein contained. But It
does not appear that the appellant Issued
and delivered the writing wltll the purpose
ot defrauding or deceiving the appellees, or
any one else. So the question ls, there being
no actual fraudulent or deceitful purpose on
the part of the appellant In Issuing and delivering Sllfd JJRJJN, does the doctrine of estoppel npplr In favor of the nppellees. they
hdYin:; pm·t•hmwd said note for value, and

no actual fraudulent or deceitful purpose on

the part of the appellant in issuing and de-

livering said paper, does the doctrine of es-

toppel apply in favor ot‘ the appellees, they

luiving purclmsed said note for value, and

Z clude the argument.

without notice of the alleged intlrmities, and

upon the faith of the assurances contained

:100

without notice of the alleged Infirmities, and
upon the faith of the aBSurances contained
ln said writing? In a case like this, where a
person has made certain assurances upon
which he Intends third persons to rely as
true in contracting In reference to the subject-matter of the assurances, and upon
which they do rely as true In making such
contracts, and but for which they would not
have thus contracted, and the denial of the
truth or the assuraucetl would be Injurious
to the contractual rlghb! of such person, the
person giving the assurances ls estopped
from denying their truth as to such persons.
The tact, in a case like this, that tbe person
made the assurances In good faith, and with·
out design to defraud, cannot relieve or
aYold the doctrine of estoppel, because be
Intended the other party to rely upon the
truth of the assurances, and be did rely upon
them In contracting, and would not have
thus contracted but for such reliance; and
It would be a fraud upon him to allow the
person to deny the truth of them to the detriment of the other party. See Rudd v.
Mathews, 79 Ky. 479. The writing delivered
to the payees of the note, and exhibited to
the appellees by the payees to Induce them
to purchRse It, and upon the assurances of
which they relied In making the purchase,
was equh·alent to personal assurances made
to the appellees by the appellant, face to
face, to Induce them to make the purchase,
and upon which they relied In making the
purchase. But, as Bald, the court held the
burden to be upon the appellees; consequently It allowed them to open and conclude the argument. The appellant complains of that ruling. We have decided that
an error In that particular ls a reversible error. The Civil Code, I 526. provides as follows: ''The burden of proof ln the whole aetlon lies on the party who would be defeated
It no evidence was given on either side."
The note sued on being prlma racle evidence
(the signature being admitted) that the payor was Indebted according to Its terms, the
burden was upon him to establish the allegations of fraud and want of consideration.
Those allegations being traversed, and It no
proof was offered establishing them, the
appellees would be entitled to Judgment on
the note; hence the burden thus far was
on the appellant to establish the allegations
ot fraud and want of consideration; and,
falllng to establish that 188ne, the appellees
would be entitled to judgment tor the full
amount of the note. The plea of estoppel
In event ot such failure would cut no figure,
for, the proof having failed on the Issue of
fraud and no consideration, the appel!ees
would be entitled to judgment on the note;
so, notwlthstnndlng, the appellees, In case
the plea of fraud and no consideration was
established, would, In order to avoid tire
ell'ect of It. be compelled to establish- by
proof their plea of estoppel, yet, In cue th1>re
was no proof ot'l'ered, they would be entitled

RIGHT TO OPEN A.ND CLOSE.
RIGHT TO OPEN AND CLOSE. [Case N0. 127

to judgment 1'01‘ their demand. Hence, as entitled to conclude the argument. For that

judgment would have been rendered against reason the judgment is reversed, and the

the appellant in case no proof had been of- case is relnanded for further proceedings

to judgment fot thelr demand. ~ence, as
judgment would have been rendered against
the appellant In case no proof bad been oftered, the burden was upon him, and he was

tered, the burden was upon him, and he was consistent with this opinion.

367
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(Ciase No. 127

entitled to conclude the argument. For that
reason the judgment le reversed, and the
case le remanded for further proceedtnp
CODBlstent with th1• ·opinion.
367

Case No. 128]
Case No. 128]

PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. ARMES.

PHODUCTIOY AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

DISTRICT OF COLU:\IBIA T. ARMES.
(2 Sup. Ct. 840, 107 U. S. 519.)
Supreme Court of the United States. Ma7 7,

(2 Sup. Ct. 840, 107 U. S. 519.)

1883.

Supreme Court of the United States. May 7,

1883.

In error to the supreme court of the Dis-

trict of Columbia.

A. G. Riddle, for plaintiff in error. S.

Shellaberger, A. A. Birney, and C. H. Armes,

In error to the supreme court of the District of Columbia.
A. G. Riddle, for plaintttr In error. 8.
Rhellaberger, A. A. Birney, and C. H . .Armes,
tor defendant in error.

for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice FIELD delivered the opinion

of the court.

This was an action to recover damages for

injuries received by the plaintiffs intestate,

Du Bose, from a fall caused by a defective

sidewalk in the city of Washington. In 1873

the board of public works of the city caused

the grade of the carriage-way of Thirteenth

street, between F and G streets, to be low-

ered several feet. The distance between the
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curbstone of the carriage-way and the line

of the adjacent building was 36 feet. At the

time the accident to the deceased occurred,

this portion of the street——sidewalk it may

be termed, to designate it from the carriage-

way, although only a part of it is given up

to foot passcngers—was, for 48 feet north of

F street, lowered in its whole width to the

same grade as the carriage-way. But, for

some distance beyond that point, only 12 feet

of the sidewalk was cut down, thus leaving

an abrupt descent of about 2 feet at a dis-

tance of 12 feet from the curb. At this de-

scent—from the elevated to the lowered part

of the sidewalk-there were 3 steps, but the

place was not guarded either at its side or

end. Nothing was placed to warn foot pas-

sengers of the danger.

On the night of February 21, 1877, Du

Bose, a contract surgeon of the United States

army, while walking down Thirteenth street,

towards F street, fell down this descent,

and, striking _upon his knees, received a con-

‘ cussion which injured his spine and pro-

duced partial paralysis, resulting in the im-

pairment of his mind and ultimately in his

death, which occurred since the trial below.

The present action was for the injury thus

sustained. He was himself a witness, and it

appeared from his testimony that his mind

was feeble. His statement was not always

as direct and clear as would be expected

from a man in the full vigor of his mind.

Still it was not incoherent, nor unintelligible,

but evinced a full knowledge of the matters

in relation to which he was testifying. A

ph_vsician of the government hospital for the

insane, to which the deceased was taken

two years afterwards, testified that he was

affected with acute melancholy; that some-

times it was impossible to get a word from

Mr. Justice FIELD delivered the opinion
of the court.
Thie was an action to recover damages for
injuries received by the plalntUf'e Intestate,
Du Bose, from a fall caused by a defective
sidewalk in the city of Washington. In 1873
the board of public works of the city caused
the grade of the carriage-way of Thirteenth
street, between F and G streets, to be .lowered several feet. 'nle distance between the
curbstone of the carriage-way and the line
ot the adjacent building was 36 feet. At the
time the accident to the deceased occurred,
this portion of the street-sidewalk it may
be termed, to designate It from the carriageway, although only a part of It le given up
to toot passengers-was, for 48 feet north of
F street, lowered in lts whole width to the
same gmde as the carriage-way. But, for
some dlstanee beyond that point, only 12 feet
of the sidewalk was cut down, thus lea vlng
an abrupt descent of about 2 feet at a distance of 12 feet from the curb. At this descent-from the elevated to the lowered part
of the sidewalk-there were 3 steps, but the
pince was not guarded either at Its side or
end. Nothing was placed to warn foot passengers of the danger.
On the night ot February 21, 1877, Du
Bose, a contract surgeon of the United States
army, while walking down Thirteenth etrt>et,
towards F street, fell down this descent,
and, striking ,µpon his knees, recel ved a concussion which lnju!'ed hie spine and produced partial paralysis, resulting In the impnlrment of his mind and ultimately In his
death, which occurred since the trial below.
The present action was for the injury thus
sustained. He was himself a witness, and It
appeared from his testimony that his mind
was feeble. His statement was not always
as direct and clear as would be expected
from a man In the full vigor of hie mind.
Still It was not Incoherent, nor unintelligible,
' but e\'lnced a full knowledge of the matters
In relation to which he was testifying. A
physician of the government ho11pltal for the
Insane, to which the deceased was taken
two years afterwnn:ls, testified that he was
affected with acute melancholy; that sometimes it was lmpoRSlble to get a word from
him; that his men..ory was Impaired, but
that he was able to make a substantially
rorrect statement of facts which transpired
before the Injury took place, though, from
the Impairment of his memory, be might

him; that his memory was impaired, but

that he was able to make a substantially

correct statement of facts which transpired

before the injury took place, though, from

the impairment of his memory, he might

leave out some important part; that then-

would be some confusion of ideas in his

mind; and that he should not be held re-
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leave out some Important pnrt; that ther•~
would be some confusion of Ideas In his
mind; and that he should not be held responsible for any cnmlnal act. A physician
of the Freedmen's Hospital, In which the
deceased was at one time a patient after his
injuries, testlfted to a more deranged condl·
tlon of his mind, and that he was, when
there In June. 1879, Insane. He had attem11ted to commit sul<'lde, and had stu<'k a
fork Into hie neck several times. 'Cpon this.
and other testimony of similar Import, and
the feebleness exhibited by the deceased on
the stand, the counsel for the city requested
the court to withdraw his testimony from the
jury, on the ground that hie mental faculties
were so far Impaired u to render him · In·
competent to testify u a wltneBB. This the
court refused to do, but lnetmcted the jury
that hie testimony must be taken with some
allowance, considering hllf condition of mind
and his Incapacity to remember all the circumstances which might throw some light
on hie present condition. Thie refusal and
•ruling of the court constitute the first error
assigned.
The ruling of the court and Its instruction
to the jury were entirely correct. It ts undoubtedly true that a lunatic or Insane person may, from the condition of bis mind, not
be a competent witness. Bis Incompetency
on that ground, like incompetency for any
other cause, must be pueed upon by the
court, and to aid Its judgment evidence of
hie condition Is admlBBlble. But lunacy or In·
sanity assumes so many forms, and ls so
often partial In Its extent, being frequently
confined to particular subjects, while there
ls full lntelllgence on others, that the pow·
er of the court Is to be exercised with the
greatest caution. The books are full of cases
where persons showing mental derangement
on some subjects evince a hlich degree of Intelligence and wisdom on others. The existence of partial Insanity does not unfit In·
dlvlduals so atrected tor the transaction of
business on all subjects, nor from giving a
perfectly accurate and lucid statement of
what they have seen or heanl. In a case In
the prerogative court of Canterbury, counsel
stated that partial Insanity was unknown to
the law of England; but the court replied
that If by this was mt>ant that the law never
deems a person both sane and lnsa.ne at one
and the same time, upon one and the same
subject, the assertion was a truism; and ad·
ded: "If, by that position, It be meant and
ll!tended that the law of England never
deems a party both sane and Insane at differ·
ent times upon the same subject, and both
sane and Insane at the same time upon different subjects, there can eCJtrcely be a position more destitute of legal foundation; or,
rather, there <'RD scarcely be one more advel'se to the strenm and current of legal authority." Dew v. Clark. 3 Add. Ecc. 79, 94.
The general rule, therefore, le that a lunatic or a person affected with Insanity la
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admissible as a witness if he have suﬂicient

understanding to apprehend the obligation of

an oath, and to be capable of giving a cor-

rect account of the matters which he has

seen or heard in reference to the questions

at issue; and whether he have that under-

standing is a question to be determined by

the court, upon examination of the party

lliniself, and any competent witnesses who

can speak to the nature and extent of his

insanity. Such was the decision of the court

of criminal appeal in England, in the case of

Reg. v. Hill, 5 Cox, Cr. Cas. 259. There the

prisoner had been convicted of manslaugh-

ter; and on the trial a witness had been

admitted whose incompetency was urged on

the ground of alleged insanity. lie was a

patient in a lunatic asylum, under the de-

lusion that he had a number of spirits about
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him which were continually talking to him,

but the medical superintendent testiﬂed that

he was capable of giving an account of any

transaction that happened before his eyes;

that he had always found him so; and that

it was solely with reference to the delusion

about the spirits that he considered him a.

lunatic. The witness himself was called,

and he testified as follows: “I am fully

aware I have a spirit, and 20,000 of them.

They are not all mine. I must inquire. I

can where I am. I know which are mine.

Those that ascend from my stomach and

my head, and also those in my ears. I

don’t know how many they are. The ﬂesh

creates spirits by the palpitation of the

nerves and the rheumatics. All are now in

my body and around my head. They speak

to me incessantly, particularly at night.

That spirits are immortal, I am taught by

my religion from my childhood. No matter

how faith goes, all live after my death, those

that belong to me and those that do not."

After much more of this kind of talk he

added: “They speak to me instantly; they

are speaking to me now; they are not sep-

arate from me; they are around me speak-

ing to me now; but I can't be a spirit, for I

am ﬂesh and blood. They can go in and out

through walls and places which I can-

not." He also stated his opinion of what it

was to take an oath: “When I swear,” he

said, “I appeal to the Almighty. It is per-

jury, the breaking of a lawful oath, or tak-

ing an unlawful one; he that does it will

go to hell for all eternity." He was then

sworn, and gave a perfectly collected and

rational account of a transaction which he

declared that he had witnessed. He was in

some doubt as to the day of the week on

which it took place, and on cross-examina-

tion said: “These creatures insist upon it,

it was Tuesday night, and I think it was

Monday;” whereupon he was asked: “ls

what you have told us, what the spirits told

you, or what you recollected without the

spirits?" And he said: “No; the spirits as-

sist me in speaking of the date; 1 thought

it was Monday, and they told me it was

admissible as a witness if he have sufllcieut
underatandiog to apprehend the obligation of
an oath, and to be capable of giving a correct account of the matters which he has
seen or heard in reference to the questions
at issue; and whether he have that understanding la a question to be determined by
the court. upon examination of the party
himself, and any competent witnesses who
can speak to the nature and extent of his
lDBllnity. Such was the decision of the court
of criminal appeal ln England, ln the case of
Reg. v. HUI. 5 Oox, Cr. Ca& 259. There the
prisoner bad been convicted of manslaughter; and on the trial a witness had been
admitted whose incompetency was urged on
the ground of alleged insanity. He was a
patient in a lunatic asylum, under the deluslon that he had a number of spirits about
him which were continually talking to hiru,
but the medical superintendent testltled that
he was capable of giving an account of any
transaction that happened before his eyes;
that he had always found him so; and that
It was solely with reference to the delusion
about the spirits that he conslden>d hlm a
lunatic. The witneu himself was called,
and be testified as follows: "I am fully
aware I have a spirit, and 20,000 of them.
They are not all mine. I must inquire. I
can where I am. I know which are mine.
Tholle that ucend from my atomach and
my head. and also those in my ears. I
doo't know how many they are. The ftesh
createa spirits by the palpitation of the
nerves and the rheumatics. All are now in
my body and around my head. They speak
to me lncessa.ntly, particularly at night.
That spirits are immortal, I am taught by
my religion from my childhood. No matter
how faith goes, all live after my death, those
that belong to me and those that do not."
Atter much more of this kind of talk he
added: "They apeak to me instantly; they
are spenkiDI' to me now; they are not separate from me; they a.re around me speaklog to me now; but I can't be a spirit, for I
am flesh and blood. They can go In and out
through walls and places which I cannot.·• He also stated his ovinion of what it
was to take an oath: "When I swear," he
said, "I appeal to the Almighty. It ls perjury, the breaking of a lawful oath, or takIng an unlawful one; he that does it wlll
go to hell for all eternity." He was then
sworn, and gave a perfectly colle<·ted aad
mtionnl account of a transa<'tlon whl<'h he
declared that he had wltnessPd. He was in
some doubt as to the day of the week on
which it took place, and on cross-examinatton said: "These creaturPs insist upon lt,
It was Tuesday night, and I think it was
Monday;" whereu1lon he was asked: "Is
what vou have tt>ld us, what the spirlt11 told
you, or what you recollected without the
spirits?" And he said: "No; the spirits asBlat me in apeaking of the date; I thought
lt was :Monday, and they told me lt was
WlLOUS,EV.-24
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Ohrlstwas eYe, Tuesday; but I was an eyewitness, an ocular witness, to the fall to
the ground." The question was reserved for
the opinion of the court whether this witness
was competent, and after a very elaborate
discussion of the subject it was held that he
was. Chief Justice Campbell said that he
entertained no doubt that the rule laid down
by Baron Parke, in an unreported case which
bad been referred to, was correct, that whereever a delusion of an insane character exlats in any person who 111 called as a witness,
lt la for the judge to determine whether the
person so called has a sumcient sense of rellglon in his mind and a suftlclent understanding of the nature of an oath, and 1t la
for the jury to decide what amount of cNd1t they will give to his testimony. "Various
authorities," 88Jd the chief justice, "have
been referred to, which lay down the law
that a person non compos mentls la not an
admissible witness; but in what sense ls the
expression 'non compos mentis' employed?
If a person be so to su<'h an extent as not
to understand the nature of an oath, he la
not admissible. But a. person subject to a
constderable amount of lIJ.8lllle delusion may
yet be under the sanction of an oath, a.nd
capable of giving very material evidence upon the aubject-matter under consideration."
And the chief justice added: "The proper
test must always be, doea the lunatic underatand what he ls saying; and does he understand the obligation of an .tath? The lunatlc may be examined himself, ·that his
I state of mind may be discovered, and wltnesses may be adduced to ahow In what
atate of sanity or insanity be actually le;
stlll, if he can stand the test proposed, the
jury must determine all the rest." He also
observed that In a lunatic asylum the patients are often the only witnesses of outrages upon themselves and others, and there
would be Impunity for ofrenfl('s <.'Ommltted in
such places If the ouly persons who can.give
Information are not to be heard. Baron Alderson, Justice Coleridge, Baron Platt, anti
Justice Talfourd agreed with the chief justice, the latter observing that "if the propc,.
sitlon that a person suffering under an insane delusion cannot be a witness were
nialntalned to the fullest extent, every man
subject to the most innocent, unreal fancy
would be exeluded. Martin Luther belleved
that he had a personal conflict with the
devll. Dr. Johnson was persundPd that he
I had heard his mother speak to him after
I death. In every case the judge must deter1 mine ac<'ording to the circumstances and extent of the delusion. Unless judgment and
I 1ll11<'rlminatlon be applled to each particular
1 c·usP, there mny be the most disastrous coni sequPnces." This <'&Ile Is also found In .D enI Ison & P. Cr. Oas. 2r>4, where Lord OampI bell ls rl.'ported to have said that the rule
contended for would have excluded the testtmony of Socrates, for he bad one spirit
always prompting him. The doctrine of thla
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PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

decision has not been overruled, that we are

aware of, and it entirely disposes of the

question raised here.

On the trial, a member of the metropolitan

police, who saw the deceased fall on the side‘-

wulk and went to his assistance, was asked,

after testifying to the accident, whether,

while he was on his beat, other accidents

had happened at that place. The court al-

lowed the question, against the objection of

the city's counsel, for the purpose of show-

ing the condition of the street, and the lia-

bility ot other persons to fall there. The

witness answered that he had seen persons

stumble over there. He remembered send-

ing home in a hack a. woman who had fallen

there, and had seen as many as ﬁve persons

fall there.

The admission of this testimony is now
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urged as error, the point of the objection be-

ing that it tended to introduce collateral is-

sues and thus mislead the jury from the mat-

ter directly in controversy. Were such the

case the objection would be tenable, but no

dispute was made as to these accidents, no

question was raised as to the extent of the

injuries received, no point was made upon

them, no recovery was sought by reason or

them, nor any increase of damages. They

were proved simply as circumstances which,

with other evidence, tended to show the dan-

gerous character of the sidewalk in its un-

guarded condition. The frequency ot acci-

dents at a particuar place would seem to be

good evidence of its dangerous character-at

least, it is some evidence to that effect. Per-

sons are not wont to seek such places, and

do not willingly fall into them. Here the

character of the place was one of the sub-

jects of inquiry to which attention was call-

ed by the nature of the action and the plead-

ings, and the defendant should have been

prepared to show its real character in the

face of any proof bearing on that subject.

Besides this, as publicity was necessarily

given to the accidents, they also tended to

show that the dangerous character of the lo-

cality was brought to the attention of the

city authorities.

In Quinlan v. City of Utica, 11 Hun, 217,

which was before the supreme court of New

York, in an action to recover damages for in-

juries sustained by the plaintiﬁ through the

neglect of the city to repair its sidewalk, he

was allowed to show that while it was out

of repair other persons had slipped and fall-

en on the walk where he was injured. It

370

was objected that the testimony presented

new issues which. the defendant could not

be prepared to meet, but the court said: “In

one sense every item of testimony material

to the main issue introduces a new issue;

that is to say. it calls for a reply. In no

other sense did the testimony in question

make a new issue. Its only importance was

that it bore upon the main issue, and all

legitimate testimony bearing upon that is-
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decision has not been overruled, that we are
aware of, :md It entirely disposes of the
question ralaed here.
On the trial, a member of the metropolltan
police, who saw the deeensed fall on the slde"wulk and went to his alll:llstance, was asked,
after testifying to the accident, whether,
while be was on hie beat, other accidents
had happened at that place. The <.'OUrt allowed the question, agalnet the objection of
the city's counsel, for the purpose of showing the condition of the street, and the Ila·
blllty of other persons to tall there. The
witness answered that he had seen persons
stumble over there. He remembered sending home In a hack a woman who had fallen
there, and had seen as many as 11.ve persons
tall there.
The admission of this testimony Is now
urged as error, the point of the objeetlon being that It tended to Introduce collateral Issues and thll8 mislead the jury from the matter directly In controversy. Were such the
case the objeetlon would be tenable, but no
dispute was made as to these accidents, no
question was raised aa to the extent of the
lnJurles received, no point was made upon
them, no recovery was sought by reason of
them, nor any Increase of damages. They
were proved simply as circumstances which,
with other evidence, tended to show the dange1-ous character of the sidewalk In Its unguarded condltton. The frequency of acc1<1en ts at a partlcuar place would seem to be
good evidence of Its dangerous cbaracter-at
least, It Is some evidence to that eft'ect. Persons are not wont to seek such places, and
do not wllllngly fall Into them. Here the
<'haracter of the place was one of the subjects of Inquiry to which attention was called by the nature of the action and the pleadings, and the defendant should have been
prepared to show Its reel character In the
face of any proof bearing on that subject.
Besides this, as publicity was necessarily
given to the accidents, they also tended to
show that the dangerous charocter of the locality was brought to the attention of the
city authorities.
In Quinlan v. City of Utica, 11 Hun, ~17,
which was before the supreme court or New
York, In an actkm to recover damages for lnjurles sustained by the plalntur through the
nei:leet of the city to repair Its sidewalk, he
was allowed to show that while It was out
of repair other persons bad slipped and fallen on the walk where he was Injured. It
370

was objected that the te&tlmony presented
new Issues which the defendant could not
be prepared to meet, but the court said: "In
one sense every Item of testimony material
to the main Issue Introduces a new Issue;
that ls to say, It calls for a reply. In no
other sense did the testimony in question
make a new Issue. Its only Importance was
that It bore upon the main Issue, and all
legitimate testimony bearing upon that issue, the defendant was required to be prepared tor." This case was amrmed by the
court of appeals of New York, all the judges
concmTlng, except one, who was absent. 74
'!>\. Y. 603.
In an action against the elty of CMcag:i.
to recover damages resulting from the death
of a person who In the night stepped off. an
approach to a bridge while It was swinging
around to enable a vessel to pa88, and was
drowned,-lt being alleged that the accident
happened by reason or the negleet of the city
to supply suffi.clent lighte to enable persons
to avoid such dangere,-the supreme court
of Illinois held that it was competent tor
the plalntitr to prove that another person
had, under the same circumstances, met with
a similar accident. City of Chicago v. Powers, 42 Ill. 169. To the objeetlon that the evidence was Inadmissible, the court said:
"The action was based upon the negligence
of the city In falUng to keep the bridge properly lighted. If another person had met
with a slmllar fate at the same place, and
from a like cause, it would tend to 11how a
knowledge on the part of the city th&t there
was inattention on the part of their agents
having charge of the bridge, and that they
had failed to provide proper means for the
protection of persons croselng on the bridge.
As It tended to prove this fact It was admissible; and If the appellants had desired to
guard against Its Improper application by the
jury, they should han asked an Instruction
limiting it to its lei,'1timate purpose."
Other cases to the same general purport
might be cited. See City of Augusta v. Haters, 61 Ga. 48; House v. :Metce.lt, 27 Conn.
G30; Calkins v. Olty of Hartford, 33 Conn.
r.7; Darling v. We11tmoreland, 52 N. H. 401;
Hill v. Portland & R. R. Co., 00 Me. 439;
Kent v. Town of Lincoln, 32 Vt. 591; City of
Delphi v. Lowery, 74 Ind. 520. The above.
however, are su!Dclent to sustain the action
of the court below In admitting the testimony to which objection was taken. Judgment
affi.rmed.
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HUGHES v. DETROIT, G. H. & M. RY.

(31 N. W. 603, 61> Mich. 10.)

CO.1

(31 N. W. 603, 65 Mich. 10.)

Supreme Court of Michigan. Feb. 10, 1887.
Supreme Court of Michigan. Feb. 10, 1887.

Error to superior court of Detroit.

Action against a railroad company to re-

cover for personal injuries. Judgment for

plaintiil. Defendant appeals.

Seth E. Engle, for plaintiff. E. W. Med-

daugh, for defendant and appcllant.

Error to superior court ot Detroit.
Action against a railroad company to recover tor personal Injuries. Judgment for
plalntllf. Defendant appeals.
Seth E. Engle, tor plalntltl'. E. W. Meddaugh, tor defendant and appellant.

CAMPBELL, C. J . Plaintiff, a little colored

boy, who is now between six and seven years

old, and was, when injured, ﬁve years old or

under, recovered judgment in the superior

court of Detroit for personal injuries causing

the loss of a leg and some other damage. In

July, 1884, towards the close of the day, but

during daylight, according to the claim of

his declaration, he was on the front of a
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switching locomotive which was making up

and distributing freight tra.ins, and standing

upon a plank step used for switchmeu and

brnkemen to stand upon in their yard-work,

and, as he asserts, was thrown off by a sud-

den start or a sudden stop, and run over. The

negligence alleged was the failure of the train-

men to put him otf before moving, and the

rapid action in starting and stopping. Other

facts were set up concerning the condition

of the yard in which the accident happened,

which ran trom Hastings street across a

block, and the use of it as a place of pastime

by children, and some similar matters, all of

which, although gone into on the trial, were

ﬁnally ruled to be improper by the judge in

his charge. This ﬁnal ruling was in accord-

ance with the decision of this court in Chicago

& N. W. R. Co. v. Smith, 46 Mich. 50-l, 9 N.

W. 830, concerning such premises, where it

was held, in a very similar case in all its

circumstances, that the company could not be

held, under such circumstances, for anything

less than wanton and gross negligence in-

volving reckless misconduct.

Under the charge, as already given. the

jury were directed not to ﬁnd for plaintiff

unless the engineer actually saw the plain-

tit! on the toot-board. If so, the court held

he should not have started the train while the

boy was on it, but should have ordered him

off; and, in giving this charge, the court

said it was conceded that the boy was on the

foot-board, and assumed the boy said the en-

gineer saw him before starting. It was not

disputed, but admitted on the argument in

this court, that, if the engineer actually saw

the boy on the foot-board before moving, he

would be bound to use eﬁlcient care to pre-

vent injury to him; but it is denied that he

CAMPBELL, C. J, Plalntllf, a little colored
boy, who ls now between six and seven years
old, and was, when Injured, ftye years old or
under, recovered judgment in the suJ;l('rlor
court of Detroit tor personal injuries causing
the 101!8 of a leg and some other damage. In
July, 1884, towards the close of the day, but
during daylight, according to the claim of
hie declaration, he was on the front of a
switching locomotive which was malting up
and distributing freight trains, and standing
upon a plank step used tor switchmen and
brakemen to stand upon In their yard-work,
and, as he asserts, was thrown otl' by 11 sudden start or a sudden stop, and run over. The
negligence alleged was the failure of the trainmen to put him olf before moving, and the
rapid action la starting and stopping. Other
facts were set up concerning the condition
ot the yard In which the accident happened,
which ran trom Hastings street acl"088 a
block, and the use of It as a place of pastime
by children, and some slmllar matters, all of
which, although gone Into on the trial, were
finally ruled to be Improper by the judge in
his charge. This final ruling was In accordance with the decision of this court In Chicago
& N. W. R. Co. v. Smith, 46 Mich. 504, 9 N.
W. 830, concerning such premises, where 1t
was held, In a very similar case In all Its
circumstances, that the company could not be
held, under such circumstances, for anything
less than wanton and gross negligence involving reckless misconduct.
Under the charge, as already given, the
jury were directed not to ftnd for plalntltl'
unless the engineer actually saw the plaintiff on the foot-board. If so, the court held
he should not have started the train while the
boy was on It, but should have ordered him
off; and, In giving this charge, the court
said It was conceded that the boy was on the
foot-board, and assumed the boy said the engineer saw him before starting. It was not
disputed, but admitted on the argument In
this court, that, If the engineer actually saw
the boy on the foot-board before moving, be
would be bound to use efficient care to prevent Injury to him; but It Is denied that he
was on the foot-board, or, It so, was seen by
the engineer, or any one else, In that position.
The fact that the boy himself ls the only wit-

was on the foot-board, or, it so, was een by

the engineer, or any one else, in that position.

The fact that the boy himself is the only wit-

1 Dissenting opinion of Morse, J ., omitted.

ness who says the engineer saw him renders

another question important, which is how far

his testimony was admissible.

Upon examining the testimony, we ﬁnd that,

while there are witnesses for piaintiif who

1

Dillsenting opinion of Morse, J., omitted.

ness who says the engineer saw him renders
another question important, which la how far
his testimony was admiBBlble.
Upon examining the testimony, we find that,
while there are witnesses tor plaintUf who
swear to his being on the foot-board, they
do not agree as to the circumstances or cause
ot his being thrown from the board. On the
part of the defense there is testimony which
le not consistent with his being there, as well
as positive testimony that he was not seen
If there. The declaration does not aver that
he was seen, but merely that he might have
been seen with proper diligence, but It does
aver he was on the board and thrown olf.
There was confl.lctlng testimony as to the likelihood or possibility of seeing him on the
board. He himself says he ran back and
forth over It while the engine was not moving, and finally got on 1t just before starting,
and then stayed on till he fell otl'. He also
says he faced the engine, whlle the other testimony would not 80 Indicate. All of this
shows the great Importance of this particular
fact, and the danger of assuming It when
the testimony conflicted. So It was· equally
Important to know whether, If seen at all, he
was seen before starting, as the duty to keep
off a child entirely could not be quite the
same as the duty which would arise from
seeing him already on a moving train. !\lost
ot the testimony Indicates that there was
nothing unusual In the running or stopping
ot the train after It started. This theory
was not laid before .the jury 80 as to call
their attention to Its significance.
The boy's own testimony as to how he fell
otl' ls not quite the same In the direct ns on
the cross-examination. On the direct, the
Impression he gives ls that he was thrown
otl' by a sudden starting and jerk. On the
c1'08s-examlnatlon be says he was carried forward, and In no other direction, with the engine, until near the switch, and then fell ofr
close by the switch. Rosa Bushey, one of
his wltnetlllef!, on the other hand, says the engine went back with him towards Hftstlngs
street before taking him east to the switch.
Tean, another of his witnessee, swore his
back was towards the engineer while he was
standing on the board, and that his hands
were under the hand-rall. The testimony
was by no means uniform upon the Important matters on which this charge bore.
The charge seemed to go upon the Idea that
the plaintiff's account was the one to be
chiefly acted on by the jury, in connection
with his testimony concerning the engineer,
and there was no other testimony which covered that matter directly. He does not
swear positively that the engineer saw him,
but his testimony undoubtedly tends that
way, but, when all compared, leaves the time
and circumstances of such seeln~ In doubt.
Without it, as the court substnntlnlly charged, there was no case for the jury. In connection with this there was testimony of the
plalntilf himself that the engineer, when he
371

Case No. 129]
Case No. 129]

PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

saw him, told the ﬁreman not to ring the ' Any one may take the oath or obligation that

bell until the little fellow got oﬁ, and there

is no testimony that after this warning the

boy showed himself, if he did at ail, to the

engineer. The court committed error in

treating controverted facts as undisputed, as

well as in saying the plaintiff should recover

if the engineer saw him, without reference

to the time and circumstances of seeing him.

Passing by minor points, this makes it nec-

essary to determine concerning the admissi-

bility of this proof. It has been held by this

court, as well as courts generally, that the

fact that a child is under seven years does

not create an absolute disability to testify.

This was held in McGuire v. People, 44 Mich.

286, 6 N. W. U69, and is the doctrine of the

text-books. But the authorities all agree that

8. child cannot testify unless capable of ap-
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preciating the obligation of his oath, if he

takes an oath, or of his affirmation if that

is substituted. And this is upon the ground

that a witness must be under some pressure,

arising out of the solemnity of the occasion,

beyond the ordinary obligation of truth-tell-

ing. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 367; 1 Phil. c. 2 (C. &

H.), and notes. One or the other of these

methods of attestation is required of all wit-

nesses, children or adults. and persons un-

sworn cannot testify unless they prefer the

other form, which in this state is under the

pains and penalties of perjury.

The fact that the child was to be put under

oath or affirmation was not brought to his

attention at all, so as to show whether he

did or did not understand the bearing or

effect of it. He merely said he must tell the

truth, or he would go to hell; but, when

asked about any other consequences, he show-

ed entire ignorance, and only said that his

mother told him the day before that he would

go to hell if he did not speak the truth. This

is all that he said bearing on his veracity.

He was examined by counsel, and not par-

ticularly tested by the court, and the court,

without making any personal examination,

certifying or in any way giving an opinion

that the boy understood the nature or obliga-

tion of an oath or affirmation, left it all to the

jury, to be tested by the ordinary question-

ing and erom-questioning by counsel. This

is what might, no doubt, be safe with many

other persons besides children who usually

tell the truth, and may have their truth sub-

stnntially tested, whether sworn or not. But

the law entitles parties to insist that all wit-

nesses shall be put under some solemn obliga-

tion before testifying, and excludes witnesses

who are incapable of understanding its sanc-

tion. As Mr. Starkle very well explains it,

this is not done because the law imputes guilt

or blame to those who do not appreciate it,

but because it requires the higiicst attainable

sanction for testimony. 1 Starkle, Ev. 22.

It is not left to courts to let in everything

which, in their general opinion. or in the case

of the particular witness, might be safe.

Neither does it rest on any particular belief.
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saw hlm, told the fireman not to ring the • Any one may take the oath or obligation that
bell until the llttle fellow got oft, and there accords with his own opinions, but he must
Is no testimony that after this warnlng the do the one or the other. And be must be
boy showed himself, If be did at all, to the able to comprehend It. Upon this there Is no
engineer. The court committed error In con111ct In the ca.ses. It Is nece881lry to be
treating controverted tacts as undisputed, as left very much to the discretion of the trial
well as lo saying the plalntltr should recover Judge If be undertakes to exercise that dis.it the engineer saw him, without reference eretlon, and acts upon such an examination
to the time and circumstances of seeing him. as sattsftes his own mind. He should conP8881Dg by minor points, this makE'll It nee- duct this examination as In bis judgment wlll
essary to determine concerning the adm188l- be effectual It cannot safely be left to
billty of this proof. It has been held by this coUDSel to make the examination. In Mccourt, as well as courts generally, that the Gulre's Case, before referred to, the judge
tact that a child Is under seven years does gave a careful pe1'80nal examination to the
not create an absolute dlllllblllty to testify. child, and formed a distinct opinion of bis
This was held In McGuire v. People, 44 Mich. own, founded on that examination. As the
286, 6 N. W. 669, and ls the doctrine of the preliminary Inquiry cannot be and ls not un' text-books. But the authorities all agree that der oath, there ls the strongest reason for
a child cannot testify unless capable of ap- very caretnl action °by the Judge himself on
preciatlng the obllgatlon of his oath, If be his ofBclal responsibility. The cases and texttakes an oath, or of bis afBrmatton If that books recognize this distinctly. See 1 Green!.
ls substituted. And this ls upon the ground Ev. II 367, 368, and notes; 1 Edw. Phil Ev.
that a witness must be under some pressure, 11, and notes. In England It baa been held
arising out of the solemnity of the occasion, that recent teaching for the occasion Is not
beyond the ordinary obligation of truth-tell- In Itself aufBclent, because the knowledge
Ing. 1 Greenl Ev. t 367; 1 Phil. c. 2 (C. & thus received may not be comprehended. 1
H.), and notes. One or the other of these Edw. Phil Ev. 11; Rex v. Williams, 7 Car.
methods of attestation ls required of all wit- & P . 320. A careful judicial examination ls
nesses, cblldren or adults, and
un- much more satisfactory than answers which
awom cannot testify unless they prefer the may or may not be really Intelligent. The
other form, whlcll In this state Is under the child's capacity and dlsposltlon to answer
pains and penalties of perj11ry.
corre<'tly and cordially such questioning as
The fact that the child was to be put under may be given Is of the utmost consequence.
oath or atllrmatlon was not brought to his because even among mature witnesses It la
attention at all, so as to show whether he not always easy to discriminate between acdld or did not understand the bearing or tual knowledge and what la accepted on
effect of It. He merely said he must tell the heaniay and Influence. It ls obviously necestruth, or he would go to hell; but, when sary for the court to be satlsfted that the
asked about any other consequences, he show- child will be disposed to tell the truth under
ed entire Ignorance, and only said that his some sense of obligation.
mother told him the day before that he would
In children of tender age no reasonable
go to hell If he did not speak the truth. This person would expect a complete power ot disls all that he said bearing on his veracity. crlmlnntlng between his means and sources
He was examined by counsel, and not par- of knowledge; and more or less undesigned
tlcularly tested by the court, and the court, coloring and mlscoloratlon ls almost lnevltawlthout making any personal examination, ble. There can be no criminal responslbll·
certifying or In any way giving an opinion lty In a young <'hlld, and the care used must
that the boy understood the nature or obllga- therefore be rather In ascertaining his cation of an oath or afBrmatlon, left It all to the paclty and disposition than In lmprPsslng the
jury, to be tested by the ordinary question- terrors of the law. We are compelled to aping and croes-queatlonlng by counst'l. This ply the law as we ftnd It, until changed by
Is what might, no doubt, be safe with mnny legislation. But we are greatly lmprP~
otbt'r persons besides children wbo usually with the practical lmperfe<'tlon of the pret1·
tell the truth, and may have their truth sub- ent roles. In France, and probably elseRtantlnlly tested, whether sworn or not. But wherP, the courts refuse to administer an
the law entitles parties to Insist that all wit- oath to chlldrPn of tendPr years, and allow
DPl!SPS shall be put under some solemn obllga- tbPm to be examined without anything mort"
tlon before testifying, and excludes wttnes11es than suitable cautions, lea\'lng their statewho are Incapable of understanding Its sane- mPnti1 on direct and cro11s-examlnntlon to ht•
tlon. As ~Ir. Starkie very well explains It, taken for what they are worth. This Re<'UI."
this ls not done because the law Imputes guilt . to .be a sensible prO<'eerllng, and ls probably
or blame to those who do not appreciate It, quite as eftkaclous as our owo system, and less
but because It requires the hlghMt attainable llkpb· to abuse. There Is a proper desire In
lltlnctlon for te11tlmony. 1 Starkie, Ev. 22. <'Onrts to rec:•elve SU<'h tt>Atlmony as wlll throw
It Is not left to courtR to let In everything lli:ht on the mse, and there ls no doubt that lo
whkh, In th<'lr it<'nen1l opinion. or In the case proc•tlce children are oftPn allowl'd to testify
of the partlC'ular witness, might be safe. whose legal capacity to do so Is very liberally
Neither does It rest on any particular belief. construed. It would be better, we think, to put
812

persons
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their testimony on the moreprational ground

that it is calculated to be of some value, and

capable, under a proper examination, of being

reasonably well weighed tor what it is worth.

The other points do not require much con-

sideration. It is possible the instructions con-

cerning damages were open to some criticism,

but the judge appears to have desired to pre-

vent any wild estimates, and it is not very

easy to be precise concerning all the elements

to be considered in such a case. The charge

was intended to keep out improper ‘consider-

ations as far as possible, and to undo some

rulings made earlier in the case which were

found improper. ln cases like this, however.

it is not possible, utter argument, to undo the

effect of important testimony once in, and

impressed on the jury by counsel.

For the reasons given, the judgment should
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be reversed, and a new trial granted.

CHAMPLIN and SHERWOOD, JJ., con-

curred. MORSE, J., dissented.

tIlIUI
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their testimony on the more . rational ground
that It Js calculated to be of some value, and
capable, under a proper exnmJnatlon, of being
rensonably well weighed for what it is worth.
The other pohits do not require much consideration. It is possible the Instructions concerning damages were open to some crltlclBm,
but the judge appears to have desired to prevent any wild estimates, and it Js not very
easy to be precise concerning all the elements
to be CODSidered in such a case. The charge
was intended to keep out improper ·consider-

(Case No. 129

ntlons as far as J>088fble. and to undo some
rulings made earlier in the case which were
found improper. In cases like this, however.
it Is not possible, after argument, to undo the
effect of Important testimony once In. and
Impressed on the jury by COUI18el
For the reasons glven, the judgment should
be reversed, and a new trial granted.

CHAMPLIN and SHERWOOD, JJ., conMOUSE, J., dissented.

curred.
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STEPHENS v. BERNAYS.

(42 Fed. 488.)

District Court, E. D. Missouri, E. D. June 7,

1890.

At law.

George D. Reynolds, U. S. Dist. Atty., for

plaintiﬂ. H. A. Loevy, for defendant.

THAYER, J. The testimony of C. C.

Crecllius, taken in connection with other tes-

timony offered by the plaintiff. clearly shows

that the deceased assigned his stock in the

insolvent bank to Crecllius, the cashier, with “

intent to evade his liability as a Silﬁl'9il0~|ti(‘l'.

According to the testimony of Crecllius, the

deceased had not only been advised before

the sale that the bank had sustained con-

siderable losses, but he declared at the time

of the sale that his purpose in selling was

to avoid his liability as a stockholder. The
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sale appears to have been made only two

days before the bank closed its doors, and

no change took place in the condition of the

bank in the mean time. Crecllius gave his

notes for the stock, instead of paying for the

same in money; and according to his state-

ment the notes were to be surrendered, and

the sale canceled, if at the end of 60 days the

deceased was then assured that the bank was

all right. Crecllius himself had little or no

means, at the time of the purchase, and was

rendered utterly insolvent by the failure of

the bank two days later. His object in mak-

ing the purchase in question was to with-

draw the stock from the market, and save

the credit of the bank, which was then in a

precarious condition. These facts, most of

which were established by the testimony of

Crecilius, warrant the conclusion that the

pretended sale was and is voidable as to

creditor of the insolvent bank, who are rep-

resented in this proceeding by the receiver.

Thomp. Liab. Stockh. § 215, and cases cited.

A question arises, however, and was re-

served at the trial, touching the competency

of Crecllius to testify against the executrix

concerning transactions between himself and

the testator. The federal statutes provide

(section S58) that-

“No witness shall be excluded * ' * in

any civil action because he is a party to or

interested in the issue tried: provided, that

in actions by or against executors, " * '

in which judgment may be rendered for or

against them, neither party shall be allowed

to testify against the other as to any trans-

action with or statement by the testator,

' " '°‘ unless called to testify thereto by

the opposite party. ' * * In all other re-

pects the laws of the state in which the

court is held shall be the rules of decision as

to the competency of witnesses in courts of

the United States," etc.

The state law on the subject (section 8918,

Rev. St. Mo. 1889) provides that-

“l\'o person shall he disqualiﬁed as a wit-

ness in any civil suit " * * by reason of

his interest in the event of the same, as :1

party or otherwise: ' * * provided that,

PRODUCTJON AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

STEPHENSv.BERNAY&
(42 Fed. 488.)
Distril't Court, E. D. MiHouri, E. D. June 7,
1800.
At law.
George D. Reynolds, U. S. Dist. Atty., for
plalntllr. H. A. Loevy, for defendant.
THAYER, J. 'nle testimony of C. C.
Creclllus, taken In connection with other te-stlmony offered by the plalntlft', clearly shows
that the deceased assigned his stock In the
Insolvent bank to Creclllus, tbe eashler, with
Intent to evade his llablllty as a shareholtler.
According to the testimony of Crccllius, the
deceased had not only been advised before
the snle that the bank bad sustained ronelderable losses, but he declared at the time
of the 1.1&le that bis purpose In selllng was
to avoid hie llablllty as a stockholder. The
sale appears to have been made only two
days before the bank closed Its doors, and
no change took _place In the condition or the
bank In the mean time. Creclllue gave bis
notes for tbe stock, Instead of paying for the
same In money; and according to his statement the notes were to be surrendered, and
the sale canceled, If at tbe end or 60 days the
deceased was then assured that the bank was
all right. Creclllus himself had little or no
means, at the time of the purchase, and was
rendered utterly lm1olvent by the fallure of
the bank two days later. Hts object In making tbe purchase In question was to wltbdraw the stock from the market, nnd save
tbe credit of the bank, whlcb was then In a
precarious condition. These facts, most of
whkh were establlsbed by the testimony of
Creclllus, warrant the conclusion that the
pretended eule was and ls voidable as to
creditors of the lni;olvent bank, who are represented In this proceeding by the receiver.
Thomp. Llab. Stockh. § 215, and cases cited.
A question arises, however, and was reserved at the trial, touching the competency
of Creclllus to testify against the executrix
concerning transactions between himself nnd
the testator. The federal statutes provide
(section 858) that"No witness llhall be excluded • • • In
any clvll action becpuse he Is a party to or
Interested In the Issue tried: provided, that
In actions by or against executors, • • •
In which judgmen1 may be rendered for or
against them, neither party shall be allowed
to testify against the other as to any transaction with or statement by the testator,
• • • unless called to testify thereto by
the opposite party. • • • In all other respects the laws of the state In which the
court ls held shall be the rules of declldon ns
to the competeney of witnesses In courts of
the United State11," etc.
The state law on the subject <section 8918,
Jlev. St. Mo. 1889) provides that"No person F.hnll he dlsqmtllfted as a witness In any civil suit • • • by renson of
.l\74

his lntereet In the event of the same, as a
party or otherwise: • • • provided that,·
In a<•tlons where one of the original parties
to the contract or cause of action In Issue
and on trial le dead or • • • Insane, the
other party to such contract or cause of action shall not be admitted to testify • • •
In his own favor; • • • and, where an
executor or administrator ls a party, the other party shall not be admitted to testify In
his own favor, unles11 the contract In Issue
wu originally made with a person who la
llvlng and competent to testify," etc.
The Jlrst clause of the proviso of section
8918, supra, as heretofore construed by the
state courts, has much greater scope than
the federal statute above referred to. Thus,
In Meler v. Thieman. 00 Mo. 434, 2 s. W.
435, It was held that by the proviso In question a person was rendered Incompetent to
testify as to transactions with a decedent
In a suit brought by bis heirs, although the
person tendered as a witness was not a. party to the suit. 'Ibe decision appears to be
based on the ground that a witness, to be
excluded by the state law, need not be a party to the record, but wlll be excluded as a
witness as to all contracts or transactions
between blmsPlf and a deceued person,
when the witness has an Interest In the result of the suit, whether he Is or Is not a
party to the record. Hence It Is Important
to determine, In the first Instance, whether
tbe competency of Creclllus to testify as to
transactions between himself and the d~
cedent Is to be tested by federal or state law.
The rule Is that. where congress has legislated on the subject,-that Is, bns ena<'ted a
law covering the pa1tlcular case,-such law
must prevail In the federal courts. notwithstanding It dllTers frcm the state law. Potter Y. Bnnk, 102 U. S. 165; Insurance Co. v.
Schaefer, 94 U. S. 4?"">8; Rice v. Mnrtln, 8
Fed. 476. The state laws control In determining the competency of witnesses only In
cases like that of Packet Co. v. Clough, 20
Wall. 537, which do not fall within any proYlslon of the federal laws.
The case at bar ls clearly wltbln the terms
of se<·tlon 858. The effort ls to exclude Creclllus as a witness on the ground of Interest;
but the first elnul*. of the section declares
that Interest shall be no dlsquallficatlon "In
any civil action," and the only cxcPptlon to
that rul~ ls that mentioned in the provlso,that a person called as witness shall not be
allowed to testify ~s to any trnnsa.ctlons
with or statement by n decedent, If the suit
ls against his executor or administrator, and
the w itness Is himself' nn opposing party to
the suit, unless the witness Is called upon to
testify by the executor or administrator.
The case at bar seems to be strictly like the
case of Potter v. Bank, supm, In which a
person situated as Creclllus ls, with respect
to the litigation, was held to be a competent
witness. Whatevel view, therefore, the
court might entertain as to the competenc7

CO.MPETE.SCY
COMPETE N C Y OF WITN ESS ES.

[Case No. 130

of the witness under the state law. it is

compelled to hold that he is made a compe-

of the witness under the state law. 1t Is
compelled to hold that he Is made a competent witness by the federal statutes. Judgment wm accordingly go against the ex-

O~'

WITNESSES.

[Case No. 130

ecutrlx for the amount of the comptroller's
assessment; that Is, for $3,500, with Interest
at'6 per cent. per annum, to be computed
from September 24, 1889, to this date.

tent witness by the federal statutes. Judg-

375
ment will accordingly go against the ex-

ecutrlx for the amount of the comptroller's

assessment; that is, for $3,500, with interest

at‘6 per cent. per annum, to be computed

from September 24, 1889, to this date.
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SUTHERLAND v. ROSS.

Case No. 131]
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(21 At!. 354, 140 Pa. St. 3i9.)

SUTHERLAND v. ROSS.

(21 Atl. 354, 140 Pa. St.. 379.)

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. March 2,

1891.

Appeal irom court oi common pleas,

Montgomery county; Aanos S. Swswrz,

Judge.

Ejectment by James Sutherland against

William Ross. From ajudgment ior de-

iendant plaintili appeals.

John Ill. Arundel. ior appellant. Louis

Supreme Court of J'l'rmsylvanla.
1891.

llarch 2,

Appeal from conrt of common pleas,
Montgomery county; AARON s. SWAl<TZ,
J11<t1£e.
Ejt!Ctml'nt by James Sutherland agalnRt
Wllllern Ro11s. From a judgment ror de·
fendant pin In tiff appeals.
John M. Arundel, for appellant. Lc>Ui.~
M. Childs, !'tlontgomery Evans, and Geo. N.
Corson, for appellee.

M. Childs, Montgomery Evans, and Geo. N.

Corson, ior appeliee.

CLARK, J. The lot oi ground in dispute

is situated in West Conshohocken, in’ the

county oi Montgomery. It is one oi two

lots—Nos. 121 and 122—in a plot oi lots

laid out by one William Da\'is, Sr.,cou-

veyed by Willia.m Dager. Sr., to Nicholas
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F. Dager, by his deed dated April 6, 1871,

and this is admitted to be the common

source oi title. The plaintiii gave in evi-

dence a deed irom Nicholas I". Dager and

Elizabeth,his wile,dated llth Maren, 1874.

describing and conveying both oi said

lots to James Sutherland; consideration,

$1,350. The defendants thereupon gave

in evidence the record oi a. deed dated 14th

February, 1877, irom James Sutherland

and Agnes, his Wile, recon veying the par-

ticular lot and premises in dispute to

Nicholas F. Dager; consideration. $1,000;

and also a deed dated 3d April, 1557, irom

Nicholas F. Dager and wile to William

Ross; consideration, $1,400. The plaintiff,

James Sutherland, then took the witness

stand. and it was proposed to prove by

him that the deed irom Sutherland and

wile to Dager, dated 14th February, 1877,

was a iorgery. Having been sworn on

his voir dire. it appeared that Nicholas F.

Dager, the grantee in the deed, was dead,

and objection was made to the competen-

cy oi Sutherland to testiiy to any matter

occurring helore the death oi Dager. The

objection was sustained. and the witness

held to be incompetent. The plaintiﬂ

thereupon called Mrs. Mary Powell, one ol

the subscribing witnesses to the deed,

who testiﬂed that Nicholas F. Dager was

not present at the execution and acknowl-

edgment oi the instrument oi writing,

which she witnessed; that William Hay-

wood. the other subscribing witness. and

the justice oi the peace beiore whom the

deed purports to haveheen acknowledged,

were present, but that the entire transac-

tion occnrred in the absence oi Dager, the

grantee therein. The oiier was then re-

newed with some modiﬁcation. The plain-

CLARK, J. The lot of around In dispute
ls situated tn West Conshohocken, In· the
county or Montgomery. It ls one or two
Jobi-NOB. 121 and lt2-ln a plot of lots
laid out by one William Da \'Is, Sr., conveyed by William Da11;er, Sr., to Nicholas
F. Dager, by hll! deed dnted April 6, H!il,
and this h1 admitted to be the common
source of title. The plaintiff gave In evidence a deed frum Nlchoh1s It'. Ds~er and
Elizabeth, his wife, dated 11th liarcn, 18i4,
describing and conveying both of itald
JotK to Jumes Sutherland; consideration,
$1,350. The defendnnts thereupon gave
In evidence the r~ord of a deell dated 14th
February, 1877, from Jamel! Sutherlan(]
and Agues, bb1 wife, recooveylog the particular Jot and preml11eR In dispute to
.Nicholas F. J..>ager; comlllleratlon, $1,000;
and also a deed dated 3d Aprll, l&;i, from
.Nicholas 1''. Dager and wife to William
Ro88; consideration, $1,400. The plaintiff,
James Sutherland, then took tile witness
11tand, and It w11s proposed to prove by
him that the deed from Sutherland and
wire to Dager, dated 14th February, l!f17,
was a forgery. Having been Rworn on
his votr dire, It appeared that Nicholas F.
Dager, the gruntee In the dt*d, was deed,
and objection was made to the competenr.y of 8uthi>rland to teRtlfy to any matter
occurring bi>fore the death of Dager. 'l'he
objection was Rustolned. and the witness
held to be lncompeteut. The plalntlft
thereupon called MrR. Mary Powell, one of
the subscribing wltnt>sseti to the deed,
who teHtlllecl that Nicholas F. Dager was
not present at the execution and acknowledgment of the Instrument or writing,
which she wltn~11ed; that William Haywood. the other subscribing witness, and
the Justice of the peace before whom the
deed purports to ha \"e Ileen acknowledged,
were present, but that the entire t1am1uctlon occurred In the absence of Dager. the
grantee therein. The offer was then re11ew2d with some modlllcation. The plaintiff's <'ounsel offered to i>rove by Sutherland, the plaintiff. not that a forgery
was committed by Dager. but that l>ager employed Wlllluri Haywood, the justice of the pettce, ns his agent on the 14th
Februury, 187i, to prPpare aud ohtaln
from James Sntherland and his wife a
conveyunce or the premises In dispute In
conslclerutlon of the payment or $1,000;
and while In that employment the agent,
Haywood. pre11ared nr had prepared the
deed dated 14th l•'ehruary, 1877, purporting to be slll;'ned by James Sutherland and

tiii’s counsel oiiered to prove by Suther-

land, the plaintiii, not that a forgery

was committed by Dager,bui: that Da-

ger employed William Haywood, the jus-

tice oi the peace, as his agent on the 14th

February, 1877. to prepare and obtain

irom James Sutherland and his wile a

conveyance oi the premises in dispute in
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his wire, and witnessed by Mer.r ~ugent
and Wiiiiam Httywood, and purporting
to be ackno'i\'ledged before William Haywood as a ju11tlce of the peace, and tha1'
no t1uch dC'E'd waa 11lgned b.v the witnl"88
or his wife, or by Mary Nugent a11 witneHs, or acknowledged before Wllllam
Huywood ae a luRtlce of the pPnce. Objection wus also made to this offer, to the
same effect es befon-, which objection was
111111talned, and this IR the first assignment
of error. The contention or the appellant
Is that, al! Dager, the grantee In the deed,
wa11 nut pret1ent at the alle~d execution
of the deed, but was repre8ented by an
ngent, who Is alive and competent totestify att to th~ whole transaction, Sntherland, the Run·h·lng party, may testify. although Dager le dead. Jn cla11ee E or the
fifth section of the act of 23d May, 18Ri, It
ls provided In the plainest manner that
where any [Jarty to a thlnli!: or contract
In action Is dead, and his rights thereto
or .therein have passed, either by his owo
11ct or by the net or the Jew, to a pal"ty
on the record, who l'f'presents his interest
m the subject In contt"OverRy, neither the
Rurvlvlng or remaining party to such
thing or contract. nor any other pe"on
whose lntt>reet shall b" ad \'erse to thP. said
rlJl;b t of the deceased party. except In certain epeclftP.tl cases, shall be a competent
wltnt'lls to an.rmntter orcurrlngbefore hie
death. The thing or contract In action
here ltt tire right or title to the prerulReK In
dlHpute under the deed of 14th 1',ebruary,
18i7, which ls alleged to be a forge1·.r. and
the record of which was In e\'ldence. :Stell·
oles F. l>uJ,.rer was a party to that deed,
and his right under It bas by bis own act
paMBed to William RoR11, a party oo the
record, who represt•nts hlH Interest In the
Rubject In cnntro~el"l1y; end It follows
from the expreHs words of the statute that
James Sutherland, who Is the surviving
or re1m1lnlng party to the deed, Is oot, In
this case, co!Ilpetent to testify to any
matter occurring before the death or Datger, who le deceased. It IA true that et
the time of the execution of the dred. or at
the time or Its alleged e:s:ecutlon, Dager
was not present. This Is conceded; but
he was a party to the deed, and In prlvlt.v
of et1tate with the plulntllf; and, although
the transaction may have been conducted
by Haywood, In his absen<'e, In his Interest, that, accor1llng to the terma or the
statute, would not render ~utherland competent as a witness to testify on that subject aftt•r Dager'11 death. Such was the
construc•tlon finally put upon similar language In the act of 1!l69. After the passa(l;fl
of tlrnt act the qnestlon arose whether the
exclu11lon of parties to the action was only as to tranllactlons with the decedent,
and for a time, It mul!t be conceded, the
r.ourse of the declRIOnt! upon that point
was Humewhat unsteady; but It was the
manifest purpose of the statute to close
the mouth or him who Is adversary to the
deceased assignor. In Karns v. Tanner,
66 Pa. St. 29i. the broad and general doctrine waH thus Rtated by Mr. Justlcll AoNEW: "The true spirit of the proviso,
then, seems to be tluit when a party to a
thing or contract In action Is dead, and
bis rights have passed, either by bis own
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[Case No. 131

act or by that of the law,to another,

who represents his interest in the subject

of c0nt.rovers_v, the surviving party to

that subject shall not testify to matters

occurring in the life-time of the adverse

party, whose lips are now closed.” This

statement of the law was followed in

Watts v. Leidig, 29 Leg. Int. 293: Brady

v. Reed.'8T Pa. St. 111; Hess v. Gourley,

89 Pa. St. 195; Ewing v. Ewing. 96 Pa. St.

381; Foster v. Collner. 107 Pa. St. 305; Ad-

ams v. Edwards, 115 Pa. St. 211,8.-\tl.

Bep.42.'>. We think this was the settled

construction. at the time of the passage of

the act of 23d May, 1887, which has also

been similarly construed in Duﬂield v. Hue,

129 Pu. St. 94, 18 Atl. Rep. 566, and in Par-

ry v. Parry. 130 Pa. St. 94. 18 Atl. Repf

628. As Sutherland was himself incompe-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:08 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104925781
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

tent, not only under the words and settled

policy of the statute. but as a person

“ whose interest is adverse to the said

right of the deceased," his wile was also

inconipetent for the same purpose. The

identity of Interest between husband and

wife is such thut. Where one oi them is in-

competent to testify as awitness, the oth-

er is incompetent also. Bitner v. Boone,

128 Pa. St. 567, 18 Atl. ilep. 404.

Judgment is aﬂirnied.
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act or by that of the law, to another,
wbo represents his lotel'e8t In the subject
<>f controversy, the surviving party to
that subject shall not testify to matters
occurrinp: lo the life-time of the adverse
party, whose lips are now closed." This
11tatement of the law was followed In
Watts v. Leidig, 29 Leg. Int. 293: Brady
v. Reed,· 87 Pa; St. 111; Hess ,._ Gourley,
1j9 Pa. 8t. 195; Ewing v. Ewlnp:, 96 Pa. !!it.
381; Foster v. Colin er, 107 Pa. 8t. 305; Adams v. Edwards, 115 Pa. St. 211, 8 Atl.
Rep. 42.'i. We think this was tbe settled
construction, at the time of the passage of
the act of 23d May, 1887, which hRB also

bPen similarly cone trued In Pnffield v. Hue,
~t. 94, JR Atl. Rep. fi66, and In Parry v. Parry, ISO Pa. St. 94. 18 Atl. Rap •.
628. As Sutherland wa11 himself lncompe·
tent, not only under the words and settled
policy of the statute, but ae a person
"whose Interest le adverse to the suld
right of the dcccueed," hie wl'fe was also
lncori1petent for the same purpose. The
Identity of Interest between husband and
wife ls such that, where one or them le Incompetent to ttlBtlfy n1.1 a wltneeil, the other le Incompetent also. Bitner v. Boone,
1~ Pa. Rt. 667, 1~ A ti. Rep. 404,
Juda;went 111 a11h'med.
377
129 Pa.
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PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

BASSETT v. UNITED STATES.

(11 Sup. Ct. 165, 137 U. S. 496.)

Supreme Court of the United States. Dee. 22,

1890.

In error to the supreme court of the ter-

ritory of Utah.

PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

BASSETT v. UNITED STATES.
(11 Sop. Ct. 165, 137 U. S. 496.)
Supreme Court of the United States. Dec. n,
1890.
Jn error to the supreme court of the ter-

ritory of Utah.
F. 8. Richards, for plalntln In' error.
Atty. Gen. Miller, lor the United Sta tee.

F. S. Richards, for plaintiff in‘ error.

Atty. Gen. Miller, for the United States.

BREWER, J. On November 23,1886, the

grand jury of the ﬁrst judicial district

court of Utah found an indictment for po-

lygamy against the plaintiff in error,

charging him with having married one

Kate Smith on the 1-lth day of August,

1884, whcn his lawful wife, Sarah Ann

Williams, was still living and undivorced.

Upon trial before a jury, a verdict ofguilty

was returned, and he was sentenced to

imprisonment fora term of ﬁve years,and
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to paya ﬁne of $500. Such sentence, on ap-

peui. was affirmed by the supreme court

of the territory, and is now brought to

this court for review.

A preliminary question is presented by

the attorney general. It is urged that

there was no proper bill of exceptions as

to the proceedings in the trial court, and

therefore nothing is presented which this

court can review. But we are reviewing

thejudgment of the supreme court of the

territory; and the rule in thiscourt is not

to consider questions other than those of

jurisdiction, which were not presented to

the court whose judgment we are asked to

examine. Clark v. Fredericks, 105 U. S. 4.

Beyond the fact that the proceedings of the

trial court were examined and considered

by the supreme court oi the territory, and

are therefore presumably reviewable by

this court. is this matter. noticed by this

court in the case of Hopt v. Utah, 114 U.

S. 48$, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 972: That a large

liberty of review is given by the statutes

of Utah to the supreme court of the terri-

tory. even in the absence of a. formal bill

of exceptions. See, also, Stringfellow v.

Cain, 99 U.S. 610; U’Reillyv. Campbell, 116

U. S. 418, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 421. But it is un-

necessary to rest upon this recognition by

the supreme court of the territory, or the

presumptions arising therefrom. The rec-

ord shows the pleadings, proceedings, and

exceptions to the charge of the trial judge,

all certiﬁed properly by T. A. Perkins, the

clerk of the trial court. At the close of

his certiﬁcate, which is of date January

20, 1887, is this statement: "And I further

certify that a copy of defendant's bill of

exceptions in said cause is not made part

hereof because said hill of exceptions is in

the possession oi defendant’s counscl, at

the city of Salt Lake, and because I am

informed by said counsel that it has been

stipulated by and between themselves and

the United States district attorney for

Utnh territory that the original thereof

in place of such copy should he used in the

supremecourt upon this appeal. " The bill

BREW EH, J. On November 23, 1886, the
grand Jory of the fil"Bt Judicial district
court of Utah found an lndktment for po.
Jygnmy agalnat the plalntln In error,
chnrging him with having married one
Kate Smith on the 14th day of August,
188-1, when his lawful wife. Sarah Ann
Williams, 'was still living and undlvorced.
Upon trial before a Jury, a verdict ofgullty
w1u1 returned, and he was sentenced to
Imprisonment for' a term of ti ve yeanJ, and
to pay a fine of $500. Such sentence, on a ppeul, was affirmed by the 1mpreme com·t
of the territory, and le now brought to
tbh~ court for review.
A preliminary question le presented by
the attorney general. It le urged that
there WliB no proper bill of exceptlont1 a11
to the proceedings In the trial court, and
therefore nothing le presented which this
court can review. But we are reviewing
tbe judgment of the supreme court of thi>
territory; and tlle rule in this court Is not
to t•oneider questions other than those of
Jurisdiction. which were not presented to
the court whose judgment we are asked to
examine. Clark v. Fredericks, 105 U.S. 4.
Be,vond the fact that thP. proceed Inge of the
trlul court WPre examined uod considered
by the supremP court of the territory. and
are therefore presumably revlewable l>y
this court. le this matter, noticed by this
<'Otnt In thP. case of Hopt v. Utah, 114 U.
8. 48.'-:, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 97:!: 'l'hat a large
llberty of review ls given by the statutes
of Utah to the BUt}reme court of the territory. et"en In the absence of a formal hill
of exceptions. Sre, also, Stringft>llow v.
Caln, 99 U.S. 610; U'Reillyv. Cumpbell, 116
U. K. 418, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 421. But It ls unnecessary to rest upon this recognition by
the enp1-eme court of the territory, or the
presumptions arising therefrom. The record t1hows the pleading!!, proceedings, and
exceptions to the charge of the triufjuclge,
all certlfted properly by ·r. A. Perkins, the
clerk of the trial court. At the close of
hie certificate, which le of date January
20, 1887, le this statement: .. And I further
certify that a copy of defendant's bill of
exceptions In sold ca nee IA not made pnrt
hereof because said hill of exceptlonl'I is In
the poaeeeelon of defendnnt'e coune<>I, at
the city of Salt Lake, and because I a.m
Informed by 1iald coumicl that It has been
titlpulated by and between themselves and
the United StateR difitrkt attorney for
Utnh territory that the original thereof
In place of sueh copy should be used in the
snpremecuurt upon thieappeal." The bill
of exceptions referred to by him in this
statement le signed by the trial Judge,
and thus lndorsed: "No. !•x-t. First Dh1t.
Court. Utah. 'fhe Unikel Sta tr~ vs. William E. Bt1sHett. Polyi.:-umy. Bill of exceptions. :Filed Jan'y 19th, 188i. T. A.
378

PERKINS, Clerk ; " and also by the clerk of
theeupremecuurt of the territory as" Filed
}'eb'y 2nd, 1887, '' the date of the filing of
the transcript of the proceedings of tho
trial court. The import of all this le that
the hlll of exceptions slJOted by the trial
Judge was ftle1l In the trial c·uurt; und that,
for the purpoRes of econo1113, time, and
con \"enience, ench original bill, together
with the record of the pr0t•eedlngt1, was
brought to and ftled In thP ~upreme court
after having been filed In the trial court.
It needs but thleRUJi:geetlon, that If a l'opy
le good the original le equally good. ThA
Identification of 11uch bill of exceptlon11 Is
pel'fect, \'ouched by the signatures of the
trial Judge, the clerk of the district court,
a.ud the clerk of the supreme court. To
Ignore such authentlca.tlou would place
this court In the attitude of resting on a
mere technicality to avoid an inquiry Into
the llubetantlal rll[hte of a party. ae coneldere<l and determined by hoth the trial
court and the supreme court of the territory. In the absence of a statute ol"
special rule of In w compelling such a practice, we decline to adopt It.
Passing from this question of practice
to the merltll, the principal question, and
the ur1ly one we de~m necessary to consider, le thh1: The wire of the defendant was
ca.lied ae a witness for the prosecution, and
permitted to testily ae to confessions made
hy him to her in respect to the crime
charged, and her testimony wa11 theon!y <11rectevlrlenceugalnet him. Thie testimony
wa11 admittrd under the first parna:raph
of section 1156 or the Code of l'l\"ll Procedure, enacted In 1884, (section 3878, Comp.
La w11 Utah 1888,) which reads: "A husband cannot be examined for or agalm•t
hie wife, without her consent, nor a wife
for or against hel" husband. without bis
consent; nor can either, during the marriage or afterwards, be, without the consent of the other,examinP.d ae to any communication made by one to the other Jurlog the marriage; but thle exception does
not apply to a clt'll action or proceeding
by one against the other, nor to a crlmlnal action or proceeding for a crime committed by one against the other." Ami tho
contention le that "polygamy" Is within
the language of that paragraph a crime
committed by the hushand against the
wife. We think this ruling erroneous. A
technical argnmen t a.~elnet It 111 thle: 'l'he
Bl'<'tlon ls fonnd In the Code of Civil Procedure, and Its provisions should not be
held tu determine the competency of wltneHRes in criminal caeee, especially when
there le " Code of Criminal Procedure,
which contains sections prescribing the
conditions of competency. Section 421 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, (i:iectlun
51!l7, Comp. Lawe 18S8,) le ae follows:
"Except with the consent of both, or In
ca11es of criminal violence upon one by the
other, neither husband nor wife are competent wttne11eee for or againHteuch other,
in a criminal action or proceeding to which
one or both ure parties. " ('!early under
thut section tlle wife we1:1 not 11 competent
wltnes11. It Is true that the Code of Criminal Procedure was emictt>d In 1878, and
the Cude of Ch·ll Pl'Ocedm·e In 1SS4, eu thai
the latter le the last e:s:prel!Blou of the leg-
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isiative will; but a not unreasonable con- I 209, 222, in which Mr. Justice MCLEAN used

struction is that the last clause of this

paragraph was inserted simply to prevent

the rule stated in the first clause from be-

ing held to apply to the cases stated in

the last, leaving the rule controlling in

criminal cases to he determined by the al-

ready enacted section in the Code oi Crim-

inal Procedure. This construction finds

support in the fact that the same legisla-

ture which enacted the Code oi Civil Pro-

cedure passed an act amending various

sections in the Code oi Criminal Procedure,

among them the section following section

421, quoted above, and did not in terms

amend such section, (Laws Utah 1884,c.

48, p. 119,) and in the further fact

that the same legislature passed an act

for criminal procedure in justices’ courts,
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and in that prescribed the same rule of

competency, and in the same language as

is found in section 421. Laws Utah li58~i,c.

54, snhc.10,§l00.p.153. Itcan hardly behe-

lieved that the legislature would establish

one rule oi competency ior a trial in a jus-

tice‘s court, and a different rule for a trial

oi the same offense on an appeal to the

district court. And there are many of-

fenses of which justices’ courts have juris-

diction, which are like polygamy in their

soicfial immorality and their wrong to the

w e.

But we do not rest our conclusion on

this technical argument. If there were

but n single section in force, and that the

one found in the Code oi Civil Procedure,

we should hold the testimony of the wife

lncompeten t. We agree with the supreme

court of California, when. in speaking of

their Codes, which in respect to these sec-

tions are identical with those oi Utah, it

says, in People v. Langtree, 64 Cal-. 259,

“ We think upon a fair construction both

mean the some thing, although the Penal

Code is more explicit than the other. On

this. as on nearly every other subject to

which the Codes relate, they are simply

declaratory oi what the law would beif

there were no Codes.” See, also, People v.

M ullings, 83 Cal. 138, 23 Pac. Iiep. 229. It

was a well-known rule of the common law

that neither husband nor wife was a com-

petent witness in a criminal action against

the other, except in cases oi personal vio-

lence, the one upon the other, in which

the necessities oi juatice compelled n. relax-

ation oi the rule. ’e are aware that lan-

guage similar to this has been presented

to the supreme courts of several states for

consideration. Some, as in Iowa and Ne-

braska, hold that a new rule is thereby

established, and that the wife is a compe-

tent witness against her husband in a

criminal prosecution for bigamy or adul-

tery, on the ground that those are crimes

specially against her. State v. Sloan, 5:’;

Iowa, 217. 7 N. W. Rep. 516: Lord v.State,

17 Neb. 526. 23 N. W. Rep. 507. While oth-

lsiatlve wtll; but a not unreasonable conatructton Is that the last t'lauae of this
paragraph was Inserted simply to prevent
the rule stated In the 01'8t clause from be·
Ing ht-Id to apply to the cases stated In
the last, lea·vlng the rule controlling In
crlmlnnl caaee tu be determined by the already enacted aectlon In the Code of Crim·
lnal Procedure. Title construction llnda
support In the fact that the same legislature which enacted the Code of Civil Procedure paeeed an act amendlnJl various
st!etlom1 In the Code of Criminal Procedure,
among t11em the 11ectioo following section
421, quott-d above, and did not In terms
amend su1:b section, (Lawe Utah 1884, c.
48, p. 119,) and In the further fact
that the same legislature passed an act
for criminal procedure in Justices' courts,
and In that prE'Scrihed the same rule of
compewncy, and In the same language att
Is found In sectlon421. Lawe Utah 18X4,c.
M, snbc.-. lli, § 100. p.153. It can hardly be believed that the legl11lature would ei,itabllsh
one ruh: of competency for a trial in a justice's court, anll a dlnerent rule for a trial
of the eamA offem1e on on aP11eal to the
die~rict court. And there are ma11:v offenses of which Justices' courtH have Juris·
diction, which are like polygamy lo their
social immorality and their wrong to the
wife.
But we do not rest our conclusion on
this technical argument. If there were
but a slntotle section In force, and thnt the
one found to the Code of Cl\•ll ProcPdure,
we shoulct hold the testimony of the wtfe
Incompetent. We Hgree with the supreme
court of California, when. in Rpenklng or
their CodP.s, which lo respect to these sections are identical with ti.Jose of Utah, It
eaye, In People v. LangtrP.e, 64 Cal. 259,
"We think upon a fnir construction both
mean the imme thing, althongb the Penal
Code le more explicit than the other. On
this. as on nearly e\'et'Y other subject to
wbkb the Codee relate, they are simply
declaratory of what the law would bA If
there were no Codes." See, also, People v.
Mullings, 8:J Cal. 138, 23 Pac. HPp. 22!!. It
was a well-known rule of the common law
that neither husband nor wife was a competent witness In a criminal action agnt1111t
the other, except In cal«'l'I of personal vi<>·
Jenee, the one upon the other, lo which
tile neceseltleK of Jm~tke compelled a relaxa tlon of tile rule. l\'e are aware that language shnl!ar to this has been presPnted
to the supreme courts of several states for
consideration. Some, ns in Iowa anll NebraekR, hold that u new rule ts thereby
establh1hed, and that the wife le a competent witnees against her husband In a
criminal pro11eeutlon for bigamy or adultery, on the gronnd that those are crimes
spedally against her. State v. Sloon, i'>i?
Iowa, 217. 7 N. W. R<'p. 5111: Lord v.State,
17 Neb. 526. 23 N. W. Rep. 507. WhilP others, ae In MlnneMota. and Texas, hold tlw t
by these words no depnrture from the
common-luw rule 18 Intended. StatP. v.
Armstrong, 4 Minn. 335, (rm. 251 ;) Compton v. State, 13 Tex. App. 274; Overton v.
Htate, 43 'l'ex. 61U. Thie precise question
bas ne~er been before this court, hut the
common-law rule ha11 been notlc.-e1l and
commended in ~teio v. Bowomn, 13 Pet.

209, 222, In which Mr. Justice McLEAN used

this language: "It is. bowe,·er, allmlt&d
in all the cases that tile wife le not competent, except In caaeit of violence upon her
person, directly to crimioate her husband, or to dlHclose that which she has
learned from him In their cootldential In·
tercourse. • • • '!'his rule is founded upon
the det-pest and soundest principles of our
nature,-princlplee which have grown out
of thos<'rlomestlc relatlonHthat constitute
the baele of civil Rociety, and which are
essential to the enjoyment of that conll·
clence whlcl.J should subeh1t between those
who are connected lly the nearest and
dellrt.'St relatiom1 or life. To break down
or impair the great principles which protect the sanctities of husband and wife
would bf' to cle11troy the best solace of huma.11 existence." We do not doubt the
power or the legislature to change this
ancient an<l well-supported rule; but un
Intention to make Huch a change should
not lightly Lie lm1rnted. It cannot he a!4eumcrl tl.Jat It le inlllfl~reut to sacred
things, or that It meantc to lower the holy
relatlonR of husband end wife to the material plane of simple contract. So, before
an.v der11rture from the rule afftrmt"d
through the ages of the common law-a
rule having Its solid foundation In thll beet
interests of sm"iety-c1rn be adjnllged, the
language declaring the legislative will
should be so clear as to prevent doubt as
to its Intent and limit. When a Colle Is
adopted, the understanding is that such
Code Is a declaration of f!Btabllshed law.
rather than an enactment of new and different rnles. Thie 11:1 the Idea of a Corle, except as to matters or procedure and jurisdiction which often Ignore the past, and
require afflrmetlve description.
We conclude, therefore, that the section
quoted from the Code of Civil Proc.-erlure,
If appllcuble to a crimlnnl case, should not
be adJudgell as working a depart.uro from
the old and estubllslled rule, unles1:1 its language Imperatively demands such construction. Doe1:1 it? The clause lo the Civil Code le nega tlve, and declaretJ that the
exct"ptlon of the Incompetency of wife or
husbund ae a witness ugulnet the other
does not apply to a criminal action or
proceelllng for a crime ·committed by one
B!Zainst the other. le polygamy :iuch a
crime a11:alnet the wife? 'l'hat It ht no
wrong upon her person le conceded; and
the common-law exception to the silence
upon the lips of husbuml and wife was
.mly broken, as we have noticed, In cases
of ae1111 ult of one upon the other. That It
is hmnllla tlon an<I outrage to her ie evident. If that ls the test, what limit 11:1 imIJosed? Is the wife not humiliated, le not
her res1,ect and love for her husband out·
r iged nnd betruyed, when be forgets bis
Integrity nM a man, and violates any human ordlvlneenactment? Ieshelesssensith·e, IR she less humilluted, when he commits murder. or robbery, or forgery. than
when he commits pol.vgamy or adultery?
A true wife floela keenly any wrong of her
hushnnd, and her loyalty and rt:VP.rPnceare
woundl-'d and humiliated by sur:h ~on
duct. But the queBtlon presented by this
statuto ls not how much she feels or suffers, but whether the crime le one against
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hcr. Polygamy and adultery may be

crimes which involve disloyalty to the

marital relation, but they are rather

crimes against such relation than against

the wile; and, as the statute speaks oi

crimes against her, it is simply an affirma-

tion oi the old.i'amiliar, and just common-

law rule. We conclude, tliereiore, that un-

380

der this statute the wife was an incompe-

tent witness as against her husband.

Other questions in the record need not be

considered, as they will probably not arise

on a new trial. The judgment: oi the su-

preme court oi the territory of Utuh is re-

versed. and the case remanded, with in-
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‘ structions to order n new trial.
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her. Polygamy nnd adultery may be
crimes which Involve disloyalty to the
marital l'elatloD. hut they are ruther
crlmeR against each relation than ugahu1t
the wife; and, ae the Rtatute epeak11 of
crimes niralnet hPr, it le simply an amrmatlon of the old. familiar, and jnHt 1•ommonla w rule. We conclude, the1-efore, that un380

f!er this statute the wife wae an Incompetent witness as against her husband.
Other questions In the record need not be
conRldered, as the~· will probably not arise
on a new trial. The Judgment of the supreme court of the territory of Utoh Is revcniecl, and the r.aee remanded, with In·
structluos to order a new trial.
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ROGERS v. STATEJ

('19 S. \V. 894. 60 Ark. 76.)

Supreme Court of Arkansas. Dec. 15, 1894.

Appeal from circuit court, Yell county; Jer-

emiah G. \\'allace, Judge.

A. L. Rogers was convicted of manslaugh-

ter, and appeals. Reversed.

The appellant. Rogers, was indicted by the

grand jury of Johnson county for the crime

of murder. The indictment alleged that he

killed and murdered one M. L. Kernoodle in

said county by shooting him with a. pistol.

A change of venue was taken to Yell county,

and the case was there tried. The evidence

showed that Rogers and Kernoodle became

engaged in a combat in the town of Clark's-

ville, near the barber shop in which Kernoo-

dle worked; that they had only struggled a

moment before Rogers drew a pistol from his

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:08 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104925781
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

pocket, and shot Kernoodle. Kernoodle turn-

ed, and ran into his shop, screaming, “Mur-

der!" As he entered, or was about to enter,

the door of the shop, which was only a few

steps away, Rogers ﬁred again. Kernoodle

staggered to the back part of the shop, sank

down on the ﬂoor, and expired almost instant-

ly. The ball from the ﬁrst shot entered the

front part of the body, near the left nipple;

and that from the second entered the back.

near the spine. Both balls passed entirely

through the body, and both, in the opinon of

the medical experts, were fatal wounds,

though they did not feel quite so certain that

the last wound would have destroyed life as

they did that this result would have followed

from the ﬁrst wound alone. There was a

conﬂict in the evidence as to whether Rogers

or Kernoodle was the aggressor in the com-

bat. From some of the evidence, one might

conclude that the killing was premeditated

on the part of Rogers; that he armed him-

self, and, going to the shop where Kernoodle

worked, beckoned him to come out, and then,

having willingly entered into a combat with

him, deliberately killed him. There is other

evidence which contradicted this, and tends

to show that Kernoodle was the aggressor,

and that, being a large and powerful man, he

walked up to Rogers, and, after some words,

without provocation struck Rogers a violent

blow with his ﬁst, pushed him against the

wall, and was about to throw. him down,

when Rogers ﬁred the ﬁrst shot. There was

some proof tending to show that at the time

Kernoodle struck Rogers he was armed with

a razor, although this was contradicted by

other proof. The other facts will sufficiently

appear from the opinion. The jury found the

defendant guilty of the crime of voluntary

ROGERS v. STAT:K1
(29 S. W. 894, 60 Ark. 76.)
Supreme Court of Arkall8&8. Dec. 15, 189-i.
Appenl from circuit court, Yell county; Jeremiah G. Wallace, Judge.
A. L. Rogers was convicted of mnnslnugbter, and appeals. Reversec~.
The appellant, Rogers, was Indicted by the
grand jury of Johnson county !or the crime
of murder. The Indictment alll•ged that be
kllled and murdered one M. L. l{ernoodle In
said county by shooting him with a pistol.
A change of venue was taken to Yell county,
and the case was there tried. The evidence
showed that Rogers and Kernoodle became
engaged In a combat In the town of Clarksville, near the barber shop In which Kernoodle worked; that they had only struggled a
moment before Rogers drew a pistol from his
pocket, and shot Ke1·noodle. Kernoodle turned, and ran Into bis shop, screaming, "Murder!" As be entered, or was about to ent.er,
the door of the shop, which was only a few
steps away, Rogers tired again. Kernoodle
staggered to the back part of the shop, sank
down oo the floor, and expired almost Instantly. The ball from the first shot entered thtt
front part of the body, near the left nipple;
and that from the second entered the back,
near the spine. Both balls passed entirely
through the body, and both, In the oplnon of
the medical experts, were fatal wounds,
though they did not feel quite so certain thnt
the last wound would have destroyed lite ns
they did that this result would have followed
from the first wound alone. There wns a
contllct In the evidence as to whether Rog~rs
or Kernoodle was the aggreB&or In the combat. From some of the evidence, one might
conclude that the killing was premt>dltated
on the part of Rogers; that he armed himself, and, going to the shop where Kernoodle
worked, beckoned hlni to come out, and then,
having wllllngly entered Into a combat wltb
him, deliberately kllled him. There Is other
evidence which contradicted this, and tends
to show that Kernoodle was the aggressor,
and that, being a large and powerful man, be
walked up to Rogers, and, after some words,
without provocation ·struck Rogers a vlohmt
blow with his ftst, pushed him against tile
wall, and was about to throw, him down,
when Rogers tired the first shot. There was
some proof tending to show that at the time
Kernoodle struck Rogers he was armed with
a razor, although this was contradktt>d by
other proof. The other facts wlll suttlclently
appear from the opinion. The jury found the
de(endant gullty of the crime of voluntary
manslaughter, and assessed his punishment
at five years In the penitentiary.
J. E. Cravens, Martin & :Murphy, and A. S.
McKennon, for appellant. Jnmes P. Clarke,
Atty. Gen., and Chas. T. Coleman, for the
State.

manslaughter, and assessed hi punishment

at ﬁve years in the penitentiary.

J’. E. Cravens, Martin & Murphy, and A. S.

McKennon, for appellant. James P. Clarke,

Atty. Gen., and Chas. T. Coleman, for the

State.

1 Supplemental opinion omitted.

RIDDICK, J’. (after stating the facts). We

need not consider the objections ur,<;eilagainst

1

Supplemental opinion omitted.

[C..ue No. 13:3

RIDDICK, J'. (after stating the facts). We
need not consider the objections urged against
the definitions of the words "wlllfully" and
"deliberately" contained In Instruction No. 1,
given by the court. The object of those definitions, we suppose, was to Inform the jnry
concerning the distinctions between the different degrees of homicide. As the defendant was only convicted of manslaughter, It
le plain that, whether erroneous or not, they
did him no harm. "'"e find no error In either
of the Instructions numbered 2, 9, and 11,
given by the court on Its own motion, and to
which defendant excepted. When taken In
connection with the other Instructions, we
think they state the law as favorably to appellant as he had the right to demand.
The twelfth Instruction given by the court,
and to which the defendant objected, ls as follows: (12) "If the jury believe that the defendant lnftlcted upon the body of the deceased two mortal wounds; that both wounds
were necessarily fatal, and either of which,
Independent of the other, would have produced and resulted In the death of the deceased within a short time, of which two
wounds the jury believe the deceased died;
and the jury further find that the deceased
had In good faith declined all further contest
with defendant, and that, while deceased was
fteelng from him, defendant Inflicted the second fntnl wound upon the body of the deceased by shooting him a second time; although the Jury might believe the defendant
fired the first shot In self·defell.!le,-the killing
would not be justifiable, but would amount
to manslaughter only." It ls eald by Mr.
Bishop that "whenever a blow le Inflicted under circumstances to render the party Inflicting It criminally responsible, If denth follows, he will be deemed guilty of the homicide, though the person beaten would have
died from other causes, or would not have
died from this one had not others operated
with It; provided the blow really contributed
either mediately or Immediately to the death
In a degree sufficient for the law's notice." 2
Bish. Cr. Law (New) § 637. To same eft'ect,
see Kee v. Stnte, 28 Ark. 100. If the defendant tired the first shot In neces..'lllry !lelfclefense, and then afterwards, when Kemoodle had abandoned the contt•st, and was fleeing, he again ftred upon him, Inflicting another wound, when the circumstances wrre
not such as to make a rl'llsonnble mnn In his
situation believe thnt he was then In Immediate dan~er of grent bodily Injury, he would
be gu!lty elth<"l' of some degree of homicide,
or of an unlawful assault, drpencllng upon
tho quPstlou whether or not the wound Inflicted by the last shot either caused, contributc><I to, or accPlerntecl his death. In other
words. If the Inst shot was not fired In nPCl'Ssnr:v self-defense, and the wound Inflicted by
It ~ltlwr cnused his death, or contributed to
or hastened It, the defendant would be guilty
of some degree of homicide. even though the
first shot waa fired In self-defense, and
881
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though at the time the last shot was ﬂred

the deceased was already so severely wound-

ed that his death would have followed in a

very short time. On the other hand, if the

ﬁrst shot was ﬁred in self-defense, and the

last shot neither caused his death nor con-

tributed to nor hastened it, then he could not

properly be convicted of any degree of homi-

cide, but might be convicted of an assault.

Davis v. State, 45 Ark. 46-1. The court, in

giving instruction No. 12, doubtless had these

rules of law in his mind, and the instruction.

abstractly considered, is nearly correct, if not

entirely so; but we doubt if in this case it

presented the question in such a way as to

let the jury understand that, in the event the

ﬁrst shot was ﬁred in self-defense, then it

became material for them to determine

whether the last shot contributed to or has-
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tened his death. Instruction No. 4, asked by

the defendant, substantially covered the law

on this point, but it was rather long, and also

stated that, if the second shot did not con-

tribute to the death of deceased, the jury

must acquit, whereas they might still have

found defendant guilty of an assault.

Another question raised by counsel is con-

cerning the meaning of the phrase “great

bodily injury.” One of the counsel for de-

fendant, in the course of his argument be-

fore the jury, stated that the law books did

not deﬁne such phrase; whereupon the court

interrupted him, and said that the law books

did deﬁne it, and that its meaning was “a

felony committed on the person.” To this

remark of the court defendant excepted at

the time, and now contends that it was not

a correct statement of the law, and that.

even if correct, it should have been reduced

to writing. It was held in Reg. v. McNeil1,

1 Craw. & D. 80, that to constitute a griev-

ous bodily harm, under a statute of Geo. IV.,

it was not necessary to show that the wound

be on a vital part, or that the injury be of

a permanent nature, or that life be endan-

gered thereby; but that proof that the pris-

oner committed an assault with a deadly

weapon, whereby a severe wound was in-

ﬁicted, was snﬂicient to sustain an indict-

ment for an assault to inﬂict grievous bodily

harm. In the case of Lawlor v. People, 7-1

Ill. 230, the court said that the phrase “seri-

ous bodily injury” me-ant substantially the

same as “great bodily injury,” and that the

meaning of both was “a high degree of in-

jury, as opposed to a. slight injury." The

phrase “great bodily injury” is diiiicult to

deline, for the reason that it will deﬁne it-

self. It means a “great bodily injury," as

distinguished from one that is slight or mod-

erate, such as would ordinarily be inﬂicted

by an assault and battery with the hand or

ﬁst withouta weapon. To put one in danger of

great bodily injury from an assault, something

more than an attack with the hand or ﬁst would

usually be required, and it would rarely hap-

pen that one might lawfully take the life of

only. But cases might be supposed when it
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though at the time the last shot was ftred
the deceased was already so severely wounded that his death would have followed In a
ve1·y short time. On the other hand, if the
first shot was fired In self-defense, and the
last shot nelthe1· caused his death nor contributed to nor hastened It, then he could not
properly be convicted of any degree of homicide, but might be convicted of an assault.
Davis v. State, 45 Ark. 464. The court, 111
giving Instruction No. 12, doubtless had these
rules or law in his mind, and the Instruction,
abstractly considered, le nea1·ly correct, lt not
entirely so; but we doubt if In this case It
presented the question In such a way as to
let the jury understand that, in the event the
first shot was fired In self-defense, then It
became material for them to determine
whether the last shot contributed to or hastened his death. Instruction No. 4, asked by
the defendant, eubstnntlally covered the law
on this point, but It was rather long, and also
stated that, 1t the second shot did not contribute to tile death of deceased, the jury
must acquit, whereas they might still have
found defendant guilty of an assault.
Another quet1tion raised by counsel ls concerning the meaning of the phrase "great
bodily Injury." One of the counsel for defendant, in the course of his argument before the jury, stated that the law books did
not define such phrase; whereupon the court
Interrupted him, and said that the law books
did define It, and that its meaning was "a
felony committed on the person." To this
remark of the court defendant excepted at
the time, and now contends that It was not
a correct statement of the law, and that.
even If correct, it should have been reduced
to writing. It was held in Reg. v. l\lcNeill,
1 Crnw. & D. 80, that to constitute a grievous bodily harm, under a statute of Geo. IV.,
It was not necessary to show that the wound
be on a vital part, or that the injury be of
a permanent nature, or that life be endangered thereby; but that proof that the prisoner committed an assault with a deadly
weapon, whereby a severe wound was inflicted, was sufficient to sustain an indictment for an as1mult to inflict grievous bodily
harm. In the case of Lawlor v. People, 74
Ill. 230, the court said that the phrase "serious bodily injury" meant substantially the
same as "great bodily Injury," and that the
meaning of lmth was "a high degree of injury, as op)loscd to a slight Injury." The
phrase "grent bodily Injury" ls difficult to
detlne, for the reason that it will define itself. It menns a "great bodily Injury," as
distinguished from one that is slight or moderate, such as would 01·dinarily be Inflicted
by an assault and battery with the hand or
fist without a weapon. To put one In danger of
great bodily Injury from an assault, something
morethnnnnntta<>k with the hnndorfist would
usually be required, and It would rarely haJJpen that one mig-ht lawfully take the life o!
another to avoid an a.si;ault with the fist
382

1

only. But cases might be supposed when It
would be justifiable to do so; for an assault
and battery by a powerful man with his
fist upon a weak one might be carried to
such extreme severity as to produce great
bodily injury, and not be unaccompanied by
such circumstances as to mnke It a felony.
One who Intentionally commits a great bodily injury upon the person or another may or
may not be guilty of a felony, depending upon the circumstances; but, as such an Injury may under some circumstances be committed aud still the otrender not be guilty
of a felony, It Is therefore not accurate to
define "great bodily Injury" as "a felony
committed on the person." What constitutes a grrot bodily injury, and whether the
circumstances in any case are such as to
justify one In believing that such an Injury
is about to be committed upon him and In
defending himself against it, are matters
which must be left to a great extent to the
judgment of the jury.
It is also contended that the court, before
making this remark concerning the meaning ot the phrase, "great bodily harm or Injury," should have redueed It to writing;
but we do not think this contention is well
taken. It is the duty of the court to restrain the remarks o! counsel within proper bounds. If, In the opinion of the court,
counsel should announce propositions of law
to the jury which are incorrect and misleading, the court should admonish counsel so
that he may desist. It ls not necessary to
stop to reduce the admonition to writing before making It, but If It contains a statement
ot law the court should, at request of counsel, reduce the same to writing, and, If necessary, repeat it In its written form to the
Jury. No request was made to reduce this
remark to writing. The general request to
put all Instructions In writing cannot be
held to cover this remark, for It was not In·
tended as a part of the instructions, but only
as a correction of what was conceived to be
a misstatement of the law In the part ot
counsel.
During the progress of the trla.l the presiding judge was called as a witness, and,
over the objections of the defendant, testified on behalf of the state. His testimony
was, in substance, that at a former term of
the court, before the change of venue was
taken, the defendant had tiled a motion for
continuance on account of the absence of
one Bert Cunnln~ham, whom he alleged was
a material witness in his behalf. Afterwards Bert Cunningham appeared, and, defendant having made an application for ball,
the judge, In open court, notified the attorneys of defendant that they might take the
testimony of said Cunningham to be used on
the application for bail; to which notification the attorneys of defendant made no re·
sponse, and took no steps to procure the
testimony of said Cunningham. It was not
shown that the defendant was present at
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the time this notiﬁcation was given to ms

attorneys, or that he in any way approved

of the conduct of his attorneys in this rc-

gard; on the contrary, defendant testiﬂed

that he had been in prison, and did not

know such notiﬁcation was given. This evi-

dence tended to make the impression that

defendant had endeavored to procure a con-

tinuance on account of the absence of a wit-

ness whose testimony he did not want, when

the failure to take this deposition may have

been due to the neglect of his attorneys, and

through no fault of the defendant. \Ve think

it clear that the testimony was incompetent.

The trial judge seems to have arrived at the

same conclusion, and afterwards, acting as

a. court, excluded the testimony which he

had given as a witness. But the question

still remains whether a judge, while pre-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:09 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104925781
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

siding at a trial of a criminal case, may,

against the objection of the defendant. testi-

fy as a witness on the part of the prosecu-

tion. The only reference to this question

we ﬁnd in our statute is section 2965, Sand.

& H. Dig. That section is as follows: “The

judge or juror may be called as a witness

by either party; but, in such cases, it is in

the discretion of the court to suspend the

trial and ordcr it to take place before an-

other judge or jury; and when a party

knows at the time the jury are iinpaneled,

that a. juror is to be called by him as a. wit-

ness, he shall then declare it, and the juror

shall be excluded from the jury." This sec-

tion was taken from the Code of Practice in

Civil Actions, and is the same as section 660

of that Code. There is a. provision in the

Code of Criminal Practice that the provi--

sions of the Civil Code shall apply to and

govern the summoning and coercing the at-

tendance ot witnesses, and compelling them

to testify in all criminal prosecutions; but

that provision, we think, refers to the chap-

ter of the Civil Code regulating the issuance

of subpoenas for witnesses and attachments

for contempt. It does not refer to the com-

petency of witnesses. While there are other

portions of the Civil Code applicable to

criminal proceedings, we do not ﬁnd any-

where tlmt this section is to apply to such

proceedings; on the contrary, the language

of the section itself furnishes convincing

proof that it was only intended to apply to

civil cases. It states that, when the judge

or juror is called as a witness, it is in the

discretion of the court to suspend the trial,

and order it to take place before another

judge or jury. It is plain that on a trial of

a defendant for a felony, after the jury are

impaneled and sworn, the court would have

no power, without the consent of the de-

fendant, to suspend the trial, and order it to

take place before another jury. So we con-

clude that this section was not intended to

apply to criminal proceedings, and that we

have no statute permitting a judge to testi-

fy as a witness in 8 criminal trial over

which he is presiding. It has been held in

the time this notlflcatlon was grveo tu 11111
attorneys, or that he In any way approved
of the conduct of his attol"lleys In this regard; ou the contrary, defendant testified
that he had been ln prison, and did not
know such notification was given. This evidence tended to make the lmpre88lon that
defendant had endeavored to procure a continuance on account of the absence of a witness whose testimony he did not want, when
the failure to take this deposition may have
been due to the neglect of his attorneys, and
through no fault of the defendant. We think
It clear that the testimony was Incompetent.
The trial judge seems to have arrived at the
same conclusion, and afterwards, acting as
a court, excluded the testimony which he
had given as a witness. But the question
stlll remains whether a judge, while presiding at a trial of a criminal case, may,
against the obje:!tlon of the defendant. testify as a witness on the part of the p1·osecutlon. The only reference to this question
we ftnd In our statute ls section 2965, Sand.
& H. Dig. That section ls as follows: "The
judge or juror may be called as a witness
by either party; but, In such cases, It Is In
the discretion of the court to suspend the
trial and order It to take place before another judge or jury; and when a party
knows at the time the jury are Impaneled,
that a juror ls to be called by him as a wt~
ness, he shall then declare It, and the juror
shall be excluded from the jury." This section was taken from the Code of Practice ln
Civil Actions, and Is the Mme as section 660
of that Code. There Is a provision In the
Code of Criminal Practice that the prov!- ·
&Ions of the Civil Code shall apply to and
govern the summoning and coercing the attendance of wltnessee, and compelling them
to testify In all criminal prosecutions; but
that provision, we think, refers to the chapter of the Clvll Code regulating the Issuance
of subpoenas for witnesses and attachments
for contempt. It does not refer to the competency of wltne88es. While there are other
portions of the Civil Code applicable to
criminal proceedings, we do not find anywhere that this tiection Is to apply to such
proceedings; on the contrary, the language
of the section Itself furnishes convincing
proof that It was only Intended to apply to
civil cases. It states that, when the judge
or juror ls called as a witness, It is In the
discretion of the court to suspend tbe trial,
and order It to take place before another
judge or jury. It ls plain that on a trial o.f
a defendant for a felony, after the jury are
impaneled and sworn, the court would have
no power, without the consent of the defendant, to suspend the trial, and order It to
take place before another jury. So we conclude that this section was not Intended to
apply to criminal proceedings, and that we
have no statute permitting a ju1lge to testify as a witness In a crlminnl trial over
which he ls p1·esldlng. lt ha::J !men held In

(Case No. 138

England that a judge may give evidence, but
that If he doee so he must descend from the
bench, and cannot return thither during the
trial. Sichel, Wit. 14. This rule was 11ppllcable to trials where the court was composed of several judges. In such a court, a
judge might descend from the bench, testify,
and take no further part In the trial of the
case without Interfering with the progress
of the trial. Speaking of tMs question, Mr.
Rapelje says: "If the judge sits alone, he
cannot be sworn at all; and, If he be one
of several judges, he ought not to oe, unless
he leaves the bench during the trial. In
such a case, the maxim t~at •no one shall
be both judge and wltne88 in the same cause'
prevails." !tap. Wit. I 45.
TWs question came before the supreme
court of New York In a case where one of
the two judges presiding had testified, and
Folger, J., who delivered the opinion of the
court, said that It was erroneous, "because
such practice, If sanctioned, may lead to unseemly and embarrassing results, to the hindering of justice, and to the scandal of the
courts." In the same opinion, referring to
the same matter, he says: "Other considerations may be added: It a judge ls put ui:1on the stand as a wltne88, he has all the
rights· of a witness, and he ls subject to all
the duties and llabllltles of a witness. It
may chance that he may for reasons sumclent to himself, but not sufficient for another of equal authority In the court, decline
to answer a question put to him or In some
other way bring himself In conflict with the
court. Who shall decide what course shall
be taken with him? Shall he return to the
bench. and take part In disposing of the
Interlocutory question thus arising, and, upon the decision being made, go back to the
stand or go Into custody for contempt? The
first would be unseemly, If not unlawful, for
It would be passing judicially upon his owtt
case. The last would disorganize the court
and suspend Its proceedings. Other like
results may be conceived as possible, equally as contrary to the good conduct of judicial proceedings." People v. Dohring, 59 N.
Y. 374. This reasoning applies with even
greater force where the court Is composed
of only one judge, for, If the judge of
surh a court takes the stand to testify
against the defendant, there ls no one to
control Ws testimony or keep him within
proper bounds. Even If he can control his
own testimony, and dlsrharge, at the snme
time, what have been called "the lncompatlble duties of witness and judge," yet, however careful and conscientious be may be,
the chances are great that by thus testifying he will to some extent drtract from the
dignity that should surround the functions of
his high office. Instead of the impartial
judge administering the law with a fl.rm
and even hand, he takes on for the time the
appearance. ot a partlswi, endeavoring to
38:!
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uphold by his testimony one side against the

other. More than likely he provokes un-

seemly conﬂicts between himself and coun-

sel, and arouses the distrust of the party

against whom he testifies. In addition to

this, the higher his character and standing

as a judge the more danger that he thus

gives the party in whose favor he testiﬁcs

an undue advantage over the opposing side.

For these reasons, in the interest of the

dignity and decorum of the circuit court and

the orderly procedure therein, we feel com-

pelled to hold that a judge presiding at a

criminal trial cannot. against the o1;jor-tion

of the defendant, be sworn and testify as a

witness on the part of the prosecution. Bish.

38-1

Cr. Proc. § 1145; Underh. Ev. § 313. We

do not mean to intimate that in this case
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there was any partiality shown by the learn-

ed judge of the circuit court. The record

shows to the contrary. The section of the

Digest above referred to is calculated to mis-

lead, if not read carefully. and the mistake

arose from being compelled to construe it

in the hurry of a nisi prius trial. There

were objections made to other rulings of the

court, but, when taken in connection with

the facts of this case, we do not discover any

error except as above indicated. For those

errors the judgment is reversed, and the

cause remanded for a new trial.
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uphOld by his testimony one side against the
other. More than likely he provokes unseemly conflicts between himself and counsel, and arouses the distrust of the party
against whom he testifies. In addition to
this, the higher his character and standing
as a judge the more danger that be thu."'
gives the party In whose favor he testifiet1
an undue advantage over the opposing side.
For these reasons, In the Interest of the
dignity and decorum of the circuit court and
the orderly procedure therein, we feel compelled to hold that a judge presiding at a
criminal trial cannot, against the olJjeC'tlon
ot the defendant. be sworn and testify as u
witness on the part of the prosecution. Bish.
~

Cr. Proc. I 1145; Underh. Ev. I 313. We
do not mean to Intimate that In this case
there was any partiality sbo\VD by the learned judge of the circuit court. The record
shows to the contrary. The section of the
Digest above referre<t to ls calculated to mislead, If not read carefully, and the mlstak&
arose from being compelled to construe it
In the hurry of a nlsl prlus trial. There
were objections made to other rulings of the
court, but, when taken In connection with
the facts of this case, we do not dlsco¥er any
error except as above hullcnted. For th~
errors the judgment Is reversed, and the
cause remanded for a new trlnl.
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MATTOX v. UNITED STATES.
[Case No. 134

MATTOX v. UNITED STATES.

(13 Sup. Ct. 50, 146 U. S. 140.)

(13 Sup. Ct. 50, 146 U. S. 140.)

Supreme Court of the United States. Nov. 14,

Supreme Court of the United State&.
1892.

Nov. 14,

1892.

In error to the district court of the United

States for the district of Kansas. Reversed.

This was an indictment charging Clyde

Mattox with the murder of one John Mullen,

about December 12. 1889, in that part of the

Indian Territory made part of the United

States judicial district of Kansas by section 2

of the act of congress of January 6, 1883, (22

St. p. 400, c. 13,) entitled “An act to pro-

vide for holding a term of the district court

of the United States at Wichita, Kansas, and

for other purposes.”

Defendant pleaded notguilty, was put upon

his trial, October 5, 1891, and on the 8th

of that month was found guilty as charged,
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the jury having retired on the 7th to con-

sider of their verdict. Motions for a new

trial and in arrest of judgment were sever-

ally made and overruled, and Mattox sen-

tenced to death. This writ of error was

thereupon sued out.

The evidence tended to show that Mullen

was shot in the evening between 8 and 9

o'clock, and that he died about 1 or 2 o'clock

in the afternoon of the next day; that three

shots were ﬁred and three wounds inﬂicted;

that neither of the wounds was necessarily ~

fatal, but that the deceased died of pneumonia

produced byone of them described as “in the

upper lobe of the right lung, entering about

two or three inches above the right nipple,

passing through the upper lobe of the right

lung, fracturing one end of the fourth rib,

passing through and lodging beneath the

skin on the right side beneath the shoulder

blade.” The attending physician, who was

called alittle after 9 o’clock and remained

with the wounded man until about 9 o'clock

in the morning, and visited him again be-

tween 8 and 9 o‘clock, testified that Mrs.

Hatch, the mother of Clyde Mattox, was pres-

ent at that visit; that he regarded Mullen’s

recovery as hopeless; that Mullen, being “ per-

fectly conscious” and “in a normal condi-

tion as regards his mind." asked his opinion,

and the doctor said to him: “The chances

are all against you; I do not think there is

any show for you at all.” The physician

further testified. without objection, that, af-

ter he had informed Mullen as to his physical

condition, he asked him as to who shot him,

and he replied “he didn’t have any knowl-

edge of who shot him. I interrogated him

about three times in regard to that,—who did

the shooting,—and he didn't know." Coun-

sel for defendant, after a colloquy with the

court, propounded the following question:

“Did or did not John Mullen, in your pres-

ence and at that time, say, in reply to a ques-

tion of Mrs. Hatch, ' 1 know your son, Clyde

Mattox, and he did not shoot me; I saw the

parties who shot me, and Clyde was not one

of them?’ ” This question was objected to

wr1.ous,sv.—25

In error to the district court of the United
Statf's tor the district of KanRas. Revf'rsed.
This wu an indictment charging Clyde
Mattox with the murderofoneJohn Mullen.
about DPCemher 12. 1889, In thRt put of the
Indian Territory made part of the United
States judicial district of KRnsas by section 2
of the Rct of congress of January ti, 1883, (22
St. p. 400, c. 13,) entitled ".An act to pr~
vlde for holding a term of the district court
of the United States at Wichita, Kansas, and
for other purposes."
Defendant pleaded not guilty, was put upon
his trial, October 5, 18~1. Rnd on the 8th
of tllat month was fouml guilty as charged,
the jury having retired on the 7th to consider of their \'erdict. Motions for a new
trial and in arrest of judgment were sever·
ally made and overrult'd, and .Mattox sentf'nced to death. This writ of error was
thereupon sued out.
The evidence tended to show that Mullen
was shot in the evening bet.ween 8 and 9
o'clock, and that be died about 1 or 2 o'clock
in the afternoon of the next day; thRt three
shots were fired and tlU"ee wounds inHicted;
that neither of the wounds was necessaril7
fatal, but that thedect'ased died or pneumonia
produced by one of them described as "in the
upper lobe of the right lung, entering about
two or three inches above the right nipple,
passing through the upper lobe of the right
Jung, fracturing one end or the fourth rib,
passing through and lodging beneath the
skin on the right sicle beneath the shoulder
blade." The attending physidan, who was
calll'd a lltUe after 9 o'cl->ek and remained
with the wound!'d man until about 9 o'clock
in the morning, and visited him again between 8 and 9 o'clock, testified that Mrs.
Halcb, the mother of Clyde Mattox, was present at that visit; that be rPgartled 'Mullen's
recovery as hopeless; that Mullen, being" perfectly conscious" and "in a normal condition as regards bis mind," asked his opinion,
und the doctor said to him: "'fhe chances
are all against you; I do not think there is
any show for you at all." The physician
further test!Hed, without objection, that, after he had informed Mullen as to his physical
conuition, he asked him as to who shot him,
nod be replied "he didn't have any knowledge of who shot him. I interrogated him
about three times in regard tu Lhat,-whodid
the shouting,-and he didn't know." Counsel for defendant, after a colloquy with the
court, propounded the following question:
"Did or did not John Mullen, in your presence 11nd at that time, say, in reply to a question of Mrs. Hutch, •I know your son, Ciyde
"Mattox, and he did not shoot mp,; I saw the
parti~ who 11hot me, and Clyde was not one
of them?' " This ques~ion was objected to
WILOUS,EV.-25
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as Incompetent, the objection sustained, and
defendant excepted. Counsel also propounded
to Mrs. Hatch this quf'stion: "Did or did not
John Mullen say to you, on the morning you
visited him, and after Dr. Graham bad told
him that all the chances for life were against
him, •I know Clyde Mattox, your son, and he
was not one or the parl.lea who shot me?'"
This was objected to on the ground of incom·
petency, the objection sustained, and defend·
ant excepted.
In support of his motion tor new trial, the
defendant offered the aftldavits of two of the
jmors that the bailiff who l1ad ch!\rge of the
jury in the c1u1e after the cause had been heard
and submitted, "11nd while they were deliberating of their verdict," "in the preaf'nce and
bearing of the jurors or a part of them, speaking of the case, 11aid: •After you fellows get
through with this case it will be tried again
down there. Thompson has poison in a bottle
that them fellows tried to 11ive him.' And at
another time, in the prt>sence and bearing of
said j nry or a p11rt of them, referring to the defendant, Clyde Mattox, said: •This is the third
fellow he has killed.' " The afttdavit of anotb·
er juror to the same effect, in respect of the
remark of the balHff as to Thompson, was also
offered, ancl, in addition, the affidavits of
eight of the jurors, Including the three just
mentioned, "that after said cause bad been
submitted to the jury, and while the jury
were deliberating of their verdict, and before
they had 11greed upon a verdict In the case, a
Ct'rtain newspRper printed and published In
the city of Wichita, Kan., known as •The
Wichita Daily Eagle.' of the date of Thursday morning, October 8, 1891, was lntrodtwed
into the jury room; that said paper contained
a comment upon the case under con1.<ideration
by said jury, and that said comment upon said
case so under consideration by said jury was
read to the jury in their presence and heat"·
Ing; thnt the comment so read to said jury 111
found upon the fifth page of said paper, and
In the third column of said page, and is as
follows:
"• Th1i Mattox Case-The Jury Retired at
Noon Yesterday and ls Still Out. The destiny of Clyde Mattox is now in the hands of
the twelve citizens of Kansas composing the
jury in this case. If he is not found guilty
of murder he will be a lucky man, fur the
evidence against him was very strong, or, at
least, appeared to be to an ou_tsider. The
case was given to the jury at nuon yesterday,
and it was expected that their drlilleratiuns
would not last an hour lJefore they would
return a verdict. The hour passed, and nine
more of them with it, and still a verdict was
nut reached by 10:30 lust night, when the
jury adjourned 1md went to their rooms at
the l:an~y. Col. Johnson, of Oklahoma
city, defended him. and ma le an excdlent
speech in his behalf tu the jury. ?.fr. Ady
also made a fina speech, and one that was
full of argument and replete with the detail11 of the crime committed, as gathered
from the statements of witnesses. Thi>
885
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lawyers who were present and the court

otﬁcers also 3.;_'l‘(-:8 that it was one of the best

and most logical speeches Mr. Ady ever

made in this court. it was so strong that

the friends of Mattox gave up all hope of

any result but conviction. Judge Riner’s

instructions to the jury were very clear and

inipaitial, and required nearly half an hour

for him to read them. When thejury ﬁled out,

Mattox seemed to be the most unconcerned

man in the room. His mother was very

pale, and her face indicated that she had but

very little hope. She is certainly deserving

of a good deal of credit. for she has stuck by

her son. as only a mother can, through all

his trials and ditliculties, and this is not the

ﬁrst one by any means. for Clyde has been

tried for his life once before. He is a youtli-

ful looking man of light build, a beardless
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face, and a nervous disposition. The crime

for which he has just been tried is the kill-

ing of a colored man in Oklahoma city over

two years ago. Nobody saw him do the kill-

ing, and the evidence against him is purely

circumstaiitial, but very strong, it ls claimed

by those who heard all the testimony.”'

The bill of exceptions states that these affi-

davits and a copy of the newspaper referred

to “ were offered in open court by the defend-

ant in support of his motion for a new trial,

and by the said district court excluded; to

which ruling the defendant, by his counsel,

then and there excepts and still excepts.”
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lawyers who were present and the court
offict'rs also agree that it Wl\8 one of the best
and most logical speeclws Mr. Ady ever
made in this court. It was so strong that
the friends of Mattox: gave up all hope of
any result but conviction. Judge Riner's
Instructions to the jury were very clear and
impartial, and rt>qnired nearly half an hour
for him to read them. When the jury filed out,
Mattox seemed to be the most unconcerned
man in the room. His ·mother was very
pale, Rnd her fRce indicated that she had but
very little hope. She is certainly deserving
of a good deal of credit, for she has stuck by
her son, as only a mother can, through all
his trials and difficulties, and this is nuL the
first one by any means, for Clyde has been
trietl for bla life once before. He is a youth·
Cul looking man of light build, a beardless
face, and a nervous disposition. The crime
for which he has just been tried is the killing of a colored man in Oklahoma city ove1·
two years 11go. Nobody saw him do the kill·.
ing, and the evidtmce against him is purely
circumstantial, but very stl'ong, It ls claimed
by those who heard all the testimony."'
The bill of exceptions states that thes!! aftldu v its and a copy of the newspaper referred
to "were oft'ereil in open court by the defendant in supp01·t of his motion for a new trial,
and by the said district court excluded; to
which ruling the defendant, by his counsel,
tht>n and there exct>pts and still excepts."
And the defendant. excepted to the overmllng of his motions for new trial and in arrest
of judgment.
J. W. Johnson, for plalntitf in error. Asst.
Atty. Gen. Mau1·y, for the United States.

And the defendant excepted to the overrul-

ing of his motions for new trial and in arrest

of judgment.

J. W. Johnson, for plaintiff in error. Asst.

Atty. Gen. Maury, for the United States.

Mr. Chief Justice FULLER, after stating

the facts in the foregoing language, deliv-

ered the opinion of the court.

The allowance or refusal of a new trial

rests in the sound discretion of the court to

whit-h the application is addressed, and the

result cannot be made the subject of review

by writ oi‘ error, (Henderson v. Moore, 5

Cranch, 11; Newcomb v. Wood, 97 U. S.

581:) but in the case at bar the district court

excluded the aﬁidavits, and, in passing upon

the motion, did not exercise any discretion

in respect of the matters stated therein.

Due exception was taken. and the question

of admissibility thereby preserved.

It will be perceived that the jurors did not

state what inﬂuence. if any, the communica-

tion of the bailiff and the reading of the

newspaper had upon them, but conﬁned

their statements to what was said by the one

and read from the other.

In U. S. v. Reid, 12 How. 361, 366. alli-

davits of two jurors were otfered in evidence

to establish the reading of a newspaper re-

port of the evidence which had been given

in the case under trial, but both deposed that

it had no inﬂuence on llieir verdict. Mr.

Chief Justice Taney, delivering the opin-

ion of the court, said: “The ﬁrst branch of

the second point presents the question wheth-

.Mr. Chit>f Justice FULLER, after stating
the facts in the foregoing language, delivered lhe opinion of the court.
'.fhe 111lowllnce or refuBltl of a new trial
rests in the sound discretion of the court to
whkb the application is addressed, and the
r&sult cannot be made the subject of revit:w
by writ of error, (Henderson v. Moore, 5
Cranch, 11; Newcomb v. Wood, 97 U. S.
581 :) bnt in the case 11t bar the district con rt
excluded the affidavits, and, in passing upon
the motion, dill not exercise any discrelion
in rt>spect of the matters stated therE-in.
Due exce11tion was taken, and the question
of Kdmissihility thereby preserved.
It will be perceived that the jurors did not
state what intluence, if any, the communication or the batlift' and the reatling of the
newspapet· had upon them, but. conllnt>d
tht'ir statl'ments to what was said by the one
and read from the other.
In U.S. v. Reid, 12 How. 861, 366, am.davits of two jurors were offered in evitlence
to establish the reading of a newspaper report of the eviuen~ which had been given
in the case under trial, but both deposed that
it bad no intluence on their vet"dict. Mr.
Chief Justice Taney, delivering the opinion of tile cou1·t, said: "The first branch of
886

the second point presents the question whether the affidavits of jurors impeaching their
verdict ought to be reetilved. It would perhaps hardly be SRfe to lay down any general
rule 11 pon this subject. Unquestionably such
evidence ought always to be received with
great caution, but cases might arise in which
it would be impossible to refuse them without violating the plainest principles of justice. It Is, however, unnecessary to lay down
any rule in this case, or examine the decisions referred to in the argument; because
we are of opinion I.hat the facts proved by
the jurors, If proved by unqnestioned testimony, would be no ground for a new trial.
There was nothing in the newspapers calculated to inliuence their decision, and bolb
of them swear that these papers had not the
slightest !nliuence on their verdict." The
opinion thus indicates that public policy,
which forbids the reception of the aftidavils,
depositions, or sworn statements of jurors to
impeach their verdicts, may, in the interest.
of justice, create an exceplion to its own rule,
while at the same lime the necessity of great
caution in the use of such evidence ls enforced.
There is, however, a recognized distinction
between what may and what may not be established by the testimony of jurors to set
aside a verdict.
This distinction is thus put by Mr. Justice
Brewer, spe1tking for the supreme court
of Kansas in Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. sm1,
545: "Public policy forbids that a matter
resting in the personal consciousness of one
juror should be received to overthrow the
verdict, because, being personal, it is not accessible to other testimony. It gives to the
secret thought or one the power to disturb
the expressed conclusions of twelve. Its
tendency is to produce bad faith on the part
of a minority; to induce an apparent acquiescence with the purpose of suhsequt>nt dissent; to induce tampering with individual
jurors subs"quent to the verdict. But ll8 to
overt acts, they are accessible to the knowl!'dge of all the Jurors. It one amrms misconduct, the remaining eleven can deny.
One cannot disturb the action of the twelve;
It is useless to tamper with one, for the
eleven may be heard. Under this view of
the law, the affidavits were properly recei\'e<I.
They tended to pro\·e something which did
not essentially Inhere in the ,·erdict,-an
overt act, open to the knowledge of all the
jury, and not alone within I.be pel'sonal consciousness of one."
The subjt>ct was much considered by Mr.
Justice Gray, then a member of the suprt>me
judicial court of Massachusetts, in Woodward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453, where numerous authorities were referred to and applied, and the conclusions announced "that,
on a motion for a new trial on the ground
of bias on the part of one of the jurors, the
evidence of jurors, as to the motives anll inftuences which atl'ected their deliberations,
is inadmissible either to impeach or to sup-
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port the verdict. But a juryman may tes-

tify to any facts bearing upon the question

of the existence of any extraneous intiuence,

although not as to how far that inﬂuence op-

erated upon his mind. S0 a juryman may

testify in denial or explanation of acts or

declarations outside of the jury room. where

evidence of such acts has_ been given as

ground for a new trial.” See, also, Ritchie

v. Iloibrooke, 7 Serg. & R. 458; Chews v.

Driver, 1 N. J. Law, 166; Nelms v. State,

13 Smedes &. M. 500; Hawkins v. New Or-

leans, etc.. Co.. 29 La. Ann. 134, 140; Whitney

v. Whitman, 5 Mass. 405; Hix v. Drury, 5

Pick. 296.

We regard the rule thus laid down as

conformable to right reason and sustained

by the weight of authority. These aﬂida-

vits were within the rule. and. being mate-
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rial, their exclusion constitutes reversible er-

ror. A brief examination will demonstrate

their materiality.

It is vital in capital cases that the jury

should pass upon the case free from ex-

ternal causes tending to disturb the exer-

cise of deliberate and unbiased judgment.

Nor can any ground of suspicion that the

administration of justice has been interfered

with be tolerated. Hence, the separation

of the jury in such a way as to expose them

to tampering may be reason for a new trial,

variously held as absolute; or prima facie,

and subject to rebuttal by the prosecution;

or contingent on proof indicating that a

tampering really took place. Whart. Crim.

Pl. 821, S23, 824, and cases cited.

Private communications, possibly prejudi-

cial, between jurors and third persons. or

witnesses. or the otﬁcer in charge, are abso-

lutely forbidden, and invalidate the verdict,

at least unless their harmlessness is made to

appear.

Indeed, it was held in People v. Knapp,

42 Mich. 267. 3 N. W. Rep. 927. that the

presence of an otlicer during the delibera-

tions of the jury is such an irregular inva-

sion of the right of trial by jury as to ab-

solutely vitiate the verdict in all cases, with-

out regard to whether any improper inﬂu-

ences were actually exerted over the jury or

not. And in State v. Snyder. 20 Kan. 306,

where the bailiff who had charge of the jury

had been introduced and examined as a wit-

ness on behalf of the state, and had testi-

ﬁed to material facts against the accused, his

presence in the jury room during the delib-

erations of thejury was held fatal to the ver-

dict.

In Gainey v. People, 97 Ill. 270, the su-

preme court ot Illinois was of opinion that

the presence of a bailiff, in charge of a jury

in acapital case, in the jury room during a

part of their deliberations, was a grave ir-

regularity and a breach of duty on the part

of the officer. which would or would not vi-

tiate the verdict, depending upon the circum-

stances in each particular case; and the ap-

plication of the rule in State v. Snyder was

[Case No. 134

port the verdict. But a juryman may tes- pie v. Knapp W1\8 not fnlly sanctioned. The
tify to any facts bearing upon lhe question text-books refer to many cases In which the
ot the existence of any edraneous inlluence, action of the qlHcer having a jury in charge,
altbough not as to how far that intluence op- whPn prejudice might have resulted; or unerated upon his mind. So a juryman may authorized communiCdtions having a tentestify in denial or explanation of acts or dency to adverse intluence; or the reading of
declarations outside of the jury room, where nPwspapers containing imperfect reports of
evidence of such actB has. been given as the trial, or objectionable matter in the form
ground for a new trial." See, also, Uitchie ot editorial comments or othtirwise, - have
v. Holbrooke, 7 Serg. & R. 458; Chews v. been heltl fatal to verdicts.
Driver, 1 N. J. Law, lti6; Nelms v. State,
The jury in the case before us retired to
13 Smedes&. M. 500; Hawkins v. New Or- consider of thPir verdict on the 7th of Octoleans, etc., Co., 29 La. Ann. 134, 140; Whitney ber, and hRd not agreed on the morning of
v. Whitman, 5 Mass. 405; Hix v. Drury, 5 the 8th, when the newspaprr article was read
to them. It is not open to rell!IOnRble doubt
Pick. 296.
We regard the rule thus laid down as that the tendency of that article WHS inj11riconformable to right reason and sustained ou11 to the defendant. Statements that the
by the w1>ight of authority. These 11ftida- defendant had been tried for bis life once
vits were within the rule, and, being mate- before; that the evidence 11gainst him was
rial, tht-ir exclusion constitutes reversible er- claimed to be very strong by those who had
ror. A brief t-xamlnation will demonstrate beurd all the testimony; that the argument
their materiality.
·
for the pros1>cut:on was such that the defendIt is vital in capital eases that the jury ant's friends gave up all hope of any result;
should pass upon the case free from ex- but conviction; and that it was expected that
ternal causes tending to disturb the exer- the deliuerations of the jury would not last
cise of delillerate and unbiased judgment. an hour before they woultl return a verdict,
Nor can any ground of suspicion that the -could have no other tendency. Nor cRn it
administration of justice has been interft>red be legllimntely contendetl that the misconwith be tolerated. Hence, the separation duct of the bailiff could have bt'en otherwise
of the jury in such a way as to expose them than prejudicial. Information that this was
to tampering may be reason for a new trial, the third person Clyde Mattox had killed,
va1iously held as absolute; or prima facle, coming from the officer In charge, precludes
and subject to rebuttal by the prost•cution; any other conclnsion. We should thert-fore
or contingent on proof indicating that a be compelll'd to reverse the judgment because
tampering rt>nlly took place. Whart. Crim. the amtlavits were not received and considPl. §§ 821, 8::!8, 824, and cases cited.
ered by the court, but another ground exists
l'nvate communications, possibly prejudi- upon which we must not only do this, but dicial, between jurors and third persons, or rect 11. new trial to be granted.
witnesses, or the officer in charge, are allsoDying declarations are admissible on a
lutely forbidtlen, and Invalidate the ,·erdict, trial for murder, as to the fact of the homiat least unless their harmlessness is made to cide and the person by whom it was com. mitted, in ta,·or of the defendant as well as
appeitr.
Indeed, It was held In People v. Knapp, against him. 1 Eust, P. C. 353; Hex v.
42 Mich. 267, 8 N. W. Rep. 927, that the 8caife, 1 .Moody & H.. 551; U. S. v. Taylor,
presence of an officer during I.he tleliliera- 4 Cranch, C. C. 338; Moore v. State, 12 Ala.
tions of the jury is such an irregular inv8- 764; Com. v. Matthews, 89 Ky. 287, 12 S.
1ion of the right of trial by jury as to ab- W. H.ep. 333. But it must be shown by the
solutely vitiate tile verdict In all case8, with- party offering them in evldt-nce that they
out regard to whether any improper influ- were ml\tle under a sense of impending
ences were actnally exerted over the jury or death. This may be made to uppenr from
not. Anil in State v. Snyder. 20 Kan. 306, what the injured person said; or from the
where the bailiff who hnd charge of the jury nature and extent of the wounds inllicted
baJ been introduced and exitmined as a wit- being obviously such that he must have felt
ness on behalf of the state, and had testi- or known that be could not survive; as well
fied to material facts a~alnst the accused, his as from his conduct at the time and the
presence In the jury room during the delib- communications, if any, made to him by his
erations of the jury was held fatal to the ver- medical advisers, if asst-nted to or underdict.
atanrlingly acquiesced in by him. The
In Gainey v. People, 97 Ill. 270, the su- length of time elapsing between the making
preme court or Illinois was of opinion that of the declaration and the death is one of
the prest-nce of a bailiff, in charge of a jury the elemt•nts to be considered, although, as
in a c11pital case, in the jury room during a sb1ted by Mr. Greenlt-af, "it is the imprespart of their deliberations, w11s a gra\·e ir- sion of almost immediate dissolution, and
regularit.y and a breach o( duty on the part not the rapid succession of death, in point of
of the officer. which would or would not vi- fact, that renders the testimony admissitiate the verdict, depending upon the circum- ble." 1 Green!. Ev. (15th Ed.)~§ 156, 157,
stances in each particular case; and the a~ 158; State v. Wensell, 98 Mo. 187. 11 S. W.
plication of the rule In State T, Snyder was Rep. 614; Com. v. Han1>y, 127 Mass. 455;
appro,·ed, but the conclusion reached in Peo- Kehoe v. Com., 85 Pa. St. 127; Swisher v.
887
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Com., 26 Grat. 963; State v. Schmidt, 73 Iowa,

469, 35 N. W. Rep. 590. In Reg. v. Per-

kins, 9 Car. 80 P. 395, the deceased received a

severe wound from a gun loaded with shot,

of which wound he died at 5 o’clock the

next morning. On the evening of the day

on which he was wounded. he was told by a

surgeon that he could not recover. made no

reply, but appeared dejected. It was held by

all the judges of England that a declara-

tion made by him at that time was receivable

in evidence on the trial of a person for killing

him, as being a declaration in articulo mortis.

There the declaration was against the ac-

cused. and obviously no more rigorous rule

should be applied when it is in his favor.

The point is to ascertainlthe state of the

mind at the time the declarations were made.

The admission of the testimony is justified
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upon the ground of necessity,‘ and in view of

the consideration that the certain expecta-

tion of almost immediate death will remove

all temptation to falsehood and enforce as

strict adherence to the truth as the obliga-

tion of an oath could impose. But the evi-

dence must be received with the utmost

caution, and, if the circumstances do not

satisfactorily disclose that the awful and

solemn situation in which he is placed is

realized by the dying man because of the

hope of recovery, it ought to be rejected.

In this case the lapse of time was but a few

hours. The wounds were three in number,

and one of them of great severity. The

388

patient was perfectly conscious, and asked

the attending physician his opinion, and was

told that the chances were all against him.

and that the physician thought there was no

“show for you [him] at all.” He was then

interrogated as to who did the shooting, and

he replied that he did not know. All this

was admitted _without objection. Defend-

ant’s counsel then endeavored to elicit from

the witness whether, in addition to saying

that he did not know the parties who shot

him, Mullen stated that he knew Clyde Mat-

tox, and that it was not Clyde who did so.

The question propounded was objected to on

the sole ground of incompetency, and the

objection sustained. In this. as the case

stood. there was error. So long as the evi-

dence was in the case as to what Mullen

said, defendant was entitled to refresh the

memory of the witness in a proper manner,

and bring out, if he could, what more, if

anything, he said in that connection. It

was not inconsistent with Mullen’s statement

that he did not know the parties. for him also

to have said that he knew Mattox was not

one of them. His ignorance of who shot

him was not incompatible with knowledge of

who did not shoot him. We regard the er-

ror thus committed as justifying the award-

ing of a new trial.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause

remanded to the district court of the United

States for the district of Kansas, with a di-
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Com., 26 Grat. 963; State v. Schmidt, 73 Iowa,
469, 85 N. W. Rep. 590. In Beg. v. Perkins, 9 Car. & P. 895, the deceased received a
severe wound from a gun loaded with shot,
of which wound he died at 5 o'clock the
next morning. On the evening of the day
on which he was wounded, he was told by a
aurgPon that he conld not recover, made no
reply, but appeared dejected. It was held by
all the judges of England that a declaration made by him at that time was receivable
in evidence on the trial of a person for killing
him, 88 being a declaration in articulo mortis.
There the declaration was against the accused, and obviously no more rigorous rule
should be applied when it is in his favor.
The point ts to ascertain, the state of the
mind at the time the declar1ttioos were made.
The admission of the testimony Is justiHed
upon the ground of necessity; and in view of
the consideration that the certain expec:tation of almo.cit immediate death will remove
all templaLion to falsehood and enforce 88
strict adherence to the truth as the obliga·
tion of an oath could impose. nut the evi·
deoce must be received with the utmoat
caution, and, If the circumstances do not
satisfactorily disclose that the awful and
aolemn situation in which he is placed Is
realized by the dying man bec1tuse of the
hope of recovery, it ought to be rejected.
In this case the lapse of time wu but a few
>tours. The wounds were th1·ee in numbe1·,
and one of them of great severity. The
888

patient was perfectly conscious, and asked
the attending physician bis opinion, and wu
told that the chances were all against him,
and that the physician thought there was no
"show for you [him] at all." He was then
interrogated as to who did the shooting. and
he replied that he did not· know. All thia
was admitted .without objection. Defendant's counsel then endeavored to elicit from
the witness whether, in addition t.o saying
that he did not know the parties who shot
him, .Mullen stated that he knew Clyde .Mattox, and that it was not Clyde who did so.
The question propounded was objected to on
the sole ground of incompetency. and the
objection lmstained. In this, as the case
stood, there was error. So long aR the e\"'i·
deoce was In the case as to what Mullen
said, defendant wl\8 entitled to refresh the
memory of the witness in a proper manner.
and bripg out, if he could, what more, if
anything, he said in that connection. It
was not inconsistent with Mullen's statement
that he did not know the parties, for him also
to have said that he knew Mattox was not
one of them. His ignorance of who shot
him was not incompatible with knowledge of
who did not shoot him. We rrgard the er·
ror thus committed 118 justifying the awarding of a new trial.
'rhe judgment is reversed, and the cause
remanded to the district court of the United
Statrs for the district of KansllS, with a direcLion to grant a new trial.
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VOGEL v. GRUAZ.

(4 Sup. Ct. 12, 110 U. S. 311.)

Supreme Court of the United States.

188-1.

In Error to the Circuit Court of the United

States for the Southern District of Illinois.

J. K. Edsall and John B. Hawley, for

plaintiff in error. H. S. Greene and John

M. Pahner, for defendant in error.

Feb. 4,

Mr. Justice BLATCHFORD delivered the

opinion of the court.

This is an action on the case, brought by

'1‘imothy Gruaz, against Rudolph Bircher,

to recover damages for the speaking and

publishing of false, malicious, scandalous,

and defamatory words, charging the plain-

tiff with being a thief, and with having

stolen the money of the defendant, meaning
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the crime of larceny. The suit was com-

menced in a state court of Illinois, and was

removed by the defendant into the circuit

court of the United States for the Southern

district of Illinois. At the trial before a

ju-_'y a verdict was rendered for the plain-

tiff, June 6, 1879, for $6,000 damages. On

the next day the defendant ﬂied a motion

for a new trial. On the fourteenth of June

the defendant died, on the twelfth of July

an order abating the case was moved for,

on behalf of the defendant, and on the six-

teenth of August the court overruled the

motion for a new trial and the motion for

an order of abatement, and entered a judg-

ment for the plaintiff, against Bircher, for

$6,000 and costs, as of June 7, 1879. The

order for judgment recited that the hearing

by the court of the motion for a new trial

was, when it was tiled, postponed to a then

future and convenient day of the same term,

and that the defendant died pending the

hearing of the motion. Leave was given to

the executor of the defendant to prepare a

bill of exceptions and to take a writ of er-

ror. The bill of exceptions being signed, it

was ﬂied by the executor, and the writ of

error was issued. Various errors are as-

signed, and among them that the circuit

court did not grant the motion to abate the

suit, and that it rendered a judgment against

Bircher after his death. But it is unneces-

sary to pass on those questions. because we

are of opinion that the judgment must be

reversed for another error committed at the

trial.

Three witnesses for the plaintiff gave evi-

dt-!D\'€ tending to prove the speaking to them

by the defendant of more or less of the

words set forth in the declaration; and after-

wards C. L. Cook was sworn as a witness

for the plnintifi‘, and testiﬂed that he was

state's attorney for Madison county, Illinois:

he had a slight acquaintance with Bircher;

and that he knew Gruaz. The following

‘proceedings then occurred: “Question. l

will ask you if you had any conversation with

Dr. Bircher with regard to Gruaz, and, if

so, when was it? Counsel for defense asked

' VOGEL 1'. GRUA.Z.
(4 Sup. Ct. 12, 110 U. 8. Sll.)
Supreme Court of the United States. Feb. 4,
188-.l.
In Error to the Circuit Court of the United
States for the Southern District of Illinois.
J. K. Edsall and John B. Hawley, for
plalntift' In error. H. B. Greene and Jolui
ll. Palmer, for defendant In error.
Mr. JastJce BLA.TOHJJ'ORD delivered the
opinion of the court.
This ls an action on the case, brought b;r
1.'lmothy Gruaz, agalnat Rudolph Bircher,
to recover damages for the speaking and
publishing of false, malicious, scandalous,
and dera01atory words, charging the plalntllf with being a thief, and with havtng
stolen the money of the defendant, meaning
tb<' crime of larceny. The suit was commented In a state court of Illinois, and was
removed by the defendant Into the circuit
court of the United States- for the Southern
district of Illinois. At the trial before a
ju,7 a verdict was rendered for the pl&lntUI', June 6, 18i9, for $6,000 damages. On
the next day the defendant filed a motion
for a new trial. On the fourteenth of June
the defendant died, on the twelfth of July
an order abating the case waa moved for,
on behalf of the defendant, and on the sixteenth of August the court oyerruled the
motion for a new trial and the motion for
an order of· abatement, and entered a judgment for the plalntllf, against Bircher, for
$6,000 and costs, as of June 7, 18i9. The
order for judgment recited that the bearing
by the court of the motion for a new trial
Willi, when it was filed, postponed to a then
future and convenient day of the same term,
and that the defendant died pending the
hearing of the motion. Leave was given to
the executor of the defendant to prepare a
bill of exceptions and to take a writ of error. The bill of exceptions being signed, It
was filed by the executor, and the writ ot
error was Issued. Various errors are assigned, and among them that the circuit
court did not grant the motion to abate the
eult, and that It rendered a judgment ngulnst
Bircher after hts death. But It Is unneces1111ry to pa1111 on those questions. because we
are of opinion that the judgment must be
reverBed for another error committed at the
trial.
Three witnesses tor the plalntlll' gave evld1m,·e tendl•1g to prove the speaking to them
by the defendant of more or less of the
words set forth In the deelnratlon; and afterwards C. L. Cook was sworn as a witness
tor the plalntll'f, and testified that be was
state's attorney for ·!\ladlson county, Illinois:
he had a slight acquaintance with Bircher;
and that he knew Gruaz. The following
proceedings then oc1.:urred: "Question. 1
will ask you If you had any conversation with
Dr. Bircher with regard to Gruaz, and, It
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ao, when was It? Counsel for defenae asked.
\Vltness It at that time he was occupying
th~ same poeltlon he now hold8. Answer.
Yes, sir. Q. It was communicated to you
while you held that position and were acting
In that capacity, whatever was communicated to you by Bircher? A. Yes, sir. (Defendant's counsel object to wltneu testifying to matters disclosed to him by the defendant under the circumstances stated, on
the ground that such communlcatlona are
to be treated as privileged.) The Court.
I will ask the witness It he regarded It professionally u a privileged communication!
A. I had never met defendant before; he
was introduced to me by a citizen of our
place, and he Informed me that he wanted
to talk with me with regard to a matter he
wanted to bring before the grand jury. (Objected to.) The Court. I will allow the witness to state what the doctor said on that occasion. Of course, It he made the communication to the witness in good faith, there
W·>•1ld be no malice about It, and I shall lnstn1ct the juey to disregard It. The objection
la overruled. To which ruling of the court
the defendant at the time e."tcepted. A. As I
stated, I had at that time no acquaintance
with defendant whatever. He Inquired tor
the state's attorney, and was Introduced 10
me, and he spoke of his al'f&lrs. He said he
wanted to bring a matter before the grand
Juey In regard to :Mr. Gruaz. I talked with
blm 1D regard to the nature of the mat·
ter, and he talked pretty freely In regard too
lt, and I directed him to the grand juey
room. He said a good many things. He
was evidently In earnest at the time, expressed himself veey freely In regard to him.
I would not like to swear to the exact words
used, or that anyb.xiy used at the time. I
can give the substance of what he said, I
suppose. He wanted to prosecute Gruaz for
stealing, was the amount of it. I recollect
this: he charged him wltll having stolen his
m"ney, and I asked him bow, and he told
me how It had be~n d:>ne. Gruaz was his
agent and handled his funds, rented bla
farms, and had tailed to account for a large
amount of money, he told me, and he charged him In this conversation with having
stolen his money, and he said be wanted to
know If there was any law in this state
to prosecute a man for that. I have no objection to st'.lte any words. I remember bis
making the charge that he bad stolen bla
money, but I can't swear that the word
'thief' was used at that time; that It was In
substance, undoubtedly. My impression 111
that this was the March term, 1878, of the
circuit court of Madison county, either that
or October term. 1877; my recolleetlon and
decided Impression Is that It was the spring
term, 1878. Dr. Bircher went Into the
grand juey room and gav~ his statement
to the grarid jury. He was anxious, of
course, to have the Indictment found, and
he evidently believed or ao expre11Bed him·
JljlQ
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self. (Counsel for defendant objected to wit-

ness stating his opinion about what defend-

ant evidently believed.) The Court. He said

he went before U18 grand jury, and said he

seemed to be in earnest in his movements,

but he didn't say what took place before

the grand jury. Don't know, I suppose.

Witness. No, I don‘: know. Cross-examina-

tion. Maj. Prickett introduced Bircher to

me; never saw him before in my life. I

was certain he came to see me as prosecut-

ing attorney, in good faith. That was his

business, as he stated it to me. After he

made his statement to me I advised him to

go before the grand jury; directed him to

their room. He went there by my advice.

Hold on—I don't say that; I advised him

that he had a good case. He came to me

and I showed him where the grand jury
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room was. He stated his case to me as

state's attorney. I then directed him where

to go. and said I should prosecute it as

vigorously as possible, if the indictment was

found. In regard to the advice I gave him,

I rather encouraged him to drop the thing;

I told him he had better sue Mr. Gruaz ﬁrst,

and see if he couldn't get judgment against

him, and so put it in a better shape to prose-

cute him. He stated his case, and I thought

from his statement that he would have few,

if any, witnesses besides himself, and that

it would be doubtful, however honestly he

might believe, that he had cause; it would

be doubtful whether the Jury would bring a

bill; so I advised him to bring a civil suit;

but, said I, you are here, and you u|ustn’t

think hardly of me if the grand jury don't

ﬁnd a. bill; and I directed him to the grand

jury room."

The bill of exceptions also contains the

following: “In reference to the testimony

of state's attorney C. L. Cook, the court

instructed the jury as follows: ‘I admitted

that evidence with an explanation, and with

the explanation made in the admission of

it I think I am content, and I think the jury

may take it into consideration; but if they

think the defendant was actuated by honest

motives in making the declaration he did,

they will disregard it.’ To the giving of

which last instruction the defendant ex-

ceptcd, for the reason that the instruction .-

ignores the. element of want of probable

cause, and for the reason also that the jury

should have been instructed to disregard

Cook's testimony entirely.”

We are of opinion that what was said by

Bircher to .\Ir. Cook was an absolutely privi-

leged communication. It was said to Mr.

Cook while he was state’s attorney or prose-

cutor of crimes for the county, and while

he was acting in that capacity. Bircher in-

quired for the state’s attorney and was in-

troduced to him, and stated to him that he

wanted to talk with him about a matter he

wanted to bring before the grand jury in

regard to Gruaz. He laid the matter before

Mr. Cook, and charged Gruaz with having
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8elt. (Counsel for defendant objected to witness statlug his opinion about what defendant evidently believed.) The Court. He said
be went before u1e grand jury, and said be
seemed to be in earnest In his movements,
but he didn't Blly what took place before
the grand jury. Don't know, I suppose.
Witness. No, I don't know. Cross-examlnatlon. Maj. Prickett Introduced Bircher to
me; never saw him before In my life. I
was certain he came to see me as prOBecut.
Ing attorney, In good faith. That was bis
business, as be stated it to me. After be
made his statement to me I advised him to
go before the grand jury; directed him to
their room. He went there by my advice.
Hold on-I don't say that; I advised him
that he bad a good case. He came to me
and I showed him where the grand jury
room was. He stated bis case to me as
state's attorney. I then directed him where
to go, and said I should prosecute It as
vigorously as possible, If the Indictment was
found. In regard to the aavlce I gave him,
I rather encom·aged him to drop the thing;
I told him he bad better sue Mr. Gruaz first,
and see It he couldn't get judgment against
him, and so put It In a better shape to prosecute him. He stated bis case, and I thought
trow his statement that be would have few,
It any, witnesses besides himself', and that
It would be doubtful, however honestly be
might believe, that be had cause; it would
be doubtful whether the jury would bring a
bill; so I advised him to bring a civil sult;
but, said I, you are here, and you mustn't
think hardly of me It the grand jury dou't
11.nd a bill; and I directed him to the grand
jury room."
The bill of exceptions also contains the
following: "In reference to the testimony
of etate's attorney C. L. Cook, the court
Instructed the jury as follows: 'I admitted
that evidence with an explanation, and with
the explanation made In the admission ot
It I think I am content, and I think the jury
· may take It Into consideration; but If they
think the defendant was actuated by honest
motives In making the declaration be did,
they will disregard It.' To the giving of
which Inst Instruction the defendant excepted, for the reason that the Instruction
lgnores the element of want of probable
cause, and tor the reason also that the jury
should have been Instructed to disregard
Cook's testimony entirely."
We are of opinion that what was said by
Bircher to Yr. Cook was an absolutely prlvlleged communication. It was said to Mr.
Cook while he was state's attorney or prosecutor ot crimes for the county, and while
be was acting In that capacity. Bircher Inquired for the state's attorney and was Introduced to him, and stated to him that he
wanted to talk with him about a matter be
wanted to bring before the grand jury In
regard to Gruaz. He laid the matter before
Mr. Cook, and charged Gruaz with having
390

stolen his money, and was asked how, and
stated how and Inquired of Mr. Cook if
tliere was any law In Illlnols by which a
man could be prosecuted for that. The
grand jury was then In session, and :.\Ir.
Cook advised Bircher that he bad a good
case and directed him to the grand juryroom, and Bircher went before the grand
jury. It all this had tsken place between
Bircher and an attorney consulted by him
who did not bold the public position which
Mr. Cook did, clearly, the communlcatlon
would have been privileged and not to be
disclosed against the objecUon of Bircher.
Under the circumstances shown, Mr. Cook
was the professional advlf'er of Bircher, consuited by him on a statement ot his case,
to learn his opinion as to whether there was
ground In fact and In law for making an
attempt to procure an Indictment a~inst
Gruaz. The fact that Mr. Cook held the
i position of public prosecutor, and was not
to be paid by Bircher for Information or ad·
vice, did not destroy the relation which the
law established between them. It made that
relation more sacred on the ·ground of pubUc policy. The avenue to the grand jury
should always be tree and unobstructed.
Bircher wight have gone directly before It
without consulting l\lr. Cook, but It he chose
to consult him Instead ot a private counsel,
I there was great propriety In bis doing so.
1 A.uy person who desires to pursue the same
course should not be deterred by the tear
of having what he may say In the confidence
ot a consultation with a professional adviser,
. supposed to be the best qualified tor the
! purpose, disclosed afterwards in a civil suit
against his objection. Oliver v. Pate, 43 Ind.
I 13'l. By the statute of Illinois In force at
.,. the tlme of this occun·ence, lt was made the
duty of each state's attorney to "commence
and prosecute" all criminal actions, suite,
i Indictments, and prosecutions In any court
of record In his county, In which the people
of the state or county might be concerned.
t (Rev. St. 1874, c. 14, § 5, subd. 1.) Under
this provision It was the province and the
privilege of any person who knew of facts
tending to show the commission of a crime,
to lay those facts before the public officer
whose duty It was to commence a prosecutlon tor the crime. Puhllc policy will protect all such communications absolutely, and
without reference to the motive or Intent of
the Informer or the question of probable
cause; the ground being that greater mis·
chief will probably result from requiring or
permitting them to be disclosed than from
wholly rejecting them. Mr. Cook learned
from Bircher the things to which he testified,
because he occupied the position of public
prosecuting officer, and because be was actIng at the time us the legal adviser of Bircher
In respect to the matter and question which
Bircher was laying before him. The free
nnd un<:>rnbnrrassed administration of jmitlc-e
1n respect to the criminal law lu which the

I
I
I
I

I

I

I
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public is concerned, is involved in a case like

the present, in addition to the considerations

which ordinarily apply in communications

from client to counsel in matters of purely

private concern. Bircher made his commu-

nication to Mr. Cook for the purpose of ob-

taining professional advice as to his right,

and that of the public through him, to have

a criminal prosecution commenced by Mr.

Cook by the intervention of the grand jury

against Gruaz.

But there is another view of the subject.

The matter concerned the administration of

penal justice, and the principle of public

safety justiiies and demands the rule of ex-

clusion. In Worthington v. Scribner, 109

Mass. -187, an action for maliciously and

falsely representing to the treasury depart-

ment of the United States that the plaintiff
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-was intending to defraud the revenue, it was

held that the defendant could not be com-

pelled to answer whether he did not give

to the department information of supposed

or alleged frauds on the revenue contemplat-

ed by the plaintiff. The principle laid down

in that case was, that it is the duty of every

-citizen to communicate to his government

any information which he has of the com-

mission of an offense against its laws; and

that a court of justice will not compel or

allow such information to be disclosed, either

i

1

i

1

I

I

i

i

i

§

I

I

I

by the subordinate oﬁlcer to whom it is given,

by the informer himself, or by any other

person, without the permission of the gov-

ernment, the evidence being excluded not for

the protection of the witness or of the party

in the particular case, but upon general

grounds of public policy, because oi.‘ the con-

ﬁdential nature of such communications. The

authorities are collected and reviewed in that

case. The case of Dawkins v. Rokeby, L. R.

8 Q. B. 255, there cited, was aﬂirmed by the

house of lords, L. R. 7 H. L. 744. See, also,

1 Greenl. Ev. 5 250; Black v. Holmes, 1 Fox

& Sm. 28.

It makes no difference that there was evi-

dence of the speaking of the same words to

persons other than Mr. Cook, and that the

speaking of them to Mr. (Jook was not the

sole ground of action or of recovery. The

evidence was incompetent, and it must be

inferred that it atfected the minds of the jury

both on the main issue and on the question

of damages.

It results from these views that the judg-
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public IB concerned, ls Involved In a case like by the subordinate officer to whom It 18 given,
the present, In addition to the considerations by the Informer himself, or by any other
which ordinarily apply In communications person, without the permission of the govfrom client to counsel In matters of purely ernment, the evidence being excluded not for
private concern. Bircher made his commu- the protection of the witness or of the party
nication to Mr. C-0ok for the purpose of ob- In the pnrtlcular case, but upon general
taining profe11Slonal advice as to his right, grounds of publlc policy, because of the conand that of the public through him, to have ttdentlnl nature of such communications. The
a criminal prosecution commenced by Mr. authorities are collected and reviewed In that
Cook by the Intervention of the grand jury case. The case of Dawkins v. Rokeby, L. R.
S Q. B. 2;"i;J, there cited, was atllrmed by the
against Gruaz.
But there ls another view of the subject. house o! lords, L. R. 7 H. L. 744. 8ee, also,
The matter concerned the admlnlsti·atlon of 1 Greenl. Ev. I 250; Black v. Holmes, 1 Fox
penal justice, and the principle of public & Sm. 28.
aafety justifies and demands the rule of exIt makes no dltrerence that there w.as evl·
.cluslon. In Worthington v. Scribner, 109 deuce of the speaking of the same words to
Mass. 487, an action for maliciously and persons other than Mr. Cook, and that the
falsely representing to the treasury depart- speaklni: of them to Mr. Cook was not the
ment of the United States that the plnlntltr sole ground of action or of reco'fery. The
was Intending to defraud the revenue, It was i evidence was Incompetent, and It must be
held that the defendant could not be com- 1 lnfen-ed that It all'ected the minds of the jury
pelled to answer whether he did not give both on the main Issue and on the question
to the department Information of supposed of damages.
.or alleged frauds on the revenue contemplat- I It results from these views that the judged by the plalntltr. The principle laid down 1 ment below cannot be upheld, and that It
In that case was, that It Is the duty of every ' must be reversed, and the case be remanded
.citizen to communicate to his government to the circuit court, with direction to set
any Information which he has of the com- aside the verdict and vacate the judgment
mission of an otrense against Its laws; and and take such further proceedings as may be
that a court of justice wlll not compel or according to law and not inconsistent with
.allow such lntormat1on to be disclosed, either th1a opinion.

I'
I
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Appeal of HARTRANFT et al.

(85 Pa. St. 433.)

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Jan. 7, 1878.

This is an appeal of John F. Hartranft,

governor of the commonwealth, M. S. Quay,

secretary of the commonwealth, James W.

Latta, adjutant general of the common-

wealth. General R. M. Brinton, and Major

A. Wilson Norris, from an order of the court

of quarter sessions of the peace of Alle-

gheny county, directing attachments to issue

against them for failure to obey a subpcena

of the grand jury who were investigating the

matters of the riots at Pittsburgh of July

21 and 22, 1877.

Thomas M. Marshall, Lyman D. Gilbert,

Dep. Atty. Gen., and George Lear, Atty. Gen,
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.Appeal of HARTRANFT et al
(85 Pa. St. 433.)
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Jan. 7, 1878.
This ls an appeal of John I!.,. Hartranft,
g<ivernor of the commonwealth, M. S. Quay,
secretary of the commonwealth, Jo.mes \V.
Latta, adjutant general of the commonwealth, General R. M. Brinton, and Major
.A.. Wilson Norris, from an order of the court
of quarter seBBlons of the peace of Allegheny C"ounty, directing attachments to Issue
agnlnst them for failure to obey a subprena
of the grand jury who were im-estlgating the
matters of the riots at Pittsburgh of July
21 and 22, 1877.
'l'homas M. Marshall, Lyman D. Gilbert,
Dep. Atty. Gen., and George Lear, Atty. Gen.,
for appellants. E. A. Montooth, Dist. Atty.,
Morton Hunter, Asst. Dist. Atty., S. A. McClung, and George Shlras, Jr., contra.

for appellants. E. A. Montooth, Dist. Atty.,

Morton Hunter, Asst. Dist. Atty., S. A. Mc-
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Clung, and George Shiras, Jr., contra.

GORDON, J’. Grand juries have the power

to make presentment, not only of such crim-

inal offences as may be laid before them by

the district attorney in the form of bills of

indictment, and of such as may come within

the personal knowledge of individual mem-

bers thereof, but also of all such matters as

may be given them in charge by the court.

Neither is there any doubt about the power

of the court to direct that body to make in-

quiry concerning aﬁairs which directly af-

fect the public peace and society, among

which aifairs may be instanced great riots,

such as those which recently disturbed the

well-disposed citizens of Pittsburgh» and its

vicinity. Matters of this kind may properly

be referred to the consideration of the grand

inquest in order that the instigators thereof

and the participants therein may be brought

to justice; and this is the more necessary

because in times of public tumult and alarm

private prosecutors may be overawed through

fear of personal violence.

Doubtless the proceedings in the case be-

fore us are very irregular, since there seems

to be a. total inversion of the proper order

of things. It was the duty of the court, not

of the grand jury, ﬁrst to move in the matter.

In a subject of so much: importance, and

one requiring the exercise of so much care

and discretion, the court should have in-

structed this jury as to what it was to inves-

tigate, and in what manner the investigation

was to be conducted. Nothing of the kind,

however, was done; but the court, "having

approved its petition, suffered it to proceed

to the adoption of its own subjects, after its

own methods, and, by this sufferance, it al-

lowed an important public investigation to

pass from its own control to that of a body

GORDON, J. Grand juries have the power
to make presentment. not only of such criminal offences as may be laid before them by
the district attorney In the form of b111s of
Indictment, and of such as may come within
the pt>rsonal knowledge or Individual members thereof, but also of all such matters as
may be given them In charge by tlttl court.
Neither Is there any doubt about the power
of the court to direct that body to mak~ Inquiry concerning alrairs which directly affect the public peace and society, among
which alTalrs may be lnstancecl grt-at riots,
such as those which recently disturbed the
well-dispo~ed citizens of Pittsburgh and its
vicinity. Matters of this kind may properly
be referred to the consideration of the grand
Inquest in order that the instigators thereof
and the participants therein may be brought
to justice; and this ls the more necessury
because In times of public tumult and alarm
private prosecutors maybe overawed through
fear of personal viol1.>nce.
Doubtless the proceedings In the case before us are very Irregular, since there seems
to be a total Inversion of the proper order
of thln~s. It was the duty of the court, not
of the grand jury, drst to wove In the matter.
In a subject of so much Importance, and
one requiring the exercise of so much care
and discretion, the court should have Instructed this Jury as to what It was to Investigate, and in what manner the lnYestlgation
was to be conducted. Nothing of the kind,
howcYer, was done; but the court, having
appron•d Its petition, sutl'ered it to proceed
to tire adoption of Its own sub,lects, after Its
own methods, and, by this sutTerance, It allowed an important public Investigation to
pass from Its own control to that of a body
of men, which, as It was goYerned by no regular Instructions, resembled more a committee for the general investigation of public
affairs, than a lawful constituent of the court
of quarter sessions. This, however, ls really
of small Importance to the matter in hand;

of men, which, as it was governed by no reg-

ular instructions, resembled more a commit-

tee for the general investigation of public

affairs, than a lawful constituent of the court

of quarter sessions. This, however, is really

of small importance to the matter in hand;

neither can the appellants call in ques-

tion the regularity of the proceedings as

39".l

neither can the appellants call In queation the regularity of the proceedings aa
between the court and its grand jury;
for If they have been properly trubprenaed, and can present no lawful excuse for
their want of obedience to the mandate
of the quarter sessions, they must stand convicted of a contempt, and we cannot help
them. The sub:p<ena Is the process of the
commonwealth, and there ls no doubt about
the court's power to iBBue that process In
proper cases.
Our Inquiry, then, ls limited to two prop.
osltlons: Were the subprenas regular, such
as an ordinary citizen would be bound to
obey? It so, were the appellants liable to
attachment for disobedience to this proceBB?
The subprena we have. before us, like the
other proceedings In this case, Is very Irregular. It is, Indeed, but a 11:eneral mandate
of the court, ordering the appellants to ap.
pear, "to testify, all and singular, those
things which they may know touching a certain lnvestlga.tlon being had, on formal presentment, by and before the grand jury,
relating to the late riots of July last, In said
county, in said court depending." It sets
forth no case, present or prospective, nor
does it state for whom, or at whose Instance.
the defendants were to be subpoonaed. As
this writ Is a Yery arbitrary one, obliging
the citizen to leave his home and abandon
his business, however Important It may be,
and give his attendance at court, wherever
that may be sitting, It is very Important to
know what parties are entitled to It; for If
it be issued at the suit of one having no right
thereto, It ls no contempt to disobey It. The
commonwealth may have this process in any '
proceeding where its Interest ls apparent,
whether as a suitor or a prosecutor, nnd so
may parties In courts, either civil or criminal; but we have yet to learn that any such
right exists In a court, in its mere character
as a court, separated from the case which lt
has In hand. So this, as well as every other
compulsory process, must show upon Its face
that lt was Issued for some person or party
having a right thereto, otherwise it ls nugatory and Yold, and disobedience to Its mandate Involves no penalty whatever. In the
case before us there was the use of the writ
of subprena, as a mere order of the court.
without statement of party or case, commanding the defendants to appear before
the grand jury, for the purpose of giving
their testimony touching the late riots. If
there Is any law authorizing such process,
we have not been informed of It.
No doubt the court might have dlrectt-d
a subpama to have issued for the common.wealth, In ony case where the commonwealth
was a party, or where it was apparent It
was In some way Interested In some cai>e or
transaction then depending. So might it h:l\"e
dlrectt>d a warrant to have Issued for the
arrest of some one guilty of a crime or misdemeanor; but In such case no one would
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contend that the mere blank warrant of the

court would in itself be suiﬁcient to detain

a. citizen for one moment. The authority for

such warrant must appear upon its face or

it is worthless. But the court’s subpoena is

no more respectable than its warrant. If the

suhptena exhibit no authority it may be dis-

obeyed with impunity. Now, in the case be-

fore us, the commonwealth was not a party

in interest, or, if so, it is not now apparent.

It seems, from the petition of the grand

jury, that the citizens of the county of Al-

legheny “were greatly concerned in having

a careful investigation of the late riots," but

whether they were concerned in bringing

the rioters to justice or not is not stated,

though this was the only matter in which

the commonwealth could be concerned.

Moreover, as the grand jury was acting un-
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der no instruction, it was not possible, even

for the court, to know what that jury was

doing or, intended to do, but of this the court

should have been informed before it under-

took to interfere with the personal liberty

of the citizen by its summary process of at-

tachment, for, as the matter now stands, it

is apparent that the subpoana was issued for

no tangible cause or party and for no proper-

ly deﬁned legal purpose; hence no one was

bound to obey it.

For the purposes of this case, however,

we may admit the regularity of this sub-

poena, and that, upon an ordinary citizen,

it would have been binding and obligatory,

for we regard the question of the liability

of the appellants to attachment, in any

event, as the prime one in this case. in

order to resolve this, we must ﬁrst under-

stand who the persons are against whom

the court has directed its attachment, and

for what purpose they have been sub-

poenaed. They are the governor of Pennsyl-

vania, the secretary of the commonwealth,

the adjutaut general, chief oﬂicers of the

executive department of the state govern-

ment, and two oﬁicers of the national guard;

the latter subordinates acting under the or-

dcrs of the former. The purpose, for which

these oflicers are subprenaed is that the

grand jury may be put into possession of

any information they may be possessed of,

or that may be within the power of their

several departments, concerning the military

or other means used by them in the sup-

pression of the late riots in the city of Pitts-

burgh. It will be observed that these per-

sons are subpoenaed for the purpose of com-

pelling a revelation of such things as have

come to their knowledge in their ofﬁcial

capacities, and which strictly belong to their

several departments as officers of the com-

monwealth. This is clearly et out in the

answer by the attorney general to the ap-

plication for the attachment, and there has

been no denial thereof upon the argument

before us. In order to simplify matters, we

may treat this case just as though the pro-

cess, iirst and last, were against the gov-

contend that the mere blank warrant of the
court would in Itself be antDclent to detain
a citizen for one moment. The authority for
1uch warrant must appear upon Its face or
it ls worthleBS. But the court's subprena ls
no more respectable than its warrant. If the
subprena exhibit no authority it may be disobeyed with impunity. Now, ln the case before us, the commonwealth was not a party
in Interest, or, 1f so, It Is not now apparent.
It seems, from the petition of the gnmd
jury, that the citizens of the county of Allegheny "were greatly concerned In having
a careful investigation of the late riots," but
whether they were concerned In blinglng
the rioters to justice or not ls not stated,
though this was the only matter in which
the commonwealth could be concerned.
Moreover, a11 the grand jury was acting under no instruction, It was not po88lble, even
for the court, to know what that jury was
doing or, Intended to do, but of this the court
ahould have been informed before It undertook to Interfere with the personal liberty
of the citizen by lt11 summary proceSB of attachment, for, as the matter now stands, it
is apparf'nt that the subprena was i8Bued for
no tangible cause or party and for no properly de1lued legal purpose; hence no one was
bound to obey it.
For the purposes of this case, however,
we may admit the regularity of this subpmna, and that, upon an. ordinary citizen,
it would have been binding and obligatory,
for we regard the question of the lla.blllty
of the appellants to attachment, In any
event, as the prime one In this case. In
order to resolve this, we must first understand who the persons are against whom
the court has directed its attachment, and
for what purpose they have been subprenaed. They are the governor of Pennsylvania, the secretary of the commonwealth,
the adjutant general, chief otDcers of the
executive department of the state government, and two officers of the national guard;
the latter subordinates acting under the orders of the former. The purpose, for which
these otDcers are subprenaed ls that the
grand Jury may be put Into J)Ossession of
any information they may be posseSBed of,
or that may be within the power of their
several departments, concerning the military
or other means used by them in tlle suppression of the late riots In the city of Pittsburgh. It will be observed that these persons are subprenaed for the purpose of compelllng a revelation of such things as have
come to their knowledge In their otliclal
capacities, and which strictly belong to their
several departments as oft\cers ot the commonwealth. This Is clearly set out In the
answer by the attorney general to the application for the attachment, and there has
been no denial thereof upon the argument
before us. In order to simplify matters, we
may treat this case just as though the prot.'tl88, fl.rat and last. were against the gov-
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ernor alone; for If he Is exempt from attachment because of his privilege, his Im·
munlty protects bis subordinates and agents.
The general principle ls that whenever the
law vests any person with the power to do
an act at the same time constituting him a
judge of the evidence on which the act may,
be done, and contemplating the employment
of agents through whom the act Is to be accomplished, such person is clothed with discretionary powers, and Is quoad hoc a judge.
ms mandates to his legal agents, on his declaring the event to have happened, will be
a protection to those agents. Vanderheyden
v. Young, 11 Johns. 158, per Spencer, J.
It follows, If the governor, ft.R supreme
executive, and as commander In chief of
the army of the commonwealth, ls charged
with the duty of suppressing domestic Insurrections, he must be the judge of the
necessity requiring the exercise of the powers with which he ls clothed; and his subordinates, who are employed to render these
powers etDclent and to produce the lei."itl·
mate results of their exercise, can be accountable to none but him. In like manner,
If he is constituted the judge of what things,
knowledge, or Information, coming Into his
department through himself personally or
from his subordinates may or may not be
revealed, then such subordinates, without
his permission, cannot be compelled t.o disclose, In court, any such matters or information.
What, then, are the duties, powers, and
privileges of the governor? In tlle language
of the constitution (article 4, f 2): "The
supreme executive power shall be vested In
the governor, who shall take care thut the
laws be faithfully executed." Also, same
article, section 7: "The governor shall be
commander in chief of the army and navy
of the commonwealth, and of the militia,
except when they shall be called Into the
actual service of the United States." He ls
also invested with the appointment and pardoning powers, the power to convene the
legislature In cases of emergency, and to approve or veto bills submitted to him by the
genera.I assembly. It Is scarcely conceivable
that a man could be more completely Invested with the supreme power and dignity of
a free people. Observe, the supreme executive power ls vested In the governor, and he
ls charged with the faithful execution of
the laws, and for the accomplishment of
this purpose he ls made commander In chief
of the army, navy, and mllltla of the state.
Who, then, shall assume the power of the
people, and call this magistrate to an account for that which he has done In discharge of his constitutional duties? If he
ls not the judge of when and how these
duties are to be performed, who ls? Where
does the court of Quarter sessions, or any
other court, get the power to call thht man
before It, and compel him to answer for the
manner In whl<!h he has discharged his con393

o.se
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stitutional functions as executor of the laws

and commander in chief of the militia of the

commonwealth? For it certainly is a logical

sequence that if the governor can be com-

pelled to reveal the means used to accom-

plish a given act, he can also be compelled

to answer for the manner of accomplishing

such act. If the court of quarter sessions

of Allegheny county can shut him up in

prison for refusing to appear before it and

reveal the methods and means used by him

to execute the laws and suppress domestic

violence, why may it not commit him for 9.

breach of the peace. or for homicide, result-

ing from the discharge of his duties as

commander in chief? And if the courts can

compel him to answer, why can they not

compel him to act’! All these things, we

know, may be done in the ease of private in-
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dividuals. Such an one may be compelled

to answer, to account and to act. In other

words, if, from such analogy, we once begin

to shift the supreme executive power from

him upon whom the constitution has con-

ferred it to the judiciary, we may as well

do the work thoroughly and constitute the

courts the absolute guardians and directors

of all governmental functions whatever. If,

ho\\-ever, this cannot be done. we had bet-

ter not take the ﬁrst step in that direction.

We had better at the outstart recognise the

fact that the executive department is a eo-

ordinate branch of the government, with

power to judge what should or should not

be done within its own department. and

what of its own doings and communica-

tions should or should not be kept secret,

and that with it, in the exercise of these

constitutional powers, the courts have no

more right to interfere than has the execu-

tive, under like conditions, to interfere with

the courts. In the case of Oliver v. War-

mouth. 22 La. 1, it was held (per Taliafero,

J.) that, under the division of powers, as laid

down in the federal and state constitutions,

the judiciary department has no jurisdic-

tion over or right to interfere with, the in-

dependent action of the chief executive in

the functions of his ofiice, even though the

act he is required to perform be purely min-

isterial. This is putting the matter on very

high grounds, for in such case no other

oiﬂcer would be exempt from the mandatory

power of the judiciary. No case could more

forcibly exhibit the extreme reluctance of

courts to interfere with the functions of

the supreme executive, for the hypothesis

put is the refusal of the governor to per-

form a duty, cast upon him by law, of a

character strictly ministerial. \Ve think,

however, that the ground upon which this

decision stands is substantial; for, as the

learned justice well argues, the ditliculty

arises in the attempt to establish a distinc-

tion between 'ministerial ‘and discretionary

acts as applied to the governor, and then to

conclude. that the former may be enforced

by judicial decree. It is objected, however,
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atltutlonal functions as executor of the laws that the doctrine ls unsound in this: that lt
.and commander in chief of the mllltla of the gives to the judiciary the large discretion of
.commonwealth? For It certainly la a logical determining the character of all acts to be
aequence that if the governor can be com- performed by the chief executive; that thl8
pelled to reveal the means used to accom- would Infringe his right to nae hlB owu
plish a given act, he can also be compelled discretion In determining the very same
to answer tor the manner of accomplishing question; that he must, necessarily, hav&
11uch act. If the court of quarter sessions the unconditional power of deciding what
-of Allegheny county can shut him up In acts his duties re(Juire him to perform, othprison tor refusing to appear before it and erwise his functions are trammeled and the
reveal the methods and means used by him executive branch of the government ls made
to execute the laws and suppress domestic subsen·lent to the judiciary. The principle
violence, why may It not commit him tor a enunciated In the above-stated case appllea
b1·each of the peace, or for homicide, result- with greater force to that we now have
ing from the discharge of his duties as under consideration; for If the governor's
-commander in chief? And if the courts can discretion may not be Interfered with In a
-compel him to answer, wh;r can they not matter purely ministerial, much more ma7
compel him to act? All these things, we that discretion not be interfered with In a
know, may be done In the case of private in- case which pertains to his office and duties
dividuals. Such an one may be compelled al! commander in chief, In the discharge of
to answer, to account and to act. In other which the constitution makes that discrewords, If, from such analogy, we once begin tion bis peculiar and absolute prerogative.
to shift the supreme executive power from
Again, the governor, having a proper rehim upon whom the constitution ~as con- gard for the dignity and welfare of the peoferred It to the judiciary, we may as well ple of the commonwealth, ls not likely to
-do the work thoroughb• and conRtltute the submit himself to Imprisonment on the de-courts the absolute guardians and dlrectol'B cree of the court of quarter seSBlons, or to
-of all governmental functions whatever. If, permit his omcers and coadjutors to be thus
however, this cannot be done, we bad bet- imprisoned. Were we, then, to permit the
ter not take the fil'Bt step in that direction. attempt to enforce this attachment, nn unWe had better at the outstart recognise the seemly conflict must result between the extact that the executive department IR a co- ecutive and judicial departments of the gov<>rdlnate branch of the government, wlth ernment. We siced not say that prudence
powe1· to Judge what should or should not would dictate the avoidance of a catastrophe
be done within Its own department, and such as here indicated. On this point the
what of Its own doings and communlca- , case of Thompson v. German Val. R. Co., 22
tlons should or should not be kept secret, N. J. Eq. 111, furnishes us with a precedent
and that with It, in the exercise of these well worthy of our consideration. In that
constitutional powers, the courts have no case a subprena duces tecum had been served
more right to Interfere than has the execu- on the governor of New Jersey, commanding
tive, under like conditions, to Interfere with him, by his Individual name, to appear and
the courts. In the case of Oliver v. War- testlt'y before an examiner of the court of
mouth, 22 La. 1, It wns beld (per Tallnfero, chancery, and bring with him an engrossed
.T.) that, under the division of powers, as laid copy of a private statute which had been
down In the federal and state constitutions, passed by the legislature, and bad been sent
the judiciary department bas no .1m1sdlc- to him, as governor, for his approval. He
tlon over or right to Interfere with, the In- refused to obey the subprena, Informing tbe
dependent action of the chief executive In court at the same time that he did not rethe functions of his oft:lce, even though the fuse out ot' any disrespect to the court or to
act be Is required to perform be purely min- the law, but because be thought his ducy
isterial. This Is putting the matter on very required him not to appear or produce the
bl~h grounds. for In such case no other
paper required, or to submit bis oWclal acts
otncer would be exempt from the mandatory as governor to the scrutiny of any court. It
power of the judiciary. No case coultl more will be seen that the case thus presented la
forcibly exhibit the extreme reluctance of quite as strong as that under dlscusslon;
.courts to interfere with the functions of for the governor, upon his own opinion of
the supreme executive, for the hy11othesls duty, which, as It will appear, did not acput ls tbe refusal of the goyernor to per- cord with that of the court, not only refused
form a dut:v. co.st upon him by law, of a to appear or produce the required paper,
chanwter strictly ministerial. We think, but to submit any or his oWclal acts to tbe
however, that the ground upon which this scrutiny of the court. An order was granted
decision stands ls substantial; tor, ns the on the governor to show cause why he
learned justice well argues, the difficulty should not appear and testify. After arguarlfl('fl in the attempt to establish a cllstlnc· ment, Zabriskie, Cb., said: "The governor
tlon lx>tween ·ministerial ·and discretionary cannot be examined as to bis reasons tor
ads ns applied to the governor, and then to not signing the bill, nor as to his action, In
conC'llldP. tbnt the former may be enforced any respect, regarding It. But there ls DO
hy Judicial decree. It ls objected, however, reason why he should IWt be called upon to
394
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testify as to the time it was delivered to

him. That is a hare fact that includes no

action on his part. 'l‘o this extent, at least,

I am of opinion that he is bound to appear

and testify. But I will make no order on

him for that purpose. Such order ought not

to be made against the executive of the

state, because it might bring the executive

in conﬂict with the judiciary. If the execu-

tive thinks he ought to testify in compliance

with the opinion of the court, he will do so

without order; if he thinks it to be his

-oﬂicial duty, in protecting the rights and

dignity of his oﬁice, he will not comply, even

if directed by an order. And in his case

the court would hardly entertain proceed-

ings to compel him by adjudging him in con-

tempt. It will be presumed the chief magis-

trate intends no contempt, out that his ac-
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tion is in accordance with his otiicial duty.”

If we adopt this opinion as a sound exposi-

tion of the law, the case before us is de-

termined; for the matter is left to rest solely

on the opinion of the executive, although his

opinion be clearly contrary to that of the

court. We are inclined to think the con-

clusion thus reached is wise and discreet, and

it is supported by‘the best text writers of

our times. These state the law to be that

the president of the United States, the gov-

ernors of the several states, and their cabl-

net oiﬁcers, are not bound to produce papers

or disclose information committed to them,

in a judicial inquiry, when, in their own

judgment, the disclosure would, on public

grounds, be inexpedient. 1 Greenl. Ev.§

251; 1 Whart. Ev. § 604. Thus the question

of the expediency or inexpediency of the

production of the required evidence is re-

ferred, not to the judgment of the court be- '

fore which the action is trying, but of the

oiiicer who has that evidence in his posses-

sion. The doctrine that the officer must ap-

pear and submit the required information or

paper to the court for its judgment as to

whether they are or are not proper matters

for revelation, is successfully met and set-

tled in the case of Beaton v. Skene, 5 Hurl.

& N. 838, per Pollock, C. B. It was there

held that, if the production of a state paper

would be injurious to the public interest, the

public welfare must be preferred to that of the

private suitor. The question then arose, how

was this to be determined? It must be de-

termined either by the judge or by the re-

sponsible crown ofﬁcer who has the paper.

But the judge could come to no conclusion

without ascertaining what the document

was, or why its publication would be injuri-

ous to the public service. Just here, how-

ever, occurred this ditﬁculty: that, as judi-

cial inquiry must always be public, the pre-

.liminary examination must give to the docu-

ment that very publicity which it might be

important to prevent. The conclusion

reached was that, from necessity, if for no

other reason, the question must be left to

-the judgment of the otiicer.

testify as to the ttme It was delivered to
him. That le a bare fact that Includes no
.action on hie part. To this extent, at least,
I am of opinion that be ls bound to appear
.and testify. But I will make no order on
hlm for that purpose. Sll<'h order ought not
to be made against the executive of the
11tate, because It might bring the executive
ln conflict with the judiciary. It the executlve thinks he ought to testify In compliance
with the opinion of the court, be will do so
without order; If he thinks It to be his
-omclnl duty, In protecting the rights and
-dignity of bis oftlce, be will not comply, even
H directed by an order. And In bis case
the court would hardly entertain proceedtngs to compel him by adjudging him In contempt. It will be presumed the chief magi&trate Intends no contempt, out that bis actlon ls In accordance with his oftlclal duty."
It we adopt this opinion as a souncl expos!tlon of the law, the case before ua ls determlned; for the matter ls left to rest solely
-00 the opinion of the executive, although his
opinion be clearly contrary to that of the
~ourt.
We are inclined to think the conduslon thus reached ls wise and discreet, and
Jt ls supported by ·the beet text writers of
our times. These state the law to be that
the president of the United t!tates, the gov-ernors of the several states, and their cablnet offtcers, are not bound to produce papers
or disclose Information committed to them,
Jn a Judicial Inquiry, when, In their own
Judgment, the dlscloeure would, on public
grounds, be Inexpedient. 1 Green]. Ev. f
251; 1 Wbart. Ev. § 604. Thus the question
of the expediency or Inexpediency of the
production of the required evidence ls referred, not to the judgment of the court before which the action Is trying, but of the
-01Hcer who has that evidence In his possesslon. The doctrine that the oftlcer mu11t appear and submit the required Information or
llftpers to the court for Its judgment as to
whether they are or are not proper matters
tor revelation, Is successfully met and settled In the case of Beaton v. Skene, ;) Hurl.
A: N. 838, per Pollock, C. B. It was there
beld that, If the procluctton of a state paper
would be Injurious to the public Interest, the
public welfare must be preferred to thatof the
private suitor. The question then arose, how
was this to be determined? It must be determlned either by the judge or by the re.sponslble crown oftlcer who has the paper.
But the judge could come to no conclusion
without ascertaining what the document
was, or why Its publication would be lnjurl-0us to the public service. Just here, bowever, occurred this dlftlculty: that, as jndldal Inquiry must always be public, the prellmlnary examination must give to the document that very publicity which lt might be
Important to prevent.
The conclusion
reached was that, from necessity, If for no
other reason, the question must be left to
·the Judgment of the ottlcer.
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A like case Is that of Gray v. Pentland,
2 Berg. & R. 23. A eubpmnn had been lesued from the court below and served upon
Governor Snyder and Secretary Boileau,
with a ducee tecum. A rule was also entered for the purpose of taking their depoel·
tlone In Harrisburg. They declined to appear In answer to the subpmna, or to permlt their depositions to be taken under the
rule, and refused to produce the paper or
deliver It to the plaintiff. This paper waa
of a very great Importance, Inasmuch as
Its production was necessary for the maintenance of the suit pending, the supreme
court holding that, though It was beyond
the plalntltr's power, parol evidence of Its
contents was not admissible. A motion was
then made, on the part of the plaintiff, for
a special subpmna duces tecum to compel
the production of the paper; but this was
refused. On argument In the superior court
, this action of the court below In refusing
I compulsory process against the governor and
I secretary of the commonwealth does not
I seem to have been questioned; on the other
I hand, It was approved In opinions delivered
\ by Tilghman, C. J., and Brackenridge, J. The
latter was, as he said, Inclined to think that
the governor could not be compelled to produce the paper transmitted to him; that It
was within his own discretion to furnish or
refuse It; and this on the ground of public
policy. The chief justice observed, Inter alla,
that the governor, who best knew the circumstances under which the charge had been
exhibited to him, and could best judge the
motives of the accuser, must exercise his
own judgment with respect to the propriety
of procluclng the writing. Thus the matter
ls treated as quite beyond the power of the
court, and the judgment of the executive Is
regarded as absolute and final.
We next 1·efer to the celebrated trial of
Aaron Burr. Here Is the case of one charged with treason; one who, by the express
terms of the constitution, was entitled to
compulsory process for obtaining wltneBSes
In his favor. The judge before whom the
examination was conducted was John llarshall, chief justice of the supreme court; a
man renowned, not only for bis legal learnIng, but also for his judgment and sagacity
as a stateman; and the president was Thomas Jetrel'son, one not likely unduly to exalt
e~ecutlve prerogative, or to refuse to the judlclary Its just tribute of respect. We may
therefore presume that whatever was done
by the principal actors In the remarkable
judlctal drama then In progress was well
done. At the request of the defence a subpama duces tecum was awardoo and directed
to the president, requiring him to appear,
and bring with him a certain letter from
General Wiikinson to himself. He refused
either to appenr. "or produce the paper required. On discussion of the question, not
whether com·pulsory process sh<>uld be
awarded against the president, !or that was
895
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withholding the paper called for.

not so much as proposed, but whether the

attorney general should permit the defence

to have the examination of a copy of the re-

quired letter which had been put into his

possession, the chief justice said (as we ﬁnd

it set down in volume 3, p. 37, Burr‘s Trial,

as published by Westcott. & Co., Washington

City, 1870): “I suppose it will not be alleged

in this case that the president ought to be

considered as having offered a contempt to

the court in consequence of his not having

attended, notwithstanding the subpoena. was

awarded agreeably to the demand of the de-

fendant. The court would, indeed, not be

asked to proceed as in the case of an ordi-

nary individual.” We ﬂnd, also, in volume

2, p. 536, of the same trial, published by

Hopkins & Earle, Philadelphia, 1808, the fol-
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lowing recorded as the utterance of the chief

justice: “In no case of this kind would the I

court be required to proceed against the pres- I

ident a against an ordinary individual. The '

objections to such a course are so strong and

obvious that all must acknowledge them.

' ' * In this case, however, the presi-

dent has assigned no reason whatever for I

The pro-

priety of withholding it must be decided by i

himself, not by another for him. Of the \

weight of the reasons for and against pro-

ducing it he himself is the judge.”

Inﬂuenced by this and the other precedents

we have cited, as well as by reason and ne-

cessity, we are in like manner disposed to

conclude that the propriety of withholding

the information required by the grand jury

must be determined by the governor himself;

and the weight of the reasons inﬂuencing

him in the conclusion at which he has arriv-

ed is for himself, and not for the court, to

consider.

Furthermore, as the governor is the chief

executive of the commonwealth, and as such

embodies the power of the people, for the

conservation of the peace and the protection

of the rights and property of the citizens of

the state, as he is also part of the legislative

branch of the government, it must be ob-

vious to every one that there are times when

he must bé excused from the ordinary pro-

cess of the courts. We presume it will not

be contended that he would be obliged to

obey the mandate of a subpoena during the

sessions of the legislature. when his presence

at the capital is constantly required, or

whilst engaged in the suppression of an in-

surrection. These, however, do not embrace

all his duties as governor. We must, there-

fore, go one step further, and concede that

he is exempt from such process whenever

engaged in any duty pertaining to his oﬂice.

Granting that there may be times when he

is not so engaged, and when he might be

free to answer to a subpoena, who is to be

the judge of his engagements or disengage-
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Dot so much as proposed, but whether the

attorney general should permit the defence
to have the examination of a copy of the required letter which had been put Into his
possession. the chief justice said (as we find
It set down In volume 3, p. 87, Burr's Trial,
as published by Westcott & Co., Washington
Olty, 1870): "I suppose It will not be alleged
In this case that the president ought to be
eonsldered as having offered a contempt to
the court In consequence ot his not having
attended, notwlthstRndlng the subprena was
awarded agreeably to the demand of the de·
fendant. The court wouJd, indeed, Dot be
asked to proceed ae In the case of an ordinary Individual." We find, also, In volume
2, p. 536, of the same trial, publlshed by
Hopkins & Earle, Philadelphia, 1808, the following recorded as the utterance ot the chief
Justice: "In no case ot this kind would the
eowt be required to proceed against the president as against an ordinary Individual. 'l'he
objectlo11t1 to such a course are so strong and
obvious that all must acknowledge them.
• • • In this case, however, the president bas assigned no reason whatever for
·withholding the paper called tor. The propriety ot withholding It mu!Jt be decided by
himself, not by another tor him. Of the
weight of the reasons for and against producing It he himself ls the judge."
Inftuenced by this and the other precedents
we have cited, as well as by reason and necessity, we are In like manner disposed to
conclude that the propriety ot withholding
the information required by the grand jury
must be determined by the governor himself;
and the weight of the reasons Influencing
him In the conclusion at which he has arrived ls tor himself, and not tor the court, to
eonslder.
Furthermore, as the governor ls the chief
executive ot the commonwealth, and as such
embodies the power of the people, for the
conservation of the peace and the protection
of the rights and property of the citizens of
the state, as he ls ahlo part ot the legislative
branch of the gm·ernment, It must be obvious to every one that there are times when
he must be ex(!Used from the ordinary process ot the courts. We presume It wlll not
be contended that he would be obliged to
obey the mandate of a subprena during the
sessions ot the legislature. when his presenC'e
at the capital ls constantly required, or
whilst engaged In the suppression ot an insurrection. These, however, do not embrace
all his duties as governor. We must, therefore, go one step further, and concede that
he ls exempt trom such process whenever
engaged in any duty pertaining to bis omce.
Granting that there may be times when he
ls not so engaged, and when he might be
free to answer to a subprena, who Is to be
the judge of bis engagements or dlsenJt&ge300

·i

ments? May he be compelled to appear before a court and submit himself to the judgment thereof as to whether his duties, just
then, require him to be In his o11l<!e at Harrisburg, or at the head ot the army in the field,
or whether he may not have a few days or
leisure, during which he may await the wlll
and pleasure of a grand jury? It will be
conceded that In all ordinary cases be must
himself judge as to what things he must do
and what things he must leave undone, and
that tlris Is a duty Imposed upon him by the
constitution. But how, then, shall a court at
any time step In and assume the power of
judging for him? 'nils cannot be done except by an unwarrantable aasumptlon ot executive prerogative. The same reasoning
which brings us to the ooneluslon that the
governor ls the absolute judge of what omclal communications to himself or his department may or may not be revealed, In
like manner leads us to conclude that he must
be the sole judge, not only of what hie omclal dntles are, but also of the time when
they should be attended to. The governor.
dl81lvowlng &Dy disrespect to the court or Its
process, has answered that, in consequence
ot his constant commun1catlon with the
state forces, now in the field, In the disorderly and riorous districts, bis time ls fully occupied In the dlflcharge of the duties of his
oftlce, and that to leave his post would endanger the Interests CYf. the public service..
This brings us face to face with the que&tlon whether the executive, or the courts tor
him, are to determine the character ot his
oftlclal duties, and the order In which they
may be performed. For Instance, Is obedience to a subprena one ot his duties, aDd, if
so, shall he discharge that duty In preference to that which reets upon him as commander ID chlet? The answer to this question ls easy; for If the courts can In any one
Instance or at any one time control or direct
the executive In the performance of bis duties, they may do so In every Instance and ac
all times. We need n<Jt: waste time ln the
attempt to prove that this proposition ls not
allowable; that the governor mnnot thus be
placed under the guardianship and tutelage
of the courts. To the people, under tbe
methods prescribed by law, not to the courts.
ls he answerable for his doings or mlsdc>!ngs. It ls his duty from time to time "to
give to the general assembly Information of
the state of the commonwealth," but it ls not
his duty to render such an account to thP
grand jury of Allegheny or any other county.
Whilst, therefore, the motives of the court
of quarter sessions In granting the proceBB
before us are not to be lightly Impugned,
yet we have no doubt It exceeded Its jurisclktlon In attempting to Interfere with th~
executive prerogative.
Let the attachment be set aside.
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ALEXANDER v. UNITED STATES.

(11 Sup. Ct. 350, 138 U. S. 353.)

Supreme Court of the United States.

1891.

In error to the circuit court of the

United States for the western district of

Arkansas.

This was a writ oi error sued out under

the sixth section of the act of February 6,

1889, (.5 St. 656,) to review a judgment of

the circuit court of the United States for

the western district of Arkansas.imposing

a sentence of death upon the plaintiff in

error for the murder of David C. Steadman

“at the (‘reek Nation in the Indian coun-

try.”

The plaintiff in error relied upon the foi-

lowing grounds for reversal:

(1) That the court erred in its selection
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of the jury, in that the defendant was re-

quired to make his challeiiges without

ﬁrst knowing what challenges the govern-

ment’s attorney had made, and thus chal-

lenged two jurors, to-wit, C. F. Needles

and Samuel Lawrence. who were also

challenged by the government, whereby

he was deprived of two of his challenges

contrary to law.

(2) That the court erred in excluding the

testimony offered by the defendant tn

prove threats to kill Steadman made by

House and others, while they were hunt-

ing Steadman under the belief that he had

seduced the wife of the said House and

ALEXA~DER T.

UNITED STA.TES.
(11 Sup. Ct. 300, 138 U. S. 333.)
Supreme Court of the United States. Feb. 2,

1891.
lo error to the circuit court of the
IJnited 8ta tee for the western district of
.Arkansas.
This was a writ of error saecl out under
the sixth section of the act of February 8,
1889, (25 Rt. 656,) to review a Judgment of
the circuit court of the United Ktates for
the weMtern dbJtrlr.t of Arkansae. lmposlnl(
a sentencf" of death upon the plaintiff In
error for the murder of Duvld C. Steadman
•at the ('reek Nation In the Indian coun-

try."

The plaintiff In error relh~ll upon the following grounds for revental:
(1) That the coo rt erl'OO In Its selection
ot the Jar~·. In that the defendant was required tu makP his challenges without
ttnit knowing what challenges the government's attorney had made, and thus <'hallenjl,"ed twn jnrm.'IJ, to-wit, C. F. Needles
and Samuel Lawrenee, who were alHo
ch111le11ged by the government, whereby
be was deprived of two of his challenges
contrary to law.
(21 That theconrterred lnexcludlnJ!; the
testimony offered by the defendant to
prove threats to kill Steadman made by
Honse and others, while they were huntIn~ 8teadman under the belief that he bad
seduced the wife of the s1tld House and
wus secreting himself with her In the
nelj!,"h bo rhood.
(3) Because the court erred In admltttn111: the testimony of J. G. RallR as to
confi<1ent1a1 communicntions made to him
as the attorney of the defendant.
A. H. Garlllnd and Heber J. May, for
J>luintiff In P.rror. Sol. Gen. Taft, for the
United States.

was secreting himself with her in the

neighborhood.

(3) Because the court erred in admit-

ting the testimony of J. G. Rails as to

conﬁdential communications made to him

as the attorney oi the defendant.

A. H. Garland and Heber J. May, for

plaintiff in error. Sol. Gen. Taft, for the

United States.

Mr. Justice BROWN, after stating the

facts as ubovo,deiivered the opinion of

the court.

l. With regard to the ﬁrst error as-

signed,it appears from the record that

“the court directed two lists of thirty-

seven qualiﬁed jurymen to beniade out by

the clerk, and one given to thedistrict at-

tomey and one to the counsel for the de-

fendant; and the court further directed

each side to proceed with its challenges

independent of the other, and without

knowledge on the part of either as to

what challenges had been made by the

other,—to which method of proceeding in

that regard defendant at the time offered

no objections, but proceeded to make his

challenges, and in so doing challenged

two jurors, to-wit, C. F.Needles and Sain-

nel Lawrence, who had been also chal-

lenged by the government." We do not

deem it necessary to inquire whether there

was errorin the method pursued by the

court in impaneling this jury. It appears

distinctly from the bill of exceptions that

Mr. Juetlce BROWN, after elating the
facts as obovc. delivered the opinion of
the court.
l. With 1."eKard to the flrst error assl~ned, It appears from the record tbut
"tbe court direeted two lists of tblrtyseven riaallfied jurymen to he made oat by
the clerk, and one gh'en to the district attorney llnd one to the cotmHel for the defendant; and the court further directed
l'&ch side to pror1..'f'd with Its cballtmg~
in<kpe111l~ot of the other, and without
knowledJ:e on the purt of either as to
whnt challPllA"eS hod been macle bv the
other,-to which method of proceeding In
that rejl,"ard defendant at the time offered
110 objf!f'tlons, bat proeeeded to mnke his
chttllenges, and In so doing challenged
two Jurors, to-wit, C. F. Needles and Samuel Lawrence, who had been ah111 challeng':'d by the gon~rnment." We do not
deem It necessary to inquire whether there
was e1Tor In the m1.-thud pursued bv the
court i11 Impaneling this Jury. It appeat'B
distinctly from the bill of exceptions that
the defendant offered no ohJectlon to It at
the time, and made no demaud to ch1tlle11Ke any of the jury beyond the 21.1 allowl•tl by Rev. St.§ t<19. lnl!eed. It doPR
not ·clearly appear whl<-h side made the
first chalknge1:1, or the t defendant had
not exbau11ted hi11 challenges before the

I
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government challen1red the two jurors in
question. If It werti a fact that ti.P de·
fl'ndant had mado his 20 cbullenbre" before
the government challenged these two men,
It Is dlfHcalt to· "ee how his rights were
prejudiced by thl' action of the district attorney.
But the decisive answer to this aBSlgnment is that the attention of the court
does not setim to have been called to it ootll after the con vlctlon, '!lfhen the defendant made It a ground of his motion for a
new trial. It IB the duty of counsel st-ason11 hly to call the attention of the court
to any error In fmpanellng the jury, in admitting testimony, or In any other proceeding durinl{ the trial by which hl11 rights
a1•e prejadked, and In case of an advt•rse
rullng tu note an exception. Stoddard v.
Clum1bers, 2 How.~; De Sohry v. Nichol.son 8 Wall. 420; Railroad C'o. v. Hart,
114 U.S. 854. ll Sap. Ct. Rep. 1127; 'rhomp.
Trials, §§ 6llO, 693, 700.
2. To understand rally the force of the
second error assigned, it ls necessary to
state su much of the evidence as exhibits
substantially the case made oat by the
go,·ernment. The evldenct!tended to show
that the defendant aud the deceased,
8teadman, bad agreed to go Into the stock
buslnesR together, and, upon the day of
the murder, were endeavoring to rent a
farm for the purpose of wintering their
horses, and making a crop the following
year. They were returning to their camp
both armed with guns. Defendant was
alHn armed with a pb1tol. So far as the
evidence dlsclo&E1t, 8teadmen disappeared
and was never seen altve again. A few
minutes nfterthey were lastHeen. a witness.
who hnd met thl'm, saw the two horses,
without riders, sttwrllng in the roud near
a wood. Shortly after, eight or nine
shots were heard In the wood, and nfter
this the defendant was seen upon the road,
slttlnj!," upm.1 one of the horses, and leading
the other, whleh bad no rider. In about
12 days the body of Steadman Wllll round
half a mile from the place from where he
and defendant had been secn, nnd within 75
yards of the place where the hurse11 were
11een standing. His skull wns cm11hed,
and ther" waR a bullet hole In It hack of
the ear. There was also l'Vldenct1 that
Steadman hnd a large amount of mone.v
on bis perl'lon at the time he dlHappeare1l.
The defend1tnt offered contradictory explanRtlons of Steadman's dlHllJ>pearance.
At onl' time suid he had probably bet'n
killed, and at another time Hugge11ted 1ml·
clde, end at ttnotber pretended to helleve
a story that had been clrcul11 tecl In the
neighborhood that Steadman and a marrll'd womnn by the name of House had
dl!mppen.red and were hiding together. Evidence WllH admitted tendlnp; to show thnt
Mra. House and Steaclmun had been sPen
In conference the d11.v before. and thRt the
~enerul lmpreHslon in theneighhorhootl et
the time was that tney had gone off together. House and his friends had nrmed
tl1emselves with guns and pistols and had
ridden through the conntr.\· hm1ting for
them, under the belief that they were hiding together In the ll"ighborhood, or had
fled the country t•>gether.
Now, U evidence was udwltted to show
897
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that House had armed himself, and was

hunting for Steadman, under the impres-

sion that the latter had eloped with his

wife, and was secreting himself in that

vicinity, it is dliﬁcult to see upon what

principle his threats in that connection

were excluded. Accepting the theory of

the government that mere threats, unac-

companied hy acts of a threatening unt-

ure, were irrelevant to the question of de-

fendant's guilt, it is not easy to under-

stand how the acts themselves could be

made pertinent without testimony tend-

ing to show the reason why House had

armed himself. and, with otherparties. was

scouring the country for Steadman. ' ‘heir

statements in that connection would be

clearly illustrative of the act in question,

and a. partof the res gestze, within the rule
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laid down in Lord George Gordon's Case,

1 Greenl. Ev. §]08, and within all the au-

thorities upon the snbject of declarations

as part of the res gesta.-.

At the same time we recognize a certain

discretion on the part of the trial judge to

rule out this entire testimony, both of the

acts and the declarations of House, if, in

his opinion, they were so remote or insig-

nificant as to have no legitimate tendency

to show that House could have commit-

ted the murder. If, for instance, it were

clearly proven that the murder was com-

mitted beiore the threats of House were

uttered, or the two occurrences were so re-

mote in time and place as to demonstrate

that there could have been no connection

between them, it would be the duty of the

court to exclude the testimony. But if,

on the other hand. the time and the cir-

cumstances attendlngthe murder were un-

certain or obscure, the conduct and threats

of House might havea material bearing

upon the identiﬁcatlon of the murderer.

It is held by some of the authorities that

the question whether such evidence should

be admitted or excluded is, to a certain

extent, a matter oi discretion with the

trial judge. Shailer v.Bumstead,99 Mass.

112: Thayer v.'i‘hayer, 101 Mass.1l1: Com.

v. Abbott, 130 Mass. 472; Com. v. Ryan,

134 Mass. 223; Mclnturf v. State, 20 Tex.

App. 335.

In the present case, however, it is as-

sumed, both in the exception noted to the

exclusion oi the testimony and in the briefs

of counsel. to have been proven as a fact,

by the witness Terry, that on the day of

the disappearance of Steadman and Mrs.

House, he saw Samuel House, her hus-

band. and several others, relatives and

friends of House, riding around the neigh-

borhood armed with Winchester guns and

pistols, hunting for deceased and Mrs.

House, who were then believed to have

eloped together, or to be secreting them-

selves in the neighborhood; and although

the testimony oi Terry, as set forth in the

bill oi exceptions, fails to support this
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that House had ·armed himself, and was
huntfn~ for Steadm1rn, nnrler the Impression that the latter hud elop<'d with hlB
wife, and was secreting himself In that
vicinity, It is dltllcult to Bee upon what
principle bis threats In that connection
were Pxcluded. Ac~eptlng the theory of
the government that mere threRts, unaccompanied by acts of a threatening nuture, were Irrelevant to the question of defendant's guilt, It ts not easy to understanrl ho.v the arts thP.mRelv(',s could be
ruade pertinent without testimony tending to Mhow the reason why House had
armed himself, and, with other parties, was
scouring the countr.vfor 8tf'adm11a. Their
statt'ments in that connection would be
cleurly llluHtrative of the act In QUt'stlon,
and a part of the re.<i gestre, within the rule
laid down In Lord George Gordon's Case,
1 Green!. Ev. § 108, and within all the authorities upon the snbJeet of declarations
as part of tile res l(t!stre.
At tne same time we recognize a certain
diRCretiou on the part of the trial judge to
rule out tills entire testimony, both of the
actN and the declnratione of Hout1e, If, In
hi11 opinion, they were· so remote or lnsignltlc11nt BR to huve no legitimate tendPncy
to show that House could hove committed the murder. If, for lnstnnce, It were
cle1trly proYen that the murcler was committed before the threats of House \Vere
utter<'d, or the t.wo occurrence11 were so remote In time and place as to demonstrate
thn t there could have been no connection
between them, it would be the duty of the
court to exdude the testimony. But If,
on the other hand, the time and the clrcum.-tencee attending the mm·derwere uncertain or obscure, the conduct and threats
of House might he'\"e 11 materl11I bearing
upon the ldentlftcatlon of the murderer.
It Is held by some of the authorities that
the qaestlon whether 1mch evidence 11hoald
be uthnltted or excluded is, to a certain
extent, a matt.er of di11cretion with the
trlnl judge. Shaller v. Bumstead,99 Mass.
112; '!'hayerv. Thayer, 101 Muse.Ill; Com.
v. Abbott, 130 Maes. 472; Com. v. Uyan,
134 Muss. 223; Mcinturf v. State, 20 Tex.
App. 3:{5,
In the pres~nt case, however, it ls a.ssumell, both in the exception noted to the
exclusion or the testlmon.v ond In the briefs
of counsPI, to ha,·e been pro\·en RS a fact,
by the witness 'l'erry, that on the day of
the disappearance of Stendman and Mrs.
Hom;e, be 11aw Samuel House, her busbancl. and several others, relath·es and
frlPn<ls of Hom<ce, riding around thll neighbi1rhoo<l armt'd with Winchet1ter guns nod
pistole, hunting for deceased an<l Mrs.
House, who were then believed to have
eloped together, or to be secreting them11eh-e11 in the neighborhood; and although
the testimony of Terry, as set forth lo the
bill or exceptlonR, falls to support this
stntement, or to show cletlnltely what he
did Intend to swear to, yet, assuming It. to
be ttH stated, we think that, If it were
sho\\·n that House was tn search of Steedrran. his declaratlons,as to hie purpose In
so tlolng 11tend u110n the suwe basis, with
re~ard to admlF11dblllty. as his conduct,
and were a part of the 1-eR ,.,restre. But in
tlw view we take of the next usslgnment
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we tlnd it onnecet1sary to determlntt
whether there was 1meh error In ruling ont
this tl'Elthnony as to require a reversal.
3. 'l'he third assignment relates to the
admission of the testimony of J. G. Halls,
an a1.torney at law, to wblch objrctlou
waa made upon the ground that It re-lated to a confidential communication
made by the defendant, who bad consulted Ralls as an attorney at law, and was
therefore privileged. Ralls stated In substance that be was practicing law at Mnlfrogee; that defendant came to bis olHcethere bttween the time of Steadman's disappearance and the finding of his body.
"and asked me If I was an attol"nPy. I
told him I was. He said his name was
Alexander, and he went on to state that
he and bis partner had some forty heacl of
horse8 across the river, In partnership.
and that some time before th1tt, probably
a week before, his partner was mlssinJr,
ancl he hadn't heard from him . He sttys
hlH partner had a brotherln California, and
he wus afl'8id his brother would come up
there and ruak11 some trouble nbout the
horses. He stated at the tlmP. his partner
had taken orf the money, and he wanted
to know If he could hold the bOntel! so as
to secure bis purt of the money. I asked
him If the horRes would pay him for his
part, an<l he 11ald they would. I told him to
hold the horses. They could not take
them until that wa11 settled." lt le Pvident from this statement that defl'ndant
consulted with Ralls as R legal ad vlHer, and
while, if he were guilty of the murder, It
may have bad a tendency to sbuw an effort on his part to defraud his partner's.
estate, and tu makeprottt outof hlsdeath,
by apvroprlatlng to hlmBP.lf the partnership property, It did not necessarily have
that tendency, and was clearly a privileged
communication. If he consulted him to.
the capacity of au a ttoruey, und the eommuulcatlon was In the course of his employment, 11.nd may be supposed to havebeeo drawn out In consequence of the relations of the parties to each othPr. neither
the payment of a fee nor the pend ency of
litigation was nf'<'eseary to cutltlP him tothe prl\•llege. Williams v. Fitch, 18 N. Y.
546; Britton v. Lorenz, 45 N. Y. 51; Bacort
v.Frlsble, &ON. Y.394; Andrews v. Simms.
33 Ark. 771.
In tile language of Mr. Justice STORY.
speaking for this court In Chirac v. Reinlcker, 11 Wheat. 2811, 294: "Whatever facts,
therefore, are communicated by a client to
a counsel solely on account of that relation, such counsel a1'6 not at liberty, even
If they wish, to disclose; and the 111w
bolds their testimony Incompetent."
We are referred, however, to the ca11e or
Queen v. Cox, 14 Q. B. Di-r. 153, as holt'.lng
the doctrine that, where a communication
ls made to counsel In furtherauc<' of a
scheme to commit a crime, the client '"
not entitled to the privilege. This was
a crown case reserved nnd urgueci hPfore
lO Judµ.es of the qupen's bench division.
The dcfendnnt11 Cox and Rull tun wen.' Indicted for a comipirUl"Y to defraud one
Munster. 'l'he fucts stated show that
Munster hnd obtained a juclgmcnt nixuinMt
Uallton In an action for libel, upon which
an execution had issued, which the sb<:rlfl
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proposed to levy upon the defendant's

stock in trade. He was met, however, by

a bill of sale from Railton toCox,the other

defendant, antedating the execution. It

was claimed that the bill of sale was

fraudulent, and made for the purpose of

depriving M nnster of his rights under the

judgment, and Raiiton and Cox were in-

dicted for conspiracy. The question was

whether an interview had by Railton and

Cox with Goodman, a solicitor, as to what

could be done to prevent the property

from being seized under execution. was

competent evidence, or was a. privileged

communication. No point was made that

Goodman was not consulted as an attor-

ney. The court unanimously held that

the evidence was competent. Mr. Justice

S’[‘EPl]l'J.\',\\'li0 delivered the opinion of the
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court, said,in a very exhaustive discus-

sion, that the question was " whether, if a

client applies to a legal adviser for ad vice

intended to facilitate or to guide the client

in the commission of a. crime or fraud, the

legal adviser being ignorant of the pur-

pose for which his advice is wanted, the

communication between the two is priv-

ileged. We expressed our opinion at the

end of the argument that no such privi-

lege existed. If it did. the result would be

that a man intending to commit treason

or murder might safely take legal advice

for the purpose of enabling himself to do

so with impunity, and that the solicitor

to whom the application was made would

not be at liberty to give information

against his client for the purpose of frus-

trating his criminal purpose.” After cit-

ing and commenting upon a large number

of cases, he comes to the conclusion that,

if the communication be made in further-

ance of any criminal or fraudulent pur-

pose, it is not privileged. This case. how-

ever, is clearly distinguishable from the

one under consideration, in the fact that

the solicitor was consulted with regard

to a scheme to defraud, for which he was

subsequently indicted and tried, and the

testimony was offered upon that trial;

while in this case the consultation was

had alter the crime was committed, and

was offered in evidence as an admission

tending to show that defendant was con-

cerned in the crime, or rather as a. state-

ment contradictory to one he had made

upon the stand. Had he been indicted

and tried fora fraudulent disposition of

his partner-‘s property, the cue of Queen

v. Cox would have been an authority in

favor of admitting this testimony, but we

think the rule announced in that case

should be limited to cases where the party

is tried for the crime in furtherance of

which the communication was made.

Had the interview in this case been held

for the purpose of preparing his defense,

or even for devising a. scheme to escape

the consequences of his crime, there could

propOlled to levy upon the defendant's
11tock in trade. He watt met, howe\•er, by
a bill of sale from Ra II tun tu <.:ox, the other
defendant, un tt•clu ting the exl.ocutlun. It
Wl\8 claimed that the bill of sule was
fraudulent, and made for the purpose uf
deprl\"ing Munster of his rights un<ler the
judgment, and Rall ton and Cox were indicted for conspiracy. The question waR
whether an Interview had by Rallton ancl
Cox with Goudma.n, a solicitor, as to what
could be done to prevent the property
from being seized under execution, wad
competent evidence, 01· was a privileged
communication. No point was made that
Goodman waR not eom~ulted as an attorney. The court unanlmuu1:1Jy held that
the evidence was comp~tent. Mr. Justice
8TEPDEN, who delivered the opinion of the
court, said, in a very exhaustl\e dll!cuselon, that the question was "whether, If a
cllent applies to a legal adviser for ad vice
lntendetl to facilitate or to guide the client
In the commission of a crime or frnud, the
ieKal adviser being Ignorant of the purpose for which hill ad,·fc'e is wanted, the
communication between the two Is priv·
lle~ed.
We expressed our opinion at the
end of the argument that no such privilege existed. If It did, the result would be
that a man intending to commit treason
or murder might safely take legal ad vice
for the purpose of enabling him11elf to do
so with Impunity, and that the rmllcitor
to whom the application was made would
not be at liberty to ,r;lve ln!ormatlon
against his client for the purpo11e of frustrating bis criminal purr)ose." After citing encl commenting upon a large number
or l'8St<s, he comes to the conclusion that,
If the communication be made In furtherance of any criminal or fraudulent purpose, It Is not prlvlleged. This case. however, le clearly dietingulehable from the
one under consideration, In the fact that
the solicitor was consulted with regard
to a scheme to defraud, for which be was
1t1heequently Indicted and tried, o.nd the
testimony was offered upon that trial;
whlle in this case the commltatlon WWI
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had alter the crime WM committed, nod
was ottered In e\•lclence as an admls11ion
tendln&" to show that defendant was concerned In the crime, or rather as a state-meut cuntra<llctory to one be had mnde
upon the stand. Had be bPen Indicted
and trlecl for a frauduleut dl11positlon of
bis pa1·tner's property, the case of Queen
v. Cox would have been un authority In
favor of admitting this testimony, but we
think the rule announced In that ease
Mlioul<t he limited to cases where the party
Is tried for the crime in further11nce of
w hlch the communication was made.
Had the interview in this ease bl>en held
for the purp1 >Se Of preparing bis defenRe,
or even for <1evl11lng a scheme to escnpe
the consequenl'es of his crime, there could
be no doubt of Its being privileged, although he had ma!le the samt: statement
that his partner wns missing an<t he had
not beard from him. Now, the coLnmunicatlon In question was pe11ectly h1H·mless
upon its ftM:e. 1f it were true tha,, bis
partner waM mlflslng, and he hnd not he>nrd
from him, aud that Steadman had taken
oH the money, there was no Impropriety
In his eoueultln'1; counsel for the rmrpos&
or ascertaining If he could bold the honiee,
so as to secure his part of it. Ralls usked
him In that connection tr tbeho~es wuulcl
pay him for his part, and llefendunt Maid
they would. He then told him to hold
the horseH; that they could not take them
untll that was settled.
It Is only by assuming tbat he wus
guilty of the murder that bis erheme t<>
defraud hie partner becomes at a11 manlfet1t . Hie Rtntement that hie partner was
n1isslnJ1: and that he had not beard from
him II! the only ma terlal or relevant part
of the conversation, and was plainly
pr! vilel(ed .
'fhe jod~ment of the court below must
be reverset.1, and the case remanded for a
new trial.
GRAY, J. woe not p1'esent at the argu..ment, and took no part In the decision or
this l'llBe.
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Owen T. Reeves, Judge.

Thomas F. Tipton, for plaintiff in error.

Kc:-rick, Lucas & Spencer, for defendants in
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SWAIM v. HUMPHREYS et al.
(42 Ill. App. 370.)
Appellate Court of Illinois. Nov. 25, 1891.
Error to circuit cqurt, McLean county;
Owen T. Reeves, Judge.
Thomns F. Tipton, for plaintiff In error.
KeITick, Lucas & Spencer, tor defendants in
error.

error.

BOG-GS, J. This case has been twice be-

fore in this court. Swaim v. Humphreys, 15

Ill. App. 451; Humphreys v. Swaim, 21 Ill.

App. 231.

Plaintiff in error, then sheriif of McLean

county, received an execution issued by the

circuit clerk of that county upon a judg-

ment confessed in vacation by J. S. Arn-

speiger and S. R. Lovell in favor of N. N.

Winslow, and by virtue thereof levied upon

certain groceries and provisions belonging to
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the defendants in the execution, being part

of their stock in trade, they being retail

grocers in Bloomington. Defendants in er-

ror, who were wholesale grocers in Bloom-

ington, had sold and delivered to Arnspeiger

& Lovell the goods levied upon, and to secure

the amount due them therefor, had received

a chattel mortgage upon the stock of gro-

ceries, etc., and they instituted this suit in

replevin against the sheriff to recover posses-

sion of the goods.

The chattel mortgage permitted the mort-

gagors to retain possession of the mortgaged

property, and to sell same in regular course

of trade, and, being for that reason regarded

as void, defendants in error sought in the

ﬁrst trial in the circuit court to recover the

goods on the ground that they had been in-

duced to sell and deliver them to Arnspeiger

& Lovell by false and fraudulent representa-

tions on the part of that ﬁrm as to their ti-

nancial condition and commercial standing,

and upon that theory they succeeded upon

the hearing.

Plaintiif in error brought the case to this

court, and it was held (15 Iii. App. -151) that

the evidence did not support the ﬁndings of

the circuit court on this issue of fraud, and

the judgment was reversed and cause re-

manded.

Upon the hearing of the case the second

time in the circuit court, defendants in error

claimed that the execution by virtue of which

the sheriif held the property was issued be-

fore the judgment upon which it was based

had been entered of record, and in support

of such claim offered oral testimony, which,

upon the objection of the plaintiff in error,

was rejected by the court, and the second

trial resulted adversely to the defendants in

error, from which they prosecuted an appeal

to this court. Upon consideration of the

question thus presented it was held by this

court: First, that an execution upon a judg-

ment confessed in vacation is void if issued

before the judgment is actually entered of

record; second, that oral evidence is admis-

sible to prove that an execution was issued

and was in fact in the hands of the Sll(‘l‘llT

BOGGS, J. This case has been twice before in this court. Swaim v. Humphreys, 15
Ill. App. 451; Humphreys v. Swaim, 21 Ill.
App. 231.
Plaintiff In error, then sheriff of McLean
county, received an execution lssued by the
circuit clerk of that county upon a judgment confessed in vacation by J. S. Arnspelger and S. R. Lovell in favor of N. N.
Winslow, and by virtue thereof levied upon
certain groceries and provisions belonging to
the defendants in the execution, being part
ot their stock in trade, they · being retail
grocers In Bloomington. Defendants In error, who were wholesale grocers ln Bloomington, had sold and delivered to Arnspelger
& Lovell the goods levied upon, and to secure
the amount due them therefor, had received
a chattel mortgage upon the stock of groceries, etc., and they Instituted this suit In
replevln against the sherur to recover posseeslon of the goods.
The chattel mortgage permitted the mortgagors to retain possession ot the mortgaged
J!roperty, and to sell same In regular course
of trade, and, being for that reason regarded
as void, defendants In error sought In the
first trioJ In th~ circuit court to recover the
icoods on the ground that they had been Induced to sell and deliver them to Arnspelger
4 Lovell by false and fraudulent representations on the part of that firm as to their llnancloJ condition and commercial standing,
and upon that theory they succeeded upon
the hearing.
Plaintiff In error brought the case to this
court, and It was held (15 Ill. App. 451) tllat
the evidence did not support the findings of
the circuit court on this issue of fraud, and
the judgment was reversed and cause remanded.
Upon the hearing ot the case the second
time in the circuit court, defendants in error
claimed that the execution by virtue of which
the sheriff held the prnperty was issued before the judgment upon which It WllB based
had been entered of record, and In support
of such claim offered oral testimony, which,
upon the objection of the plaintiff In en-or,
was rejectetl by the court, nnd the second
trial rl'sulted adversely to the defendants In
error, from which they prosecuted an appeal
to this court. Upon consideration of the
question thus presented It was hl•id by this
court: First, thut 11.n execution upon a judgment confessed In vacutlon Is void If Issued
befo1·e the judgment is actually entered ot
400

recol'd; second, that oral evidence ts admlsslble to prove that an execution was Issued
and was In fact In the hands ot the she1·1tf
before the judgment was written up. Tlw
circuit court having erroneously refused to
permit such oral evidence to be heard, it~
judgment was reversed, and the cause again
remanded. Humphreys v. Swaim, 21 Ill.
App. Zl2.
The cause has again been heard In the cir·
cult court, the result being a Judgment lo
favor of defendants In error, to reverse whkb
the Wl'it of error now before us Is pr08e·
cuted.
The material questions arising upon the
present record are: First. Was Wllllam E.
Hughes properly required to testify as to
whether the judgment had been entered of
record when the execution was Issued ·1 Se<-ond. Could defendants ln error, If their mortgage was void as to execution creditors, have
judgment for the recovery of the property?
Counsel for plaintiff In error also Insist
that oral testimony is not competent to be re('eived to show that the judgment had not
been written of record when the execution
issued, but, as this court in this same case
(21 Ill. App. 232) bas expressly held that such
evidence ls admissible, we must decline to
again consider, but wlll adhere to the rule
there announced.
Wllllam E. Hughes was Introduced in tbt'
circuit court as a witness for defendants In
error.. He testified that be wu an attorney
tor the plalntur In error, and was also attorney for Winslow, the execution creditor.
That as such attorney for Winslow be prepared the declaration and cognovlt upon
which the jud1:nnent In question was render·
ed, and presented them to the clerk, and performed such other duties as were professionally required to entitle his client to a
judgment In vacation. As such attorney he
requested that execution be issued on the
judgment, which was done by the clerk, and
the same banded by the clerk to him. After
these facts were elicited, the witness W&JI
asked it the clerk bad written up the judgment before the execution was Issued. To
this the plaintiff In error objected on the
ground that It was by reason of his professional relation to Winslow that the witneBll
had obtained whatever knowledge be might
have of the matter desired to be inquired
Into, and that It was therefore privileged
from disclosure by him. This objection WM
overruled, and the witness required to answer.
The testimony of the witness established
the fact to be that before the judgment had
heen entered of record by the clerk the execution was Issued and delivered to the witness, who Immediately placed It In the hands
of the sheriff.
The rule Is well settled that an attorney
will not be compelled, or even allowed,
against the objection of the client, to disdose
anything communicated by his client to him
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in his professional capacity, and the reason

on which the rule rests is that it is in the

interest oi.‘ Justice that the most full, free.

and complete communication should take

place between attorney and client. It is not.

however, in the interest of justice to extend

this privilege so that by its operation the

truth in relation to facts otherwise in the

knowledge of an attorney be suppressed.

When desiring to deﬁne its breadth and lim-

its, Mr. Greenleaf says: “The great object

of the rule seems to plainly require that the

entire professional intercourse between client

and attorney. whatever it may have consist-

ed in, should be protected by profound se-

crecy.” 1 Greenl. Ev. § 240.

“The privilege." it is said in Best on Evi-

dence (section 281), “does not extend to mat-

ters of fact which the attorney knows by
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other means than conﬁdential communica-

tions with his client, even though, if he had

not been employed as attorney, he probably

would not have known them." In effect the

same is held in Bridge Co. v. Jameson, 48 Ill.

283; Crosby v. Berger, 4 Edw. Ch. 25-1; Den-

brough v. Rawlins, 3 Mylne & K. 505; 1

Greenl. Ev. § 2-H.

The fact which Mr. Hughes was called up-

on to disclose did not arise from. and had no

connection with. the professional intercourse

between himself and his client. 1t was not

in its nature or character either private or

conﬁdential. It was not an act done by the

client, or by his agent or servant, or any one

acting in his behalf.

w11.cUs.Ev.--26

The witness, in the discharge of profes-

sional duty, had indeed been called to the

otiice of the clerk of the circuit court. He

placed papers in the hands of the clerk

which required of the clerk the performance

of an oﬂicial duty, in the discharge whereof

he sustained no conﬁdential relation what-

ever to the witness of his client. It became

important to know what otﬁcial act the clerk

there performed; and of this the witness had

knowledge. Such knowledge was not obtain-

ed by the witncss in any wise from the

client, nor from professional intercourse with

him. The privilege of secrecy does not ex-

tend a.nd cover information and knowledge

thus obtained, and the circuit court ruled

correctly in requiring the witness to answer.

It is clear that the execution issued before

there was a judgment of record to support it.

The execution was therefore void, and the

possession of the goods by the sheril‘! under

it unauthorized. 21 Ill. App. 231, supra.

The chattel mortgage, upon which must

rest the right of defendant in error to pos-

session of the goods in question, was not

valid as against the rights and interests

of third persons. As between the parties to -

it, the mortgage was good and effectual; and

if the sheriff had no legal writ wherewith to

seize the property, it must be surrendered by

him to the owners, or to the defendants in

error, if they have superior right as between

In his professional capacity, and the reason
on which the rule rests la that It la In the
Interest of justice that the most full. tree,
and complete communication should take
place between attorney and client. It IB not,
howeve1·, In the Interest of justice to extend
this privilege so that by Its operation the
truth In relation to facts otherwise In the
knowledge of an attorney be sup1>reased.
When desiring to define Its breadth and limits, Mr. Greenleaf says: "The great object
of the rule seems to plainly require that the
entire professional Intercourse between client
and attorney, whatever It may have consisted in, should be protected by profound secrecy." 1 Greenl. Ev. f 240.
"The privilege,'' It ls said In Best on Evidence (section 281), "does not extend to mattel"3 ot fact which the attorney knows by
other means than confidential communications with bis client, even though, If he had
not been employed as attorney, be probably
would not have known them." In etl'ect the
same ls held In Bridge Co. v. Jameson, 48 Ill.
283; Croeby v. Berger, 4 Edw. Ch. 2:>4; Denbrough v. Rawlins, 3 Mylne & K. 505; 1
Greenl. Ev. § 244.
The fact which Mr. Hughes was called upon to disclose did not arise from, and had no
connection with, the professional Intercourse
between himself and his client. It was not
In Its nature or character either private or
confidential. It was not an act done by the
client, or by his agent or servant, or any one
acting In his behalf.
WILGUS,Ev.-26

The wltuess, In the discharge of professional duty, had Indeed been called to the
ofHce of the clerk of the cll·cult court. He
placed papers In the hands of the clerk
which required of the clerk the performance
of an official duty, In the discharge whereof
he sustained no confidential relation whatever to the witness of his client. It became
Important to know what official act the clerk
there performed; and of this the witness bad
knowledge. Such knowledge was not obtained by the witness In any wise from the
cllent, nor fl'oru p1·ofesslonal Intercourse with
him. The privilege ot secrecy does not extend a.nd cover information and knowledge
thus obtained, and the circuit court ruled
correctly in requiring the witness to answer.
It Is clear tbnt the execution Issued before
there was a judgment of record to suppm·t it.
'fhe execution was therefore void, and the
possession ot the goods by the sherltl' under
It unauthorized. 21 Ill. App. 231, supra.
The chattel mortgage, upon which must
rest the right ot defendant in error to possession ot the goods In question, was not
valid as against the rights and interests
of third persons. As between the parties to
It, the mortgage was good and etl'ectual; and
If the sberitl' had no legal writ wherewith to
seize the property, It must be suri-endered by
him to the owners, or to the defendants in
error, If they have superior right as between
themselves and the owners. The judgment
must be aftlrmed.
Judgment aftlrmed.
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In re COLE.\IAN'S WILL.

(19 N. E. 71, 111 N. Y. 220.)

(19 X. E. 71, 111 N. Y. 220.)
Court of Appealtt of New York. Nov. 27, 1888.

Court of Appeals of New York. Nov. 27, 1888.

Appeal from supreme court. general term,

Third department.

James (J. Rogers, for appellant. A. D.

Wait, for respondent.

Appeal from supreme court, general term,
Thlrd department.
.Tames C. Rogers, for appellants.
Wait, for respondent.

A. D.

RIIGER, C. J’. The probate of the will of

William Coleman, deceased, was contested

before the surrogate by his widow and sev-

eral of his children and grandchildren, upon

the ground that he was not of sound mind

and memory at the time of its execution,

and its execution was procured through un-

due inﬂuence, fraud, and intimidation exer-

cised over him by Robert S. Coleman. The

will was admitted to probate, and the de-

cree was affirmed upon appeal by the gen-

eral term. It is urged upon this appeal that
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the evidence produced before the surrogate

by the contestants, as to the mental and

physical weakness and incompetency of the

testator to make a valid will, is so strong

and conclusive that this court should reverse

the decision of the court below upon the

facts. It is not our purpose to go into a

detailed history of the evidence, or comment

upon the. weight and force of the various

facts and circumstances proved on the trial

by the respective parties to sustain their sev-

eral positions, as it is not even claimed by

the appellants that there was no evidence to

support the decree of the surrogate. Their

utmost contention is that the evidence on

the part of the contestants is so persuasive

and convincing, either of the mental incom-

petency of the testator or of the exercise of

undue inﬂuence by the proponent in procur-

ing the execution of the will, that the court

should hold as matter of law that it was

error for the surrogate to admit it to probate.

The argument of the appellants is based, to

a large extent, upon evidence which was ad-

mitted on the trial against the objections of

the proponent, and which we deem to be

clearly inadmissible. \Vhile we consider the

case made by the contestants upon the evi-

dence to be very strong, and as presenting a

serious question whether the testator was

competent to make a valid will or not, yet

the exclusion of the evidence improperly re-

ceived on their behalf by the surrogate very

much impairs the force and strength of their

case. and leaves the evidence as to the tes-

tator's competency more nearly balanced

than it would otherwise have been.

A general outline of the facts will be suf-

ficient to present the views we deem it nec-

essar_v to express upon the determination of

this appeal. Robert S. Coleman, the only

son of the testator, was the proponent of the

will. and one of the three executors named

therein: the others having renounced or de-

clined io act in that capacity. The testator

at the time of its execution was upwards of

80 years of age, and died within a year there-

after. He Was then possessed of property

mainly consisting of real estate of the value

Rl"Gl~R. C. J. The probate of the will of
Wllllum Coleman, deceased, was contested
b<>fore the surrogate by his widow and several of his children and grandchildren, upon
the ground thnt he was not of sound mind
and memory at the time of its execution,
and its execution was procured through undue influ<>uce, fraud, and intimidation exerclsed ov<>r him by Robert S. Coleman. The
wlll was admitted to probate, and the decree was atfl.rmed upon appeal by the general term. It ls urged upon this appeal that
the evidence produced before the surrogate
by the contestants, as to the mental and
physical weakness and incompetency of the
testator to make a valid will, ls so strong
and conclusive that this court should reverse
the decision of the court below upon the
facts. It ls not our purpose to go into a
detailed history of the evidence, or comment
upon the weight and force of the various
facts and circumstances proved on the trial
by the respective parties to sustain their several positions, as It ls not even claimed by
the appellants that there was oo evidence to
support the decree of the surrogate. Their
utmost contention ls that the evidence on
the part of the contestants Is so persuasive
and convincing, either of the mental lncompetency of the testator or of the exercise of
undue Influence by the proponent ln procurIng the execution of the wlll, that the court
should hold as mutter of law that it was
error for the surrogate to admit it to probate.
The argument of the appellants Is based, to
a large extent, vpon evidence which was admitted on the trial against the objections of
the proponent, and which we deem to be
clearly Inadmissible. While we consider the
case made by the contestants upon the evldence to be very strong, and as presenting a
ser1om1 question whether the testator was
<'Ompctent to make a valid will or not, yet
the t>xl'iuRlon of the evidence Improperly recelv<>d on their behalf by the surrogate very
muc·h hnpalrs the force and strength of their
<'n!le. noel leaves the evidence as to the testutor's competency more nearly balanced
than It would otherwise have been.
A general outline of the facts will be suffi<'lent to present the views we deem lt neees!Ulry to express upon the determination of
this appeal. Robert B. Coleman, the owy
son of the teRtntor, was the proponent of the
will. and one of the three executors named
th<>reln: the othf'rs having renounced or dedined to act In that capacity. The testator
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at the time of Its execution was upwards ot
80 years of age, and died within a year thereafter. He was then possessed of property
mainly consisting of real estate of the value
of about '40,000, and had several children
and grandchildren who were In needy clr-cumstances, partially dependent upon him
for support; but were not mentioned In or
provided for by the wlll, although apparently
the naturnl objects of his bounty. That instrument, after making slight provision for
two of his grandchildren, gave his personal
property, together with a Ute-estate in bis
homestead, to bis widow, and the remaluder thereof, together with a r~lllalnder ln the
homestead, to the proponent. Robert was
by profesalon a. lawyer, and although living
in his father's family, and being supportt'd
, by him until he was nearly 40 years of age,
· had never rendered materlal assistance to
the testator in hls buslneBS alfalrs, and was
not apparently regarded by him with fa.vor,
or as a proper or fit person to have the management and control of busine11& such as that
In which the testator had theretofore been
engaged.
Upon the trial much evidence was given
upon both sides in regard to the mental and
physical condition of the testator during the
three or four years preceding his death; but
no direct evidence was produced as to any
effort on the part of the proponent to pro/ cure the making of a will by bis father, or to
lntluence or dictate the nature of Its provisions. The proof on the part of the coo1
testants as to the exercise of undue influence ls based wholly upon Inference sought
to be drawn from the apparently unfriendly
relations existing between the testator and
his son; the alleged unnatural and lnequltable disposition of the property; the advanced aee of the testator; and tbe abseo•-e
of any apparent reason, except the assumed
existence of some extraneous influence, for
excluding the other children from a share lo
his estate. There was much evidence produced by the contestants as to the lmpairment of the mental and physical condition of
the testator subsequent to 1877, when It was
claimed that he had experienced a paralytic
atrectlon which caused a gradual but contlnuous impairment of his faculties down to tht"
time of his death, In April, 1881. The evideuce was met on the part of the proponent
by nearly an equal number of witnesses,
who testlfted to facts and circumstances
showing the continued mental soundness of
the testator's faculties, and bis capacity to
transact business alfalrs, until after the executlon of the will.
The evidt•nce on the part of the contestants
ls subject to the criticism that much of It
was given under the obje<'tion of the proponent, and was of doubtful admissibility
upon the questions litigated. Aside from the
evidence of Mrs. Coleman, the most material
and important fa<'ts on the part of the <'ontestnnts were undoubtedly prol'ed by tht>
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-ecute the instructions of the testator.

witnesses Mrs. Seelye, the daughter of the

testator, and the two physicians, Drs. Clark

and Little, who testiiied to the unsountlness

of mind of the testator during the year 1877,

and subsequent thereto, from knowledge

acquired by them while attending him, rc-

spectively, in a professional capacity. This

evidence was duly objected to by the pro-

ponent, but was admitted against such ob-

jection. So far as the evidence of the medic-

al witnesses is concerned, there can be but

little doubt of its inadmissibility, and it

should have been disregarded by the surro-

gate in determining the question of the tes-

tator’s mental and physical condition. It

seems to us that this evidence falls clearly

within the prohibition contained in section

834 of the Code, as illustrated and applied in
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recent decisions of this court. Grattan v. In-

surance Co., 80 N. Y. 296; Edington v. In-

surance Co., 67 N. Y. 185; Westover v. In-

surance Co., 99 N. Y. 56, 1 N. E. 104; People

v. Schuyler, 106 N. Y. 318, 12 N. E. T83;

Renihan v. Dennin, 103 N. Y. 574, 9 N. E.

320.

It is perhaps not important that we should

comment upon the propriety of the rulings on

the trial in reference to the evidence on the

part of the contestants, since, in any event,

whether it be considered or not, we are of the

opinion that the question of the testator‘s

mental condition, and the exercise of undue

inﬂuence over him in respect to the execution

of the will, was one of fact, to be determined

by the trial court. Whatever may be said of

the evidence, we are clearly of the opinion

that not only was there evidence upon which

the decision of the surrogate could properly

be supported, but there was no such pre-

ponderance, as to the testator’s mental in-

capacity to make a valid will, as would have

authorized a reversal by an appellate tri-

bunal of the surrogate's decree determining

that fact in favor of the proponent. In re

Ross, 87 N. Y. 514; In re Cottrell, 95 N. Y.

~ -333; Hewlett v. Elmer, 103 N. Y. 161, 8 N.

E. 387. .

The most material question in the case

arises over the exception taken by the con-

testants to the admission of the evidence of

the witnesses Hughes and Northrup as to

conversations had by them, respectively,

with the testator at the time of receiving in-

structions in reference to a draft of the will

offered for probate, and another drawn about

two years previously by the same attorneys.

The testimony given by these witnesses was

undoubtedly very material and important in

its bearing upon the issue tried, and if er-

roneously admitted would lead to a reversal

of the judgment appealed from. The evi-

dence showed that the witnesses were a ﬁrm

of lawyers residing at Sandy Hill, and were

employed by the testator in their professional

capacity to draw such wills, and that the

conversations testified to were had with

them for the purpose of enabling them to ex-

witnesses Yrs. Seelye, the daughter of the
testator, and the two physicians, D1111. Clark
and Little, who testified to the unsoundness
of mind of the testator during the year 1877,
and subsequent thereto, fl'om knowledge
acquired by them while attending him, respectively, In a professional capacity. This
evidence was duly objected to by the proponent, but was admitted against such objection. So tar as the evidence of the medical witnesses ls concerned, there can be but
little · doubt of Its lnadmissiblllty, and 1t
should have been disregarded by the surrogate In determining the question of the testator's mental and physical condition. It
seems to us that this evidence falls clearly
within the prohibition contained In section
.834 of the Code, as Illustrated and applied In
recent decisions of this court. Grattan v. Insurance Co., 80 N. Y. 296; Edington v. Insurance Co., 67 N. Y. 185; Westover v. Insurance Co., 99 ~. Y. 56, 1 N. E. lo-!; People
v. Schuyler, 100 N. Y. 318, 12 N. E. 783;
Renlhan v. Dennin, 103 N. Y. 574, 9 N. E.
~lO.

It ts perhaps not Important that we should
upon the propriety of the rulings on
the trial In reference to the evidence on the
part of the contestants, since, In any event,
whether It be considered or not, we are of the
opinion that the question of the testator's
mental condition, and the exercise of undue
Influence over him In respect to the execution
-0£ the will, was one of fact, to be determined
by the trial court. Whatever may be said of
the evidence, we are clearly of the opinion
that not only was there evidence upon which
the decision o'f the surrogate could properly
be support!!d, but there was no such preponderance, as to the testator's mental Incapacity to make a valid will, as would have
authorized a reversal by an appellate tribunal of the surrogate's decree determining
that fact In favor of the proponent. In re
Roa, 87 N. Y. 514; In re Cottrell, 95 N. Y.
· .333; Hewlett v. Elmer, 103 N. Y. 161, 8 N.
~mment

E. 38i.

The most material question In the case
arises over the exception taken by the con·
testnnts to the admission of the evidence of
the wltnesaes Hughes and Northrup as to
conversations had by them, respectively,
with the testator at the time of receiving Instructions In reference to a draft of the will
oft'ered for probate, and another drawn about
two years previously by the same attorneys.
The testimony given by these witnesses was
undoubtedly very material and Important In
Its bearing upon the Issue tried, and If erroneously admitted would lend to a rel"'ersal
of the judgment appealed from. The evidence showed that the witnesses were a ft.rm
of lawyers residing at Sandy Hill, and were
employed by the testator In their professional
capacity to draw such wills, and that the
conversations testified to were had with
them tor the purpose of enabling them to ex·ecute the Instructions of the testator. That

these Interviews were bad In pursuance of,
and under the sanction of, a professional employment, and that communications made by
a client under such circumstances to his attorney were clearly within the protection of
the statute, we have no doubt. Westover v.
Insurance Oo., supra; Renlhan v. Dennin,
supra; section 835, Code Civ. Proc.
The prohibition e>f the statute, therefore,
applies to these communications, and they
were Inadmissible as evidence unless brought
within the provisions of section 836 authorizing their disclosure. By that section the
pledge of secrecy Imposed by the statute la
to be observed, unless Its provisions "are expressly waived" by the client. There ls nothing In this section requiring the waiver to be
made In writing, or In any particular form or
manner, or at any particular time or pince;
but It ls required to be an express waiver,
and made In such manner as to show that
the testator Intended to exempt his attorneys
In the particular Instance from the prohibition imposed by the statute. An examination
of the wlll Itself, as well as the evidence of
all of the witnesses present on the occasion
of Its execution, concur In establishing the
fact that the testator requested both Hughes
and Xorthrup to sign the attestation clause
of his first as well as of hie second wlll, as
witnesses thereto. That request Implies, not
only Information as to the necessity of such
signatures to the validity of the Instrument
executed, but also knowledge of the obligations which they assumed In respect to the
proof thereof after his death. He must have
been aware that his object In making a will
might prove to be Ineffectual, unless these
witnesses could be called to testify to the
circumstances attending Its execution, Including the condition of his mental faculties
at that time.
The condition of the testator's mind, as
evidenced by his actions, conduct, and conversation at the time of making a will, ls a pnrt of
the res gestre of the tmnsactlon, and witnesses thereto are competent to speak thereof, and give opinions In relation thereto, without any other knowledge thereof except that
derived from bis conduct on such occasions.
Clapp v. Fullerton, 34 N. Y. 100; Holcomb v.
Holcomb, D5 N. Y. 316. The law presumeR
knowledge on his part of its provisions, and
that what he does deliberately Is done with
a full comprehension of the legal etrect of
his act. and the duty which It Imposes upon
those who comply with his request. It
would be contrary to settled rules of law to
ascribe to the testator an Intention, while
making his will, 1tnd going through the forms
required to make It a valid Instrument, to
leave In operation the provisions of statute
which he had power to waive, but which If
not waived might trust.rate and defeat the
whole object of his action. It cannot be
doubted that If a client In bis life-time
should call bis attorney as a witness In a
legal proceeding to testify to transactions
403
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taking place between himself and his attor-

ney while occupying the relation of attorney

and client, such an act would be held to con-

stitute an express waiver of the seal of se-

crecy imposed by the statute; and can it be

any less so when the client has left written

and oral evidence of his desire that his at-

torney should testify to facts learned through

their professional relations, upon a judicial

proceeding to take place after his death? We

think not. Mc-Kinney v. Railroad Co., 101

N. Y. 352, 10 N. E. 544. The act of the testa-

tor in requesting his attorneys to become

witnesses to his will leaves no doubt as to

40-1

his intention thereby to exempt them from

the operation of the statute, and leave them

free to perform the duties of the oiﬁce as-

signed them, unrestrained by any objection
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which he had power to remove. We have

carefully examined other points made by the

appellants upon the argument, and in the

printed brief submitted to the court, but ﬁnd

no material error committed by the trial

court which entitles the appellants to a re-

versal of the judgment.

The judgment should therefore be atﬂrmed,

with costs.

All concur.

1

taking place between himself and his attorney while occupying the relation of attorney
and client, such an act would be held to constitute an express waiver of the seal of secrecy Imposed by the statute; and can It be
any lCBB so when the cllent hns left written
and oral evidence of his desire that his attorney should testify to fat•ts learned through
their professional relations, upon a judicial
proceeding to take place after his denth? We
think not. llcKlnney v. Railroad Co., 104
N. Y. 302, 10 N. E. M4. The act of the testator In requesting his attorneys to become
witnesses to his will leaves no doubt as to
4<M

his intention thereby to exempt them from
the operation of the statute, and leave them
tree to pertorm the dutiE'S of the om<.oe assigned them, unrestrained by any objeetlon
which he had power to remove. We have
carefully examined other points made by the
appellants upon the argument, and In tile
printed brief submitted to the court, but find
no material error committed by the trial
court which entitles the appellants to a reversal of the judgment.
The judgment should therefore be amrmed,
with costs.
All concur.
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HIIRLBURT ct al. v. HURLBURT.

(28 N. E. 651, 128 N. Y. 420.)

Court of Appeals of New York. Oct. 13, 1891.

Appeal from supreme court, general

term, tllth department.

Action for money had and received,

brought by Lyman F. Hurlburt and an-

other, administrators of Charles F. Hurl-

burt. deceased, against Ella Hurlburt, ad-

minlstratrix of Theron D. Hurlburt,de-

ceased. Verdict for defendant. Judgment

was ordered for defendant on plaintiffs’

motion for a new trial on exceptions or-

dered to be heard at the genera-l term in

the first instance. Plaintiffs appealed.

Atlirmed.

Charles 2lIcLoutb, for appellants. S. B.

Mclntyre. for respondent.

EARL, J. This action was brought to

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:09 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104925781
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

recover the sum of $6,682, with interest

thereon, which it is alleged Charles 1*‘.

I-iurlburt, the plaintiffs’ intestate, placed

in the hands of his son Theron,thedel'end-

ant‘s intestate, as his agent. and for his

benefit, in the latter part of the year 1881.

Theron was a son of Charles, and he died

I)ecembe1-25, 188-“Land Charles died Janua-

ry 6, IRR4. The defendant claimed that the

money was a gift to her husband, and

that he was never under any obligation

to repay the same. The plaintiffs were

unable to produce any writing of any

kind evidencing any obligation on the

part of Theron to repay the money.

They are the sons of Charles, and were the

sole witnesses to establish their claim,

and this they attempted to do by testify-

ing to certain conversations which they

overheard between their father and '[‘he-

ron. Upon the trial the defendant rested

her case mainly upon the conceded fact

that for about two years beiore the death

of her husband the money claimed had

been in banks to his credit, and had been

managed and controlled by him, and she

produced proof of various declarations

and admissions made by Charles, tend-

ing to show that the money was trans-

ferred by him to his son as a gilt, and

not to be held for his beneﬁt.

During the progress of the trial the

plaintiffs made objections to evidence

which were overruled. and they now claim

some of the rulings were erroneous. We

will brieﬂy notice some of them. Theron

and (‘harlcs, in the spring of lS.\'3, went

together to consult a lawyer by the name

of Aldrich as to the best mode of dispos-

ing of or adjusting the prospective inter-

est of the plaintiff Lyman as an heir in the

farm belonging to his father, and several

plans were suggested by Theron. in the

presence of his father, and assented to

by him, to accomplish that end. The

statement was there made by Theron to

the lawyer, and assented to by his father,

that Lyman had had all his share in his fa-

ther's personal property; and othcrstate-

m;RLBURT et al v. HURLBURT.
(28 N. E. 661, 128 N. Y. 420.)
Court of Appeals of New York. Oct. 13, 1891.
Appeal from supreme eourt, general
term, fifth dPpartment.
Actlou for money had and received,
brought by Lyman F. Hurlburt and another, administrators of Charles F. Hurlburt, decem1ed, a.Jr;nlnst 1-;11a Hurlburt, administratrix of Theron D. Hurlburt, deceased. Verdict for defendant. Judgment
was ordered for dpfendant on plaintiffs'
motion for a new trial on exceptions ordered to be heard at the grnera.J term 111
the tl1·st lnstuhce. Plaintiffs appealed.
Affirmed.
Clmrles McLouth, for appellants. S. B.
Mcintyre, for respondent.
EARL, J. Thie action W&R bronght to
recover the smu of $G,61ol:l, with lntere11t
thereon, which It Is alleged Charles F .
Hurlburt, the plaintiffs' lntestatP, placed
In the hundR of his eon 'rheron, thedPfend.
ant'N lntc>Mtate, as his agent, and for his
hrnetlt, In the latter part of the year 1l'<Sl.
Theron wsR a son of Charles, a11<l he died
Decemher2!\, 1R~1.and Charles died .Januar.v 6, l&W. The defendant clalmP<l that tht1
money was a gift to her buRl:onnd, and
that he woe never under any obligation
to re11ay the same. The plaintiffs were
unable to produce any writing of any
klocl evidencing any obligation on the
JIBrt of Theron to rPPRY the JtlUDPy.
They are the sons or Charle1o1, and wel'e the
eole wltneRses to estnblleb theh· clalm,
and this thl'Y attempted to do by testify.
Ing to certain cooven1attons which thPy
o\"erhenrd between their fathPr and 'rheron. Upon the trial the defendant rested
her case mainly upon the conct>decl fact
that for about two years before the dt>ath
or her husband the monPy claimed bad
been lo hanks to hie credit, and hod been
mannp;NJ and controlled hy him, and she
produce1l proof of variou11 declnra tlon"
and admissions made by Charles, tend ing to 11how that thll money was trans·
ferred by him to his 11on as a gift, and
not to be held for hl11 benefit.
Durlnl( the prop;ress of the trial the
plaintiffs made olJjectlons to evidence
which l\ere overruled, and theyoowclahu
eome of the rullni;rs were erroueons. We
will hrlefty notice some or them. Theron
and Charles, In the spring of JSS:i, went
togetllPr tu consult a lnw.rer by tht> n»me
of Aldrich as tu the beet mode of dh"poslng or or adjusting the pro<1pecth·e Interest of the plRlntlff Lyman as an heir In the
farm belonging to his father, anrl several
plans were suggested by Ther<m, In the
prP.t!t.'DCe of bis father, anrt 11s11entt>d to
by him, to accomplish that end. The
stotl:'m~nt was there made by Theron to
the lnwyer, and a'!11ented to by hlH father,
the t Lyman had had all his share In his father's penmnal property; and otlll'rstateml'nts were there macle by Theron, and.
a1:1seotect to by hlR father, of similar Import. Aldrich waH cnlle<I by the<IC'fendant
to prove thl'HP stn trmen ts un1J a1lmlsslons.
The plalntlffR objected to hlH evidence on
the grouud that bo was an uttorney, con.sultell professlunally, and tbut the com-

[Cue No. 140

munlcatlons to him were privileged. 'rhe
court o\'erruleil the objection, and received
the evidence. We think that In receiving
this evidence there was no violation of
section R3.'l of the Code, which provides
that "on attorney or coun11elor at law
shall not be allowed to disclose a communication made by his c11ent to him, or
hl.R advice given thereon. In the conrse of
his profesailonal employment." Th111 sec.
tlon le a mere re-enaetment of the common-lt1 w rule, and It caunot be supposed
from the p;eoeral language •1eel1 that It
WR'i! lntemled to chaua:e or enlitrge that
rule as It had been expoumled by the
courts. It bas frequently lwen said that
the object of the rulP emhorllcd lo the section Is to enable and encourage per11ons
needlnJP; professional advice to disclose
freely the ract11 In reference to which they
seek advice, w!thout fear that such facts
will be ma1Je public to thPlr dh.igrace or
detriment by their utton1ey. Such a case
as thiH Is plainly not within the rule.
Here Theron and hlR father were both lnterestl•d In the advice which they 11ought,
and they were both present at tbe 1:1ame
time, and e111.rugcd In the same convenmtlon. Each heard what the other said,
so that the dlsclo11urPs made were not, as
between them, euutldentlal, and there can
be no rp1111on for treating such dlsrlosures
as prl\"lleged. It has frequently been held
that the prlYllege secured by this rule of
law does not apply to a case where two
or more per1mns consult an attorney for
their mutu11l benefit; that It cannot he Invoked In any litigation which may thereafter arise between such persona, hut ran
be In a.lltlp;atlon between them Anrl strangers. Root v. Wright, 21 Hun. 347; Sher·
irinn v. Scott, 27 Hun, 331; Foster v. Wilkinson. 37 Hun. 244: Rosenburg'°· Rosenburg, 40 Hun, 91; Whiting v. Barney, 30
N. Y. 3:.10; Hebhurd v. Haughlan, 70 N. Y.
64; Root v. Wright, 84 N. Y. 72. Therefore. If Charles and '!'heron had beeu alive,
and parties to thht action, this evidence
woulil have been competent; and, a11 It
would th~n have been competent, It Is
equally competent lo this action t:>etweeu
their pei•sonal representatives. The fact
thot thesp plaintiffs are personally lntereMtell In the eRtnte of their father can make
no dlffel'ence In the applies tlon of the rule.
They are parties to this actlor1 only In a
representath·e capacity. They legally
stand as the reprt'sentntlves or tht>lr fa.
ther, and no one else. Evidence which
wunl•I have been competent agulnRt him
In his life-time Is competent aguinst his
perimnul representatives. So we think
that thlH case is not within the reneou of
section s:15, end. e¥en If It should he re1o<ardl'rl us within its letter, It Hhonlll be
tukl•n out of the letter by the Rlll>llcntlon
of the famlllflr maxim, 04 cessn11te ratioIJt
/pgf,.,, ce"·" ll t 111.<:n le.r."

Severul witnPsHes were permitted to give
e\·idt>nce of declarutions made h.v the
plaintiffs' lnte11tate tending to Hhow th•1t
he hacl made u. itlrt of this money to hie
son, Rntl this evidence was ohjt>cted to by
the plaintiffs tlH incumpetl'nt. It Is fumlllur In w, for which no cltntlou or 11ut1wrl·
ties IH nl'ede•I, that the <leclarutluns of u
testator or ln~state binding blw or blnd405
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ing or impairing his estate may be given

in evidence against his personal represent-

atlves in all cases where they would have

been competent against himself it he had

been living and a. party to the action.

His executor or administrator represents

him and stands in his place, and his dec-

larations admitting a. debt or obligation,

or tending to discharge u debt or obliga-

tion due him, or to impair his estate in

any way. are competent in any litigation

to which his personal representatives are

a. party. Therefore the evidence of mute-

rial admissions made by Charles in his

life-time was competent against these

plaintiffs. It is further claimed that much

of the evidence thus received was wholly

immaterial, and should, therefore, have

been excluded. We have carefully scruti-
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nized the evidence, and. while much of it

has but a slight and remote bearing upon

the case. yet we cannot say that any of it

was wholly immaterial. It was compe-

tent for the defendant to prove the rela-

tions between Theron and his father, and,

to some ex tent, the dealings between them,

and the relations between the father and

the different members of his family.

lomplaint is made of the charge of the

judge. Our attention is called to no erro-

neous rule of law laid down by him, and

406

' the most that can be said is that the

charge shows a signiﬁcant leaning‘ in fa-

vor of the defendant, and that thejudge

was strongly impressed with the merits

of the deleudant’s case. But the mere in-

timation of an opinion by the judge upon

evidence, or upon the merits of the case,

or his commeu ts upon the evidence, though

unfavorable to the party complaining,

furnish no ground for a reversal here, so

long as the whole case is submitted to

the jury upon a charge which lays down

no improper rule of law. If a judge.in his

charge to the jury. uses such language as

to improperly bias their judgments or

inﬂuence their verdict, that may he ground

for the court below. upon a motion for a

new trial, to set aside the verdict if satis-

ﬁed that injustice has been done: but up-

on an appeal to this court, where the

court below has refused to set aside the

verdict, and has aﬂirmed the judgment

entered thereon. we can review only er-

rors of law which have been properly ex-

cepted to. A careful examination of the

whole case leads us to the conclusion that

the exceptions of the plaintiffs point out

no legal error, and that thereis no ground

for a reversal of the judgment. '.l‘hejudg-

ment should be aﬁirmed, with costs. All

concur.
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rial admissions made by Charles In his charge to the jury. uBes Ruch language as
life-time wad competent against these to Improperly bias their judgment11 or
plaintiffs. It Is further claimed that much lnftuen~e their verdict, that ruay he ground
of the evidence thus received wns wholly for the court below, upon a motion for a
Immaterial, and should, therefore, have new trial, to 11et aside the \"e1·dict ll satlBbeen excluded. We have cal'efully scruti- fied that Injustice haB been done: but upnized the evidence, and, while much of It on an appeal to this court, where the
bas but a slight and remote be11rlng upon court below hM refused to Bet aside the
the case, yet we cannot say that any of It verdict, and has affirmed the judgment
was wholly Immaterial. It was compe- entered thereon, we can review only ertent for the defendant to prove tb~ rela- rors of law which have been properly extlom1 between Theron and his father, and, cepted to. A careful examlnatiun of the
to some extent, tbedealingd between them, who.le case leads UR to tbe conclusion that
and the relations between the father and the excei>tlons of t11e plalntlHs point out
the different members of his family.
no legal error, and that therelt1 noground
Complaint Is madt> of the charge of the for a re,·ersal of the ju()gment. The judgJuuge. Our attention Is called to no erro- ment should be affirmed, wltb costs. All
neouB rule of law laid down by him, and concur.
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lawful reason for refusing to &D6wer the
question. The plalntltr In error stll'! refmlfng
to answer the question, the court adjudged
Supreme Court of Illinois. Nov. 4, 1891.
him In contempt of court, and asaesRed a :fine
Error to appellate court, Fourth district against him of $25 as a punishment. The
judgment of the circuit court having been
Reversed.
Proceedlng to punish F. E. Minter for con- amrmed In the appellate court, this writ of
tempt of court. Defendant was convicted, error was sued out to reverse the latter
and the appellate court atnrmed the judg- judgment.
Article 2 of section 10 of our constitution
ment. Defendant brings error.
provides: "No person shall be compelled In
Pillow & Mlllspaugh, for plaintiff in error. any criminal case to give evidence against
Geo. Hunt, Atty. Gen., for the People.
himself." 1 Starkie, Ev. 136, says: "A witness ls not bound to answer any question,
CRAIG, J. The plantU'f ln error was sub- either In a court of law or equity, If his
prenaed as a wltneBB to testify ln reference answer wlll expose him to any criminal punto a charge under Investigation before the ishment or penal llablllty," agreeably to the
grand jury of Gallatin county. After being wise and humane principle that no mau ls
sworn, the foreman of the grand jury asked bound to crtmlnate himself. Greenleaf, in
the witness the following question: "Do the discussion of this question, (volume 1, I
you know of any pe1son playing at a game 451,) says: ''Where an answer will hal·e a
with cards for money lo Gallatin county tendency to expose the witness to a penal
within eighteen months past?" towhichques- liability • • • or to a criminal charge,
tion he answered, "I do." The foreman then here the authorities are exceedingly clear
asked the following question: "(2) Who did that the witness Is not bound to answer. If
you see playing?" which last question plain- the fact as to which he Is interrogated forms
tiff in erl"Ol" refused to answer on the ground but one link in the chain of testimony which
that he could not do 80 without giving evi- ls to convict him, and whether It may tend
dence against and tending to crlmlnate him- to crlmlnate or expose the wltneRs, ls a
self. Thereupon the foreman of the grand pclnt which the court will determine, unjury caused the plalntltr in error to be der nil the circumstan<'PS of the case, but
brought before the clrcrit court, then ju- without requiring the witness fully to exdicially slttlng, to be dealt with as for con- plain how he might be crlmlnated by the
tempt In refusing t<> answer said last ques- answer which the truth would oblige him
tion. Plaintiff In error appeared In open to give." In People v. Mather, 4 ·wend.
court, and stated voluntarily that the fore- 229, it ls said: "When the disclosures he
going was a correct statement of the pro- [the witness] may mnke can be usc>d against
ceedings before the grand jury, and that he him to procure his ~onvlctlon for a criminal
bad answered the :first question, and refusetl otrense, or to charge him with penultles and
to answer the last, because to do 80 would forfeitures, he may stop In answering before
crfmlnate, or tend to crlmlnate, himself. he arrives at the question the answer to
The court then ruled and stated to him that which may show directly his moral turpihe was not required to give evidence against tude. • • • If th;}re be 11. series of queshimself, nor to give evidence that would tend tions, the answer to all of which would estabto crfmlnate himself, but that be wns re- lish his criminality, the party cannot piC'k out
quired to answer whether or not he bad seen a particular one, and say, if that be put, the
any person other than himself play at cards answer wlll not crlmlnate him. If lt Is one
far money; that he might lawfully refuse to step having a tendency to crfmlnate him, he
tell anything that he himself had done, but ls not compelled to answer." In 1 Burr's
that be could not lawfully refuse to tell Tr. 424, Chief Justice Marshall, In discusswhat he bad seen another person do. Plain- ing this question, said: "It ls the province
tiff ln error then asked if the court held of the court to judge whether any direct anthat a witness before the grand jury was re- swer to the question which may be proposed
quired to tell that be bad seen others gaming wlll furnish evidence against the witness.
for money, if the witness was also playing If such answer may disclose a fact which
at the same time, and in the same game, forms a necessary and essential link in the
with such other persons; and the court chain of testimony which would be sufficient
thereupon ruled that, under such circumstan- to convict him of any crime, he le not bound
ces, the witness wns bound to tell that the to answer It so as to furnish matter for that
others bad played, but that he (plaintltr In conviction."
It will be observed from the authorities
error) might lawfully refuse to tell anything
that he himself bad done or said or anything cited that a witness ls not required to go
that tended to crlmlnate himself, but that on and answer questions until one Is prohe must tell If he bad seen others play; that pounded the answer to which will of itself
the fear that his answer might Induce the crlmlnate him of a crime, but if the evidence
other parties to testify against him In retal- elicited tends to crlmlnate the witness, or if
iation, or that the grand jury might summon it constituted a link In a chain of evidence
the others, and force them to tell, was not a which might crimlnate the witness, he may
MIXTER '"· PEOPLE.
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MINTER v. PEOPLE.

(29 N. E. 45, 139 Ill. 363.)

Nov. 4, 1&1.

Error to appellate court, Fourth district.

Reversed.

Proceeding to punish F. E. Minter for con-

tempt of court. Defendant was convicted,

and the appellate court aﬂirmed the judg-

ment. Defendant brings error.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Pillow & Millspaugh, for plaintiff in error.

Geo. Hunt, Atty. Gen., for the People.

CRAIG, J. The plaintiff in error was sul»

poenaed as a witness to testify in reference

to a charge under investigation before the

grand jury of Gallatin county. After being

sworn, the foreman of the grand jury asked

the witness the following question: “Do

you know of any person playing at a game
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with cards for money in Gallatin county

within eighteen months past?" towhich ques-

tion he answered, "I do." The foreman then

asked the following question: “(2) Who did

you see playing?" which last question plain-

tiﬁ in error refused to answer on the ground i

that he could not do so without giving evi-

dence against and tending to criminate him-

self. Thereupon the foreman of the grand

jury caused the plaintiff in error to be

brought before the circrit court, then ju-

dicially sitting, to be dealt with as for con-

tempt in refusing to answer said last ques-

tion. Plaintiff in error appeared in open

court, and stated voluntarily that the fore-

going was a. correct statement of the pro-

ceedings before the grand jury, and that he

had answered the ﬁrst question. and refused

to answer the last, because to do so would

criminate, or tend to criminate, himself.

The court then ruled and stated to him that

he was not required to give evidence against

himself, nor to give evidence that would tend

to criminate himself, but that he was re-

quired to answer whether or not he had seen

any person other than himself play at cards

for money; that he might lawfully refuse to

tell anything that he himself had done, but

that he could not lawfully refuse to tell

what he had seen another person do. Plain-

tiff in error then asked if the court held

that a witness before the grand jury was re-

quired to tell that he had seen others gaming

for money, if the witness was also playing

at the same time, and in the same game,

with such other persons; and the court

thereupon ruled that, under such circumstan-

ces, the witness was bound to tell that the

others had played, but that he (plaintiff in

error) might lawfully refuse to tell anything

that he himself had done or said or anything

that tended to criminate himself, but that

he must tell if he had seen others play; that

the fear that his answer might induce the

other parties to testify against him in retal-

iation, or that the grand jury might summon

the others, and force them to tell, was not a

lawful reason for refusing to answer the

question. The plaintiff in error still refusing

(29 N. E. 45, 139 Ill. 363.)
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claim his privilege, and refuse to answer. 1 tense that one person cannot commit alone.

Here the grand jury was investigating the

question whether certain persons had been

guilty of gambling by playing with cards

for money. The witness had played in a

certain game with these persons. and the

question presented is whether he could dis-

close the name of the person or persons

with whom he played without furnishing a

link in a chain of testimony sutliclent to es-

tablish his own guilt. In other words, if A.

and B. play with each other a game with

cards for money. can A. testify that he saw

B. play, without disclosing evidence which

will form a link in a chain of testimony sut-

ﬁcient to convict A.? The answer to this

would seem to be obvious. The testimony

of A. establishes the fact that two persons

played with cards for money. The name of

claim his privilege, and refuse to answer. , tense that one person cannot commit alone.
Here the grand jury was Investigating the He must of necessity have an accomplice.
question whether certain persons had been t.:nder the ruling adopted In tbts case, plainguilty ot gambling by playing with cards tiff In error was compelled to go on the
tor money. Tbe witness had playP<I In a stand and testlry that a crime had been comc·ertalo l{nme with these persons. nud the mitted, and give the name of his nccompltce,
question presented ls whether be <'OUld dls- and was only allowed to withhold the tact
t•lose the name of the person or l>erson~ that be was the other guilty party. We
with whom he plnye<l without furnishing a think this ruling violated that long and well
link lo a <·halo of te11tlmooy sutftcleot to es- established rule ot law which shields a partablish his own gullt. In other words, It A. ty from testifying to a fact that may crlmnnd B. play with ea<'h other a game with lnate him11elf. It plaintiff In error bad not
<'tlrds tor money, <'an A. testify that he 11aw been a party to the crime whkh the people
B. play, without dlS<'loslng evidence which were attempting to prove; It be bad merely
wlll form a link lo a <"halo of testimony suf- been In a room or place, and saw others play,
ficient to convict A.? The answer to this -he could be compelled to testify to all he
would seem to be obvious. The testimony saw. But such was not the C'&Be. He was
ot A. establishes the tact that two persons a party to the ll'!lme. He and another had
played with cards for money. The name of violated the law. and he could not be reone ls given. One mere link lo the chain quired to establish the crime by bis own eviof evldencewlll sutft<'e to romplete the chain, dence. The judgment ot the appellate and
and establish the t·1ime; that Is, that A. circuit courts wlll be reversed, and the cause
also joined In the game. Gaming Is an of- remanded.
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one is given. One mere link in the chain

of evidence will suﬂice to complete the chain,

and establish the crime; that is, that A.

also joined in the game. Gaming is an of-

408

He must of necessity have an accomplice.

Under the ruling adopted in this case, plain-

tiff in error was compelled to go on the

stand and testify that a crime had been coni-

niitted, and give the name of his accomplice,

and was oni_v allowed to withhold the tact

that he was the other guilty party. ‘Va

think this ruling violated that long and well

established rule of law which shields a par-

ty from testifying to a fact that may crim-

inate himself. It‘ plaintiﬂ? in error had not

been a party to the crime which the people

were attempting to prove; if he had merely

been in a room or place. and saw others play,

——he could be compelled to testify to all he

saw. But such was not the case. He was

a party to the game. He and another had

violated the law. and he could not be re-

quired to establish the crime by his own evi-

dence. The judgment ot‘ the appellate and

circuit courts will be reversed, and the cause

remanded.
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MAHA."lffi:E

T.

CLELAND, Judge, et al.

(41 N. W. 53, 76 Iowa, 401.)

MAHANKE v. CLELAND, Judge, ct al.

(41 N. VV. 53, 76 Iowa, 401.)

Dec. 22, 1888.

Ce1'tirn'a'ri proceeding by Elizabeth Ma-

hanke against John B. Cleland, judge of the

district. court, Twelfth judicial district of

Iowa, and John Barlow, clerk of the district

Supreme Court of Iowa.

court in and for Butler county, Iowa, and I answering such quesﬁonm

said district court of said county, to test the

validity of an order requiring the plaintiff to

answer questions in regard to a certain issue

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 22, 1888.

Certtorarl proceeding by Elizabeth Mabanke against John B. Cleland, judge of the
district court, Twelfth judicial district of
Iowa, and John Barlow, clerk of the district
court in and for Butler county, Iowa, and
said district court of said county, to test the
validity of an order requiring the plaintiff to
answer questions in regard t.o a certain issue
invoh·ed m 11n nction thPn pending, to which
she was a pa1·ty def1>ndant.
Hemenway cf lJrundy, for petitioner.

involved in an action then pending, to which

she was a party defendant.

Ilemenway ti’: Grundy, for petitioner.

ROBINSON. J. John Smallpage com-

menced an action in the district court

of Butler county, in which the petitioner

in this proceeding and one John Mahanke
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were made parties defendant. The peti-

tion in that action alleges tliai; Small-

page is the owner of a judgment rendered

by said district court against said John

Mahanke, on which an execution has been

issued and returned unsatisﬁed, and on

which there is due about the sum of $8.10;

that before said judgment was rendered said

John Mahanke, being the owner of certain

lands in Butler and Grundy counties, “did

make a pretended sale and conveyance, by

deeds of the same,” to the plaintiff in this

action, "‘ with intent to hinder, delay, and de-

fraud the plaintiff in the collection of his

said judgment;” that the plaintiff in this ac-

tion “took said deeds of conveyance with the

like intent, and without paying therefor any

consideration.” The petition prays that the

conveyances be set aside, and that the land

therein described be subjected to the pay-

ment of said judgment. The plaintiffin this

action, by her answer, admitted the allega-

tions in regard to the judgment, and that the

conveyances speciﬁed had been made to her,

but denied that they were made without. con-

sideration, and denied all allegations of fraud.

While the action aforesaid was pending, the

plaintiff in this action was called before a no-

tary public, and sworn, for the purpose of

taking her deposition to sustain the issues

on behalf of the plaintiff Sm.-illpage, and was

asked the following question: “When did

you first know that John Mahanke had made

and executed to you deeds of his interest to

the land left by Henry Mahanke, being the

real estate described in the petition?” There-

upon the witness objected to answering such

question, on the ground “tli-at the witness is

a defendant in the case; that the only issue

in the case is the good faith of the convey-

ance made by John Mahanke to the witness,

ROBINSON, J. John Smnllpap:e commenced an action in the district l'ourt
of Butler county, in which the petitioner
iu this proceeding ancl one John Mahanke
were made parties defendant. The petition in that action alll'ges that Sm11llpage is the owner of a jutlgment rendered
by said district court against said John
Mahanke, on which an execution h11s been
issued and returned unsatisfied, and on
which there is due about the sum of 88.10;
that betore said judgment was rendered said
'1ohn .Mahanke, being the owner of cl'rtain
lands in Butler and Grundy counties, "did
make a pretended sale and conveyance, by
deeds of the same," to the plaintiff in this
action, .,. with intent to hinder, delay, and defraud the plaintitr in the coUection of hiB
said judgment;" that the plRintiff In this action "took said deeds of conveyance with the
like intent, and without paying therefor an~
consideration." The petition prays that tb41
conveyances be set aside, and that the land
therein described be subjected to the payment of said jndgment. Th~ pl11intitr in this
action, by her answer, admitted the allega·
tions in regard to the judgment, and that the
conveyances specified had been made to her,
but denied that they were made without consideration, and dt>nled all allegations of fraud.
While the action aforesaid was pending, the
plaintiff in this action was called before a notary pubJic, and sworn, for the purpose of
taking her deposition to sustain the issues
on behalf of the plaintiff Sm1dlp11ge, and was
asked the following question: "When did
you first know that John Mahanke had made
and executed to you deeds of his interest to
the land left by Henry Mahanke, bein~ the
real est.ate described in the petition?" '!'hereupon the witnt'Bs objected to answering such
que.'ltion, on the ground "that the witnt>ss is
a defendant in the case; that the only issue
tn the case is the good faith of the com•ey.
ance rollde by John Mahanke to the witness,
set. out in the petition.: and the matter sought
to be elicited would render the witness liable
to criminal p1·osecution ;" and "objected to
any further examination concerning issues
in the case upon like grounds." The parties
agreed in writing that phtintilT was &t>eking
to prove the affirmative allegations relating

(Case No. 142

to the issue, by interrogating Elizabeth Mahanke in regard to the circumstances nnder
which the deeds were executed by John .Mahanke to her, the consideration paid by her,
etc.; and tl111t a return should be made to the
court for il:.!4 determination as to whether this
testimony would be competent under the issue, and whether the witn1>ss would be excused, under section 3647 of the Code, from
answering such questions. A return was
made by the notary of the deposition, objections, and agreement. The district court
overl'llled the objection made by the witness,
and ordered that she "answer questions propounded to her relative to the said issues
joined in said cause." This proceeding Is
designed to test the validity of that ruling
and order.
The attorneys for petitioner have made no
argument, but eontent themselves wltll sugp:l'Sting a few points for the c11nsideration of
this court. The questions raised by the suggestions of counsel require an examination
I of the following st'4:tions of the C-Olle: "~ec.
3ti47. But when the mattei: sought to be
elicited would tend to rendt>r him criminally
liable, or to expose him to public ignominy,
he is not compelled to answer, except as provided in the next section. Sec. 3648. A witness may be interrogated as to his previous
conviction for a felony, but no other proof of
such conviction is competent, except the
record thereof." "Sec. 4074. Any person who
knowingly, being a party to any conveyance
or assignment or any estate or lnte1·est in
lands, • • • or being a party to any
charge on such estate, • • • made or
created with intent to defraud prior or subsequent purchasers, or to hinder, delay, or
defraud creditors or other persous, and every
person ·who, being privy to or knowing of
such fraudulent conveyance, assignment, or
charge, puta the &1&me in use as having been
matle in guod faith, shall be fined not exceeding one thousand doUars, and imprisoned in the county jail not exceeding one
year."
·
I. It is thfl duty of the court to determine
whether a witness should answer a qul'Stion
propounded, but, if reasonable grounds for
believing that the answer woultl tend to render him criminally liable exist, it should not
be req1~ired. But the witness cannot claim
his privilege on this ground where pros..cution for the offense of which he is guilty is
barred by the statute. 1 Green}. Ev.§ 451;
2 Phil. Ev. 933, 984; 1 Whart. Ev.§§ 536,
538; 2 Tayl. Ev.§ 1457; Calhoun v. Thompson, 56 Ala. 166.
In thi~ case, the witness Is a party defendant called to testify for the plaintiff. She
had ftled her answer, in which she had denied all allegations of fraud, and the law presume!l, in the absence of pl"Oof, that there
was no fraud in the transactions. The witness objected to answering, on the ground of
her privilege, but it does not 11ppear that she
understands what answers would tend to render ber criminally liable. The date of the

set out in the petition_; and the matter sought

to be elicited would render the witness liable

to criminal prosecution;” and “objected to

any further examination concerning issues

in the case upon like grounds.” The patties

agreed in writing that plaintiff was seeking

to prove the atlirmative allegations relating

to the issue, by interrogating Elizabeth Ma-

409

Cl\Se No. 142]
Case No. 142]

PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE

execution and delivery of the deeds is not

shown. It may be that prosecution for the

crime, if any, involved in their execution

and acceptance, is barred by the statulae of

limitations. Again, their execution and de-

livery may have involved a constructive

fraud, suﬂicient to render them invalid as

against creditors, but not of such a character

as to render the grantee criminally liable.

There is nothing in the record, as submitted

to us, which overcomes thepresumption that,

so far as the wit-ness is concerned, the trans-

action in question involved no criminal lia-

bility on her part. She should not be per-

mitted to defeat the ends of justice by claim-

ing a privilege to which there is no reasonable

grounds for believing her entitled.

2. In case the witness has been guilty of a

crime within the meaning of section 4074 of
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the Code, prosecution for which is now barred

by the statute, would she be privileged from

testifying as to her share in the transactions

in controversy, on the ground that her an-

swers would tend to expose her to public ig-

nominy? “Ignominy” is deﬁned to be “pub-

lic disgrace, infamy. reproach, dishonor.”

Bouv. As used in our statute, it seems to

have a wider meaning than the word “infa-

my, ” as formerly used lo test the competency

of witnesses; but, in our opinion, it was not

intended to apply to all acts which mightjus-

tify public censure or disapproval, but those

of a more serious nature, which would tend

410

to expose the perpetrator to public hatred or

detest-ation or dishonor. For example, a

woman cannot be compelled to testify to sex-

ual intercourse with ditferent men. Brown

v. Kingsley, 38 Iowa, 221; Lolnnan v. Peo-

ple, 1 N. Y. 385. Treason, felony, and of-

fenses founded in fraud, were considered in-

famous at common law, and persons guilty

of any of them were incompetent to testify.

1 Greenl. Ev. § 373. Under our statute, no

rule applicable to all cases is possible. but the

privilege of the witness must depend largely

upon the facts of the transaction which are

sought to be shown. It is possible that the

circumstances involved in the giving and

taking ot‘ the deeds in controversy were of

such a. character as to entitle the witness to

the privilege which she claims, but there is

nothing in the record to indicate that such is

the case. The order of the court of which

the witness complains must be understood as

requiring her to answer the particular ques-

tion set out in the record, and such other

questions as may be proper. We cannot, say

that the question shown was improper, nor

that the witness should not be further inter-

rogated as to the issues involved in the case.

The witness will be entitled to show reason-

able grounds for believing that her answer

to the question in controversy would tend to

render her criminally liable, or expose her to

public ignominy. With this modiﬁcation the

order of the district court is atﬁrmed.
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execution and dellvery of the deeds is not
11hown. It may be that prosecution for the
crime, if any, involved in their execution
und acceptance, is barred by the statute of
limitations. Again, their execution and delivery may have involved a constructive
fraud, sufficient to render them invalid as
against cre<litors, but not of such a character
as to render the grantee criminally liable.
'£here is nothing in the record, as submitted
to us, which overcomes the presumption that,
eo far as the witness is concerned, the traMaction in question involved no criminal liability on her part. She should not be permitte<I to defeat the ends of justice by chtiming a pri vilt>ge to which there is no reasonable
grounds for believiug her entitled.
2. In case the witness has been guilty of a
crime within the meaning of section 4074 of
the Code, prosecution for which is now barred
by the statute, would she be prh·ilegt>d from
testifying as to her share in the transactions
in controversy, on the ground that her answers would tend to expose her to public ignominy? "Ignominy" is defined to be "public disgrace, infamy, reproach, dishonor."
Houv. As used in our statute, it seems to
have a wider meaning than the word "infamy," as formerly used lo test the competency
of witnesses; but, in our opinion, it was not
intended to apply to all acts which might justify public censure or disapproval, but those
of a more serious nature, which would tend
410

to expose the perpetrator to pubUc hatred or
dete!ltation or c.liithonor. For example, a
woman cannot be compelled to testify to sexual intercourse with ditferE>nt men. Brown
v. Kingsley, 38 Iowa, 221: Lohman v. People, 1 N. Y. 385. TrPason, feluny, and offenses founded in frawl, were considered infamous at common law, and persons guilty
of any of them were incompetent to testify.
1 Green!. Ev.§ 373. Under our statute, D()
rule applicable to all cases is po!lsiule. but the
privilege of the witness must depend largely
upon the facts of the transaction which are
sought to be shown. It is possible that the
circumstances involved in the giving and
taking of the dePds in controversy were of
such a character as to entitle the witness to
the privilege which she claims, but there is
nothing in the record to indicate that such is
the c11se. The order of the court or which
the witness complains must be understood as
requiring her to answer the pa1'licular question set out in the record, and such other
questions as may be proper. We cannot say
that the question shown was improper, nor
that the witness shuuld not be further interrogated as to the issues involved in the C&l!fl.
The witness will be entitled to show reasonable grounds for believing that he1· answer
to the question in controversy would tend to
render her criminally liable, or expose her to
public ill'nominy. With this modification the
order of the district court is affirmed.
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COUNSELMAN v. HITCHCOCK, :Mnrshnl.
(12 Sup. Ct. 195. 142 U. S. 547.)

COUNSELMAN v. HITCHCOCK, Marshal.

(12 Sup. Ct. 195. 142 U. S. 547.)

Supreme Court of the United States.
1892.

Jan. 11,

Supreme Court of the United States. Jan. 11,

1892.

Appeal from the circuit court of the

United States for the northern district of

Illinois.

Petition by Charles Counselman for a

writ oi habeas corpus to release him

from the custody of United States Mar-

shal Frank Hitchcock, by whom he was

held under an order made in certain con-

tempt proceedings. The circuit court dis-

missed the petition, and remanded the

Appeal from the circuit court of the
United States for the northern district of
Illinois.
Petition hy CharleR Counselman for a
writ of habetts corf>UH to release him
from the custody nf United States Mar11hal Frank Hitchcock, b,v whom he was
held under an urder made In certain contempt proceedings. The circuit court dlsmli1sed tht> petition, aud n~manded the
prisoner. Petitioner appeals. Ht>verst'd.
John N .•Tew,.tt and Ja.o,:. C <:u1ter, for
appellant. A tty. Gen. Miller and G • •V.
Lamt1ertllon, for appellee.

prisoner. Petitioner appeals. Reversed.

John N. Jewett and Jas. (.. Carter, for

appellant. Atty. Gen. Miller and G. M.

Lamhertson, for appeliee.

Mr.Justice BLATCHFORI) delivered the
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opinion oi the court.

On the 21st of November, 1890, while the

grand jury in attendance upon thedistrict

court of the United States forthenorthcrn

district of Illinois was engaged in inves-

tigating and inquiring into certain alleged

violations, in that district, of an act oi

congress entitled “Au act- to regulate

commerce,” approved February 4, i887. c.

104, (2-iSt.379,) and the amendments there-

to, approved March 2. i889, c. 382, (25 St.

855,) by the ofﬂcers and agents of the Chi-

cago, Rock Island & Paciﬁc Railway

Company. and by the officers and agents

of the Chicago, St. Paul & Kansas City

Railway Company. and by the officers

and agents of the Chicago, Burlington &

Quincy Railroad Company, and the offi-

cers and agents of various other railroad

companies having lines of road in that

district, one Charles Counselman appeared

beiore the grand jury,in response to a

subpcena. served upon him. and, after hav-

ing been duly sworn, testified as follows:

“Question. Your name is Charles Coun-

selman? Answer. Yes, sir. Q. You are

the sole member of Charles Counselman

&Co.'I A. Yes, sir. Q. Engaged in the.

grain and commission business in the city

oi Chicago‘! A. Yes, sir. Q. Have you

been a receiver of grain from the west dur-

ing the past two years? A. Yes, sir. Q.

Over what roads did you ship grain re-

ceived by you during the present summer

of1890‘! A. The Rock Island & Burling-

ton, principaliy. Q. From what states

was most oi the grain shipped? A. From

Kansas and Nebraska. I think. Q. What

did your receipts in bushels amount to

of corn in the months oi May, June, and

July, 1890? A. I haveno idea; Icouid not

tell you. Q. Five hundred thousand

bushels a month? A. I cannot tellyou.

Q. How many men have you employed

during the last year? What is the usual

number of men employed in connection

with your business? A. I have, I think.

six or seven men in my oiiice. Q. Have

you during the past year, i\ir.Counselman.

Mr. Justice BLATCHFORD delivered the
opinion or the court.
On the 21et of November, lROO, while the
grand Jury In attendance u1>on the<llstrlct
court of the {Tnlted Sta.tea forthenortht"ro
district or Illinois waR en.cai.ted In In vestlgatlng and lnqulrin!l' lntot'ertaln allt-ged
violations, in that dl!trlct, of an act of
coni;i;rese entitled "An act · to regulate
commerce," approved February 4, 1~7. c.
104, (24St.37D,} and the amendments thereto, upproved March 2. 18X9, <!. 3M2, 0!5 St.
855,) by the officers and agents of the Chicago, Rock Island a: Pacific Hallwa.r
Com1>any. and by the otflcel'H and agentK
of the t:hlcago, ~t. Paul & Kansas City
Railway Company, and by the offtceni
and agents of the Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy Uallroad Com1>any, Rnd the officers anll agents of various other rtlllroad
companiea having lines of road in that
district, one Charles Counselman uppeared
oorore the grtlnd JUl'Y, tn response to It
subprena served upon him. and, after having been duly 11 worn, testified as follows:
"Q11eRtlon. Your name Is Charles Counselman? Answer. Yes. sir. Q. You are
thP. ..ole member of Charles Counselman
& Co.? A. Yes, 11ir. Q. Engaged In the
grain and commission business lo the l'lty
of Ct>lcago'! A. Yes, sir. Q. Have you
been a receiver of grain from the west during the past two years? A. Yes, sir. Q.
Over whut road11 dlil you ship grain receive<) by you during the present Hummer
of 1800'! A. The Rock l1dund & Burlington, principally. Q. From what stateR
was mol!t of the grain Khlpped? A. From
Kansas and Nebraska. I think. Q. What
did your receipts In bushels amount to
of corn 111 the won th11 of !\Jay, June, and
July, 1890? A. I haveno hlea: lcouh1not
tell you. Q. Five hundred thousand
bu11hels a month? A. I r.annot tell you.
Q. How many men have you employed
during the last year? Whnt IH the usual
number of men employed In connection
with your business'? A. 1 have, I think.
six 01· seven men In my offll'e. Q . Have
you during the 1>m1tyeur, Mr. l'oum1elman,
obtained a rate for the trunsportation of
yom· grnln on an,\• of the railrmuls coming tu Chlcair;o, from points ou tslde of this
statt>, leRs than the tariff or open rate'?
A. 'fbat I decline to answer, Mr. Mllcbrlst, on the ground thatltmlght tend to
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erlmlnate me. Q. Outing the past year
have you recolved rateA upon the Chicago. Rock Island & PttclHc from points out·
side of the state to the l'lty of Chlca~u,
at less than the tarlH rntes? A. That I
decline to answer on the 11ame ground.
Q. I will aek you the Ra me question with
referent'e to the Burlington. A. I a1111wer
In the same way. Q. The same with reference to Atchl11on. A. I can't recollect
. that we have done any huslneAe with that
road. Q. I will ask you whether you
have during the Jost year recel\"ed a rate
Iese than Ute tariff rate on what Is cHfted
the' Diagonal' or Stickney road. A. Not
to my knowledge. Q. Who attends to the
freight department of your hm1lnPHR? A.
Myself and Mr. Martin. Q. HavA you or
the firm of Cbarlee Coun11ehnun & Co. received any rebate, drawback, or commission from the Chlca~o. Rock lRlund &
Ptlt'lftc RH II road Cumpan.v, or the Chit'ago,
Rurllngton & Quincy Railroad Company,
on the transpol'tntlon of grain from
polnt11 In the states of Nebraska Rud Kansas, to the city of ChlCUKO. In the state
of IlllnoiH, daring the past year, whereby you secured the transportation of said
Krain ut less than the tariff rateR e11tahllshed by eald rallrond? A. I dt>cllne to
answer on the same ground . "
'l'he grand Jurors thereupon flied in ealrl
court, on the 22d of No,·emher, 1~90. their
report, signed by their foreman aud clerk,
certifying to the court the several q11eetluns which Counse1mun eo refused to an·
ewer. Thereupon the judge of the court
granted a rule on (.'ouuselman to 11huw
cause why he 1<hould not anHwer the ;mid
questions, a hctlrlng wal! hurl, und the
court made nn order, ou tl.tt> 25th of :So·
\"ember, 1H90, which found that thP.excuRes
and rt>a11ons advanced on behalf of Connselman, us to why he should not anMwer
said questions, were wholly insuffil'lent,
and directed that he appeur ht>fore the
grand Jury without delay, and there answer
the s1tld questions, and also such further
qnestlons tout'hlog the uwttcr unrle1· inquiry by the grand Ju1·y, and which should
be pertinent to such inquiry, as should
be propounded to him by any mP.mber of
the g;rnnd Jury, or the district attorney.
or any of his aesh1tants.
Counselman was again coiled beforll the
grand Jury, and the same QUP.Htlons. together with other kindred questions, were
submitted to him to answer; and he refused to answer them, and each of thP.m,
for the same reReons. The grand Jury, by
Its report signed by its foreman und clerk,
reported to t.h e court thllt CounHl'lman
still refused to answer thfl que11tlune
which he had prcvlouel,v refused to answer, and upon the same grouncls, and
that there were also propounded to him
by the dlHtrlct attorney and the grand
Jury oddltlonul questions, whkh, and the
answerR thereto, were us follows:
"Question. llo you know whether or
not the Chlc1tgo, Rock Island & Pacific
Railroad Company tt·am~portecl for any
person, company, or corporation In the
city of Chlcai:o. during the year laRt pest,
Jtraln from any "olnt In the states of Nebraska, Kani.as, or Iowtt, to the city of
Chicago, in the state of Illlnoht, for less
11:11

Case No. 143]

PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

order ﬁning him $500 and the costs of the

than the established rateR In force on eoeh
ror •I at the time of such tr1meportntlon?
Answer. I decllue to auswer, on the
ground that my answer mlarht tend to
erlmlnate me. Q. Do you know any pert1oo, corpora tlon, or company who ht1e
obtained their transportation of grain
from poiuts or places In the states of
Iowa, !Sebrllska, or Kansas, to the city of
{'bit ago, over the Chicago, Rock Island &
Pa.:lfic Railroad, during the past year, ttt
a rate and 11rlce les11 tlrno the publhihed
and IPgHI tariff rate at the time of such
shltimeiit? A. I decline to answer, for tho
rea11on that my Rnswei· might tend to
crlmlnate me. Q. Do you know whethl'r
the Chicugo, Rock l1dand & Pacific Railroad Company, within the pal!lt yP.ar, bas
eharge1l, demanded, or received from any
person. compuoy, or r.orporatlon lo the
dty or l'hicago any let111 rate than the
011en rate, or rate e11ta hllllhed O)· said railroad company, on 11:raln or other property transported by the sairl rallrund company from points In the stntl'~ of NPbraska. KOJmms. and Iowa to the city of
<.'blcago, In the state of llllnole? 1f you
ha t"e lluc!J knowledge, give the name of
1rnch shlJ1pl'r of whom said rate was
<:barged, demanded, or recelvP.d, aucl the
amonot of such rate and shipments, stating fully all the particulars within your
knowledge. A. I d('('Jlne to anHwer, for
the reason that my answe1· might tend to
erlmlnate me. Q. Do you know whether
the Chlcag;o, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Company, during the y11ar A. D. 1800,
has paid to any shipper. at the city of
('blcago. any rebate, refund, or commh1sloo on property and grain tram1ported
by such company from polntM lo the
8tates or K1tnea111, Nebraska, or Iowa,
whereby such shipper obtained the trnnRportatloo of snch gruln or propPrty rrom
the said polot11 In said statPH to the city
of Chicago, lu the state of Illinois, at a
le11s rate than the open or tarltt rate, or
the rate established by sal<t company? If
you have such knowledge, state th~
1tmount or llUCh rebntes, the druwbacks,
nr rommls111lone paid, to whom pald, tbtl
date of the same, Bnd on what shipments,
and state fully all the particulars within
sour knowledge relating to such transaction or traneactloue. A. I decline to answer, for the rea11100 thftt my answer
mlJtht tend to crlmlnu.te me."
Thereupon, 11ftPr a hparlnJ,t, the court on
Novt>mher 25. 1~0. Rdjudged Counselmun
to lie In contem11t of court, and made an
order fining lllm $500 and the costs or the
prucePCliog, and 1llrectlng Ute mai·slutl to
tllkl' him into custody end bold him 1111t11
he should have answered snl'.l queMtlone,
and all que1ttlons of similar Import which
sbonld be pr<•poun1led to him by the
gran1l j11ry, or the district attorney, or
any RlfSiHtnnt dhitrlct attorney, In the
preiwnce of such jnry, and until be should
pay Kuch ftne and cu111ts. l;ncler that order he was tRkeu Into cm1tody by the
lllll l'Klrnl and held.
On the 26th of November, 1800, he flied
fn the circuit court of the United State11
for thl' northern diHtrlct of llllnol11 a petl ·
tlon setting forth the for<•golng facts, und
11ra~·ing for a writ of ha/Je11s cor111111. 'l'he
11ctlUou allt>getl that the grund Jury bad

proceeding, and directing the marshal to

·11:.?
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than the established rates in force on such

ro-"'i at the time of such transportation?

Answer. I decline to answer, on the

ground that my answer might tend to

crimiuate me. Q. Do you know any per-

son, corporation. or company who has

obtained their transportation of grain

from points or places in the states of

Iowa, Nebraska. or Kansas, to the city of

(‘hicago. over the Chicago. Rock island &

Paciﬁc Railroad, during the past year. at

a rate and price less than the published

and legal tariff rate at the time of such

shipment? A. I decline to answer, for the

reason that my answer might tend to

criminate me. Q. Do you know whether

the Uhicago, Rock Island & Pacific Rail-

road Company, within the past year. has

charged, demanded, or received from any
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person. company, or corporation in the

city of Chicago any less rate than the

open rate, or rate established by said rail-

road company. on grain or other proper-

ty transported by the said railroad com-

pany from points in the states of Nebras-

ka. Kansas. and Iowa to the city of

Chicago. in the state of Illinois? ifyou

have such knowledge, give the name of

such shipper of whom said rate was

charged, demanded. or received, and the

amount oi such rate and shipments, stat-

ing fully all the particulars within your

knowledge. A. I decline to answer, for

the reason that my answer might tend to

criminate me. Q. Do you know whether

the Chicago, Rock Island & Paciﬁc Rail-

road Com pany. during the year A. D. 1890,

has paid to any shipper. at the city of

Chicago. any rebate, refund, or con1|nis-

siou on property and grain transported

by such company from points in the

states oi Kansas, Nebraska, or Iowa,

whereby such shipper obtained the trans-

porta tion of such grain or property from

the said points in said states to the city

of Chicago, in the state of Illinois, at a

less rate than the open or tariff rate, or

the rate established by said company? ll‘

you have such knowledge, state the

amount of such rebates, the drawbacks,

or commissions paid. to whom paid, the

date of the same, and on what shipments,

and state fully all the particulars within

your knowledge relating to such transac-

tion or transactions. A. I decline to an-

swer, for the reason that my answer

might tend to criminate me. ”

Thereupon. after a hearing. the court on

November 2-3. 1890. adjudged Counselman

to he in contempt of court. and made an

take him into custody and hold him until

he should have answered said questions,

and all questions of similar import which

should he propounded to him by the

grand jury, or the district attorney, or

any assistant district attorney. in the

no Jurisdiction or authority to make the
Investigation fn question. or to submit to
him the several questlon11 referred to:
that hie answers to tboeequestlona would
tend to Incriminate him, and, by compelling him to auewer them, he would be
compelletl to be a witness agalot.'t himself
In the crhnlual proceeding and Investigation pending before the grand Jory, and
In any criminal proceedings which might
be brought as a re1mlt of auch Investigation, contrary to the provisions of tbe
constitution of the United StatP.B, and
especially the fourth and fifth amendments thereof; that the dh1trlct court h11d
no jurt11dlctlon to compel him to answer
s11ld question&; thnt ltH order to that
effect was contrary to the constitution
and laws or the Ur.lted States, and was
void; that the district court had no Jurisdiction so to adjudge him lo contempt;
' the t the ordn Imposing a ftne upon him
and committing him to the cuKtody of the
marshal was void: and that be was held
lo custody without legftl right, and l'ontrary to the constitution and laws of the
l'nlted States.
On the same <lay, the circuit court tsRued R writ of hHhf'aR corp11s, retnroable
forthwith, the return to which by the
marshal weB that Coun11elman was held
nnder the order of the dlotrkt court. made
November 25, 1!l90. The case waa beard
on No'\'ember !?!Ith, and on December 18th
the circuit court, heJtl by Judge 0REflllAll,
delivered an opinion, (44 Fed. Rep. 268.)
anti made uo order adjudging that the
district court was lo the exercise of Its
rightful authority in doing what It had
done, overruling the motion of Couuselmao for his dl11charge, dlamlBHlng bis petition, remanding him to the custody of
the marshal, discharging the writ of b•
beas corp11s, anti adjudging against Counsel man the cost"' or the proceedings. He
exceptE'd to the order and appealed to
this court, and an ordl"r was made admitting him to ball p~udlog the appeal.
Iu the opinion or the circuit court, It
was bt'ltl that. under the fifth ame11dmeot
to the constitution, which declares that
.. no pl•rson • • • shall be compelled In
Roy criminal co11e to be a witness og11lnet
himself," 11 persou cagnot be compelled to
dlecloHe faces before a court or grand Jory
which might snhject him to a criminal
proMecntlon, or hlM property to forfeiture;
that, undP.r the Interstate commerce law,
It Is rnulle u criminal offem1e, punishable
by fine and Imprisonment, ff>r any omcer
or agent or a ralltoad company to grant
any shippers of mt'rchandlse from one
state to another, and for anyanch shipper
to eontrac~t for or reeelve, a rate lesR than
the tariff or open ratt; that shippers, 88
well a11 the olttcers, Rl!,"eute, and em)lloyee
of corporations engage1l lo the carrying
bu11lm•HH bt>t ween eta tee, are made subject
to the penaltieK of the eta tutl'; bot that,
aK the ,,rotl'ctloo of section !160 of the Re\•ls1•d 8tatuteH WllS ('o-extemdve with that
or the conetit11tlon, Counsi,lman waF. Pntltlt'd to no prlvllt•ge under the constitution; that, tr thereuftE'l' be were to be
vroseruted for thP offense, Bt'rtlon f\60
would not 11ermlt blM admi111do1111 to be
proved against hlru; that bis )'('fu11ul to
testify was not a refusal to testify lo a
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the commission may apply to institute in

proceeding to obtain evidence upon which

he might be indicted, but in a proceeding

to obtain evidence upon which others

might be indicted; and that, although in

his testimony he might disclose facts and

circumstances which would open up

sources of information to the govern-

ment, whereby it might obtain evidence

not otherwise obtainable to secure his

conviction, yet, if his testimony could not

be repeated in any subsequent. proceeding

against him or his property, he was pro-

tected as fully by section 860 as the consti-

tution intended he should be.

Section 860 is ‘a re-enactment of section

1 of the act of February :15, 1868, c. 13. (15

St. 37,) which provided as follows: “That

no answer or other pleading of any par-
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ty. and no discovery or evidence obtained

by means of any judicial proceeding from

any party or witness in this or any for-

eign country,shall be given in evidence.

or in any manner used against such par-

ty or witness, or his property or estate,

in any court of the United States, or in

any proceeding by or before any oﬁicer

of the United States. in respect to any

crime, or for the enforcement of any pen-

alty or forfeiture, by reason of any act or

omission of such party or witness: pro-

vlded, that nothing in this act shall be

consnued to exempt any party or wit-

ness irom prosecution and punishment

for perjury committed by him in discover-

ing or testifying as aforesaid."

Section >460 provides as follows: “No

pleading of a party, nor any discovery or

evidence obtained from a. party or wit-

ness by means of a judicial proceeding in

this or any foreign country, shall be given

in evidence. or in any manner used against

him or his property or estate, in any

court of the United States,in any criminal

proceeding, or for the enforcement of any

penalty or forfeiture: provided, that this

section shall not exempt any partyor wit-

ness from prosecution and punishment

for perjury committed in discovering or

testifying as aforesaid."

iiy section 10 of the interstate commerce

act of February 4, 1887, c.104. (24 St. 382,)

as amended by section 2 of the act of

March 2, 1889, c. 382. (25 St. 857,) unlaw-

ful discrimination in rates. fares, or

charges, for the transportation of pas-

sengers or property, is made subject, not

only to a ﬁne of not to exceed $5.000 for

each offense. but to imprisonment in the

penitentiary for not over two years, or to

both, in the discretion of the court. B

section 12 of the act of 1887, (24 St. 383,)

as amended by section 3 of the act oi 1889,

(25 St. 558,) the interstate commerce com-

mission is authorized and required to

execute and enforce the provisions of the

act, and, on the request of the commis-

sion, it is made the duty of any district

[CaRe No. 143

proceeding to obtain evidence upou which not In the exercise of Its proper and lea;ltlhP ml~ht be Indicted, but In a proceeding ma te authority In prosecuting the inve11tlto obtain evidence upon wbleh othel'B gntlone speclftcally t1et out 111 Its two remight be Indicted; aml that, although In ports to the district court; that tho11e rt'·
his testimony he ml~bt disclose facts and ports could not be made the foundation
clrcumstanct'fl whtr.h would 011eo up of any Judicial action by the court; that
sourl'e& of Information to the i:overn- the Interstate commerce commlHslon waH
ment, wherPhy it might obtain evhlenct! specially l11veeted b.v the statute with the
not otherwise obtainable to secure hlat authority to Investigate violations of the
conviction, yet, if his tet1tlmony could not act nnd chargPd with that duty; snd
be repPah•d In any subsequent proceeding that no duty In that 1~pect wee Imposed
against him or his property, he wa11 pro- upon the grand Jury, until Rpeclftc charges
tected as fully by section SISO as the couRtl- bad been mude.
But, In the view we ta(le of this case,
tutlon Intended be 11hould be.
Section 860 Is ·a re-enactment of section we do not tlnd it J>ecessary to Intimate
1 of the act of February !!5, 1868, c. 13, I 16 any opinion as tu that 11ue11tlon In any of
St. 37,) which provided as followR: "That lte branches, or ae to the qul'Btlon whethPr
no ao11wer or other pleading of any pur- the reports of the grand Jury, In statln~
ty, and no dlsco\"'ery or evidence obtained thut they were enll'll ited In investigating
by means of an.v judicial proceeding from and Inquiring Into "certain alleiz:ell violaRuy party or wltoesR in this or any for- tions" of the actll of 1~7 and 1889 by the
eign cmrntry, shall be given In evldem·e. officers and agents of three 11peclfted rallor In any manner need agalnl!t Huch par- w11y and railroad companiett, and the
ty or witness, or his property or estate, oftlrers and agents of various other railIn any court of the Unlterl States, or In road companies ha vlng lines of road lo
RllY proceedlup; by or before uny officer I the district, (there bPh1g no other 11howof the Tlntted States, In respec:t to any ' lng lo the record as to what they were lncrime, or for the enforcement of any r1en- veetlgo ting and Inquiring to to,) are or are
alty or forfeiture, by reason of any act or not COllHIHtPnt with thP fRct that they
omlseloo of such pllrty or wltnt>HS: pro- were Investigating speclflccharge1:1agdlr.st
fiued, tllat nothlu11: lo this act sllnll be partlcular~rsons; hecaueeweare of opinco11&t1ued to exempt any party 01· wlt- ion that upon another ground the judgnes1J from proNeCutlo11 and punlHhment ment of the court below must be rever1:1'.!d.
It II' broadly c1Jnte11decl on the part of
for perjnry committed hy him lo d!Mcoverlng or testifying aR aforetutld."
the appellAe that a wltneR11 le not eotltlt>d
Hectlon "'60 provides aa follows: .. No to plead the privilege of silence, except In
pll•adlop: of a party, nor any discovery or a criminal caae against blmeeJr; but sul'h
evtdenc·e obtal~d from a party or wlt- le not the languttge of the conetltutloo.
net1e by means of a Judicial procef'dlng In Its pro\•ltilon Is that no person shall be
this or any forelf{D country, 1Jball be given com1>elll'd lo any criminal case to bea. wltIn e\·idence. or lo any manner used 8Jtalm1t DeHeagalm•t himself. Thie provision mm1t
him or ll\e property or estate, In any have a broad construction In fa\•or of the
court of thA United St&tt>R, In any criminal right which It wae Intended to secure.
}lroceedlng, or for the enforcement of any The matter under lnvesthotatlon hy the
penalty or forfeiture: provided, that this grao~ Jury In this ca11C was a <'l"l•nlmd
section shall not exempt any party or wit- matter, to Inquire whether there hail heeu
ness from prosecution and punishment a criminal vlolutlon of the lnterBtate comfor perjury committed lo discovering or merctl act. If Coum1elman had been guilty
tpstlfylng ae aforesaid."
of the matter& Inquired of In the questions which he refused to an<iwer, he himBy section lU of the tntt>rBtate commerce
act of February 4, 1"87, c. 104, (24 St. ~2,) self was liable tu criminal prosecution unas amenrled by section 2 of the act of der the act. The case before the grand
March 2, ll-189, c. at\2. (25 St. 857,) unlaw- Jury wae therefore a criminal case. The
ful dleel'lmlnatlon In rates, fares, or reason given by Counselman for bis recharges, for the tra11s1wrta tlon of pas- fusal to answer the que1:1tlooe wee that
eengen1 or property, h1 made subject, not his a11sweN1 might tend to crlmlnate him,
only to a fine of not to e~ceed $fi,OOO for and showed tbnt bis apprehension wns
each offense, but to Imprisonment Ir. the that, If he answered the questlonH truly
penitentiary for not over two years, or to anrl fully, (as be was bound to do If he
both, In the dllilcretlon of the conrt. By should antlwer them at all,) the answers
section 12 of the act of 18lol7, (24 St. 38:i,) might show th11t he bad committed a
&R amended by section 8 of the ar.t of 1!:'8U, crime ageln11t the Interstate commerca
(25 St. !:158,) the Interstate commerce cum- act, for which be might be prusecuted.
mleslon le authorlzPd and· required to Hts anewere, therefore, would be teHtl- .
e:1:ecnte and enforce the provisions of the mony aKalnst himself, and he would be
ar.t, and, on the req11est of the commh1· compelled to give them In a criminal l'a&e.
It Is lmpos<tlble that the meaning of the
slon, It 111 marle the duty of any distrkt
attorney of the United Stutes to whom constitutional proviHlon can onl.v be that
·the commission may llPJ>ly to Institute in a person shall not be compelled to be n
the prop!>r court, anll to prusel·ute under witness a~alnst himself In a criminal
the direction of the att.orney generul of pro11ec11tlon against himself. It wo111ll
the United :States, all necessnry proreell- doubtle1Js cover such caseti: lmt It Is not
tng11 for the enforcement of the provisions limited to them. The ohject w11e to in.
of the act and for the punlshnwnt of all vio- sure that a pe1·son ahoulrl not be coP.>pelled, when acting RS a wltneHs In uny
la lions thereof.
It Is <'On tended by the uppeJ:ant that Investigation, to 11;ive testimony whlrh
the grand jury of the district court was might tend to show tbat he himself bad

.u::t
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PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

committed a crime. The privilege is lim-

ited to criminal matters, but it is as

broad as the mischief against which it

seeks to guard.

It is argued for the appeliee that the in-

vestigation before the grand jury was

not n criminal case. but was solely for the

purpose of finding out whethera crime

had been committed. or whether any one

should be accused of an offense, there be-

ing no accuser and no parties plaintiff or

defendant, and that a case could arise

only when an indictment should be re-

turned. in support of this view reference

is made to article 6 of the amendments to

the constitution of the United States,

which provides that in all criminal prose-

cutions the accused shall enjoy the right:

to a speedy and public trial by an impar-
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tial jury. to be confronted with the wit-

nesses against him. to have compulsory

process for witnesses. and the assistance

of counsel for his defense.

But this provision distinctly means a

criminal prosecution against a person

who is accused and who is to be tried by

a petitiury. A criminal prosecution un-

der nrticle 6 of the amendments -is much

narrower than a “criminal cuse," under

article 5 of the amendments. it is entirely

consistent with thelanguage of article 5

that the privilege of not being a witness

against himself is to be exercised in a pro-

ceeding before a grand jury.

\\'e cannot yield our assent to the view

taken on this subject by the court of ap-

peals of New York in People v. Kelly, 2i

l\'. Y. 74, 84. The provision of the consti-

tution oi New York of 1846 (article 1, § 6)

was that no person shall "be compelled,

in any criminal case. to be a witness

against himself.” The court, speaking by

Judge DENIO, said: “The term ‘criminal

case.’ used in the clause. must be allowed

some meaning. and none can be conceived

other than u prosecution for a criminal

offense. But it must be a prosecution

against him; for whnt is forbidden is that

he should be compelled to be a witness

against himself.” This ruling, which has

been followed in someother cases, seems

to us. as applied to the provision in the

fifth amendment to theconstitution of the

United Slates, to take away entirely its

trne meaning and its value.

it is an ancient principle of the law

of evidence that a witness shall not be

compelled, in any proceeding, to make dis-

closures or to give testimony which will

tend to crimiunte him or subject him to

ﬁnes. penalties. or forfeitures. Itex v.

$laney.5 Car. & P. 213; Gates v. Hard-

acre. 3Taunt. 424: Maloney v. Bartley, 3

Camp. 210; 1 Starkie, Ev. Tl, 191; (“‘-ase of

Sir John Friend, 13 How. St. Tr. 16;

(Jase oi Earl of Macclesiield. iii How. St.

'i‘r. 767; 1 Greenl. Ev.§ 451; 1 Burr’s 'l‘r.

244: Whart. Crim. Ev. (9th Ed.) § 463:

PH.ODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

committf'd a rrhne. The privilcp;e le limited to rrlminl\I mattP-re, but It le eR
broad ae the mischief agaloet which it
St!ekt< to gua1·d.
It le erJ!;ued for the appellee that the Investigation before the grand jury wee
not a criminal caRe, but waR solely for the
)JUrpoRe of finding out whether a crime
hRcl been committPd, or whether any one
should be accused of au offt>nse, there helnj( 110 accuRer and no parties plalntltt 01•
<lefendant, end thut a c1H1e couhl arlRe
only wl11m an Indictment. ehoulct be returned. In support or this view reference
IH nrnde to article 6 of the amendmPnh to
the constitution of the UnitPd States,
which provides that In ull criminal pr1111ecutions the accused 1o1hall Pnjo;v the right
to a SJJeedy and public trial by an Impartial jur~·. to be confrontt>d with the wit·
neiiseR against him. to h11 ve compulsor~·
process for wltneeset1, anll the BRBletaoce
of coun11el fur hie defense.
But this provl11lon distinctly means a
criminal pro;iecutiou against a pt>rson
who IR accused and who le to be tried by
e petlt Jury. A criminal prm•ecutlon under urtlcle 6 of the amendments 111 mueh
nnn·ower than a "criwinul cuse," under
llrtlt'le 5 of the nmemlmente. It IA Pntlrely
con11i1:1tent with the language of article 5
that tbe prl vllege of nut being a witness
againl't himself le to be exercised in a proceeding before a grand Jury.
We <'annnt yield our assent to the view
taken on this subj~t by the court of appe11ls of New York in People v. Kelly, 2-l
N. Y. 74, 84. The provision of the constitution of New York of 1846 (article 1, § 6)
was that no person shall "be compelled,
lo any criminal cnHe, to he e wltneRB
against himself." The court, speaking by
Judge DENIO, said: "The term • rrlmlnttl
case,' need In the clnuse, must he allowed
some meaning, and none can bP. conceived
othe1· thttn 11 prosecution for a criminal
onense. But it must be a prosecution
agulmJt him; for whnt IH fnrbid!len IR l hat
he Rhould be compelled to be a witneRe
8A"uln<tt himself." This ruling, which htt11
been followed In some other cases, seems
to UH, as a11plled to the provision In tbe
fifth amendment to theconHtitution of the
United Ht ates, to tnke away entirely Its
true me1mlng and itR value.
It is an ancient princi11le of the law
of evidence tbs t e wltne11s shall not be
compelJPd, In Rny 11roceelllng, to make dlselo1o1ure11 or to ~vc teRtlmony which will
tend to crlmlnnte him or suhject him tu
tines, penalties, or forfeitureH. HPX v.
~laney. 5 Car. & P. 21.a; Cates v. HardRcre, 3 Taunt. 424: Mttlnney v. Bartley, 3
Cl1mp. 210; l Sturkie, Ev. 71, 1!ll; f'111,;e of
8ir John Friend, 13 How. St. Tr. 16;
Case ol ERrl of MaccleRfleld, 1ll How. St.
'rr. ill7; 1 Green!. Ev. § 451: l Burr'11 'l'r.
244: Whart. Crim. Ev. (9th Ed.) § 46:~:
Houthlird v. Rexford, 6 Cow. 254; l'eor>IP.
v. Muther, 4 WenlJ. 229; Lister v. Boker, 6
Bla.ckf. 4:-19.
The relations or CounHelman to the sub~
ject of inquh•_y IJefore the grand jury, &M
Hhown h.v the questions put to him, In
connediun with the m·ovlslons of the intP.rRtate l'ot11111e1·cn 1wt. entitled him to Invoke tho p1·utectlun of the co1111titutlun.
414

State ,.. XowPll, 58 N. H. 314; Emery's
CH11e, 107 MaRR. 172.
It rPmalns to consider whether section
860 of the Revised :Stat u tee rtlrnoveA the
protection of the constitutional privilege
of Cnuneelman. '.fhat 11ectlon mm1t be
construed as rleclarlnll that no e\"idence
ohtalned from a wltne"'s by means of a jnclicinl proceeding shall be given in evidence,
or In any manner used ttgainet him or his
property or e11tate, in uny ·~ourt of the
United Slates, in any criminal proceeding,
or for the enforcemPnt of any penalty or
forfeiture. It follows that ttn.v evidence
which might have ul'f!n' obtained from
Coun11elman hy mean11 of his examination
before the grand jury could not be given
in evidence nor used aµ-ain11t him or hie
property In any court of the United StateA,
In an.v criminal proceeding, or for the tlD·
fotcement of any penalty or forfeiture.
Thie, or couree, protected him a1&Hlnst the
USt' of his testimony against him or hie
propm ty tn any prosecu tlon Bllttlnst him
or his property. In any criminal procreding, In a court of the United StaleR. But
It had only that effect. It could not, and
would not, prevent the use of his testimt•ny to search out other testimony to he
u1<ed In evidence against him or his property, In a crlmi1111l proceeding In 11uch
court. It could not prevent the obtaining
und the UF!e of witnesseo;i and evidence
which should be attrlhutahle directly to
the testimony he ml11:ht give under compulsion, and on which he might be convicted, when otherwil4e, and If he had ~
fused to answer, hA could not possibly
have been convicted.
The constitutional provision dlet1nctly
decla!i('S that a person shall not "be compelled In any criminal cuse to be a witness agRlnst himself," and the proteetloo
or section 860 Is not co-extensive with tbe
constitutional provision.
Legislation
cannot detruet from the privilege afforded by the constitution. It would be quite
another thing If the coni1tltutlon bad provided that no person shall bt compelled in
any criminal case to be a wltneBB Against
himself, unless It slwuld be provided b~
statute that crlml11atln11: evidence ext1 act·
ed from a wltnees B!l&inst his will should
not be used against him. But a mere act
of congress cannot emend the constitution, eYen If it should lngraft thereon such
a proviso.
In some states, where there ls a like constitutional provision, It has been attP.m11te<1 by leg;lsletion to remove the constitutional provision, by d~larlni: that
there i,ahall be no future criminal proriecution against the wltnei.s, t11ue making It
lmpoRslhle ro'r the r.rlmlnal charite against
him ever to come urder the cognizance of
Any court, or at least enabling him to
pleod thP statute In absolute bar of such
prosecn tlon.
A re\'lew of the subject In ttdJmlged ca8t'8
wlll be useful.
In Com. v. Gibbs, 3 Yeates, 429, ttnd 4
Dall. 2a:J, In 1802, tbP dechtrutlon of rights
In the constitution of Pennsylvania of 1176
declared that no man c11n "be compelled
to gl?e e\•ldencc a~olust himself," and tht'
same languHgc wa" found In tbP constitution of 17llO. Under this, the supreme court

PRlVlLEGED COMMUNICATIONS.
PRlVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.

[Case No. 143

of Pennsylvania held that the maxim that

no one is bound to accuse himself ex tend-

ed to cases where the answer might in-

volvehlm in shame or reproach; and it

held to the same effect in Lessee of Gal-

brcath v. Eichelberger, 3 Yeates, 515. in 1803.

In June. 1807, Chief Justice Mansuann,

in the circuit court of the United States

for the district of Virginia. in Burr’s trial,

(1 Bun-’s Tr. 244.) on the question whether

the witness was privileged not to accuse

himself. said: “lithe question he of such

a description that an answer to it may or

may not criminate the witness, according

to the purport of that answer, it must

rest with himself, who alone can tell what

it would be, to answer the question or

not. if, in such acase, he say, upon his

oath, that his answer would criminate
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himself, the court can demand no other

testimony of the fact. * ' ' According

to their statement. [the counsel for the

United States,] a witness can never refuse

to answer any question, unless that an-

swer, unconnected with other testimony,

would besufﬁcient'toc0nvict him of crime.

This would be rendering the rule almost

perfectly worthless. Many links frequent-

ly compose that chain of testimony which

is necessary to convict any individual of

a crime. It appears to the court to he

the true sense oft.he rule that no witness is

compcilable to furnish anyone of them

against himself. It is certainly not only

a possible, but a probable,case thata

witness, by disclosing a single fact, may

complete the testimony against himself,

a.nd to every effectual purpose accuse him-

self as entirely as he would by stating

every circumstance. which would be re-

quired for his conviction. That fact, of it-

self, might be unavailiug, but all other

facts without it would be insufficient.

While that remains concealed within his

own bosom. he is safe: but draw it from

thence, and heis exposed to a prosecution.

The rule which declares that no man is

compellable to accuse himself would most

obviously be infringed by compelling a

witness to disclose a fact of this descrip-

tion. What testimony may be possessed

or is attainable against any individual

the court can never know. It would seem.

then. that the court ought never to com-

pel a witness to give an answer which dis-

closes a tact that would form a necessary

and essential part of a crime which is

punishable b_v the laws."

In 1-*%.'»3, in State v. Quarles, 13 Ark. 307,

the declaration of rights in the constitu-

tion of Arkansas of lsrm (article 2,§ 11) had

declared that, in prosecutions by indict-

ment or presentment, the accused “shall

not be compelled to give evidence against

himself." Quarles was indicted under a

gaming law, for betting money on a game

of chance. A nolle prosequi having been

entered as to one Neal. against whom a

of Pennsylvania held that the mnxlm that
no one 111 bound to accuse hlm11elf extencJf'<l to ca11es where the answer might Involve him lo shame or reproucb; and It
held to the same erfect In Lessee of Onlbrllatb v. Eichelberger, a Yeo.tes,516, In 1803.
Jn June. 1807, Chief Juetke MARl!HALL,
in the circuit com·t of the United States
for the district of Virginia, In Burr's trial,
( 1 Burr's Tr. 244.) 011 tht' question wht tll'3r
the wltne11e was privileged not to accuse
himself. said: "If the quP.Stlon be of 11uch
a description that an answer to 1t ma.v or
may not crimlnate the witness, according
to the purport of that answer, It must
rest with hlmselr, who alone <'an tell what
it would be, to answer the que1ttlon or
not. If, In such a case, be say, upon his
oath, that his answer would crlmlnate
himself, the court can demand no other
testimony of the fact. • • • According
to their statement, [the counsel for the
United States,] a witness can r.ever refuse
to an11wtir uuy question, u11le1n1 that answer, unconnected with other testimony,
would beenfflclent·to convil't him of crime.
Thie would be rendering the rule almost
perfectly worthlee11. Many links frequently com1JOs~ that chain of te11tlmony which
is nece1:11uu·y to convict any lndl vidual of
a crime. It ap11eurs to the court to be
the true eenKe oftberule that no witness ls
compelloble to fnrnlsh any one of them
agaln11t hlm&elf. It le certainly not only
a possible, but a probable, case that a
witnet1s, by dlecloelug a single fact, may
com11lete the testimony against hlm11elf,
and to every eftectual purpoHl' accUBA himself ae entirely ae be would by stating
every circumstance. which would be required for bht conviction. That fact, of It·
seU, might be unavailing, but all other
faete without It would bl' Insufficient.
While that remalnR concealt-d within hie
own bmmm. he le eafe: hnt <Ira w It from
theore, and hele exposed to a 1>ro1:1eeutiun.
The rule which declareH that no man 111
comptillable to ac<"nse himself would most
obviously bP. lofrlop:ed by compelling a
wltnet111 to dhreloKe a fact of this description. What te1:1tlmony may be possessed
or Is attainable aKalnst any lndlvhlual
the court con never know . It would 11eem.
then, that the court ought never to compel a witness to ~Ive an an11wer wblch r1leclo11ee a ract that would form ft neceHeury
itnd e1111entlal DRrt of a crime which le
punlRhAhle by the Jaws."
lo 18ii3, In ~tate v. Quarlel', 13 Ark. 307,
the declaration of rhrh tR In the conetlt11tlon of Arkansas of JX:jti ( lll'tlcle 2, § 11) had
declared that, In prosecutions Lly Indictment or presentment, tht- accused "shall
not be compelled to gh·e evidence ugaloet
himself." Quarlt>e WftB Indicted under a
gaming law, for betting money on a irame
of chance. A uol/P. prose(/111 ha vlng been
entered all to 'lne Neal. against whom a
like pr011ecutlon was pendlnr.c. Neal wa11
sworn as o witness for the state, and Informed of the no/le prnseq11I, and that no
Indictment for a 1dmllar offen11e would be
preferrt d against him. and wa11 a11ked
whethc>r he had seen Quarles bet money
at cards within a specified time. Nenl refused to answer the q nuitlon, alleirlnr.c thnt
he feured that he would crlmlnute hlmseH
thereby. The trial court relu11ed to compel
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him to answer, end, the jury ha vlnir found
for the dc>fenllent, the state appealed.
There was a statute of Arkansas which
rend as follows: "In all caeet1 where two
or more r:~1·sone are Jolntl~· or otherwise
concerned in the commission of eny crime
or ml11demeao01', either of such persons
may be sworn as ft witness In relation to
such crime or misdemeanor: but the testimony given by BUCh wltneMB sbAll In no
Instance be used against him In nny criminal prosecution for the same offense. "
Eng. Dip;. 398, § 72.
The 11upreme court of Arkansas held
that. although witnesses were not expressed In the terms of the provisions of
the bill of rights, yet they were eubetantlally embraced to thefull extent or a complf'te guarauty against 11elf-accusntlun;
and that the prlvlJElge or the bill of rights
wa11 that a wltne1111 should not be compelled to produce the evidence to prove
blmKelf guilty or the crime al>out which he
ml11:ht be called to tel'tlfy. But It was
further held that, by the statute, the legl11latnre had sorhanged therole by directing
that the testimony required to be gh•en
should never be used against a witness
for the purpose of procurlop; hle<'onvlC'tlon
for the <:rime or UJlsdemeanor to '~hlch It
related, t11at It wus no lunger nec0H11ary
for him to claim bis prl \'liege In regard
to such testimony, In order to prevent Its
afterwnrlle bf>ing used against him: and
that the only question was whether the
11tututory regulation afforded sutHelc>nt
protectlor1 to the witness, responsive to
the new rulA and to the constitutional
guaranty ngalnst compulaory self-accuse·
tlon. Jt was held that the statute ~um
clen tly guarded witnesses from eelf-aet·u1:1atlon, within the meunlng of the constitution, to make It lawful for the courts to
compel them to testify ae to all mattert1
embraced by the provisions of the statute
on that Knbject.
Jn Higdon v. Heard, 14 Ga. 2.>5, In 1803,
It was said that the constitution of
Georgia declared that "no penmn shall be
compelled In any criminal case to be a witness ll~alnet himself." In that ca110 the
plalotln had Oled' a bill lo equity praying
a dleco\•ery as to property which be alleged the defendants had won from him In
a game of card11. The bill wa11 demurred
to on the ground that the law of the
state compelllng a discovery of gaming
tran11actlone was uoconstltutlonnl, because such transactions were crlmtn11l. and
the statute did not grant an absolute and
unconditional relea11e from punb1hmeot,
and because the defendant11 <'Ould not
make the dlecovery sought without crlmlnatlrigthemselveeaod incurring penalties.
The demurrer was overruled by thtt supreme court of Ueorgla, on the ground
that, although all pe1·sone were protected
by the constitution from furnbihlng evidence agaln11t themselves which mlgh t tend
to subject them to a criminal prosecotlon,
tbey received their protection by virtue of
an act of Georgia of li64, bccar•se, under
that act, their 1rnsweri! could not be read
In evidence agaln11t them In any crlmlnal
caHe w hRtever, l>elng exclurled by the constitution.
In Ex parte RowA, 7 Cal. 184. In 1~'17, the
constitution of California of 1~49 provided
415
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(article ].§8) that no person shall "be

compelled,in any criminal case. to he a

witness against himself." Rowe had been

committed for refusing to answer, under

an order of the court, certain questions

propounded to him by thegrand jury in an

examination concerning thedisposition of

certain moneys taken from the state

treasury. on the ground that his answer

would disgrace him, and would tend to

subject him to a prosecution for felony.

Thesupreme court of California.,on habens

corpus, considered the construction and

constitutionality of the ﬁfth section of an

act passed April 16,1855, which provided

that“the testimony given by such wit-

ness shall in no instance be used against

himself in any criminal prosecution. ” The

court held that the provision of the con-
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stitution was intended to protect the wit-

ness from being compelled to testify

against himself in regard to a criminal of-

fense; that he could not be a witness

against himself unless his testimony could

be used against him in his own case; and

that the statute gave the witness that

protection which was contemplated by

the constitution, and therefore be was

bound to answer.

in 1860. in Wilkins v. Malone,14 Ind. 153,

the constitution of Indiana of 1851, in its

bill of rights, (article 1, § 14,) had declared

that “no person in any criminal prosecu-

tion shall be compelled to testify against

hinisell‘. " In a suit brought by Malone to

recover on a promissory note, the defense

pleaded usury, and offered to examine

Malone as a witness to prove the usury.

The plaintiff objected, on the ground that

such examination would criminate himself,

and the objection was sustained. On ap-

peal to the supreme court of Indiana by

the defendants, it was held that the con-

stitutional provision protected a person

from a compulsory disclosure, in acivil

suit, of facts tending to criminate him,

whenever his answer could be given in

evidence against him in a subsequent

criminal prosecution. The court referred

to State v. Quarles, supra, and i-ligdon v.

Heard, supra, and to the statute of In-

diana, (1 Rev. St. p. 345. § 8,) which pro-

vided that a. person charged with taking

illegal interest might be required tonn-

swer, but that his answer should not be

used against him in any criminal prosecu-

tion for usury. The court held that by

this statute the constitutional privilege of

the party was fully secured to him, al-

though he might disclose circumstances

which might lead to a criminal prosecu-

tion.

in 1S61.~in the court of app}-nls of New

York, (People v. Kelly, 24 N. Y. 74,) the

constitution of New York of 1846 declared

that no person shall“ be compelled, in any

criminal case. to be a witness against

himself.” In that case, one Hackley, as a
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(article 1. § 8) that no pereon shall "be
compelled, In any criminal rnee, to be a
witness against hlmel'lf." Rowe had been
committed for refusing to answer, under
an order of the court, certain questions
propounded to him by thel(rand jury In on
examination concerning thedlepoHltlon of
certulo moneys taken from the state
treasury, on the ground that hie auewer
would dh11erace him, and would tencl to
subject him to a proeerutlon for felony.
'l'beeuprewe court of California, on habe11s
curp11s, considered the conettuctlon and
com1tltutlonallty of the fifth section of an
act passed April 16, 1H.'l5, which provided
that" the testimony given by such witness shall In no Instance be used a1ralnet
himself In any criminal prosecution." The
court hell) that tbe provision of the constitution was Intended to protect the witness from being compelled to testify
against himself lo regard to a criminal offense; tlrnt he could not be a wltnee11
against himself unless bis testimony could
be used ngaln11t him In his own case; nnd
that the statute gave the witness that
protection whtcb was contemplated by
the constitution, and therefore be was
bound to answer.
lu 181i0, In Wilkins v. Malone, 14 Ind. 153,
the co11stltutlon of Indiana of 1851, In Its
bill of rights, (nrtlclA 1, § 14,) hall declared
that" no person In any criminal prosecution 11ball be compelled to teHttry ageln11t
hlmseU." In a suit brought by Malone to
recover on a promle11or.v note, tht1 defen11e
pleaded usury, und offered to examlno
Malone as a wltneHe to pro\•e the usury.
Th~ plalntln objected, on the ground that
such examine tlon would crlmlna te himself,
amf the objection WWI eustalne11. On op·
peal to the 1mpreme court of Indiana by
the defen1lants, it was held that the con.
etltutional provision protected a person
from a compulsory di,iclosure, In a civil
suit, of facts tending to crlmlr1a te him,
whenever hie answer coultl be given In
evidPnce ngalnst blm ln a subsequent
criminal pro11ccutlo11. The court referred
to Stute v. Quarles, 11upra, tmd Higdon v.
Heard, BuJ>ra, and to the stutnte or Indiana, (1 Rev. St. p. a.Iii, § 8,) which provided that a person ch1:1rged with taking
lllei;al interest might be required to answer, but that hfH uuswer should not be
u11ed against him In any criminal prot1ecutlon for usury. The court held that by
thlH t1tatute the constitutional privilege of
the party was fully sccured to him, although he mhr:ht disclo11e circumstances
which might leall to a criminal proeecu·
tion .
In 1861 :-in the court of apyieals of New
York, (Peo1>le v. Kelly, 24 N. Y. 74,) the
com~tltution of New York of 1R46 declared
that no per11on shall" be compelled, In any
crlmlnnl case, to be a wlt11e11s agnln11t
hlm1<clf." lo that case, one Har:kley, as a
witness before the grnnd jury on a complulnt aJr;uln11t certain aldermen for felonlom1ly receiving a gift of money under an
ngreement that their votes should be influenced the1"P.hy In a matter then pe11dfng
bl'fore them In their •JtHclal capacity, In
uns wer to a qneHtlon put to him n11 to
what he hud tlone with certain money
whkb be ball recci vecl, 111nill that any ttn·
416

ewer which he could give to the question
would disgrace him, and would have a
tenden<'y to Recuse him of 11 crime, and
bff demurred to the qu011tlon. Having
been ordereli by the court of general sessions of the peace to answer It, ho etlll refused, and was adjud~ed guilty of contempt, and put In prison. On a writ of
hllbeas corpus, be was remnmled into CUB·
tody by the supreme court, and he appealed to the conrt of appeals.
B.v chapter 539 of the Laws of New York
of 1~ii.1 It waR enact!ld, b,v s~tlon 2, that
section 14 should be edde<I to article 2. tit.
4, c. l, pt. 4, H1w. St. 'l'be act provicled
thnt the glvin1t of money to any meruber
of the common council of a city, with Intent to lnftuence his action upon any matter which mlitht be brought before him In
bi11 official capacity, ehoulll be an onen110
punlHhable by ftne or Imprisonment In a
l'ltate-prlson or both; and section 14 provided that every person offending agalnMt
the statute should" be a rompetent witness against any other person so oftP.ndlng," and might be cohl{lelled to give evf.
dence befo1·e nny mngl11trate or granl\
Jury, or In any court, In the same manner
as other persons, "bot the testimony so
Kfven shall not be 011ed In any prosecution
or proceeding, civil or criminal, against
the person BO testifying.• A similar pro·
vision was cont11l11ed ln chapter 446 of the
Laws of 1857, in section 52.
The court of appeals considered the
question whether those pro\·lsions were
consistent with the true 11ense of the decluratlon of the constitution, and ttald,
B)lenklngby Judsr:eDENIO, (page 82:) "1.'he
mandate that an accoi!ed person should
not be compelled to gl"e evidence against
himself would fall to secure the whole object Intended, If a prosecutor might call an
accomplice or confederate In a criminal
oftE1n11e, and afterwardt1 nee the evidence
be might give to procure a conviction, on
the trial of an Indictment against him. If
obliged to testify, on the trial of the coonender, to matters which would show hie
owu compllclty, lt might be said u1wo a
very liberal const1·uctlon of the lang1u1~
tha.t he was compelled to give evlclem·e
against hlmsPlf,-that Is, to gl'f'e evidence
which might be used In a criminal cmre
against himself. • • • It le, of course,
competent for th!' legislature to change
any doctrine of the common law, but I
think they could not compel a wltneRs to
tP.l!tlfy, on the trial of another pet'flon, to
fact11 which woulcl }Jrove hlmflelf guilty of
a crime, without lndemnlfyio1rhlm agalm1t
the conseqnenres, bec·ouse I think, as has
been mentlon ecl, that lJy a le1ral construction the C•)nstitutlon would be found to
forlJld it." Ilut ·the court Wl'llt on to e11y:
"If a man cannot give e"ldl•nce upon the
trial of another per1:1on without dl11cloalng
clrc1,1mstnnces whll•h wlll make hi11 own
guilt apparent, or at lenst caJ>able of
proof, thou~h hl11 account of the trammetlons should never be ut1e1l as evld!:!nl'e, It
Is the mh1furtune of his condition, Hnd not
any want or humunlty ln the law. lf a
wltneRH objects to a question on the
1!.'Toun1l that an an11wer would crhninnte
bimHeif, he mu11t nllt>ge, In 1mh11tam·e. that
his answer, If repca ted as bis admls11ion,
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on his own trial, would tend to provehim

guilty of a criminal offense. Ii the case is

so situated that a repetition of it on a

prosecution against him is impossible, as

where it is forbidden by a positive statute,

I have seen no authority which holds or

intimates that the witness is privileged.

It is not within any reasonable construc-

tion of the language of the constitutional

provision. The term ‘criminal case.‘ used

in the clause, must be allowed some mean-

ing. and none can be conceived other than

a prosecution for a criminal offense. But

it must be a. prosecution against him; for

what is forbidden is that he should becom-

pelled to be a witness against himself.

Now.if he be prosecuted criminally, touch-

ing the matter about which he has testi-

ﬁed upon the trial of another person, the
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statute makes it impossible that his testi-

mony given on that occasion should be

used by the prosecution on the trial. It

cannot, therefore, be said that in such

criminal case he has been made a witness

against himself, by force of any compul-

sion used towards him, to procure, in the

other case. testimony which cannot possi-

bly be used in the criminal case against

himself.” The court held, therefore, that

Ha:-kie,v was not protected by the consti-

tution of New York from answering before

the grand jury.

In 1157.1, in Emery’s Case, 107 Mass. 172,

article 12 of the decla ration of rights in the

constitution of Massachusetts of 1780 had

declared that no subject shall be" compelled

to accuse or furnish evidence against him-

self.” A statute of Massachusetts. of

March 8. l871,c. 91, entitled “An act for

the better discovery of testimony and the

protection of witnesses before the joint

special committee on the state police,”

provided as follows: “No person who is

called as a witness beiore the joint special

committee on the state police shall be ex-

cused from answering any question or

from the production of any paper relating

to any corrupt practice or improper con-

duct of the state police, forming the sub-

ject of inquiry by such committee, on the

ground that the answer to such question

or the production of such paper may crim-

fna te or tend to criminate himself. or to

disgrace him, or otherwise render him in-

famous, or on the ground of privilege;

but the testimony of any witness exam-

ined before said committee upon the sub-

ject aforesaid, or any statement made or

paper produced by him upon such an ex-

amination, shall not be used as evidence

against such witness in any civil or crim-

inal proceeding in any court oi justice:

provided, however. that no official paper

or record. produced by such witness on

such examination. shall be held or taken

to be included within the privilege of said

evidence so to protect such witness in any

civil or criminal proceeding as aforesaid.

CO.HMUNlOA.TlO~S.

on bfa own trial, would tend to prove him
~ullty of ll criminal otft•n11e. If the caRfl fa

eo Rltunted that a repetition of It on a
prosecution a,,;alnst him le Impossible, as
where it ie forbidden by a pmdtlvestatute.
I have seen no antborlty which bolds or
totlmatee that tbe wltoeaB le privileged.
It le not within any reasonable construction of the lnnaruaite of the constitutional
provision. Tbe term 'criminal case,• used
fn the clau~. must be allowed some meaning, and none can be conceived other than
a prostieutlon for a criminal offense. But
tt must be a prosecution against him: for
what 18 forbidden ls that he should becompelled to bo a wltneas against bimBf'll.
Now. If be be prosecuted crlmlnaJly, touch·
Ing the matter about which he baa tescl11ed OJ.Ion the trial of another penion, the
etatute makea it lmpoeslhle that hie tf'tltlmooy gi'f'en on that occasion should be
ospd by the prusecutlon on tbe trial. It
cannot, tben>fore, be said that lo such
erltoloal case he bas been made a wltoe11s
against himself, by forcit of any compulelon used towarcls blm, to procure, In thP
other cuse, te11tlmooy which conoot JhJHtli·
bly be uaed In the criminal cnee aKnlnst
hlm11elf." The court held, therefore, that
Hac•kley waa not protected by tbe eonetltotlon of New York from answering before
the grand Jnry.
In 18i.1, In Emery's C'a111>, 107 Maes. 172,
artfcle 12 of theclecl11ratlon of rlghtR In tbe
eonstltutloo of MasKachueettR of 17!'0 ho.d
declared that no euhject 11hall be" compelled
to a<"cuse or furnish 1tvldetll'e agaln11t blmBPlf." A statute of MaHeachueette. or
March 8, JKTI, c. 91, entitled "An act for
the better dl11co\"ery of testimony and the
protPCtlon (Jf wltneset-a before tile Joint
special committee on the stete police,"
provided ae follows: No penion wbo Is
ealled as a witness before the Jolot special
eommlttee on the state police Mlu1ll be exeust>d from answerlnir any question or
from the production of any paper relating
to any corr11pt practice or Improper conduct of the state police, forming the subjef!f of Inquiry by sm•h committee, on tne
ground that the anHwer to 1mcb question
or tbe production of such paper maycrlminate or tencf to r.rlmlnate himself, or to
dls1trace him, or otherwise reader hlw Infamous, or on the ground of pt·lvlle,,;e;
bot the testimony or any witness examined before said committee ur>un the 11ubJect afore11ald, or nny statement made or
paper prmluced by him upou such an exaruinathm, shall not be u~ed ae evidence
ap;olnst such witness lo any civil or criminal proceeding In any court of JuKtlce:
provided, however, that DO official f1aper
or rt'cortJ, prodnced by such wltuese on
such examination. ellflll be held or taken
to be Included within the prlvllc1te of suld
evicl~nce so to protect 1111ch wltnPt1M In any
eh·ll or crlmlnel proceeding ae aforPRald,
and that noth 1nic in tblH act Rholl be cnu.
strnE'd to exempt an.v wltnPss from proPecu tlon ond puulshmeut for pnjury committed by him In testifying ae aforeRahJ ...
Emery wne eummoued nK a wlt11P11e b~
fore the Joint epl"Clal committee of the 11enate and house of rPpesPotatlveeof tht> general court "to Inquire If the state police la
gullty of bribery nnd corruption." lnterM
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rogatorleil were propounded to him by
the committee, which he declined to anewer. On a report of the facts to the senate. ft ordered hie arrest for contempt.
He was brought before the seuate, and
asked the following qul'Btlon: " i\ re yon
ready and wlllllng to answer hefore the
Joint special committee, a1>pol11ted hy thl1
senate and the bouee of repreiieotatlvee of
Museacho11etta, to Inquire If theetate police
le gnllty of bribery and corrnptlon, the
following qoeetlone, namely: Flr11t.
Whether, since the nppolntmcnt of the
state com1tab11Jary fort'e, you have ever
tleen proeecoted for the sale or keeplnsr for
sale lnto:r.lcatlnp; liquors. Second. Have
you ever paid any money to any state
constable, nod do you know of nny corrupt practice or Improper condnrt of the
etote police? If 110. state fully whet 1111111&,
and to whom you bave thus paid money.
and altto what you know of such corrupt
prartlce and lmpn>Jlt'r conduct.,. He answered In writing es follow": "JntPndlng
no disrespect to the honorable seuatP, I
answer, under advice or counsel, that 1
am ready and willing to ant1wer the ttret
question; but J decline to answer the l'econd quet<tlon. upon the groundR-Ffrst,
that the answer thl!reto will accuse me or
an lndlctahle oHPm1e; .'lecond, that the an11wer thereto will furoh1h evldl'nce agalni;t
me by wbkb I cnn be convicted of eucb an
oftense." The senate thereupon committed him to the rustor1y of the MergPunt at
armR, to be couflnl'd In Jail for 25 duy11, or
no tll the fur.ther order of the Bl'n ate, unle1111 he should sooner answer the Qllt'S·
tlunM. He was lmt,rleoued arcortJl111dy,
and the <loee was brought before ,J ut11-~
WE1,u of the supreme Judklal court en a
writ of bubf'llB curpus, and wee fullv ar11:ued. It WRH helcl under advlflf'ml'nt and
for conference with the other Jurl:?Pll; nnd
In the opinion Huhst>quentl.v dt•llverPCI by
Judge WELLS It llJ 11tatPcl that that opinion had the approval and unanhlionM cun,•urrence of all the members or tho court.
It le said In the opinion, In rejrnrd to thf'l
Hecon<l question JJUt to the witnPMs: "It
le apparent that an affirmative nnswer to
the question put to him might tenrl to
show that be had been guilt.¥ of on offPnRe,
either against the laws relating to the
keeping and 1tale of lntoxlclltln~ liquors,
or undrr the shttute for punlHhlnsr one
wbo shall corruptly attempt to loflut>111·0
an executive ofHcer b.v the gift or offer of
a bribe. Oen. Ht. c. 163, § 1."
In n>gnrd to ther.lauMealJovequoted from
the bill or 11gbte, thll opinion M8YH: .. By
the 11t1rrowest conMtructloo, thiH prohihi·
tlon extends to all lnve11tlgatlo11R of an lnquh!ltorial nature, lnMtituted for the purpose of dlHcoverlng crime, or the perpetrators of crime. by putting suspectt>d purtles
upon their examlnutlon In rt>t<pect thereto,
In any manner, althoughuot In the courtie
of any pending proMerutlon. Put It le not
even thus limited. The prlncl11le ap11llee
equally to any compuleory dlsrioHUJ"A of his
guilt by the offender himself, whether
sought directly aa the object of the In-'
qulry, or indirectly and btcldentnlly for
the purpose of estuhllMbfug facts lnvol\"ed
In an leene between other partlee. If the
dleclo11ure tbus ma.de would be capable of
417
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being used against himself as a confes-

sion of ciime. or an admission of facts

tending to prove the commission of an

offense by hi|nself,in any prosecution then

pending',or that might he brought against

him therefor, such disclosure would be an

accusation of himself, within the meaning

of the constitutional provision. in the

absence of regulation by statute, the pro-

tection against such self-accusation is se-

cured hy according to the guilty person,

when called upon to answer as witness or

otherwise. the privilege of then avowing

the liability and claiming the exemption,

instead oi compelling him to answer, and

then excluding his admissions so obtained,

when afterwards offered in evidence

against him. This branch of the consti-

tutlonal exemption corresponds with the
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common-law maxim, neum tenetur seip-

sum uccusare, theinterpretation and ap-

plication of which has always been in ac-

cordance with what has been just stated.

Broom, Leg. Max. (5th Ed.) 968; Wing.

Max. 486; ltosc. Crim. Ev. (2d Amer. Ed.)

159; Starkie. Ev. (Hth Amer. Ed.) 41, 204,

and notes; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 451. and notes.”

The opinion then cites the case of People

v. Kelly. supra. as holding that the clause

in the constitution oi New York of 1846

protected a witness from being compelled

to answer to matters which might tend

to criminate himself, when called to testi-

fy against another party; and also People

v. Matiier, 4 Went]. 229, as declaring that

the exemption in the constitution of New

York extended to the disclosure of any

fact which might constitute an essential

link in a chain of evidence by which guilt

might he established, although that fact

alone would not indicate any crime. The

opinion then proceeds: “The third branch

of the provision in the constitution of

Massacliiisetts. ‘orfurnlsh evidence against

himself,’ must he equally extensive in its

application; and, in its interpretation.

may be presumed to he intended to add

something tothesigniiicanceof that which

precedes. Aside from this consideration,

and upon the language of the proposi-

tion standing by itself, it is a reasonable

construction to hold that it protectsa

person from being compelled to disclose

thecircumstances of his offense, the sources

from which, or the means by which, evi-

dence oi its commission, or of his connec-

tion with it. may be obtained, or made

effectual for his conviction. without using

his answers as direct admissions against

him. For all practical purposes. such dis-

being used against hhuaelf as a confession of c1lme. or an admlsRlon of facts
tending to prove the commission of an
olJen"'e by himself, In an.v prosecution then
pending, or that mhrht he brought against
him therefor, surh disclosure would bf' an
accusation of himself, within the meaning
of the constitutional provision. In the
ahfience of reAulatloo h.v statute, thP protPctlon ugalm1t such self-11ccu11ation la securt>il hy arror<.llng to the p;ull1y person,
wtwn called upon to answer a11 witness or
otherwll!e, the prlvllPge of then avowing
the llaulllty and clalminp; th" exemption,
lnsteo<I of rompdllng him to answer, and
then exclmlin11: his admissions 1m obtalnPd,
"'' hl'n aft(>rwards ofterl'd In evhlenc&
ap;afnl!t him. Thie branch of the constitutional Pllemptlon corrl'spond11 with the
common-law maxim, nemo tPnetur seip1>u111 11rc1ma rf!, the interpretation and appllcntlon of which bal! alw11y11 been In accordance with what h'IM hPPn ju11t 11htted.
Broom, J.eg. Max. (5th Ed.) 968; Wing.
Max. 486; Ho11c. Crim. Ev. (2d Amer. Ed.)
1511; ~torkle, Ev. (~th Amer. Ed.) 41, 204,
and notc11; 1 Green I. E\·. § 451. an<l 11ot"8."
The opinion tbt·n clte11 the r_·nse of People
v. Kelly, 1mpra. ae holtllng that the clause
In the con11titutlon ol New York of 1~6
protectl:d a witness from helng compelled
to anKwt-r to m11tter11 which might tend
to crlminate himself, when c111led to testl·
f;v Agaln ... tanotlwrparty: and also People
'"·Muther, 4 Wend. 2:z9, a11 rleclarlng that
the exemntlon In the co11Rtltutlon of NPW
York extended to the dh1cloaurei of anv
fact which might constitute an eRsentl~I
link In a chain of evldenre by whkh guilt
miJrht he e11tablished, although that feet
alonf' would not lnrllcate any crime. ThP
opinion then procP.edB: "The thlr•I branch
of the provision In thA conetitution of
Ma11s11rh11eetls, 'or fnrnild1 evidence agnlnHt
hlm11Plf,' mm1t he equally extem1h·e In lte
eppllca tlon; and, In lte Interprets tion,
may hf' presumed to he lnten•led to add
something tothPRlgnltlcanceof thntwhlch
precedes. ARlde from this consideration,
and upon tbe lan11:u11ge of the proposltlou standing by Itself, It le a reasonable
cunRtrurtlou to ho)fl that It protects a
per1111n from being compt>llell to disclose
therircumRtance1111f bis offense, thP Rourre11
from \VhlC'h, or the means by which, eviclence of lte commleslon, ur of his connectlo11 with ft. ma.v be obh.1lned, or made
effectual for hie conviction, without mllnp;
hie an11wera as dlrPCt aclmleslone against
him. For all practical purpose11. sul'h dlsclo11uret1 'would have the effect to furnish
· e'·l1le11cP 81(8ln11t the party making them.
'J'hey might furnish the 011ly means of dis·
('O\'erln~ the nameR of those who could
give e'l'ldem:e ('Oncerr.lng the trausul·tlon,
the lnRtrument l>y which R rrlme wus perpetrn tecl, or e'\"en thP rorp11s delicti lt11elf.
Both the re111mn upon which the rule Is
fo1111'1er'I, anrl the terms In which It 111 expre11Hed. forbid thnt lt!!houlcl be llmitell to
confeRl!iu1111 of Jeullt, or statements which
may he provl'rl In l4Ub11equent pro11ecutlonF1, nR 111lmiHHions of fart11 eonght to be
eetlthllsht'd therl'in." The court then proceedR to bold that tho11e com1tltutlonal
provlsion11 n1>plled to Investigations before a legislative body.

closures 'wouid have the effect to furnish

- evidence against the party making them.

They might furnish the only means of dis-

covering the names of those who could

give evidence concerning the transaction,

the instrument by which n crime was per-

petrated, or even the corpus delicti itself.

Both the reason upon which the rule is
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Pa1111ing, tlwn. to consider the effect of
the statute of l!l71, the opinion says: "It
follows from the conRlderatlone alren1lv
named that so far as this statute requir~
a wltnesH, who may he called, to 1111swer
qneMtloue and produre 11apers which may
tend to criminate hlru11elf, and attemptB
to tnke from him the ronstitutional prl¥llege In respect tbt>reto, It must be entirely lnelJCf'tual for thRt purpose, unle8ll It
al110 relieves him from nll llRbllitles, for
protection agalnRt which the privllep:E> Is
secured to him by the constitution. The
etatnte does undertake to secuni him
ap;uin11t certain of tbm1e liabilities, to-wit.
the UMP Of any dlscloeares he may make. es
adml111don11 or direct evidence ap;alnet
him, In any civil or criminal proct'eclin~ ...
The opinion then refers to the caRe of PeoplP. v. Kelly, supra, and says thut that d(>cli;lon was macle upou thP 11:ro11nd that
the termM nf the prnvlMlon of the l'OnHtitution of New York protected the wltnces
only from being compelled "to he a wltnes11 SJ?alnet himself,·· and did not protect
blm from the i1J11irert aml Incidental coneequencPS of a disclosure which be might
be calle<l upon to make.
The opinion then 11aye: "The terms of
the provlHion In the constitution of MaRBachnMetts require a much broader Interpretation, as haR already b~n Indicated; aucf
no one can be required to forego an appeal to ltM protection, unleHs f1r11t secured
from future liability, and exposure to bet
prejmli<'ell, In any criminal proceeding
ap;alrun him, as fnlly and extemlively es he
would he secured by a valllng hlmHelf or
the privilege acrorde<l by theronl!tltlltlon.
Un•ler the Interpretation alreacly given,
thl" cannot. be accomplll!hed so long as he
remaln<J llRble to proMecution crfmloally
for any matters or causes In respect of
\vhlch he shall be examined, or to whit:h
his te11tlmony shall relate. It Is nut done,
In direct tl'rmH, hy the statute In queKtlon; It Is not contended that thP 11tatute
le capable of rm Interpretation which wlll
,Kh·e ft that Pffect; end It 111 clear that It
cannot and was not Intended to so operate. Falling, then. to furnish to the
pPt"llons to be examined an exemption
e11ulvalent to that cont11lnec1 In the con11titutlo11, or to remove the whole liability
arz;alnst which its provisions wP.re Intended to protect them, It falls to deprl¥e
them of the right to fl!Jpeal to the prlvllt•p;e therein. The reHul t fH that, In appenling to his privilege, a11 an Pxemptlon
from the oblhrntlon to nnswer the lnquirlPM put to him, the petitioner was In the
exercl11e of his constltutlonul rlJ1,ht: and
hlR refu11al to answer upon that ~round
was not, an<l could not be considered 11e,
rllRurdPrly conduct, or a contempt of the
t1uthorlty of the body bf'fore which he
wa11 callecl to anRwer. There helnp; no
leizal ground to authorize the commitment upon which he Is held, he mm1t be
dh1chare:el1 therefrom."
In CullPn v. Com., 24 Grat. 624. In 18i3,
Cullen, when asked before u gr11nd jury te>
state what he knew of a certain duel, decllnerl tn auewe1·, \il'('nuse the answer
would tenll to crhnlnate him. The h118tfngM court ordered him to answer, an1f,
on his etfll refu11lng tu do so, tlued him
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and committed him to jail. The case was

brought before the court of appeals of

Virginia. The hill of rights of the consti-

tu tion of Virginia of l-‘<70, in section 10 of

article 1, provided that no man can “be

compelled to give evidence against him-

self.” That provision had existed in the

bill of rights ‘of Virginia as far back as

June 12, 1776, and of it the court of ap-

peals said that it was the purpose of its

framers “ to declare, as part of the organ-

ic law, that no man should anywhere, be-

fore any tribunal. in any proceeding, be

compelled to give evilence tending to

criminate himself, either in that or any

other proceeding;" and thatthe provision

could not be confined “only to casesin

which a man is called on to give evidence

Einiself in a prosecution pending against

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:09 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104925781
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

in."

The opinion then cited People v. Kelly

and Emcr_v's (Vase, hereinbefore referred

to, as sustaining‘ its view, and proceeded

to consider the effect of an act of Virginia,

passed October 31, 1870, in regard to duel-

ing, which provided as follows: “Every

person who may have hcen the bearer of

such challenge or acceptance, or otherwise

engaged or concerned in any duel, may be

required, in any prosecution against any

person but himself, for having fought or

aided or abetted in such duel, to testify as

a witness in such prosecution; but any

statement made by such person. as such

witness, shall not be uscd against him in

any prosecution against himself." The

court held that the effect of the statute

was to invade the constitutional right of

the citizen, and to deprive the witness of

his constitutional right to refuse to give

evidence tending to crimina te himself,

without indemnity, and that the act was

therefore, to that extent. unconstitution-

al and void. It held further that, hcfore

the constitutional privilege could be taken

away by the legislature, there must be

absoluteindcmnity provided; that noth-

lug short of complete amnesty to the wit-

ness, an absolute wiping out of thcofieuse

as to him, so that he could no longer be

prosecuted for it, would furnish that in-

demnity: that the statute in question did

not furnish it, but only provided that the

statement made by the witness should

not be used against him in a prosecution

against himself; that. without using one

word of that statement, the attorney for

the commonwealth might ln many cases,

and in a. case like that in hand inevitably

would, be led by the testimony of the wit-

and committed him to )all. The case was
brought before the court of appeal1:1 of
Vll'Klula. 'file hlll or rhrhts of the constitution or Virginia or 1)110, In section 10 of
article 1, provided that no man ean "be
compelled to give evidence aJtafnst himself. n 'l'lrn t provlRlon ha ti exl1:1ted In the
bill of riJ?hts ·of Virginia as fer back a.
June 12, li71l, and of It the court of appeals 1mlcl that It was the purpm•e of Its
framers" to declnre, n1:1 part of tho organic law, that nn mnn sbonld anywhere, befon1 any tribunnl, In any pro<'ee1ll11g, be
compelled to give evi.lenr.e tending to
crlminate hlrust>U, either In that or any
oth~r proceeding; n and that the provhdon
ronlll not be confined "only to ca11(.>H In
which a man Is called on to give evidence
hlmst>lf in a i;rosecutlon pending against
him."
The opinion tl1en cited People \•. Kelly
and Eml'ry's Cnse, berelnuefore referre!I
to, as 1:11111taining itH Yiew, an<l procl'cliell
to <'onsfller the rffect of an act of "lrglnh1,
PBHHell <>t:tubur 31, 1870, In reJCnrd to dueling, which pro,·ided us follow!!: "Every
perl!OO \\"hO ffiay ha Ve fleell the hearer or
such chnllenge or acceptance, or otherwise
enl(aged or concerntid In Bny duel, may be
re<1ulrt'd, In any proHecutlun aiculnst any
per~on but hlml'.lelf, for having rou~ht or
uhle<I or abetted in atuch duel, to teetUy as
a witntsH In such proee<·ution: but any
eta tl'meot made by such person, a8 such
wltnet!s, shall not br used against him In
an.\· prosecution against himself." 'l'be
court held that the effect or the statute
was to Invade the coni,itltutlonal right of
the <'itlzen, and to deprive the wlt11e1111 of
blt1 cont1tltutlonal right to refuse to give
evidence tending to crimina te hhm1Plf,
without ludemnlty, and that the act waR
therefore, to tbat extent, unconstitutional ancl void. It held fnrther tbHt, hefore
the con11tltutlonnl privilege could betaken
awa.v by the le11:h!lature, there must be
a hatolute Indemnity provided; that uothlmc ehurt of com(llete amneRty to the witness, an absolute wiping uut or the offe11Me
as to him, so that he could no longer he
prosecuted for It, w'lul<J fnrnlsb thnt Indemnity: thttt the etutntn 111 question did
not fnrnish it, but only provided that the
statement made hy the wltne1111 shoul<J
not be need a,11;aln1:1t him in a pro1:1ecution
ogolm1t himself; that, without usln1t one
word of that statement, the attorney for
the commonwealth might In muny cases,
1rnd in a case like th1:1t In lurnd inevitably
would, be Jed by the teMtlmon.v of the wltnt>Kt! to meam1 anrl eourcPR of Information
which might result In crimlnutlngthe wltDl'llH himicelf; unll that this would be to
deprive the wltnrfls uf his privilege, without lnclemulty. The judgment of the hustings l'ourt was rever1:1ecL
In ~tate v. No,H'il, 5~ N. H. 314, In 1k78,
article 15 of the bill or rights In thP. conHtltn tlon of New Hnmp11hlri' of 1i92 declared that no subject Khnll "be compelled
to accuse or furnish evlctenl'e Bgalnst himself." Nowell refuee<l to tPstlfy before a
grand jury a.i to whetht•r, as a clerk for
one Good win. he bnd sold spirituous llquorH, and whether Goodwin sold th .. m or
kept them for sale. He declined to answeron tbeground that his evidence might

1
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tencl to crlmlnate himself. A statute of
the state (Hen. St. c. 99, § 20) provldeti as
follows: "No clerk, t1er·1ant, or agent or
any person accused or a violation or this
chnpter shall he excused from testifying
against hie prlnclnel, for the reason that
he may thereby crlmlnate himself: hut no
te11tlmony so given by him 11hall, In any
pro11ecutlon, be used ne evidence, either
directly or Indirectly, ngalnst him, nnr
slrnll he be thereafter prosecuted for any
offense so dliccloeell by him." A motion
having bt>eu malle, before the supreme
court of New Hamp1:1hlre, for an attal'hment against him for contem1't for ref1111lng to te11tlfy, that court, ofter quoting
the provision In the bill of rlghtt1. 11aid:
"The common-law maxim (thu'j affirmed
by the hill of rights) thut no one shall be
compelled to testify to bl11 own criminality has been unrlet'l!too<l to mean, not
only that the Huhject llhnll not he compellrd to disclose hi11 gull t upon a trial of
a criminal prO<'eefllng against himself, 1111t
als11 that he shall not be required to discloer, on the trial of Issues between others,
facts that can bo used a,11;Hln11t him a11 admlsHlonH tending to (H"OVe hill guilt or HllY
crime or offense of which he may then or
afterwards be charged, or the sourc011
from which, or the means by which. evldenre of it11<·om mission or of hill connection
with It may be obtained. Emery's Ca11e,
107 MllRll. li:.!, 181. ..
!n 1·egard to the statute, the court said
that the legislature, ha vlng undertaken
to obtain the teet.lmuny of the witneHS
wltliout de11rlvlng him of his constitutional prh·llegc of prntectlon, must relieve him from all llabllltlet1 on account of
the ruatters which he is compelled to dl1:1cloi;;e; that be we11 to be eecurPd agnlust
all llahlllty to future proRecution as effectually as If be were wholly Innocent; that
thlll woul<l not be accomplished If he were
left liable to prosl't'utiun criminally for
any mutter In respect to which he mlJtht
he requirer! to tes...ty: that tbe i,itatute
of New Hampshire went further thuo the
statute of Mn1111achuHetts co1111idered in
Emery·e Case, because It provided that the
wltnP1:1s shoulfl not he thereartm· prosecute!] for any offense so dl11closed by him;
that the wlt11e11e had. under the stu tute,
nil the fJrotecllon which the l'ommon.Jnw
right, adopted by the bill of rl~htll In Its
conunnn-law sense, gave him; that, ff he
should he pro1:1ecute•I, a plea tbot he had
dl11elosed the same offense on a lawful
accusation against his 11rlnclpal would
be a perft>t•t an11wer In bur or abat1•ment
or the pro11ec11tlon against hlm,..elf; and
tho t, nnleN& he should testify, the motion
for the a.thtchment must be granted.
In l~o. In La Fontaine v. Southern Underwriters,~ N. C. 132, the com1tltntlon
of North Carolina of 11'176 had provided,
in the clecll1ratlon or rights, (article 1, §
11,) that, "In all criminal prosecutions
every man has the right • • • to
• • • not he c:ompelled to give evidence
against himself." One Blncknnll, as a
witness In a hearing before a referee In a
civil Rutt, had refm1ed to answer a question 88 to hill po1:111eHelon of cC'rtalu books,
on the gronnd that Indictments were
pending against lllw, connected with the

ness to means and sources of information

which might result in criminntingthe wit-

ness himself; and that this would he to

deprive the witness of his privilege, with-

out indemulty. The judgment of the hus-

tings court was reversed.

In State v. No“ ell, 5-F4 N. H. 314, in 1878,

article 15 of the bill of rights in the con-
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management of the affairs oi’ the associa-

tion owning the books, and that his an-

swer to the question might tend to crim-

inate him. The case was heard before an

inferior state court, which ruled that he

must answer the question. On appeal to

the supreme court of North Carolina, it

held that the fair interpretation of the

constitutional provision was to secure n

person who was or might be accused of

crime from making any compulsory rev-

elations which might be used in evidence

against him on his trial for the offense;

that, as the witness was protected from

the consequences of the discovery. and the

facts elicited could be given in evidence in

no criminal prosecution to which they

were pertinent, the plaintiff in the case

was entitled to all the information which
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the witness possessed, whether it did or

did not implicate the witness in a framin-

lent transaction; that the inquiry could

not be evaded upon any ground of the

self-criminatlng answer which might foi-

low, although the answers of the witness

:ould not be used against him in any

criminal proceeding whatever; and that

his constitutional right not to “he com-

pelled to give evidence against himself”

Wolll-'i be maintained intact and full.

In Temple v. (‘om., 75 Va. 892, in 1881,»

the same section l0 oi article i oi the hill

oi rights of the constitution oi Virginia oi

1870. that was considered in (‘alien v.

(,‘om., supra, wns in iorce. An indictment

had been found by a grand jury. on the

evidence of Temple, against one Berry for

setting up a lottery. On the trial oi Berry

before the petlt ]ury,Tcmple refused to

testif_v,on the ground that by so doing he

would crin-inate himself; and for such re-

fusal he was fined and imprisoned for con-

tempt hy the hustings court. The case

was taken to the court oi appeals by writ

of error. That court cited with approval

Cullen's Case, supra, and held that it was

applicable. it appeared that in the hus-

tings court the attorney ior the common-

wealth was asked whether any proscen-

tion was pending against Temple in that

court, or whether it was the intention ‘of

such attorney to institute a pro._t.ling

against Temple for being concerned in a.

lottery, to both of which questions he re-

plied in the negative.

The court of appeals held that Temple

had a right to stand upon his constitu-

tional privilege, and not to trust to the

chances oi.a further prosecution; that the

court could offer him no indemnity that

he would not be further prosecuted, nor

could the attorney forthecommon wealth;

that Temple had a right to remain silent

whenever any question was asked him,

the answer to which might tend to crim-

inn te himself; that the great weight of

authority in the United States was in

favor of the rule that, when a witness on

PRODUCTIO~ A~D
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mBnnzement or tlrn 11nnll'8 or thl' nR!'lodntlon owning the books, and thut hlH nnRwer to the 11uestlon might tend to crlmlnate him. The case wns heard befon> an
lnlerlor stnte court, which rult:d that he
must an;iwer the qneRtloo. On appl'al to
the supreme eourt of North Uarollna, It
held that the fair In terr, re ta tton of the
constitutional provision waa,i to secure R
perRun who waH or might be accused of
crime from making any compulsory rE'velatlons which might be uRed In evhJence
81P.'alnst him on his trial for the offense;
that, ae the witness was proteeted from
the conRequeucee of the dlsco\•ery, and the
facts ellclt!'d could be given In evl<lent'e In
no erlmlnnl proHe<>utlol'l to whleh they
were pertinent, the plaintiff In the caRe
waK entitled to All the Information which
the wltneRs posResse1J, whether It did or
dlll not lm111lcate t11e wltnesR to a fra111lulent tranRAetfon: that the Inquiry l'onld
out be evaded upou any grouud of thu
11elf-eriminatlng am1wer which ml:tht follow, althoulP.'b the answers of the witness
::ould not be uRed aitalnat him In any
rrlmlnal proce!'dlng whatever; and t!l!lt
hlR constitutional rlirht not to" ht' compelled to aclve evl•lence airnlnst hlmRell"
woulil be maintained lntnct and full.
In Temple v. Com., i5 Va. '>'92, In 18Rl,
the sit nm lll>ctlon 10 of article 1 of the bill
or rlghtK of the constitution of Vlr2initt of
11\70. tlrnt wne conHldered In Cullen v.
Com., supra, w1111 In force. An Indictment
bud been found by a grand jury. on the
evldPnce or Temple, against oue Hl'rry for
setting uµ a luttery. On thetrlal uf .Berry
before the petlt Jury, Temple refused to
testlf.v, on the ground thut hy 110 dulng he
woukl c·1·in.lnate himHelf; and for such refmml he waR fined and Imprisoned for contempt hy the huetl11ge court. The enHe
was tu ken tu the court of appeals by writ
of error. 'fhat court cited with approntl
Cullen's Case, 11111>ra, and held that It was
applicable. Jt appeared that In th~ hustings court the attorney for the common·
wealth Wlll! aHked whether an.r pr1111ecetfon was pPn!llmr ag1:1inst Temple In thut
court, or whether It was the lutenlhn · or
11m·h uttomey tu Institute a pru, . uling
aJtainst Temple for IJeinlP.' concerned In a
lottery, to both of which questions he replied In thE' npgn tive.
The court of er>peals held that Temple
bad a rtgh t to stand u11on hie cons tit U·
tlonnl prlvllPg<', und not to trust to the
-chanceH of.a further prosreutlon: thnt the
court coulll offer him 110 Indemnity that
he would not be further proeecute1I, nor
('OU Id the attorntiy for thrcotnmon wealth;
that Temple hurl a right to remain silent
whene\·er any question wm1 nKkl'cl him,
the 1:1nHwer to which might tend to crlmfrrnte hilliHt>lf; tl1at the grent wPlght of
a11thorit.v In the United :Stnte!! was In
favor uf the rnle thut. when a witness on
oath decloretl his bt>llt."f that his anRwer
woulcJ t!'nd to crimlnute himself, the
Cl1urt could not co11111L•I him toan11wer, unlt>!'l4 It was 11erfectly ch·ur, from 11 careful
t•om;ideratlon of all the clrcum11tnnce11 In
tht> caRe. thut the witneRR was ml11t11ken,
and that the am~wer could not pol!!lihly
hn ,.e 11uch u teu<lency: end thnt the husllng!I court bad no right to compel Tem-

'20

11le to answer the question propounded
to lllm, anll to fine and Imprison him for
his t•cfuRal to answer It. The court further held that the stetute or the state
which provided thAt no witness giving
evldE>nce In a prosecution for onlawfol
11:nmlng should ever be prqceeded against
for any ofte1111e of unlawful gaming committed by him at the time and plac.-e
Indicated In such prosecution dlt1 not
apply to the CAl!e then In hand, becnuRe et•ttfng op a lottery wait not within the statute against unln wful gaming. 'l'he Jmlgml'nt or the hu11ting11 court was revPrlled.
Jn Boyd v. (T. S., 116 U.S. 616, 6 Slip. Ct.
Rep. 524, 111 1AA6, thlR court, In considering
the fifth amendment to the coni~tltu lion of
the United States, which declares thAt no
pereon "11ball he t'ompelled In anyrrlmlnal
case to be I\ witness a~nlnet himself," And
the fourth nmE'ndment, which dPClarPe
that the right of the people to he secure In
theh· persons, houses, 11apers, 11od erleets,
agalnRt onrensonahle searches oml ~elz
ur~. 11hall not bfl violated, seltl, spenking
by Mr. JuKtit'e BnADl.EY,(pnlP.'cli3l, 116 li. 8.,
and puge 5;:1!i, 6 !Sup. Ct. Rep.:) "And any
compulsory dlRcovery by extorting the
party's oath, or compelling the production of bis }lrlvate books and pn11ers, to
convh·t him uf c1ime, or to forfeit hie prop.
erty, le coutrary to the principles of a free
government. It le ahhorrPut to tht> luRtl111.·ts of an En~lishruen; ft Is alJhorn•nt
to the lnstlnrtH of an American. It may
suit the purposes of d~potlc powE'r; but
It eannot abide thP. pure atmo11plwre of
pollth·nl liberty and penmnAI freedom." It
was further said, <1u1;:r:e
116
tt.nd
11age 534, 6 !Sup. Ct. HPt). :) "We hnve
ulrcudy noticed the Intimate relation between the two amE>udment11. They throw
grent li~ht un en ch other. For the' uorenRonable searches and erllmreli' conclemnPd iu the fourth amendment are almoRt fllwaye made for the 11ur110He of compelling a man to 11:lve evldt!DCC a~nlnMt
himself, which In criminal Ctt!!Pll le condemned lo the ftlth amendment; and l'\JID·
pellln~ a mnn 'In a criminal caKe to he a
wltue ..s agnlnRt himself.' which IR condemned In. the firth Amendment. throw11
light on the qneRtion nK to whnt IH nn
'unren1mnahle HPareh an1l KPlztirP' within
the mennlng or the fourth a111e111l11w11t.
And we have been unnble to p<'rcPive that
thel1\l'lzureofa mnn'H pri\·ate hookH 1111<1
papl'l'I! to be lll!l'<I In evldt>nre a:i;aim~t him
le enl11stnnti111lv <1iffen•nt from !'011111elllng
him to be a w!tiw!!s Ag11l11Rt hfms<•lf. We
think It is within the clear intent and
meaning of those terms. • • • As,
therefore, suits for penalties nnd forfeit·
ur('ll Incurred by the commh11don of uffem1es 11~11ln11t the law are or thiH qu11sl
criminal 11nture, we tbluk thnt th('y are
within the reAl'!On of criminal proeeedin~
for all the pt1rp0Re11 of the fonrth amendment of thl' constitution, anrl of tbut portion of the Hfth Amen<lm!'nt which dC'Clures
that no penion "'bull he compellE'tl lo nny
criminal eaHe to be u wit1wss ugninHt himself; anrl we are further of opinion that ll
compulsory 11roductlon of the prh·nte
books and papers or the owner or ltOlHIB
sought to be forfeited In such.a suit la
cowpelllng him to IJe a witneu against

oaa.

u. s.,
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himself, within the meaning of the ﬁfth

amendment to the constitution, and is

the equivalent of n search and selzure——and'

an unreasonable searchand sci1.ure—with-

in the meaning of the fourth amendment.

Though the proceeding in question is di-

vested of many of the aggravating inci-

dents of actual search and seizure, yei:,

as before said, it contains their substance

and essence, and effects their substantial

purpose. it may he that it is the obnox-

ious thingin its mildest and least repul-

sive form: butillegitimate and unconstitu-

tional practices get their first footing in

that way, namely, by silent approaches

and slight deviations from legal modes of

procedure. This can only be obviated by

adhering to the rule that constitutional

provisions for the security of person and
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property should be liberally construed.

A close and literal construction deprives

them oi half their efficacy, and leads to

gradual depreciation of the right, as if it

consisted more in sound than in sub-

stance. it is the duty of courts to be

watchful for the constitutional rights of

the citizen, and against any stealthy en-

croachmentsthercou. Thcirmottoshould

be ohsta prim-ipiis. ”

In that case, the ﬁfth section oi the act

of June 22, 1874, (18 St. 157,1 which slither-

ized the court in revenue cases to require

the defendant or claimant to produce his

private papers in court, or else the allega-

tions of the government's attorney would

be taken as confessed, was held to be un-

constitutional and void, as applied to a

suit for a penalty or to establish 0. forfeit-

are of the goods of the party, because it

was repugnant to the fourth and fifth

amendments to the constitution: and it

was held that a proceeding to forfeit the

goods was a criminal case, within the

meaning of the ﬁfth amendment. Mr.

Justice i\lI|.1.r:R, in the concurring opinion

of himself and Chief Justice \VArrE in the

case, agreed that it was a criminnione,

within the meaning of the ﬁfth amend-

ment, and that the effect of the act of con-

gress was to compel the party on whom

the order of the court was served to be a

witness against himself.

in People v. i~iharp,107 N.Y. 427, 14 N. E.

Rep. 319, in 1887, the court of appeals of

New York had under consideration the

provision of article 1, § 6, of the constitu-

tion of New York of 1846, that no person

shall "be compelled, in any criminal case.

to he n witness against himself,” and the

provision ofscction 79 of the Penal (‘ode of

New York, tit. 8, c. 1. in regard to bribery

and corruption, which was in these

words: "A person offending against any

provision of any foregoing section of this

Code relating to brlberyis a competent

witness against another person so offend-

ing, and may be compelled to attend and

testify upon any trial, hearing, proceed-

himeeU, within thA meaning of the ftfth accordingly, In bar of such an Indictment
amen1tment to the constitution, and J., or prmiecutlon." Sharp and others were
the equivalent of o sean:b and seizure-and· Indicted for bribing a member of the common council, and 8hnrp was tried sepa1tn uorea11onahle t1earch aotl Reizure-wlthln tbe meaning of the fourth amendment. rutel~·. It was proved that he had been
Tbougb the procl>eUing In question le di- examined as a witness before a committ1>e
vested of muny of the aggravating Inci- of the etnte 11en11te, and tht>re gave testidents or act11al search anu seizure, yet, mony whil'h th" prosecution clulmed was
as hefore s11id, It contalnK their sul111ta11ce e\·luence of hie co:npllclt,v In the crime;
and e1>Hence, and effects their 11ubstantlal an<l that te11tlmo'ly was offered In evipurpoHt>. It may be that It le the oh11ox- dence by the prosecution. The testimony
lou11 thing In lt11 mild~st and lea11t repul- had been gl ven under the compulsion of 11
sive form; bn t lllegl tlma tl' anu unconstitu- eubp<Pna, und was admitted at the trial,
tional practke11 get their first footing in ap;ulnet the objection that the disclosures
that way, namely, by silent approaches before the eeuate committee were priviand slight dt>viatlons from legal modes of leged. '!'be court of a11pe&l11 held th11t secprocedure. '!'bis can only be obviated by tion 79 of the Penal Code maue the constiadhering to the rule thftt con11tltutional tutional prh·llege lnappllcal.Jle, hecnm1e it
prm•lelons for the eP.curlty of per11on and lndemnlfl<'d or protected the pnrt.v n~al1111t
property should be llherally construed. the con11equencee of hh prevlonK te1:1tlA close and llterul construction deprlvt'll
mony. The court cited with approval the
them of half thc:>ir effic'lry, and leads to c1111e of People v. Kelly, supra.
gradual deprecla tion of the right, ae If It
In Bedgood v. 8tate, 115 Ind. 275, 17 N.
com1!sted more In souud than In sub- E. Rep. U21, In 1888, the supremti court of
stance. It Is the duty of coui·t11 to be ln<Jiftna hau under consideration the 1n·owatchful for the constitutional rights of vlslon of ftrticle 1, § 14, of the bill of rights
the cltlzPn, amt agulm1t any stealthy en- of the constitution of· Indiana of 18.il,
croachments thereon. Their mutto 11hould whkh provides that "no person In any
be obHtR prlnclplis."
Cl'lminal prost>cutlun ehRll be compelled to
In that caee, the fifth section of the act testlry aJ?,alnet himself," And the provli;lon
of June 22, 1~74, (18 tlt. 187, 1 which author- of sectlf)D 1800 of tile HevlHed 8tututes of
ised the court In revenue cases to require Inulana of 1881, to the effect tint tei<tlthe defendant or claimant to produce hie muny gtven by a witness ebuuld not be
private papers in court, or el11e the allega- need In any prosecution against him. On
tiom1 of the government's attorney would a trlul before a p1?tlt Jury iu a crlmlnul
be taken aa conft>Bsed, was held to be un- case against otbel's, a woman had re·
comitltutlonal and void, as applied to a fui1ed to an11wer a queetioo,on the grouud
suit fur a penalty or to establish a forfeit- that the am1wer might crlmlnatc her.
ure of the goods of the party, because It The 11uvreme court held that, as the statwas repugnant to tht> fourth and fifth ute prohibited her testimony from being
amendment11 to the constltntlon; and It URed against lier, It completely protected
was ht>ld that a proceeding to forfeit the her, and the Juugment was reversed begoods was a criminal c1111e, wllhln the cau11e the trial court hacl erroneously remt>anlnp: of the fifth amendment. Mr. fused to reqnire ber to answer the quesJustice Mll.LER, In the concurriug opinion tion.
of hln111elf and Chief Ju11tice WAITE In the
Thie review of the casPs abo\"e referred
caHe, a-"reed that It was a criminal one, to shows that In the conetltatloneofGeorwithin the meaning of the ftfth amend· gla, California, and New York the provisment, and that the erfect of the act of con- ion is Identically or eubstantlall,v that of
gress was to compel the part.v on whom the constitution of the United States,
the order of the court was Perved to be a
namely, that noper11on shall .. be compelled
witness against blm11elf.
tu any crlmlottl case to be a wltne11s
Jn People v. 8harp, 107 N. Y. 427, 14 N. E. against himself;" w bile in the constlt uRep. 319, In 1887, the court nf appeals of tlooe of Pennsylvania, Arkansa11, Indiana,
Sew York had unuer consideration the Massar.hu11etts, Virginia, New Hampprovision of article 1, § 6, of the conetltn- shire, nnd North Carolina ft ls different In
tlon of New York of 1846, that no person hrngunge, and to the P.ffect that" no m1m
shall" be compelled, In any criminal ca11e, cun hP. compelled to give evidence agah111t
to he a witness against hlm11eH," and the himself;" or that, In prosecutions, the 11cpro\·lslon of section 79 llf the Penal Code of cu11ed "shall not be compelled to give eviNew York, tit. 8, c. l, In re1tard to brlb<.'ry dence agalnHt hi meelf;" or that "no perand corruption, which was In these son In any criminal pro11ecutlon shall be
worcls: .. A person offendlnp: against any compelleu to testify against hhnHelf;" or
provl11lon of any forl'!going 11ectlon of this that no person 11hall be "compellP.u to ncCode relating to brlhery 111 a competent cnee or fnrnl"'h evidence ngalnst himself; n
wltne11s a~alnet another per11..>n so orfeud- or that no man can "he compelled to give
lng, aud may be compelled to attend and evidence a~alnet himself;" or that, In all
testify upon any triul, henrlnp;, procee<1- criminal prusecutluns,"every man has the
ing, or Investigation, In the 11ame manner right to not be !~ompelled to give evidence
as any other person. But the testimony agaln11t himself."
so given shall not be used In any proHecuUnder the constltutlllnB or Arkamms,
tlon or proceeding, civil or criminal, Georgia, California, Indiana, New York,
against the person so testifying. A ptir- New Hampshire, and North Carolina it
eon so testl!ylng to the a:lvlug of a bribe was held that a given statutory provl11lon
which has been acc:>eptecl shall not there- made It lnwinl tu compel a wltnesH totesaftf'r be liable to Indictment. prosecution, tlf,v; while In M11e11achusette and Virginia
or panlshmt>nt for that bribery, and may it was held that the statutory provisions
plead or prove the giving of testimony were Inadequate, In view of the constltu.. ..,1
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PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

tional provision. In New Hampshire, and

in New York under the Penal Code, it was

held that the statutory provisions were

sufficient to supply the place of the consti-

tutional provision, because, by statute,

the witness was entirely relieved from

prosecution.

But, as the manifest purpose of the con-

stitutional provisions, both of the states

and of the United States, is to prohibit

the compelling of testimony of a self-crim-

inating kind from a party or a witness,

the liberal construction which must be

placed upon constitutional provisions for

the protection oi personal rights would

seem to require that the constitutional

guaranties, however differently worded,

should have as far as possible the same

interpretation: and that where the consti-
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tution, as in the cases oi Massachusett

and New Hampshire, declares that the

subject shall not be “compelled to accuse

or furnish evidenceagninst himself, "such

.1 provision should not have a different in-

terpretation from that which belongs to

constitutions like those of the United

States and of New York, which declare

that no person shall be “compelled in any

criminal case to be u witness against him-

self.” Under the rulings above referred

to by Chief Justice 1\IAltSHAi.L and by this

court, and those in Massachusetts, New

Hampshire, and Virginia, the judgment of

the circuit court in the presentcase cannot

be sustained. It is a reasonable construc-

tion, we think, oi the constitutional pro-

vision,that the witness is protected " from

being compelled to disclose the circum-

stances of his offense, the sources from

which, or the means by which, evidence

of its commission, or of his connection

with it, may be obtained,or madceffectuai

for his conviction, without using his an-

swers as direct admissions against him. "’

Emery’s Case, 107 Mass. l72, 182.

lt is quite clear that legislation cannot

abridge a constitutional privilege, and

that it cannot replace or supply one, at

least unless it is so broad as to have the

same extent in scope and effect. It is to

be noted of section 860 oi’ the Revised Stat-

utes that it does not undertake to compel

self-crlminating evidence from a party or

a witness. In severalof the state statutes

above referred to thetestlmonyof the par-

ty or witness is made compulsory, and in

some either all possibility of a future pros-

ecution of the party or witness is distinct-

ly taken away, or he can plead in bar or

abatement the fact that he was compelled

to testify.

422

We are clearly of opinion that no stat-

ute which leaves the party or witness

subject to prosecution after he answers

the criminating question put to him can

have the effect of suppianting the privi-

lege conferred by the constitution of the

PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

tlonal provision. Jn New Hampshire, and
in New York under the Penal Code, It was
held that the 11tRtutory provisions were
t1ulttelent to 1rnpply the 11l11ce of the conetltutlonal provision, because, by Rtatnte,
the wltnPRS was entirely relieved from
prosecution.
But, as the manifest purpose of the coostltu tlonal provislom1, buth or the sttttf'll
aud (Jf the Uolterl States, Is to prohibit
the compelling of testimony of a self-crlmlnatln11: kind from a party or 8 wltneBB,
the llhPrul construction which mm1t be
placed npon com1tlt11tionnl provllllonR for
the protl'Ctlon or 11er1mnal rights wonld
St'em to require that the con11tltutlon11l
gunrnntlee, bowe'l'er differently worded,
shonld hnvo 88 far 88 posRlble the same
Interpretation; 1md that whPre the constltntlon. as In the cases of Ma11RachuRetts
and New Hampshire, declares that the
tmhjPct shall not be "compellefl to accnse
.ir fnrnleh evldenceagnlnet nlm11elf, "such
..l provision should not have a diffeI"Pnt lnterpretu tlon from that w hlrh helongs to
conRtitutlons like those of the tlnlted
State-R and of ~ew York, whll•h declare
thut no person sh11ll be "com11elled In any
criminal ra11e to be- ll wltneH11 ngulm1t hlmsdr." Under the rullngH nbove referred
to by Chief Jm1tlce l\IAW!HAl.L und by this
conrt, and tho11e In MaHsachusette, ~ew
HompRblre, and Virginia, the Judgment of
the circuit court In the present case cannot
be 11ustni11ecl. It Is a rPasonahle con11trnc·
tlon, we think, or the constltutlunol pruvi ... 1011, thnt the wltne111< le protected" from
being compelled to disclose the ch-cum·
stnnreA of his offense, the 11ource11 from
which, or the- means by which, e\·ldence
of ltR commission, or of his counectlon
with It, may be obtained, or modeeffoctuul
for hlf! conviction, without using his an·
Mwers as direct admis1dons ngolnst him."
Emer.r'11 Cose, 107 .Mas11. 172, 182.
It Is qnite clear that legislation cannot
a brldite a con11tltutlonal prl vllege, and
that It cannot replace or supply one, at
le8f;t unleMR It h1 so broad as to havo the
same extent In scope and effect. It ls to
be notecl of 11ectlon 1!60 of tbeRevlMed Stat·
utl'H tho t it iloes not undertake tu l'ompPI
self-crlmlnatlng evidence from a party or
a witues~. In se\'eralof the state etatutt's
above referred to thetestlmonyof tht>party or witness Is made com1)Ulsory, anrt In
some either all posRlblllty of a future pro11f'Cu tlon of the party or wltneP11 Is distinctly tuken away, or he can plead In bar or
al.att>ment the fR.ct that he was compelled
to testify.
422

We are clearly of opinion that oo Mtatnte which leaves the party or wltneHH
1mbJe<:t to prosecution after he answers
the crlmlnatlng que11tlon put to him can
have the effert or supplantln11: the prl¥llege ronferred by the constitntion or the
United Stote11. Section ~O of the Revised
l-ltatutei1 does not supply a complete prutPCtlon from all tbP perils against whirh
the con11tltutlon11l prohihltlon WOK deshcned to guarrl. 11nd Is not a full substitute for that prohlllltlon. In view of the
con11titutlonal pro,·ielon, a 11tatutory enactauent, to be valid, must arforrl ahsulute
hnmnnlty egalnRt future pro11t'Cutloo for
thl' offense- to which the queHtlon relate11.
In this respect, we give our assent rather
tu the doctrine of Emery'11 C'o11e, in Mm•1<ach11Flettto, than to that or People v. Kelly,
In New York; and we comllder thttt the
ruling <.1 f thlH court In Bo.r1l v. U. S., supra, supp(Jrts the view we take. Se1·tlon
860, moreover, a fforrl11 no protection
against that use or com11elled te11timony
whleh co1111l11ts In galn!ng therPfrom a
knowledge of the details of a erime, and
of snurrPs of Information which may supply other means of convicting the witness
or party.
Ith! eon tended on tlu~ pnrt of the appellee that the rea1mn why the courtR In YlrJl;inla, !\la11snch11sefts, 11nrt New Hampshire hnve lwld that the exonerating
etetnte mn11t be 110 broad UR to gh-e- the wltne11s completA emneRty le that the c·onstitutlonR of thoRe states irlve to thl• witness
a broader pri \'liege and exemption than
Is gr1111te1l hy the COllHtlt:ntlon or the Fulted l;tuteH, In that th<•lr lungnage 111 that
the wltneRR shall not he compelled tu accuse himself, or furnish evldt>nce BKRln11t
hlm11elf, or give e\'ldenl'e ngninst himself;
and It Is contended that the terms of the
constitution of the r~nltPd States, and of
the constitutions of Georgia, California,
end New York, are more restricted. But
we ore of GJJlnion that, however this difference may bave been commented on lo
some. of the decisions, tlwre Is really, In
spirit and principle, no dfl.itlnctlon arising
ont or 1111eh difference of l>tnguoge.
From a con11lcJera tlon of the lnngua1te
or th" constitutional provision and of nil
the authorities referred to, we are clearly
of opinion that the ap(>t'llant was e11tltled to refuse, as he did, to an11wer. The
Judgment of the circuit court muRt therefore be rever11ed, and the case re111anded to
that court, with a direction to dlRcharge
the Appellant from custody on the writ
or habeas corp11s.
0

CORHOBORA.TIVE EVIDENCE.
CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE.

STATE

Y.

PETERS.

[Case No. 144

(12 S. E. 74, 107 N. C. 876.)
STATE v. PETERS.

(12 S. E. T4, 107 N. C. 876.)

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

1890.

Nov. 6,

Indictment for perjury, tried before Wo- J

MACK, J., and a jury, at May term, 1890. of

Guilford superior court. The indictment

was as follows: “The jurors for the state

upon their oath present that George Pe-

ters, of Guilford county, did unlawfully

commit perjury upon the trial of an action

in the mayor's court oi the city of Greens-

boro, before Jame W. Forbes, mayor, in

Guilford county, wherein the state was

plaintiff and Amos Phillips was defendant,

by falselyasserting on oath that he (mean-

ing the said George Peters) had not pur-

chased any spirituous liquors from Amos
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Phillips less than half a pint on Sunday,

April 27, 1890, knowing the said statement

to be false, or being ignorant whether or

not said statement was true, against the

form of the statute in such case made and

provided, and against the peace and dig-

nity of the state. ” The false swearing was

alleged to have taken place before the

mayor of Greensboro, in the trial of Amos

Phillips upon the following warrant,

which was introduced in evidence: “State

and City of Greensboro against Amos

Phillips, before James W. Forbes, mayor.

Warrant for retailing. State of North

Carolina to the Chief of Police of the City

of Greensboro, or other lawful officer of

Guiiford (.‘ounty,—Greeting: Whereas,

complaint has been made before me this

day, on the oath of W. J. Weather-ly, that

Amos Phillips, on or about the 28th day

of April, 1890, with force and arms, at and

in the county aforesaid. and within the

city limits, did willfully and unlawfully

sell spirituous liquors inside the corpora-

tion to one George Pcters,in quantity less

than five gallons, without having license,

against the statute in such cases made

and provided, against the pence and dig-

nity of the state, and in violation of the

city ordinance, (section 8, c. 15, p. ll0:)

These are therefore to command you forth-

with to apprehend the said Amos Phillips,

and him have before me at the mayor's

Supreme Court of North Carolina. Nov. 6,
1890.
Indictment for perjury, tried before WoMACK, J., and a Jury, at l\fay term, 1800, of
Hnllforcl 1mperlor court. '.rhe Indictment
was as follows: "The jurors for the ti ta te
upon their oath present that George Peters, of Guilford county, did unluwfully
commit perjury upon the trial of an action
1n tbP. mayor's court of the city of Greensboro, before Jamee W. Forbes, mayor, lo
Gullford county, wherein the state was
plalntlft and Amoe Phllllps was defendant,
by fall1ely asserting on oath that be I meaning the said George Peters) had not pur.chnsed any 11plrltuoue liquors from Amoe
PhllllpR les11 than hulf a pint on Sunday,
April 'Z'I, 1~00. knowing the tiaill statement
to be fnlse, or being hrnorant whether or
nol said statement was true, against the
form of the Htatute In such case made and
provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state." The falRe swearlug was
alle~ed to have taken pince before thfl
mayor of Greensboro, In the t1ial of Amoe
Phillips upon the following warrant,
which was Introduced In evidence: "State
and City of Grecn11horo agulnet Amoe
PhllllpK, before James W. J•orbcs, mayor.
Warrunt for retailing. State of North
Carolina to the CbM of Police of the City
of Grel'nsboro, or other Ju wful officer of
Guilford County,-Grt•etlng: Whereas,
eo11111lalnt bas heen made berore me this
day, on the oath of W. J. Wettthl•rly, that
Amos Phlllipe, on or about the 28th day
of April, 11\00, with force and armri, at aml
In the county aforeE<nld. and within the
city llmltti, did willfully an<t unlawfnlly
sell spirituous liquors lmilde the corporation to one George Peterf'.l, In quuntlty Iese
than five J?,o.llons, without ha\·lng license,
agalnRt the statute In such cusee mude
unrl provided, agalnrit the pence and dignity of the state, nod In violutlon of the
city ordinance, (section 8, c. 15, p. 110:)
TheHe are therefore tocommaml you forthwith to apprehenrJ the suld Amos PhllllpH,
and him have before me at the ma,roi:-'s
office, then and there to answer the said
.charge, nnd be dealt with nccortllni;r tu law.
Given undermyhand antl seul thh1 7th day
of M11y. A. D.1~110. JAH. W. Fonm:s,l\Jay<>r. [SE'al.]" The evidence le e11bF1tantlully statl'd In the opinion. The Jury returned a wrdlct of guilty. Motion In arretlt of Judgment, on the ground that the
Indictment was not sntficient In Its averments to charge the crime of perjury. Motion denied. Hentence pronouncetl UR In
the record from whkh defendant appealed.
The AttorneJ' <ienernl, for the State.
John W. Graham, for defendant.

office. then and there to answer the said

charge, and be dealt with according to law.

Given undermy hand and seal this 7th day

of May, A. D. 1890. Jss. W. Fonnl-:s, May-

or. [Seal.]” The evidence is substantial-

ly stated in the opinion. The jury re-

turned a verdict of guilty. Motion in ar-

rest of judgment, on the ground that the

indictment was not sufficient in its aver-

ments to charge the crime of perjury. Mn-

tion denied. Sentence pronounced as in

the record from which defendantappeuled.

The Attorney General, for the State.

John W. Graham, for defendant.

CLARK, J., (after stating the facts as

above.) The defendant’s counsel asked a

CI.JARK, J., (after stating the facts as
above.) The defendant's coum1el asked a
wltneHR, "Was not the warrant on which
Amos PhlllipK wuK tried li;Rut.'d without a
sworn comvlulnt or affidavit being made
by any prreon whatever?" The Indictment ch11rged the perjury to have been
committed In that trial. 'l'he IJlH'Rtion
was ruled nut on objection by the state,
and clefenda.nt excepted.

(Caae No. 144

In State v. Bryson, ~ N. C. 780, ABBE,
J .. In com1trulng the act which le now
Code,§ 113:3, says that no wrlttl'n affidt1vlt or complaint le e8Rentlnl, antl that the
appellate court "can only look at the war·
rant which le the complaint," and "cannot look heblnd the wttrrant for otJjectlone lying In the defectK or lrregnlaritlee
of the preliminary tivldence." If the objt~
tlon now mAde could not htt \•e &\·ailed
Phillipe on appenl /1 fortiori. It could not
he raised In thlR collateral way by the defendi.nt. la Eup:lnnd, where tt written Information on oath, It 11eeme, Is necessury
to the vttlldlty ot s wa1-rant, It was held
by a full bench In the court of crlmlnnl appeals In a recent case-(Heg. v. Hughes. 14
('ox, Crim. (;as. ~4 (18711)-that on an Indictment for perjury, alleged to have been
committed by a wltneKe ltJ a case where
the warrant was lsRned without either
wrlttt>n Information or an.v oath wbnte\'t'r, this Irregularity conld not avail the
wltn1>ss In such case when on trlul for pl'rjury con1mitted In such action Any more
than whether the court In tmch cnse pro.
nounced a legal or Illegal jutl~meut.
Those are matters which concerned the
defendant In thn t caeP, but not the wit.
ness If the conrt bad JurlH<lictlon of the
offe1111e churged In the warrant. In State
v. Lavalley,9 Mo.~. the <'ourt esys that
It le no defense for a. person cbarj?.'ecl with
perjury to show that the court committed
error In Its proceeding, provlcled It had Jurisdiction of the snhJect-matter and of the
parties, nnd that any other rule would
change the Issue, eo that, Instead of trying the deft>ndunt for fal1<e swearing, the
conrt would re\•lew thP , regularity and
correctness of the procPedlng In another
cnse. In Stn te v. Alexander, 4 HawkR, JS:!,
the court upon the face of the witrrant
had no jurl1<1llctlon of the action In which
thfl fnlse ot1th was taken. 'l'hejurlsdktion
depends not upon the affida vlt prelhul11ary
to h1snlnF: the warrant, bnt on the nature
of the offense charged in the warrant.
The defemlan t aekP<l the court to Instruct
the Jury" that, ae the evidence of Weatherly and others lllcl not esta bllsh the foct
that the liquid which l'hlllipH bad was
spirituous, and that as their evidence,
with the other <·ircumstanr.eR taken together, only afforded an Inference that It
was Rplrltuous liq um-. It was not sufficient
to convict of an Indictment for perjur.v,"
and further"'thRt no wltuesecurrohor,ntl'd
the evidence of Weatherly as to the eule by
Phillipe to the defendant, nor was therf'
anv confirmatory clrcnmetanceR as to the
suie iti;elf from Phillips to rlefendant, and
thnt It amounted only In either of abo,·e
cases to the oath of Weatherly against
the oath of Peters, the defendant, and
that such wne not sufficient to warrant a
convktlon for perjury." The court did
not µ:Ive these Instructions, and defendnnt
ext•t>pted. A wltneeH for the state tl'StlttPd
that un the Snturday night before thf
Suntfa.y (April Zl, 1800) on which the Ille
gal sale of Flpirltuous liquor by Pbllllpll
was charged to have IJecn committed, he
Bl\W Phillipe get a Jug of white liquid
drawn from a barrel In a ba1·-room, and
pa.y for It, and tuke It and p)uce It near
where he afterwards saw him In the alley,
on the north side ot the street, on the Sun4:!3
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Case No. 144]

PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

day referred to, on which day he saw Phil-

lips go to where it had been placed several

times, and return with a bottle, from

which he poured out the drinks in a. small

glass, holding much less than half a pint,

to divers colored men, who drank and

handed Phillips money, and he saw Peters

in the crowd. Another witness, one

Weatherly, testified that the liquid looked

like corn whisky; that Phillips poured it

out of a bottle into a “short" glass hold-

ing much less than half’ a. pint; that he

saw the defendant, Peters,drink, and give

Phillips a nickel, and that divers other col-

ored men came to Phillips at the same

place, in the alley on the north side of the

street, in the course of some hours. A

third witness testified to the crowd of col-

ored men coming to Phillips, who was on
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the north side of the street, into the alley.

described by the other witnesses, and that

the defendant. Peters, was among them.

The witness heard money rattling out in

the alley, but did not look to see who had

it, and did not see any transaction be-

tween Phillips and Peters. There was al-

so evidence by the mayorand another wit-

ness that on the trial of Amos Phillips, the

defendant, Peters, was sworn and exam-

ined as a. witness, and testified that he did

not buy any liquor in quantity less than

half a pint from Amos Phillips on the day

testified to by the state's witnesses. and

that he was not on the north side of the

street on that Sunday. The false oath

charged in the indictment is that the de-

fendant testified at the trial of Amos Phil-

lips that “he had not purchased any spir-

ituous liquor from Amos Phillips less than

half a pint on Sunday, April 27, 1890.”

The materiality of the oath. and that the

defendant so swore, are not controverted

by any exception taken; We think there

was sufficient evidence to go to thejury

upon the question whether the liquid dis-

pensed on that occasion by Amos Phillips

was spirituous liquor. One witness testi-

ﬁcd that he saw defendant purchase of

Amos Phillips some of the liquid in quan-

tity less than half a. pint on Sunday, April

27, 1890, and pay for it. The testimony of

other witnesses of sales by Amos Phillips

of the liquid at the same time and place to

divers others, and of defendant being in

the crowd, and on the north side of the

street, together with defendant's denial

before the mayor that he was on that

day north of the street, together with all

the circumstances in evidence, make evi-

dence corroborative of the single witness

day referred to, on which day he ea w Phillipe go to where It bad been placed several
tlme1t, 11ml return with a bottle, from
which be poured out the drlnkH In a smllll
ghlSH, hole.ling ruucb less th11n half a pint,
to dlverH colored men, who drank and
banded Pbllll11e money, and be saw Peters
In the crowd. Another witness, one
Weathl'rly, testified that the liquid looked
like corn whh~ky; that Phllllpa poured It
out of a bottle into a "short" glass holding much less than half a pint; that be
saw the defendant, Peters, drink, and Klve
Phillipa a nickel, and that divers other coloret.I wen came to Phllllpa at the same
place, In the alley on the north side of the
atre<>t, ln the coui't!e of some houl't!. A
thir'd witness testified to the crowd of colored men coming to Phillips, who wat1 on
the north aide of the street, tntQ the alll'y,
described by the other wltneaReB, and that
the defl'ndant, Petel."fl, was among them.
The witness heurd money rattling out In
the alley, but did not look to see who had
it, and did not see any transaction between Phillips and Peters. There was also evidence by the mayoraDfl anothPrwltness that on the trial of Amos Phillips. the
defendant, Peters, was aworn and examined as a witness, and testified that he did
not buy any liquor in quantity leaH then
bolf a pint from Amos l'hllllps on the duy
tf'Btified to by the state'H witnesses, and
that he was not on the north aide of the
atrttet on that Sunday. '£he false oath
charged In the Indictment IH tbRt the defendant testified at the trial of Amo!I Phllllpe that ·•be had not pun·baHed any spirituous liquor from Amos Phillips less than
half a 11lnt on Sunday, April 'IT, 1890."
The materiality of the oath. and that the
defendant so swore, are not controverted
by any exception taken; We think there
was sufficient evidence to go to the jury
upon the question wbethl'r the llqulcl dispensed on that occasion by Amoe Phillips
was Hplrituous liquor. One witneaR testified that he saw defenclant purchase of
Amoe Phillipe 1wme of the liquid In quantity lPRB than half a pint on Sunday, April
'IT. 1890, and pay for it. The testimony of
other witnesses of sales by Amos Phillips
of the liquid at the same time and piece to
divers others, and of defenclnnt being In
the crowd, and on the north side of the
street, together with defendant's denial
before the mayor that he was on that
day north of the street, together wlth all
the clrcnm'ltanr.ea in evidence, make e\·ldence corroborative of the single witness
who testified as eya-wltnetJs of the sale by
Phillipe to Peters. State v. Brown, 79 N.
C. 642. It le not reqnlred that"the r.orroboratl ve circumstances Hhonld equal In
weight the testimony of one witness, but
there m net be enough, in addition to the
teHtlmony of one witness, to turn the scale
as against the weight of the prhwner'e
oath on the former trial." 2 Bish. Crim.
Proc.§ 871. The Instructions RBked were
properly refused.
The defendant moved In arrest of Judg·
ment, on the ground that "the bill of i11dlctment was not sufficient ln Its aver·
menta to charge the crime of perjury."
The blll of lndlctmentla asubMtantial l'opy
of the form authorized by chapter ~. A.!tB

who testiﬂed as eye-witness of the sale by

Phillips to Peters. State v. Brown, 79 N.

C. 642. It is not required that-“the corrob-

orative circumstances should equal in

weight the testimony of one witness, but

there must be enough. in addition to the

testimony of one witness,to turn the scale

as against the weight of the prisoner's

PRODUCTIOY AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.
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1889, except that It adds the formal con-

clusion," aa;atnst the form of the statute,
In such case made and provided, and
against thP. peace and dl&"uity of theetate."
The.ie words are not required by thfl ar.t
cited, nor are they nece11Sary or material
In an Indictment for any offense to tills
state, as was held by the court lo State v.
Kirkman, 104 N. C. 911, 10 s. E. Rep. 312.
The same rDle obtains In England. The
Hu use of Lords, iu the famous perjury cuee
rif Custro v. Queen, (b('tter known al:! the
Tlchborne Case,) L. R. 6 App. Caa. 229,
held, Lord ChancellorSi,;1.noRNE and Lords
BLACKBUllN and \V ATSO.S co11cur1·iug in the
opinion, affirming the court below, tbut
by virtue of St. 14 & 15 Viet. (similar to
our Codt', § 11R3) the words" against the
form of the statute and againMt the pence
and dignity of the queen" were not et111entlal lo any Indictment, and their omiHRion
n•>t ground either for a 1uotlon to quush
or In arreet of judgment. But we take It
that their use la meresur11lusagP The defcnclnnt contends however that the Indictment IH defective In that no time is laid.
The act does not require It, and indeed, as
time le nut uf the essence of the offense,
•the omitting to state the time at which
It was com mltted" ls not ground to etay
or reverse the judgment. Code, § 1189.
It ls urged here that the warrant In the
case ag!llnst Amos Phllllpt1 was en tilled,
"State and City of Greensboro vs. Amoe
Phillips," and that It charged that the
offense was against the ordinance of the
city of Greensboro, when the Illegal sale
of splrltuouR liquor la an offense only cognizable by Htate authority. No objection
was tu ken below to the Introduction t•f
the warrant, nor ll'aH there any prayer for
Instruction that there was a vari1tnce between the nlleittttlon and proof. If we
could notice' such objection, when taken
here f<>l' the first time, It iel:luftklent to say
that the warrant lu proper terrus chargea
a ea.le of spirituous liquor, without llcende,
and as an orrenae niralnat the state. The
addltlon!\l a\·erment In the warrant that
It was a \'iolatlon of a town ordlnam.-e
also was mere aurpluange as wna the use
of the words, "and City of G reeneboro," In
entltlinat the warrant. State v. l'olllna, Si>
N. C. 511; State v . Brown. 79 N. C. ti42.
Objection wea also taken here that on
the face of the record the mayor had no
jurlsclictlon of the offense charged against
Phillipe, and therefore the defendant could
not be convicted of false swearing, the action beln~ corR.m nonjudlce. By virtue of
Code, § 3."$18, the mayor le a court, with
the juri1ulktlo11 of a magistrate, and as
such he bad authority to investigate the
charge of selling liquor without license.
It does not appear whether he assumed
final jurisdiction or merely bound the par·
ty over to court, or acquitted the •lefendant or dlemlRRed the action. Noris It material, since the eubRPquent erroneous or
Illegal Judgment of the mayor could not
atfect the guilt or innocence of this defend·
ant. 'rhe cbar~e in the warrant determlnl's the Jnri11dictton, 11.nct not what la
done In the trial.
lt le further objected that the allegation
of the false oath as having ~n taken at the
"trial of an action," etc., Is not auttlcleut-

CORROBORATIVE
CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE.
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iy deﬁnite. Still it is such allegation as is

declared suﬁicient by the statute. and we

cannot see that it can make any difference

whether it was a. “preliminary trial” or a.

trial with ﬁnal jurisdiction. Eithercomes

within Code, § 1092. The many technicali-

ties which have hampered the administra-

tion of justice in regard to false swearing

moved the legislature to enact section 1185

of the Code, and more recently the above-

cited act prescribing a simple form of in-

dictment for that offense. Chapter 83,

Acts 1889. The authority oithe legislature

to prescribe forms of indictment is sus-

tained in State \'. Moore, 104 N. C. 743. l0

S. E. Rep. 183. The form of indictment

here authorized points out to the defend-

ant that the offense charged is perjury,

the court and the names of the parties to
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the proceeding in which it is alleged to

have been committed, the words alleged

to have been sworn. and their falsity.

The charge is simpliﬁed. But the constit-

uent elements of the offense remain as he-

fore. They are included in the nllega tion,

“did commit perjury, ” and it must still

he shown in prooi that the defendant made

oath or aﬂirmation substantially as

charged that the defendant was duly sworn

by an officer competent to administer the

oath. and in a matter of which he had

jurisdiction, and In one oi the instances

speciﬁed in Code, § 1U92,—I. e., “in a suit,

controversy, matter, or cause depending

in any of the courts oi the state, or in a

deposition or aﬂidavit taken pursuant to

law, or in an oath or aﬂirmation duly ad-

ministered of or concerning any matter or

thing whereof such person is lawfully re-

quired to he sworn or a['iirmed;" that it

was in a material matter, and the iury

must be furthersatjsﬁed that such oath or

affirmation was willfully and corruptly

Ialse. When, however. falsity is proven,

it has been held that the burden is on the

defendant to show that it arose from sur-

prise, inadvertence, or mistake. and not

from a corrupt motive. State v.Chambcr-

iin, 30 Vt. 559; 2 Whart. Crim. Law, (9th

Ed.) § 1320.

PER CURIAM. No error.
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ly definite. Still It le euch allegation as la
uf!<:lared sufficient by the statute, and we
cannot see thnt It can make 1my difference
whether it was a" preliminary trial" or a
trial with final jurisdiction. Elthercomes
within Code, § 10112. 'l'he many teclmicalitles whll'h have hampered the administration of ju11tlce in regua"tl to fulRe swearing
mo\'ed the legislature to enact section 11S5
of the Code, and more rt'Cently the aboveCitt'd act prt'scrl bing a elm pie form of indlctmen t for that offense. Chapter 83,
Acts 1889. The authority of the leg is la tu re
to prescribe forms of lndictm1,mt is sustained in 8tate v. Moore, 104 N. C. 743, 10
S. E. Rep. 18:J. The form of Indictment
here authorized points out to the derendant that the offense charged Is perjury,
the court and the name11 of the partle8 to
the proceetling In which It Is alleged to
have bef'n committed, the words allege(}
to have be<>n sworn, and their falsity.
The rharge Is eimplltled. But the constituent elements of the otfen11e remain a11 before. They are included in the alll'U:ll tion,
"did commit perjury," and it must still

EVIDE~CE.
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be shown In proof that the defendant made
oath or affirmation substantially us
charged that the defendant was duly Rworn
by an officer competent to af1mlnh1ter the
oath, and In a matter of which he had
JuriR<lictlon, and In one of the instances
specified In Code, § 1092,-/. e., "In a suit,
controversy, matter, or cause deptmdlng
In any of the courts of the etn te, or In a
deposition or nffl<lavlt taken purRuant to
law, or In an oath or affirmation duly admlnlRte:-ed of or eoncen1lng any matter or
thin~ whereof such person Is la wfull.r required to he 11worn or affirmed;" that It
was in a material matter, and the Jury
must be further 1:1atjsfled that such oath or
affirmation was willfully and corruptly
falHe. When, however. falsity le proven,
It has been held that the burden is on the
defendant to show that It aroRe from eurnrise, Inadvertence, or mistake, and not
from a corrupt mntlve. State v. Chamberlin, 30 Vt. 559; 2 Whart. Crim. Law, (9th
Ed. ) § 13:l0.
PER CUlUAM. No error.
421>

Case No. 145]
Case No. 145]

PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

DEIMEL et al. v. BROWN ct al.

(27 N. E. 44, 136 Ill. 586.)

March 30, 1891.

Appeal from appellate court. ﬁrst dis-

trict.

Moses, Newman & Pam, for appellants.

PRODUCTION AND EFl'ECT OF EVIDE:SCE.

DED!EL et al. v. BROWN et. al.
(27 N. E. 44, 136 Ill. 1586.)
Supreme Court of llllnoill. March 30, 1891.

Appeal from appellate conrt, first dis·
trlct.
Moses, Newman & Pam, for appellants.
Tenney, Huwley & Coffeen, E.C.Crawford,
and Cratty Bros. & Ashcraft,for appellees.

Tenney, Huwley & Coffeen, E..C. Crawford,

and Cratty Bros. & Ashcraft,for appeliees.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

BAKER, J. in September, 1884, Jacob

Biersdorf, of 362 Canal street, Chicago,

failed in business. Thereafter Brown. De

Furck & (J0. recovered in the superior

court of Cook county two judgments

against him for the aggregate amount of

$7,291.64, besides costs; and Bean, Hughes

& Cu. recovered judgment against him in

the same court for $410.87, besides costs;

and William A. Comstock recovered judg-
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ment agaiust him in the county court of

said county for $499.13, besides costs; and

l-lammacher, Schlemmer & Co. recovered

judgment against him in said superior

court for $1,285.34 and costs. Bro\vn, De

Fnrck &()o.and Bean, Hughes & Co.joined

in a creditors‘ bill, which was exhibited in

said superior court, and William A. Com-

stock and Hammacher, Schlemmer & Co.

ﬁled intervening petitions. Jacob Iiiers-

dorf, Mrs. Jacob Biersdorf, the Sage; &

Biersdorf Furniture Manufacturing (Tom-

pnuy. and the present appellants, Simon,

Joseph, and Rudolph Deimel, composing

the ﬁrm of 1)eimel & Bros.,were made par-

ties to the original and amended bills, and

the intervening petitions. Subsequently

the complainants in the bills and the in-

tervening petitioners dismissed their suits

as against Mrs. Jacob Biersdorf and the

Sugg &Biersdorf Company. Answers and

replications were ﬁled, and the cause was

hea rd upon the pleadings and proofs, and

the court found the material allegations

of the amended bill and the intervening pe-

titions to be true, and entered a decree

rendering judgments against Simon Dei-

mel. Joseph l)eimel, and Rudolph Deimel,

and in favor of Brown, De Furck & Co.,

for $8,820.47; in favor of Beau, Hughes &

Co.for $504.13; in favorof William A.Com-

stock for $608.42; and in favor of Ham-

macher, Schlemmer & Co. for $1,437.19;

and" awarding executions for said several

and respective amounts, and for costs.

Appeals were taken by the Deimels from

these several decrees in favor of different

judgment creditors of Biersdorf, and by

consent of parties the appeals were heard

both in the appellate court and in this

court as one appeal. There wasajudg-

ment of afﬁrmance in the appellate court.

The theory of the amended bill and of the

intervening petitions is that in February,

1884, Biersdorf, the principal defendant,

sold and delivered to the co-defendants,

Simon. Joseph, and Rudolph Deimel, com-

posing the ﬁrm of Deimel & Bros., 209

pieces of Tiugue plushcs, at $1.05 per yard,

BAKER, J. In September, 1884, Jacob
Bte.redurf, of 362 Canal street, Chlrag.>,
failed In buslnP.ss. Thereafter Brown, De
Forck & Co. recovenad In the superior
court of Cook county two jucJgments
against him for the aggregate amount of
f7,21U.6.J, besides rosts; and Bean, Hught>s
& Co. recovt>red judgment agnlnst him In
the same ronrt for $410.87, besides costs:
and Wllllum A. Comstock 1·ecovered Judgwent a11.alnst him In the county coul't of
.11aid county for f499.13, beel<leK costs; and
Hammacher, Schlemmer & Co. n.>covcrcd
judgment agaimit him In said superior
court for $1,2~.34 and costs. Brown, De
Furck &. Co. and Hean, Hughes & Co. Joined
In a creditors' bill, which was exhlbltl'd In
said superior court, and William A. Comstock and Hammacher, Schlemmer & Co.
Hied Intervening petitions. Jacob Ble1'81Jorf, Mrs. ,Jacob Blersdorf, the l:)ug~ &
.Biel'Kdorf Furniture Manufacturing Company, and the present avpella.nts, tilmon,
.Joseph, and Rudolph Delmel, composing
the Hrm of llelmel & BroK., were maue parties to tbe original and amended blllH, and
the Intervening petitions. Sub11eque11tly
the complainants lo the bills and the lnter'l'enlug petitioners dlsmlKHet.l tllelr 1rnltt1
as against Mrs. Jacob Bie1"11dorf and the
Sugg &Blersdorf Company. Answers and
replications were flied, and the cau11e wa11
beard upon the pleadings and proofM, and
the court found the mutt11iRI allegations
of the amended bill and the Intervening petitions to be true, 11.ild entered a deeree
rt1ulerlng judgments against Simon J>el·
mel, Joseph Delmel, and Rudolph Delmel,
an<l In favor of Brown, De Furck & C:o ..
for $8.~20.47; In fa\•or of Bt>an, Hughes &
Co. for fii04.13; In favor of WIJllam A. Comst0t•k for $60!U2; and In favor of Hammarher, Schlemmer & Co. for $1,437.lll;
anti a wardln& executions for 11aill Heveral
an<l respective amount!", and for costs.
Appeals were taken by the Delmels from
these several decree"J In favor of different
Judgmt>nt creditors of Blersdorr. and by
-consent of parties the ap1>eals were heard
both In the appellate court and In this
court as one appeal. 'J'here was a Juclgment of affirmanee In the appellate court.
The theory of the amended bill and of the
tnter'l'enlng petitions ls thut In Fehruary,
1884, Blersdorf, the principal defendant,
11old and delivered to the co-defendnnts,
Simon. Joseph, and Rudolph Delmel, composing the firm of Delmel & Bros., 209
pleres of Tlngue plushes, at$1.65 per yard,
and of the ascj[rr.gatevalue of $14,700; and
that stild $14,700 remains tlnpald and ow·
lni: from the co-<lefendants to Blt•rsrlorf:
and that they, for the purpose of keeping
eald money out of the reach of the creditors of Rlersdorf, falsely claim an<l pretend
thut the purehase price of said Tlngue
plu11heH haK been paid and disci1arged, bnt
that In fact the claimed payment was

Jlctitlous and colorahle merely, anrl a part
of a Rrheme to defraud the creditors of
Blersdorf, and tht1t Aln<~e flflld money stilt
remains unpaid, It mui;ht to be flpplled in
satlsractlou of the Jmlgments of the &e\'·
eral appelleee a1tah1At Bleredori. The
principal dt>fendaot and the co-defendants
were called upon to answer undt>r oath.
The answer of Bleradorf states that for
nearly three yeat"H prior to bis failure he
was, and Hince bas beeo, confined to bis
bed hy slcknt>~H. and thereby com1,ellt>tl to
Jea'l'e the management of bis bu11lne&11 lo
tbe handA of one Max Berg," and thel"f'fore
has little or no knowledge of thecondltlon
or character of Raid acconuts or other
matters connected with 11ald business or
its a1Jeets." It further Rte tee that he bas
neither posAeselon uor control nor knowledge of his books of account. It admits
that Rudolph l>elmel, Joseph Delm••I, and
Simon J>elmel hall numerou11 bu1dnl'l!s
transactions with him In the way of purrhaslng good!$ of him, but denies that at
the tlmeof the filing of the bill of complaint
a large part or any part of the purehase
price or said g;oods remained unpaid, or
thllt the Delmels were then or are owing
him on al'count of said purchases f15,000
or any other sum. Tbe 1tnbstance of tbe
joint and several auswer11 of Simon, Joseph. find Rudolph Delmel ls as follows:
'l'hat Rome time In the month of February•
1884, they bought n lurge quantity of plm~h
from Jacob Bieredorf, amounting In all to
about 209 pie<•es. The. plush was received
In the month of Februury, 1884, and wns
what lt1 known In the comuiel'l'lul world as
"Tln1rue" plush. and was of the 'l'alue of
abont f14,700. The l'lu11h was paid for In
the following manner: On th11 29th day of
January, 188-l, Jacob Blersdorf bad purcl11u1ed from the defendants lumber and
men·hnn1ll11e to the amonnt of $12.7is7,and
on Fchruury 7, l!!X4, to the amount of
about $5,502.50, and afterwards became Indebted to them upon other tran11actloos
In the sum of about $1.000, and that said
accounts were adjudgedauclset offai;talnst
t>acb other, and the difference paid these
defendants In cash or notes, which were
afterwards paid by Blenulorf; that said
settlemt>nt was made In September, 1884,
and that at that time Blersdorf was lndt>bte<l to the defendants In the sum of
$19,000. They further answered that they
were not, nor are either of them, lo any
wlKe or to itny extent Indebted to Jacob
Blersdorf, nor were they su Indebted at
the time of the filing of the original bill lo
said cause. and that they did not then
have or have they now In their poKSeS11lon.
cnstody, or control any propP.rty of any
kind or nature belonging to Jacob Blf'r&dorf, or In which he hati or had any Interest, claim, or demand whatsoe'°er, and
that they hold no sucb property In trust
for him. either directly or tncllrectly. The
matter to cllari;r;eappellanta-the purt'haee
by them in February, 1884, from Blen1dorf
of a lot of 1'1ngue plu11bes for $14,700-ls
claimed In the bill and petitions and admitted In the answer. The rule IK that
where a fact le alleged to a blll and aclmltted by the answer, such admission ls c:oucluslve of the exlst1mce of the fact, and
other evidence to e11tahllsb such fact 1111 unneecssary. Insurance Co. 'I'. Myer, 93 Ill.
271; .Morgan v. Cornes, 81 Ill. 72. The
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ma tter in discharge of appellants. as stated

in t|lPil‘8llFlW8l'.i8 that on January 29, I884,

Biersdori bought: of them “lumber and

merchandise" to the amount oi‘ $12.78",

and on February 7, 1984, to the amount of

$5,502.50, and afterwards became indebted

to them in the further sum of about $1,000,

and that in September, 1884, a settlement

was made between tl1em,and theaccounts

l~it'l. off against. each other, and the differ-

ence paid by Biersdorl to them. It is ad-

mitted that these statements are respon-

sive to the charges and interrogatories

contained in the bill and petitions, but

appeilees deny the truth of such state-

ments. 'i‘hc material issue in the case.

tin-n.is whether or not appellants paid

and settled for the $14,700 worth ofplushes,

as is represented by them in their sworn
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.an.~=wer.

What weight have the sworn answers

as evidence for appellants? The general

rule is that. where an answer to a bill in

chancery is required to be made under

-oath, and an answer is ﬁled which is re-

sponsive to the allegations of the bill, then

all material averments of the bill that are

denied by such answer must he proved

by the testimony of two witnesses. or by

evidenee which is equal to the testimony

of two witnesses. This rule, however,has

no application to averments dcnicd upon

information and belief, or where the de-

fendant himself refutes the sworn state-

ments in his answer. It is only when a

defendant states facts within his own per-

sonal knowledge that his answer has to

-be overcome by evidence equivalent to the

testimony of two witnesses. Fryrear v.

Lawrence,5 Gilmau. 325. in the case cited

this court said: “ While a defendant's an-

swer, which is required to be sworn to, is

made evidence in the cause by the com-

plainant, it is only entitled to weight when

it is entitled to belief; and if he chooses to

swear to that which the court sees becau-

not,or which headmits he does not know.

he is entitled to no morecredit.and is sub-

ject to the same censure and condemna-

tion as any other reckless witness, who

the court sees is trying to impose upon it

his belief, when he should only speak of

his knowledge. The court is not a mere

machine to weigh everything that is of-

fered without examining its value, any

more when the defendant's oath is put

into the scale than when examining tne

testimony of any other witness." The an-

swer of the defendant liiersdorfstates that

in September, l.\‘:s‘-l, and for nearly three

years prior thereto, he was, and for the

greater part of the time since then has been.

confined to his bed by sickness. and was

compelled to leave the management of his

business to one Max Berg, “and therefore

has little or no knowledge of the condition

or character of said accounts or other

matters connected with said business or

mntter tndl11chargeofappellanta, nutated
In tht>lranawer, Is th11t on January 29, 1884.
Blt>rsdorf bought of them "lumber and
mt>rehanrllRe" to the amount of f12.787.
.and on February 7, 1~. to the amount of
$5.50~.50. aud afterwards became lndPhted
to them In the further aum or about fl ,000,
.and that In Reptember, 1HR4, a settlement
waamade between them, and theaccount.e
Ht'L off ag11t11st eal'h f•tht'r, and the dltterencti paid by Blersdorf to them. It Is admitted that these atatementil are reHponelve to the charges and lnterrogotorlM
-contained in the · blll anti petitions, but
11p1,ellees deny the t1·uth of such state·
ments. The material Issue In the ('8Se,
tlwn. 111 whether or not appellants palcl
.and settled fur the $14.700 worth of pluehes,
.as le represented by them In their nvorn
.amc\'l·er.
What weight have the sworn anaweJ"M
.as evidence fur a1Jpellaote? The general
rule ls that. where an answer to a bill tu
ehnncery la required to be JJ.iade under
-<>ath, and an ttnRwer le ftle!l which 111 responsive to the allegations of the bill, theP
all rnhterlal avermcnte of the bl!! that ar..
df'nled by such anawer must be 11rov('(l
by tllA tf'Rtlmony of two w1tne1111l's, or h~·
~vldence which le equal to the teatlmon.v
-01 two wltnesHee. ThlH rule, however, huK
no application to averments denied upon
Information and belief, or where the defendnnt Jilmet'lf refutes the sworn statements fn hie answer. It Is only when a
defendant states fact11 within hie own per•onal knowle1lge that hlM anewr.r has to
-be overcome by evidence t>qulvalt>nt to the
tf-sthnonyof two wltnes..t'8. Jo'ry1·eHr T.
Lawrence,5 Gilman. !l2ii. Jn thti case l'ite1l
this court 11ald: "While a defendant'11 an•wer, which Is l'f'qulred to bt' sworn to, IM
made evidence lo the cauHe by the complalnant, It 111 only entl tied to weight whf'u
it le entltled to belief; and If he choo11es to
swear to that which the 1•ourl seeH heco11not, or which he all mite be doeH out know.
he le entitled to no more credit, and Is suhJect to the 11ame ('en11ure and condemn&·
tlon BK any other reckl<'"I! wltnes111, who
tbe court aee11 Is trying to lm11ose upon it
bf11 helit'I, when he should only spcak or
bis knowledge. The court fs not a mere
ma<~hlm.• to weigh everything that ls offe.red without examining; Its value, an~·
more when the defendant's oath Is put
tnto the &l'ale th1m wht>n PX a mining the
teetlmon.~· or an~ other witness." The an·
ewer or the dcfemhmt Hlersdorfatutes the t
1n Septembe:-, 1~4. and for nearly three
y('arR prior tht>reto, he was, and tor the
-gn-11terpartor the time i,ilncethenhasbeen.
-confined ti) his bed by sil'knes11, and was
i!Ompr.lled to lea,·e the managt>mP11t of hl11
business to one Max Berg. "al"ld therefore
has little or no knowledge of the con<litlou
-or character or aald accountH or other
mattf'l'8 connected with said business or
1te as11ets." This admle11lon thoroughly
1mpt>acbee his an11wer as evidence, and
renden hlK denial contalnPd therein of any
lndebtedne1111 from DL•lmel & Brothers to
him of no prohuth·e force whatt>ver. It la
mantre11t that at the most such denial Is
basPd upon mPl'f" Information anll hf'lief.
The Joint and several answer of the apflf'l111nt11 111 11worn to by all three of them.
'l'he Htn h•nwnt11 In Kaid a1111wer are nrn1l1•
in positive and anquallfte<l terms. .But
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there la In evidence In the r11uee the record
In a garnh1hment snit prn1:1eeuted In the
circuit court of C'ook county In the name
of Blersdorf tc.r the ·Ul!e of Mftl'Rhall FleM
& Co. agatn11t Raid Uetmel & Bro11.; and
ltoppf'arstherefrom that lnsahlllultltwa11
sought to reach by garnlehment the same
fund that Is here Involved, and thut the
written Interrogatories there filed r.overed
the same trana11ctlons and t11ct11 that are
embraced ID the an~wer now under conslder11tlon. It further Hppeare from eald
record that, while all three of the appellants joined In the anawers made In sold
garnl1:1hee proceeding, yet that the truth of
each answeN was eworn to by Joeeph
Delmel alone: that said Jo11eph tlll're
made affidavit that he was the only member of the firm who Is per11onally f1'mlllar
with all the matters and things referred
tolnthe se\'erlll lnterrogatorlee; and that
said Uudolph anrl Hlmon Delmel alMo madl'I
affidavit that they are not penmnally famlllar with all the matters referred to In
the 8d, 4th, oth, 6th, nnd 7th lntcrro~ato
rles aHkE'd of them as garoleheea, and are
unwilling to swear to the answf'l'B flied to
the same; and that, ae to the matterH referrt>1l to In 11ald Interrogatories, they w el't!
business transactions In the special ('harge
of their copartner, Jueeph Delmel, who le
persunall:v famlllar with the 11ame. 'rhe
purchafle of the fl4,700 worth of Tlngue
plushes, and the supposed settll'ment therefor, nil trans1>lred during the year 1~ii4. If
In Novemb<>r, 11®>, they had DO such JIPr·
sonal knowledge of the truneactlonM relating thE>reto as would authorize them to
make oath In reHpect tbP.reto, It le lmpoi!elble that In .Murch, 1886, said matters
we!"-' within their own knowll'dge. We
think that tht> fact thn t Hudolph and Simon Delmel have sworn to the answer
gives It n9 weight as evidence In favor of
appellants.
Joseph Delmel also made oath to the an11wer. This maile It competent evlilem·e
for the tlrm. anrl Imposed upon appellee•
the burden of ove1·comlng It, so fur as It
states matters !n discharge of oppellants,
by evidence equivalent to thut of two wltnesHe11. I>ld th"' supHlor court err In Its
findings th11t thl11 has been done? In the
an1:1wl'rs eworn to by him In the Marshall
Field &: C'o. :i:arni11hee proceedlngM, Jusl'l.lh
Dehnel 1ruve an uccountof the purchase by
Dl'lmel & Bro111. In the month of 1''ebrt1a1·y,
1~4. of the lot of Tlngue plushl'I! here lnvoJv..d; anti aleo stated that BlerMdorf
was lmlebted to Th-Imel & Bros .. In 1''ebruary, lHRt, and prior to the time of purchasing eald pluHbes, In a sum con111!1erably In
excees of the amount or price or said
plushe11, and the same wae applied In payment of said lndehtednt>11e of Blersdorf to
Dehne! & Bro11. eo far 011 the purchase prlr!e
of said plu11hee would extend In payment
thereof; and to th<:>MP answeni added this:
"All thl' foreP:olng mattel"ll appear upon
the books of said R. Delmel & Bros.·· The
depoeltlon of Joseph Delmel was token at
the Instance of appl'lleee. We ha \'e read
this df'po11ltlon at length, aH It u1111ears In
the rt'cord ltRelf, and It lmpre1tses our
minds aA being eva11IV'e and dlelngenuone.
In reRpect to almoet all or the material
QlleRtlona a11ke<l him by appellees he ehlelde
blm1wlf behind the p)Pu that he does not
remember. When oueetloned In regard to
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the details of the dealings of his ﬁrm with

Biersdorf, he answers, time and time

again. and almost uniformly,thut he does

not remember; that he can tell nothing in

reference to the particular matter inquired

about without his books; that his ledger

would show the transactions, that his

bookswould show the transactions; that

his ledger was in New York, and mostoi the

other books destroyed by ﬁre. An analy-

sis of his testimony would require more

time and space than the reasonable limits

of an opinion would allow; but suffice it

to say that it is manifest therefrom that

he has but little knowledge or recollection

in respect to the dealings with Biersdorf,

and that most of that was predicated

upon what appeared upon the ledger and

other books of his firm. He even states in
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his examination that he does not remem-

ber that he ever read the answer in chan-

cery which is here under consideration.

but that, if he signed it. he supposes that

he read it. Upon the whole, his deposi-

tion has not favorablyimpresscd us; and,

in our opinion, it goes far to impeach the

force of his sworn answer. He afterwards,

in obedience to a subpcena, produced the

ledger before the master in chancery; and

it was then desired by appellee “ to exam-

ine him with reference to the items con-

PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

the details or the df'allngs of his ftrm with
BlerRdorf, he ennrers, time and time
11goln. Anet almoHt uniformly, tbllt he does
not remt>mher; that be ean tell nothing lo
reference to the particular mutter inquired
about without his books; that bis ledger
would show the transactions, that his
books would show the transat>tloos; that
blHledgerwae In New York, and most of the
other books deetroyt'd by fire. An analysis of his teHtfmony would require more
time mul 11pal'e than the l'f'asonable limits
of an opinion would alluw; but 11uflke It
to Htty thut It is manife11t therefrom that
he has but little knowlo<lge or recollection
In respect to tlle deallnire with Blersdorf,
ar.d that most of that was predicated
upon what &J>peart-d upon the ledger and
other boo\(R of hlH tlrm. He even states In
bis examination that he doe>1 not remember that he e\'(:r read the answer in chancery which la here under coualderatlnn,
but thttt, if he signed it, he euppoeee that
be read It. U11on the whole, hie deposition has not favorahlylmpreeaed us; and,
In our opinion, it goes far to Impeach the
fo~e of his -iworn anHwer. He arterwarils,
In obedience to a subpama. produced the
led~er bt>fore the master In chancery; and
It was then desired by appellee "to e:tRmlne him with reference to the items contained 111 the Jpcfg;er, which he here produces, and which in bis former examlmttlon he claimed his Inability to testify
about on account of the absence of the
books;" but both he and his counsel refm1erJ to submit to Roch examination.
The ac<·ount of Bleredorf. as it appears
upon the ]edger produced by Delwel &
Brue., 18 as follows:

tained in the ledger, which he here pro-

duces, and which in his former examina-

tion he cluimed his inability to testify

., I

about on account oi‘ the absence of the

0

books;" but both he and his counsel re-

"-o:

;-

fused to submit to such examination.

The account of Biersdorf. as it appears

upon the ledger produced by Deimei &

Bros., is as follows:
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The Items which appcllcea claim to be
fal111e and fraudulent are the charges
"18.~.J. Jan'.v 29. Reg. 1-5.'l7, $12.71'17.00. •
and "1~~- Jo'eh'.v 7. 1-f>71, fa.n112.;, 1." •11111
the credit, "Sept. 11. By cash, 61, f 18,·
289.53." It le supposed that the orderbook and 1mpre881on or bUI book of the
firm would throw llgbt upon the above
items of charge: but they were not produced hy ap1,ellants. It 18 stated by Jo&eph Delmel In his depoHltlon that most of
the books, other than the ledger, were lost
by tire; but to this he lit contradicted by
Taylor, who was book-keeper, and by
Drown, who wuH aBl!IHtant book-keeper,
of the tlrm, and the substance or their evidence ls that the books were pr('llerved In
the vault, and that they did not know of
any books ha vlng been lost or destroyed
by the fires. It appe!trH from the teRtl·
mouy of Taylor, which le corroborated
by that of Drown,anrl by that of Jenkins.
an emoloye of a ftrm of book-blodt-rs and
printers, that be (Taylor) in 1S85, by dil"t'C·
tioo of Joseph Delmel, removPd some 80
leaves from the order book ot Delmel &Co.•
which included a large part of the yf'ar
1R84, and covered the tranaactlonH with
Blersdorf, ttnd caused to be ruled and
puged and bound In the book an equal
number of blank pages or like paper, and
on whleh were written up ordettJ for
goo1ls, Including fictitious orders of goods
for Blersdorf; a·nd at the same time pag~
containing copies of paites of bUls to 1iurchaRel'R of goo<111 were removed from the
blll-linok, covering a part of 18.~. and
blank leaves corresponding to those removed were inserted therein, and the
book rebound; and tbat bills were entered
therein to corte11pond with the ordeni t>U·
tered In the mutilated order-book; and that
a 11olutlon or rorree was used to give the
Aubstltuted leAves the appearance of age.
Thia evidence le wholly uncontradlcted;
and Its truth was further made manifest
by the produetlon In court by Taylor, under an order of court, of the leaves which
h11d been remove.I from tbe order-book.
Upon lJOge 29 or the loose sheets produced
by Taylor appears a supposed Bleradorf
order, as follows:
"J. D."
January 28..
4749, Jacob Bleradorf, ll6S Canal St., City.
'758 50 plecea Olive, 1 U. I. Tlngue plu.ab, emboased Franklin.
llO "
Gold 0, Tingue plnab, emboued
Franklin.
211 " Blue 4, Tingne pluab, emboell8d
Franklin, 11.5.5 per yard.
211 " Green 2, Tingue plush, emboaeed
Franklin.
llO "
Red 2, Tiogue pluah, emboaeed
Franklin.
Terms, net flO days, to be delivered Jan•y 29th,
or 5 p. oft 10 daya.
J.

It appears from the testtmonyof Taylor
that In the order-book as altered, lumber
was Hubstltnted for plushes, and that the
same cbangP waa made tu the bill-book.
Tho charge in led11:er, Janual'y 29, $12,7!"<7.
la b&11ed on the order of January 28th, aod
currespoudlug entry In bill-book. He alHo
states that the Items which constitute the
charge ol f5,502.50 were changed In the or·
der-book and In the blll-book. These ma·
tllattons of their books are admitted by appellants; but it 111 claimed In their behalf

CORBOBORATIVE EVIDENCE.
CORROBORATIVE E VIDENCE.

[Case N0. 145

that the object in view was not to defraud

the creditors oi Biersdorf, but to defraud

liiarshall Field & (‘o.in a suit ior damages

brought in New York by Dcimsl & Bros.

against said i\Iarshall Field & Co. for

breach of a contract to deliver in the

month oi February, 1884, a large quantity

oi Tingue plushes. It is suggested that, if

the charges against Biersdori for $12,787

and $5,502.50 were just cliai-gvs, it is im-

material to said creditors whether they

were predicated upon items ior plusbes

sold or items ior lumber sold. It is read-

ily perceived how it might have been for

the interest of appellants, in said damage

suit, to show that in order to supply the

demands of their business they had been

compelled to go into the market and buy

from Biersdori $l~l,'i'0ii worth oi Tingue
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plushes at $1.65 ayard; and so also it

might have been for their boneiitin said

suit, for the purpose oi enhancing dam-

ages or creating a ﬁctitious price ior such

goods, to have manipulated their books

to show ﬁctitious and unreal sales oi

plushes by them. But here the falsiﬁca-

tion oi their books is not explainable up-

on either oi these theories. The purchase

of plushes from Biersdori was not shown

by the books, either before or alter the.

mutilation; and by the alterations

charges which before that indicated sales

of plushes by them were changed to sales

oi lumber. It is diliicult to see what bear-

ing the sale oi lumber by appellants to

Biersdori would have in the litigation for

the non-delivery of silk plushes to appel-

lants by Marshall Field 6’: Co. it is more

reasonable to suppose that ior some ren-

son it was deemed unadvisable that the

books should show such very large sales

oi plushes to Biersdorf, or that at or

about the time they were buying plushes

for Biersdorf at $1.65 per yard they were

also selling him many thousands ofdol-

lars worth oi the same quality of plushes

at $1.55 a yard; and that the charges

made were in furtherance oi a plan to still

further cover up the iund of$l4.700. and

conceal it from the creditors oi Biersdorf,

said Iiiersdorf having failed in business

some months beiore. That \\‘hlch we have

above said proceeds upon the theory that

the entries upon the ledger oi $i2,T.\7 and

$.'>.5U3.50 were made prior to the changes

made in the books; but that such was the

case is not at all clear from the evidence.

Taylor, in his evidence taken beiore the

master, says: “The entries $12,787 and

$3.502.5‘)iu January and February, 1884,

were not made at those dates, but a con-

siderable time afterwards, and after the

mu tilatlon of the books, and not from act-

ual transactions occurring in lieimel‘s

business.” Subsequently, on his cross-ex-

amination, he states that the entries on

the ledger were made according to the

dates there shown. but that the items

that the object In '°lew wa11 not to <1erratJd
the Cl"Pditors of Biers1lorf, but to defraud
Marshall Fle!d & Co. In u Hult for d11magee
brought In New York by Delmel a: Brus.
agalnHt said Marshall Field & Co. for
breacb of a contract to deliver In the
month of February, 1884, a lnrge quantity
of Tlngue plutihes. It Is suggested that, If
the charges agahu~t Blenulorf for 112.787
and f.'l,502.50 were just ebargt>s, It bs Immaterial to aalcl creditors whether they
were predlrated upon Items for plu11het1
eold or ltP.ms for lumber sold. It Is readily percelve1l how It might have been for
the Interest of appellants, In said damage
suit, to show thut lo order to supJ>ly the
demands of their boMIOCRS they had been
compelled to go Into the market and buy
from BIEirsdorf $14,700 worth or Tlngue
plushes at fl.65 a yard; and so also It
might have been for tbtdr hcneHt In said
ault, for the purpvse or enhancing damages or creating a fictitious price for sucb
goods, to have manipulated their books
to show fictitious and unreal sales uf
plu11het1 by them. But here the faltdOcation of their books Is not explainable up.
on either of these theories. 'l'he purchase
of plushes from Blersdorf W&B not sho<vn
by the books, either before or after the
mutHatlon; and by the
alteratloms
chu.rgeM which before that Indicated sales
of plushes by them were r.hanged to i<all'H
of lamber. It ls di1Dc111t tc ere what beuriog the sale of lnmber by ap11ellnnts to
Blersdorf would ha f'e In the litigation for
the non-<JPllvery or 11ilk plushes to uppellants by MarMlmll Field & Co.
Jt I& more
reasonable to "oppose that for some r<>n.ion It was deemed unadvlitable that the
books shoald show such very large sales
of ploRhes tu Blel'l!dorf, or that at or
about the time they were buying olu11he&
for Blenitlorf at fl.65 per yard they were
also selling him mauy thou1umds of dollarR worth of the same quality of plushes
at $1.55 a yard; aod that the l'hargeR
made were In furtherance of a plan to still
further cover up the hml1 of $14.iOO. uod
~once11l It from the creditors or BlerHdurf,
said Hlersdorf ha vlnp: fallt?d In buslnt?HS
ifome mouths before. That which we have
above said proce<>ds npon the theor;v that
thr. Pntrlea apon the ledger of $1:.!,ix7 and
.$:J,i>O:J.50 wero made 1n·lor to the chnngPs
made lo the books; hut that such WHM the
~ase ls not at all clt?ar h'om the evidence.
'Taylor, In his evidence taken bpfore the
maHtPr, Rays: "1'he e11trle11 $12,iS7 nnd
f:>.502.5') In January and J<'ehruary, 18S4,
were not made at those dates, hut a con~hlerable time afterwardM, and after the
mutilation of the books, an<l not from actual tram~actlons Ot'currlng In lleimel's
busfneHs." Subsequently, on his croHs-e:r.amlnatlon, be states that the entries on
the ledger were ma1le according to the
datt>A there shown, but that the Items
whkh <'OnRtltutrd the. charges or $12,787
and fj,502.50 were altered, chnngPd In the
order-book and In the bill-book, whkh
wrre made over and lea"reM put In. It 111
-evident from the testimony of Taylor thu.t
he was an nowllllug witness for appellees,
and deslrPd to tell as little as po11slble that
waR lnJurlouM to a11pcllnnts; that he wtts
41ulte considerably under tbe Influence of

[Oise No. 14:>

Joseph l>Plmt>l; aud that the latter Interviewed him frpqut>ntly prior to and IJl"odlng his tlf!\'eral examlnn tlnn& as a w1toete11
In respPct to his teMtlmony, uml MOllll'ht to
Influence him In regard to tbe evidence he
11hoold give. Wl" are Inclined to think that
It would be conducive tu a Juiit result to
take hi& statementR moMt strongly against
appellants. Jn rPl!lpect to the credit, l:ie1>temher 11th, of $11'.~9.fi3, '.raylur tt>stlties,
amuog other tblnl(tl, that It represents 110
real tran11actlon of that date; that to preserve the balanc" cash wa11 dt!blted with
that amount, and t'redlted with mercban·
dllle' charged to BlerMdorf: that It appeared as thouKh the amount hod brPo
paid to <'&sh, and charged to merchamli11e,
and to Mose11 L. Miller, a brother-In-law of
I>elmel's; and that Joseph Delmellustructed him to credit Blt>r'i!dorf for caBh, and
l'harge It up to 11omesuch account, where It
would uot attract uttentloo. On .June 2,
1885,-aboot the time that the books were
mutilated and changecl,-Jo11e11h Delnll'I
tt>legruphed from New York tu Charles L.
Miller, who was his brother-In-law. and a
Hon-in-law ol Blel'lldorf, as follows: "Don't
neglect to aiee Max as per my lettPr to
Rodo. If any one should ask him an.vtblng he can 11ay he remember'i! nothln,;,
aud his book" are lost, hut If they give
him time be will try to l't'freRh hlM memory. W1lte me U nny one ht111 been to Mee
him. Do so to·dny, a11 it Is lmportn 11 t.
Look him up wherever he Is. Jm:." The
reasonable presumption Is that the" Max•
Dlt'ntloned In the tt>legram was Max Bi>r~.
who was a brother-lo-lnw of Rler111lorf,
and the book-keeper and bu•fness mana1&er
of Raid lllet"Mdorf. It Is Hlgnillcnut, wlll'o
tRken In connection with this telegrum,
that BlerBdorf stntPS lo his sworn answer "that be hns neltht'r J>OMReMsion
nor t'ontrol nor knowlt•1lge or hlR hookM of
acconnt, •· nnd that, notwlth11t11ndiug the
enorts which the record Rhows were made
In that hehdlf, sttld books of account were
not obtained anll brought Into rourt.
There 111 nothing wllate\·er lo the record
to sn~grst that the charires of January 29
and :F~l.Jruary 7, ISS-1. were for any nwrchandiMe or consideration other than 111111ber or plushes. 1'1Jere is no evhlt-m·e except that of the Mworn anHwer tPndlng
tu show that apJ>t>llitntR 110111 lum her to
Blr.rsdorl. 1'hedt•positlon of HPnry8tnhl,
who was foreman for lliei"Hdorf, uud the
other evidence lo the l'ttlle, renders It re1tsonably certain that no lumber wRs 110
solll. The teKtlmony of R1alolph Di>lmel,
of C. L. llletrlch, who lo 1>-S-1wuR11hi1111ing
clerk of Dlemel & Bros., and of E. H. l\fllrku<J, a tea1m1ter to the employmrnt or the
firm. tends to Rhow tht> s11Je and dt•live,.y
of plu11heR by a p111?llan ts to lllerHdorf In
the early part of 1SS4. Tlw sta temt>nt1o1 of
the HrRt are lrupeoched by the nfflcln \"It
which he made and filed In the Mnniball
Field & Co. ~arulshment vroceetling. If
'1;e Hhould assume the mnttPl'!I staled by
all three or them to be trne, yet they are
not lncom11Htt'nt with the throry of appellees that shortly before the fullure of Blersdorf, and to l'onterupl1ttlon thereof, said
Bler11dorf, throuJrb Max Berg, purch11Rud
larKe quanth.les of pluMhes from his creditors, and rasold them to appellants, and
429
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with the intention of depriving such cred-

itors oi the fund realized from such

plushes; that Delmel & Bros. were active

participants in the contemplated fraud;

and that the hauling oi‘ plushes to and fro

between the places of business of Deimel &

Bros. and Biersdori was simply part and

parcel oi the plan to cover up and conceal 1

l place in February, 1584. This is not a. bill

the actual facts. Under all the circum-

stances of the case, we are unable to say

that it was error in the superior court to

arrive at the conclusion that the other

evidence in the case was suliicient to suc-

cessfully impeach and overcome the sworn

answer of Joseph l)eimel.

Some minor points seem to require brief

attention. It is objected—citing in that

behalf Durand -v. Gray, 129 ill. 9, 21 N. E.
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Rep. fil0—that in respect to some of the

judgment creditors it does not suliiciently

appear from thepleadimzs and proofs that

legal remedies have been exhausted, since

the residence of the judgment debtor at

the time of the issuance and delivery oi.’

execution is not stated. it is both averred

and proven that the judgments were re-

covered in courts of record in (‘ook coun-

ty. and that the executions were issued to

and returned by the sheriff of that county.

In the absence of averment or evidence to

the contrary, the presumption is that the

defendant resides in the county where the

suitis brought and judgment recovered.

It appears from the record that on No-

vember 25, 1885, the summons herein was

served on Biersdorf in Cook county, and

the presumption is that he then resided

there. It abundantly appears from the

evidence that in the latter part of March,

1889, said debtor was a resident of said

county. The maxim probatis ext:-emis

pr.-csumuntur media. has application to the

case. The objection was not made in the

court below. and it is now too late to

chancery for want of specirlr averlnents in

the pleadings of some of the creditors of

the place of residence oi the judgment

debtor at the dates when executions were

sued out.

it is immaterial that the bill fails to

state that the complainants were credit-

ors when the Biersdorf transaction took

to set aside the sale of the plnshes to

Deilncl & Bros. as being a voluntary con-

veyance of property without considera-

tion, and u fraud against claims of then

existing creditors, but the case of appcllces

admits and recognizes the validity of the

sale. and proceeds upon the theory that

the indebtedness thereby created was

frandulentI_v covered up and concealed.

and that such indebtedness was a fund

which really belonged to the judgment

debtor. if there are assets of the debtor

in the hands oi appellants. they can be

reached b_v the creditors, no matter when

the debts due to the latter were con-

PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

with thn lott>ntlon of depriving such cre1J- <'hancery for want or spee:nr a \"erments tn
1tol'8 or the fund realized from snch the pteadlnirs of some of the creditors or
plushes; that DP-Imel & Bros. were nl'tlve thti place of re1ddenr.e of the Judgroc·nt
participants in the contemphlted fraud; debtor at the dateit when execution& went
and that the hauling of plushes to and fro , sued out.
betWo!ell the plttces or business or Delmel & ' It lt1 immaterial that the blll fallR to
Bro11. and Blersdorf was simply part and state that the complalnants were creditparcel of the plan to cover up and conceal or11 when the Bler11dorf trnn11actlon took
the al'tual fnct11. Under all the clrcum- place In February, 1~. This is not a bill
stances or the case, we al't' unable to say to set ao;illle the sale of the plm1hes t~
that it wus error in the superior court to Dt:hnel & Bros. as being a voluntary conarrlve at the conclu1don that the other veyance of property without consldersnvldence In the cuse was sufficient to sue- tlon, and o fraud against claims of theu
cessrully Impeach and overcome the sworn exl11ting creditors, but the cose of appellees.
anMwer of Joseph Delmel.
admits and recop:nlzes the validity of the
:Some minor point1111eem to require brief sale, and proceeds upou the theory that
attention. It ill objected-citing lo that the inllebtednE'BH thereby crented was
behlllf Durand .v. Gra~·. 129 Ill. IJ, 21 N. E. frandulently covered up and concealed.
Rep. IUO-that In reMpeet to 1mme of the a111l that sul'h lndebtednell8 wa11 a fund
Judgment creditors it doe11 not sntHclently which re1tlly belonged to the Judr;unent
appear from theplea11ln1ts and p1·oofs that debtor. If there are nesets of the debtor
legal remedies ha'l"e been exhausted, 11lnce in the hands of a(1pellants, they cau b&
the re;ildence of the ju1lirment debtor at reache1l by the creditors, no matter wbeo
the time of the f11suaoce and delh·ery of the debts due to the latter were conexecu tlon Is not stated. It ls both averred t1·acted. The <'ourt, in its decree, found
and pronn that the jmtgments \Vere re- that the $14,700 bacl not been paid. and
covered In courts of !'('Cord In ('o•lk coun- that said lndebtedne11R, with lnteretit therely. and that the exec11tfon1:1 were Issued to on at 6 per cent. per annum, amounted to
an:l returned by the sheriff of that county. $17,640, and that said sum of $17,IUO cooJn the ah11ence of averment or t!Vldl!ul'e to stltuted a fund to which t.he creclltors had
the contrary, the pre11umptlo11 ls that the a right to resort for the coJlection of their
defendant resides In the county where the claims against Blersdorf, and rendered
suit is brought and judgment reco,·ered. Judgments and awarded executions lo
It appears from the record that on No- fa \•or of the 11everal appellees, aggregating
vt-mber ~. 1885, the summons herein was $11,370.21. 'l'he finding that lntel'f"Bt was
st-rved on Blenidorf In Cook county, end due on the '14,700 ls assIJtned as error. A
the presumption Is that he then resllled fraudnlent vendee or truRtee 19 cbergenble
there. It abunctantly appeani from th" wltll 6 per cent. lnte!"Pfft on the value of
evlllence that In the latter p1\l't or March, the property or fund . 8teere v . Hoagland.
1~, said debtor was a retildent of said
50 111. 377. In respect to the remalnlo~ obcounty. The maxim probatls extn:m1ls jectlons nri;red by av11ellants, we may say
prR!sumuntur medln has application to the that we think them without merit, and
caee. '!'he objection was not made In the that they do not call for special notice.
court below, nnd it fit now too htte to The judgment of the appellate court la.
qneHtlon the jurlRdlctlon of the <·ourt of affirmed .
·
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noanvson et ill. v. UNITED STATES.

(13 \\'all. 363.)

Supreme Court of the United States. Dec.,

1871.

Error to the circuit court of the United

States for the district of California.

Action by the United States against Rob-

inson & Co., merchants of San Francisco, on

a contract with the assistant quartermaster

of the United States “to deliver” on his or-

der “1,000,000 bushels of ﬁrst quality clear

barley" between the 1st of July, 1867, and

the 30th of June, 1868, at such points as

might be deignated, and at such times and

in such quantities as might be requh-ed. The

contract did not provide as to whether the

barley was to be delivered in sacks or in

bulk. The ﬁrst barley delivered was deliver-

ed in sacks, but, on being required to de-
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liver 30,000 pounds more, defendant tender-

ed the quantity in wagons which the oflicer

at the post where it was tendered refused to

accept, and the contractor abandoned his con-

tract. The United States asked a witness

shown to have been engaged in the grain

business in California as to his knowledge of

the usage of the trade in delivering barley.

An objection that it was incompetent for

plaintiff to vary the terms of a contract by

evidence of a usage was overruled, and the

witness testiﬂed that it was the custom to

deliver grain in sacks, and had always been

the custom. There was no other evidence of

usage, and the court found that it was the

usage, and always had been in California, to

deliver barley in sacks, unless expressly stip-

ulated otherwise, and that the tender in bulk

was not sufficient under the contract. Judg-

ment for the United States, and defendants

ROBINSON et al. v. UNITED STATES.
(18 Wall. 363.)
Supreme Court of the United StateJI. Dec.,
1871.
Error to the circuit court of the United
States tor the district of California.
.Action by the United States against Roblnaon & Co., merchants of San Francisco, on
a contract with the assistant quartermaster
ot the United States "to deliver" on his order "1,000,000 bushels of first quality clear
barley" between the 1st of July, 1867, and
the 30th of June, 1868, at such points as
might be designated, and at such times and
in such quantities as might be required. The
contract did not provide as to whether the
barley was to be delivered in sacks or in
bulk. The first barley delivered was delivered in sacks, but, on being required to deliver 30,000 pounds more, defendants tendered the quantity in wagons which the officer
at the post where It was tendered i·efused to
accept, and the contractor abandoned his contract. The United States asked a witness
shown to have been e]1ftnged In the grain
buslness in California as to his knowledge of
the usage of the trade In delivering barley.
An objection that it woe incompetent for
plaintiff to vary the terms of a contract by
evidence of a usage was overruled, and the
witness testified that It was the custom to
dellver grain In sacks, and had always been
the custom. There was no other evidence of
uaage, and the court found that it was the
usage, and always had been In California, to
deliver barley In sacks, unless expressly stlpulated otherwise, and that the tender in bulk
was not sufficient under the contract. Judgment for the United States, and defentlants
bring error.
E. L Goold, for plalntltrs in error. G. H.
Williams, Atty. Gen., and B. H. Bristow, Sol.
Gen., for the United States.

bring error.

E. L. Goold, for plaintiffs in error. G. H.

Williams, Atty. Gen., and B. H. Bristow, Sol.

Gen., for the United States.

Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the opinion of

the court.

In Barnard v. Kellogg, 10 Wall. 383, this

court decided that proof of a custom or usage

inconsistent with a contract, and which either

expressly or by necessary implication contra- .~

dicts it, cannot be received in evidence to af-

fect it; and that usage is not allowed to sub-

vert the settled rules of law. But we stated

at the same time that custom or usage was '

properly received to ascertain and explain

Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the opinion of
the court.
In Barnard v. Kellogg, 10 Wall. 383, this
court decided that proof of a custom or usage
inconsistent with a contract, and which either
expreBBly or by necessary Implication contradiets It, cannot be received ln evidence to affect It; and that usage Is not allowed to subvert the settled rules of law. But we stated
at the sam-e time that custom or usage was
properly received to ascertain and explain
the meaning and Intention of the parties to
a contract, whether written or parol, the
meaning of which could not be ascertained
without the aid of such extrinsic evidence,
nncl that sueh evidence was thus used on the

E\"lDE~CE.

[Case No. 14&

theory that the parties knew of the existence
of the custom or usage and contracted In
reference to lt. This latter rule ls as well
settled as the former (1 Smith, Lead. cas.
[7th Ed.) p. 386), and under It the evidence
was rightly received.
It Is obvious by the steps which the defendants took t.u perform their contract, that there
are two modes In which barley may be dellv·
' ered, tor they delivered part in sacks and
tende1·ed part in bulk. And It Is equally obvtous, on account or the additional cOBt, that
they would not ban delivered the barley in
sacks for a 1>ertod of six months, It the con, tract on its face was satisfied by a delivery
1 tn bulk. The contract, by its terms, ls silent
1 as to the mode of delivery, and although
I there are two modes in which this can be
done, yet they are essentially different, and
one or the other, and not both, must llave been
In the minds of the parties at the time the
agreement was entered into. In the absence
of an express direction on the subject, ex·
trlnslc evidence must of uP.cessity be resorted
to in order to find out which mode was adopted by the parties, and what extrinsic evideuce ls better to ascertain this than that of
usage? If a person of a particular occupatlon in a certain place makes an agreement
by virtue of which something ls to be done
In that place, and this Is uniformly done In a
. certain way by pel'80ll8 of the same occupatlon in the same place, It ls but reasonable to ·
aseume that the parties contracting about It,
and specifying no manner of doing it ditfer! ent from the ordinary one, meant that the
ordinary one and no other should be followed_
Parties who contract on a subject-matter concernlng which known usages prevail, by Im·
plication incorporate them into their agreement11, if nothing is said to the contrary.
The evidence in the present case did not
tend to contradict the contract, but to deftne Its meaning, in an important point, where.
by its written terms, It was left undeftned_
I This, it Is settled, may be done.
It is objected that the usage was proved by
a single witness. But we cannot assert, as
I a rule of law governing proof of usages of
I trade, that if a witness have a full knowledge and a long experience on the subject
j about which he speaks, and testUles expllcltJy to the antiquity, duration, and universality
of the usage, and ls uncontradieted, the usage
' cannot be regarded by the jury as established_
On the contrary, the authorities are that in
such a case it may be. See 1 Smith, Lead.
Cas. (7th Ed.) 782; Vail v. Rice, 5 N. Y. 100;
Marston v. Bank of l\Ioblle, 10 Ala. 2!U; Part1 ridge v. Foniyth, 29 Ala. 200.
Judgment amrmed.

I
i

I
I

I

!
i

the meaning and intention of the parties to

a contract, whether written or parol, the

meaning of which could not be ascertained

without the aid of such extrinsic evidence,

and that such evidence was thus used on the

, a single witness.

theory that the parties knew of the existence

of the custom or usage and contracted in

reference to it. This latter rule is as well

settled as the former (1 Smith, Lead. Cas.

[Tth Ed.] p. 386), and under it the evidence

was rightly received.

It is obvious by the steps which the defend-

ants took to perform their contract, that there
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WHISKY CASES.

(99 U. S. 594.)

UNITED STATES v. FORD (two cases).

SAME v. ONE STILL. SAME v. FIFTY

BARRELS OF DISTILLED SPIRITS.

SAME v. THREE HUNDRED AND NINE-

TEEN BARRELS OF WHISKY. SAME

v. FOUR HUNDRED BARRELS OF DIS-

TILLED SPIRITS. SAME v. FOUR

PRODUCTIO~

AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

WHISKY CASES.
(99

u. s. 594.)

UNITED STATES v. FORD (two Cllllell).
SAME v. ONE STILL. SAl\IE v. FIFTY
BARRELS OF DISTILLED SPIRITS.
SAME v. THREE HU~'DRED AND NINETEEN BARRELS OF WHISKY. SAlIE
v. FOUR HUNDRED BARRELS OF DISTILLED SPIRITS.
SAME v. FOUR
HUNDRED PACKAGES OF DISTILLED
SPIRITS. SAME v. ONE HU.NDUED
AND FIFTY BA.URELS OF WHISKY.

HUNDRED PACKAGES OF DISTILLED

SPIRITS. SAME v. ONE HUNDRED

AND FIFTY BARRELS OF WHISKY.

Supreme Court of the United States. Oct.,

1878.

Error to the circuit court of the United

States for the Northern district of Illinois.

The ﬁrst two of these cases were actions

of debt to recover the penalties imposed by

sections 3296 and 3452 of the Revised Stat-
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utes. The remaining cases were by way of

information under sections 3281, 3299, 3453,

and 3456. The defence in the ﬁrst case, and

it is substantially the same in ail, consists

of the general issue and the following spe-

cial plea:

“And for a further plea in this behalf said

defendants say actio non, because they say

that heretofore, to wit, on the twenty-sev-

enth day of December, A. D. 1875, at Chi-

cago, at, to wit, said northern district of Il-

linois, the said plaintiffs and the said de-

fendants entered into an agreement by

which it was, among other things, agreed

that if the said defendants would testify on

‘behalf of the piaintiifs frankly and truth-

fully, when required, in reference to a con-

spiracy among certain government oiiicials

in the revenue service and other parties.

then known to exist, whereby the honest

manufacture of spirits and payment of the

tax had been rendered practically impossi-

ble, and should plead guilty to one count in

an imiietnient then pending against them in

the district court, in and for said northern

district, and should withdraw their pleas in

a certain condemnation case then pending

against them in said district court, the said

plaintiffs would recall any and all assess-

ments under the internal-revenue laws then

made against said defendants, and that no

more assessments under said law should be

made against said defendants, and that no

proceedings other than said condemnation

case should be prosecuted against said de-

fendants, and that no new proceedings

should be commenced against.said defend-

ants on account of transactions then past;

and these defendants aver that they and

each of them have fully performed said con-

tract on their part, and defendants further

aver that this suit is a proceeding other than

said condemnation case, and that this suit

is for the recovery upon transactions prior

to the entering into said agreement; and

this the said defendants are ready to verify.”

A demurrer to the special plea was over-

ruled, and judgment rendered for the de-

fendants, ahd the judgment of the district

Supreme Court of the United States. Oct.,
1878.
Error to the circuit court of the United
States for the Northern district of Illlnole.
The first two of these cases were actions
of debt to recover the penaltles Imposed by
sections 3296 and 3452 of the Revised Statutes. The remaining cases were by way of
information uniter sections 3281, 3299, 34:>3,
and 3456. The defence ln the first case, and
lt is substantially the same in all, consists
of the general l88ue and the following special plea:
"And for a further plea lo this behalf said
defendants say actio non. because they say
that heretofore, to wit, on the twenty-seventh day of December, A. D. 18ia, at Chicago, at, to wit, said northern district of 11llnoie, the said plaintiffs and the said defendants entered into an agreement by
which it was, among other things, agreed
that if the said defendants would testify on
behalf of the plaintiffs frankly and truthfully, when required, In refPrl•nce to a conspiracy among certain government ofticials
In the revenue service and other partle11,
then known to exist, whereby the honest
manufacture of spirits and payment of the
tax had been rendered practically Impossible, and should plead guilty to one rount In
an lo<lict'llleot then pending against them In
the district court, in and for said northern
distric>t, and should withdraw their pleas In
a certain condemnation case then pending
against them in said district court, the said
plalotltts would recall any and all asePsBmente under the Internal-revenue laws then
made against said defendants, and that no
more assessments under said law should be
made against said defendants, and that no
proceC'dings other than said condemnation
.case should be prosecuted against said defendants, and that no new proceedings
should be commenced against. said defendants on account of transactions then past;
and these defendants aver that they and
each of them have fully performed said contract on their part, and defendants further
avE>r that this suit ls a proceeding other than
said c·ondemnatlon case, and that this suit
le for the recovery upon transactions prior
to the entPrlng Into said agreement; and
thls the said defendants are ready to verity."
A demuner to the special plea was over432

ruled. and judgment rendered
fendants, ahd the judgment of
court atDrmed.
The Attorney General, for
States. Mr. Edward Juseen and
H. Reed, contra.

tor the dethe district
the United
Mr. Charles

Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.
Accomplices In guilt, not previously convicted of an Infamous crime, when separatt>ly tried are competent witnesses for or
against each other; and the universal usage
is that such a party, It called and examined
by the public prosecutor on the trial of his
associates In guilt, will not be prosecuted
for the same offence, provided It appears
that he acted in good faith and that he testified fully and fairly.
Where the case Is not within any statute,
the general rule ls tha.t If an accomplice,
when examined as a wltneSB by the public
prosecutor. discloses fully and fairly the
guilt of himself and his associates. be will
not be prosecuted for the o11ence disclosed;
but It Is ('<]Ually cl~ar that he cannot by law
plead such tact 1n bar of any Indictment
against him, nor avail himself of it uI>on his
trial, for It ls merely an equitable title to
the mercy of the executive, subject to the
conditions before stated, and can only come
before the court by way of application to
put off the trial In order to give the prisoner
time to apply to the executive for that nurpose. Rex v. Rudd, 1 Cowp. 331.
Sufficient appears to show that the following are the material proceedings In the several cases: 1. That the first two were actions of debt commenced In tne circuit court
to recover the double lnternal-revenm~ tax
Imposed, as fully set forth in the respective
declarations. 2. That the other six cases
are Informations filed In the district court to
forfeit the properties therein described for
acts done ln violation of the ioternal-revenue laws.
Service was made In the first two caaes.
and the defendants appeared and pleaded
the general Issue and the special plea set
forth in °the transcript. Issue was joined
upon the first plea, and the United States demun·ed to the special plea. HE>aring was
had, and the court overruled the demurrer
and gave judgment for the defendants.
Like defences ln the form of answers or
pleas were filed lo the other six cases commencro lo the district court, to whl<'h the
United States demurred; but the district
court overruled the demurrers, and finally
rendered jmlgmeot In each ease for the defendants. Prompt steps were taken by the
district attorney to remove the cases into the
circuit court, where the respective judgments rendered by the district court were
afll.rmed.
Sutnc>e It to say In this connection. without
euterlog into detail, that the United Stat.ea
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sued out a writ of error in each case and

removed the same into this court. Both

parties agree that the questions presented

for decision are the same in each case, in

which the court here fully concurs.

Two errors are assigned as causes for re-

versing the judginent, which present very

clearly the matters in controversy as uls-

cussed at the bar. 1. That the plea or an-

swer set up as defence is bad because it is

too general and does not set forth the sup-

posed agreement in traversable form. When

ﬁled, the ﬁrst assignment of error also ob-

jected to the plea or answer that it did not

designate the oiiicer who made the alleged

agreement, which was plainly a valid objec-

tion to it; but that was obviated at the ar-

gument, it being conceded by the lfnited

States that the plea or answer should be
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understood as alleging that the supposed

agreement was made by the district attor-

ney. 2. That the plea or answer is bad be-

cause the ofiicer representing the govern-

ment ln these prosecutions had no authority

to make the agreement pleaded, and that the

court cannot enforce it, as it is void.

As amended, it requires no argument to

show that the plea or answer cannot be un- '

derstood as alleging that the president was

a party to any such agreement, as the dis-

tinct allegation is that it was made by the

district attorney; nor could any such impli- =

cation have arisen even if the pleading had

suits of the kind to recover municipal for-

feitures must be prosecuted in the subordi-

nate courts by the district attorney, and in

this court, when brought here by appeal or

writ of error, by the attorney general. Con-

fiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454. Suppose the

plea to be amended as stipulated at the ar-

gument, the ﬁrst question is. whether as

amended it sets up a good defence to the

several actions. Taken in that view, it al-

leges in substance and effect that the dis-

trict attorney promised the defendants that

if they would testify in behalf of the Unit-

ed States frankly and truthfully when re-

certain government otiicials in the internal-

revenue service, and other parties then

known to exist. whereby the honest manu-

facture of distilled spirits and the collection

of the tax thereon had been rendered prac-

tically impossible, and would plead guilty

to one count in an indictment then pending

against them in said district court, and

would withdraw their pleas in certain con-

demnation cases then pending against their

property in said district court, for the pur-

pose only of insuring their good faith in so

testifying on behalf of the United States,

then the United States would recall an_v and

all assessments under the internal-revenue

law made against them, and that no more

assessments under said law should be made

against them, that no more proceedings

wn.ous,n'.v.—28

. same offence;

quired, in reference to a conspiracy among 1

sued out a writ of error in each case and
removed the same into this court. Both
parties agree that the questions presented
for dedslon are the same In each case, in
whl<•h the court here fully concurs.
Two t'n-ors are assl;::nE'd as caulll's tor re'l"Nslng the judgment, which present very
dearly the matters In controvPrsy as ms·
<·ussed at the bar. 1. That the plea or answer set up as defence ls bad because It Is
too gPnernl and doe8 not set forth th<• 1-mpposed agreemE>nt In tl'a'l"ersable form. "'hen
filed, the first assignment or error also objected to the plea or answer that It did not
de11ignate the officer who made the alleged
agr<><•ment, whl<'l1 was plainly a valid objection to It; but that was obviated at the argument, It being conceded by the Cnlted
!'tates that the plea or answer should be
understood as alleging that tht> supposed
ugr1>ement was made by the district attorney. 2. That the plea or answer is bad becam~e the ofHcer representing the government In these prosecutions hrul no authority
to make the agreement plPadi>tl, and thnt tlw
court cannot enforce It, as It Is void.
As amended, It requires no ar~"l.twent to
show that the plea or answer cannot be undt-rstood as alleging that the president wae
a party to any such agreement, as tht> distlnct allegation le that It Wll8 made by the
district nttomey; nor could uny such Implication ha¥e nrlsPn e¥en It the plm<llng had
not been amended, as It ls settled law that
suits or the kind to recover municipal forfeitures must be prosecutPd In the subordinate courts by the db1trlct nttornPy, and ln
thie court, when b1·ought here hy n1111t'ul or
writ or e1TOr, by the attorney genPral. Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. ·t:'i4. Huppose the
plea to be amendt->d as stipulated at thP argument, the first qttE>Rtlon ls. whether as
amended It setR up a good defence to the
seyeral actions. Taken In that view, It alleges In substance and elfPct that the district attorney promised the dPfendantR thut
It they would testify In lwhnlf of the {;nlted States !rankly and truthfully when required, In reference to a conspiracy among
certain government ottlclals In the Internalrevenue service, and othPr pnrtl(•" then
known to Pxlst. wherPhy the houPst mnnu!acture or dlstllled spirits and the collection
of the tax therPon had hPPn rend('rrd practically Impossible, and would (>lead guilty
to one COUnt in an lndlCtlllt>llt thPn lll'Wlillj.t
against thl'lll In said district court, and
would withdraw their plt>us In <'f•1·taln condemnation cases then J>l>ndlng n1ml111it their
property in sai<l dll"trid eourt, for thP purpose only of Insuring their good faith In so
testifying on behalf or the United ~tntf'S,
then the United State11 would recall uny and
all assessments under the Internal-revenue
law made against them, and that no more
asseMmPntfl under said law should be made
against them, that no more proceedings
WILGUS,EV.-28
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against thf'm should be comml'ncecl on account of violations of the lnternul-reYenue
laws then passed, and that no penalties or
forfeitures should In any manner be enforced or reco"l""ered against them or their propPrty, that all suits tor penalties and for !or!Pltures then pending against them and their
property should be dismissed, and that run
and complete Indemnity should be gi·nnh•d
to them as the said claimunts.
Complete performance on their part Is alleged by the claimants, uml they allege that
the pending suits are tor the condemnation
and confiscation of their property, which
was seized by the United States on the
ground of the alleged violation or the Internal-revenue law, prior to entering Into the
said agreement. Assessments made against
the claimants or thl•lr propPrty are to be recalled, and they and tbelr 111·operty are to
be tree or lntemal-revenui> tnxatlon. Proceedings pending against them tor violations
of the Internal-revenue laws are to be dlemlseed and no more are to be Instituted, and
the claimants are promised full and eomplete Indemnity, civil and crlmlnul, It they
will comwnt to testify.
Conslde1·tug the ecope and comprehensive
character of the supposed agreement, It is
i not strange tbnt the district attornPy deemed it proper to demur to the plea. HP took
two objections to It; but the court will examine the se<'Ond one first, as If that ls su11tnlned, the other will become Immaterial.
Waiving for the present the question
whether the district attorney mny contract
with an accomplice or an nec•used }Wrson
on trial, that It he will testify in the case
his taxes shall be abut<>d, or thut he and his
property shall be exempt from internal-1-evenue taxation, the court will 1.'0nslder In the
first place wht>tht>r the district attorney. as
a public prosecutor. may properly t>nter into an agrP<•ment with such an ac<'ompllce,
that tr he wlll testify fully and fairly In
SU('h a prosecution 11galm1t his RRsoC'lnte In
guilt he shall not be proRec:·utPd tor the
same otre1w-e; and If so, whether such an
agreement, if the witness pN·forms on his
part, will avnll the witness ae a defpnce to
the criminal clmrl!"e In case or a subsPquent
pros<>entlon.
Consldt>red In Its full scope, the agreement
Is that In eons!dpratlon of thE> dcfPndants
testifying against their co-conspll'lltors who
were Indicted tor defrauding the revemw,
1 they, the defendants, should have a run
and complete discharge, not only from nil
criminal liability, but from all penalties and
' forfeitures they had lncurr<>d, and from llahlllty fm· their lnternal-revt-nut> tnxPs which
thpy had !nmdult>ntly refnsl'd to pay, giving
tlwrn full and complete indPmnlty, civil und
1 criminal, tor all their frauduli>nt and illt>gal
acts In respect to the public r e\·emtl'.
Courts or justice everywhere agree that the
established usage ls that an accomplice duly

I
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admitted as a witness in a criminal prose-

cution against his associates in guilt, if he

testifies fully and fairly, will not be prose-

cuted for the same offence, and some of the

decided cases and standard text-writers give

very satisfactory explanations‘ of the origin

and scope of the usage in its ordinary ap-

plication in actual practice. Beyond doubt,

some of the elements of the usage had their

origin in the ancient and obsolete practice

called “approvement," which may be brieﬂy

explained as follows: \\'hen a person in-

dicted of treason or felony was arraigned, he

might confess the charge before plea plead-

ed, and appeal, or accuse another as his

accomplice of the same crime, in order to ob-

tain his pardon. Such approvement was on-

ly allowed in capital oﬂences, and \vas equiv-

alent to indictment, as the appellee was
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equally re'quired to answer to the charge;

and if proved guilty, the judgment of the

law was against him, and the approver, so

called, was entitled to his pardon ex debito

justitiae. On the other hand, if the appellee

was acquitted, the judgment was that the

approver should be condemned. 4 Bl. Comm.

331 .

Speaking upon that subject, Lord Mans-

ﬁeld said, more than a century ago, that

there were three ways in the law and prac-

tice of that country, in which an accomplice

could be entitled to a pardon: First, in the

case of approvement, which, as he stated,

then still remained a part of the common

law, though he admitted it had grown into

disuse by long discontinuance. Secondly, by

discovering two or more oifenders, as re-

quired in the two acts of parliament to which

he referred. Thirdly, persons embraced in

some royal proclamation, as authorized by

an act of parliament, to which he added,

that in all these cases the court will bail the

prisoner in order to give him an opportunity

to apply for a pardon.

Approvers, as well as those who disclosed

two or more accomplices in guilt and those

who came within the promise of a royal proc-

lamation, were entitled to a pardon: and

the same high authority states that besides

those ancient statutory regulations there was

another practice in respect to accomplices

who were admitted as witnesses in criminal

prosecutions against their associates, which

he explains as follows: Where the accom-

plice has made a full and fair confession of

the whole truth and is admitted as a wit-

ness for the crown, the practice is, if he act

fairly and openly and discover the whole

truth, though he is not entitled of right to

a pardon, yet the usage, the lenity, and the

practice of the court is to stop the pl'useCl1—

tion against the accomplice, the understand-

ing being that he has an equitable title to a

recommendation for the king‘s mcrc_\'.

Subsequent remarks of the court in that

opinion showed that the ancient statutes re-

ferred to were wholly inapplicable to the

case, and that there remained even at that
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admitted as a wltnesa In a criminal prosecution against bis aBBOClates In guilt, 1f he
testltit>s fully and fairly, will not be prosecuted for the same otfenl'e, and some of the
decided cases and standard text-writers give
very satisfactory explanations· of the origin
and scope of the u11&ge in it11 ordinary appllcatiou In actual practice. Beyond doubt,
some of the elements of the u11&ge had their
01igln in the ancient and obsolete practice
called "approvement,'' which may be briefly
explained as follows: ""hen a p<'rson Indicted of treason or felony was arraigned, he
might confess the charge before plea pleaded, and appeal, or accuse another as his
accomplice of the same crime, ln order to obtain his pardon. Such approvement was only allowed in capital otrences, and was equivalent to Indictment, as the avpeDee wBB
equally required to answer to the charge;
and If pro"'ed guilty, the judgment of the
law was against blm, and the approver, so
called, was entitled to hls pardon ex deblto
justitlre. On the other hand, lf the appellee
wa11 acquitted, the judgment was that the
1111111·0\·er should be condemtu~d. 4 Bl. Comm.
3~;:).

Speaking upon that subject, J.ord Mansfield Sllld, more than a <'entury ago, that
titer~ were three ways In the law and practice of that country, In which an accomplice
could be entitled to a pardon: First, In the
Cflse of approvement, which, as he stated,
then still i·emalned a part of the common
law, though he admitted It had gt"Own Into
disuse by long discontlnuanc('. Secondly, by
dlsco\·eriug two or more otTenders, as required In the two acts of parliament to which
he referred. Thirdly, persons embraced In
some royal llt"OClamatlon, as authorized by
an act of parliament, to which be added,
that In all these cases the court will ball the
prisoner In order to glve him an opportunity
to apply for a pardon.
Approvers, as well as those who disclosed
two or more accomplkes In guilt and those
who cnme within the promise of a royal pro<'lamatlon, were entitled to a pardon: and
the same high authority states that besides
those ancient statutory regulations tht'l"e was
anothPr practice ln respect to a<"compllces
who were admitted as witnesses In criminal
prose<>utlons against their associates, which
he explains as follows: WhPre the accompllce has made a full and fair confeBSlon of
the whole truth and Is admltt<'d as a wltneRS for thP crown, the practice ls, If be act
fnlrly and openly and dl11roTer thP whole
truth, thoUlith be ls not entltlecl of rlgl1t to
a pardon, yet the U88ge, the lenlty, and the
practice of the court Is to stop th<' 11ro>1rcutlon against the a<'cmnpllce, the und1•rHt111.dlng J"'lnl? that he has an equltnhle tltil• to a
l"t'<'ommendntlou for the king's mer<"~'.
8ubHequrut remarks of the court In that
opinion tthowE>d that the ancient statuh•11 referred to were wholly lnappll1•able to the

case, and that there remained even at that
date only the equitable practice which gives
a title to recommendation to the mercy of
the crown. Explanations tl1en follow which
pl'ove that the practice referred to was adopted In substitution for the ancient doctrine
of approvement, modified and modelled so as
to be rt'<·elvl'd with greater favor. As modified It gives, as the court 881d In that case,
a kind of hope to the accomplice that If hr
behaws fairly and discloses the whole truth,
he may, by a recommt>ndatlon to mercy, save
himself from 1mnlshment and sec.·ure a 1ml"don, whkh Hhows to a demonstration that
the prote<>tlon, lf any, to be gh-en to tlw
accompll<"e rests on the described usage and
bis own good behavior; for If he acta ln bad
faith, or falls to testify fully and fairly, he
may still be prosecuted as If he had never
been admlttPd as a witness. Rex v. Rudd,
1 Cow1>. a:n. 1 Leach, 115.
Great ln(•onvenl('nce arose from the practice of appro\"t>ment, In l'Onsequence of which
a mode of proceeding was adopted In analogy
to that law, by which an accomplice may be
entitled to a recommendation to mercy but
not to a pardon as of legal right, nor can he
plead It In bar or avail himself of lt on his
trial. 2 Hawk. P . C. p. 532, note 3; 3 RU88.
Crimes (Dth Am. Ed.) 596.
In th(' present practice, says Mr. Starkie,
where ae<.ompllces make a. full and fair confession of the whole truth, and are In con1 sequence admitted to give ('Vldence for the
' crown, If they afterwards give their testimony fairly and openly, although they are
not of l'lght entitled to a pardon, the usage,
lenlty, and practice of the court ls to stay
the pl'08ecutlon against them and they have
an equitable title to a recommendation to
the king's mercy. 2 Starkie, Ev. (4th Am.
Ed.) 15.
Particlpes crlmlnls In sucb a <.'ase, when
called and examined as wltneBBes for the
prosecution, 1111ys Roscoe, have an equitable
title to a recommendation for the royal mer1 cy; but they C'annot plead thl11 In bar to an
1 Indictment against them, nor can they avail
! themseh-eH of It as a defenl>t> on their trial,
; though It may be made the ground of a mo! tlon for putting olf the trial in order to glve
the prisoner time to present an application
for the exe<·utlve clemency. Ros(•oe, Cr. Ev.
(9th Am. Ed.) 597.
Authorftl('B of the highest character almost without number su11port that pl'<'p<n'li-'
tlon, nor ls lt neceBRary to look beyond the
decl11lons of this court to Htabllsh the correctness of the rule. Ex parte Wells, 18
How. 307.
~p<>«'lal ref1>ren<'e ls made In that <'ftNe to
the three an<-lt>nt modes of pra(•tfee which authorized ac1•ompllces, when admitted as wltnesse-s In criminal prosecution11, to claim a
pardon as a matter of right; and the court
hUYlng <'XPlllined the COUMff> of such proceedings. remarked that, exct'pt In those cases.

I
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accomplices, though admitted to testify for

the prosecution, have no absolute claim or

legal right to executive clemency.

Much consideration appears to have been

mven to the question in that case, and the

court held that the only claim the accom-

plice has in such a case is an equitable one '

for pardon, and that only upon the condi-

tion that he makes a full and fair disclosure

of the guilt of himself and that of his as-

sociutcs. that he cannot plead it in bar of

an indictment against him forthe offence, nor

use it in any way except to Support a mo-

tion to put oﬂ the trial in order to give him

time to apply for a pardon.

Three-quarters of a century before that,

ten of the twelve judges of England decided

in the same way, holding that the accom-

plice in such a case cannot set up such a
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claim in bar to an indictment against him,

nor avail himself of it upon his trial, that

such aclaim formercy depends upon the con-

ditions before described, and that it can only

come before the court by way of application

to put off the trial in order to give the party

time to apply for a pardon. Rex v. Rudd,

1 Leach, 125; 1 Chit. Cr. Law (Ed. 1847) 82;

Mass. Cr. Law, 175.

Attempt was made sixty years later in the

same court to convince the judges then pre-

siding that some of the remarks of the chief

justice in Rex v. Rudd, before cited, justi-

fied the conclusion that the accomplice in

such a case was by law entitled to be ex-

empted from punishment; but Lord Den-

man replied that the organ of the court on

that occasion was not speaking of legal

rights in the strict sense, nor of such rights

as would constitute a defence to an in-

dictment or an answer to the question why

sentence should not be pronounced, saying,

in substance and effect, that the right men-

tioned was only an equitable right, and that

the court would postpone the trial or any ac-

tion in the case to the prejudice of the pris-

oner, in order to give him an opportunity to

apply to the crown for mercy. Rex v. (lar-

side, 2 Adol. & E. 2'75; Rex v. Lee, Russ.

& R. 361; Rex v. Hunton, Id. 454.

Other text writers of the highest repute,

besides those previously mentioned, atﬁrm

the rule that accomplices, though admitted

as witnesses for the prosecution, are not of

right entitled to a. pardon, that they have

only an equitable right to a recommendation

to the executive clemency; and they all hold

that prisoners under such circumstances can-

not plead such right in bar of an indictment

against them, nor avail themselves of it as a.

defence on their trial.

accomplices, though admitted to testify for
the prosecution, have no al111olute chllm or
legal ~ht to executive clemency.
Much consideration apvears to have been
given to the question In that case, and the
court held that the only claim the accompllce has In such a case ls an equitable one
for pardon, and that only upon the condltlon that he makes a full IUld fair disclosure
of the arullt or nimself and that of bis aesoclates, that he cannot plead lt In bar of
an lndlctmentagalnst hlm for the offence, nor
use It ln any way except to support a motlon to put off the trial In order to give blm
tlme to apply for a pardon.
Three-quarters of a century before that,
ten of the twelve judges of England decided
In the same way, holding that the accompllce In such a case cannot set up snch a
claim ID bar to an Indictment against him,
nor avail himself of It upon his trial, that
such aclalm for mercy depends upon the con·
dltlons before described, and that It can only
come before the court by way of application
to put off the trial ID order to give the party
time to apply for a pardon. Rex v. Rudd,
1 Leach, 125; 1 Chit. Cr. Law (Ed. 18-17) 82;
Mass. Cr. Law, 175.
Attempt was made slxty years later in the
same court to convince the judges then prealdlng that some of the remarks of the chief
Justice ID Rex v. Rudd, before cited, justl11.ed the conclusion that the accom1lllce In
such a case was by law entitled to be ex.empted from punishment; but Lord Denman replied that the organ of the court on
that occasion was not speaking of lPgal
rights In the strict sense, m_>r of such rights
as would constitute a defence to an In·
dlctment or an answer to the question why
sentence should not be pronounced, saying,
in substance and effect. that the rl&'ht mentloned was only an equitable right, and that
the court would postpone the trial or any actlon in the case to the prejudice of the prlsoner, in order to gtve him an opportunity to
apply to the crown for mercy. Rex v. Harside, 2 Adol & E. 275; Rex v. Lee, RuAS
A R. 361; Rex v. Hunton, Id. 454.
Other text writers of the highest repute,
besldes those previously mentioned, atllrm
the rule that accomplices, though admitted
.as witnesses for the prosecution, are not of
right entitled to a pardon, that they have
only an equitable right to a recommendation
to the execu.tlve clemency; and they all hold
that prisoners under such cfrcumstan<>cs cannot plead such right In bar of an Indictment
against them, nor avail themselves of It as a
defence on their trial.
None of those propositions can be successfully controverted; but It ls equally clear
that the party, If he testifies fully and fairly,
mny make it the ground of a motion to put
otr the trial In order that he may a[lply to
tlie executive for the protel"tlon whl<-h Immemorlal usage concedes that he Is entitled to
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I at

the hands of the executive. 3 Russ.
Crimes (9th Am. Ed.) 59i.
Certain ancient statutory regulations, as already remarked, gave unconditional promise
to accomplices of pardon and complete ex1 emption from punishment, and ln such cases
,. lt was always held that the accomplice, lf he
was called and examined for the prosecution,
was entitled as of right to a pardon, provlded he acted In good faith, and testlfted fully
1 and fairly to the whole truth. Instances of
I
I the kind are adverted to by Mr. Phllllpps In
his valuable treatise on Evidence; but he,
llke the preceding text writer, states that accompllces, when admitted as witnesses, un; der the more modern usage and practice of
/ the courts, have only an equitable title to be
, reeorumeQded to mercy, on a strict and ami pie performance, to the satisfaction of the
I presiding judge, of the conditions on which
: they were admitted to testify, that such an
: equitable title cannot be pleaded In bar nor
i In any manner be set up as a defence to an
i Indictment charging them with the same ofj fence, though it may be made the ground of
a motion for putting off their trial ln order
j to allow time for au application to the pardonlng power. 1 Phil. Ev. (Ed. 1868) 86.
Offenders of the kind are not admitted to tesI tlfy as of course, and sutll.clent authority exlats for saying that ID the practice of the
English court It ls usual that a motion to thP
court ls made for the purpose, and that the
court, In view of all the circumstances, will
admit or disallow the evidence as will best
I promote the ends of public justice. Id. 87;
I 3 Russ. Crimes (9th Am. Ed.) 598.
' Good reasoDB exist to suppose that the
I same course Is pursued ID the courts of some
of the states, where the English practice
seems to have been adopted without much
modlftcatlon. People v. Whipple, 9 Cow. 707.
Such offenders. everywhere are competent
I witnesses 1f tl1ey see tit voluntarily to apj pear and testify; but the course of proceed·
, Ing In the conrts of many of the states Is
I quite different from that just described, the
; rule being that the court will not advise the
· attorney general how be shall conduct a
criminal prosecution. ConfK'quently It ls regarded as the province of the public proseeutor and not of the court to determine
whether or not an accomplice, who Is willIng to crlmlnate himself and bis associates In
guilt, shall be called and examined for the
state.
Of all others, the prosecutor ls best qual·
Uled to determine that question, as he alone
ls supposed to know what other evidence can
be adduced to prove the criminal charge.
Applications of the kind are not always to
be granted, and In order to acquire the lnfonnatlon D<'<"f'ssary to determine the questlon, tlw pnhll<· pros<'<"lltor will grant the ac·
rom11lke an interview, with the un(}prstandIng that nny communications he may wake
to the pro11ecutor will be strictly conftdential.
1'

I

I

!
I

I

None of those propositions can be success-

fully controverted; but it is equally clear

that the party, if he tcstiiies fully and fairly,

may make it the ground of a motion to put

off the trial in order that he may apply to

the executive for the protection which imme-

morial usage concedes that he is entitled to

at the hands of the executive. 3 Russ.

4:1:>
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Interviews for the purpose mentioned are

for mutual explanation, and do not absolute-

ly commit either party; but if the accom-

plice is subsequently called and examined,

he is equally entitled to a recommendation

for executive clemency. Promise of pardon

is never given in such an interview, nor any

inducement held out beyond what the be-

fore-inentioned usage and practice of the

courts allow.

Prosecutors is such a case should explain

to the accomplice that he is not obliged to

crimlnate himself, and inform him just what

he may reasonably expect in case he acts

in good faith, and testifies fully and fairly as

to his own acts in the case, and those of his

associates. When he fulﬁls those conditions

he is equitably entitled to a pardon, and the

prosecutor, and the court if need be, when
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fully informed of the facts, will join in such

:1 recommendation.

.\lodiiications of the practice doubtless ex-

ist in jurisdictions where the power of par-

don does not exist prior to conviction; but

every embarrassment of that sort may be 1

removed by the prosecutor, as in the absence

of any legislative prohibition he may nol.

pros. the indictment if pending, or advise

the prisoner to plead guilty, he, the prisoner.

reserving the right to retract his plea and

plead over to the merits if his application

for pardon shall be unsuccesst’ul. 1 Bish.

Cr. Proc. (2d Ed.) 5 1076, and note.

Where the power of pardon exists before

conviction as well as after, no such- diiiicul-

ties can arise, as the prisoner, if an attempt

is made to put him to trial in spite of his

equitable right to pardon, may move that

the trial be postponed, and may support his

motion by his own aﬁidavit, when the court

may properly insist to be informed of all

the circumstances. Power under such cir-

cumstances is vested in the court in a proper

case to put off the trial as long as may be

necessary, in order that the case of the pris-

oner may be presented to the executive for

decision.

Centuries have elapsed since the judicial

usage referred to was substituted for the

ancient practice of approvement, and ex-

perience shows that throughout that whole

period it has proved, both here and in the

country where it had its origin, to be a

proper and satisfactoryt protection to the ac-

complice in all cases where he acts in good ‘

faith, and testifies fairly and fully to the

whole truth. Cases undoubtedly have arisen

where the accomplice, having refused to

comply with the conditions annexed to his

equitable right, has been subsequently tried

Interviews for the purpose mentioned are punishment; but lf they reCUlle to testily,
for mutual explanation, and do not absolute- or testify falsely, they are to be tried, and
ly commit either party; but lf the accom- may be convicted upon their own confession.
pllce is subsequently called and examined,
Nothlng of weight by the wny of judicial
he is equally entitled to a recommendation authority can be Invoked ln opposition to the
for executive clemency. Promise of pardon views here expressed, as la evident from the
111 never given in such an interview, nor any brief flied by the defendants, which exhibits
Inducement held out beyond what the be- proof of research and diligence. Decided
fore-mentioned usage and practice of the cases may be cited which contain unguarded
courts allow.
expl'esslons, of whkh the following al'e'
Prosecutors la such a case should explain striking examples: People v. Whipple, auto the accomplice that he ls not obllged to pra; U. S. v. Lee, 4 McLean, 103, Fed. Cas.
crlmlnate himself, and Inform him just what No. 15,!'iSR.
he may reasonably expect In case he acts
Neither of those cases, however, support
In good faith, and test111.es fully and fairly as the proposition for which they are cited.
to bis own act11 In the case, and those of his Enough appears ln the drat case to show
IUl80<'lates. When he fultlls those conditions thtlt it was objected on behalf of the accomhe ls equitably entitled to a pardoo, and the pllce that t™' usage gave him no certain asprosecutor, and the court lf need be, when surance of a pardon, inasmuch as the power
fully Informed of the facts, will join In such of pardon ·Was vested In the governor, and
a recommendation.
the authority of the court extended no turllodlftcatlons of the practice doubtless ex- ther than the recommendation for merry;
lat In jurladlctlons where the power of par- to which the court responded, that the legal
don does not exist prior to conviction; but presumption was tlrat the public faith will
every embarra88tnent of that sort may be be preserved lnvlolate, and that the equitable
removed by the prosecutor, as ln the absence claim of the party will be ratlded amt alof any legislative prohibition be may nol. lowed.
pros. the indictment lf pending, or advise
Publlc policy and the great ends of JWlthe prisoner to plead guilty, be, the prisoner, tlce. lt was said ln the second case, require
reserving the right to retract his plea and that the arrangement between the publle
plead over to the merits If hl11 application prosecutor and the accomplice should be carfor pardon shall be unsuN•essfnl. 1 Bish. rled out; and the court proceeded to remark.
Cr. Proc. (2d Ed.) t 1076, and note.
that It the di.strict attorney failed to enter
Where the power of pardon exists before a nolle prosequl to the lndktment, "the
conviction as well aa after, no such dlmcul- co011 will continue the cause until an appll·
ties can arise, as ~ prisoner, lf an attempt ! <'ation can be made for a pardon," which of
ls made to put him to trial In spite of bis ! Itself ls a complete recognition of the usa11:e
equitable right to pardon, may move that and practice establl.ahed In the place of the
the trial be postponed, and may support hie ancient proeeedlng of approvement. Yore
motion by hi.a own a.ftldavit, when the court evil than good ftowed from that regulation,
may properly Insist to be Informed of all and In consequen<'e the pra<'tlcP now acthe circumstances. Power under such cir· knowledged was substituted in lta place,
cumstances I.a vested In the court In a proper under which the accomplice acquires only
case to put otf the trial as long as may be an equitable rl~ht to the <'lemeuc·y of the ex·
nece88ftrY, ln order that the <'Ilse of the pris- ecutlve. whi<'h. as I.ord llansfteld said, rests
oner may be presented to the executive for on usa~e and the good behavior of the acdeclslon.
compll<'E!. who In a propt>r case will be ball·
Centuries have elapsed 1dnce the judl<.'lal ed by tht' court ln order that be may appl;r
usage referred to wa11 sub11tltuted for the for the pardon to wbklt he ls equitably enanclent practice of approvement, and ex· tltled.
pertence shows that throughout that whole
Should It be objected thnt the application
period it has proved, both here and In the may not be successful, the answer of the
<'Ountry where lt had Its origin, to be a <'OUrt must be In substance that given by
proper and satisfactory, protection to the ac- ' J..ord Denman on a similar ()('ceslon. that we
compll<'e In all cases where he acts ln good are not to presume that tlK' Pqultable title
faith, and testifies fairly and fully to the to mercy whh•b tht> humblest and most
whole truth. Cases undoubtedly have arisen <'rlmlnal accomplice may thus acquire b;r
where the accomplice, having refused to testifying to the truth In a federnl court will
<'Omply with the conditions annexed to bis not be sacredly ac<'orded to him by the pl't'14equlta ble right, hes been subsequently tried ldent, In whom the pardoning power la \'Mand convicted, It being first determined that eel by the federal constitution.
he has forfeited hls equitable title to promn1ng come to the conclusion that the
tectlon by bls bad faith and false representa- district attorney bad no authority to makP
tlona. C-0m. v. Knu1ip, 10 Pick. 477. Such the agreement alleged In the plea In bar,
offenders, If they make a full disclosure of It follows that tile c•lrcult court erred In tilt>
all matters wltlrln their knowledge In fal'or two cases Instituted there, In overruling the
of the prosecution, will not be subjected to dt'murrer to it, and that the judgment must

I
I!

I

and convicted, it being ﬁrst determined that

he has forfeited his equitable title to pro-

tection by his bad faith and false representa-

tions. Com. v. Knapp, 10 Pick. 477. Such

offenders, if they make a full disclosure of

all matters within their knowledge in favor

of the prosecution, will not be subjected to

punishment; but if they refuse to testify,

4:w
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be reversed, and the causes remanded for other cases, and that the judguiont in each

further proceedings in conformity with the ot’ those cases must be reversed, and the

opinion of the court. causes remanded with directions to reverse

Tested by these considerations, it is clear the judgment 01' the district court, and for

thut the circuit court also erred in aﬁirming further proceedings in conformity with the

the judgment of the district court in all the opinion of the court; and it is so ordered.
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be revel'lled, and the causes remanded for
further pl'O(.'t't'(llngs ln conformity with the

opinion of the court.
'rested by these considerations, It Is clear
that the circuit court also erred In a11lrmlng
the judgment of the district court In all the

(Case No. 147

other cases, and that the judgment In each
of· those cases must be reversed, and the
t>auses remanded with directions to reverse
the judgment of the district court, and for
further pr0<•t-edlngs ln conformity with the
opinion of the court; and It Is so ordered.
437
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(24 N. E. 861, 184 111. 189.)
HRONECK v. PEOPLE.

(24 N. E. 861, 134 Ill. 139.)

Supreme Court of Illinois. June 12, 1890.

Error to criminal court, Cook county.

J ulius Goldzler, for plaintiff in error.

Supl't'mt> Court of Illinol1.

June 12, 1890.

Error to criminal court, Cook county.

Jull11s Gold•ler, for plalntlH tn t>rror.
Geo. Hunt, Atty. Gen .. for the People.

Geo. Hunt, Atty. Gen., for the People.

BAKER, J. The plaintiff in error, John

Hroneck, was indicted with Frank Chapek,

Frank Chleboun, and Rudolph Sevic for

violation of an act of the legislature of

this state entitled “ An act to regulate the

manufacture, transportation, use, and

sale of explosives, and to punish an im-

proper use of the same,” approved June

16, 18%, and in force July 1. 1887. Rev. St.

1889. c. 38, §§ 54h-54n. The ﬁrst count

charged the defendants with unlawfully

making dynamite, with the unlawful in-

tention of destroying the lives of certain
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persons therein named ; and in the five re-

maining counts the defendants were

charged successively in such several

counts with manufacturing,compoumiing, '

buying, selling, and procuring dynamite.

with the same unlawful purpose and in-

tent. The defendant Hroneck was alone

put upon trial, and that trial resulted in

a verdict of guilty, and fixing his punish-

ment at 12 years‘ imprisonmentin the peni-

tentiary. Motions for a new trial and in

arrest of judgment were severally over-

ruled, and the said defendant was sen-

tenced on the verdict. Numerous grounds

are urged for reversal,which we shall con- .

sider, substantially, in the order they are

made.

Itls insisted thatthe statute upon which

the prosecution is based is unconstitu- ,

tional in that it is obnoxious to section 13 *

of article 4 of the constitution of the state,

which provides “that no act hereafter

passed shall embrace more than one sub- .

ject, and that shall be expressed in the ti-

tle." The speciﬁc objection is made that

two distinct subjects are expressed in the i

title. That objection is without merit.

The act is entitled “An act to regulate the I

manufacture, transportation, use. and

sale of explosives, and to punish an im-

proper use of the same.” The regulation

of the use necessarily implies the right to

punish an improper use. To“regula.te"

means to adjust by rule or regulation;

and any attempt to ﬁx rules forthe man-

ufacture, transportation. use. and sale of

explosives that did not also prescribe pun-

ishment for violation of such rules and

regulations would necessarily be imperfect.

Two different subjects are not included or ,

expressed in or by the title; for the pun-

BAKER, J. The platntlft tu error, John
Hroneck, W88 tndktecl with Jo'rauk <.'hapek,
l<'rank Chleboon, and Rudolph lSevlc for
violation of an act of the leglslu.ture of
this stl\te entitled" An act to regulate the
manufttcture, transportation, use, and
sale of explo11lves, and to pllnlsh an Improper use of the same," approved June
16. lS.'\i, and In force July l, 1887. Rev. St.
1889, c. 38, H Mh-Mn. The first count
charged the defendants with unlawfully
making dynamite, with the unlawful Intention of destroylog the lives of certain
pel'Hons therein named; and lo the ftvc remaining counts the defendants were
charged succes1dvely in such sevE>ral
counts with manufacturing, componndlng,
buying, Relllng, and procuring clynnrulte,
with the same unlawful purpose anc.l lntent. The defendant Hroneck wa11 nlonei
put npon trial, and that trial resulted in
a verdict of guilty, and fixing his punishment at 12 years' Imprisonment in the penitentiary. Motions for a new trial and In
arrest of Judgment were severally overruled, and the said dPfendant was sentenced on the verdict. Numerous grounds
are urged lor 1-e\·ersal, which we shall consider, substantially, lo the order they are
made.
It Is Insisted that the eta tote upon which
the prosecution ls based Is unconHtltutlonal In that It ls ohnuxlons to 11ectlou 13
of article 4 olthe constitution of thE' Rtate,
which pro\·ldes "that no act herel:llter
padlled shall embrace more thnn one 11ubJect, and that shall be expressed In the title." The Rpeclflc objection tR made that
two distinct sub)L'Cts are expreHscd In the
tit.le. That objection ls without merit.
The act ls entitled "An act to ~ula.te thr
manufacture, transportation, use, and
sal_, of explmdves, and to punish an impro1>er use of tho same." The n>11:ulatlon
of the use neceHsarily Implies the right to
puni11h an Improper use. To "regulate"
means to adjust by rule or regulntlon:
aml an.v attelllpt to flx rules for the manufacture, tran1<portatlon, use, and sale of
explosives thutdld not also preticrlbe punlt1hme11t for violation of such ruleR and
regulations would nece11sarlly be Imperfect.
Two different subjects are not included or
ex11resscd In or by the title: for the punishment of an Improper use flows nec.·e1~sa
ril)' and lep;ltlmntely from the main or
substantive object as eta ted In the title,
I. e., to regulntP. the use, etc., of exploRlveH. It 111 not necessary that the title
shall ex11ree11 all of the minor divisions of
the gener!ll subj('('t to which the act reh1.tPH; and tt Is 1:1ufficient If It express the
general suhjPCt of the act, and all the minor Huhdh·lelonH germane to the general
RuhJect wtll be held to be tncludrd In tt.
Bnt, If the title exprrHHt>H Ruch minor subdlvhiloos, which without such E'Xl>reRHionR

ishment of an improper use ﬂows necessa-

rily and legitimately from the main or

substantive object as stated in the title,

i. e., to regulate. the use, etc., of explo-

sives. It is not necessary that the title

shall express all of the minor divisions of

the general subject to which the act re-

lates; and it is sufficient if it express the

4:18

would be held to be locludrd within tbe
general subject, such expression will not
rt-nder the title obnoxious to the constitutional provlRlon. Plummer v. People, 74
Ill. 361: Fullerv. PE>ople.92 llJ. 1R2; Magner
v. People, 97 Ill. 320; Cole v. Hall, 103 llL
30; Prescott v. City of Chicago, 60 Ill. 121;
Potwin v. Johnson, 108 111. n; Timm v.
Harrison, 100 Ill. 593; Hawtliorn v. People, Id. 802; People v. Wright, 70 Ill. 389;
City of Virden v. Allan, 107 Ill. 605.
The contention that the statute ttst>tr
treats of two separate and well-defined
subjects ts not tenable. It is said that the
first three sections of the act relate to
the "manufacture aml use of explosives
for Illegal purposCR," while the four remaining sections relate to "the manufacture, sale, and trunMportatlon of explosives for 1.-gitlmate purposes." It ts thereforeclatmed that the former sectlonsshould
properly be found in the Criminal <.'ode,
l\Dd that they are not ge-rmc..ne to the other sectlous of the al't, which are mere police regulations. The general subject of
the statutetsthemanufacture, transportation, use, and sale of explosives; and tt
cannot be said that because one section
provldl'tl for a llcense or permit to be ohtatnl'd for their manufacture, and another
prohibits the storing of explo11lves within
a certain distance of Inhabited dwellings,
and another punishes fraudulent acts to
procure the transportation or explosives
In public conveyances. tilat Rtlll another
section. or other sections, making It unlawful to manufacture or procure such e~
plostves with the intent to use the same
for unlawful destruction of life or property, and afHxln.r a penalty therefor, would
not be within the same general suhjel't of
IE>gl11laUon. It can no mt>I'(> be said that
the prohibition, under a penalty, against
storing explosives In dunJterous proximity
to a dwelllog, ill a. police regulation, than
that a like prohibition agalnHt nm.nuracturtn.r or procurln~ the same for an uola wful
uHe or purpose ts a police regulation. All
of the provisions or the act are within the
snbject.expreMsed tn the title, and are germane to each other, and to the general
scope and purpose of the 8('t.
It ts next claimed that the section of the
statute under which this Indictment was
prm1ecu ted Is not eufHclently defl nite to
authorize Imprisonment in the peottentta.ry. S<.>etlon 1 ofthe act provides that whoever t1ball be 11:uilty of the act.It therein denuunced "shall be deemed guilty of felony,
and upon com·lction thereof shall be punished by lmprlflonment for a term of not ll'Bll
than ft,·e yettl'H, nor more than twenty-five
years." It is urged tlmtM It Is not stated
the imprisonment shnll be in the penitentiary, and the statute Is highly pPoal,
and req ulrcs strict <·onstructlon, u sentence thereunrler to thE' penitentiary cannot be sustuined. We art• not prepared to
adopt this view. The offE>nse ts Ly the act
declared to be a felony. A felony ts by the
Criminal Code of the stttte declared to be
an offense punishable by death or confinement In the penitentiary. Rev. St. 1889. c.
3R. § 2i7. While the legislature undoubtedly may prol"ide for the pnntshmE'nt or
mlHdemc:llnors by Imprisonment tn tht>
penitentiary, and Dndoubtedly might, if

OATH.
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they saw proper, punish felonies other-

wise than byimprisonment in the peniten-

tiary, yet there is nothing in these sec-

tions of the act which indicates an inten-

tion to do the latter. Applying the well-

known rule that acriminal statuteis to be

strictly construed. and that nothing is to

be taken by intendment or implication

against the accused beyond -the literal and

obvious meaning of the statute, it is nev-

ertheless clear, we think, when this stat-

ute is considered in connection with the

general Criminal Code, which it must be

presumed the legislature had in contem-

plation when passing it, the punishment to

be inﬂicted for violation of said sections

of the act is by imprisonment in the peni-

tentiary. '

It is insisted that the verdict is void for
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uncertainty, in that it simply ﬁnds “the

defendant” guilty, without specifying the

plaintiff in error by name. Before plain-

tiff in error was put upon trial a separate

trial had been awarded to the defendants

Chapek and Sevic. The defendant Chie-

boun was not put upon trial. but was

used as a witness on behalf of the people.

The record shows that on the 26th day of

November, 1888, at the term of the crim-

inal court then being held, the following

proceedings were had and entered of rec-

ord. to-wit: “The People of the State of

Illinois v. John Hroneck, impleaded, " etc.

“This day come the said people by Joel M.

Longnec-ker,state‘s attorney, and the said

defendant, as well in his own proper per-

son as by his counsel, also comes. And

now, issue being joined, it is ordered that

a jury come,” etc. Then follows the im-

paneling of a jury. It is manifest from the

foregoing‘ that no one was put upon trial

other than the defendant Hroneck, and

the verdict finding “the defendant" guilty

could not refer to any other defendant.

There was no uncertainty in the verdict.

Complaint is made of the second instruc-

tion given on behalf of the people. That

instruction told the jury that any person

abetting or assisting in the perpetration

of the offense mentioned in section 1 of the

act was upon conviction to be punished

as provided in said ﬁrst section. This

was not error. The statute provides that

any person abetting or in any way assist-

ing in making. manufacturing, buying,

procuring, etc., such explosives, etc., know-

ing or having reason to believe that the

samearcintended to be used by any person

or persons in any way for the unlawful in-

jury to or destruction of life or property,

shall he deemed a principal, and upon con-

viction shall besubject to thesume punish-

ment as provided in section 1 of the act.

Under this statute a defendant, if guilty as

an accessory before the fact, is to be indicted

and punished as a principal. In view of

the evidence tending to show the connec-

tion of plaintiff in error with the other de-

they saw proper, punish felunlei! otherwll1e than by Imprisonment In the penitentiary, yet there le nothing In these sections of the act which lndi<"atee an Intention to do the latter. Applying the wellknown rule that acrlmlnal statute le to be
strictly com1trued, and that nothing is to
be tak..n by lntendment or Implication
11galm1t the accuee<l beyond .the literal and
ob\·loue meaning of the statute, It Is nevertheless clear, we think, when this statute Is coneldered In connection with the
general Criminal Code, which it must be
presumed the legislature bad in contemplation when pm111lng It, the punishment to
be Inflicted fol' violation of said sections
of the act le by Imprisonment In the penitentiary.
·
It is insisted that the verdict le void for
uneertulnty, In that It simply flnde "the
defendant" guilty. without sprclfylng the
plalntlH In error by name. Before plaintiff In error was put upon trial a separate
trial bad been awarded to the defendants
Chapek and Sevlc. The defl>ndant Chlebonn was not put upon trial, but w11e
used as a wltneBR on behalf of the people.
The record 11hows that on the :l6th day of
Nnvember, Ixx~. at the term of the criminal court then b1>l11g held, the following
pr1x·eedings were bad and enteretl of record. tu-wit: ••The People of the State of
Illlnob1 v. John Hroneck, hnpleaded," etc.
'"l'hlH day cume the said people by Joel .M.
Longnecker,state's attorney, and the said
defendant, as well In his own proper person as by bis counKel, ah-io comes. And
now. ls11ue being joined, It 11:1 ordered that
a Juri come," etc. 'l'hen follows the Impaneling of a Jury. It Is ma111fe11t from the
foregoing tha.t no one was put upon trial
other than the defendunt Hroneck, and
the verdict finding" the defendant .. guilty
could not refer to any other defendant.
There was no uncertainty In the vertllct.
Complaint le made of the second Instruction given on behalf of the people. That
l111o1t rnc tlon told the Jury that any person
abetting or a11sl11tlng In the per1Jetratlon
of the offense mentioned In sectloQ 1 of the
act was upon conv:ction to be punished
a11 provided In 11ald first Election. This
was not error. Thf' statute provides that
any person abetting or In any way atiHistlng In making. manufacturing, buying,
procuring, etc., such explosives, etc., knowing or having reason to believe thut the
samearelntended to be u;ied byanyper1w11
or persons In any way for the unlawful Injury to or tlestructlon of life or pru1•erty,
shull he dN>med 11. prlncip!ll , and u1ion conviction sh!lll he11uhject to thetmme punishment aH provided In section 1 of the net.
Under this statute a defendant, If guilt.v aK
1tn accee11ory before thefal't, ls tu be indicted
anu vunlsherl as a principal. In \"lew of
the evidence tE"11dlng to show the connection of plaintiff In error with the other def1>ndant11 In the perpetration of the offense,
the Instruction wns entirely proper.
It Is ol>jcctP1l thut the court erred In re
h11o1l11sc an im~truction thnt the evidence of
lJrlvate fletecti\"CS and Of the police ' l:lhouJd
be received with a lurg'e dl'~reeokaution."
'l' hls Instruction rloeH not contaiu a correct 11ropo1:1ltlon of law. All the circumstnnces connet·ted with a witn:•Hs, or that
0

might tend to anect blR credibility or bias
his Judgment. are competent to be Hhown
to a11d conHlrlt>red by the jury In detcl'lnlnlng the wei11;ht and credit to be given to
his testimony. In view of the fucts and
clrcumstanres thus shown, it Is for the
jury to determine Its weight as matter of
fact.
It Is urged that the court erred In modifying an inHtructlon asked l>y the defendant. The Instruction as askeci was aH follows: "The Jury are Instructed th·ut, to
constitute the crime charged against the
defendnnt 111 the Indictment, two things
are necessary, namely: First, the making, manufacturing, compounding, buying, sl·lling, or dlspoRing of the dynamite,
or some portion thereof, described in the
Indictment, on or 11ubsequent to the 111t
dny of July, A. D. 18::!7." To this the court
aclded the following: "Therefo1·e the Jury
n•uHt disregard any evidence as to the
making .,pr ~ompoundlng or prol'urlng
ot any aynamlte at Chapek's house or
elsewhere p11or to said date." The instruction then proceeds: "Seco11d," etc.
Hroneck's defense In part consisted In accounting for the dynamite found In his
poMsestilon by testifying that It wa11 left
in hlH house In the fall of 1~6 by one Karaflat; and it became Important for the Jury
to consider testimony tending to tihuw
thnt he waH In pus11e11i1lon of dynamite in
the Rprlng of 18S7 prior to the law under
wbkh he was prosecuted going Into enect,
on the l11t day of July of that year. It Is
Insisted that the effect of the modification
was to take from the con11lderatlon of the
jury this evlrlence offered by the defendant
of prior pos11e11!!lon of theexploslves. It Is
concN1Pd that 1mcb was not the purpose,
anrl It Is clear to us that such was not the
effect, of the modification. 'l'he Instruction related 1mlely to the elements necessary to conHtitute the crime charged. '!'he
Jury we1·e told that. to constitute the
crime, it was necessary that the making,
etc., of the dynamite must ba'\"e been on or
subsequent to the let day of July, 1887,
and that therefore the jury must disregard
the making or procuring, etc., prior to
that date. lt must he presumed that the
jury were men of t"f'asonable lnt('lligence,
and would understand that whatfollowt:d ·
the Introductory part of the Instruction
related to what was neces1mry to con11titute the crime, and not to the defem1e set
up, that the dynumlte was In the po11sesslon of tho defendant prior to the date
fixed by the in11tructlon. Moreover the
jury, by a lengthy series of hJstructions,
were fnlrlv lnHtructetl as to the law of the
case,-fully us favorably to the defendant
ns he could rightfully 11.sk. They were
told that they must consider all the f!lcts
und clrcunu1tunces proven, and <leternslne
therefrom wtaether the defendant procured,
etc., the explo&lves In question after the
law went into force, and that his posse11slon prior thereto would raise no presumption of guilt. It Is, we think, lmpo11r1lhle
thu t the jury could ba.\·e bet>n mhded to
the prejudice of the plaintiff In error by
the modification. It is not contended
that the in11tructlon, when t•unRlden•d as
rk•Hning whut would comctltute guilt of
the crime charged, and what the jury
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stitutional provision or legislative enact-

might properly consider In respect thereof,
Jrty ls that ach1 or Ucen tlouenese shall not
ls not a substauthtlly acP.urate statement be excused, and practl('esfnconelstent with
or the law. As the Jury were not mt11led the peace and 1J1tfet.v of the Rtate shall not
by the modification to the prejudice of the be justified." The section provides: "No
plalntln In error, be has no cause or com- pel'llon shall be denied any ch·ll or political
plalut.
right. prl\"llege, or capacity on account of
Objeetlon ts made to the competency of hie religious opinions: but the llbert¥ or
l•'rank Chleboun, a wlt11es11 for the rieople, eoneclence hereby secured shall not be conwt.o was permitted to testify over the ~trued to dispense with oaths or amrmaobJet·llon of th'"' defendant. He was ex- tlons, excuse acts or llcentlousneea, or jusamined u1W>n his ,·otr dire, and avowed tify practices lncon11l11tcnt with the peace
hle belief In the existence or Hod and "a or safety of the state. " No reltgtoos belief
h<'renfter:" that he belle\•ed, If be swore le re11ulred to qualify a citizen to take an
falsely. he woulcl he punished under the oath, and no cltb:e.n can be excused from
criminal lawR of the KtRte; that he had taklu" an oath or atHrmatlon because of
nevttr thought 11erl111111ly of whether God bis religious belief. The liberty of conwould puul11h him either in this world or srlence secured by the constitution Is not
the next, and had never considered the to be construed ae dl11penslng with oaths
question wlwtber he would be punished or aflh'matlonslncaHeH where the eame are
tor false Mweartna In any other way than re11ulred by law. No man, bl'Cause of bis
by that Inflicted by the law. He had . it rellgloue bPllef, le to bE:' excused from takROOms. no religious belief or con,l'.ictlon or ing the pre11crlbed oath of office before enbis accountuhlllty to the Suprewe Ht-Ing, tering upon the dlscbaf1te of the publle duP.ltber In thl11 world or tu any after life. ty; nor can hP be perml1 tl'd to tt>stlfy beThe test of the competency of a witness cauHe of such reltglousbellef or opinion exIn respect to religious belief, as grnero.lly cept upon taking the oath, or making the
held, Is, does the witness bellP\"e In God, affirmation, required b.v law. Now, as beand that he will punlRh him if he swenrs fore the adoption of this provision, oaths
falsely? It le stated by Rar>alje In hie are to be taken, and attlrmatlonit made,
Law of WitneHSee (section 11) that" the whenenr required by law; but the right
great weight of authority in this country to take such oath or make such afftrmanow le that It 111 immaterial whether the tlon, If such right be a civil right, priviwitness hellevee Goit 'a vengeance will over- lege, or capacity, cannot be tleniecl to any
ta.ke him hefore or after death." Thie citizen. It le said that one who holds prodoctrine was approved In Railroad Co. v. scribed religious oplnll•ns ls ln~um1>et.ent
Rockafellow, 17 Ill. Ml, where, after a con- thnt 111, has not the legal capaf'lty-to tes.iideratlon of the aut110rities, It wae held tify. The incapacity, If It exists. grows
that all pereoneare com1>etentto be sworn out of, and le based upon, hie failure to
a11 wltne11ee11 who belll•ve there le a God, hold cert1tln religious hellefB and opinions
and tho.t he wlll punish them. either In In accord with the prevaillnir rellglous
thts world 01· the next, If they 11wear false- opinions of the people; and the contention
ly. and that a want of such belief rendered le tho.t he should not, by reason or such
them incompetent to take an oath ae wit- fncapaclty, be permitted to testify, hownesses. This caH<>, set>mlngly, overruled e\"er great and important the lntP.rest at
the doctrine of thP earlier case of Noble v. stake to bhneelf, his family, his neighbor,
People, Breese. 54. Without pau11lng here or the 11tnte. It le clear from the authorito deter1nlne whether tbe court erretl In ties that the rule contended for does not
subjecting the wltneee to an exnminatlon 11pply when t11e witnese le testlfylnir In hta
touching bis religious belief, (Hap. Wit. own heh a.If; but If the life, liberty, reputa§ 12, and caeee cited,) It may be eaid that tion. or property of hie fnmlly or neighbor
the bettP.r practice, and that whkh now l>e involved. or hie testimony be necessary
prevails, forbids the exnmlnntlon of the to the r>rotectlon of society. he ls, under
witness In reMpect thereof on hhi volr such rule. to be flxcluded from the privilege
dire. If there wa11 error in this regard. It of teRtlfylug In courts of Justice because of
WM committed at the Instance of the desuch Incapacity. If it exlstll at all, the infendant. aud In bis interest; and he can- ca1>aclty 111 ct'l"ated by law, and It is therenot complain.
fore a civil tncupacity. The constitution
Returning to the questhn of the compe- provides that no person shall be denied any
teoc.v of the witness, the rule seems to bo civil or political right, privilege, or capacas above stated, unless changed by con· ity on account of hie rellgluue opinions.
stl tu tlonnl proYislon or legleb1 tive enact- In Bouvier's Law Dictionary, capacity la
men t. 'l'he tendency of moclern times by defined to be" ability. power, qualification,
thecourteand lull:'gislatlou letowardH lib- or eompt>tency of persona, natural or nrtleralizing the rule, and In many jurisdictions flclnl, for the performance of Ci\'il acts dt'Incompetency for the want of rell){lous pendlng on their state or condition ae debE>llef bas been aholh1hed. l::iee Rap. Wit. fined or fixed by law." It lfl aleo defined
§ t:i, and Whart. .i-;,-. § :J95. Has tbrrule anas follows: "Power; coml>f"tenr.y; qualinomwed by this court In Railroad Co. v. fication; ability, power, or qualification
Rocko.fpllow bt>en changed In this state'? to do certain acts. " 2 Amer. & Eng. f'yBy section 3 of article 2 of the constitu- clop. Law, 722. The obvious meaning of
tion of 1870, it would seem that a radical the provision In the constitution ls that
change wae efft•<'tl'd in rel!llf'Ct to the mat- whatever civil rights, privileges, or ca)laC·
ter under consideration. •.rbls section ltiee belong to or are enjoyed by cltlzen11
guaranties non-lnterferenl'e of the state generally, Hball not be taken from or denied
with the religious faith of Its citizens. In to any person on account of hl11 reJlgloas
ChaMe v. Cheney, 58 Ill. 009, It was 11ttld: opinions. As eaid by the supreme court
"'l'he only exception to uncontrnlkd lib- of Kentucky In construing a almlhtr pro-

ment. The tendency of modern times by
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might properly consider in respect thereof,

is not a. substantially accurate statement

oi the law. As the jury were not misled

by the modiﬁcation to the prejudice of the

plaintiff in error, he has no cause of com-

plaint.

Objection is made to the competency of

Frank Chleboun. a witness for the people,

who was permitted to testify over the

objection of the defendant. He was ex-

amined upon his voir (lire, and avowed

his belief in the existence of God and "a

hereufterz" that he believed, if he swore

falsely, he would be punlslied under the

criminal laws of the state; that he had

never thought seriously of whether God

would punish him either in this world or

the next, and had never considered the

question whether he would be punished
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for false swearing in any other way than

by that inﬂicted by the law. He had. it

seem s. no religious belief or conyiction of

his accountability to the Supreme Being,

either in this world or in any after life.

The test of the competency of a witness

in respect to religious belief. as generally

held, is, does the witness believe in (lod,

and that he will punish him if he swears

falsely? It is stated by Rupaije in his

Law of Witnesses (section ll) that “the

great weight oi authority in this country

now is that it is immaterial whether the

witness believes God ‘s vengeance will over-

take him before or after death.” This

doctrine was approved in Railroad Co. v.

Rockafcllow. 17 ill. 541, where, after a coii-

sideratiun of the autiiorities, it was lieid

that all persons are competentto besworn

as witnesses who believe there is a God,

and that he will punish them.either in

this world or the next, if they swear false-

ly. and that a want of such belief rendered

them incompetent to take an oath as wit-

nesses. This case, seemingly, overruled

the doctrine of the earlier case of Noble v.

People. Breese. 54. Without pausing here

to determine whether the court erred in

subjecting the witness to an examination

touching his religious belief. (Rap. Wit.

§ 12, and cases cited,) it may be said that

the better practice, and that which now

prevails, forbids the examination of the

witness in respect thereof on his voir

dire. Ii there was error in this regard. it

was committed at the instance of the de-

fendant. and in his interest; and he can-

not complain.

Returning to the questiun of the coiiipe-

tency of the witness. the rule seems to be

as above stated, unless changed by con-

the courts and inicgisiation is towards lib-

eralizing the rule, and in manyjurisdictions

incompetency for the want of religious

belief has been abolished. See Rap. Wit.

§ 13, and Whart. Ev. §395. Has therule an-

nounced by this court in Railroad Co. v.

[Case No. 14'3
U.\'I‘l[.

[Case No. 14$

vision of the constitution of that state in

Bush v.C0m., 80 Ky. 2-i-4: “ It is a declara-

tion of an absolute equality, which is vio-

lated when one class of citizens is held to

have the civil capacity to testify in a court

of justice because they entertain a. certain

opinion in regard to religion, while anoth-

er class is denied to possess that capacity

because they do not conform to the pre-

scribed belief." it is manifest that, if the

legislature may prescribe the test of belief

in rewards and punishments, they may

impose any other test or qualification

that. in the judgment of those entertain-

ing the dominant belief, may be necessary

to afford the requisite sanction. In Perry's

('a.se, 3 Grat. 632, a like conclusion was

reached in construing a constitutional pro-

vision that “all men shall be free to pro-
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fess, and by argument maintain, their opin-

ions in matters oi religion; and the same

shall in no wise affect, diminish, or enlarge

their civil capacities. ” We are of the opin-

ion that the effect of this constitutional

provision is to abrogate the rule which

obtained in this state prior to the consti-

tution of 1870. and that there is no longer

any test or qualiﬁcation in respect to re-

ligious opinion or belief, or want of the

same. which affects the competency of cit-

izens to testify as witnesses in courts of

justice. It follows that there was no er-

ror in permitting the witness to testify.

The only remaining question which we

deem it necessary to consider is the claim

thatthe evidence is insufficient to warrant

a. conviction. It is insisted that there is

no proof of the corpus dellcti. The corpus

delictf of the offense charged in the indict-

mentis the making, procuring. etc.,ofd_vna.-

mite with intent to use the same for the un-

la wful destruction of the lives of the persons

named in the indictment. At the time of

the arrest of plaintiff in error, a large

quantity of dynamite, and a number of

bombs of different make and material,

were found in his possession. 1t was

proved that he said, as indicating his in-

tent. that he must kill Gary, Grinnell. and

Bonfield, and that he would throw the

bombs at them. in his statement made

to the oﬂieers after his arrest, which was

reduced to writing, and which he intro-

duced in evidence at the trial, it appears

that he went with Chleboun and (Jhapek

to Airline square for the. purpose of finding

Grlnncll’s residence, and that the intent of

his companions, as expressed at the time.

was to ﬁnd (irinne-ll‘s house. and that

they were talking of killing Boufield. It

appears, also, that he pointed out to said

persons Grinnell's house, or what he

thought to be his house. It is also shown

that, on different occasions, he threatened

to take the lives of the three persons

named in the indictment, and said that he

would throw the bombs at them in the

court-rooms, or on the street, or wherever

vision of the rom1tlt11tlon of that Rtate In
Bush v.Com .. 80 Ky. :?44: "lt Is a tlecluratlon of nn abHolutf' t~quallty, which 111 vloJated when one claMs or cltb:ens ls held to
have the civil capacity to testlfyln a court
<>f justice because they entertain a certain
<>pinion In regard to religion, while anoth~r claes Is denh•d to po1111{'MH thut capacity
hecause the)· do not conform to the ·pre~crlbed belief." It IR manHe11t that, It the
lcghdature may preRcrllie thl" te11t of bellt>f
In reward11 and punl11hmentH, they may
Impose any other test or qualltlcHtlon
that. In the jutlgu1ent of thoRe entertaining the dominant belief, lllll)' be nece11Rury
to afford the requisite sunctlon. In Ptlrry's
-<'ase, 3 Grat. "112, a like conelu11lon was
reached In construing a con11tltutlonal Pt"O\"l&lon that" all men tthall be free to profess, and by argument maintain, their opln10011 In matters of religion; and the Rn me
~hall In no wise affect, dlmlnlRh, or enlarge
their civil cape.citit>e." We a.re of the optnlon that the effect of thh1 constitutional
prod1don Is to abrogate the rule which
-0btalned in this state prior to the contttltutlon of 1870. and that there Is no longer
.an)' test or qualification In J"eHpect to religious opinion or belief, 01· wuot of the
same. which affects the com1>eteocy or citizens to teHtlfy as witnesses In courts of
justice. It follows that there was no er;ror lo permttting the witness to testify.
The only rem1dning queHtion which we
dt'f>m It nPCeHHe.ry to comdder Is the <'lnlm
that the evh.lt'nce IH lnsnfflclt>nt to wn rrant
a conviction. It i"' ioMh~tccl that there Is
no proof of the corpus de/let/. The corpus
<IElictl or the offenRe charge<} lo the Indictment Is the making, procurln11:. etc.,uf il)·ne.mlte with Intent to 1111ethesa.me for the unlawful detitruction of the lives of the r1et'Kons
nRmerl In the Indictment. At the time of
the arrest of plldntlH In error, a lnrge
-qtJantlty of dynamite, and a nmnht'r of
bombR of iltfferent make and material,
were found In his posst'sslon. It was
proved that he saltl, 88 lmllcatlng his Intent. that be must kill Gary, Grinnell. an<l
llonHehl, and that he would throw tlw
bombs at them. Jn hltt Htutl•ment made
to the offlcel'll after bis Rrrcst, which was
redut'ed to writing. and which he intro·ducecl In evidence at the trluJ, It appeo.rH
that he went with Chlehoun and Cha11ek
to Airline square for the purpoHe of tlmllng
-01innell's residence, and thut the Intent of
hie companions, as expreel!ed at the time.
was to find Grlnrll'll'H ho1111P. and that
tht\\' were talklnµ. ol kiliing EunHt>ld. It
a111wars, also, that he (JOlnted out to snld
pl•r1<011s Grlnnt'll's houHe, or what Ill'
thought to be his houHe. Ith~ ahm 11hown
that,"on different occaelons, he threatened
t:o take the lives of the three perHons
named In the Indictment, and s11ld that he
would throw the bomlJH ut them In the
-court-rooms, or on the strPet, or wherever
he mlp:ht meet them. Indeed, It b1 out
-quetttlonerl that there Is sufficient evidence
of the Intent of plnintlff In l·1-rorto destroy
1ie llveR of said pt'rHons h~· means or such
xploslves, If It wu11 hl'llen~tl by the Jur.r
to be true. It Is lnHIHtt!d, however, that
therf' can be no presumption that Hroneck
bad procured the dyne.mite with the 110Jawful intent Indicated from the fact that

~uch d~ namlte was fouutl In hlR po11ses11lon. Where a party 111 found In posses-.
Rion of exploHlveR, and bas the avowed Intention or using them for a. particular purpose, the pre8umptlon would arhie that he
pr·ocured the same for 11nch unlawful use.
It Is to be remarkf'd that there was nothing In the hmllnees or vocation of Hroneck
that woul<l call for or r<>qulre the use or
po8Hl'f!11lon of explosives. ~Joreover, It
was Rh own hy the witness Chleboun that
he was at Hroneck's house the last Sundtt,v
In .May, l~SS. when HronE!l'k showed him
some unttlled bombs, and Hroneck then
said that he would Ket dynamite with
which to load them. He at that time
s11oke of an opportunity he bad to kill
Bonfield, that he <.lid not du It because he
didn't have the necessary weapon, hut
that he rea:retterJ It \"er.v much. 'J.'hP wltneRR saw no dynamite that day. Ju ;Ju111>
following the witnl'HH again 1:111 w H roneck
at his requeRt,a.ntl Hroneck had a. number
of bombs which were charged. Some of
them had fUl!eB attarhed. and others had
fulminntlnJ; l'apH. Cun It be questlunf'd
that, tr no ex pin notion hatl bt>en oftpred by
Hroneck as to when and how he r•ame
Into the JJOHSt'llH~'>n of the rlynumlte, the
fact of Its heln11: In his 11uRMPRSlon In the
month of Junt> with the avowed Intent of
using It In the 1111rtil"ulur unlawful way
charged, coupled with his declaration In
May that he would procure dynamite for
the accomplishment of such onla wful purpose, would be sufficient to ma.lute.In a
con\"lctlon for unlawfully procuring the
ex1>lo11lvewith the Intent to use the Hnme'!
In other words, wou!IJ not the jury be Justlftt•d In tlndlng therefrom that the corp11s
delicti had been proved? The fact that he
procured the exoloRlve Is shown by hie
ha\·lng It In his posMeHslon. The unlawful
Intent is manlfesfoll by the charRcter of
the substance Itself, hie concealment or It.
and his contemporaneous declarations or
his Intent. A jury, frvm the necessity of
the c&Re, must hP allowr>d to draw conclusions from thl' facts proved; and Intent
can ordinarily he Hhown only hy Inferences
lira wn from the nets of the party, and
from his declarations. Hrom~ek le hel."t'
11hown to have het>n In the actual posElesslon of the dynumlte In June, 1888, and
subsequently, by unq11<>11tloned evidence;
and the fact or his Intention is shown b)'
hlR declaratlon11 and acts. If, from the
facts prove!], the t•o1wl11slon Is lrreelstlhle,
If the testlmon)' IH helirved, t lrn t the oftl•nse
wae t'ommlttl'd, then the corpus delicti ls
estn bllHhed.
Home q1wRtlon Is made In respect of the
evidence or the elate when the dynamite
was 11roc11re1I by Hrom~ck. He tt>Htlfil'd
that one Karallat left it at hlR house In
the fall of 1886, and had never called fur It.
Without entering Into a dlACussion of the
evldenee, It must be Raid that the1'l! was
much In h!R own testimony, a11 there wns
also lu the testimony of the witness Chleboun, that tended to db1cre!llt his evidence.
The queBtion waH fully und fairly suhmittctl
to the Jury as to wlwtherornot he procured
the dynamite with the unlawful Intent
rharged, after the 1st day of Jnly, 11'~7.
when the statute went Into eftt>et. 'l'hey
were told In numerous Instructions that
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unless they believed irom the evidence, be-

yond a.reusonahledoubt,that he procured

the same, with the speciﬁc intent charged,

on or subsequent to that date, they must

acquit.

Withoutextendingthisopinion—ulready

too long—by an analysis of the evidence,

it must suﬂice for us to say that we have

carefully considered the record, and the

iacts and circumstances proved, and are

unable to say that the jury were palpably

wrong in the conclusion reached by them.

It is not enon1_-;h that we, sitting as a. jury,

might have found diﬂerently. They saw

H2

the witnesses. had means of determining

their credibility which we do not possess:

and, helore we would be justilied in set-

ting aside their verdict for error in ﬁnding
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of fact. the error must be palpable.

Other minor objections are urged, which

We have carefully considered, and there is

no reversible error in them: and no good

purpose would be served, either to the de-

fendant or the profession, by their discus-

sion. We ﬁnd no error in this Pt :ord ior

which the judgment oi’ the court below

should be reversed, and it is accordingly

aﬁirmed.

PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

unless they believed from the e\·ldenc·e. beyond areasouahledoubt, that be procured
the eame, with the epedflc Intent charged,
on or subsequent to that date, they must
&CtlUlt.
Without extending thlH opinion-already
too Jong-by an analysis of the e\·idence,
It roust suffice for us to say that we ha,·e
carefully considered the record , and the
facts Bnd circumstances proved, end are
unable to say that the Jury were pel11ably
wrong In the conclusion reached by them .
It Is not enough that we, slttlnga-s a jury,
mlg?lt have round dltterently. They saw
'42

the wltnl:'R&eB, had meat.DB Of determining
their cl'f'dlblllty which we do not p088e88;
and, bt-fore we would be JustlHed In eetttng &Hide their verdict for error In finding
of fact, the error must be palpable.
Other minor obJectloue are urged, which
we have carefully considered, and there la
no reversible error In them ; and no ~ood
purpose woulct ht. served, either to the defendant or the profession, by their dlecuaelon. We find no error In this rt:ord for
which th11 Jullgment of the court below
should be reversed, and It le accordlngl7
amrmed.

DEPO.~JTIO~S.
DEPO.:'lTlONS.

' BLAKESLEE v. DYE.

(27 Pac. 881, 1 Colo. App. 118.)

Court of Appeals of Colorado. Oct. 12, 1891.

Error to Otero county court: C. W. Bom-

gardner, Judge. ,

James H. Dye sued Wilmot Blakeslee for

commissions for selling defendant’s prop-

erty. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant

brings error. Reversed.

James Hotfmire, for plaintiff in erorr.

F. Thompson, for defendant in error.

A.

BISSELL, J. Dye brought this action

against Blakeslee before a justice in Otero

county to recover $125, which he claimed as

a. commission upon the sale of certain prop-

erty belonging to Blakeslee. After a trial

before the justice an appeal was taken to

the county court, where the action was tried
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by a jury, which found a verdict of $50 in

favor of the plaintiff, on which the judgment

was entered whereon error is assigned.

During the progress of the litigation in the

county court, the plaintitl, Dye. sued out a

dedimus to take testimony of one Desent in

Fayette county, Iowa. Divers errors are in-

sisted upon and argued by counsel in their

briefs, but the only one important to con-

sider is that predicated upon the form of the

dedimus under which the testimony was

taken.

was apparently issued by the judge of the

county court acting as his own clerk. It is

without a seal or any other form of au-

thentication. A motion was made prior to

the trial to suppress the deposition because

of this irregularity. The error is well as-

signed. The statute requires (Code 1887, 5

349) that the deposition of a witness resid-

ing out of the state must be taken upon a

commission to be issued by the clerk under

the seal of the court. This statute is but

declaratory of the law as it existed prior to

this enactment. The seal of the court was

always a necessary and essential part of

every writ issued at the common law. In

no other manner did a court of record au-

thenticate its process. It is clear under the

‘ authorities that a dedimus is a writ, and

~ that it is a process requiring a seal.

Free-

man v. Lewis, 5 Ired. 91; Ford v. Williains,

' 24 N. Y. 359; Tracy v. Suydani, 30 Barb.

The writ appears in the record, and .

110; Churchill v. Carter, 15 Hun, 385; By-

ington v. Moore, 62 Iowa, 470, 17 N. W. (H4.

The statutory provision is in harmony with

the general law upon the subject. It must,

therefore, be true that the speciﬁc require-

ment of the statute upon the subject must

be observed in order to render the process

available as an authority to an oﬁicer to

take the testimony, and that without it the

writ would be a nullity, and a deposition

taken under it would be inadmissible as evi-

dence. The motion to suppress the deposi-

tion should have been sustained, a11d for the

error of the court in this particular the

I

without a seal or &Ill' other form of auBLAKESLEE v. DYB.
thentication. A. motion was made prior to
(27 Pac. 881, 1 Colo. A.pp. 118.)
the trial to suppresa the deposition because
Court of A[lpenls of Colorado. Oct. 12, 1R91. I of this Irregularity. The error ls well asError to Otero county court: C. W. Bom- ! Rlgned. The statute requires (Code 1887, I
gardm~r. Jud&'e.
; 349) that the deposition of a witness resid•
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I

James H. Dye sued Wilmot BlakP.Slee for ing out of the state must be taken upon a
commlsslons for selling defendant's prop- commission to be Issued by the clerk under
erty. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant . the eeal of the court. This statute ls but
brings error. Reversed..
declaratory of the law as it existed prior to
James Hofrmlre, for plaintiff lo erorr. A. this ensctruent. The seal of the court was
always a necessary and ess.-ntlal part of
F. Thompaon, for defendant lo error.
every writ Issued at the common law. In
BISSl<.:LL, J. Dye brought this action no other manner did a court of record auagainst Blakeslee before a justice lo Otero thentl<•ate Its process. It ls clear under the
county to recover $125, which he claimed as : authorities that .a dedlmus ls a writ. and
a commlsRlon upon the sale of certain prop- · that It ls a process requiring a seal. Freeerty belonging to Blakeslee. Aftt>r a trial man v. Lewis, 5 Ired. 91; Ford v. Williams,
before the justice an appeal wu taken to 24 N. Y. 3,;9; Tracy v. Suyclaw, 30 Bnrb.
the county court, where the action waR tried 110; Churchill v. Cnrter, 15 Hun, 385; Byby a jury, which found a verdict of $f">O In ' ington v. Moore, 62 Iowa, 470, 11 ~- W. 644.
favor of tht> plaintiff, on which the judgment Tht> statutory provision Is In harmony with
was enterecl whereon error ls assigned. the general law uvon the subject. It wust,
During the progress of the litigation In the therefore, be true that the specific requirecounty court, the plalntllr, Dye. sued out a · ment of the statute upon the subject must
dedlmua to take testimony of one Desent In be observed In order to render the proce88
Fayette county, Iowa. Divers errors are ln- available as an authority to an oftlcer to
slflted upon and argued by coull8el in their take the testimony, and that without It the
briefs, but the only one Important to ron- . writ wouhl be o. nullity, and a deposition
sider ls that predicated upon the form of the : taken under it would be Inadmissible as evidedlmus under which the teRtlmony was ' dence. The motion to suppress the depositaken. The writ appears In the record, and , tion should have been sustained, anct for the
was apparently ISBued by the judge of the : error of the court lo this particular the
county court acting as his own clf~rk. It ls : cause must be reversed and remanded.
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EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

GARRI<~'l'KOX.

PRODUC HON AND EFFE.C'1‘ OF EVIDENCE.

(23 Atl. 353, M N. J. I..aw, 42.)

I

CHASE v. GARRl'I'l'.'\‘().\'.

~upreme

Court of New .TPl'lll.'y. Jan. 22. 1892.

(23 At]. 353, 54 N. J. Law, -L2.)

Supreme Court of New Jersey. Jan. 22. 1892. '

On rule to show cause why a new trial

should not be granted. Cause tried in the

Essex county circuit court before Justice De-

pue and a Jury.

Action by Selon H. Chase against Garret

Garretson to recover on a note. Verdict for

defendant. Rule to show cause why a new

trial should not be granted. Rule dismissed.

Argued February term. 1891. before BEAS-

LEY, C. .T., and MAGIE, DIXON, and GAR-

RISON, JJ.

On rule to show cause why a new trial
should not be granted. Cause tried In the
Essex county circuit court before .Tustl<oe Depue and a jury.
Action by Selon H. Chase against Garret
Garretson to recover on a note. Yerdlct for
defendant. Rule to show cause why a new
trial should not be granted. Rule dlsmlsl!e<l.
Argued February tt.>rm, 18Ul, before BI<~AS
LEY, C.•J., and MAOIE, DIXON, and UARRISON, JJ.
F. E. Bradner, for plalntltr. John S. Voorhees, for defendant.

F. E. Bradner, for plaintiff. John S. Voor-

hees, for defendant.

GARRISON, J. This is an action on a

promissory note, the making and indorse-
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ment of which were admitted at the trial.

The defense was that the note had been ob-

tained by false representations, of which

there was some proof. The plaintiff offered i

in evidence certain depositions which had

been received by the trial court, properly

sealed. What these depositions contained

we do not know, as the state of the case is

silent upon that point. The justice before

whom the case was tried excluded these dep-

ositions, upon the ground that the supreme

court commissioner before whom they had

been taken had not certiﬁed any reason for

taking them; and upon the further ground

that, whereas they were taken upon short

notice, it did not appear by the certiﬁcate of ‘

the commlsioner that the case. in his opin- I

ion, required such short notice. The ver-

dict was for the defendant, whereupon this

rule to show cause why a new trial should

not be granted was allowed. The question

is whether the depositions should have been

received in evidence. The aﬂidavits in ques-

tion had been taken’at Newark, N. J ., before

a supreme‘ court commissioner, upon short

notice. in the absence of the adverse party.

The certiﬁcate of the oﬂicer who took them

was in these words: “I, A. B. C. Salmon,

supreme court commisioner, do hereby cer-

tify that the witnesses above named herein 1

appeared personally before inc. were duly

sworn by me, and examined by plaintiff's

attorney, and gave evidence as is set out

above; that such other and further proceed-

ings were had as shown by this transcript.

A. B. C. Salmon, Sup. Ct. Comm'r." The

notice stated that the witnesses to be ex- .

amlned were about to leave this state, but

the certificate of the connnissioner is silent

as to the reasons why he took the atiidavits,

or whether. in his opinion, the case was one

requiring short notice. In this condition of

affairs the party who had procured the. tak-

ing of the depositions offered to supply by

oral proof evidence as to the reasons which

moved the commissioner to take thc niﬁd:1-

vits, and that the commissioner had ﬁxed the

time for taking the same, and had authorized

the giving of the notice. The overruling of

GARRISON, J. This ls an action on a
promissory note, the making and lndorsement of which were admitted at the trial.
The defense was that the note had been obtalned by false representations, of which
there was some proof. The plalntlft' oft'ered
In evidence certain depotdttons which had
been received by the trial court, properly
sealed. What these depositions contained
we do not know, as the state of the C88e 111
silent upon that point. The Justice before
whom the case was tried excluded tht>se dep.
osltlons, upon the ground that the supreme
court commissioner before whom they had
been taken bad not certified any reason for
taking them; and upon the further ground
that, whereas they were taken upon short
notice, It did not appear by the certlfi("llte of
the commissioner that the ease, In hlM opln·
Ion, required such short notice. The verdlct was for the defendant, whereupon this
rule to 11how <'lluse why a new trial should
not be granted was allowed. The question
ls whether the dt>posltlons should have been
received In evidence. The affidavits In questlon had been taken'at Newark, N. J., bt>fore
a suprt>me · court comml11Sloner, upon short
notice, in the absence ot the advt>rse party.
The certificate of the ofHl'er who took tht>m
was In these words: "I, A. B. C. Salmon:,
supren1t> court comml881oner, do hen>hy ('('rtlty that the wltnt>BSes abo\"'e nauwd heri>ln
nppt>ared personally before Ult>. were duly
.-:worn by me, and examlnP<l by plalntlll's
attorney, and gave evl<lt>nce as Is set out
above: that snl'h other and further proceedlugs were had as shown by this transcript.
A. B. C. Salmon, Hu1>. Ct. Comm·r." The
notice stated that the witnesses to be exarnlnetl wPrt> ahout to leave this state, but
the <.>t>rtlfl('8te of thP comml1111loner Is sile nt
as to the l"('llsons why he took the attldavlts,
or whether, In his opinion, the cast> was one
requiring short noti~. In this condition of
al'falrs the party who had 1m>c:ured the tak·
lnir ot the depositions oft'ered to supply by
orul proof t>vlden<'e as to the reasoni; which
moved the commls11loner to take tlw atHda4-14

\"ltM, and that the commissioner bad fi.I.ed the
thue for taking the same, and had authorized
the giving of the notice. The overruling of
I this otrer raises the only question before ua.
The privilege of producing, upon the trial of
an Issue of fact, affidavits taken elMewhel"t',
18 so marked a departure from the ordinary
<.'Ourse of trials that every saft>guard thrown
by the legislature around the extraordinary ·
procedure r.«hould be upheld. Upon tlll<c
lM>lnt there Is entire unanimity of judicial
sentiment. Chief JU8tlce Kirkpatrick, In the
case of Hendricks v. Craig, 5 N. ;J. Law, 568.
speaking of commissions to take testimony,
said: "As the power to take the testimony
of absent witnesses ls a new power, created
by statute, the rule Is that It must be pursued
strictly." To the same eft'eet Is the language
of Uyerson, J., In Sayre v. Sayre, 14 N. J.
Law, -187-492: "The statute 18 an lnnontlon on a great and valuable principle of tht>
common law tlla.t the witness shall be producetl before the jury, who are to judge, as
well from his manner as otherwise, of the
credit to which he ls entitled." "I do not
, think," said this learned judge, with marked
I' <llS<·rlmluatlon,
"that this ls a case where
the ll'glshltttre have lngrafted a new prln' clple on the common law which the court are
to re~rard as a principle, and give etllclency
to It lo practice. They have only made an
exception, and the party has not brought
himself within it." "This statute," said
Chancellor Zabriskie, speaking of the same
act, "cn>ates a new power cootl"ary to the
settled practice, and should therefore be
1 11trlctly construed and strictly complied with.'"
' Parker \"'. Hayes, 23 N. J . .Eq. 18G, 187. In
the 1"a11t• of l\loran v. Green, 21 N. J. Law,
lil.t.!-;i(l9, Chh•f Justiee Hornblower, while relaxlng the mlt> as to the directory parts of
the statute In reference to the filing of the
afftdavlts, says: "!<'or the doe observation
of everything relating to these matters, the
party suing out the comml11slon Is alone re·
spon11lble; but when be has got It back Into
the hands of a juige of the court, out of
which It lRBued, be has done all the law
requh"f's him to do,"-an exception whl<"h, It
will be observed, lnst<>ad of loosening the
rult>, rather emphaslzt>s It. so far as the presI' t>nt caSt> ls concerned.
If WI' are to be gulded by the views thus t•xprPBSt>ti, there will
be no dltHculty In giving a construction to
the statute under which theMe de110Sltions
have l)('t>n taken. The section In question Is
this {He\"'lslon, p. 382. § :?a): "'If any matt>rial wltnt>11s In an action or suit of a <'lvll DB·
, ture.'' et<'.. "Is about to leaYe tht> state,
(hlR deposition ma~· be takt>n 11<• bt>nt> esst>):
pro\•lclt>tl, tllnt the ofH(•t>r beforP whom tbt>
'. dt•poi;ltlon 111 to be taken shall <'llllll<' notke
· to ltt• irl\"'t>n to the adn~r11e party lmmedlatt>ly.
i or at 1ml'l1 short clay as tht> cnMf'. In the oplu·
; Ion ot the said oftkt>r, may requlr1>, to attt-nd
and bt> 1>rt>sent at the taking thereof, and to
put qut>Rtlons and <'l'OSS·examlm~. If be shall
think ttt." AB hns been shown, the con·

I

I

1'

I
I

I

DEPOSITIONS.
DEPOSITIONS.
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scnsus of judicial opinion favors that con-

struction of this statute which gives to the

language employed its plain and unmistak-

able meaning. The act says that there shall

be a certiﬁcate by the oﬁicer who took the

atlidavits of the reasons for their being tak-

en, and of the notice given to the adverse

party. Revision. p. 382, § 27. The entire

matter is a creature of legislative enactment,

so that it is diﬂicult to see by what power

these statutory provisions um be altered by

this court, even if it were deemed advisable

to dispense with them. Apart, however, from

authority, there are cogent reasons why these

jurisdictional matters should appear to the

trial court by oﬂiciai certificate rather than

by oral proofs. In the ﬁrst place, they con-

cern matters resting in the bosom of the <.tli-

cial who makes the adjudication, and hence
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cannot safely be the subject of oral testi-

mony from the mouths of others. The rea-

sons which move the oﬂicer to take the ath-

davlts, and his opinion as to the facts re-

quired by the exigencies of the case before

him, are known to himself. The best evi-

deuce, therefore, is his own statement. All

else is hearsay or surmise. Further, it is

evident that the cases in which contention

will arise are those in which the depositions

have been taken in the absence of the ad-

verse party: for, if he appear and cross-e.\'-

amine the wituesses, his presence or his con-

duct may be such as to waive his right to

insist upon the statutory provisions designed

for his protection. In this respect each case

must be determined upon the gcneraliprln-

clpies applicable to its peculiar features.

But where the return of the otiicer shows

that the affidavits were taken in the presence

only of the party procuring them, the ad-

verse party has a right to insist that they

shall become evidence against him only when

delivered to the trial court, with the juris-

dictional facts proved in the manner pre-

scribed by the statute. To hold otherwise

would be to place it within the power of the

party who had procured the proofs, and who

alone was represented at their taking, to ad-

(luce testimony in their support, which, under

the circumstances, it would be entirely be-

yond the power of the absent party to gain-

say, or even to verify, except by calling the

otlicer himself; thus shifting the burden of

proof in an oppressive and unwarranted

manner. When we consider that the matters

to he proved are the reasons which operated

upon the mind of the oﬁiclal, and his opin-

ion as to the necessity of short notice, we

shall see the diiiiculty and danger of per-

mitting such matters to rest in oral proofs

offered by an interested party during the

course of a trial,—diiilculties and dangers

which are incurred solely by an arbitrary

disregard of the provisions of the statute,

which plainly enacts that these matters are

to be shown by the certiﬁcate of the oﬂiccr.

As between these two lines of practice, if

the language of the statute was open equally

sensus of judlclal opinion favors that construction of this statute whlcb gives to the
laupage employed Its pla.ID and unmistakable meanlng. The a<.1 says that there shall
be a certificate by the officer who took the
affidavits of the reasvns tor tht>lr being taken, and of the notlre given to the adverse
party. RevlRion. p. 382, I 27. The entire
matter la a creature of legislative enactment,
so that lt ls dlt!kult to see by what pvwer
these statutory p1·ovlslons can be altered by
this court, even lf It were deemed advisable
to dispense with them. Apart, however, from
authority, there are cogent reasoDB why thetie
jurl&dlcttonal matters should appear to the
trial court by official certlfteate rather than
by oral proofs. In the flt"St place, tht>y eoncern matters resting ID the bosom of tilt> 1.tll·
clal wbo makes the adjudication, and hence
ennnot safely be the subject of oral tl'lltlmony from tbe mouths of others. The reasons which move the oftlcer to take the atttda vtts, and his opinion aa to the facts re·
quired by the exigencies of the case before
Wm, are known to himself. The best evidence, therefore, 111 his own statement. All
el&e Is heal"llBy or surmise. 1''urther, It 111
evident that the cases In which contention
will arise are those lo which the depositions
have been token ID the al18em·t> ()f the adverse party; for, If he appe11r and cro811-examlne the witnesses, his preRenee or his <'OD·
duct may be such as to waive bis right to
lnsltrt upon the Rtatutory provisions deslpt"'l
for his protection. In this respect eaeb case
must be determined upon the general . principles applicable to Its pe<•ullar feoturt>S.
But where the return of the otHeer shows
that the aftidavlts were taken lo the presem•e
only of the pa11y procuring them, tbe adverse part)' has a right to Insist that they
shall become evidence agalDBt blm only when
delivered to the trial court, with the Jurisdictional facts proved In the manner prescribed by the statute. To hold otherwise
would be to place It within the powpr of the
party who had procured the proofs, and who
alone was represented at their taking, to adduce testimony ln their su1iport, which, under
the circumstances, It would be PDtlrely beyond the power of the absent pnrty to galnMy, or even to verify, ex<'Ppt by ealllng the
offtcer himself; thus shifting the burden of
proof lo an oppressive and unwarranted
mnnner. When we consider that the matters
to be proved are the reasons which operated
upon the mind of the official, and his opln-
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Ion as to the necessity of short notice, we
shall &e\! the dltUculty an1l dunger of permitting sueb matters to rest In 1.11'1ll proofB
offered by an Interested party during the
course of a trlal,-dltllcultles and dangers
which ai-e hll'urred solely by an arbitrary
disregard of the provisions of the statute,
which plainly enacts that these matters are
to be shown by the certlflcate of the officer.
As between these two lines of p1"Uctlce, tf
the language of the statute was open equnlly
to either coDBtructlon, I should deem the construction Indicated most consonant with correct principle and sound policy. When to
this t·oncluslon Is added thP Wt>lght of judicial opinion as to the spirit lo which acts of
this kind are to be coDBtrued, and the legislative IDtent ls expre88ed In unambiguous
language, I can see neither ren1mn nor authority for permitting the substitution of oral
tPsthnony for the otftclal certi.lkate required
by the statute under review.
Section 43 of an act concerning evldPnce
(ltevlslon, p. 38.>) does not reach the infirmity of the certitlcate now before us. That
section provides that any depo11ltloo may be
overruled upon objections to the competency
of witnesses or of testimony, or to the regularity of questloDB, but "shall not be excluded for any Irregularity or IDformallty In taking or returning the same, If the court In
which the same ls olfPred shall be satisfied
that thP testimony of the wltneuee has been
fairly an<l truly taken and returned." The
taking of teatlmony here mentioned refPrK
to the mode In which the wltDPRS Is lntPrrogatt'<l, ancl to the form in which bis testimony Is transcribed, and the returning of thP
depm1ltlons refers to their custody from the
time they are sealed by the commissioner
until they are <lPUvered to the rourt. But
nothing ln tblB t\t't altPrs the preYlous provisions as to what the eertltlcate shall contain.
Moreover, these Irregularities are to be overlooked only when the court Is MtlRtled concerning the falmeRll with whleh the testimony waR taken. But. under the views
above expressed. It would hP petftl,, p11nclpll to say that depositions whl<'h cnnnot be
received, lM>cause not properly a1•c•n>11lted,
may be usPd to satisfy thP mind of thP caurt
by their lntProal evlllenc•p <"oneernlng the>
manner In which thP testimony wns tak<'D.
Su<"h a course would not hP ovPrlooklng an
Irregularity; It would be abrogating a le1otlR·
latlve provision. The rule to show cnus1•
should be dismissed, with costs.
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PRODUCTION AND EFFEG1‘ OF EVIDENCE.

CITY OF SANDWICH v. DOLAN.

(42 Ill. App. 53.)

Appellate Courts of Illinois. Dee. 7, 1891.

Appeal from circuit court, Dekalb county;

Charles Kellum, Judge.

VV. & WV. D. Barge, for appellant. C. A.

PRODUOT!ON AND

E~~FEo·r

CITY OF SANDWICH v. DOLAN.
(42 m. App. 53.)
Appellate Courts of Illinois. Dec. 7, 1891.
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CARTWRIGHT, J. This case has been

before this court and the supreme court on

former appeals by the present appellant. and

is reported in 3-1 Ill. App. 199, and 133 lll.

177, 2-1 N. E. 526. The case ha been again

tried in the circuit court, resulting in a some-

what increased verdict for appellee in the

sum of $000. That the sidewalk upon

which the accident occurred was, and for a

long time had been, out of repair and in very

bad condition is not denied, but is admitted

by appellant; nor is it denied that the acci-
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dent of appellee, falling upon it by reason of

its defective conditlonyoccurred as claimed

by her; but it is contended on the part of ap-

pellant that the jury were not justified in

ﬁnding that the injuries complained of re-

sulted from the fall, nor that appellee was in

the exercise of ordinary care, and that the

court erred in refusing to admit certain evi-

dence olfered by appellant and in giving and

refusing instructions. The circumstances

under which the accident happened are de-

tailed in the former opinion of this court.

and need not be repeated here. The facts

proven upon the retrial appear to be sub-

stantially the same as stated in that opinion,

except that the health and bodily condition

of appellee was shown to be worse than at

the time of the ﬁrst trial. The record shows

some contradiction among the doctors as to

ivhether the eighth rib was broken at the

time of the fall or at a subsequent time. and

those testifying for appellant say that the

twelftli rib was not broken. but that \vhere

there was a bunch on the side of appellee,

the attaching cartilage from the ninth rib.

several inches in length, was broken or torn,

which fact they do not regard as of much

consequence. A consideration of all the evi-

dence on those subjects satisﬁes us that the

injuries to appellee resulted from the fall,

and that injurious consequences. permanent

and progressive in their nature, have already

taken place, and are to be reasonably ap-

prehended in the future. With respect to

the question of the degree of care exercised

by appellee, the evidence shows that in the

manner of using the walk she exercised ordi-

nary care, and that the accident resulted

from no act or omission on her part, but

from her son stepping on a board which ﬂew

up in front of her and tripped her so that she

fell; and the main contention of appellant i.-

that she was negligent in using the walk at

all. Considering this proposition as a qucs

tion of fact, it appear‘s that this walk wn:

Ihc direct route from the Congregational

Church, where appellee had been, to her

home, where she was going; that it was an

ordinary walk, and its inﬁrmity consisted in

CARTWRIGHT, J. This case bas beell
before this court and the supreme court on
fot'Dler appeals by the present appellant. and
ls reported In 34 Ill. App. 199, and 133 Ill.
177, 2-l N. E. 526. The case bas been again
tried In the circuit court, resulting In a somewhat Increased verdict for appellee In the
sum of '3,000. Tba.t the sidewalk upon
which the accident occurred was, and for a
long tlme had been, out of repair and In vert
bad condUlon le not denied, but ls admitted
by appellant; nor Is It denied that the accident of appellee, falling upon It by ree.son of
Its defective condition,· occurred as claimed
by her; but It ls contended on the part of appellant that the jury were not justified In
finding that the injuries complained of resulted from the fall, nor that appellee was In
the exercise of onllnary c:are, anll that the
court erred In refusing to admit certain evidence offered by appellant and In giving and
refusing instructions. The clreumstanccs
under which the accident happened a.re detailed In the former opinion of this court.
and need not be repooted here. The facts
proven upon the retrial appear to be substantially the same as stated In that opinion,
except that the health and bodily condition
of appellee was shown to be worse than at
the time of the first trial. The record shows
some contradiction among the doctors as to
whether the eighth rib was broken at the
time of the fall or at a subsequent time, and
those testifying tor appellnnt say that the
twelfth rib was not broken, but that where
there was a bunch on the side of appellee,
the attaching l'8.rtllage from the ninth rib,
several Inches in length, was broken or torn,
which fact they do not regard as of much
consequPn1·P. A consideration of all the evidence on those subjel"ts aatlsftes us that the
Injuries to appellL>e resulted from the rail,
and that Injurious eonsequenees. pt>rmauent
and progressive in their natu1-e, have already
taken place, and are to be reasonably ap111·ehended in the future. With respect to
the question o! the degree of care exercised
by aJJpellee, the evidence shows that In thcmanner of using the walk she exerel.8E'd ordinary care, and that the accident resulted
Crom no act or omission on her part, but
from her son stepping on a board which dew
up in !ront of her and tripped her so that slufell; and the main c-ontention of a1>pello.nt i;
rhnt she was negligent In mdng the walk 111
all. C'onRlcle1·lng this pro)>ORltion as a qnP~
tlon of fact, lt ap1>ear8 that this walk wai
the direct route from the Congregationa ~
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Church, where appellee bad been, to her
home, wbPre 8he was g'()lng; that It was an
ordinary walk, and Its lnftrmlt;y consisted In
loose boanls on al'C'Ount of decayed stringers;
that she was accustJOmed to travel upon it
frequently; that It was used by the public
without notice or prohlbltlon by appellant;
that It was not palpably dangerous t.o use it
at all, and that, so far as apJ>Pm'S, the prerious use of the walk In Its existing condition
bad been without Rl'l'ldent.
'l'here was some evidence that a portion ot
the walk on the opposite side of the street,
which it ls aid she should have used, was
ln about the same condition as this. She
was certainly not obllgecl to take a JIM>re circuitous route if she thereby would encounter
equal danger. We think that she was not
negligent In exercising her undoubted right
to the use of the walk In going to her home.
Upon the trial appellant called as a wltnesB
Harold M. l.'tloye1·, a doctor, who testlfted that
be examined appellee at the Instance of appellant to ascertain the existence or nonexistence of injuries claimed to exist, and their extent. The object and purport of his testimony
was to show, so far as nervous, spinal, and
mus<'ular symptoms of Injury were concerned., that she was exaggerating or feigning.
He testlfted that such was hie belief as to
symptoms relative t.o the spine, and that he
examined the spine and muscles and measured the arms. He thought she did not ex·
perience the symptoms which she stated. He
further stated that be wanted to examine the
muscles with a battery, but that she objected
to It. He gave as a reason for wanting to
make such a test that the battery would show
the amount of electricity required to produce
contraction of a muscle, and would show,
apart from any statement of the patient, Indications of health or disease. Appellant afterwards examined as a witness G. W. Nesbit,
another doctor, who was present and aBBlsted
at Moyer's examination of appellee; but no
testimony was elicited from Nesbit about any
proposal to examine appellee with a battery.
or any refusal on her part. After appellant
had completed Its defense, Mrs. M. P. Johnson, Dr. Bryant. James Dolan, and appellee.
all of whom were present at the examination
by Moyer, testified in rebuttal that Moyer did
not propose to examine appellee with a battery, and that she did not refuse to permit
such an examlnntton. After the evidence in
rebuttal, appellant recalled Dr. Nesbit, and
proposed to have him testify that Dr. Moyer
had a battery there, and that appellee said
that be could not Ulile It on her. On objection
this was not permitted, and It le Insisted that
this was error. The well-settled rule of pra<'·
tlce is that when a plalntltf, holding the affirmative of the Issue, as In this ease, ba11
~lven all the evidence he proposes to offer In
~upport ot the Issue, the de!endnnt shall then
"ntroduce all proof In contradiction of th"
proof adduced by the plalntl1f and establish-

EXA.lUNATION OF WITNESSES. IN OHIEF.
EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES, IN CHIEF.

[Case No. 151

ing matters of defense, and the plaintiff may

then rebut aﬂirmative evidence introduced by

defendant. If new and aﬂirmative matter is

introduced in rebuttal, the defendant may

meet and overthrow it, but that is the extent

of defendant's right in surrebuttal, and any

departure from the 1'ule is matter of indul-

gence and discretion in the court, not ordi-

narily subject to review. After the defend-

ant is fully apprised by plaintiffs evidence of

the ground upon which a recovery is to be

had, if at all, it is the plain duty of the de-

fendant to meet the case made by whatever

proof he may have and intend to use. Thomp.

Trials, §§ 344-347. It is true that neither

party is bound to maintain the credibility of

his witnesses until it is assailed by the

opposite party, and some attempt made to

impeach their credibility; and so at any
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stage of the case, if evidence should be of-

fered for no other purpose than to impeach

their credibility, the party in interest may

support their credibility by additional tes-

timony. In the case of Wade v. Thayer,

40 Cal. 578, witnesses testified that several

persons who had testiﬂed to an occurrence

were not present at the time of the occur-

rence. This was not testimony as to any fact

material to the issue, but was manifestly of-

fered only to impeach witnesses by showing

that their testimony was manufactured.

The court say: “The evidence on behalf of

the plaintiff to the effect that these witnesses

of the defendants were not present, could

have been offered for no other purpose than

to impeach their credibility, and was compo.»

tent for this purpose." It is a well-settled

rule that a party whose witnesses are sought

to be impeached by proof of this character

may support their credibility by rebutting ev_-

idence, and it was held that defendants had a

right to show that the witnesses were present.

In the case of Richardson v. Lessees of Stew-

art, 4 Bin. 198, evidence tending to show an

interest of a witness in the subject-matter of

a suit was offered, and could have been for

no other purpose except to affect his credibil-

ity. He had testiﬂed that he had no interest,

and the court say that the evidence was an

attack on his character and that the party

had a right to introduce a deed showing that

he parted with hi interest before he testi-

ﬂed. In the present case appellee introduced

her evidence of the nature and extent of her

injuries. If appellant claimed that she ex-

aggerated or feigned the symptoms which

she manifested and related, it was important

and substantial matter of defense. If she

had refused to submit to an examination

which would disclose the truth it would tend

to show that the symptoms were exaggerat-

ed or feigned. Appellant had no right to

present that defense b_v piecemeal. The evi-

dence rebutting the testimony of Dr. .\ioyer

as to the material fact was not impcar-hing

evidence in any sense. and did not tend to

discredit him in any diiferent manner than

that in which any contradiction discredits a.

ing matters of defense, and the plaintiff may

then rebut afll.rmatlve eYidence Introduced by
defendant. If new and affirmative matter Is
introdu('ed lD rebuttal, the defendant may
meet and overthrow It, but that ls the extent
of defendant's right lD surrebuttal, and any
departure from the rule ls matter of Indulgence and discretion in the court, nc>t ordinarily subject to review. After the defendant Is fully apprised by plalntltr's evidence of
the ground upon which a ~covery ls to be
had, If at all, It ls the plain duty of the defendant to meet the case made by whatever
proof be may have and Intend to use. Thomp.
Trials, H 344-347. It ls true that neither
party ls bound to maintain the credibility of
his witnesses until It la all88lled by the
opposlte party, and some attempt made to
Impeach their credlblllty; and so at any
stage of the case, If evidence should be offered for no other purpose than to Impeach
their credibility, the party in Interest may
support their credlbl1lty by additional testimony. In the case of Wade v. Thayer,
40 Cal. 578, wltnes11es testified that several
persons who bad testified to an occurrence
were not present at the time of the occurrence. This was not testimony as to any fact
material to the IBSue, but was manifestly offered only to Impeach witnesses by showing
that their testimony was manufactured.
The court say: "The evldenre on bt'half of
the plaintiff to the effect that thPSe wltne88es
of the defendants were not present, could
have been offered for no other 1mrpose than
to Impeach their credibility, and was competent for this purpose." It Is a well-settled
rule that a party whose witnesses are sought
to be Impeached by proof of this character
may support their c1·edlblllty by rebutting evidence, and It was held that defendants had
right to show that the witnesses were present.
In the case of Richardson v. Lessees of Stewart, 4 Bln. 198, evidence tending to show an
Interest of a wltne88 lD the subject-matter of
a suit was offered, and could have been for
no other purpose except to street his cre1llblllty. He had testified that he had no lntere8t,
and the court say that the evidence was an
attack on bis character and that the party
had a right to Introduce a deed showing that
he parted with his Interest before he testified. In the present case appellee Introduced
her evidence of the nature and extent of her
Injuries. If appellant claimed that she exaggerated or feigned the symptoms which
she manifested and related, It was Important
and substantlal matter of defense. If she
had refused to submit to an examination
which would disclose the truth It would tend
to show that the symptoms were exaggerated or feigned. Appellant bad no right to
present that defense by piecemeal. The evidence rebutting the testimony of Dr. :Moyer
as to the material far t was not impen<"hlng
evidence In any sen11e. and 11111 not ten<l to
discredit him in any dlffereut manner than

a
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that In which any contradiction discredits a
witness. Mere contradiction among wltne88es
as to facts furnishes no basis for attempting
to prove the fact over again by new witnesses. It upon each contradiction a party
would be entitled to produce a aew witness
there would be practically no Umlt to their
production. Nor was there any element of
surprise in the production of the rehuttlng
testimony. When appellant was lntrodurlng
testimony llO damaging to appellee as that of
Dr. Moyer, It would necessarily be anticipated that appellee would meet and contradict It if in her power to do !50, and the presenre of the other witnesses at that examination who could testify as to what occurred
there was well known. There was no error
In the exclusion of the otrered evidence. Its
admission at that time rested in the discretion of the court.
The court refused two instructions prepared
by appelbµ1t's counsel, both of which declared that if the evidence showed the sidewalk to be unsafe, and that appellee knew It
to be unsafe, then It was her duty to keep
off the sidewalk and not go upon It. These
Instructions were clearly not in accordance
with the law. The question whether appeJ.
lee was negligent in going upon this walk
was one of fact for the jury, and any knowledge on her part of Its condition was to be
taken Into account In deciding that question;
but the question Itself was for the jury.
The court, at the Instance of appellant, gave
several Instructions presenting in varying
language the question upon the evidence
whether she was in the exercise of reasonable care and caution In going upon and using
the sidewalk; and these were correct. In
City of :nora v. :Saney (ID. Sup.) 26 N. E.
645, error was 888lgned, upon the refusal of
an instruction stating that the plaintiff would
be precluded from a recovery If she went upon the sidewalk, or continued to walk thereon, after she had observed that it was out of
repair. The court say: "But If the plaintiff
knew that the sidewalk was out of repair,
the law did not require her to go out Into the
street and pa88 around the walk. Although
a person goes upon a sidewalk knowing It to
be out of repair, recovery may be had for an
injury received, If ordinary and reasonable
care has been used." It was held not error to
refuse the Instruction. When the present
case was before the supreme court It was
said: "Whether It was obligatory on plaintiff to travel over one walk or the other was
a question which It was not the pro\•ince of
the court to determine as a matter of law."
City of Sandwich v. Dolan, 133 lll. 17i, 24
N. E. 526.
It ls iD1!lsted that the court erred In giving
an Instruction prepared by n1>1:iellee as follows: "If the jury believe from the evidence
that any witness has wlHfully sworn falsely
on this trial, as to any matter or thing mnterlal to the Issues in the case, then the jury
447
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are at liberty to disregard the entire testi- | ness or class of witnesses.

mony of such witness except in so faras it

has been corroborated by other credible evi-

dence or by facts and circumstances proved

on the trial." The objections made to this

instruction- are: First, that the jury would

understand it to apply to the witnesses for de-

fendant only, and that it was therefore erro-

neous as only applying to the witnesses on

one side and as an intimation that in the

judgment of the court they were more to be ‘

suspected than those on the other side; and,

second, because it did not mention the name

of any witness or witnesses. The instruction

is not subject to the ﬁrst objection. It has

no more application to the witnesses for one

party than the other, and could not be drawn

in more general terms. The second objection

are at llherty to disregard the entire test!mony of such witness except 1n so far ·as It
has been corroborated by other credible evlden<'P or by facts and circumstances proved
on the trial." The objections made to this
lnetn1ctlon- ore: First, that the jury would
understand It to apply to the wttnPllses for def endant only, and that 1t was therefore erroneous as only applying to the wltneRaes on
one side and as an intimation that In the
judgment of the court they were more to be
suspected than those on the other side; and,
second, because it did not mention the name
of any witness or witnesses. '.rhe Instruction
Ill not subject to the tlret objection. It hoe
no more appllcatton to the witnesses for one
party than the other, and could not be drawn
In more general terms. The second objection
111 not tt>nable. While lnlltructtons alluding
dlrt>etly to a wltneBB hove been suetnlnPll.
the better practice Is doubtless not to 11lrt•l't
such an Instruction against a pni:tl<'ular wlt-

is not tenable. While instructions alluding
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din-ectl_\' to a witness have been sustained.

the better practice is doubtless not to direct i

such an instruction against a par,ti(-ular wit-

448

Insurance C0. v.

La Pointe. 118 Ill. 384, 8 N. E. 3-")3; Thomp.

Trials, § 2421.

The jury might readily understand that in

the judgment of the court there was some-

thing in the testimony of the witness or wit-

nesses named upon which to base the instruc-

tion, and to make the general rule peculiarly

applicable to such witness or witnesses as

distinguislled from the others. It is certain-

l_\' not an objection that the court has failed

to make such direct application of the rule to

some witness or witnesses. In Martin v.

People, 5-1 Ill. 225. it is said: “A court can

hardly err in refusing to give any instruction

which seems designed to inﬂuence a jury as

to the credit to be given to particular wit-

nesses.” Some other minor objections are

made to the language oi.‘ instructions given,

but we think the instructions were properly

given. The judgment will be aﬂirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

PRODUCTlON AND EFFECT OF EVIDES'CE.
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I nes11 or <'laBB of wltnl'&see. Insurance Co. v.
l.a Pointe, 118 Ill. 384, 8 N. E. 35.1; Thomp.
Trials, § 2421.
'.rbe jury might readily understand that In
the judgment of the court there was something In the telltlmony of the witness or wltne11F.es named upon which to base the fnstrul'tfon, and to make the geneml n1le peculiarly
applh·able to su1•h witness or wltnP118ell as
dh~tlngull1hl'd from the others. It ill <"ertaln; ly not on obje<•tlon that the rourt bas failed
' to make such direct applll'atlon of the rule to
1 110me
wltne88 or witnesses. In :Martin v.
People, 54: Ill. 225. It ls 881d: "A court l'8D
hardly err in refusing to give any Instruction
which seems designed to lntluence a jury as
to the credit to be given to parti<-ular witnesses." Some other minor objP<•tlons are
made to the language of tn11tru1•tlons given,
I but we think the lnstrn<'tions were properly
given. The judgment wlll be amrmed.
Judgment afflrmed.

EXAMINATION OF WlTNESSE5, IN CHIEF.
EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. IN CHIEF.

[Case No. 152

ROBERTSON v. CRAVER.

(55 N. W. 492, 88 Iowa, 381.)

Supreme Court of Iowa. May 20, 1893.

Appeal from district court, Poweshiek coun-

ty; A. R. Dewey, Judge.

Action for breach of promise of marriage.

Jury trial. Verdict and judgment for plain-

tiff. Defendant appeals.

John T. Scott and H. S. Winslow, for ap-

pellant. Haincs & Lyman, for appellee.

KINNE, J. 1. It is averred that plaintiff

and defendant, in January, 1891, entered into

a marriage engagement; that the marriag

was to take place about December 25, 189 ;

that in April, 1891, the defendant married

another woman, and thus put it out of his

power to perform his contract with the plain-

tiﬁ. The answer admits the marriage of the

defendant, and denies the other allegations
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of the petition. .

2. Plaintiff was asked, “Do you know

whether or not he [the defendant] bought his

father's homestead?" The question was ob-

jected to as leading, suggestive, incompetent,

and calling for a conclusion. She answered:

“Yes, sir; he told me he had bought his fa.-

t.her's place the ﬁrst time I saw him after he

was married.” Defendant moved to strike

out the answer as incompetent and immate-

rial; the statement having been made since

the defendant‘s marriage, and referring to

matters occurring after his marriage. The

motion was overruled. Questions so framed

are not necessarily leading. Woolheather v.

Risley, 38 Iowa, 486; State v. Watson, 81

Iowa, 383, 46 N. W. Rep. 868.‘ It is some-

times permissible to direct the attention of

the witness to the particular fact about which

information is sought. Graves v. Insurance

Co., S2 Iowa, 637, 49 N. W. Rep. 65. The

purchase of a homestead was a fact. The

question did not call for a conclusion. The

ruling was without prejudice, as the same

fact was testiﬂed to by another witness, and

was not disputed.

3. Plaintiff was also asked, on direct exam-

ination, this question: “When you heard that

he was married, how did it affect you?" It

was objected to as incompetent and immate- _

rial, and the objection overruled. She an-

swered, “I hated it awful bad." The ques-

tion, we think, was proper. It called for

facts touching her condition, mental and

physical, as a. result of the marriage. The an-

swer, though not in good form, was but one

way of expressing the mental condition of

the witness. Besides, in the course of the

trial, the answer was withdrawn from the

jury. Other witnesses were asked questions

relathig to plaintiff's condition after she had

heard of defendant's marriage, thus: “You

may state to the jury how it alfected her, or

how it seemed to affect her.” The court held

the question was not incompetent, and the

witness answered, “She didn’t talk about the

matter, only she was downhearted." It was

wmous, Ev. -29

competent to show how, if at all, the de-

(Caae No. 152

competl'nt to show how, It at all. the 'd&fendant's marriage a1l'ected the plalnwr. Her
wounded feelings, mortlft.catlon. and pain, tf
any, resulting from defendant's breach of the
oontrnct, were all proper to be shown as elements of damage.
4. Error ts assigned on the rullng ot the
court excl.udlng evidence as to plalntUf's deolaratlons made after the marriage contract
wns broken. We think there was no error In
these rulings. The questions asked did not lndlcnte that they related to expressions of
KINNE, J. 1. It 18 avelTed that plalntlft plalntl1l' as to her feelings towards defendand defendant, ln January, 1891, entered Into ant before the breach of the contmct. How
a :marriage engagement; that the marriagi' she fclt towards the defendant after he had
was to take place about December 26, 1891; dec{'h·cd her, and put lt out of his power to
that In April, 1891, the defendant married fulfill his contract with her, could In no way
another woman, and thus put lt out ot his tend to show what her feelings towards him
power to perform his contract with the plaiD.- were while the engagement lasted. It was
wr. The 'l.DSWer admits the marriage of the not proposed to show that these declarations,
defendant, and denies the other allegations though made after defendant's marri:ige, related to her feelings towards or atl'ectlon for
et the petition.
2. PlalntUf was asked, "Do you know him during the time the engagement subsistwhether or not he [the defendant) bought his ed. Moreover, the objection that the matt.er
father's homestead?" The que111cton was ob- Inquired about was not proper croes-examinatlon was well grounded.
jected to as leading, suggestive, Incompetent,
G. A witness was asked what the plalnand calling for a conclusion. She answered:
"Yes, sir; he told me he had bought his fa- t:Ul' was doing In the way of getting ready to
ther's place the ftret time I saw him after he be married. "Do you know anything about
was married." Defendant moved to strike Rosa making preparations for mnrrlnge?"
out tl•e answer as Incompetent and Immate- 'l'hese questions were objected to as assuming
rial; the statement having been made since a fnct not proven. and the objection was
the defendant's marriage, and referring to overruled, and the witness answered: "Yes,
ma ttere oocurrlng after his mnlTlnge. The sir; piecing quilts, and doing fancy work."
motion wu overruled. Questions so framed Prior to the examination of this witness, tesare not necessarlly leading. Woolheatl1er v. timony had been Introduced, without objecRisley, 38 Iowa, 486; State v. Watson, 81 tion, which showed these and other propara·
Iown, 383, 46 N. W. Rep. 868.' It ls some- tlons for marringe. Indeed, there appears to
times permissible to direct the attention of be no conflict In the evidence touching prepthe witness to the particular fact about which arn tlons on pnrt of plalntl1l' tor a marriage.
lntormntlon ls sought. Graves v. Insurance In that respect, and In view of tlle undisputCo., 82 Iowa, 637, 49 N. W. Rep. 65. The ed evidence in the case, tlle ruling was corpurchase of n. homestead was a fact. The rect. But defendant urges that the questions
question did not call for a conclusion. The assumed the existence of the contract of marruling was without prejudice, as the same riage, and cites Jones v. Layman, (Ind. Sup.)
fact was tcstlfl.ed to by another witness, and 24 N. E. Rep. 363. The question In that case
was not disputed.
was: "What declaration, If any, did she
3. 1•1n1ntUl' was also asked, on direct exam- make In regard to her disappointment, and
ination, this question: "When you heard that refusal of defendant to marry, at the time
he was married, how did It affect you?" It she showed you the letter?" It will be obwas objected to as Incompetent and lmmate- served that the entire inquiry was bnsed uprlnl, and the objection ovelTnled. She an- · on the tllought expressed ln the question, that
awered, "I hated it awful bad." The ques- defenclant hnd refused to marry the plalntion, we think, was proper. It called for tUr. Again, the question related to a declarafncts touching her condition, mental and tion made by plalntifl' In tlle absence of dephysical, as a result of the marriage. The an- fendant, Rfter the engagement hnd been
swer, though not In good form, was but one broken. The court held the question objeoway of expressing the mental condition of tlonnble for the latter reason, as well as bethe witness. Besides, In the course ot the cause lt assumed a breach ot the contract.
trlal, the answer was withdrawn fl'om the In the case at bar the evidence called for an(l
jury. Other witnesses were asked questions
elicited related t<> preparations which plalnrel:1tb1g to plalntltT's condition after she had wr was making for a marriage during the
heard of defendant's marrlnge, thus: "You contlnunnce of the engagement. Evidence ot
may state to the jury bow It a1l'ected her, or 1 the conduct of the plalntltl', It It relates to the
how It s~med to atl'ect her." The court held time covered by the engag<'ment, or to 11 time
the question was not lncompetrnt, and the when first informed of the 1'nct tbnt her Inwitness answered, "She didn't talk about the tended husband hRs married another, ls admatter, only she was downhearted." It was j missible to prove her consent to the alleged
ROBERTSON v. CRAVER.
(55 N. W. 492, 88 Iowa, 381.)
Supreme Court of Iowa. May 20, 1893.
Appeal from district court, Poweablek county; A. R. Dewey, Judge.
Action for breach ot promise of marriage.
.Jury trinl. Verdict and judgment tor plaiD.wr. Defendant appeals.
John T. Scott and H. S. Wl.nalow, for appellant. Haines & Lyman, for appellee.
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marriage and contract. \Ve do not think the

questions, as asked, were objectionable.

6. A brother of plaintiif who had testified

on direct examination that, while the defend-

ant was keeping company with his sister, no

one else was going with her, was asked: “Did

you not, then, at that house on your father's

farm, tell Mr. Graver, the defendant in this

case, that yo\..- sister (plaintiff) had made a

mash on Shadley there, at John Stllwell's?”

An objection to the question was sustained

on the ground that it was incompetent, im-

material. and irrelevant. The evident drift of

this question was to show that the witness

had made statements to defendant inconsist-

ent with his testimony on direct examination.

The question was clearly proper. What the

answer would have been, of course, we can-

not say; but it was proper for defendant to
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show if he could, on the cross-examination,

that he was mistaken in his statements made

in his examination in chief. The ruling of

the court placed an undue restriction on the

right of cross-examination.

7. On cross-examination a witness testified

that plaintiff had kept company with one

Mackey a short time before she began going

with defendant. The court, on motion of

plaintiff, struck out this evidence as imma-

terial and irrelevant. This action is as-

signed as error. We think the ruling was

right. Defendant‘s claim seems to be that

the conduct of plaintilf in receiving the at-

tention of young men prior to the time the

defendant began keeping company with her

is material to the question of damages. Coun-

sel say: “The ease with which the affections

became enlisted. the readiness with which

she laid down the old to take up the new,

and like matters, were proper subjects to be

considered, if the amount of damages to be

allowed ever becomes important." If such ev-

idence, relating to a time anterior to that

when defendant began to seek plaintiff's so-

ciety, is ever admissible, surely it is not

under the circumstances developed in this

examination. There was no evidence that

the relations existing between plaintitf and

Mackey were other than those usually inci-

dent to mere friendly association. It does

not appear that it was a case of love at

ﬁrst sight, or otherwise. Their intercourse,

so far as appears, was not diiferent from

that which exists in all cases of friendship

between persons of the opposite sex who do

not contemplate marriage. To show such

friendly association between plaintiif and oth-

er men at a time prior to defendant's seek-

ing her society is not material to any ques-

tion involved in the case.

8. On cross-examination,

asked several questions in relation to his

property. All of them were objected to as not

being proper cross-examination. The objec-

tions should have been sustained. Nothing

was asked him on direct examination relat-

ing to his property. The questions were for-

eign to the examination in chief.
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marriage und contract. We do not thlnk. the
ciuestions, as asked, were objectionable.
6. A brother of plaintUf who had testlfted
on direct examination that, while the defendant was keeping company '\\1th his sister, no
one else w11B going wlth her, was asked: "Dld
you not, then, at that house on your father's
farm, tell Mr. Craver, the defPndant 1n this
case, that YOl••" sister (plalntl11') had made a
mllBh on Shadley there, at John Stllwell'e?"
An objection to the question was BUStalned
on the ground that lt was Incompetent, Immaterial, and irrelevant. The evident drift of
this qul'Stion was to show that the wit.Dees
bad made statements to defendant inconsistent with hie testimony on direct examlnatlon.
The question was clearly proper. Whnt the
answer would have been, of course, we cannot say; but lt was proper for d<>fendant to
show lf he could, on the cross-examtnatlon.
that he was mistaken 1n his statements made
1n his examination 1n chief. The ruling of
the court placed an undue restriction on the
right of croes-examtnatton.
7. On cross-examination a witness testifted
that plalntltf had kept company wlth one
Mackey a short tlme before she began going
with defendant. The court, on motion of
pla1ntltf, struck out this evidence as tmmaterlal and Irrelevant. Tbls action le assigned as error. We think the ruling was
right. Defendant's claim seems to be that
the conduct of pla1ntltf 1n receiving the attention of young men prior to the time the
defendant began keeping company with her
ls material to the queetlon of damages. Counsel BRy: "The ease with which the affections
became enlisted, the readiness with which
she laid down the old to take up the new,
and llke ma ttere, were proper subjects to be
considered, 1f the amount of damages to be
allowed ever becomes important." If such evidence, relating to a time anterior to that
when defendant began to seek pla1ntlff"s society, ls ever adml.sslble, surely it ls not
under the cl.rcumstnnces developed In this
examination. There was no evidence that
the relations existing between plnlntltf and
Mackey were other than those usually incldent to mere friendly aSllOciutlon. It does
not appc.>.ar that it was a case of love at
firet sight, or otherwise. 'lbelr intercourse,
eo far as appears, was not dl1ferent from
that which exists in all cases of frlemlshl.p
between persons of the opposite sex who do
not contemplate marriage. To show such
friendly association between plaintiff and oth·
er men at a time prior to defendant's seeking her society ls not material to any question Involved in the case.
8. On cross-examination, defendant was
asked several questions in relation to his
property. All of them were objected to as not
being proper cross-examination. The objections should have been sustained. Nothing
was asked him on direct examination relating to his property. The questions were foreign to the exa1nlnntion in chief.
9. ComplalDt 1.8 made that the court ad-

'50

mltted certain evidence 1n rebuttal which
was a part of plalntltT's case m chi<>f. As
there was no ruling, we must presume that
the objection was wal'rnd.
10. Witness Unn Craver testifted wlth reterence to having had a conversation with
plaintltf after defendant's marriage. He was
asked: "Now you may state whether or not.
In that conversation, she said anything in
regard to whether she had cared for your
brother; that all she wanted was his mouc.>y.''
Ollie Craver also testified to a slmllnr <'On·
versntton. She was asked the following qul•
' tions: "You may state whether or not, In
that conversation, she did or did not say sh<>
b.nd never cared anything for the defend·
:int, but all she was after was his money?'"
"I will ask you whether or not Rosa Robinson dld or did not say, In this conversation.
that she did not care lf he was married?"
"What did she say was her feeling towards
the defendant?" These questions were all
objected to as incompetent and Immaterial.
and one of them WRB also objected to as
lending. The objections were sustained. Thtruling was proper as to the last two questions. Evidence of the plalnillr's statements
or declarations, made soon after hearing of
the defendant's marriage, and relating thereto, and expressive of her feelings towards
the defPndant, as they exlsted during thE'
term of the engagt.>ment and before It ls t<>r·
mlnated, ls ndmlselble when It tends to show
l'llCh feelings as are "Inconsistent with any
purpose to fulfill the engagement in a spirit
befitting the relation contemplated by It."
One po88e88ed of such feelings would suffer
little or no injury by reason of the breach
of the contract. But evidence tending t<>
show the feeling of the plalntiff tC>wards the
defendant after the bren.ch ot the contract,
and relating only to that time, le never n.d·
ml.sslble. Miller v. Hayes, 34 Iowa. 400: Mil·
ler v. Rosier, 31 Mich. 475. A declarntlon of
a woman who claims to have hnd nu 1•11g.1i;,•ment of marriage, whether made during th!'
existence of the engagement, or after sh1learns of lts breach, that she had not caft'(!
for a111.anced; that all she wanted was hl8
money,-certalnly has a tendency to show
that her object in seeking the engagement
was of a mercenary character; that that love
and affection so necessary to the enjoyment
of the married state were wholly wanting;
and that an engagement col18Ummated 1Dl·
der such circumstances would be unprofitable,
unendurable, and full of contention and sorrow. The first two questions clearly refer
to the feeling pla1ntlff had for the defeild·
ant before his marriage. Whether she "bad
cared" or "had never cared" for the defendant calls for the condition of her feelings towards him as they existed when she had l'Mlson to believe that the marriage would In
due tlme be consummated. The 11111t two
questions may be said to relate to her feelings as they were at the time she made the
statements, if any, and hence were properq
excluded.

EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES, IN CHIEF.
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[Case No. 152

11. Error is assigned on the giving of an

instruction to the effect that, if the jury found

that the parties had entered into a marriage

contract, the admission by the defendant

of his marriage to another woman would

constitute a breach of it, and plaintiff would

be entitled to recover. It is said that there

was evidence tending to show that the en-

gagement had been broken, and that the in-

struction assumed that the evidence failed

to establish that fact. There was no issue

under which it would have been proper to

submit to the Jury the question of the

abandonment of the contract. It was aver-

ted by plaintiif that a marriage contract

was made, and it was denied by the de-

fendant. Defendant rested his whole case

upon the fact that no contract of marriage

ever existed. The case was tried by the
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defendant upon that theory. Furthermore,

the letter which is claimed shows the aban-

donment did not reach defendant until after

ll. Error Is 888lgned on the giving of an
instruction to the etrect that, l! the jury found
th.at the parties had entered into a marriage
contract, the adml.~lon by the defendant
of his marriage to another woman would
constitute a breach of It, and plnlntltr would
be entitled to recover. It Is said that there
was evidence tending to show that the engagement hnd been broken, tlDd that the Instruction 888Urued that the evidence failed
to establish that fact. Tbere was no issue
under wblch it would hn ve been proper to
submit to the jury the question of the
abandonment of the contract. It was averred by plnintlfT that a m111·rlllge contract
was made, and it was d1mlcd by the defendant. Defendant rested h1s whole case
upon the fact that no contract of marriage
ever existed. The case wns tried by the
defendant upon that theory. }1lrthermore,
the letter wblch Is claimed shows the abandonment did not reach defN1dnnt untll after
h1s marriage. The instruction, under the i.
sues, was correct.
12. Exception ls also taken to an lnstruotlnn of the court wherein he W..d the Jttr7

that in tu1Se88lng damages they might consider, among other things, "personal p:iln"
eutrered by plalntitr by reason Qf the bn•nch
tr the contract. It Is Insisted that "personul
pain" means J>hyslcnl sutrerlng, instead of
mental distress or mental sutrerlng, and lt
Is said the question of ''personal pain" was
not In issue. The petition avem "that the
plnlntltr has bt-en, by the defendant, made to
suffer gre:i t grief, shame, and mortltlcatlon, and
her atrectlons b.ave b~n greatly wounded,"
etc. This court hns snid that In this class
of cases "the distinction between Injury to
the feelings and aft'ectlons and personal pain
and mortlf\c>ntlon for disappointment Is too
shadowy to receive pm.ctlcnl recognition."
Royal v. Smith, 40 Iowa, 618. Webster defines pain as "mentnl dh1trl'SS; anxiety; grlet;
angul~b." It may well be said that the pain
would be "personal," as much so as If it was
purt.>ly physical. The lnstructlon ls unobJectfonnble.
The many other errors nsslgned we find
to be without merit. For the reasons given,
the Judgment of the district court ls reversed.

his marriage. The instruction, under the 18- .

sues, was correct.

12. Exception is also taken to an instruc-

tion of the court wherein he told the jury

that in assessing damages they might con-

sider, among other things, “personal pain"

suifered by plaintiff by reason of the breach

oi’ the contract. It is insisted that “personal

pain" means physical suﬂering, instead of

mental distress or mental suffering, and it

is said the question of “personal pain” was

not in issue. The petition avers “that the

plaintiff has been, by the defendant, made to

suifer great grief, shame, and mortiﬁcation, and

her affections have been greatly wounded,"

etc. This court has said that in this class

of cases “the distinction between injury to

the feelings and aifections and personal pain

and mortiﬁeation for disappointment is too

shadowy to receive practical recognition."

Royal v. Smith, 40 Iowa, 618. Webster de-

ﬁnes pain as “mental distress; anxiety; grief;

anguish." It may well be said that the pain

would be "personal,” as much so as if it was

purely physical. The instruction is unob_Iec-

tionable.

The many other errors assigned we ﬁnd

to be without merit. For the reasons given,

the judgment of the district court is re-

versed.
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COM.\IONVVEALTH v. CHANEY.

(18 N. E. 572, 148 Muss. 8.)

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

Essex. Nov. 27, 18:88.

Exceptions from superior court,

county; John W. Bacon, Judge.

Complaint against John Chaney for main-

taining, in Gloucester, a building used for

the illegal sale or keeping of intoxicating

liquors. A witness for the government

(Burns) testiﬂed that he never had bought

cider to be drank upon tl1e premises, and

that he never had bought any cider and

drank the same upon the premises; and he

was then asked, subject to defendants ex-

ception, “whether he had ever drank cider

upon the premises," and “how often he got

cider upon the premises." Boyle, another

witness, called by the government, testiﬂed
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that he never had bought and drank cider

upon the premises; and the court thereupon,

against defendant's objection, allowed the

witness to be asked “how often he drank

cider upon said premises,” and "how often

he paid for cider which he got there, and

which he said he carried away." The wit-

nesses were unwilling ones. and the ques-

tions were asked by the district attorney as

on cross-examination. The jury returned a

verdict of guilty, and defendant excepted.

11‘. L. Evans, for defendant. A. J. Water-

man, Atty. Gen., and H. A. Wyman, Second

Asst. Atty. Gen., for the Commonwealth.

452

Essex

i to these witnesses.

FIELD, J. One issue of fact was whether

the defendant sold in his tenement, during

the time alleged in the complaint, cider or

native wine, “to be drunk on the premises."

Pub. St. c. 100, §§ 1, 27. Evidence that cider

and wine were drunk on the premises, by

various persons, during this time, was com-

petent, in connection with evidence that cider

and wine were sold there during the same

time, although the occasions were different.

The evidence, taken together, had some tend-

ency to prove that the tenement was used

both for selling and for drinking intoxicating

liquor, and the whole evidence may have

been suiﬁcient to warrant the jury in ﬁnd-

ing that some of the liquor drank on the

premises had been sold there by the defend-

ant. The answers given to the questions

put to Burns and Boyle do not appear in the

exceptions, and therefore it does not appear

that the defendant has been prejudiced by

the admission of the evidence, even if the

questions should have been excluded. The

questions were competent in substance, as

they called for testimony relating to the

drinking or the obtaining of cider upon the

premises, presumably during the time alleg-

ed. The court could permit the attorney for

the commonwealth to put leading questions

The objection does not

appear to have been taken that the questions

assumed facts of which there was no evi-
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COllMO~"'WEALTH

v. CHANEY.
(18 N. E. 572, 148 Mnss. 8.)
.
Supreme Judicial Court of Mnssachusette.
Essex. Nov. 27, lf!SS.
Exceptions from superior court, Eesex
county; John W. Bacon, Judge.
Complaint against John Chaney for maintalnlng, In Gloucester, a building used for
the Illegal sale or keeping of Intoxicating
liquors. A witness for the government
(Burns) testified that he never had bought
cider to be drank upon the premises, and
that he never had bought any cider and
drank the same upon the premises; and he
was then a1:1ked, subject to defendant's exceptlon, "whether he had ever drank cider
upou tbe premises," and "how often he got
cider upon the premises." Boyle, another
witness, called by the government, testified
that he never had bought and drank elder
upon the premises; and the court thereupon,
against defendant's objection, allowed the
witness to be asked "how often he drank
cider upon said premises," and "how often
he paid for elder which he got there, ancl
which he sald he carried away." The wituesses were unwilllng ones. and the questlons were asked by the district attornev 88
on cross-examination. The jury returned a
verdict of guilty, and defendant excepted.

FIELD, J. One Issue of fact was whether
the defendant sold In hie tenement, during
the time alleged In the complaint, cider or
native wine, "to be drunk on the preml&e11."
Pub. St. c. 100, ff 1, 27. Evidence thut cider
and wine were drunk on the premises, by
various pereone, during this time, was competent, in connection wlth evidence that cider
and wine were sold there during the same
time, although the occasions were dl1ferent.
The evidence, taken together, had some tendency to prove that the tenement was used
both for selling and for drinking intoxicating
liquor, and the whole evidence mav hav~
been sufficient to warmnt t»e jury in llndIng that some of the llquor drunk on the
premises had been sold there l>y the defendant. The answers giYen to the questions
put to Burne and Boyle do not appear In the
exceptions, and tberefore It does not appear
that the defendant has been prejudiced by
the admission of the evidence, even lf the
questions should have been excluded. The
questions were competent In substance, as
they called for testimony relating to the
drinking or the obtaining of elder upon the
premises, presumably during the time alleged. The court could permit the attorney tor
: the commonwealth to put leading questions
. to these witnesses.
The objection does not
1 appear to have been taken that the questions
assumed tacts of which there was no evi1''. L. Evans, for defendant. A. J. Water- 1 dence, and apparently the exceptions were
man, Atty. Gen., and H. A. Wyman, Second not drawn for the purpose of presenting thJs
Asst. Atty. Gen., for the Commonwealth.
objection. Exceptions overruled.
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CURTIS v. BRADLEY.
[Case No. 154

CURTIS v. BRADLEY.

(31 At]. 591, 65 Conn. 99.)

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. Oct.

(31 Atl. 591, 65 Conn. 99.)
Supreme Court of Errol'll of Connecticut.
4, 1894.

Oct.

4, 1894.

Case reserved from superior court, Fairﬁeld

county.

Action by Lewis F. Curtis against Frederick

H. Bradley to recover for moneys advanced

by plaintiff to defendant for labor and mate-

rials used in the construction of defendant's

building. Judgment for plaintiff, and motion

for a new trial by defendant. Motion denied.

J. C. Chamberlain and Elbert O. Hull, for

appellant. Allan W. Paige and George P.

Case reserved from superior court, Fairfield
county.
Action by Lewis F. Curtis against Frederick
H. Bradley to recover tor moneys advanced
by plaintiff to defendant for labor and materials used in the construction of defendant's
building. Judgment for plaintift', and motion
tor a new trial by defendant. Motion denied.
1. C. Chamberlain and Elbert O. Hull, for
appellant. Allan W. Paige and George P.
Carroll, for appellee.

Carroll, for appellee.

HA.\IERSLl'~}Y, J’. In the summer of 1890

the plaintiff sold the defendant a building lot.

In September of that year the defendant de-

cided to have a house erected on the lot. It

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:09 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104925781
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

was then understood that one Simeon E.

Plumb, a builder, should build the house, and

that the plaintiff, a merchant, should advance

the money for the cost of construction. The

decision of this case depended on the actual

terms of the agreement then made, the de-

fendant subsequently claiming that his only

agreement was with the plaintiff, and that by

such agreement the plaintiﬂf undertook to

have the house built for the agreed price of

$1,700. Plumb built the house under the di-

rections of the defendant. The plaintiff paid

to Plumb the amount of all bills for labor and

materials as they came due. The house was

ﬁnished in March, 1891, and the defendant

accepted and occupied it. At the time the

house was completed, Plumb and the plaintiﬂ

went over the labor and other bills, and the

account of money paid for the cost of con-

struction as charged on the plaintli’f’s ledger,

and at the foot of that account Plumb wrote

the following: "I have examined the above

account, and ﬁnd it correct. S. Plumb." The

14th of t-he same month, the plaintiff made

a copy of this ledger account, and gave it to

the defendant as the bill due from him to

the plaintiff, in pursuance of their agree-

ment. The defendant examined the bill. ob-

tained the labor and material bills, made in-

quiries among the men who furnished mate-

rials whether the prices of the materials were

correct, and found t-hat they were correct.

The defendant made no objection to the bill

rendered as regards amount or price, except

the claim that one item of 32 cents was

charged twice; but the defendant did object

to the total amount of the bill, and refused

payment. Subsequently Plumb, as an orig-

inal contractor, placed a mechanic's lien on

the land upon which the house stood, to

enforce payment for its construction, and

brought an action against the defendant for

the foreclosure of said lien. The plaintiff

then brought an action against Plumb to re-

cover the money paid for the cost of the

house, and garnished the defendant as the

debtor of Plumb. Subsequently, Plumb as-

signed to the plaintiff his interest in said me-

chanic's lien, and in the sum due from the

BAllERSLEY, J'. In the summer of 1890
the plaintlft' sold the defendant a building lot.
In September of that year the defendant decided to have a house erected on the lot. It
was then understood that one Simeon E.
Plumb, a builder, should build the house, and
that the plalntltf, a merchant, should advance
the money for the cost of construction. The
decision of this case depended on the actual
terms of the agreement then made, the defendant subsequently claiming that his only
agreement was with the plaintiff, and that by
such agreement the plaintiff undertook to
have the house built for the agreed price of
$1,700. Plumb built the house under the directions of the defendant. The plaintiff paid
to Plumb the amount of all b1lls for labor and
materials as they came due. The house was
ftnlebed In March, 1891, and the defendant
accepted and occupied it. At the time the
house was completed, Plumb and the plaintiff
went over the labor and other bills, and the
account of money paid for the cost of construction as charged on the plaintiff's ledger,
and at the foot of that account Plumb wrote
the following: "I have examined the above
account, and find It correct. S. Plumb." 'l'be
14th of t-he same month, the plalntilf made
a copy of this ledger account, and gave It to
the defendant as the bill due from him to
the plaintiff, In pursuance of their agreement. The defendant examined the bill, obtained the labor and material bills, made Inquiries among thP. men who furnished materials whether the prices of the materlals were
correct, and found t-hat they were correct.
The defendant made no objection to the bill
rendered as regards amount or price, except
the claim that one item of 3:! cents was
charged twice; but the defendant did object
to the total amount of the bill, and refused
payment. Subsequently Plumb, as an original contractor, placed a mechanic's lien on
the land upon which the house stood, to
enforce payment tor Its construction, and
brought an action against the defendant for
the forel'losure of said lien. The plalntllf
tben brought an action against Plumb to recover the money paid for the cost of the
house, and garnlshed the defendant as the

[Cl\Se No. lM

debtor of Plumb. Subsequently, Plumb . .
lll&:ned to the plaintiff his Interest in said mechanic's lien, and In the sum due trom the
defendant to Plumb for the construction of
the house; and the plaintltf then withdrew
hls action against Plumb, and became substituted as party plaintilf in the action to foreclose safd lien. The action of foreclosure wu
tried, and In Det.>ember, 1892, judgment wu
rendered In favor of Bradley, the present defendant. By the record of the judgment, It
appeared that the court found that the lien
had been made and recorded, and had been
assigned to the plalntllf, who became sole
owner, and was the actual and bona fide hold·
er and owner of the chose In action; but that
the contract for the building of the house had
not been made with Simeon Plumb, as al·
Jeged In the complaint; and that neither be
nor the plalntUf, as his assignee, was entitled
to foreclose the same. After this judgment
was rendered, the plalnt11T brought the present action.
The complaint follows the focm called the
"common counts," authorized for the commencement of an action. 'l'he counts rellecl
on are those for money paid, goods sold and
.delivered, goods bargained and sold, and
work performed and materials furnished, under which counts a bill of particulars was
flied, detalllng each Item that the plalntlft
claimed entered into the cost of the house,
and also the count for molft!y due on account stated, under which count the bill rendered the defendant In March, 1891, was
flied as the blll of particulars. The answer
ls a general denial. l'pon the trial there appears to have been no contest as to the fact
that the plalntilr had paid for the construction of the house, and no serious contest as
to the accuracy of his account as rendered.
The claim or the defendant appears to have
been In the alternatlve.~lther the defend·
ant's contract was made with the plalntlft
for a fixed price, or the contract was made
only with Plumb, and therefore the plaintiff ha8' no cause of action against the defendant; the position of the defendant under the latter claim, which was the one
ma.Inly relied on In argument, being that,
having induced the court In the former action to bold thnt the contract was not with
Plumb, he had escaped all liability on that
ground, and, If be now Induced the court to
hold that the contmct was made with
Plumb, he would escape all liability whatever, and secure his house without any pay·
ment. obtaining judicial sanction tor the
practical theft, under two contradictory
judgments. So far as the record shows, the
main question at Issue was: What agreement, If any, had the defendant made with
the plaintiff? It was not claimed on the
trial that any qul'Stion ot law was involvoo
In the determination of this Issue, and the
court found from the evidence that there was
an agreement between the plaintiff, Plumb,
and the defendant "that Plumb should per-

m
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form work h.\ erecting a house for the de-

fendant on this lot. Plumb, as carpenter,

was to work by the day, under the defend-

ant’s directions, at twenty-ﬁve cents an hour,

anti was to employ other carpenters at the

same rate. He was also to order materials

and work other than carpenter w°ork for the

house, and have the bills for the same char-

ged to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, at the

request of the defendant, agreed to be re-

sponsible and liable for all such materials

and other work as Plumb should order for

the house, and advance the money for the

payment of them, and also to advance

money to Plumb from time to time as he

might require to meet l1is weekly pay rolls.

The defendant agreed that on the comple-

tion of _the house, in consideration of the

money thus to be advanced by the plaintiif
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for the building of said house, and in consid-

eration of the building of the same. he would

repay the plaintiff the total amount of the

moneys so paid out by the plaintiff.” Upon

these facts. the court rendered judgment

that the pialntiil’ recover of the defendant

the sum of $2974.51, such sum being, as the

court found, the total amount paid by the

plaintiﬁ in pursuance of that agreement,

with interest. From this judgment the de-

fendant appeals.

The appeal contains two distinct grounds

for an appeal from the judgment:

1. Because the evidence introduced on the

trial, and printed in the record, does not sup-

port the facts found by the court below, but

does support a different state of facts claim-

ed by the defendant, and which the court

below found were not proved by the evi-

dence. The law does not authorize an ap~

peal from the judgment of a trial court for

such reasons, and this court will not take

Jurisdiction of such appeal. Styles v. Tyler,

64 Conn. 432, 30 Atl. 165. The record dis-

closes no reason for the correction of the

appeal on the ground that the ﬁnding of

facts does not fairly present the questions of

law actually raised and decided.

2. Because the defendant is entitled to a

new trial on account of errors alleged to

have been made in the admission of evidence.

Under this ground of appeal four errors are

assigned:

First. The plaintiff offered in evidence cer-

tain slips of paper, testifying that Plumb

came to the store each Saturday during the

building of the house, and gave him the

names of the men employed by him during the

week, and their time; that the plaintiff wrote

down at the time, in the presence of Plumb, on

these slips, these names, the hours of time,

the amount due each man, the total amount

due, and the date; that he paid Plumb the

total amount of money called for by each

slip, and tiled the slip on a spindle; and

that he had no personal knowledge of the

facts so stated to him by Plumb, and so

written by him on the slips, but that he made

such memoranda correctly as Plumb then

PRODUCTION AND EFFEJ1' OF EVIDENOE.

stated the facts to be. Plumb had already
torm work 1n erecting a house for the defendant on this lot. Plumb, as carpenter, testified that be bad employed these men on
was to work by the day, under the defend- the Bradley house, and that the slips of
ant's directions, at twenty-five cents an hour, paper were correct statements of the facb
and was to employ other carpenters at the ot each case as far as be could recollect:
same rate. He was also to order materials that he knew them to be correct when made;
and work other than carpenter wbrk for the and that he bad given the names, hours of
house, and have the bills for the satne char- time, and the amounts to the plalntilf, In the
ged to the plalntur. The plalntUr, at the manner that the plaintiff subsequently tesrequest of the defendant, agreed to be re- tified; and that, after deducting hie own
sponsible and liable for all ltllch material& · wages, he paid each man the amount due
and other work as Plumb should order for him. This evidence was olfered to pr:>ve
the house, and adyance the money for th& that the plalntltr had lncw·red llabllltles and
payment of them, and also to advance paid out moneys upon the order of and as
money to Plumb from time to time as he required by Plumb, as agent for the defendmight require to meet his weekly pay roll11. ant, In the manner agreed upon by the parThe defendant agreed that on the comple- ties, and to prove the correctness of the Items
tion of the house, lo consideration of the and prices. The defendant objected to the
money thus to be ndYanced by the plaintiff Introduction of these slips, and to the test[.
tor the bulldlng of said house, and In considmony of the plalntll'l and of Plumb as shown.
eration of the building of the same, he would The court admitted the slips, not as themrepay the plalntllf the total amount of the selves evidence apart from the 01·al testl·
moneys so paid out by the plalntilf." Upon
mony, but as memoranda made at the time
these facts, the court rendered judgment and In the manner shown, and to be used
that the plalntllf recover of the defendant by the witnesses Plumb and Curtis In the
the eum of $2,974.51, such sum being, as the
manner Indicated, the witnesses reading the
court found, the total amount paid by the contents of the slips, and admitted the tesplaintll'l In pursuance of that agreement. timony of Curtis and Plumb In connection
with Interest. I<'rom thle judgment the de- with them as stated. Said slips were marked
fendant appeals.
as exhibits.
The nppeal contains two distinct grounds
Second. The plalntltr offered lo evlden<"8
for mi appeal from the judgment:
certain bills, testifying that they were ren1. BC'cause tile evidence Introduced on the dered him from time to time, and that he
trial, and printed In the record, does not sup. went oYer the bllls with Plumb, In the deport the facts found by the court below, but fendant's abst>nce, at various times as they
does support a different state of facts claim- came due, while the house was building or
ed by the defendant, and which the court upon Its completion; that some of these bills
below found were not proved by the evi- were exclusively for materials and work tor
dence. The law does not authorize an ap.
the defendant Bradley's house. and some conpeal from the judgment of a trial court for tained other Items not for that house, and
such reasons, and this court wlll not take Plumb picked out the Items of material and
jurisdiction of such appeal. Styles v. Tyler, work thnt went Into the Brndley house, and
64 Conn. 432, 30 Atl. 165. The record dis- stated that the Items and prices were correct;
closes no reason for the correction of the that when the 1lE'Rlgnatlon "Bradley house"
appeal on the ground that the finding of was not In the body of the blll when rendered,
facts does not fairly present the questions of . as It was In many bills, be (the plaintiff)
law actually raised and decided.
wrote It In at the time In Plumb's presence,
2. Because the defendant Is entitled to a and correctly ae given to him, and that he
new trial on account of errors alleged to also made the check marks appearing on the
have been made In the admission of evidence.
bills when offered In evidence, to Indicate
Under this ground of appeal four errors are Plumb's assent to the correctness of the Items
assigned:
and prices; that these check marks were
First. The plalntltr offered In evidence cer- made ln Plumb's presence, and correctly,
tain slips of paper, testifying that Plumb as then stated by him to the plaintiff; and
.came to the store each Saturday during the that he could not recall those Items or prices
building of the house, and gave him the without referring to the bills and memo.
names of the men employed by him during the randa made on them at the time. Plumb had
week, and their time; that the plalntllf wrote already testified that he bad. given the or·
down at the time, In the presence of Plumb, on ders to the persona thus rendering bills to
these slips, these names, the hours of time, the plalnt!IT, and that be bad gone uver these
the amount due each man, the total amount bills In the manner that the platntltr testJ.
due. and the date; that he paid Plumb the fled, and that he had stated to the plaintiff
total amount of money called for by each that the Items and prices as picked out were
slip, and filed the slip on a spindle; and correct, and that these Items represented mathat be bad no personal knowledge of the terials and labor that bad gone Into the
facts so stated to him by Plumb, and so house, and that be bad no recollection of the
written by him on the slips, but that he made details of those Items Independently of the
such memoranda correctly as Plumb then bills and the memoranda upon them, which
4M
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he had seen at the time, and which he then

knew to be correct. This evidence was of-

fered to prove that the plaintiff had in-

curred liabilities and paid out money as re-

quired and ordered by Plumb as agent for

the defendant, in the manner agreed by the

parties, the correctness of the items and

prices, and that the materials went into the

Bradley house. The defendant objected to

the introduction of the bills, and to the tes-

timony of the plaintiff and of Plumb as above

set forth. The court did not admit the bills,

marked and designated as stated, as them~

selves evidence apart from the oral testi-

mony, but admitted them as memoranda made

or seen by witnesses who at the time either

had knowledge of their truth or made them

upon the statements of one who had such

knowledge at the time, and to be used by
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witnesses in the manner shown, the witnesses

reading their contents as marked, and their

value depending upon the oral testimony ac-

companying them, and admitted the testi-

mony of the plaintiﬂ and Plumb as stated

above.

There is no error in the above rulings. The

court found that Plumb was authorized by

the defendant to perform and to employ the

labor on the house, and present his weekly

pay rolls to the plaintiff; also, to order other

work and materials for the house, and pre

sent the bills for such materials and work to-

zhe plaintiﬁ; that the plaintiff was author-

ized by the defendant to pay to Plumb such

weekly pay rolls, and to pay such bills for

materials and work so ordered by Plumb,

and charge the amounts of the pay rolls and

bills so paid by him against the defendant.

The court was bound to admit the testimony

of the plaintiff and of Plumb as to the liabil-

ities incurred and the payments made under

such authority. The use of the slips and

bills made at the time of the transaction, and

known to the witnesses to have been correct-

ly made, as memoranda to be used by them

in connection with their oral testimony, comes

within the settled rules of evidence. “A wit-

ness may, while under examination, refresh

his memory by referring to any writing made

by himself at the time of the transaction con-

cerning which he is questioned, or so soon

afterwards that the judge considers it likely

that the transaction was at that time fresh in

his memory. The witness may also refer

to any, such writing made by any other per-

son, and read by the witness within the time

aforesaid, if, when he read it, he knew it to

be correct.” Steph. Dig. Ev. art. 136. “How

far papers not evidence per se, but proved

"to have been true statements of fact at the

time they were made, are admissible in con-

nection with the testimony of a witness who

made them, has been a frequent subject of

inquiry. and it has many times been decided

that they are to be received. And why should

they not be? Quantities and values are re-

tained in the memory with great diiiiculty.

If, at a time when an entry of aggregate

Ile had seen at the tJme, and which he then
knew to be correct. This evidence was ot·
fered to prove thnt the plnintltT had In.
curred llabllltles and paid out money as required and ordered by Plumb as agent for
the defendant, ln the mnnner agreed by the
parties, the correctness of the Items and
prices, and that the materials went Into the
Bradley house. The defendant objected to
the Introduction ot the bills, and to the testimony of the plaintitT and of Plumb as above
set forth. The court did not admit the bills,
marked and designated aa stated, as them.
selves evidence apart from the oral tesu.
mony, but admitted them as memoranda made
or seen by witnesses who at the time either
had knowledge of their truth or made them
upon the statements of one who had such
knowledge at the time, and to be used by
witnesses In the manner shown, the witnesses
reading their contents as marked, and their
value depending upon the oral testimony accompanying them, and admitted the test!·
mony of the plaintl.!r and Plumb as stated
.above.
There is no error 1n the above rulings. The
{:ourt found that Plumb was authorized by
the defendant to perform and to employ tlle
lnbor on the hcuse, and present his weekly
pay rolls to the plaintUf; also, to order other
work and materials for the house, and present the bllls for such materials and work to
the plaintiff; that the plalntltT was authorized by the defendant to pay to Plumb such
weekly pay rolls, and to pay such bills for
materials and work so ordered by Plumb,
and charge the amounts of the pay rolls and
bills so paid by him against the defendant.
'ThP. court was bound to aclmlt the testimony
-0f the plalntltr and of Plumb as to the liabilities incurred and the payments made under
.such authority. The use of the slips and
bills made at the time of the t1·nm•nctlon, and
known to the witnesses to have been correct·
ly made, ns memornndn to be used by them
ln connection with theit· oral testimony, comes
within the settled rules of evidence. "A witness may, while under examination, refresh
his memory by referring to any writing made
by himself at the time ot. the transaction con.cernlug whlch he ls questioned, or so soon
.afterwards that the judge considers It likely
that the transaction was at that time fresh In
hls memory. The witness may also refer
to any; such writing made by any other per·
son, and read by the witness within the time
aforesaid, It, when he read It, he knew It to
be correct." Steph. Dig. Ev. art. 136. "How
far papers not evidence per se, but proved
to have been true statements of fact at the
time they were made, are admissible In connection with the testimony of a witness who
made them, has been a frequent subject of
Inquiry, and It has many times been decided
that they are to be received. And why should
they not be? Quantities and ¥Blues are retained In the memory with great difficulty.
U, at a time when an entry of aggregate
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quantities or values was made, the wltneBS
knew It was correct, It ls hard to see why
It ls not at lenst as reliable as the memory of
the witness." Insurance Co. v. Welde, 14
Wall. 380; Town of Bridgewater v. Town
ot Roxbury, 54 Conn. 213, 6 AU. 415.
The defendant also claims error In marking
the slips as exhibits, on the ground that, If
they might properly be read by the witness,
they are not themselves admissible as evl·
dence. Courts in other jurisdictions have
made dUl'erent rulings as to the admissibtllty
ot. such a writing. In England It ls excluded.
In Massachusetts and some other states It la
excluded. Costelo v. Crowell; 133 l\Iass. 355;
l\Iorrlson v. Chapin, 97 Mass. 72; Duggan v.
Mahoney, 11 Allen, 572. In Vermont it seems
to be treated as evidence. Lapham v. Kelly,
35 Vt. 195. In New York and some other
states the writing ls admitted as evidence.
Guy v. Mead, 22 N. Y. 462, 465; Mayor, etc.,
v. Second Ave. R. Co., 102 N. Y. 572, 7 N.
E. 905; Haven v. Wendell, 11 N. H. 112;
Kelsea v. Fletcher, 48 N. H. 282; State v.
Rawls, 2 Nott & McC. 331; Pearson v. Wightman, 1 Const. (S. C.) 336; Owens v. State, 67
Md. 307, 10 Atl. 210, 302; Milling Co. v.
Walsh (Mo. Sup.) 18 S. W. 005. In the fed·
eral jurisdiction the question ls still open.
In Insurance Co. v. Welde, supra, the court
Indicates the admlsslblllty of the evidence;
but the opinion 1n Bates v. Preble, 151 U. S.
lM, 14 Sup. Ct. 277, sho'l\a that the court Ill
not committed to the general doctrine that
such memoranda are admissible !or any other
purpose than to refresh the memory of the
witness. We do not attempt to cite all the
cases bearing on the question, or to weigh
the condlctlng authorities; tor we are satisfied, on p11nclple, that the evidence ln ques·
tlon ls admissible. The discussion would be
endless, unless confined to the precise questloh presented, which may be stated as follows: The litigated question Is, did the plaintlfl' pay to the agent of the defendant a certain sum on a certain date, as wages due tor
labor performed by a certain man employed
by the agent? The plalntlff and the agent
testify thnt a sum was paid tor such purpose;
that at the time of payment the agent gave
to the plnlntlll' the exact amount due, and
the name of the employi; entitled to the same,
and the plaintiff then, In the presence of the
agent, wrote on a piece of paper the date,
the amount, and the name; that these Items,
as then written by the plaintiff, were correct;
that the pnper produced In court ls the Identical paper then written upon by the plalntltr,
and since unchanged; that they have no
recollection, either before or after examining
the paper, of the date, the amount, or the
name. Is that paper admissible as evidence?
AU courts concur 1n holding that the witness
may read the statement of such paper to the
jury, and that the jury may draw the con·
cluslon that the statement so read to them
ls a true statement ot. the tacts; but some
courts hold that the paper 18 not evidence.
400
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It seems to us to be pressing the use of a

legal ﬁction too far for a court to permit the

statement made by such paper to be read as

evidence, while holding that the law forbids

the admission as evidence of the paper which

is the original and only proof‘ of the state-

ment admitted. In other words, it would

seem as if, in admitting the paper to be so

read, the court, of necessity, admitted the

paper as evidence, and therefore, by the con-

current authority of all courts, the paper is

itself admissible. But, waiving the question

whether, in admitting such paper to be read,

the courts have gone so far as to make the

denial of its admissibility no longer tenable,

we will deal with the matter as if wholly

undecided. Is the paper itself admissible as

evidence? Its admissibility, in the ﬁrst in-

stance. depends on its relevancy. Of this
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there can be no doubt. Being relevant, it

must be admitted, unless excluded under

some legal principle or rule of public policy

which forbids the admission of certain classes

of evidence, no matter how relevant and ma-

terial. It cannot be said that the paper is

not capable in its nature of being treated as

competent evidence. Legal evidence is not

conﬁned to the human voice or oral testi-

mony; it includes every tangible object cap-

able of making a truthful statement, such evi-

dence being roughly classiﬁed as documen-

tary evidence. In oral evidence the Witness

is the man who speaks; in documentary evi-

dence the witness is the thing that speaks.

In either case the witness must be competent,

—i. e. must be deemed competent to make a

truthful statement. And in either case the

competency of the witness must be proved

before the evidence is admitted; the differ-

ence being that in oral evidence the compe-

tency is proved by a legal presumption, and

in documentary evidence the competency

must be proved by actual testimony, and the

further difference that in oral evidence the

credit of the witness is tested by his own

cross-examination, while in documentary evi-

dence the credit of the witness is tested by

the cross-examination of those who must be

called to prove its competency.

The competency of this paper is clearly

established by the testimony, and it would

seem to follow, of necessity, that it should

be admitted on the same ground that any

relevant and material documentary evidence,

proved to be competent, is admitted. The

doubt has arisen from the complication of

the admissibility of such paper with the

right of a. witness to refresh his memory.

In fact, the two questions may be entirely

distinct. The right of a witness to refresh

his memory is a settled and necessary rule

of evidence. The application of that rule is

often diiﬁcnlt, involving delicate distinctions.

We are not called upon now to draw the line

which limits the right of a witness to the

use of such aids as, under the subtle laws

of association, serve to refresh his memory.

All courts recognize that right, and right-
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It seems to us to be pressing the use of a
legal fiction too tar for a CO\lft to permit the

statement made by such paper to be read as
evidence, while holding that the law forbids
the admission as evidence of the paper which
ls the original and only proof of the statement admitted. In other words, It would
seem as if, in admitting the paper to be so
read, the court, ot necessity, admitted the
paper as evidence, and therefore, by the concurrent authority of all courts, the paper ls
Itself admissible. But, waiving the question
whether, In admitting such paper to be read,
the courts have gone so far as to make tbe
denial of Its admlsslblllty no longer tenable,
we will deal with the matter as If wholly
undecided. 11 the paper itself admissible as
evidence? It.I admisslbllity, in the first instance, depe.nds on Its relevancy. Of this
there can be no doubt. Being relevant, lt
muat be admitted, unless excluded under
some legal principle or rule of public policy
which forbids the admission of certain classes
of evidence, no matter how relevant and material. It cannot be said that the paper ls
not capable In Its nature of being treated as
competent evidence. Legal evidence ls not
confined to the human voice or oral testimony; it includes every tangible object capable of making a. truthful statement, such evidence being roughly classified as documentary evidence. In oral evidence the witness
ts the man who speaks; In documentary evidence the witness ls the thing that speaks.
In either case the witness must be competent,
-l. e. must be deemed competent to make a
truthful statement. And in either case the
competency of the witness must be proved
before the evidence ls admitted; the dllference being that in oral evidence the competency is proved by a legal presumption, and
in documentary evidence the competency
must be proved by actual testimony, and the
further dUTerence that In oral evidence the
credit of the witness Is tested by his own
cross-examination, while ln documentary evidence the credit of the witness Is tested by
the cross-examination of those who must be
called to prove its competency.
The competency of this paper ls clearly
established by the te8tlmony, and lt would
seem to follow, of necessity, that It should
be admitted on the same ground that any
relevant and material documentary evidence,
proved to be competent, ls admitted. The
doubt has e.rlsen from the complication of
the admissibility of such paper with the
right of a witness to refresh his memory.
In fact, the two questions may be entirely
distinct. The rlglit of a witness to refresh
his memory Is a settled and necessary rule
of evidence. The application of that rule is
often difficult, Involving delicate distinctions.
'Ve are not called upon now to draw the line
which limits the right of a witness to the
use of such aids as, under jhe subtle laws
ot aesoclatlon, serve to refresh his memory.
All courts recognize that right, and rigbt.W

ly hold that the thing used to refresh the
memory Is not, by reason of such use, Itself
admissible a11 evidence. When, in the application of the rule, a. document llke the
one In question was presented to the witness, and absolutely failed to refresh his
memory, Its exclusion as a means of refreshing his memory became Imperative; but theevidence of the document was ao elearly essential to a fair and just trlal that Its use
In some form seemed all!O Imperative. Instead of treating the paper as Itself competent documentary evidence, resort wu
had to a palpable fiction. The paper ls read
by the witness, and the knowledge the witness once had of the facts stated by the
paper ls imputed to him a.a still existing, and
the statement of the paper la recetnd aa the
testimony of the witness, and the paper Itself, the only witness capable of making the
statement, ls excluded. The use of such a.
fiction in the administration of justice can
rarely, If ever, be justified. It ls certainly
uncalled for In this Instance. The principles of law invoked to justify the fiction are
amply sumclent to support, Indeed to demand, the admission of the document as evidence. There ls no occasion to sacrUlce
truth In order to secure justice. As regards
Its admisslblllty as evidence, there ls no substantial difference between this paper and
any other tangible object capable of making
a truthtul and relevant statl"ment. It ls
true that a wrlting may be a mere declaration, and practically equivalent to a spoken
declaration, and so be excluded as heal"Blly
evidence. This posslblllty has played a conspicuous part In the discussions that have
ftnally resulted in the admission as evidence
of account books, whether kept by a clerk
or by a party to the suit (a subject closely
related to the one In hand, but involving too
large a field to juetlty an attempt to define
that relation). But it is also true that a
writing may, by reason of the circumstances
under which It was made, be a documentary
witness to the fact the paper itself tends te>
prove, and this, altbough the particular writing may also in a cP.rtaln sense be a declaration. Indeed, nearly all documentary evidence ls In a certain sense a declaration;
yet it Is admitted as a witness, not of a declaration, but of a fact. We think this paper Is admissible as a documentary witness.
Suppose the litigated question turns on the
dimensions of a man's foot. A witness produces a plaster <'&St of the foot. The testimony conclusively sliows that the cast was
so taken that It can state accurately the
dimensions of the f'lOt. Another witne11s
produces a pape1· on which the exact measurements are written. The testimony conclusively shows that the paper also was so
made that it can state accurately the dimensions ot the toot. le It not evident that the
paper and the cast ls each a witness to the
fact that each tends to prove? How does
the paper now ln question differ? Upon this

EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES, IN CHIEF.
EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES, IN CHIEF.

[Case No. 154

paper was stamped an accurate delineation

of existing facts. In the one case the fact

stated by the document relates to a physical

object, and in the other to a mental object;

but in both cases the fact is clearly rele-

vant and accurately stated by the document.

It is immaterial whether or not a critical

analysis may impute to these documents, to

a greater or less degree, some element of a

declaration; the controlling principle of law

is not based on such reﬁnements. If the1'e

is any element of a declaration, it does not

make the document in a legal sense a decla-

ration. The conditions required by law to

make such documents legal evidence are:

The substance offered as a witness must be

proved to have been made or found and pre-

served in such manner that it states direct-

ly, accurately, and truly a fact relevant and
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material to the issue. The paper claimed

as evidence in this case fulﬁlls these condi-

tions.

In the discussions on the admissibility oi‘

account books, it has often been assumed

that such books are declarations, and are

admitted as exceptions to the class of hear-

say evidence. Without stopping to consid-

er whether such ground for the admission of

account books is logically accurate, and, if

so, whether the same reasoning applies to

this paper, we will assume that it may be

classed as hearsay evidence. It should then

be admitted as an exception to the rule ex-

cluding such evidence. The limits of the

ticld covered by the term “hearsay evi-

dence" are so uncertain. and the exceptions

are so many and important, that it is often

very diﬂicult to draw the distinction be

tween those matters that are admitted as

not subject to the rule and those that are

subject to the rule, but excepted from its

operation. It is signiﬁcant that most mat-

ters supposed to be covered by the rule.

whose relevancy and materiality come to be

recognlzed as so close and clear that their

admission seems essential. come to be class-

ed as exceptions to the rule. If this paper

must be classed as a declaration and hear-

say evidence, it must also be classed as an

exception to the operation of the rule. The

reasons on which the rule is founded plain-

ly do not apply to such evidence, and the ar-

guments adduced in support of the admis-

sibility of this paper as original evidence are

suﬂicient to demonstrate that it does not

come within the reason of the rule exclud-

ing hearsay evidence. Whether this paper

is not within the scope of hearsay evl(len(-c.

or, being hearsay evidence, is excepted from

the operation of the rule, as not within its

reason, is immaterial so far as concerns the

question of admissibility, though the distinc-

tion may be quite material as affecting the

symmetry of the law of evidence, and the

clear understanding of the underlying prin-

ciples that must control the development of

that law. It does not, however, necessarily

follow from the admissibility of such evi-

paper was etamped an accurate delineation
ot existing tact& In the one case the tact
stated by the dOC'Ument relates to a physical
object, and In the other to a mental object;
but In both cases the tact 18 clearly relevant and accurately stated by the document.
It ls Immaterial whether or not a critical
analysts may Impute to these documents, to
a greater or le811 degree, some element of a
de<'laratlon; the controlling principle ot law
ls not baaed on such refinements. It there
• la any element ot a declaration, It d()(lll not
make the document in a lepl sense a declaration. The conditions required by law to
make such documents legal evidence are:
The substance offered as a witness must be
proved to have been made or found and pre11erved In such manner that it states directly, accurately, and truly a tact relevant and
material to the Issue. The paper clnlmed
as evidence In this caae fulfllls these conditions.
In the discussions on the admissibility of
account books, It has often been assumed
that such books are declarations, and are
admitted aa exceptions to the clau ot hear·
say evidence. Without stopping to (.'(maid·
er whether such ground for the 11dml&11lon or
account books ts logically accurate, and, If
so, whether the same reasoning applies to
thla paper, we will assume that It may be
classed as hearsay evidence. It should then
be admitted ae an exception to the rule excluding such evidence. The limits ot the
field covered by the term "hearsay evi·
deuce" are so uncertain, and the exceptloni;
are eo many and Important, that It ts often
very dlmcult to draw the distinction between those matters that are admitted a11
not subject to the rule and those that arl'
eubject to the rule, but excepted from lti-:
operation. It ta significant that most matters supposed to be covered by the rule.
who11e relevancy and materiality come to be
recognized as so close and clear that their
admission seems essential, come to be classed as exceptions to the rule. It this pap<>:·
must be classed as a declaration and hearsay evidence, It must also be clns11ed as a1:
exception to the operation ot the rule. Thi'
reasons on which the rule ls founded plainly do not apply to such evidence, and the arguments addur~ed In support of the admissibility ot this paper 1111 original evidence are
sumclent to demonstrate that It does not
come within the reason of the rule excluding henr11ny evidence. Whether this pape:·
ts not within the scope of hearsay evldcn<'I'.
or, being hearsay evidence, Is excepted from
the operation of the rule, as not within !ti-:
reason, ls Immaterial so far as concerns the
question of admissibility, though the distinction may be quite material as atrectlng the
symmetry of the law of evidence, and the
clear understanding of the underlying principles that must control the development ot
that law. It does not, however, necessarily
follow from the admlsslblllty ot such evl-

(Que No. lM

dence that the document should be sent to
the jury room. Under the general rule ot
practice, the Jury must depend on thefr memory In the case ot oral testimony, but may
take documentary evidence to their consultation. But there ls a difference In documentary evidence. Some is not given to the
jury, either because Its possession ls agreed
to be of no consequence or Is Inconvenient,
or the document ls of such a nature that It
testifies to facts not relevant, In addition to
the relevant facts. It might be claimed In
the case of some writings offered in proof
ot the facts stated by the writing that a
jury would confuse the effect to be given
such writing with the peculiar effect sometimes given to a record or a deed, and so
ctve an lllep.1 wetcht to the evidence.
Possibly, some such consideration may have
had lnfiuence In keeping such writings from
the Jury; but, whateyer force such a consideration may once have bad, It ls entitled to
little weight under the present pollcy of the
law, which tends to submit to the jury all
relevant and material evidence. and even
trusts them to dlecrimlnate the allowance
to be made tor the Interest of a party to the
suit, or the character of a coo:vlcted felon.
If the writing admitted In evidence clearly
tends to prove nothing but the fact that It
was admitted to prove, It should go to the
jury. If, by reason of peculiar circumstances, It clearly may be treated by the jury
as evidence ot other tacts not admissible,
It should not go to the jury. Between the
two extremes the question ls largely one ot
discretion In the trial judge.
In the present case It Is clear that the writing could only be used tor Its legitimate purpose, and that the court did not err In marking It as an exhibit. The conditions under
which the general question we have discussed may arise are so various, and the different principles that may be Involved In
each case are so related, that there Is special
need to confine the appllcntlon or the views
expressed strictly to the particular question
presented In this case. The only point now
decided Is: A memorandum of details which
are essential to the tun proof of a transaction at Issue, proved to have been made substantially at the time of the transaction, and
under such circumstances that the memorandum can make a correct statement of such
details as they were then known to the person who made the memorandum or saw It
made, and who Is himself a witness and testifies to the transaction, but has lost all recolll'ction of such details, Is, In connertlon
with the testimony of such witness, admissible as evidence, because such memorandum
ls In itselr evidence of a fact closely relevant, plainly material, and essential to a just
trial, and because no principle of the law ot
evidence or rule of public policy justifies Its
exclusion; and such memorandum may properly be marked as an exhibit.
Third. The persona rendering the bills
457
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above mentioned testiﬁed that the bills as a

whole were correct as regards amounts and

prices, and that, when the body of the origi-

nal bill indicated what items went to the

Bradley house, those items of material and

labor were ordered for that house by Plumb.

The defendant excepted to the admission of

the testimony of these persons. The error

assigned by the defendant is that the court

erred in allowing the evidence of the par-

ties furnishing this material, to the effect

“that, where the body of the original bill in-

dicated what item went to the Bradley house,

these items of materials and labor were or-

dered for that house by Plumb." The fact

that the money paid by the plaintiff was

paid for materials used in building the house,

and ordered for that purpose by Plumb, as .

the agent of the defendant, was a fact in is-
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sue; and the testimony of the persons from

whom it was claimed that Plumb had so or-

dered such materials, that he had in fact or-

dered the same, was relevant to that issue.

The use by such witnesses in their testimony

of the bills made by them at the time, in

pursuance of such orders from Plumb, and

of the written memoranda made by them at

above mentioned testified that the bllls as a
whole were correct as regards amounts and
prices, and that, when the body of the original blll indicated what items went to the
Bradley house, those Items of material and
labor were ordered for that house by l'lumb.
'.rhe defendant excepted to the admission of
the testimony of these persons. The error
assigned by the defendant ls that the court
erred In allowing the evidence of the parties furnishing this material, to the "'ft'ect
..that, where the body of the original bill Indicated what Item went to the Bradley house,
these Items of materials and labor were ordert'(\ for that house by Plumb." The fact
that the money paid by the plaintiff was
pnld for materials used In building the house,
and ordered for that purpose by l'lumb, aa
the ag.:?nt of the defendant, w!ls a fact In ls.sue; and the test!mony of the persons from
whom It was claimed that Plumb bud so ordered such materials, that he had In fact ordered the same, was relevant to that issue.
'l'he use by such witnesses In their testimony
of the bills made by them .it the time, 1n
pttrimance of such orders from Plnmb, and
of the written memoranda made by them at
the time to the effect that Plumb, the agent
of the defendant, ordered the materials specified for the defendant's house, is plainly authorized by law.
Fourth. The plaintiff offered the record of

the time to the eﬂect that Plumb, the agent

of the defendant, ordered the materials speci-

ﬁed for the defendant's house, is plainly au-

thorized by law.

Fourth. The plaintiff oifered the record of

458

the judgment above mentioned, in the case

of Curtis, assignee of Plumb, against Brad-

ley, for the purpose of showing that in this

case the defendant was estopped from claim-

ing that the contract for the erection of the

house was made with Plumb. The court

admitted the record against the objection of

the defendant. The fact that the contract

for the construction of the house was not

made with Plumb was one material fact at

issue in this case, and the plaintiff was en-

titled to show that the defendant was es-

topped from claiming that the contract was

made with Plumb. It is not claimed that

the record of a judgment in a. case between

' the same parties, which appears on its face

to have adjudicated a matter in issue be-

tween them in a subsequent action, is not

admissible in the latter suit in support of a

claim of estoppel; but the claim is that in

this case the parties to the record oifered

were not the same as the parties to the pres-

ent suit. This claim has no foundation in

fact. The plaintiff in this suit was the ac-

tual plaintiff in the former action, and, more-

over, was substituted for the nominal plain-

tiff, and by such substitution became also

the plaintiff of record. Gen. St. §§ 981, 887-

889; Buckingham’s Appeal, 60 Conn. 143, 22

Atl. 509.

A new trial is denied. The other judges

concurred.
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the judgment above mentioned, In the case
of Curtis, assignee of Plumb, against Bradley, for the purpose of showing that In this
case the defendant was estopped from claiming that the contract for the erection of the
house was made with Plumb. 'l'be court
admitted the record against the objection ot
the defendant. The fact that the contract
tor the construction of the hoUBe was not
m!lde with Plumb was one material tact at
Issue In this case, and the plaintiff was entitled to show that the defendant was estopped from claiming that the contract was
mnde with Plumb. It Is not claimed that
the record of a judgment In a case between
the same parties, which appears on Its face
to have adjudicated a matter In Issue between them In a subsequent action, ts not
admissible ln the latter suit In support of 11.
dahn of estoppel; but the claim Is that In
thls case the parties to the record offered
were not the same as the parties to the pn:-sent suit. This claim bas no foundation 1n
tact. The plalntltr In this suit was the actual plalntlfl' In the former action, and, moreover, was substituted for the nominal plain·
tl!'t, and by such substitution b<•came al110
the plaintiff of record. Gen. St. H 981, 8..'fl889; Buckingham's Appeal, 60 Conn. 14:-l, 22
Atl. l'\00.

A new trial ls dented.
.:oncur1·ed.

The other Judgca

CROSS-EXAMINATION.

[Case No. 155

CRt)SS—EXA MINATION.

BORA~

[Case No. 155

BOI-IAN v. BOROUGH OF AVOCA.

(26 Ati. 60-1, 154 Pa. St. 40-l.)

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. May 1, 1893.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Lu-

zerne county; Rice, Judge.

Action in trespass by Paul Bohan against

the borough of Avoca for damages to plain-

tiﬂ’s lot resulting from the construction of

gutters along defendant's street, and thus

conducting the surface water from a large

v. BOROUGH OF AVOCA.
(26 At!. OOI. 154 Pu. St. 404.)
Supreme Court of PenDBylvania. May 1, 1893.
Appeal from court of common pleas, Lu?.erne county; Rice, Judge.
Action In trespass by Paul Bohan against
the borough of Avoca for damages to plaintiff's lot resulting from the construction of
gutters along defendant's street, and thus
<.-onductlng the surface water from a large
territory to the lot. Plalntltl had judgment,
and defendant appeals. Afftrmed.

territory to the lot. Plaintiff had judgment,

and defendant appeals. Aﬂirmed.

The Points Which were Submitted in Writ-

ing to the Court Below, and the Answers

Thereto.

"The plaintiff asked the court to charge

the jury as follows: ‘(1) If the jury believe

that the defendant borough, in constructing

its gutters. caused the surface water of a
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large territory, which did not naturally ﬂow

in that direction, to be gathered into a body,

and precipitated on plaintiffs premises, to

the injury of the plaintiff, defendant is lia-

ble, and plaintiff is entitled to recover’ We

answer that point in the affirmative.

“Defendant's counsel request us to charge:

“ ‘(1) That no recovery can be had in this

case unless the jury are convinced by the

testimony presented that the quantity of

water ﬂowing down Main street through the

culvert upon the property of the plaintiff

has been increased, and that such increase

has given to it a greater force of destruc-

tiveness, and that in consequence of the

same the plaintiffs property has been in-

jured.‘ This point is aﬂirmed.

" ‘(2) That, if the increase in the volume

and destructiveness of said water is due to

the change of the grade of the street. and

not to the construction of the gutters, the

piaintitf is not entitled to recover.’ This

point is aﬂirmed.

“ ‘(3) That in determining whether or not

there has been any increase in the volume

of water since the construction oi.’ the gut-

ters, it is the duty of the jury to make com-

parison upon the theory that the street and

‘its gutters were kept in proper order, and

unobstructed, before the paved gutters were

constructed.’ As explained by the counsel

in his argument to us. we aﬂirm that point.

What we understand is meant by this is that

a comparison is to be made between the ﬂow

of water in the present condition of the gut-

ter with the ﬂow of water ordinarily, prior

to the placing of the gutters there. In other

words, the comparison is not to be made be-

tween the present ﬂow of water in the gut-

ter and through the culverts, with the ﬂow of

water when the street or water courses, pri-

or to the placing of the gutters there, were

temporarily obstructed.

“ ‘(4) The allegation in this case being that

the alleged injury to the property of plain-

tiff was caused by paved gutters constructed

by the borough, plaintiff was bound to prove

that said gutters were constructed pursuant

to legislation on part of said borough, and,

The Points Which were Submitted In Writing to the Court Below, and the Answers
Thereto.
"The plaintiff asked the court to charge
the jury as follows: '(1) It the jury believe
that the defendant borough, In constructing
its gutters, caused the surface water of a
large territory, which did not naturally flow
in that direction, to be gathered Into a body,
and precipitated on plaintiff's premises, to
the Injury of the plalntllT, defendant Is liable, and plaintiff ls entitled to recover• We
:answer that point In the nJftrmatlve.
"Defemlunt's eounsel request us to charge:
" '(l) That no recovery can be had In this
case unless the jury are convinced by the
testimony presented that the quantity of
water :tlowlng down Main street through the
culvert upon the pr<>verty of the plaintiff
has been Increased, and that such Increase
ha11 given to It a greater force of destructlvene11s, and that In consequence of the
same the pl:.intlff's property has been Injured.' This point ls afftrmed.
•• '(2) That, If the Increase In the volume
and destmctlveness of said water ls due to
the change of the grade of the strP.Pt. and
not to the construction of the gutters, the
plaintiff Is not entitled to recover.' Tills
point ls umrmed.
" '(3) That In determining whether or not
there has been uny lnci:ease In the volume
of water since the construction of the gutters, It Is the duty of the jury to make comparison upon the theory that the street and
"its gutters were kept In proper order, and
unobstructed, before the paved gutters were
constructed.' As explained by the counsel
in his argument to us, we atllnn that point.
What we understand Is meant by this Is that
a comparison Is to be made between the :tlow
of water in the present condition of the gutter with the 1low of water ordinarily, prior
to the placing of the gutters there. In other
words, the comparison Is not to be made between the present :tlow of water In the gutter 11Dd through the culverts, with the :tlow of
water when 1!be street or water courses, prt·
o()r to the placing of the gutters there, were
temporarily obstructed.
" '(4) The allegation In this case being that
the alleged injury to the property of plalntltl' was caused by paved gutters constructed
by the borough, plaintltl was bound to prove

that said gutters were constructed pursuant
to legislation on part of said borough, and,
there bt.>lng no legitimate proof presented to
establish auy such legislation, the plaintltl la
not entitled to recover.' We decline to charge
as requested In that point. We think there
Is evidence from which a jury would be warranted In finding that the gutters were constrm·ted by the borough.
.
" '(ri) That the plaintiff cannot recover any
damnges tor llDY Injury to bis property which
he might have avoided by the exercise of ordinary care, either In respect to the past or
to the future.' '.fhls ls ntlirmed.
" '(6) That the jury, If they find that the
defendant Is liable In this action, may adopt
as the measure of damages the expense of
protecting the property with n wall or pipe
from injury on account of the water flowing through the ravine.' This Is atDrmed.''
Speclttcatlons of Error.
"First. The court erred In ove1TUllng the
defendant's objection to questions of plaintltr's counsel on the cross-examination of defendant's witness as to who authorized the
work of constructing the gutters,-tl fact not
alluded to In chief, and provable by the record of council proceedings alone,-whlch said
ruling, testimony, and questions are as follows: 'Question. Done by the borough wblle
you were burgess? A. No, sir. (Objected
to. Objection overruled.) Defendant's coun·
eel states the objection as follows: (1) Because It Is not cross-examination. (2) It Is
a part of plaintiff's case in chief, and cau be
proved only by the records of the council,
whether It was done by the borough or not.
(Objection overruled, and bill sealed for detendru1t.) Q. Do you swear that It was not
done by the borougb,-that the borough did
not employ Mr. Westdeld to do the work? A.
It was done under the jurisdiction of the borough, but the people paid the money. Q.
Who employed Mr. Westfield to do It? A.
The town council.'
"Second. The court erred In refusing to affirm defendant's point number four, which
rends as follows: 'Point 4. The alleg11tlon
In this case being that the alleged lnjury to
the property of plulntltr was caused by paved
gutters constructed by the borough, plalntltr
was bound to prove that said gutters were
constructed pursuant to legislation on the
part of said borough, and, there being no leldtlmate proof presented to establish any such
legislation, the plaintiff Is not entitled to recover. Answer of the Court: We decline
to charge as requested In that point. We
think there Is evidence from which a jury
would be wammtell In finding that the gutters were constructed by the borough.' "
P. A. O'Boyle nnd F. M. Nichols, for appellant. C. F. Bohan and John T. Lenahan, for
appellee.
STERRETT, 0. J. One of the specl:tlcatlons In this case is refusal of the court to
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sustain objections to questions put, on cross-

examination of defendant’s witness, for the

purpose of showing that the gutters alleged

to have caused the injury complained of

were constructed by the defendant borough,

or under its authority. The objections were

(a) that the questions were not proper cross-

examination, and (b) that the fact sought to

be proved was part of plaintiff's case in chief.

and could be proved only by the records of

the borough council. The court having over-

ruled said objections, the witness testiﬂed in

substance that the work of constructing said

gutters was done under the supervision of

the borough authorities, and paid for by the

property owners. In his examination in

chief the witness was not asked, nor did he

expressly say, by whom the grading and gut-

tering in question were done, but he testiﬂed
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as to the physical nature of the street along

which the gutters were made, the effect of

their construction on plaintifs property, etc.; "

and such was the general character and

scope of his testimony in chief that it might

be fairly inferred that the work was done by

or under the direction of the municipal au-

thorities. In view of the circumstances, we

cannot say there was error in permitting the

cross-examination complained of. While, as

a. general rule, it is improper to permit a. de-

fendant to interject his defense under guise

of cross-examination of plaintiffs witness,

and vice versa, the range of a cross-examina-

tion must, to a very great extent, be left to

the sound discretion of the trial judge; and

unless that discretion has been plainly

abused, to the injury of the party complain-

ing, it ls not ground for reversal. In Jack-

son v. Litch, 62 Pa. St. 451, it was held that,

in order to reverse for this cause, it must be

an extreme case in which the discretion has

been abused, and in which it is apparent the

party has been injured; and also, where a

witness has stated a. fact, he may be asked

by the other party to detail all the circum-

stances within his knowledge which qualify

it, though they may be new matter and form

part of his own case. As was said in Bank

v. Fordyce, 9 Pa. St. 277: “A party is enti-

tled to bring out every circumstance relating

to a fact which an adverse wltnes is called

to prove.” In this case there was no abuse

of the discretion with which the trial judge

was invested; nor do we think the defend-

460

ant was prejudiced by the fact elicited on

the cross-examination. An examination of

plaintiff's testimony shows that fact was ei-

ther recognized or assumed by witnesses as

well as the parties. One of plaintiffs wit-

nesses was asked if he remembered "when

Main street was graded by the borough,” and

“when they paved the gutters along there."

and his answer was, “Yes, sir." Even if the

plaintiff had closed his case without intro-

ducing any testimony from which the jury

would have been warranted in ﬁnding the

fact, the court, in order to prevent a miscar-
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sustain objections to questions put, on crossexamination of defendant's witness, for the
purpose of showing that the gutters alleged
to have caused the Injury complained of
were constructed by the defendant borough,
or under Its nuthorlty. The objections were
(a) that the •1uestlons were not proper crossexamination, and (b) that the fact sought to
be proved was part of plalntilf's case In chief,
and could be proved only by the records of
the borough council. The court having overruled said objections, the witness testified 1n
substance that the work of constructing said
gutters was done under the supervision of
the borough authorities, and paid for by the
property- owners. In his examination ln
chief the witness was not asked, nor did he
expressly say, by whom the grading and gutterlng ln question were done, but he testtfied
as to the physical nature of the street along
which the gutters were made, the effect of
their construction on plalntltr's property, etc.; J
and such was the general character and
scope of his testimony In chief that It might
be fairly Inferred that the work was done by
or under the direction of the municipal authoritlee. In view of the circumstances, we
cannot say there was error In permitting the
cross-examlnatlon complained of. 'Vblle, as
a general rule, It ls Improper to permit a defendant to Interject bis defense under guise
of cross-exnmlnatlon of plaintltr's witness,
and vice versa, the range of a cross-examlnatton must, to a very ~at extent, be left to
the sound discretion of the trial judge; and
unless that discretion has been plainly
abused, to the Injury of the party compla1n7
Ing, It Is not ground for reversal. In Jackson v. Lltch, 62 Pa. St. 41'.>1, It was held that,
In order to reverse for this cause, it must be
an extreme case In which the discretion has
been abused, and In which It ls apparent the
party has been Injured; and also, where a
witness has stated a. fact, he may be llllked
by the other party to detail all the clrcumstances within his knowledge which qualify
It, thouirh they may be new matter and form
part of his own case. As was said In Bank
v. Fordyce, 9 Pa. St. 277: "A party is entltled to .bring out every circumstance relating
to a fact which an adverse witness ls called
to prove." In this case there was no abuse
of the discretion with whkh the trial judge
was Invested; nor do we think the defend460

ant was prejudiced by the fact elicited on
the croBS-examlnation. An examination of
plaintur's testimony shows that fact was elther recognized or assumed by witnesses 8.8
well as the parties. One of plalntl!T'a wltnesses was asked 1t he remembered "when
:Main street was graded by the borough," and
"when they paved the gutters along there,"
and his answer was, "Yes, sir." Even If the
plalntltr had closed bis case without lntroduclng any testimony from which the jury
would have been warranted In finding the
fact, the court, in order to prevent a miscarrlage of justice, would not have refused to
permit the plaintltr to call wltneBBes out of
order and prove It.
The only other specification of error ls the
refusal of the court to atD.rm defendant's
fourth point for charge recited therein. In
declining to charge as requested, the learned
judge rightly held there was "evidence from
which a jury would be warranted lf\tlnding
that the gutters were constl"Ucted by the borough." The authority of the borough t9 do
so was not, and could not have been, queetloned. In view of the evidence, 1t was for
the jury to say whether the proper borough
authorities did or did not ,construct or superlntend their construction, etc. It ls well
settled that the acts of a. municipal corporation may be proved otherwise than by Its records or some written document. Dill. Mun.
Corp. § 300; Bank v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat.
64. In aOlrming plaintitr's first point, the
learned judge rightly Instructed the juq
that, If they believed the "defendant borough, in constructing Its gutters, caused the
surface water of a lurge territory, which did
not naturally tlow in that direction, to oo
gathered Into a body, and precipitated on
plaintitr's premises, to the injury of the plalntitr, defendant ls liable, and plaintiff la entitled to recover." The evidence tended to
prove the facts of which this proposition ls
predicated, and by its aftlrmance plalntltf'a
case was fairly presented to the jury. On
the other band, by the afftrmance of defendant's first, second, third, fifth, and sixth
points, every necessary precaution was taken to properly Indicate the limits within•
which the jury should act. An examination
of the record discloses no error that would
warrant us in disturbing the judgment.
Judgment afftrmed.

CROSS-EXAMINATION.
CROSS-EXAMINATION.

[Case No. 156

PHILLIPS et al. v. TO\VN OF MARBLE-

HEAD.

(‘l9 N. E. 5-17, 148 Mass. 326.)

Supreme Judicial Court of Massacliusctts.

Essex. Jan. 4, 1889.

)xceptions from superior court, Essex coun-

ty; John Lathrop, Judge.

Petition by Emily A. Phillips and others for

the assessment of damages for taking their

land in the town of Marblehead for a street;

the taking being alleged to have occurred

March 6, 1886, and July 27, 1886. Mason. a

witness for petitioners, who was about 45

years of age, and had always lived in that

town, testiiied that he did not own real estate

in the town, nor had he bought or sold real

estate therein; that he had for several years

advised his father, or, rather, his father, who

had bought and sold real estate in the town,
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had advised him; that he had heard of a

great many of the sales of real estate in the

town in the last ﬂve or ten years, and at the

time of such sales he heard of some of the

prices paid; that he heard of the sale of the

Gerry-Street lots, and other land near that of

petitioners, and of similar character, and had

heard of some of the prices, but could not

now give the price at which any particular

lot sold; that he had been a collector of taxes

in said town, and had in one instance acted

as an appraiser of real estate; that he was

familiar with petitioners’ land, having known

it all his life; that he had heard of sales and

prices of land upon Chestnut street, which ex-

tends north and south the entire length of the

petitioners’ land, and is about 100 feet dis-

tant therefrom, but could not tell of any par-

ticular saie; that he thought he had a judg-

ment as to the fair market value of real es-

tate in said town, and as to the fair market

value of the land taken from the petitioners

for said street, as aforesaid; and thereupon

the petitioners asked him what, in his judg-

ment, was the fair market value upon July

27, 1886, of the land taken from the petition-

ers for the laying out of the street. The court

excluded the question, upon the ground that

the witness was not qualiﬁed as an expert

to express an opinion as to the market value

of the land, remarking that “there must be

better evidence to be had.” Wyman, who

owned a considerable tract of land known

as the "Bessom Farm," adjoining the peti-

tioners’ tract, and of the same general char-

acter, testitied to the value of the land taken

from petitioners; and upon cross-examina-

tion testified that the Bessom farm, adjoin-

ing that of the petitioners, was worth $2,000

or $2,500 per acre. Thereupon respondents,

against the petitioners’ objection and excep-

tion, were allowed, solely as bearing upon

the Question of the bias or fairness of the

witness, to place in his hands a written

statement dated about June, 1886, and di-

rected to the assessors, signed and sworn to

by witness, and to ask him from that to

say what in that he valued his said land ad-

‘ ers’ land.

PffiLLIPS et al.

T.

(Case No. 156

joining that of petltlonere; and he replied,
"One hundred dollars per acre," and added
that he so valued It, and 1t was so understood, for its agricultural purposes only.
Respondents called n.e a wltneBB one Martin,
a member o:I' the board of selectmen of the
town in the year 1886. Martin, upon direct
examination, testltl.ed that the petitioners'
land, Including that taken, was worth $200
to $300 per acre, and no more; and that the
petitioners' remaining land was largely benefited by the laying out of the street. Upon croBB-examlnation be testitl.ed that the
petitioners bad, in his judgment, sustained
damage to the amount of $300, and no more.
Petitioners then offered in evidence, solely
for the purpose ot contradicting him, the
record of the board of selectmen made July 27, 1886, showing the laying out of the
street, and the damages theret1>r, signed by
Martin, together with the remaining members of the board; which record contained
the statement that petitioners had sustained
damage by the taking of their land to the
amount of $553, and awarded to them that
sum. The record was excluded, and petitioners excepted. Verdict tor respondents,
and. petitioners ftled e.-,:ceptlons.

TOWN OF MARBLE-

HEAD.

(19 N. E. 547, 148 M888. 326.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Essex. Jan. 4, 1889.
Exceptions from superior court, EBSeX county; John Lathrop, Judge.
Petition by Emlly A. Phillipa and others tor
the assessment ot damages tor taklDg their
land ID the town of Marblehead for a street;
the taklDg being alleged to have occurred
March 6, 1886, and July 'n, 1886. Mason, a
witness !01· petitioners, who was about 45
years of age, and had always lived In that
town, testified that he did not own real estate
In the town, nor had he bought or sold real
eat.ate therein; that he had tor several years
advised his father, or, rather, h1e father, who
had bought and sold real estate In the town,
had advised him; that he had heard of a
great many of the sales of real estate ID the
to,vn In the last five or ten years, and at the
time of such sales he heard of some ot the
prices paid; that he heard of the sale of the
Gerry-Street lots, and other land near that of
petitioners, and of slmllar character, and had
heard of some of the prices, but could not
now irtve the price at which any particular
F. L. Evsns, for petitioners. W. D. Northlot solcl; that he had been a collector of taxes end, tor respondents.
In said town, and had ln one Instance acted
as an appraiser of real estate; that he was
FIELD, J. Whether a. person who is offamlllar with petitioners' land. having known
It all hla life; that he had beard of sales and fered as a witness Is shown to be qunll1led to
prices of land upon Chestnut street, which ex- give an opinion upon the value of land must
tends north and south the entire length of the be left largely to the discretion of the prepetitioners' land, and ls about 100 feet dis- siding judge. We cannot say, upon the evitant tllerefl'om, but could not tell of any par- dence recited In the exceptions, that Mason
ticular sale; that he thought he had a judg- was not rightly excluded as a witness to
ment as to the fair market value of l"eal es· value. The case shows that there was no
tate In said town, and as to the fair market dltDculty in obtaining witnesses whose quallvalue of the land taken from the petitioners tl.catlons were unquestioned, and this tact
for said street, as aforesaid; and thet·eupon was properly considered by the presiding
the petitioners asked him what, In his judg- judge In deciding to exclude him. Tncker
ment, was the fair market value upon July v. Railroad Co., 118 MaBB. 548. It was also,
27, lSSG, of the lond taken from the petition- we think, within the discretion of the preers for the laying out of the street. The court siding judge to admit the question which
excluded the question, upon the ground that was put to Wyman by the respondents, on
the witness was not qualified as an expert croSB-examinatlon, to which the petitioners
to express nn opinion as to the market vnlue objected. As Wyman's land was adjoining
of the land, remarking that "there must be to and of the same general character as
better e'l-idence to be bud." 'Vyman, who that of the petitioners, sales of It would be
owned a considerable tract of land known competent to prove the value of the petitionas the "Bessom Furm," adjoining the peti- ers' land, but the opinion of witnesses upon
tioners' tract, and o:I' the same general char- the value of ·Wyman's land would not be
acter, testltled to the value of the land taken competent to prove the value of the petitionfrom petitioners; and upon cross-exnminn- ers' land. Wyman v. Railroad Co., 13 Mete.
tlon testltletl thnt the Bessom farm, adjoin- (Mass.) 316, 327; Shattuck v. Railroad Co.,
ing that of the petitioners, was worth $2,000 6 Allen, 115. When, therefore, the respondor ~2,GOO per acre. Thereupon respondents, ents asked the witness 'Vymnn bis opinion
ngnlnst the petitioners' objeetlon and excep- 1 of the value of his own land, the question
tion, were allowed, solely as bearing upon 1 might have been excluded. The inquiry
the question of the bias or :l'nlrness of the was immaterlnl and irrelevant, except, perwitneAs, to place in his bands a written j haps, :l'or the put11ose of testing the weight
stutmnent dated about June, 188fi, and di- of the opinion of the witness as to value.
rected to tbe assessors, signed and sworn to The question, however, having been answerby witness, and to ask him from that to ed without objection, the respondents could
say what in that be valued bis said land ad- not have been permitted to contra.diet tb•

I
I
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PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

answer by the testimony of other witnesses, I

or by other evidence than the testimony of

PRODUCTlON AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

answer by the testimony of other witnesses, I of damages by a board composed of more
or by other evidence than the testimony of than one person, there must be compromises
tile witness himself. Immaterial or Irrele- of Individual opinion, In order that any !"('vant Issues cannot be raised and tried ln suit may be reached; and a Judicial body
this manner. Shurtleff v. Parker, 130 Mass. mm1t gl"l"e some weight to e~tdence, and can293; Fletcher v. Railroad Co., 1 Allen. 9. not act solely upon the personal knowledge
But the extent to which the cross-examina- of its members, when evidence Is produced
tion of a witness as to credit may be carried before them. Either, then, the record should
must be left largely to the judge presiding have been excluded, or, If admitted, Martin
at the trial, and If matters which are merely and the other 11electmen should have been
Immaterial, or which tend to show the rea- permitted to testify to the part taken, and
sons of the witness for his 01>lnlons or his to the opinions expressed by Martin in the
fairness of mind, are admitted In cross-ex- deliberations of the selectmen which resultamination, there Is, as a general rule, no ex- ed In the award. While the deliberations or
ce1>tlon. Considerable latitude should be ! legislative bodies are usually public, the deallowed In cross-examining witnesses to val- liberations of judicial or qu'.lsl judicial bodue, In order that the grounds of their opln- ies are private; and there are reasons or
Ion may appear. Prescott v. Ward, 10 Al- I public policy why they should not be made
len, 203; Smith v. Castles, 1 Gray, 108.
public, particularly when the purpose to oo
The record of the board of selectmen, of seITed Is comparntl"l"ely unimpo1·tnnt. Grand
whom Martin was one, was ollered for the and J.)etlt jurors are not permitted to testipurpose of contradicting the testimony of fy to opinions concerning the case, expressed
Martin. The fact that the record or certifi- in their consultations with each other, and
cate was signed by Martin, as well as by arhltrntors nre not permitted to testify t<J
the other selectmen, did not show that the the ground11 on which they reached the conamount of the damages awarded was the clusions tlc!"luri>d In the award. Com. '"·
sum which Martin, acting on his own judg- White, 147 1\lass. 76, 16 N. E. 707; Woodment, thought ought to have been a warded. ward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453; Bigelow v.
Selectmen have no clerk, and their doings Maynard, 4 Cush. 317.
can only be certified by their own signaFor the purpose ot contradicting a wittures, and the certificate purported to give, ness, we think that evidence ought not to oo
not the opinion of the selectmen Individual- received of the deliberations of selectmen
ly, but the judgm_ent of the board, which acting In a quasi judicial capacity, and that
might be the judgment of a mujorlty only the certificate of the doings of the board of
of a quorum of the board. Besides, In ev- selectmen was rightly excluded.
ery judicial or quasi judicial determination
Exceptiona overruled.
462

I
I
1

the witness himself. Immaterial or irrele-

vant issues cannot be raised and tried in

this manner. Shurtleﬂ! v. Parker, 130 Mass.

293; Fletcher v. Railroad Co., 1 Allen. 9.

But the extent to which the cross-examina-

tion of a witness as to credit may be carried

must be left largely to the judge presiding

at the trial, and if matters which are merely

immaterial, or which tend to how the rea-

sons of the witness for his opinions or his

fairness of mind. are admitted in cross-ex-

amination, there is, as a general rule, no ex-

ception. Considerable latitude should be

allowed in cross-examining witnesses to val-

ue, in order that the grounds of their opin-

ion may appear. Prescott v. Ward, 10 Al-

len, 203; Smith v. Castles, 1 Gray, 108.
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The record of the board of selectmen, of

whom Martin was one, was oifered for the

purpose of contradicting the testimony of

Martin. The fact that the record or certiﬁ-

cate was signed by Martin, as well as by

the other selectmen, did not show that the

amount of the damages awarded was the

sum which Martin, acting on his own judg-

ment, thought ought to have been awarded.

Selectmen have no clerk, and their doings

can only be certiﬁed by their own signa-

tures, and the certiﬁcate purported to give,

not the opinion of the selectmen individual-

ly. but the judgment of the board, which

might be the judgment of a majority only

of a quorum of the board. Besides, in ev-

ery judiciai or quasi judicial determination

462

of damages by a board composed of more

than one person, there must be compromises

of individual opinion, in order that any re-

suit may be reached; and a judicial body

must give some weight to evidence, and can-

not act solely upon the personal knowledge

of its members, when evidence is produced

before them. Either, then, the record should

have been excluded, or, if admitted, Martin

and the other selectmen should have been

permitted to testify to the part taken, and

to the opinions expressed by Martin in the

deliberations of the selectmen which result-

ed in the award. While the deliberations of

legislative bodies are usually public, the de-

liberations of judicial or quasi judicial bod-

ies are private; and there are reasons of

public policy why they should not be made

public, particularly when the purpose to be

served is comparatively unimportant. Grand

and petit jurors are not permitted to testi-

fy to opinions concerning the case, expressed

in their consultations with each other, and

arbitrators are not permitted to testify to

the grounds on which they reached the con-

clusions declared in the award. Com. v.

White, 147 Mass. 76, 16 N. E. 70'; Wood-

ward v. Leavitt. 107 Mass. 458; Bigeiow v.

Maynard, 4 Cush. 317.

For the purpose of contradicting a. wit-

ness, we think that evidence ought not to be

1
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[Case No. I57

HOYE BENEFIT ASS'N v. SARGENT.
(12 Sup. Ct. 332, 142 U. S. 691.)

\

HOME BENEFIT ASS'N v. SARGENT.

(12 Sup. Ct. 332, 142 U. S. 691.)

Supreme Court of the United States. Jan. 26,

1892.

In error to the circuit court of the United

States for the Southern district of New York.

Action by Henrietta P. Sargent against

the Home Beneﬁt Association on a policy of

life insurance. Verdict and judgment for

plaintiff. Defendant brings error. Affirm-

ed.

A. G. Fox and Francis Lawton, for plaintiﬂ

Supreme Court of the United States. Jan. 26,
1892.
In error to the circuit court of the United
States tor the Southern district of New York.
Action by Henrietta P. Sargent against
the Home Benefit Association on a policy of
life Insurance. Verdict and judgment for
plaintur. Defendant brings error. Affirmed.
A.G. Fox and Francie Lawton, for plalntur
in error. Miron Winslow, for defendant In
error.

in error. Miron Winslow, for defendant in

error.

.\Ir. Justice BLATCHFORD delivered the

opinion of the court.

This is an action at law, brought in the

circuit court of the United States for the
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Southern district of New York by Henrietta

P. Sargent, a citizen of Massachusetts

against the Home Beneﬁt Association, a life

insurance association incorporated by the

state of New York, to recover the sum of

$5.000, with interest from Mar -h 15, 1887.

upon a policy of life insurance issued by the

defendant September 5, 1885, on the life

of Edward F. Hall, J r., for the beneﬁt of the

piaintiif, who was his sister.

Hall was made by the policy an accept-

ed member of the life department of the de-

fendant. By one of the conditions in the

policy it was provided that “death of the

member by his own hand or act, whether

voluntary or involuntary, sane or insane at

the time," was a risk not assumed by the

defendant under the policy.

The complaint alleged that the policy was

in force on the 19th of October, 1886, when

Hall died at the city of New York, and that

his death was not caused by any of the

causes excepted from the operation of the

policy. It was setup in the answer as a

defense that the death of Hall was brought

about by his own hand and act, in that he

died from the immediate effect of a shot

from a pistol ﬁred by his own hand, such

shot having been ﬁred by him with the in-

tention of taking his own life.

The case was tried before Judge Coxe and

a jury, which rendered a verdict for the

plaintiﬁ‘ for $5,350. A motion for a new

trial was made before Judge Coxe. and was

denied,—the opinion of the court thereon be-

ing reported in 35 Fed. 711,—and a judgment

was thereafter rendered in favor of the

plaintiff for $5,350, with interest and costs;

the whole amounting to $5,517.99. To re-

view that judgment the defendant has

brought a writ of error.

By the bill of exceptions it appears that,

after the plaintiff rested her case, the de-

fendant moved the court to direct a verdict

for it, on the ground that the plaintiff had

failed to.show that she ever had presented

to it, in accordance with the provisions of

the policy, satisfactory evidence of Hall's

death; but the court denied the motion.

l!r. Justice BLATCHFORD delivered the
opinion of the court.
Thia le an action at law, brought In the
circuit court of the United States for the
Southern district of New York by Henrietta
P. Sargent, a citizen of Maesnchueettl\
agalnet the Home Benefit Association, a life
insurance association Incorporated by the
stetf~ of New York, to recover the 11um of
Sl).000, with tntert>st from March Hi, 1887,
upon a policy of life Insurance Issued by the
defendant September 5, 1885, on the life
of Edward F. Hall, Jr., for the benefit of the
plalntirr, who was hie sister.
Hall wae made by the policy an accepted member of the life department of the detend.ant. By one of the conditions In the
pollcy It was proYlded that "death of the
member by his own hand or act, whethe1·

(Case No. 157

the policy, satisfactory evldenre of H1tll's
death; but the court dented the motion.
The defendant excepted, and then proceeded
to put In evidence on Its part. After it bad
rested, the plalntur put In rebutting evl·
dence on her part, and then the defendant
put In further evidence. It ls not stated lo
the bill of exceptions that It contains all the
evidence; but It ls set forth at the close of
what doee appear that the defendant moved
I the court to direct a Yerdlct for the defendant, on the ground that the evidence showed
that Hall died by hie own hand. The court
refm~ed to do so, and the defendant excepted.
Parts of the charge of the court to the jury
are set forth, and It le stated that the court
charged the jury as to all other features
of the case fully and In euch manner that
no exception wae taken thereto, and that
the portions of the court's charge to the
jury which are not eet forth did not In any
wise bear on or relate to any matters C!Ontained In the defendant's requeete to charge,
hereinafter referred to.
Among the tnstructlone of the eourt to the
jury were the following: "The only quesI tion upon this proof is, did Edward F. Hall
commit suicide'! It be did, the policy ltr
void. It be died In some other way-by
accident or aesasslnatlon-lt would be otherwlS<'. Upon that Issue, the burden ls upoo
the defendant to satisfy you by a fair prepondernnce or proof of the truth ot this detense. • • • When the policy of Insur\ ance was introduced with evidence or ad-

I

!

;:!u~:?,:. o~~:v:l~~~~;>t~~~u~e~111:;e~~ 1 !~~:"~o::rt1::s t~~;:~l:h~sd::~ ~7~h~a~:~
defendnnt under the policy.
sur!'fl, the plalntlft', If no further evlden<'e
The complaint alleged that the policy was had been produced, would have been entitled
in force on the lUth of October, 1886, when to a verdict; but the defendant comes Into
Hall died at the city ot New York, and tnat j court, and asserts that the contract under
hie death was not caused by any of the which the action le brought has not been fulcauses excepted from the operation of the ,. 1Uled, but bas been violated by the assured.
policy. It was set . up In the answer as a Being an aturmatlve defense, the onus Is
defense that the death of Hall was broug-ht upon the defendant to satisfy you by evlabout by his own hand and act, In that he deuce which, In your judgment, outweighs
died trom the Immediate elTe<"t of a shot the evidence of the plalntift', that that defrom a pistol fl.red by bis own band, such tense has been establlshed."
shot having been fl.red by him with the InThe court, after stating that the detend:mt
tentlon of taking his own life.
bad Introduced In evidence proofs of death
The case was tried before .Judge Coxe and furnished to It by the plalnttrr; that the dea jury, which rendered a verdict for the fendant Insisted that the plalntltl', having
plalntlft' for $5,350. A motion for a new produced those proofs, was estopped trom
trial was made before Judge Coxe. nnd was saying that the cause of death tnere n111111mdenled,-the opinion of the eourt thereon be- ed was not truly assigned; and that s11e11
Ing reported In 35 Fed. 711,-and a judgment proofs asserted generally that Hall met his
was thereafter rendered In ta,·or of the death by suicide, while lnborln.i.r under h•mplalntift' for $5,350, with Interest and costs; porary aberration of mlnd,-illso Instructed
the whole amounting to $5,517.00. To re- the jury that such proofs were proper evlvlew that judgment the defendant has dence for them to consider, but were by no
hrought a writ of error.
means conclusive evidence, and were to be
By the bill of exceptions It appears that, taken by them In connection with the other
after the plalntlft' rested her case, the de- testimony In the case, and given euch weight
fendnnt moved the court to direct a verdlr.t In determining the main question ae the jury
for It, on the ground that the plalntift' bad might see fit to give them.
falled to . show that she ever had presented
Tlw <'ourt turthn Instructed the jury, that
to it, In accordance with the provisions of the plalnUfl"s po11ltlon was--Flm, that the
J'

I
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PRODLTCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

burden being upon the defendant to satisfy

them that Hall met death by his own hand,

intending to kill himself, the plaintilf had a

right to rely upon the alleged failure of the

defendant to prove that fact; second, that

it was asserted by the plaintiif that Hall's

death might have been occasioned simply

and solely by accident; and, third, that it

might have been the result of assassination;

and that, if the jury found that there was a

failure on the part of the defendant to prove

that Hall committed suicide, (whether he

was in his right mind or laboring under tem-

porary insanity being wholly immaterial)

or if they found upon the proofs that his

death was caused by accident and nothing

else, there must be a verdict for the plain-

tiﬂ.

The defendant excepted (1) to the instruc-
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tion that, on the question whether Hall com-

mitted suicide or not, the burden of proof

was on the defendant to satisfy the jury by

evidence which in their judgment outweigh-

ed that of the plaintiff that his death was by

suicide; (2) to the charge that the proofs of

death were proper evidence in the case, but

by no means conclusive; (3). to the submis-

sion to the jury of the question whether Hall

died as the result of assassination, and to

the charge that the evidence must be such

as satisﬁed the jury of the truth of the fact

in dispute.

Before the case was summed up to the

jury by counsel—which was done before the

giving of the chargokthe defendant present-

ed to the court 15 several written requests to

charge the jury. These requests are inserted

in the bill of exceptions after the statement

of the charge and the exceptions thereto,

and it is stated in regard to each of the re-

quests that the court refused so to charge

“except as already charged," and that the

defendant excepted to each refusal to

charge.

Although there are 25 alleged errors set

forth in the assignment of errors ﬁled in the

court below, yet, as the brief of the plain-

tilf in error relies on but a few of them.

we confine our attention to those thus relied

on.

1. One Andrew S. Brownell was examined

as a witness for the defendant. At the time

he was examined-—in February, 18S8—he

was one of its directors, and had been its

secretary in 1885. in December, 1886, he

received, on behalf of the defendant, from

one John Sherman Moulton, as agent of the

plaintiff, certain proofs of death in the case.

He testiﬂed that on that occasion he had a

slight conversation with said Moulton on the

were incomplete,—that the coroner’s verdict

did not accompany them,—and that Moulton

said it would be supplied in a few days.

Brownell was then asked by the defendant:

“Question. What was the substance of the

understanding between you as to the man-

A~D

EFF.ECT OF EVIDENCE.

burden being upon the defendant to satiety
them that Hull met death by his own hand,
Intending to klll himself, the plaintiff had a
right to rely upon the alleged failure ot the
defendant to prove that fact; second, that
It was asserted by the plaintiff that Hall'&
death might have been occasioned etmply
and solely by accident; and, third, that It
might have been the result ot a8811118lnatlon;
and that, If the jury found that there was a
failure on the part of the defendant to prove
that Hall committed suicide, (whether he
was In hie right mind or laboring under temporary IDBanlty being wholly Immaterial,)
or It they found upon the proofs that his
death was caused by accident and nothing
else, there must be a verdict tor the plalntltr.

The defendant excepted (1) to the Instruction that, on the question whether Hall commlttt'd suicide or not, the burden ot proof
was on the defendant to satisfy the jury by
evldf'nce which In their judgment outweighed that ot the plaintiff that his death was by
suicide; (2) to the charge that the proofs ot
death were proper evidence 1n the case, but
by no means conclustve; (3) to the submission to the jury of the question whether Hall
died as the result of 8881188lnatlon, and to
the charge that the evidence must be auch
.as t1atisfted the jury of the troth of the tact
ID dispute.
Before the case was summed up to the
jury by counsel-which was done ~tore the
giving ot the charge-the defendant presented to the court 15 several written requests to
charge the jury. 'l'hese requests are Inserted
In the bill of exceptloDB after the statement
ot the charge and the exceptions thereto,
and it ls stated ID regard to each of the requests that the court refused so to charge
"except as already charged," and that the
defendant excepted to each refusal to
<:harge.
Although there are 25 alleged errors Ret
forth ID the assignment of errors ftle<J In the
court below, yet, as the brief of the plalntltr in error relies on but a tew ot them,
we confine our attention to those thus relied
on.
1. One Andrew 8. Brownell was examined
as a witness for the defendant. At tlle time
he was examined-In February, 1888-he
was one of Its directors, and had been its
secretnry In 188:), In December, 1880, he
recei\'ed, on behalf of the defendant, from
one John Sherman Moulton, as agent of the
plaintiff, certain proofs ot death in the case.
He testified that on that occasion he bad a
slight conversatlou with said Moulton on the
subject of such proofs of death; that he
(Brownell) looked at them, and said they
were lncomplete,-that the coroner's verdict
did not accompany them,-and that Moulton
said It would be suppllro in a tew days.
Brownell was then asked by the defendant:
"Question. What was the substancf" of the
und,.rstandlng between you as to the man-

subject of such proofs of death; that he

(Brownell) looked at them, and said they

PRODL7CT10N
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ner In which llr. Hall met hie death, ll that
was mentioned between you?'' His answer
was: "Answer. That he had met hls
death by his lnAlctlng a pistol-shot; and
that we must have the coroner's verdict.
which lie said would be furnlshed in a few
days; and It came a few days later." Brownell was then asked by the plalntl.lr: "Q.
Did you say to Mr. Moulton that you had
known Mr. Hall well, in California; and
that, 1f lt depended upon you, the loas should
be paid without any deluy? Did you state
that ID that conversation or In any subsequent convel'B&tlon ?" This was objected to
by the defendant as Irrelevant, but the question was allowro, and the defendant excepted. The answer was: "A. I think that
I expressed such a personal feeling in the
matter." He was then asked by the defendant: "Q. You say that you expressed auch
a personal feeling for Mr. Hall. What waa
your feeling as to your obligations to the defendant, in view of the risk excluded from
the policy, and the fact of the wound being
self·lnfilcted? A. In view of the policy of
the company, as shown in the certificate
that has been presented here, the compaDJ'
could not pay it. It was against the policy
of the company to assume the risk of a
man's death by shooting or bj self-lnfilcted
wounds. Q. When you say that it was
against the policy of the com1iany, what do
you mean by that? A. Against the decision
of the managers of the company as to t.he
best interests of the <.'Ompany, taken u &
whole. I did not Wt>an the mere terms of
the policy, but the settled course of buslnetlB
of the co1npnny."
It ls contended by the defendant that the
declaration by Brownell to Moulton that, it
It dE"pE"nded upon him, (Brownell,) the loss
should be paid without any delay, was Irrelevant, and the admission of It In evldeoce
constituted errcr. But we think the evidence was admissible. Brownell was a wit·
ness for the defendant, and the evidence in
qu<.>stlon was brought out on his cros~x·
amluatlon. He had stated on his direct examination that the substance of the undef'·
standing between him and Moulton, at the
time the latter brought ID the proofs of
death, as to the manner ID which Hall met
his death, was "that he had met his death by
his inftlctlng a pl9tol-ehot;" and the evidence
1D question, being drawn out on cross-exam·
!nation. he.d a lx>Uring upon the testimony
which Brownt•ll had given on his direct ex·
aminatlon, lmply!ng that Moulton had stated
that Hall met ht.s death. "by his l.nfilctlng a
pistol-shot." '.fhe evidence was as to a pa.rt
of the same conversation, and we think It
was relevant and competent.
2. On the direct examination of :Mr. Brown·
ell as a witness for the defendant he wu
askro the substance of a conversation whk!I
be had with one Charles W. )loulton, the
ageut or attorney of the plalnttrr, In November, 1886, on an occas1on when said Moulton,
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on behalf of the plaintiff, visited Brownell

at the otﬁce of the defendant. The question

was objected to by the plaintiff as immate-

rial, and was excluded, and the defendant ex-

cepted. A sufficient answer to this assign-

ment of error is that the bill of exceptions

does not state what the subject of the con-

versation \\"as, or what was intended to be

proved by it.

(J-"harles W. .\Ioulbon was the father of John

Sherman Mouiton. Subsequently, when Brown-

ell had been recalled by the defendant, and

it had been proved that Charles \V. Moulton

was the plaintiifs agent, the question was re-

peated by the defendant as to what Charles

W. Moulton said to Brownell when he visit-

ed the latter to make a claim on the defend-

ant for the payment of the $5,000. The in-

quiry was again ruled out, it not being stat-
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ed what the subject of the conversation was,

or what was sought to be proved. The

proofs of death were furnished to the defend-

ant after this alleged conversation; and, even

if the conversation related to the cause or

manner of Hall's death, it could not bind the

plaintiff, in the absence of any authority by

the plaintiff to Moulton to make any state-

ment on the subject.

3. It is contended by the defendant that

the proofs of death, including the coroner’s

inquest, constituted an admission by plaintiff

that Hall came to his death by his own hand,

and that such admission was suﬂicient to

create a legal right in the defendant to have

a verdict directed for it. One of the defend-

ant's requests to charge was that, the plain-

tiff, in her proofs of death, having stated to

the defendant that the death was by suicide,

it was incumbent upon her to prove by s

preponderance of evidence that the state-

ment was mlstuken, and that the death was

the result of accident; and another was that,

the plaintiff's proofs of death having been

presented in her name, and by her agent iii

the matter, and constituting the essential

preliminary to her action, they must stand as

her acts, and the representations made there-

in must be taken as true, until at lmst some

mistake was shown to have occurred in them.

The facts of this case are thus stated in

the charge of the court to the jury, and there

was no exception to such statement: “It ap-

pears to be undisputed that Edward F. Hall

had lived about twenty years of his life in

San Francisco. He frequently—habitual1y,

perhaps—carried a pistol. He some time

during his life kept a pistol under his pillow.

He was a man of genial, sanguine tempera-

ment; hopeful,—making plans as to the fu-

ture; proud of his only son. But it also ap-

pears that for a long series of years he had

been suffering from severe headache,—to

such an extent that it created depression so

strong at times that the doctor describes it

as melancholia. It appears, further, that up-

on the evening prior to-his death he was with

a party of friends at the residence of Mr.

Johnson, and there, in the presence of two or

on behalt of the plaintiff, vl61ted Brownell
at the omce of the defendant. The question
was objected to by the plalntUf as lmme..terlal, and was excluded, and the defendant excepted. A suftlclent answer to this assignment of error Is that the bill of exceptions
does not state what the subject of the conversation was, or what was Intended to be
proved by It.
Obe.rlee W. MoultlOn was the father of John
Sherman Moulton. Subeequently, when Brownell had been recalled by the defendant, and
It had been proved that Oharlee W. Moulton
was the platntltr's agent, the question was repeated by the defendant as to what Cbarlus
W. Xoukon 81lld to Brownell when he visited the latter to make a claim on the defendant for the payment of the '5,000. The inquiry was again ruled out, It not being stated what the subject of the conversation was,
or what was sought to be proved. The
proofs of death were furnished to the defendant atter this alleged conversation; and, even
1t the conversation related to the cause or
manner of Hall's dee.th, It could not bind the
plalnttfr, In the absence of any authority by
the platntUf to Moulton to make a.ny statement on the subject.
3. It Is contended by the defendant that
the proofs of death, Including the coroner's
lnqueet, constituted an adml.sslon by plalntltr
that Hall ca.me tlO his death by his own hand,
and that mch admission was sumctent to
create a legal right In the defendant to have
a verdict directed for It. One of the detend$Dt's requests to charge was that, the plalutlft', In her proofs ot death, having stated to
the defendant that the death was by suicide,
It was Incumbent upon her to prove by a
preponderance of evidence that rhe statement was m18taken, and that the death was
the result of accident; and another was that,
the plaintiff's proofs of dea.tb having been
presented In her name, and by her agent lb
the me.tter, and constituting the eBBeDtlal
preliminary to her action, they mu!tt stand aa
her acts, and the representations made therein must be taken 88 true, until at 1'01LBt some
mistake was shown to have oceurred. ln them.
The tacts of this case are thus stated In
the charge of the court to the Jury, and there
was no exception to such statement: "It appeal'B to be undisputed that Edward F. Hall
bad llved about twenty years of his life tn
San Francl:eco. He frequently-habitually,
perhap&--<Brrled a pistol. He some time
during his life kept a pistol under his plllow.
He was a man of genial, 11BJ1gulne temperament; hopeful,-maklng plans as to the future; proud of his only son. But 1t also appears that for a long series of years he had
been su~rlng from severe headnche,-to
such an extent that lt created depre&Slon HO
strong at times thnt the doctor describes It
as melancholia. It appears, further, that upon the evening prior to· his death he was wltll
a pRrty ot friends at the residence of l\lr.
Johnson, and there, In the presence of two or
.... _ ..........., .......

on

three witnesses, complained of suffering lntenge pain In hie head, frequently placing hla
hands to his head, and complaining of the
severe pain which be suffered. The pecuniary circumstances of Hall have not been dis·
closed here further tbe.n the evidence as to
borrowing money of his sister. It ls in proof
that he had a wife and son, his son lo college, and that he took gn!ftt Interest in his
future. But It Is also proper that I should
call your attention to the fact that at the moment of bis death his wife was seriously 111thought to be hopele881y Ill-In a dlstnnt city.
Upon the morning of the 19th of October,
1886, at 139 East Twenty-Flnrt street, In tbts
city, and between 7 and 7:30 o'clock ot that
morning, Edward F. Hall wu found tn the
back ball bedroom of the fourth story, with
a severe wound in his right temple. The
wound was so severe that It caused a commtnuted fracture of the frontnl bone, and
fractures radiating up and down and backward from the bole In the right temple, sumclent, unquestionably, to produce his death.
He was found lying upon his bed, with the
clothes drawn up under the armpits, bis
limbs relaxed, no evidence of any struggle
having taken place, and near hie right hand
-within a few Inches, or very near It-was
the pistol, probably, which has been shown
In your presence, with three of Its chambers
discharged. There was also faund upon his
stand or desk a letter to hie physician, In
substance statlng that he has been wrrerlng
terribly wH:h headache; that he baa had It
for several days; that It is growing worse,
and has become well-nigh unbearable."
In the proofs of dea.th furnished to the defendant, and signed by the platntltT, was this
question: "Was the death of deceased caused by his own hand or iwm, or in consequenee
ot a duel, ar In violation of any law?" Her
answer to this W88: "See statement of coroner's pbyelclan, Dr. Jenkins." In the statement of Dr. Jenkins was this queetlon:
"State the Immediate cause of death." His
answer was: "Shock from penetrating pistol shot; wound of head, (right temple;) mental aberration, superlnduced by chronic headache." There was also this question to Dr.
Jenkins: "Was the death at deceased caused
or accelerated or aggravated by his own hand
or acts?" His answer was: "I examined the
deceased only 8!J coroner's physician, and
therefore am unable to make any further
statement than above, other than from the
bbltory. His mental condition was probably
due to chronic headache, which Wll8 ooused
either by chronic meningitis ar tumor of
braf.n."
It Is contended for the defendant that, because of the contents of the proofs of dee.th,
the plaintiff Is estopped from <'lalmlng that
llnll's clcnth was caused otherwli;e than by
suicide; anrl that, at lee.st, the court should
have held that the burden originally upon the
defendant was shifted, by the Introduction
of the proofs of death, to the plaintiff, and
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it became her duty to satisfy the jury, by

a preponderance of evidence, that Hall died

otherwise than by his own hand.

But the defendant was not prejudiced by

the statements and opinions contained in the

proofs of death, and the plaintiff wasnot

estopped thereby, as a matter of law. When

the court was asked to charge the jury that

by the introduction of those proofs the bur-

den was shifted, the evidence was all before

the jur_v, and was much more full and com-

plete than that upon which Dr. Jenkins had

based his opinion. He himself had been ex-

amined as a witness, and had testified as to

what he knew or did not know at the time

he made his certiﬁcate; and all the facts of

the case. so far as they were known, had

been explained in view of the contents of the

proofs of death. It appeared that most of

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:09 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104925781
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

the statements in the certiﬁcate of Dr. Jen-

kins were based on hearsay. The instruc-

tion-s asked for in that respect, therefore,

would have been erroneous.

Nor did the declarations in the proofs of

death, when all taken together, necessarily

amount to an admission that Hall committed

suicide. The facts, or what Dr. Jenkins at

the time supposed to be the facts, were stat-

ed in the proofs of death; and, although the

defendant might have drawn therefrom the

conclusion of suicide, they ought to be scru-

tinized carefully when they are sought to be

used as amounting to an admission by the

plaintiff that the policy was void. The lan-

guage used by Dr. Jenkins in his certiﬁcate

is not inconsistent with the theory of death

by accident, especially in view of the fact

that, when he came to the direct question as

to whether Hall's death was caused by his

own hand or acts, he answered it by stating

that he was "unable to make any further

statements than above, other than from the

history;" the statements he had made above

being that the “immediate cause of death"

was “shock from penetrating pistol-shot;

wound of head, (right temple;) mental aber-

ration, superinduced by chronic headache.”

The jury were en-ti-rely at liberty to properly

ﬁnd that that wound, although self-inﬂicted,

466

was accidental. The proofs of death, and

the entire evidence at the trial, left it in

doubt how Hall’s death was caused, and it

was for the jury to determine by their ver-

dict. The court charged the jury that, if

they should ﬁnd that Hali’s death was caus-

ed by accident, they should ﬁnd for the plain-

tiff. There was no exception to that in-

struction, and the case was cried on the theo-

ry that that was a correct construction of

the policy. The sixth request of the defend-

ant to charge was that, if the jury should

ﬁnd that Hall shot himself “in any manner

except as by mere accident.” the defendant

was entitled to a verdict; the tenth request

was that the plaintiff had failed to give any

evidence that the death was accidental; and

the twelfth request was that the defendant

PRODUCflO:S- AND EFFECl' OF EVIDENCE.

It became her duty ro lllltlsfy the jury, by
a preponderance of evidence, t11at Hall 'llled
otherwl.se than by hls own hand.
But the defendant was not prejudiced by
the statements and opinions contained In the
proofs of death, and the plalntltr was · not
estopped thereby, as a matter ot la.w. When
the court was asked to chaI"ge the jury that
by the Introduction of those proofs the burden was shifted, the evidence was all before
the Jury, and was much more full and complete tllan that u1'°n wlllch Dr. Jenkins bad
based his opinion. He himself had been examined as a witness, and had testified as to
what lie knew or did not know at the time
be made his certificate; and all the tacts of
the ('8.Se, so tar as they were known, batl
been explained lo view ot the contents ot the
proofs of death. It appeared that most of
the statements In the ceTtlficate of Dr. Jenkins we1·e based on hearsay. The lnstruc·
tlons l!Bked tM In that respect, therefore,
would ha\·e been erroneous.
:Sor did the declaratloDS In the proofs ot
death, wllen all taken together, nece88ftrlly
amount to an adm188lon that Hall commltte<l
suicide. The tacts, or what Dr. Jenkins at
the time supposed to be the facts, were stated In the pro1>fs of death; and, although the
detemlant might have drawn therefrom the
conclusion ot suicide, they 1>ught to be scrutinized carefully when they a.re B1>ught to be
used as amounting to an adml881on by the
plalntltr that the policy was void. The language used by Dr. Jenkins In bis certificate
ls not Inconsistent with the theory of death
by accident, especially In view of the fact
that, when he came to the direct question as
to whether Hall's death was caused by bis
own hand or acts, he answered it by stating
that he was "unable to make uy further
statements than above, other than from the
history;" the statements he bad made above
being that the "Immediate cause or death"
was "shock from penetrating pistol-shot;
wound of bead, (right temple;) mental aberration, superlnduced by chronic headache."
The jury were entirely a.t liberty to properly
find that that wound, although self-lntllcted,
466

wa..s accldental. The proofs of dath, and
the entire e\"ldence at the trial, left it iB
doulJt bow Hall's death was caused, and it
wa..s for the jury ro determine by their verdict. The court charged the jury that, if
they should find that Hall's death was caused by a.ccldent, they should 1lnd for the p.lalntltr. There was no exception to ttiet Instruction, and the case was tried on the theory that that was & correct construction of
the pollcy. The sixth request ot the defendant to charge was that, If the jury should
find that Hall shot himself "In any manner
except as by mere accident," the defendant
was entitled ro a verdict; the tenth request
wa.s tba.t the plaintiff bad tailed to give any
evidence that the death was accidental; and
the twelfth request was that the defendant
was not bound to exclude every theory or
accident.
. 4. As to the exceptloDS to the charge ot the
court to the jury, we aee no error therein.
It Is contended tba.t there was DO ev1dence
from which the jury could find, as an a.fllrmat!Ye tact, that Hall died by accident or as- 1
saaslne.tlon. In regard to this, as before remarked, the bill of exceptions does not purport to set forth all the evidence in the C88e.
It was conceded that, If Hall's death wu by
accident or ll888S8inatlon, the policy covered
It, and, on the evidence given In the bill ot
exceptions, we think the jury were fully
warranted In finding that It was by accident.
The defendant having alleged In Its answer
that Hall's death was due to one of the
causes excepted from the operation ot the
policy, It was not error for the court to
charge the jury that the defendant W8.8
bound to establish such defense by evidence
outweighing that of the plaintltr.
We think the court property refused to
charge In accordance with the requests made
by the defendant, except as It had alre8dy
charged, and that it had already charged Dl
terms sumclently full and correct as to the
particulars now Insisted upon to have been
erroneous. Judgment aftlrmed.
Mr. Justice BROWN dlsaentlng.

CBOSS-EXAMIN ATION.
CROSS—EXAMINATION.

[Case No. 158

ANHEUSER-BUSCH BREWING CO. v.

ANHEUSER-BUSCH BREWING CO. v.
HU'.rM:ACHER.
(21 N. E. 626, 127 Ill. 652.)

HUTMACHER.

(21 N. E. 626, 127 Ill. 652.)

Supreme Court of Illinois. April 5, 1889.

Appeal from appellate court, Third district.

The plaintitT’s ﬁrst instruction, referred

to in the opinion, was as follows: “The court

instructs the jury that if they believe from

the evidence that the plaintiff, Hutmacher,

at the request of the defendant, performed

the services and did the work and labor

for the defendant in and about the pur-

chase of ice, and also in and about the con-

struction of an ice-house at Tompkins, or

Busch, in Missouri, as claimed by him, and

that in addition thereto the said Hutmacher

ﬁlled the said ice-house, or partly ﬁlled the

same, and also certain barges of defendant,

with ice, at the request of the defendant, and
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that such ﬁlling with ice was done by the

said Hutmacher for the defendant under a

contract with the defendant that the said de-

fendant should pay said Hutmacher ten cents

per ton for all the ice so put in said ice-

house and said barges by said Hutmacher.

then the said Hutmacher would be entitled,

in addition to his compensation for services,

work. and laborin the purchase of ice, as afore-

said, and in the construction of the said ice-

house, whatever amount the amount of ice

so tilled in the said ice-house and said barges,

by said Hutmacher, would amount to at ten

cents per ton, so far as the same maybe

shown by the evidence, deducting whatever

the jury shall believe from the evidence has

been paid to the said Hutmacher; unless the

jury shall believe from the evidence that the

said Ilutmacher has been fully paid for his

said services, work, and labor, and the filling,

or part filling, of the said ice-house and

barges, or has accepted from the defendant

a certain sum of money in full satisfaction

and discharge of all of the said claims and

demands of the plaintiff.” The objection

urged to said instruction was that the court

thereby told the jury that, unless they should

believe that the said Hutmacher had accept-

ed of defendant a certain sum of money in

full satisfaction and discharge of all his

claims and demands, he would be entitled to

.a verdict for whatever the ice, so placed in

said ice-house and barges, would amount to,

at ten cents per ton. The instructions on

behalf of defendant which were refused by

the court were as follows: “(1) The court in-

structs the jury that long delay, in claiming

or demanding a money debt, by one in ne-

cessitous circumstances, and where, if it

was honestly due, it could be had for the

asking, would be a circumstance tending to

prove that no such indebtedness, in fact, ex-

isted between the parties; and that, in de-

termining whether the demand, in any case,

is well founded or not, the reasonableness or

unreasonableness of the claim, in view of

all the surrounding facts and circumstances,

should be taken into account. (2) The court

instructs the jury that, where the testimony

Supri>me Court of Illinois. April 5, 1889.

Appeal from appellate court, Third district.
The plaintiff's first Instruction, referred
to in the opinion, was as follows: "The court
instructs the jury that If they believe from
the evidence that the plaintiff, Hutmacher,
at the request of the defendant, performed
the services and did the work and labor
for the defendant in and about the purehase of ice, and also in and about the construction of an ice-house at 'fompkins, or
Busch, in Misi1omi, as claimed by him, and
thRt in addition thert-to the said Hutmacher
filled the said ice-house, or partly filled the
same, and also certain barges of defendant,
with lee, at the request of the defendant, and
that such filling with ice w11s done by the
eaid Hutm1tcher for the defendant under a
~ontract with the defendant that the said defendant should pay said Hutmacher ten cents
per ton for all the ice so put in said icebouse and said barges by said Hutmarher,
then the said Hutmacher woulrl be entitled,
in addition to bis compensation for services,
work, and labor in the p11 rchase of ice, as aforesaid, and in the construction of the said icehonse, whatever amount the amount of ice
so fl lied in the said ice-house and said barges,
by said Hutmacher, would amount to at ten
cents per ton, so f1tr as the same may be
shown by the ~vidence, deducting whatever
the jury shall believe from the evidence has
been paid to the said Hutmacher; unless the
jury shall believe from the evidence that the
s11id Hutmacher has been fully paid for his
said services, work, and labor, and the filling,
or part lilling, of the said ice-house and
barges, or has accepted from the defendant
a cei·taln sum of mom•y in full sati!lfaction
and discharge of all of the said claims and
demands of the plaintiff." The objection
urge•! to said instruction was that the court
thereby told the jury that, unless they should
believe that the said Hutmach~r had accept-ad of defendant a certain sum of money in
tun satisfaction and discharge or all his
claims and demands, he would be entitled to
a verdict for whatever the ice, so placed in
said ice-house and barges, would amount to,
at ten cents per ton. The instructions on
behalf of defendant which were refused by
the con rt we1·e a.'I follows: "(1) The court in-strncts the jury that long delay, in claiming
or demanding a money debt, by one in necessitous circumstances, and where, if it
was honestly due, it could be had for the
asking, would be a circumstance tenrling to
prove that no such indebtedness, in fact, existed between the parties; and that, in determining whether the demand, in any case,
is well founded or not, the reasonableness or
unreasonableness of the claim, in view of
all the surrounding facts and circ11mi1tances,
should be taken into account. (2) The court
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instructs the jury that, where the testimony
of a witnes.'I is so extraordinary as to be manifestly contrary to all human observation and
experience, and so manifestly repugnant to
right reason as to appear, when taken in connection with its related facts and surrounding circumstances, incredible and unnatural,
-as if one should say he had, in the open
market, or a sane and intelligent person, purchased a genuine coin of the value of 11 ve
dollars for a penny,- then, in that event~
such testimony may be by them wholly disregarded and for naught held, as being contradicted by human reason nnd the common
experience of mankind."
George W. Fogg, for appellant. Ca1·ter cf
Gof!et·t, for appellee.
BAILEY, J. Thill was a suit in ass11mpsft,
brought by liudolph Hutmacher against the
Anheuser-Busch Brewing Association, a corporation organized and doing business at St.
Louis, .Mo., to recover for work, labor, and
services of the plaintiff in superintending
the erection of an ice-house, and cutting,
storing, and purchasing Ice for the defendant.
'.rhe trial in the circuit court resulted in a
judgment in favor ol the plaintiff for $1,640
and costs, which judgment was affirmed by
the appellate court on appeal, and by a further appeal the record has been brought to
this court. To the declaration, which consisted of only the common counts, the defendant pleaded non aasumpsit and the payment by th1i defendant to the plaintiff of certain sums of money, which were received by
the plaintiff in full satisfaction and discharge
of the indebtedness sued for. Upon the is.;
sues thus formed the evidence was to a considerable dt>gree conflicting. But, as all
questions of fact have been conclusively settled by the appellate court, we must accept
the verdict and judgment as the only proper
result of the evidence, it being open to this
court to review the record only so far as it
may be shown to contain errors of law.
Error is assigned upon the refnsal of the
court to grant the defendant's motion for a
continuance. Said motion was supportecl by
an afttllavit showing the absence of five witm~sses, all residents or St. Lonis, and all being officers or employes of the defendant,
viz.: Adolph Busch, its president; Erwin
Sprau], the general superintendent of its outdoor business; Gustav Housman, its assistant 11ecretary; George Krug, its general and
commercial agent; and Henry Jacobs, its
master carpentE>r and bnilder. The materiality of the testimony of each of these witnesses seems to be sulticiently shown, and
the only question ls whether there Is sufficient proof of diligence In endeavoring to
procure. their attendance. The affidavit
shows that at a prior day of the same term
the defendant had all of said witnesses in
court ready to testify, but thRt at the time of
making the affidavit for a continuance they
were all absent from the state, Krug and Jacobs being t.emporarily in Nebraska, Hous467
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mun being in attendance upon the circuit

court at linnsus City, l\lo., as a witness. and

Busch and spraul being both coniined to

their houses in St. Louis by sickness. The

court held the atiidnvit suilicient so far as it

related to witnesses Busch and Spranl, but

insniﬁcient as to the others, and, the plain-

tiff electing to admit the ailid.-wit in evidence

so far as it related to the testimony of Busch

and Sprani, the motion for a. continuance

was overruled. The rule is too familiar to

require the citation of authorities that, to

entitle a party to a continuance on account

of the absence of material witnesses, it must

be shown that due diligence has been used to

obtain their testimony. That the aiiidavit in

this case fails to show such diligence is too

plain for argument. All of the absent wit-

nesses were in court one day during the ear-
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lier part of the same term, and were there-

fore within reach of process, but neither was

served with subpcena, nor is it pretended

that any attempt was made to subpoena

them. All were ofﬁcers or empioyés of the

defendant, and subject to its orders, and it

will be presumed that their attendance before

a commissioner might'have been procured

at any time, yet no eiforts are shown to have

been made to obtain their depositions, al-

though the suit had been pending more than

eight months, and had been once continued

at the instance of the defendant on account

of the absence of witnesses. Upon such a

showing as to diligence, the motion for a con-

tinuance was properly overruled.

Complnint is made of various rulings of

the court in relation to the admission of evi-

dence. While the plaintiff was on the stand

as a witness in his own behalf, the defend-

ant's counsel, on cross-examination, put to

him questions as to the defendant’s solvency

and his own insolvency during the period

which intervened between the accruing of

the indebtedness sued for and the commence-

ment oi the suit. These questions were ob-

jected to on the ground that they were not

proper cross-examination, and the objection

was sustained. N0 questions had been put

to the witness, on his direct examination, as

to the solvency of the defendant, or his own

insolvency, or in any way involving those

subjects, and therefore, according to the

well-settled practice in this state, it was not

open to the defendant to put to the plaintiif

questions in relation to them on cross-exam-

ination. Stafford v. Fargo, 35 Ill. 481; Bon-

net v. Glattfeldt, 120 ill. 166, 11 N. E. Rep.

250; Lloyd v. Thompson. 5 Ill. App. 90;

Waller v. Carter, 8 Ill. App. 511. See, also,

Railroad Co. v. Stimpson, 14 Pet. 448; Floyd

V. Bovard. 6 Watts & S. 75; 1 Greenl. Ev.

§ 445. If the defendant deemed the inquiry

material, it should have introduced evidence

in relation thereto, either by recalling the

plaintiff. or by the production of other testi-

inony, after the plaintiff had closed his case.

Complaint is also made of the ruling of the

court sustaining an objection to questions
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m:m being in attendance upon the circuit
court at Kilnsas City, ~Jo., as a witness, and
Busch and Spraul being both confined to
thelr houses in St. Louis by sickness. The
court held the affidavit sufficient so far as it
related to witnesses Busch and 8praul, but
Insufficient as to the others, and, the pluintitf electing to admit the atlidavit in evidence
so far as it i·elated to the testimony of Busch
and Spraul, the motion for a continu1tnce
was overruled. The rule Is too familiar to
require the citation of authorities that, to
entitle a party to a continuance on account
of the absence of material witnesses, it must
be shown that due diligence has been used to
obtain their testimony. That the affidavit in
this case fails to show such diligence is too
plain for argument. All of the absent witnesses wPre in court one day during the earlier part of the same term, and were therefore within reach of process, but neither was
served with subpcena, nor is it pretended
that any attempt was made to subprena
them. All were officers or employes of the
defendant, and subject to its orders, and it
will be presumed that their attendance before
a oommissloner might •have been procured
at any time, yet no efforts are shown to have
been made to obtain their depositions, although the suit had been pending more than
eight months, and had been once continued
4&t the instance of the defendant on account
of the absence of witnessPs. Upon such a
showing as to diligence, the motion for a continuance was properly overruled.
Complaint is made Qf various rulings of
the court in relation to the admission of evidence. While the plaintiff was on the stand
as a witness in his own behalf, the defendant's counsel, on croBB-examination, put to
him questions M to the defendant's solvency
and his own insolvency during the period
which intervened between the accruing of
the indelJtedness sued for and the commencement of the suit. 'fhese q uestion1:1 were objected to on the ground that they were not
proper cross-examination, and the objection
wa.s sustained. No questions bad been put
to the witness, on his direct examination, as
to the solvency of the defendant, or his own
insolvency, or in any way Involving th.ose
subjects, and therefore, according to the
well-settled practice in this state, it was not
open to the defendant to put: to the plaintiff
questions in rPlation to them on cross-examination. Stafford v. Fargo, 35 111. 481; Bonnet·•· Glattfeldt, 120 lll. 166, 11 N. E. ltep.
250; Lloyd v. Thompson, 5 Ill. App. 90;
Wallu v. Carter, 8 Ill. App. 511. See, also,
Railroad Co. v. Stimpson, 14 Pet. 448; ~'loyJ
v. Bovard, 6 Watts & S. 75; 1 Greenl. Ev.
~ 445. If the defendant deemed the inquiry
material, it should have introtluced evidence
in relation thereto, either by recalling the
plaintiff. or by the production of other testimony, after the plaintiff had closed his case.
Complaint is also made of the ruling of the
court switaining an ubjection to questions
put to the plaintiff 011 cross-examination,
468

calling for Lhe contt>nts of a certain letter
written by Spraul to the ptaintitT, and which
appears to have been lost. '.rl1Pse questions
were exclud<>d, on the ground that they were
not proper cross-examination, but it is suflicient lo say that no exception to the ruling
was preserved, and Its propriety is therefore
not open to review.
The court also sustaine1l objections to quPstions put to the plaintiff 011 cross-examination, as to the gross cost of putting up the
ice, for which he claims a commission by
contract of 10 cents per ton. The witness
was not examined on that. subject on his direct examination, and for that reason t:he
questions objected to were improper. Moreover, the plaintiff was seeking to recover
upon an expres!I contract with the defendant
1U1 to the amount of hi& compensation, and
under such contract the amount of the gros.~
cost of cutting and putting up the ice would
seem to be immate1·ial.
A number of teh•grams in relation to the
labor and services sued for, and purporting
to have been sent by the defendant to the
plalntitT, were produced by the plaintiff.
and, on proof that they were received by him
from the telegraph company in the usual
conrse of business, they were admitted in
evidence, against the objection and exception
of the defendant. Several letters of date$
contemporaneous with the telegrams written
by the defendant to the plaintiff were also
read m evidence, in which the defendant admitted having communicated with the plaintiff by telegraph, and in some of which letters copies of the telegrams sent were given.
the 11ame being exact copies of telegrams of
the same date, read in evidence. The position now taken is that the papers delivered .
by the telegt"aph company to the plaintiff areonly copies, the 01·iginals being the telegram&
signed by the defendant, and delivered by it.
to the telegraph office from which the message was sent, and it is urged that such
originals shonld have been prn.luced, or som&
proper foundation laid for the introduction
of secondary evidence of their contents. The
application of the rule of evidence here contended for must depend upon whether the
messages delivered by the telegraph company
to the plaintiff, or thosfl delivered by the defendant to the telegraph operator, are, as between the parties in this suit, to be deemed
the ori!{inals. In Durkee v. H.ailroad Co., 29
Vt. 1<!7, the rule which we consider the most.
reasonable one is laid down, viz. : That the
original, where the person to whom it is sent
takes the risk of its transmission, or is the
employer of the telegraph, is the message delivered to the operator; but where tl1e person
sending the message takes the initiative, B<>
that the telegraph company is to L>e regarded
as his agent, the original is the message aclually deli ve1·ed at the end of the Ii ne. ~.
also, 8aveland v. Green, 40 Wis. .i;H; Telegraph Co. v. Sholter, 71 Ga. 700; Wilson v.
Hailroad Co., 31 Minn. 481, 18 X. W. Hl'p.
291; Dunnin11: v. ltoberts, 35 Barb. 4tH;
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Gray, Tel. §§ 104. 129. The same rule was

adopted by this court in Morgan v. People, 59

Ill. 58.

The fact that the defendant took the ini-

tiative in sending the tEl€gl"r\ll'lS, thus em-

ploying the telegraph company as its agent,

is clearly shown by its letters to the plaintiff,

read in evidence. Having thus employed

such agent to convey communications to the

plaintiif, in must be held to be bound by the

acts of its agent to the extent at least of

making the messages delivered originals,

thereby constituting them primary evidence

of the contents of the messages sent. It

should be observed that there is no sugges-

tion that any of these messages were errone-

ously transmitted, and the case, therefore,

does not present the question, upon which

there is some conﬂict in the authorities,
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whether the sender of a telegram makes the

telegraph company its general agent so as to

become responsible for the acts of such

agent, where there is a departure from the

authority actually given, by transmitting the

message incorrectly.

Some criticisms are made upon the rulings

of the court in giving the plaintiffs ﬁrst in-

struction, and in refusing two instructions

asked by the defendant. The plaintiff's first

instruction is a correct stateinent of the law

applicable to the case, and the objection

urged to it is not well taken. Both the de-

feuda.nt’s instructions refused are clearly er-

roneous. We ﬁnd no error in the record,

and the judgment of the appellate (‘~.‘l.".‘l5 will

therefore be aliirmed.
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Grny, Td. ~§ 104, 129. The same rule was
adopted by tbis court in Morgan v. People, 59
111. 5tl.

'fhe fact that the defendant took the lnltiat.ive in sending the telegrams, thus employing the telegraph company as its agent,
is clearly shown by its letters to the plaintilT,
read in evidence. Having thus employed
sud1 agent to convey communications to Lhe
pl11i11titf, it must be held to be bound l>y the
acts of its agent to the extent at least of
making the messages delivered orlginals,
therel.ly constituting them prim11ry evidence
of the contents of the messagPS sent. It
Rhould be ol.lserved that there is no suggestion that any of these messages were erroneously transmitted, and the case. thertifore,
does not present the question, upon which

[Case No. lb8

there is some conflict in the authorities,
whether the sende1· of a telegram makes the
telegraph company Its general agent so as to
become responsible for the aets of such
agent, where there Is a departure from the
authority actually given, by transmitting the
message incorrectly.
Sotoe criticisms are made upon the rulings
of the court in giving the plaintiff's first instt-uction, and in rf'fnsing two instructions
askt>d by the defendant. The plaintiff's first
instruction is a correct statement of the law
applical.lle to the case, and the object.ion
urged to it is not well taken. Both the defendant's instructions refused are clearly erroneous. We find no error in the record,
and the judgment of the appellate <'Ill' ;t will
the1·eCore be alllrmed.
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_ James Artery

CHICAGO, M. 8:. ST. P. RY. CO.v. ARTERY.

(11 Sup. Ct. 129, 137 U. S. 507.)

Supreme Court of the United States. Dec. 22,

1890.

In error to the circuit court of the

United States for the northern district of

Iowa.

John W. Cary, for plaintiff in error. H.

B. Fouke and D. E. Lyon, for defendant in

error.

BLATCHFORD, J. This is an action at

law, hrought in the district court of Du-

buque county, in the state of Iowa-, by

against the Chicago, Mil-

waukee & St. Paul Railway Company, a

Wisconsin corporation, to recover dam-

ages for a personal injury, and removed

by the defendant into the circuit court of
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the United States for the northern district

oi Iowa. The petition alleges that the

defendant owns and operates aline of rail-

road from Dubuque, in Iowa, to La

Crosse, in Wisconsin, and St. Paul, in Min-

nesota, and in the operation of it uses lo-

comotives propelled by steam, hand-cars

propelled by hand, and cars drawn by its

locomotives; that the plaintiff, on March

5, 1883, and for several months prior there-

to, was in the employ of the defendant in

the use and operation of the road in the

county of Allamakee, in Iowa, in working

upon its road and road-bed, in keeping

the tics in good order, in keeping the road

well and properly bailasted, in removing

obstructions from its track, in keeping its

culverts and crossings in repair, in keep-

ing the iron on the road properly spiked

and fastened, and in keeping the road-bed

ﬁt for use and operation along its line of

road and right oi wayin the county of Al-

iamakee; that in doing such work, cars

propelled by steam and hand-cars were

used by the plaintiff and others. the cars

being furnished by the defendant; that

while in such employ, the plaintiff left the

village oi Harper's Ferry, in said county,

with other employes, under a foreman of

the defendant, named Iiellehan, and went

north somel0 miles, making repairs on the

road; that, after doing such work, and

towards evening, the foreman ordered a

start to return to I-Iarper’s Ferry, on a

small hand-car, on which were placed sev-

en or eight men, and more than the car

could or ought to carry; that. when the

hand-car was ordered by the foreman to

start to Harper's Ferry. it was started at

the time that a train of cars was due, of

which the plaintiff then had no knowledge‘,

dered the plain tiff to get a shovel and seat

himself on the front of the hand-car, and

hold the show el on the top of the rail, in

order to remove the snow as the hand-car

went forward; that on the hand-car there

were no places provided for the feet to rest

EVIDE~CE.

than JO miles an hour, being a dnnget'ous
11peed: that while It was so running, and
the plalntln was holding the sho\•el, and
while It waR crossing over a cattle-guard
In the roa11. und without any fault or
negligence on his part, hl1:1 foot wnscaught,
and be was thrown off and under the
hand-car, his body doubled up, his spine
Injured, and bis backbone broken; that by
reason thereof he has been confined to his
bed ever since, unable to work, and suffering great pain In body and mind; and
that all this happened by the negligence of
BLATCHFORD, J. Tbl1 ls an action at the defendant In furnishing untit and hnlaw, hrongh t In the district court or Du- proper hand-cars, In requiring oneroutJ
buque connty, In the state of Iowa, by and dangerous duty from the plalntlll, lo
James Artery agaloHt thA Chicago, Mil- running the hand-car at a dangerous rate
waukee & St. Paul Railway Cou1pnny, a of speed, and in overloading it. Damages
"\\'h~consln corporation, to recover damare claimed In the sum or $20,000, bee!dee
ages for a personal Injury, and remo,·ed the sum of $1,000 for money paid for
by the defend1mt Into the circuit court of bourd, care, and surgical and medical
the United States for the northern dh1trlct treatment. The petition was afterwards
of Iowa. The petition alleges that the amended by alleging further that the
defendRnt owns and operate1:1 a. line of rall- hand-car was not constructed with rearoBd from Dubuque, In Iowa, to La sonably safe appliances to push the snow
Crosse, In Wisconsin, and St. Paul, In Min- off from the rails, which appliances could
nesota, end In the operation of It uses lo- eu11lly have been furnished by the defendcomotives propelled i,y steam, hand-cars ant; that It was wanting in the proper
propelleli by hnnd, and ca~ drawn by Its kind of a brake, and the proper kind of a.
locomotives; that the plaintiff, on March foot-rest for doing the kind of work which
5, 1'*'3, and for several months prior there- the pllllntlff was ordered to do; that.
to, was In the employ of the defenliant In when the pluintlft was orderecJ by the forethe use and operation of the road In the man to sit down on the front of the handcounty of Allamakee, In Town, In working car end hold the shovel, he was unaware
upon lb~ road and road-bed, In keeping of any danger therefrom, and had reason
the ties In good order, In keeping the road to belle\·e nod did believe that the handwell and properly ballasted, In removlDlt car would be run by the foreman at a safe
obstructions from Its track, In keeping its rate of speed: that ft was run at an unculverts and cro11slngs In repair, In keep. reasonable Rod unnecessary faRt and danIng the Iron on the road properly spiked gerous speed, which the plaintiff could not
and fastened, and In keeping the ronli-bed control, nor could he leave the rar '''bile
flt for use and operation along Its line of It was in motion; that the cattle-guard
ro1td and right of way In the county of Al- was made of three-cornered pieces of
lamakee; that In doing 11urh work, cars wood. plnred negligently on top of the ties.
propelled by steam and hund-cars were , across the track instead of lengthwlst",
used by the plaintiff and others. t11e cars a nil some of the three-cornered plPCes stood
being furnished by the defendant; that higher than the surface of the rail, of which
while In f',Jch employ, the plaintiff lert the fact the plaintiff was not tbeo awnl'I';
village of Harper's Feny. in t1nid county, and th1tt, by reason of such negligent conwith other employe11, under a forem11n of struction ur the cn.ttle-gu1uc.1, the spee<l
the defendant, named Rellehan, and went of the hand-car, and the dangerous and
north some 10 miles, mnkln~ repairs on the tlret1ome position In which the defendant
road; thut, after doing such work, and placed the plaintiff, he was Injured either
towards evening, the foreman ordered a
IJy his foot or feet coming In contuct with
start to return to Harper's Ferry, on a
the rnll or the three-cornered pieces. or by
small band-c1tr, on which were placed se\"- the shovel getting caught on the rail or
en or eight men, and more than the car on such pieces, or by all of such circumcould or ought to carry; that. when the stances. 'l'he answer of tbede(endaut cunbaud-car was ordered by the furem1tn to tal1111 a J!;enernl denial, and an ullegutlon
start to Harper'R Ferry, It was started at or contributory negligence on the p1trt of
the time that a. truin of cars wa111 due, of the plaintiff. The case was t11t:>d by a
which the plaintiff then ha<l no knowledge~ Jury, which renclered a verdict for the
that the snow had been fnlllng, and there pluintlH or $13,500, for which, with coi1ts,
was snow on the rails, and the foreman or- he had Judgment, to review which the
dered the 11laln tiff to get a sho\'el and seat defE>ndant has brought a writ of error.
himHclf on the front of the hnncl-cnr, and
One ol the princlp11l points taken by the
hold the shu~ el on the top of the rail, In defendant ls that this was a case of an Inorder to remove the snow as the hand-car jury r1•sulting from tho negligem•p of a cowent forw1ud; thut on the hund-cnr there empluye, namely, the foreman lh•llehan, lu
were no places provided for the feet to re11t the mun1tgementand running of the hmtdupon while perrormingimchduty; tbatthe car, und did nut fall within the pro,·lsions
plaintiff was compelled, In order to hold or the stutute or Iowa on the subject. On
the shovel, to exert all his strength, and the 8th of April, 1Sli2, a statute w11R enhy mui;culnr exertion holll up his feet anti acted In Iowa (Laws 11'62, c . Hi!J. § i, p.
at the same time guide and bohl the Ill~.) as follows: "~ec. 7. Every rullroad
shovel; that the hand-car wus run ahead company 11bttll be liable for all c1nma~ea
of the truln, then due, at the rate of more su1:1tulued by any person, tncludlng em-

CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO. v. ARTERY.
(11 Sup. Ct. 129, 137 U. S. 507.)
Supreme Court of the United States. Dec. 22,
1800.
In error to the circuit court of the
United States for the northern district of
Iowa.
John W. Cury, for plaintiff In error. H.
B. Fouke and D. E. L,yon, for defendant lo
error.

that the snow had been falling, and there

was snow on the rails,and theforeman or-
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ployes of the company. in consequence oi

any neglect oi the agents or by any mis-

management oi the engineers or other em-

ployes oi the corporation to any person

sustaining such damage.” This provis-

ion was afterwards modiﬁed by section

1307 of the Code oi Iowa oi 1873,which was

in force at the time oi this accident, and

read as follows: “Sec. 1307. Every corpo-

ration operating a railway shall be liable

for all damages sustained by any person,

including employes oi such corporation,

in consequence oi the neglect oi agents. or

by any mismanagement oi the engineers,

or other employes oi the corporation, and

in consequence oi the willful wrongs,

whether oi commission or omission, oi

such agents, engineers, or other employes,

when such wrongs are in any manner
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connected with the use and operation oi.’

any railway, on or about which they

shall be employed, and no contract which

restricts such liability shall be legal or

binding." The modiﬁcation introduced

by the later statute is that the wrongs

for which the corporation is to be liable

must be wrongs connected with the use

and operation oi the railway on or about

which the employes are employed. ltis

contended by the defendant that, under

the decisions oi the supreme court oi Iowa

upon this statute, only employes en-

gaged in operating and moving trains,

and who are injured by such trains. and

employes who, while in the discharge oi

their duty, are injured by trains used in

operating the railway, are within the

statute. and that, in the present case, the

plaintiff was not engagedin operating and

moving a train, and was not injured by a

train used in operating the railway. But

we cannot concur in this view.

In Deppe v. Railroad Co., 36 Iowa, 52, it

w'us held, under the act oi 1862. that the

statute included the case oi‘ an employe

who was engaged in connection with a

dirt-train, and was injured, while loading

n car, by the falling oia bank oi earth.

and in Frandsen v. Railroad Co.. Id. 372,

that a person employed asa section-hand,

in the business oi keeping a certain part

oi‘ the road in repair, and going with his

co-employes on the track on a. hand-car

ior that purpose, was within the act oi

1862, he being injured through a collision

with theengine oi a passenger train,which

struck the hand-car, and threw it against

the plaintlﬂ while he was on the ground,

and engaged in trying to remove the hand-

car out of the way oi the engine.

The ease oi Schroeder v. Railroad Co., 41

Iowa, 344, arose under section 1307 oi the

Code. It was said in that case that that

section applied only to accidents growing

out oi the use and operation oi the road,

and did not appl_v to all persons em-

ployed by the corporation without re-

Eard to their employment, and it was

ployes of the company. tn consequence or
any neglect of the agents or by any mismanagement of the eu~neers or other employee of the corpora tloo to any person
sustaining such damage." This provision was afterwards modified by seetlon
1807 of the Code of Iowa of 1878, which was
In foree at the time of this accident, and
read asfollowa: "Sec.1307. Every corporation operating a rbllway shall be ltable
for all damages sustained by any penion,
lncl11dlng employee of aucb corporation,
In consequence or the neglect or agents. or
by any mismanagement of the engineers,
or other 1>ruployes of the corporation, and
in conseq11ence of the wlllful wronp,
whether of commls11lon or omission, of
such agents, engineers, or other employee,
when such wrongs are In any manner
connected with the use and operation of
any railway, on or about which they
11ball be employed, and no cont1·act which
restricts such liability shall hfl legal or
binding." 1.'he modiftcatlon Introduced
by the later statute Is that the wrongs
for wblcb the corporation ls to be liable
most be wrongs connet-ted with the use
and operation of the railway on or about
which the employee are employed. It Is
contended by the dc>fendant that, under
the dedslons of the supreme court of Iowa
upon this statute, only employes enJr;aged In operating and moving traf11s,
and who are Injured by such trains, and
employee who, while In the dlschurge or
their duty, are injured by trains used In
operating the railway, are within the
stntote. and that, In the preMf'nt case, the
plaintiff was not enJ(aged In operating and
movlu11: a tralo, and was not Injured by a
train used In operating: the railway. But
we cannot concur In this view.
In Deppe v. Railroad Co., 36 Iowa, 52, It
was held, on<lf'r the act of 1862, that the
statute Included thll caRe Qf an employe
who was engaged In connection with a
dirt.train, and was injured, while loading
a car, by the falling of a bank of earth.
and In Frandst>n v. Ralll'Oud Co .. Id. 372,
that a person employed asa section-hand,
In the b111dnPSB of keeµlng a cPrtaln part
of the road In repair, and going with hl1:1
co-eniployes on the track on a hand-car
for that purpoire, was within the act of
1862, bA being Injured through a colli11lon
with the engine of a p1111Renger train, 'vhlch
etrock the hand-car, and threw It against
the plaintiff while he was ou the ground,
ancl Pogaged In trylngtoremovetbe handcar out of the way or the engine.
The case of 8cbroeder v. Railroad Co., 41
Iowa, 344, arose muter section l::J07 of the
Code. It was snld in that cm;e that that
section apfJlled only to accidents growing
out of the uRe and opera tlon of the road,
and did not apply to nll personf! employed by the corporation without re·
11:ard to theh· employment, and It was
held, therefore, that It did not cover the
caRe of Schroeder, who was not connected
with the operation of the road, bnt who,
while f'ngagcd In removing the tlmbeni of
an abandoned hrlllge, and loading them
on cars. wa11 lnj11re1l by Home of the timbers which lell from a car. The same
view was held In Potter v. Railroad Co.,
46 Iowa, 399, where Potter, a laborer in
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the machine-shop or the company, was
Injured by a locomotive driving-wheel,
which be and other ernploye8 wero moving by hand.
It was held, lo Schroeder v. Railroad
Co., 47 Iowa, 375, that where a person
wa1:1 required in the course of bis employment by the tallroad company to gt:t
upon a train, and did so, be was to be
regarded as belnit engaged In Its operation, although bis employment mlghl:
not be connected with the running of tbe
train; and that the company was liable
to him forlnJurles l't'Sultlng from the neglipuce of a co-employe.
In Pyne v. Railroad Co., 54 Iowa, 223,
6 N. W. Rep. 2!11, Pyne was en11Jloyed by
the railroad company as a private detective, a11d, while walking on the track, In
the performance of hbt duties, and In obe.
dleoce to the orders of the company, wat1
Injured, wlthont negligence on his part,
through the negllg;ence of the engineer of
a passing train, and It was held that hits
case fell within the provisions of section
1307, and that he was entitled to recover
from the company for the injuries received
by him.
In Smith v. Railroad Co., 59 lo\\·a, 78,
12 N. W. Rep. 768, where tt appeared that
the plaintiff was only a St!Ctlon-hond,and,
when Injured, was engaged In lua1llng a
~ar, and it did not appear tbut hiH eerv.
lee pertained to the operation of the roact.
It was held that be conld not recover for
an Injury which occnrred through the neKllgence of a. co-employe, the court remarkln1t th11 t under section 1307 of the Code it
must be shown that hlH employment wuH
connected with the operation of the rail·
way.
It wu held, In Malone v. Rall way Co.,
61 Iowa, 826, 16 N. W. Rep. 203, that a person whose duty It WWI to wipe the company's eoglueH, and do other work about
the round-house, and to open the doors of
tbut. house so as to allow the engines to
paBS ln and out, and wbo,wblle endeuvor.
lug to shut those doorK, was Injured by
the carelt'Ssness of his co-employee who
were at the time engaged with him In the
same effort, could not recover under tiectlon 1307 for the Injury, because It wwi
not "lo any manner connected with the
use and operation "of the railway,::.:; con·
tern plated by that section.
In l<'oley v. Railroad Co., 64 Iowa. 6.U,
21 N. W. Hep. 12.f, it waR held that a carrl'palrer, whose outy It was to repair cars
on the track, but who had nothing to do
with cars in motlou,except to ride on passenger or freight trains to and from the
placeH where his services wl're required,
was not engaged In theoperatlonof a railway, within the meaning of section 1307,
and could not recover of the company for
an Injury received while In the dbichnt·ge
of his tlutles, thro11gh the nPgl!gence ur a
co-employe. Foley was engaged at the
time In making repalrH on a car, ancl was
Injured while uncter the car, through its
being moved Improperly.
'!'he Malone l'asP. cnme up again, in 65
Iowa, 417, 21 N. W. Hl•p. 756, and ft was
there held, that Malone, whose duty It
was to wipe engln1'fl, open and clost> the
doors of an engine-house, and remove
471
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snow from a turn-table and connecting

tracks, was not, by reason of such duties,

employed in the operation of the railroad,

within the meaning of section 1307; and

that, for an injury received by him while

performing such duties, and through the

negligence of a co-employe. he could not

recover against the company. although he

might have had other duties to perform

which did pertain to the operation of the

road.

It was held, in Luce v. Railroad Co., 67

Iowa, 75. 24 N. W. Rep. 600, that a person

employed in a coal-house of the railroad,

and injured by the negligence of a co-em-

ploye while loading coal upon a car,could

not recover from the company under sec-

tion 1307, because the injury was not in

any manner connected with the use and
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operation of the railway.

In Maison v. Railroad Co., 68 Iowa, 22,

25 N. W. Rep. 911, the plaintiff was a mem-

ber of a construction gang on the road,

and his duties required him to ride upon,

and to Work upon and about, the com-

pany's cars and tracks. He was injured

by the negligence of a co-employe in

throwing a heavy stone upon his hand,

while he was‘ engaged in placing stones

under the ends oi the ties. it was held

that the injury was not connected with

the use and operation of the railway. as

contemplated in section 1307, and that

the company was not liable. -

It was held, in Stroble v. Railroad Co.,

70 Iowa. 555, 31 N. W. Rep. 63, that a per-

son whose sole duty it was to elevate coal

to a platform convenient for delivering it

to the tenders of engines, was not em-

ployed in the use and operation of the rail-

way, within section 1307, because he was

in no way concerned with the moving and

operation of trains.

In Pierce v. Railway Co., 73 Iowa, 140,

34 N. W. Rep. 783, a mechanic from a shop

of the company was working. under or-

ders, upon a ladder which leaned against

one of the cars of a. train. The tralnmcn

moved the train backward, without no-

tice to him, the ladder fell, and he was in-

jured. It was held that the negligence.

whether that of the trainmen or of the

foreman in not giving the requisite informa-

tion to the trainmen, was connected with

the use and operation of the railway, and

was the negligence of some one employed

on it, so as to make the company liable,

under section 1307,for the injury sustained

by the plaintiff, and this although he was

not engaged in the operation of the rail-

way.

it was held, in Nelson v. Railroad Co.,

73 Iowa, 576, 35 N. W. Rep. 611, that the

working, on the railway, of a ditching

machine which was operated by the move-

ment along the track of the train of which

it formed a part, was an employment con-

nected vsith the use and operation of the
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snow from a turn-table and conne<-ting
tracks, was not. by reusun of Huch du ties,
employed In the operation of the railroad,
within the meaning of section 1307; and
that, for an Injury received by him while
performing such duties, and through the
negligence of a. co-employe, he could not
recover against the compnny, altliough he
might have had other duties to perform
which did pertain to the operation of the
roud.
It Wl\H held, In Luce v. Railroad Co., 67
Iowa, 75. 2-l N. W. Rep. 600, that a person
employed in a coal-hom1e of the railroad,
and Injured hy tht> nt>gligence of a co-employe while loadlug coal upon a cur,cuuld
not recover from the company und~r section 1307, because the Injury wa11 not In
any manner connt>eted with the uHe aud
operation of the rnllway.
In Matson v. Railroad Co., 68 Iowa, 22,
20 N. W. Uep. 911, the plaintiff was a member of a construction gang on the road,
and his duties required him to ridti upon,
and to work upon and about, the company's care and track~. He was Injured
hy the negligence of a co-employe tn
throwing a heavy stone upon hl11 hand,
while he was engaged iu placing 11tones
under the end11 of the ties. It was held
that the Injury was not connected with
the use and 01Jeratlun of the railway. as
contemplated In Rectlon 1307, and that
the l omr1any was nut liable.
It wail held, in Stroble v. Railroad cf).,
70 Iowa, 5.'\5, :n N. W. Rep. 6.3, that a person whose Role duty It wne to elevate coal
to a platform convenient for delivering It
to the te111Jers of engines. was not employed In theuseand operation of the railway, within section 13117, becamie he was
In no wa.v concerned with the moving and
oper1t tion of trains.
In .f>lerce v. Railway Co., 73 Iowa, 140,
34 N. W. Rep. 783, a mechanic from a shop
of the company was working, under ordel'!I, urum a lttdder which lt>aned a.a"alnst
one of the cal"!! of a. train. 'l'he tralnnum
moved the train backward, without notice to him, the ladder fP.11, aud he was hajured. It wa11 held that the negligence.
whether that of the trainmen or of the
foreman In not gt vlng the req ul11lte Information to the trainmen, was connected with
the URe and operation of the rallwa..v, and
was the negligence of some one emplo;ved
on It, 110 al! to make the company lluhle,
ut1der sec tlon 130i, for the Injury suHtalned
by the plaintiff, and this although he was
not engaged in the operation of the railway.
It was held, in Ne111on v. Railroad ('o.,
73 Iowa, 576, 35 N. W. Hep. 611, that the
working, on the railway, of a ditching
machine which wus operated by the movement along the track of the train of which
It formed a part, was an employment connected "Ith the use an1l operation of the
railway, within the meaning of section
1307, and made the company llablf' for Injury to an employe through the negllgem·1·
of a co-emplo.re. although the plaintiff
waR n•it engugecl In the actual movement
of the train, but waH only one of the crew
necessnry fur the tlerformance of the work
Intended to he done by the train and it11
machinery and uppliuncef!.
0
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In Rayburn v. Hallwoy Co., 74 Iowa,
637, 35 N. W. Rt>p. l!OU, and 38 N. W. Rep.
5:.!0, the plaintiff and othel'H were Heetlonhauds of the comp1tny, engagt!d in remo,·lng snow nnd Ice from the track, when a
train of care louded with slack came
a.long, moving slowly, and the conductor
and others In chari.te of the train directed
them to get upon the train tu unload the
elack. They requested that the train be
stopped, but were told that if It was
etop11ed it could not be started agate.
In attempting to ohey the order, the
plaintiff ws thrown down by a jerk of the
train and injured. It was held that he
was not precluded from rrcoverlng against
the company under section 130i, on th~
ground that the negligence cum11lalned of
was not connected with the use and operation of the railway.
From this statement of tho decisions of
the supreme court of Iowa, we are clearly
of opinion that, in the pre11ent case, the
defendant was liable, under Hectlon l30j'
of the Code, for the Injury to the plain tin
caused In the manner Bl't forth In the petition, and In the evidence contained to the
bill of exceptions. The plal11t1n wnR upon
a moving car propt>lleod by hand-power.
The mo\•ement of the car, Its speed, the
position of the plaintiff upon It, and the
duties he had to dl11charjl;e In tha.t position, were under the direction of the foreman, who was upon the same car. The
Injury was directly connected with the use
and operation of the railway, In whose
cummon service the foreman and the plain
tiff were, and they were co-employee. The
injuries to tht plalutln were, by the petl·
ti on and thu evldeuce, sought to be a ttrlbu ted to the t1mallness of the hand-ear, Its
heing overcrowded, thP. failure to providP
It with contri'l"ances for removing snow
from the track, the absence of a proper
brake, the want of foot-restR. and the arrangement of the cuttle-guard. The rail·
way was being used and operated In th..
movement of the hand·car quite at1 much
as If the latter 1111.d been a train of cars
drawn by a locomotive. If a single locomotive be on ltH way to Its englne·house,
alter IP.a ving a train which It has drawn,
or If It be 11ummoned to go abne for service to a po~nt mul't' or less distant, and. In
either ct1ee, by the negligence of one employe upon it, another employe 111 injured,
the Injury takP.R place In the use and opera tlon of the railway, under section Ia07,
quite as much as If It takes place while
the locomoth·e Is drawing ft train of carH.
This we under11tancl to be the manifest
purport and effect of thP. deciHions of the
supreme court of Iowa on the subject, as
well as ob\•iously the f>roper lnter11retatlon of the litatute. But, although this 111
so, we are of opinion that n new trial
must be granteu, on account of er1·ore In
the exclmo1lun of evidence offered by the
defendant.
At the trial, one Jerry Artery, a brother
of the plaintiff. was c1tlled as a wltneRs by
him. He was un the 11antl-c1tr with the
plaintiff at the time of the accident. nnd
saw all thtt.t occurred. He te11tilied nH to
the S(leed of the car, and as to ltll size, nnd
Its crn111pe1l and crowdPd condition. and
as to the fact that there was nothing on

CROSS-EXAMINATION.
CROSS-EXAMINATION.
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it in front upon which the plaintitf could

rest his feet while he was holding the

shovel, and as to the arrangement of the

cattle-guards. In the course of his cross-

examination, the following proceedings

occurred: “Question. (in the 23d of

March, 1886, at Harper's Ferry, in the

presence of Mr. Buell, did you sign a. writ-

ten statement. stating what you know

about this case, and about the accident to

your brother, after the written statement

had been read over to you? Answer.

Yes, sir. Q. I will show you now the

written statement. and ask you whether

that is your signature? (Written state-

ment shown tbe witness hereto attached

and marked ‘ Exhibit A.’) A. That is my

signature there. Q. In the Written state-

ment which I have just shown you you
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state as follows: ‘At the time Jim got

hurt we were running from 4); to 5 miles

an hour—certainly not to exceed 5 miles.’

Is that statement correct? (Objected to

by plaintiff; objection sustained.) The

grounds upon which the court sustained

the objections to interrogatories to this

and other witnesses,based upon a written

statement signed by the witness, and to

the introduction of the written state-

ments themselves, were that it appeared

that the statements were not volunteered

by the witnesses, but that the company

had sent its claim agent,after the happen-

ing of the accident, to examine the em-

ployes oi the company who were present

nt the time of the accident, in regard to

the transaction: that the statements

made by the witnesses were not taken

down in full, but only a synopsis thereof

made by the agent, the correctness of

which is questioned by the witnesses in

some particulars. although such written

statement was signed by the witness;

that, upon the trial of this case, these

statements, thus obtained, were sought

to he used not alone as a means of im-

peachlng the witness, but as evidence of

the matters therein recited; that it is ap-

parent to the court that, whether so in-

tended or not, these statements become a

ready means of confusing and intimidat-

ing witnesses before the iury, and that, if

it be permitted to parties to thus procure

written statements in advance from wit-

nesses, and then use the same in examin-

ing such witnesses, it will enable parties

to shape and control the evidence in a.

cause by committing the witnesses to

particular statements, couched in the lan-

guage not of the witness. but of the per-

son carrying on such exparte examina-

tion: that these growing abuses can only

.be prevented by entirely excluding such

statements thus procured from neingin-

troduced in evidence for any purpose;

that, if the party desired to impeach a

witness by showing contradictory state-

ments made by him, the person to whom

It In front upon which the plaintiff could

re11t hl11 feet while he w11s holding the
shovel, and 118 to the 11rraogeruent or the
cattlP.-guerds. In the course of his croB.6examloation, tile following proceedings
occurred: "Question. On the l!'dd of
March, 18~6, at H11rper's Ferry, lu the
presence of Mr. Buell, did you sign a written statement, 11tating wbat you know
abo11t this case, and about the accident to
your brother, after the written statement
had been read over to you? Answer.
Yes, sir. Q. I will show yon now the
written statement, and ask you whether
that ls your Mignature? (Written statement shown the wltnen hereto attached
und marked' Exblblt A.') A. That 18 my
silrnature there. Q. In the written statemPnt which I have just. shown you you
state as follow11: 'At the time Jim got
hurt we were running from
to 5 miles
an hour--(!ertaloly not tu exceed 5 miles.'
111 that statement correct? (Objected to
by plniotiH; objection sustained.) The
grounds npon which the court 11ustalned
the objections to lnterroga tories to this
and other wltnesse11, bused upon a written
statement 1dgnetl by the wltneBB, and to
the Introduction of the written statement11 themsel\•e11, were that It appeared
that the statemenbl were not volunteered
b,v the wltne1111es, bot that the com,1any
bad 11ent Its claim agent, after the happenini.t of the accident, to l'Xa mine the em1110,\'es of the company who were present
at the time of the accident, in regard to
the tram1actlon; that the statement.a
made by the witnesses were not taken
down in full, but only a synopsis then..>0f
made by the agent, the correctness or
which Is questioned by the wltne1111....s In
some particulars, elthoul{b such wrltteJJ
Htatement was signed by the witneRS;
that, upou the trial of thlK case, these
t1tatement11, thus obtained, were suught
to he used not alone as a means of impeaching the wltnes11, but as evidence of
the matters therein rer.lted; that U ts apparent to the court that, whether so lntt"uclt>d or not, theKe statements become a
reucly means of confusing and intimidating witnesses before the Jury, and that, if
it be permitted to partlet1 to thus procure
written st11temeotH In advance from wltllf'HHes, and then u11e the 11ame in exurulning 1mch wltneR11e11, It will enable parties
to 11hape and control the e\"hlence lo a
eaUHl' by committing
the wltne11ses to
purti1·ular statements, couchetl In the language not or the wlt.ne11s, but of the person carrying on such ez parte examination; that these growln11: abnse11 can only
. be prevented by entirely exclutllng 11ui:h
statements thu11 procured from uelng In·
troduced In evidence for any purpose;
that, If the party desired to ltnpeal!b ll
witness by showing contrarllctory state·
ments made by him, the p1?rson to whom
-0r In whose presence such alleged contradictory statements Wt're made should be
enllt'd as a wltne1111, so that opportunity
might be afforderl of plAclng before the
. jury the statements actuully mode by the
wltnt>HS sought to be lmpeache<I, noel not
a mere synopsis thereor made by nuother
per1mn, and the uccuracy or which, In
Mome particulars, was challenged. Excep-
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tton by defendant." The following further ['roceedlng~ took place on the crollftexamloa tlon of the 11ame witness: "Question. On thE> occasion I ha \"e 1eferretl tu,
did you make this statement: •Six men on
a hand-car have plenty or room. We often
had 8 and 10 men on a hand-car of the
same size?' (Objected to by plaintiff; ohjectiou sustained; exception by defendaut.) Q, Did you, on the occnslun I ha'\"e
referrrd to, at Harper's Ferry. say as follows: 'I am 8 larger man than .Jim ever
was, and my legs ere A great deal lonJi;er.
I have never had any trouble in kf'eplng my
feet up when I sat on the front of the car?'
(Objected to by plalutlff; objection sustained; exception by deren1lnnt.) Q. On
the occasion rt?ftorred to, did you 11tate
as follows: 'If a man ls holding a shovel
on the rail encl be ls sitting on the front
of a hand-car there ts no way for blm to
get hurt unless he forget& himself and lets
bis feet drop down?' (ObjPcted to by
plaintiff; objection sustained, exce11tloo
by defendant.) Q. On the occasion referred to, did you state: 'The l1and-cnr
was In JCOOd condition, nothing broken
about It In any way. It was an ordinary
car, full size?' (Objected to by plaintiff;
objection sustained; exception by defendnnt.) Q. Did you, on the occa11lon refer~d to, 11tate as follows: •I am foreman
at preRent on 11ectlon No. 20. The top of
the ribbons on the ties of tht> cattle-p,uard
was about level with the bull of the rail?'
A. Well, sir, I dnn't remember whether I
did or not say that. Q. If you did say
that, wns It the truth or not? {Objected
to by plain UH; objection Rustalned; exception by defendant.)" Sub!!equently,
while the defendant was putting In Its e"ldence, the bill of exceptions say11: "Thereupon the defendant offered lo evidence, for
the purpose of Impeachment, the statt>ment nod2r date ot March 23, 1~6, obown
the wltne11s Jerry Artery, and hereto nttach~1J, marked 'Exhibit A,' "'•blcb, on obJectlon by plaintiff, was ruled out by the
court; to which ruling the defendant at
the time excepted." The court, in RUHtalnlng the objection, stated that It deemed
the proper method to be to produce the
person to whom the Blleged statement
was made, and to prove by hlm whtJt the
w1tnes11 may have said on the occasion.
Exhibit A, thuH referred to, Is a paper
signed by the wltneHs, am1 contains the
stl\tements set forth In the six questlonK
thu11 exclude<I, ns above.
'fha.t the e\'ldence l'overed by the six
queAtlon11 wa11 material to the Issue, Is ap)laren t. The.v rel a tell to the speed of the
car. to the que11tlon of Its size 1.111d whether It wnH crowded or uot, to the que11tlon
whether the plalntlH could have kept up
hlH feet without a foot-reiit, anrl to the
que11tlon or the condition of the cattle.
guard. It IK a.n elementury principle of
the law of evidence that If a wltne1111 Is to
be lmpenche<l, In conHe11uence of his havini.t
madP, on some other occmlion, different
etateru~:nts, oral or written. from tho11e
w!:lch he muke11 on the wltneHs-11tand, us
to material 11oln ts In the case, his attention must Hr11t be called, on croF;11-examlnatlon, to the particular time and occasion when, the place where, and the per473
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son to whom he made the varying state-

ments. In no other Way can a founda-

tion be laid for putting in the impeaching

testimony. In the present case, it is ap-

parent that the views of the court, as set

forth in the bill of exceptions immediately

after the exclusion of the ﬁrst question

which is above stated to have been ex-

eluded on the cross-examination of the

witness .Ierry Artery, must have been

founded, not only upon what had at that

time transpired. but also upon the subse-

quent proceedings at the trial, and were

the views of the court upon additional

and kindred questions which arose in the

case, because. at the time such ﬁrst ques-

tion was asked upon cross-examination

and excluded. it had not yet appeared in

evidence under what circumstances the
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written statement was made by the wit-

ness. Moreover. it was stated by the

court that the written statements of the

witnesses “ were sought to be used not

alone as a means of lmpeaching the wit-

ness, but as evidence of the matters there-

in recited ;" whereas, when the statement

signed by the witness Jerry Artery was

offered in evidence and excluded, it was

distinctly offered “for the purpose of im-

peachment, ”and it is not otherwise stated

in the bill of exceptions that it was offered

for any other purpose; and, in excluding

it, the court excluded it as so offered. We

think the circuit court erred in laying it;

down as a. rule that a written statement

signed by a witness and adlnitted by him

to have been so signed. cannot be used in

cross-examining him as to material points

testified to by him; and in announcing it

as a further rule that the only way to im-

peach a witness by showing contradictory

statements made by him is to call as a

witness the person to whom or in whose

presence the alleged contradictory state-

ments were made. The foundation mu at

be first laid for impeaching a witness, by

calling his attention to the time, place,

nnd circumstances of the contradictory

statements. whether they were in writing

or made orally; and the court,in the pres-

ent case, excluded that from being done.

The written statement having been pre-

sented to the witness, and he having ad-

mitted that what purported to be his sig-

nature to it was his signature, it was per-

fectly open to him to read it. and he could

have been inquired of as to the circum-

stances under which it was taken down
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and signed. so as to advise the iur,v as to

its authenticity, and the credit to be given

to it. The bill of exceptions does not

show that the plaintiffs counsel asked the

witness to read the statement, or asked

the court to have it read to him, or that

the witness did not read it, or did not

have it read to him. The exclusion of the

ﬁrst question put to him and excluded,
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i;on to whom he me.de the Yarying statements. In no other way can a foundation be laid for putting In the impeaching
testimony. In the present case, it leapparent that the views of the court, as set
forth In the blll of exceptions lmmedintely·
nfter the exclu11lon of the first question
which 111 above stated to have boon excluded on the croee-examlnatlon of the
witness .Jerry Artery, must have been
founded, not only upon what bad at that
time transpired, but also upon the e11beequent proceedings at the trial, and were
the views of the court upon addltloual
and kindred questions which arose in the
case, becam1e, at the time such first question was aHked upon crose-examlnatlon
and excluded, It had not y11t appeared In
evltlence under what circumstances the
written statement was made by the wltneee. ~lort'over, It was stated by the
court that the written statements of the
witnesses "wer11 eo 11ght to be used not
alone as a means of Impeaching the witness, hut 8.11 evltlencc of the matters therein recited;" whereo11, when the statement
signed by the wltueee Jerry Artery was
offP-re<l ln evidence and excluded, It was
dhctlnctly offered "for the purpo!!e of Impeachment," and lt le not otherwise 11tnted
In the bill of exceptions that it wa11 offered
for any other purpose; and, In excluding
it, the court ex<·luded it as so offered. We
think the circuit court erred ln laying It
down as a rule that a written statement
signed by a wltne8s and admitted by him
to have been so slgnei.l, cannot be used In
croHR-examlnlnghlm a~ to material points
testified to by him; and in announcing it
as a further rule that the only way to lmpettch R wltne11s by 11howlng contradictory
statements made by him ls to caJI ae a
wltnei,iH the person to whom or ln whm1e
pre1:1e11ce the alleged contradictory etn tem«>nts were made. The foundation mu it
he ttrHt laid for Impeaching a wltnt'!!ll, by
calling his attention to the time, place,
und circumstances of the contrnlllctory
Htn tenwn tH, wlwther they were In wrlttng
or m1u.le orally; and the court, in the prei,ient case, excluded that from l.Jelng done.
The written statement ha\·ing bet>n presented to the wltne1:1s, and he having admitted that what purportt>d to be hie Hignnture to it was hl1:1 Hignature, it was per·
fectt.v open to him to read It, nnrl he coulrl
h11ve heen lnquil'ed of ae to thl.l circumetnnces under which It wne taken down
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and ehrned. so ae to advise the fury ne to
lt11 au then tic! ty, and the crerllt to he gt nm
to it. The bill of exceptions does not
show thttt thP plaintiff's rouneel asked the
witness to l'ead the statement, or asked
the court to hR ve It read to hi 111 1 or that
the witness did not read it, or did not
have It read to him. The exclusion of the
first question put to him and excluded,
namely, "le thRt statement correct?"
did not refer to the entire written statement, but to the statement In it as to the
speed at which the car was running.
ThH.t lnqulr.l' was directly pertinent to the
ltieue that was being tried.
The rule of evidence Invoked by the
plaintiff, and laid down in The Queen's
Case, 2 Rrod. & B. 284, 288, le that If, on
croee-examlnatlon, a witness 11dmlte a letter to be In hie handwriting, he cannot be
quP.etloned by counsel a11 to whether etatemen te, such as the counsel may Huggest,
are contained In It, but the whole letter
must be l'ead aH the evidence of the exi1:1tence of the statements. Thie principle le
not applicable to the present l'aee, bPCau11e
the plaintiff did not take the objection
that the whole statement wae nut, hut
should have been, read as evlden<'e; Rnd
thl' court, with the assent of the plalntift,
excluded it from being rea«t in evidence.
'l'he case or Railroad v. O'Brien, 119 U.
S. 99, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 118, le not In point.
In tl)at case, which wae a suit against 11
railroad comp1m~- to reco\'er for personal
injuries Tf>Ceived by an accident to a. train,
a written statement as to the nature and
extent of the lnJDriee, made by the plalnt1ff'e phyekian whlle treating him fo,r
them, was held not to be admissible aK
atHrmat!\'e evidence for the plolntlff, even
.thou~h It was attachf'd to a depo11itlon of
the physician, In which he swore that It
was written b,v him and that it correctly
stated the condition of his patient at the
time referrl'll to. The que11tlnn wu11 uot.
one which arose on the cross-examination
of a wltneee or in regard to hie impeachment.
Nor was the present case one Involving
the well-e11tahllehect propoRltlon, that Incompetent quPstione are not nllownble on
croes-examina tlon In order to prei.llcate
upon them an Impeachment or contl'ndlc·
tlon of the witness. The judgment le re\'ereed, and the ca11e le rem1rnde<l to the
clrcul t court, with a dll'el'tion to grant a
new trial.

CROSS-EX AMIN.A'rlON.

[Case No 160'

CROSS—EXAMlNATl0N'.

[Case No 160'

In re SNELLI.\'G’S WILL.

tn re SNELLI!\G'S WII.L.
(32 N. E. 1006, 136 N. Y. 513.)

(32 N. E. 1006. 136 N. Y. 515.)

Court of Appeals of New York. Jan. 17, 1893.

Appeal from supreme court, general term,

Second department.

Application for the probate of the will of

Mary Snelling, deceased. Probate was con-

tested by Mary Gorden and others, on the

ground, among others, of incapacity of tes-

tatrix to execute a will by reason of ad-

vanced age, impaired faculties, and undue

inﬂuence. From a judgment of the general

term (17 N. Y. Supp. 683) aﬂirming a decree

of the surrogate's court admitting the will

Court of Appeala of :Sew York.

Jan. 17, 1893.

Appeal from supreme court, general term,
Second department.

Application for the probate of the will of
Mary Snelling, decea.eed. Probate was contested by :\lary Gorden and others, on the
ground, among others, of Incapacity of testatrix to execute a will by reason of advanced age, Impaired faculties, and undue
ln1luence. From a judgment of the general
term (17 N. Y. Supp. 683) a1!lrmlng a decree
of the aurrogate'a court admitting the will
to probate, contestants appeal Reversed.

to probate, contestants appeal. Reversed.

L. R. Beckley, for appellants.

Young, for respondents.

L. R. Beckley, for appellants.
Young, for respondents.

Thomas

Thomas

O'BRIEN, J. The will of .\Iary Snelling,
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who died in the year 1890, was admitted to

probate, after a contest before the surro-

gate, wlrich was instituted by her nephews

and nieces, her only next of kin, on the

ground of incapacity and undue inﬂuence.

She was about 84 years of age, and possessed

of a small personal estate, which she be-

queathed to the persons, husband and wife,

with whom she lived at the time of the exe-

cution of the will, which was but a few

months before her death-. The property

came to her from her husband, who died in

1885. Subsequent to his death she lived

with various persons in the neighborhood as

a boarder, and during this time it appears

that she made several other wills in favor of

parties with whom she lived or boarded for

short periods of time. Her management of

the property, and the frequent change of

purpose on her part in disposing of it by

will, from time to time, in favor of different

persons with whom she temporarily resided,

and to whom she was more or less attached

for the time, would seem to indicate that

she had no ﬁxed plan with reference to her

estate, and possessed no great intelligence

in business affairs. Still it was not shown

conclusively that she lacked the capacltynec-

essary in a person of her age and condition in

life to dispose of her property by will, or that

the will in question was the result of undue

inﬂuence. The fact that the deceased was a

woman of advanced age, somewhat enfeebled

in body and mind, and that she gave her

property to strangers, instead of her collateral

relatives, from motives of gratitude or person-

al attachment, does not show that she was

wanting in intelligence sufficient to compre-

hend the condition of her property and the

scope and effect of the testamentary provi-

sions. So long as her mental powers en-

abled her to understand and appreciate the

amount and condition of her property, and to

comprehend the nature and consequences of

her act in executing the will, she was at lib-

erty to dispose of her own in such manner

as seemed best to her, providing the disposi-

tion was her own free act. What the law

terms “undue inﬂuence” is not established

O'BRm~. J. The will of Mary Snelling,
who died In the year 1800, was admitted to
probate, atter a contest before the surrogate, whtch was Instituted bf her nephews
and olecea, her only next of kin, on the
ground of Incapacity and undue loftuence.
She was about 84 years of age, and posseSBed
of a small personal estate, which she bequeathed to the persons, husband and wife,
with whom she lived at the time of the execution of the will, which was but a few
months before her death. The property
came to her from her husband, who died lo
1885. Subsequent to his death she lived
with various persons lo the neighborhood as
a boarder, and du11ng this time It appears
that she made several other wills lo favor of
parties with whom she lived or boarded for
short perlod11 of time. Her management of
the property, and the frequent change of
purpose on her part In disposing of It by
will, from time to time, lo favor of dltrereot
persons with whom she temporarily resided,
and to whom she was more or leSB attached
for the time, would seem to Indicate that
she had no fixed plan with reference to her
estate, and poSBessed no great Intelligence
lo business alralrs. Still It was not shown
conclusively that she lacked the ca1>aC'lty necessary in a person of her age and condition In
life to dispose of her property by will, or that
the will in question was the result of undue
lntluence. The fact thnt the deceased was a
woman of advanced age, somewhat enfeebled
In body and mind, and that she gave her
property to strnng(•rs, lnstead of her collateral
relatives, from motives of gratitude or personal attachment, does not show that she was
wanting in Intelligence sufticlent to comprehend the condition of her property and the
scope and etrect of the testamentary provisions. So long as her mental powers enabled her to understand and appreciate the
amount and condition of her property, and to
comprehend the nature and consequences of
her act In executing the wlll, she was at liberty to dispose of her own In such manner

as seemed best to her, providing the disposition was her own free act. What the law
terms "undue influence" ls not established
by proof tending to show that the testator
acted from motives of affection or gratitude.
though the objects of her bounty were strangers to her blood. The lo1luence or moral
coercion, or by whatever other term designated, must be such as to overpower the will
of the testator, and subject It to the will and
control ot another, In which case It a.esnmes
the character of fraud. Horn v. Pullman, 72:
N. Y. 27ll; Clapp v. Fullerton, 3-1 N. Y. 190;
Hollis v. Theological Seminary, 95 ~. Y.
166; :Marx v. McGlynn, 88 N. Y. 3'1t>.
The eYldence given upon the trial before
the surrogate, viewed In the most favo1·a:ble
light for the contestants, was contllctlng~
and the findings that the decell8ed was possessed of sutllclent capacity to make a will.
and that the will was not the result of undue
lntluence, are conclusive u1>0n us with respect to the objections made against Its probate. But the record discloses certain rulings by the surrogate In the course of the proceedings before him which, In view of the
nature of the questions Involved In the trial.
cannot be overlooked. On the hearing two
witnesses were produced by the contestants
for the purpose of sustaining the objections.
made to the probate of the will, who testified
at great length to various acts, convenations, and transactions of the testatrix, tending to establish undue Influence and Incapacity. This testimony extended over some
years prior to the execution of the will, and
much of it had no bearing upon the Issues.
as may well be loferred from the fact that It
covers over 00 printed pages In the record.
The proponents then called two physicians.
who both testified that they had read the
whole of the testimony of the two witnesses
referred to above, giving the names of these
witnesses, and to each of them In succession
the following question was propounded:
"Assuming their testimony to be true, and
basing your opinion upon such testimony,
what would you say as to the mental condition of Nancy Snelling, say in June, lSUO?''
This question was objected to by the counsel
for the contestants, and, while the form In
which the objection WIUI made Is quite Inartistic, there can be no doubt as to what
was Intended, and we think It was snftletent
to challenge the com1>etency of the testimony
sought to be elicited. The surrogate o\·erruled the objection, and an exception was
taken. The witness In each case then answered: "I should say she was perfectly
sane." It ls needless to enter upon any reasoning or discussion to show that this question was Improper, as this court has more
than once condemned this method of eliciting opinions from experts. Ueynolds v. Robinson, M N. Y. f>89, 50:i; Peopl<> v. !\l<'Elvaloe, 121 N. Y. 2:)(), 2-! N. E. 4-0J; Link v.
Sheldon, 136 N. Y. 1, 32 N. E. tl9G. And It
would be dlfticult to imagine a plainer breach

Case No. 160]
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of the rule than is presented by the question

propounded to the witness in this case. The

principle is not changed by the circumstan-

ces that all the testimony embraced within

the sweeping terms of the question was be-

fore the court, or by the fact that the mass of

testimony upon which the opinion was based

came from witnesses of the opposite party.

The necessity of a speciﬁc question, at the

time of the examination of the witnesses,cov-

ering all the facts, or assumed facts, upon

wh-lch the opinion of the expert is required,

is as apparent in such a case as in any other.

One of the subscribing witnesses to the

execution of the will was a neighbor of the

persons, husband and wife, in whose favor

the will was made, and she attended at the

time the will was executed, at the request

of the wife, who was one of the beneﬁciaries
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under the will. About the time of the hear-

ing upon the contest before the surrogate

this subscribing witness was visited by a wo-

man who, under an assumed name, and with-

out disclosing her real purpose, had been

procured by the contestants or their counsel

to elicit admissions from her for use upon

the trial. The subscribing witness, after

having testified to what took place at the

execution of the will, and that the testatrix

was at the time apparently rational, was

subjected to a long cross-examination with

reference to the interview with the visitor

above referred to, for the purpose of laying

a foundation for impeaching her testimony.

Many of the questions put to the witness in

the course of this exceedingly prolix and

discursive examination were properly exclud-

ed by the surrogate. She was asked, how-

ever, in substance, if Mrs. Cook, who was

one of the beneﬁciaries under the will, and

interested in its probate, and who had pro-

cured her to attend as a witness to the will,

had not promised her money or some reward

in the case, and she answered the question

in the negative. Subsequently the woman

who sought the interview in the interest of

476

the contestants was called as an impeaching

witness, and in various forms was asked if

the subscribing witness had not so stated in

the interview, and other questions tending

to impeach her, which were excluded under

exception. The interest whichv a witness has

in the subject of the controversy is a mate-

rial inquiry, as it bears upon the question of

credibility; and where a witness has re-

ceived, or has been promised, any reward for

giving testimony in a case, the fact may be

shown upon cross-examination, and, if de-

nied, admissions or declarations out of court

to that eﬂ'ect may be proved. The relations

which the witness bears to the case are so

far relevant to the issue as to admit proof of

contradictory statements by way of impeach-

ment, when the proper foundation is laid. 1

Greenl. Ev. § 450; Newton v. Harris, 6 N.

Y. 345; Starks v. People, 5 Denlo, 106. Many

of the questions propounded to the impeach-
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()f the rule than ls preeented by the question

propounded to the witness in this case. The
principle ls not changed by the clrcumstan-ces that all the testimony embraced within
the sweeping terms ot the question was before the court, or by the tact that the mass of
testimony upon which the opinion was baaed
-came from witnesses of the opposite party.
The necessity of a specific question, at the
time of tlie examination ot the wltnesses,cov~ring all the tacts, or assumed facts, upon
wh4ch the opinion ot the expert ls required,
is as apparent In such a case as In any other.
One ot the subscribing witnesses to the
-executloa of the wlll was a neighbor ot the
persons, husband and wife, In whose favor
the will was made, and she attended at the
time the will was executed, at the request
-0! the wife, who was one of the beueflclarles
under the wlll. About the time of the hearing upon the contest before the surrogate
this subscribing witness was visited by a woman who, under an assumed name, and with.out disclosing her real purpose, had been
procured by the contestants or their counsel .
to elicit admissions from her tor use upon
the trial. The subscribing witness, after
having testified to what took place at the
execution ot the will, and that the testatI1x
was at the time apparently rational, was
subjected to a long cross-examination with
reference to the interview with the visitor
above referred to, for the purpoee of laying
a toundntlon tor impeaching her testimony.
Many of the questions put to the witness In
the course of this exceedingly prolix and
-discursive examination were properly excluded by the surrogate. She was asked, however, In substance, It Mrs. Cook, who was
one of the beneficiaries under the will, and
Interested In Its probate, and who had procured her to attend as a witness to the will,
bad not promised her money or some reward
In the case, and she answered the question
in the negative. Subsequently the woman
who sought the interview in the Interest of
476

the contestants was called as an Impeaching
witness, and In various forms was asked It
the subscribing witnese had not so stated In
the Interview, and other questions tending
to Impeach her, which were excluded under
exception. The Interest which a witness has
In the subject of the controversy ls a mat.erlal Inquiry, as 1t bears upon the question of
credlb111ty; and where a witness bas received, or has been promised, any reward for
giving testimony In a case, the fact may be
shown upon cross-examination, and, If denied, admissloll8 or declarations out ot court
to that effect may be proved. The relatloll8
which the witness bears to the case are so
far relevant to the issue as to admit proof of
contradictory statements by way of Impeachment, when the proper foundation ls laid. 1
Greenl. Ev. § 450; Newton v. Harris, 6 N.
Y. 345; Stark!! v. People, 5 Denio, 100. Many
of the questions propounded to the Impeaching witness were so framed that thel,r purpose or meaning was not quite clear, or they
were so intermingled with other matters that
they were properly excluded; but with respect to the Interest which the subscribing
witness had In the establishment of the
will, the contestants were not permitted to
make such Inquiry as they were entitled to.
The very questionable methods used to procure the impeaclnng testimony might well
artect Its credibility with the surrogate, but
could not affect Its competency. An error
In admitting or excluding evideuce In such a
case ls not suftlclent to reverse the decree
of the surrogate, unless It appears that the
party against whom the ruling was made
wus uecesl!arlly prejudiced thereby. Code,
I 254:i. The rulings referred to related to
important testimony ln the case, and, at
least in some degree, must bave been prejudicial to too contestants. For these reasons,
the judgment of the general term and the
decree ot the surrogate should be reversed,
and a new trial granted; coats to abide the
event. All concur.

CROSS-EXAM:IN ATJON.
CliOSS—EXAMlNATlON'.

[Case No. 161

WELCH v. STATE.

(3 N. E. 850, 104 Ind. 347.)

Supreme Court of Indiana. Dec. 15, 1885.

Appeal from circuit court, Monroe county.

Landen & Miers, for appellant. J . E. Hen-

ley, for appellee.

MITCHELL, J. The indictment in this

record charges, with proper formality, that

on the fourth day of January, 1885, William

Welch did feloniously, etc., kill and murder

one Louis Fedder, by then and there feloni-

ously, etc., “striking him, the said Louis Fed-

der, upon his head with a dangerous and

deadly weapon, to-wit, a large heavy club,

which he, the said William Weich, had and

held in his hands.” The only objection made

to the indictment is that, by the omission of

the words “then and there" after the name

of the accused, as last above set out, it fails
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to allege that the defendant had the club

in his hand at the time of the beating and

striking. Within the ruling in Dennis v.

State, 2 N. E. 349, there is no force in this

objection.

The accused was found guilty of murder

in the ﬁrst degree, and his punishment ﬁxed

at imprisonment for life. His conviction

rests largely, if not entirely, upon the testi-

mony of one Matthew James, whose evidence ‘

relates wholly to alleged confessions or ad-

missions made by the defendant to him. Be-

sides the testimony of James are some crim-

inating circumstances of more or less weight.

The evidence of the alleged confession, as

detailed by this witness, is not altogether

free from suspicion; and the circumstances

under which it is said to have been made,

and the not altogether unblemished reputa-

tion of the witness, as it is made to appear

in the record, detract somewhat from the

force and reasonableness of the confession as

related by him. Notwithstanding this, con-

sidering the other circumstances which ap-

pear, since the jury have passed upon it, we

should hesitate to disturb their ﬁnding on

the evidence. The witness testified that the

defendant made admissions to him, indica-

tive of his guilt, in the presence of Andrew

Cooper, and Charles Young. Both of these

persons were called as witnesses for the de-

fense, and both denied having heard any-

thing of the kind testified to by James.

Cooper, having testiﬂed on his direct ex-

amination that he heard no confession made

by the defendant to James, and no talk be-

tween them about the murder of Fedder. was

asked, on cross-examination by counsel for

the state, this question: “I will ask you if,

in the barber shop of William Proﬁt here in

Bloomington, you did not say there that

morning that you knew Bill Welt-h was the

man that killed Louis Fodder?" To this

question the appellant objected. for the rea-

son that lt was asking the witness for an

opinion expressed by him out of hearing of

defendant, and was not asking for a fact,

and was not a cross-examination, which ob-

jection was overruled, _and defendant ex-

[Case No. 161

and was not a cross-examination, which objection was overruled, and defendant excepted, and the wltnes8 answered, "I did
Supreme Court of Indiana. Dec. 15, 1885.
not." The state then asked the witness,
Appeal from circuit court, Monroe county. "And if you did not say there that you were
Landen & Miers, for appellnnt. J. E. Hen- wllllng to bet '2fl0 that BUl Welch was the
guilty man?" To this question the appellaDt
ley, for appellee.
again objected, for the reason stated. The
MITCHELL, J. The indictment ln this objection was again overruled and the witrecord charges, wlth proper formality, that ness answered, "I dld not." The state then
on the fourth day of January, 1885, William called William Profit, and asked him the folWelch did feloniously, etc., kill and murder lowing question: "State to the Jury whether
one Louis Fedder, by _then and there felonl· you heard him [Andy Cooper] make the reously, etc., "striking him, the said Louts Fed· mark that 'WUliam Welch or Blll Welch is
der, upon his head with a dangerous and the man who murdered old man Fedder. I
deadly weapon, to-wit, a large heavy club, am not guessing at It; I know it.'" To this
which be, the said Wllllam Welch, had and the appellant objected, for the reason that
·held In his hands." The only objection made the question was Ulegal and Incompetent.
to the Indictment ls that, by the omission of and was hearsay evidence, and was an effort
the words "then and there" after the name to impeach a witness on Irrelevant and imof the accused, as last above set out, it falls material matter. and that the question reto allege that the defendant had the club ferred to the opinion of an outside party;
ID his band at the time of the beating and which objection the court overruled, and apstriking. Within the ruling In Dennis v. pellant excepted, and the witness answered:
State, 2 N. E. 349, there ls no force In this "Yes; he said that." The state then asked
objection.
the witness the following question: "I will
The accused was found guilty of murder ask you If he said then, at the same time and
In the first degree, and his punishment fixed ·place, 'l wlll bet,' or 'I am wllllng to bet.
at lDiprlsonment for life. His conviction
that he Is the man?'" To which question
rests largely, 1t not entirely, upon the testi- the appellant again objected, for the samemony of one Matthew James, whose evidence · reasons, which ol>Jectlon was again overrelates wholly to alleged confessions or ad- ruled, and defendant excepted, and the witmiulons made by the defendant to him. Be- ness answered: "Yes, sir; he said that."
sides the testimony of James are some crlm· The same question was asked the witness
inatlng circumstances of more or less weight. Harry Innes, by the state, to which the apThe evidence of the alleged confession, aa pellant objected, for the same reasons. These
detailed by this witness, Is not altogether rulings of the court were presented, among
free from suspicion; and the circumstances others, aa causes for a new trial.
We know of no principle or authority upon
under which It Is said to have been made,
and the not altogether unblemished reputa- which to maintain the rulings of the court
tion of the witness, as it ls made to appear in admitting the testimony of Profit and InIn the record, detract somewhat from the nes. The conversation about which Inquiry
t:orce and rea80nableness of the confession as was made of Cooper on cross-examination
related by him. Notwithstanding this, con· was so remotely, 1t at all, connected with the
slderlng the other circumstsnces which ap- subject of his direct examination, and of the
pear, since the Jury have passed upon it, we matter in issue, that the rule was put to its
should hesitate to disturb their finding on utmost tension In allowing the question tothe evidence. The witness testified that the be asked him, over the defendant's objection.
defendant made admissions to him, lndlca- Mcintire v. Young, 6 Blackf. 400. As, howtlve of his guilt, In the presence of Andrew ever, it the witness had admitted that heCooper, and Charles Young. Both of these made the declarations imputed to him by the
persons were called as witnesses for the de- cross-examining question such admission
fense, and both denied having heard any- might have formed the basis for further Inquiry as to the sources of hls knowledge, or
thing of the kind testified to by James.
Cooper, having testified on his direct ex- the grounds upon which be based bis opinion
amination that be beard no confession made of the guilt of the accused, wlth a view ot
by the defendant to James, and no talk be- driving him ultimately to an admission that
tween them about the murder of Fedder, was he heard the alleged confesslon, we think it
asked, on cross-examination by counsel for was within the discretion of the court to althe state, this question: "I wlll ask you It, low the question. Having denied the ImputIn the barber shop of Wllllam Profit here In ed declarations, we think the state was bound
Bloomington, you did not say there that by the denial. '£he subject about which tile
morning that you knew Blll Wek'h was the witness W88 Inquired of was new, and colman that killed Louis Fedder?" To this lateral to the main Issue. Seller v. Jenkins,
question the appellant objected, for the rea- 07 Ind. 430. It did not come wlthln the ntle
son that It was asking the witness for an that a witness may be shown to have made
opinion expressed by him out of hearing of statements out of court Inconsistent with
defendant, and was not asking for a fact, his testimony given upon the trial. The conWELCH•· STATE.

(3 N. E. BrlO. 104 Ind. 347.)
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versation or declarations imputed to him had

no relation, except by argument or inference,

to the testimony given by the witness in his

exaniiiiation in chief. They were not contra-

dictory of his testimony as given, nor were

they inconsistent with it so as to become the

-subject of an impeachment. 1 Whart. Ev.

§§ 55*, 559; Seller v. Jenkins, supra.

This case is complete in its analogy with

that of People v. Stackhouse, 49 Mich. 76, 13

l\'. W. In that case a witness was ex-

amined on behalf of the accused, who was on

trial for the crime of arson. On cross-exam-

ination she was asked if she had not said to

certain persons named, on the night the ac-

cused was arrested, that she always did sus-

pect that he did burn the mill. Having de-

nied the imputed conversation, two witnesses

were called who testiﬂed that she had so
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stated. Reversing this ruling, the court said:

“The opinion or suspicions of the witnes

out of court, although inconsistent with the

conclusion which the facts which she testiﬂed

to on the trial would warrant, cannot be made

the basis of an impeachment. This is so

iii-mly settled by the authorities that the

question cannot be considered an open one."

Whether the matter inquired of on cross-

examination, and proved by the state in im-

peachment of Cooper, was collateral to the

main inquiry or not, is determined b_v this in-

quiry: Would the prosecuting attorney have

been permitted to introduce it in evidence as

part of the state's case? If he would not, it

was collateral. if it was collateral, it was

not competent to contradict it. 1 Whart. Ev.

§ 559; George v. State, 16 Neb. 318, 20 N. W.

.311; State v. Townsend (Iowa) 24 N. W. 535;

Sumner v. Crawford, 45 N. H. 416; Moore

v. People, 108 Ill. 484.

in 1 Greenl. Ev. § 449, the rule is stated

thus: “And if a question is put to a. witness

which is collateral or irrelevant to the issue,

his answer cannot be contradicted by the

party who asked the question, but it is con-

clusive against him.”

in 1 Starkie, Ev. § 200, the author says: “It

is here to be observed that a witness is not

to be cross-examined as to any distinct col-

lateral fact for the purpose of afterwards im-

peat-hing his testimony by contradicting

him." .

in \\'liart. Ev. 5 55!), the learned author

says: “In order to avoid an interminable
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multiplication of issues, it is a settled rule of

practice that when a witness is cross-exanr

ined on a matter collateral to the issue, he

cannot, as to his answer, be subsequently

contradicted by the party putting the ques-

tion.” _

The ruling of the court in admitting this

evidence, and other rulings admitting evi-

dence of like character, was such error as

must reverse the judgment.

In the ﬁfth reason assigned for a new trial

is also included an alleged error of the court

in excluding the evidence of James Kelley,

PHODUCTION AND EFFECT OF E\'IDENCE.

versation or declarations Imputed to him had multiplication of Issues, it is a settled rule of
no relation, except by argument or Inference, practice that when a witness la crou-examto the testimony given by the witness ln bis lned on a matter collateral to the issue, he
o(!xamlnatlon In chief. They were not contra- cttnnot, as to bis answer, be subsequently
dictory ot bis testimony as given, nor were contradicted by the party puttiJlg the qu~
,
they inconsistent with It so as to become the tlon."
The ruling of the court In admitting thla
:aubject ot an Impeachment. 1 Wbart. Ev.
evidence, and other rulings admitting evi§§ 55~, ::>59; Seller v. Jenkins, aupl'll..
This case ls complete In Its analogy with dence of like character, was such error aa
tbnt ot People v. Stackhouse, 40 Mich. 76, 13 must reverse the judgment.
N. W. 364. In that case a witness was exIn the fifth reason 8.88lgned for a new trial
.amlned on behalf of the accused, who wns on ls also included an alleged error of the court
trial tor the crime of arson. On cross-exam- In excludlng the evidence of James Kelley,
inntlon she was asked if she had not sa.ld to a witneSB for appellant. When James Kel-certain persons named, on the night the ac- ley was on the witness stand the counsel of
cused was a1Tested, that she always did sus- appellant asked him to state what he knew
pect that he did burn the mlll. Having de- of the intention ot the defendant to leave
nied the Imputed conversation, two witnesses Bloomington, and for what purpose, etc.
were called who testified that she bad so To this question the state objected for the
8tated. Reversing this ruling, the court said: i·eason that it was hearsay. Counsel for the
''The opinion or suspicions ot the witness defendant stated that the defendant wanted
out of court, although incollfllstent with the to show that defendant and this witness had
conclusion which the facts wblch she testltted a conversation as to bis going away to the
to on the trial would warrant, cannot be made Air Line Railroad to get a job ot work, Inthe basis ot an Impeachment. This ls so stead ot going away to avoid a prosecution;
iil'mly settled by the authorities that the that the defendant made hie going away pub(1uestion cannot be considered an open one." lic; and that be made known bis intention
'Yhetber the matter inquired of on croBB- and purpose to five or six other witnesses,
exawlnntlon, and proved by the state In Im- and that be went to get work, and got work.
peachment of Cooper, was collateral to the The court sustained the objection, and apmain Inquiry or not, ls determined by this ln- . pellant excepted. Concerning the evidence
(]Ulry: Would the prosecuting attorney have thus proposed, It may be Bald the record falls
been permitted to introduce it In evidence as to show that the state had introduced evipart of the state's case? It be would not, it dence tending to show that the defendant
was collateral. If it was collateral, It was left Bloomington under circumstances which
not competent to contradict It. 1 Wbart. Ev. might lndlcate a purpose to avold arrest and
t 559; George v. State, 16 Neb. 318, 20 N. W. prosecution. Until some evidence was intro.311; State v. Townsend tiowa) 24 N. W. 535; duced by the state upon which a claim of
.Sumnet· v. Crawto1·d, 45 N. H. 416; Moore flight or evasion of arrest might have been
v. People, 108 Ill. 484.
l.Jased, the evidence otrered was Immaterial.
In 1 Greenl. Ev. I 449, the rule le stated It may have been exduded for that reason.
thus: "And if a question ls put to a wltneSB We need not decide whether, under any cirwhich Is collateral or Irrelevant to the Issue, cumstances, such evidence is competent.
bis answer cannot be contradicted by the Hamilton v. State, 36 Ind. 280; Austin v.
party who asked the question, but It ls con- Swank, 9 Ind. 109; Boone Co. Bank v. Wallace, 18 Ind. 82.
clusive ngnlnst him."
Ju 1 Hturkle, Ev. § :.>oo, the author says: "It
The application for a new trial, so far as It
is here to be observed that a witness la not was asked on the ground of newly-dlacovered
to be cross-examined as to any distinct col- evidence, need not, In view ot the fact that,
lo tl't·ul fa('t !or the lmrpose ot atterwa1·ds lm- tor the reasons already given, the Judgment
pea<·hlng bis testimony by contradicting must be reversed, be further noticed. Judgment reversed, with dlrections to the clerk
him."
In Wbart. Ev. § 05!), the learned author to make the proper order concerning the fursays: "In 01·der to avoid an Interminable ther custody of the defendant.
478
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ANEALS et al. v. PEOPLE.

(% N. E. 1022, 134 Ill. 4-01.)

Supreme Court of Illinois. Nov. 1, 1890.

Error to circuit court, Adams county;

w|i.i.lAM Msssn, Judge.

Indictment for assault with intent to

commit murder. The instructions referred

to in the opinion were as follows: “The

court instructs the jury that in determin-

ing the question whether the defendants

William Aneals and Louis Stormer were

or were not at another place, or at other

places. at the time of the alleged assault,

they should not be governed alone by the

testimony of the witnesses introduced to

prove an alibi, but that it is the duty of

the jury to consider all the evidence in the

case before them, and unless the iury. after

considering all the facts and circum-
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stances ln evidence before them, have a.

reasonable doubt as to the presence of the

defendants William Aneals and Louis

Stormer at the home ofJames Knox at

the time of the assault, that then the iury

should not permit the defense of an alibi

to avail said last-named defendants. ”

“The court instructs the jury that the

theory of an alibi in this case is that the

defendants were so far removed from the

scene oi the alleged assault at the time of

its commission as to make itimpossible

that they could have committed it; and

even although the jury may believe from

the evidence in the case that the defend-

ants were at other and different places

than the scene of the assault 'on the samc

evening such assault, if any, was made,

nevertheless, if the jury further believe

from the evidence in the case beyonda rea-

sonable doubt that the defendants could

have reasonably been at the place of such

assault at the time thereof, and also at

such other place or places, on the same

evening. and at the time or times men-

tioned by the witnesses in the case, that

then the defense of an alibi cannot avail

the defendants."

John H. Williams and Charles M. Gil-

mer, for plaiitiffs in error. George Hunt,

Atty. Gen., for the People

SHOPE, C. J. At the May term, 1889,01

the Adams circuit court, Francis Asbury

Aneals, William Aneals, and Louis Storm-

er were indicted for an assault upon James

Knox, with intent to commit murder. At

the September term.1889,the trial resulted

in averdict of guilty. ﬁxing the term of

Asbury and William Aneals, severally, at

18 months in the penitentiary, and the de-

fendant Stormer at 1 year. A motion for

a new trial was sustained as to Asbury

Anenls. but overruled as to the other de-

fendants, and they were severally sentenced

on the verdict. They prosecute this writ

of error.

The ﬁrst contention is that the verdict

should have been set aside because the

proof failed to sustain it. No question is

(Case No. 162

supper table, two masked mPn ~ntered the
house, and saying only, "Hold," fired two
shots at Knox from a revolver, each tiring
one 11hot, one taking effect in the no11e of
Supreme Court of Illinois. Nov. 1, 1890.
Knox, the other mls11lng him and pa~lng
Error to circuit court, Adams county; out through a window. The assailants
Wu,1,1AM MARSH, Judge.
then barked out of the house, drew shut
Indictment for a11Rault with Intent to the door, and disappeared. There were
commit murder. The ln11tr11ctlons referred present James Knox, his wife, Samuel
to In the opinion were a11 folio we: "The Knox, a brother of James, Mls11 Agne11
court Instructs the jury that In determln- Lagee, and Mis11 Hattie Wibhle. 'file latinar tbA question whether the defendants ter two had just risen from tbe table.'
Wtlllam AnealR and Louis Stormer were Ml11s La.gee w1111 within four feet, .a ncl posor were not at another place, or at other sibly nearer the smaller, of the two a1111allploces. at the time of the alleged assault, ant:R. One of the assailants was considthey should not be govemed alone by the erably larger than the other. The larger
teHtlmony of the wJtuesRes Introduced to one came in first, but the smaller one
11rove an alibi, but thnt It 111 the dnty of stepped furthest Into the room. Samuel
the jury to consider all the evidence in the Knox waR 10 or 12 feet from the door at
case before them, and unle11.s the jury. after which the nesallant8 entered, which was
considering all the ract11 and ch'Cum- on the south side of the room. winding t11e
11tance11 In evidence before them. have a clock which hung on the west wall of the
reasonablt> doubt as to the presence of the room. James Knox was unable to IdendPfendant11 William Ant>ttlH nnd Louis tify either of the assallanh, and unable to
Stormt>r at the h1Jme of Jn.mes Knox at give any description of thew, exeept that
the time of tht' osst1ult, that then the jury the smaller of the two was a man from 5
should not permit the defense of an alibi feet 6 to 8 Inches.high, welghlnir 130 or 140
to avail said laHt-named defendantR." pounds, "loniz:l11h neck," shoulders not
"Tiu.• court instructs the jury that the l.Jrouu tmt square. Miss Lagee, who wus
theorv of an a/lbi In thl11 ca11e Is that the nearer than the othP.rs, says tlta.t one wa11
defendants were so far removed from the quite a little smaller than the other in size.
scene of the alleged assault 11t the time of build, and height: tba t 11he noticed the
its commission as to make It impossible eyes of the smaller one particularly
that they could have committed It; and through his mask. She also noticed that
even although the Jury may believe from the hair of one of the aseallt1nt11was dark.
the evidence in the case that the defend- and the other light. On the following
ants were at other and lllflerent places Saturday morning, this witness an•l oththan the 11cene of the aRRault ·on the 11amo ers went to Aneals' u.nd Stormer·R to see If
evt"nlng snch a11sault. If any, was made, they could Identify any one. She 11ay11
neverthele11K, If the Jury further belie,·e that Stormer's build and size resembled
from the evidence in the ca11e beyond a rca.- very much the size and build of the smallsom1ble doubt that the deftondants could er of the assailants. He had llgbt blue
have reasonably been at the pince of 11uch eyeR, o.nd a peculiar stare about them
aesunlt at the time thereof, umJ al110 at "that I noticed particularly that night. "
each other place or )llace11, oo the SH me She 11.1110 states that the eyes were rather
evening, and at the time or times men- smnll, and through the mask they seemed
tioned by the wltneRse11 In the ca11e, that rath~r round than oval. The largf'r of the
then the defense of an alibi cannot a vall two men bad d1.1.rk eye8 and hair. Both
the defendantH."
wore light, brown-gray suits, u.nd hate
John H. Wllllams ancl Charles Al. Gil- the 11ame color. The larger one had a
mer, for plall:ltiffs in error. George Hunt, large hat; the other a small one. The
Atty. Gen., for the People .
larger one hod square shoulders, was firmly built, and straight. ·She testltled that
SHOPE, C. J. At the May term, 1889,of the desm·l11tton of the larger one answers
the A<lams circuit court, Francis Asbury to that of William Aneals "very well."
Aneals, William Aneals, and Louis Storm- She was unable to recognize any one tts
er were lncllcted for an as11aultuponJamee the as11allant. hut te11tltlcd that the two
Knox, with Intent to commit murder. At defendants, William Anea.ls nnil Louis
the September term, 18!:!9, the trial resulted Stormer. resembled the parties who made
In a verdict of guilty, fixing the tPrm of the aReaolt. On the motion for a new
Asbury and William Aneule, severally, at trial, 11be flied &11 amdavit Rtatlnit that she
18 months in the penitentiary, and the de- did not believe that tho defeudants were
fendant Stormer at 1 year. A motion for the assaulting parties," a.ud did not In tend
a new trial was sustained a11 to Asbury to be 110 understood in gl vlng her testl_.\neal11. but overruled nH to the other de- monv. MIRs Wlbble was uuot.le to Identifendonts, and they werc11eYerally Heutenced fy any one, whlle she agrees with thr. othon the ,·erdlct. 'fhey pro11ecute this writ er wltne1111 In the main as to the de11cripof error.
tlon of the persons wbo made thP. assault.
The first contention Is that the verdict Samuel Knox teetlfte1l that he had known
11hould have been set aside because the Wlllhtm Aneals from Infancy, and was
proof fulled to rmstain It. No question le familiar with hi11 size, form, and gerwral
made that there ls am11le proof or the cor- appParance. He describes 11artlcularly the
pus delicti. The onl.v question of foct is clothing and hats of the as11allnnb1, and
as to the Identity of th1• per11ons who com- says he 11aw William Aneals wear a hut
mitted the 11.t111ault. On April ~. 1889, like the one deserlbed by him, on May 6th,
about 8 o'clock in the r\·cnlng, while In Qnlney. He saw him clearly at the time
James Knox and hl11 rumlly were at the or the 11bootlng. Saw none of his face but
479
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his chin, and that resembled the chin of

William Aneals. He testified that he

thought he knew these men, and was sat-

isﬁed from what he saw that William

Aneals was one of them. On cross-exam-

inafion of this witness. much occurred

that might very properly Weaken the force

of his testimony.

It is made to appear with reasonable

certainty that no one came out onto the

road or public highwayin front of the

house immediately after the shooting;

but back of the house, near the hedge. it

was found that two horses had been

hitched, and an opening had been made

through a rail fence. and that horses had

passed through the same going north.

The rails had been recently let down, and

horses led or ridden over them. On the
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fence werejlound prints of horses‘ feet, and

black and bay horse-hair. The horse

tracks led in the general direction of

where Aneals and Stormer lived; that is,

northerly. One of the horses that made

these tracks had two shoes behind, and

one in front. The other was shod in front

only. The large tracks were made by the

horse having three shoes. Knox lived on

the east side of section 15. To go to

Aneals’ through the fields would be from

a mile and a half to two miles north, and

a half mile west. The witness Carroll had

heenat Ingraham’s,substantiallya half a

mile west from William Aneals‘, and was at

the gate “at the corner” about 200 yards

from Aneals’ house, where the road turns

north to Bloomﬁeld. At about 8:30 o’clock

he saw two persons on horse-back coming

from the south, and which would be from

the general direction of Knox’s going

north. At the corner mentioned the rid-

ers turned east. He thought he recog-

nized one of them as the defendant Will-

iam Aneals, and called to him by name,

but received no reply. He also thought

that he recognized the horse next to him,

the larger of the two horses, and it was,

as he thought, the horse that William

Aneals had shortly before that purchased

of Louis Fogle. It was moderately dark,

and the moon not shining. The persons

were riding in a “fair lope.” Two wit-

nesses examined the horse tracks found

near Kn0x‘s house, and in the field. Sub-

sequently, the witnesses Carroll and Hunt-

er examined William Aneals‘ horses, and

found a large mare belonging to him,

with two shoes behind and one in front,

which Carroll testifies was the Fogle

mare, and whose feet, they -testify, com-

pared exactly with the larger tracks found

at the fence and in the ﬁeld near Knox’s

house. Unc witness, at least, went to As-

bury Aneals’ barn, and found 0. horse,

shod in front, and bare behind, the tracks

of which were apparently the same as the

trucks of the other horse found back of

Knox’s house, and in the ﬁeld. The horse-

PBODUC'flON AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

hl11 chin, aml that resembled the chin of
WllUam Aneale. He testltled that he
thought be knew tbeae men, and wae eat·
lefled from what be saw that William
Aneala was one of thP.m. On cross-exam·
tuatlo11 of this witness. much occurred
that might very properly weaken the force
of his tei!tlmony.
It le made to appear with reasonable
certainty that no one re.me out onto the
roud or pulJllc hlghw1ty In front of the
house lmme<llately after the shooting;
hut back of the house, near the hedge, it
was found that two horses had been
hltchl'd, and an opening had been made
through a rail fence. and that horses had
paest'd through the same goln.ir north.
The rails had been recently let down, and
horses led or ridden over them. On the
fence were:found prints of horset1' feet, 1md
black and bay horse-ha.Ir. The horse
tt'ackR led In the .ireneral direction of
where Aneals and Stormer ll\'ed; that le,
northerly. One of the horse11 that made
these tt'ackll had two shoes behind. and
one In ft'ont. The othPr was shod In front
only. 'l'he large tracks were made by the
horse having thrPe shoes. Knox llve<l on
the east side of section 15. To go to
Aneale' through the fteldH would be from
a mile and a. half to two miles north, and
a half mUe wellt. The witness Cat'roll had
been at Ingra ham's. eubetantlaJly a hRlf a.
mile west from Wllllam Anee.hf, ond was at
the gaw "at the corner" about 200 yards
from Anenls' house, where the road turna
north to Bloomfield. At about 8:30 o'clock
he ea w two persona on horse-back coming
from the south, and whtcb would he from
the genera.I direction or Knox's .going
oot'th. At the comer mentioned the riders turned east. He thought he reeogntzed one of them aa the defPndant Will·
lam Aneale, and called to him by name,
but received no reply. He also thought
that be recognized the horse next to him,
the larger of the two horses, and It was,
as he thought, the hone that William
Aneals hail shortly before that purchased
or Louie Fogle. It was moderately dark,
and the moon not shining. The Pf'rBOns
were riding In a "fair lope." Two wltnt~BSee examined the hone tracks found
near Knox's house, and In the ftehJ. Subsequently, the wltneMsee Carroll and Hunter ex11.mincd Wllllam Anenle' bf)reee, and
found a. large mare belonging to him,
with two shoes behind and one In front,
which Carroll testifies was the Fogle
m1tre, a11d whose feet, they -testify, compar..>d exactly with the larger tracks found
at the fence and In the field neat' Knox's
house. One witness, a.t least, went to Asbury Aneah~' barn, and found o. horse,
shod In front, and bare behind, the tracks
of which were apparently tho same as the
tracks of the other horse found ba.:k of
Knox's house, and In the field. The horseha.It' round at the fence WIUI of thti same
general color as the halt' upon the legs of
the two horHeH mentioned by the wltneseeK. On Thut'sday following the shooting, Cnt'roll snw the Fogle mare at Wllllam AnenlH'. and the hair had been cut on
her leA"H, when, howe\·er, does not appear.
The nvtdencli shows thnt, a short time
prior to the assault, Asbury Anea.ls and
-'SO

Jamea Knox had had l!Ome dlmculty over
local political affairs. Much Ill feeling seems
to have been engendered at and before the
caucus, which nominated both of these
men fur oftlce; Aneala for supervisor, and
Knox for aHseMor. Knox was elected,
and Aneala defeated. William Aneals ls
the SOD or Asbury; Loni!! Stormer lived
neat' the Aneale, and, at the time of the
assault, was In William Aneals' employ.
About a week after the election, the wltnes11 Altenhl'lm testlftea that Asbury Aneals said, when It was remarked that Mr.
Knox was elected, that "he would never
serve." The witness Gould, who claims
to have been preHent, corroborates the
statements of Altenhelm, which are denied
by Aneals. The defense was an alibi.
In respect of the evldE'nre, of which the
foregoing ls an· tmperlect epitome, it must
be said the jnry heard the desct'lptlons
given of the asitnllante, partlcuh.tt'ly of the
one alleged to have been St(Jrmer, and had
the opportunity of comparing It with the
rlefendantR as they appeat'ed on the tt·lal.
Tht>y aa w the witnesses, could obtte?\'e
their demeanor, and thereby jut\ge of the
weight and credit due to each; all of
which Is denied to us. If tbe description
of the smaller of the two assallan ts, In con·
nectlon with the other' facts and <'h'Cumstunces proved, satisfied them bl'yond a
re1U1unable doubt a11 to his Identity, they
were justlHed In finrllng ltlm guilty. In
respect of the defendant William Aneala,
if they believed hie idE'ntlfkatlon by the
wltncsseR, Samuel Knox and Carroll, was
sufficiently certain, when taken in eonneetlon with the very strong clrcumetances
proved tending to connect him with the
commission of the oneniie, to 1-emove all
reasonable doubt as to his identity, they
were likewise justified In their verdict, unless a reasonable doubt of the guilt of said
defendantK, or one of them, was created by
the evidence of good character of the ae-cused, and uf that tending to prove an
a/Jhl. No moth·e In respect of the defendant Stormer is shown, unless It can be
traced to the fact that he wae the friend
of, a.ml working for, the Aneals. In respect, however, of Wtlllam Aneals, It can·
not be said that evidence of motive was
altogether wanting. James Knox had declined to run for office on the ticket with
bis father, and the brother of said Knox
had stated In open caucus that he was
ashamed to have hie brothPr run on the
same ticket with Asbu!'y Aneals. Iluth.
however, ran, uncl AnealK was defeated,
and Knox elected. It seems that Asbury
Aneals was much Incensed. Knoi: was
also a school director, and Asbury Aneala
said, to the witness Whitler, that he
wanted Knox out; be wanted "the scoundrel out." In view of the facts and clrettm·
stances proved, It cannot be said that there
was not sufficient evidence upon which to
predicate" verdict or guilty, If the jury be.
lleved It tu be true. And, R8 to the ulibl, It
must be euld, when the evidence is all considered, that the defense 111 not estuhlbihed,
a.nd the jury were, we think, jm:1tifted In
concluding that the pt'esenee of the plain·
tiffs IQ error at the store In Bloomfield, at
h'om about8o'clock to about 10 o'clock, on
the night of tbe assault, was not necee-
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sariiy inconsistent with their being pres-

ent at the time and place of the as-

sault. Perhaps the weight of the testi-

mony in support oi the alibi is that William

Aneals came to Davis’ store in Bloomfield

about 8 o'clock,-some oi the witnesses for

defendants, however, put it later,—and

that Stormer reached the store 5 to 10

minutes later than Aneals. To illustrate:

John Carlin came to the store between

7:30 and 8 o’t-lock, and says: “IsawAneals

when he came in. I was there .quitea

whilebeiore became in ; ” and furthersays:

“To the best oi my opinion. it was some-

where about 8:30 when I ﬁrst saw Will-

iam Ancals at the store.” Henry Nedick,

who was at Davis’ store on the evening

in question, was produced by the plaintiffs

in error, and lived about three-fourths of

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 19:09 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112104925781
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

a mile from Bloomﬁeld. He says: “I

looked at the clock beiore I went. It was

just 8 o'clock. It struck while I was look-

ing.” Ho then says he started with a lit-

tle boy. and walked to the store, taking

about 15 minutes‘ time. Aueals was then

at the store, and Stormer came about 10

minutes later, which would indicate that

Aneals had just arrived. The difference

oi time oi the coming of Ancals and

Stormer, as shown by all the proof.wouid

indicate that Aneals. as beiore said. bud

just arrived at the store. so thatitis possi-

ble, if not quite probable, in view oi all

this testimony, that the arrival oi Aneals

‘was later than 8 o‘cioek. The distance

from Knox‘s house to Aneais’, by the

road that Carroll saw the parties men-

tioned by him coming, would be from 2%

1:03 miles; and from Ancals' to the store,

about three-fourths oia mile: and from

b‘tormer's to the store. but n few hundred

‘yards. When the persons described by

Carroll passed him, the horses were on

a “ fair lope. ” it is apparent that if these

plaintiffs in error were escaping from the

scene oi their crime. but a very few mo-

ments would be required to coverthese dis-

tances. lt appears, from the testimony

introduced by plaintiffs in error, that

they ate supper together at William An-

eals' house, and Stormer’s presence is

unaccounted for, by any evidence, save

that of plaintiffs in error, from that time

until he reached the store, except from

2 to 6 minutes that he was at his iather’s,

beiore walking the five or six hundred

yards from his father’s house to the store.

It is also to be remembered that no one

at Knox‘s pretends to have looked at any

time-piece, or to give any more definite

surily Inconsistent with their being present at the time and place of the Msault. Perhaps the weli:bt of the tel!tln10ny In support of theallb1111 that William
AneHlR cume to Da'l"ls' store In Bloomfield
about 8 o·clock,-some of the witnt'Sl!t'S for
defendants, bowe\"Pr, put It later,-and
that Stormer reached the store 5 to 10
minutes luter than Aneals. To Illustrate:
.John Carlin cume to the store between
7:30and 8 o'rlock, and1mye: "I saw Aneuls
when be came In. I was there .quite a
while before hecamti In;" end further says:
"'To the best of my opinion, It wus somewheni ubout 8:30 when I first saw Will:lnm Ancals at the store." Henry Nedick,
who was at Davis' store on the evening
in <1uestlon, waR produced by the plaintiffs
in error, anil lived about three-fourths of
a mile from Bloomfield. HP says: "I
looked at the clock before I went. It waa
ju11t 8 o'clock. It struck while I was looking." He then snys he started wltb a little boy. and walked to the store, taking
about 15 minutes' time. Aneals was then
at the store, an1l Stormer l'ame about 10
minutes later, which would Indicate that
.Aneale had just arrived. The difference
of time of the comlnir of Ancals and
8tormer, as shown by all the proof.would
indicate that Aneale, as before enlrl. had
just arrived at the store. eo that It le 11osslble, If not quite probable, In vlf'w of all
this testimony, that the arrlrnl of Aneals
wHs latclr than 8 o'clock. The diHtance
from Knox's boost> to Aneals', by the
road that Carroll saw the parties mentJoned hy him com lug, would be from 2"'
to 3 miles; and from Aneal11' to the store,
about three-folJ'1'ths of a mile; anti from
:Stormer's to the store. bot a few hundred
yards. When the persons descrlhed by
Carroll pa11Hed him, the horses were on
a "rulr lope." It 111 apparent that if th1•110
plaintiffs In error were eHCaptng from the
•cene of their crime. bot a very few moments would be required to cover these <llstance11. It avpears, from the tl"Btlruony
Introduced by plaintiffs In eITor, that
tht'y ate supper together at WllllRm An.eals' house, and Stormer's pJ'PSence le
nnaccoonted for, by any e\"ldence, sRve
that of plaintiffs In error, from that time
until he reached the store, except from
.2 to 6 minutes tbut he was at hl11 father's,
before walking the flve or six hundred
yards frow hie father's house to the store.
It la also to he remembered that no one
at Knox's pretends to ha\"e looked at any
time-piece, ur to give any more definite
.11tatement of the time than that it .vas
about 8 o'clock. No data le furnb1lw<J
from wbkh that conclusion is reached.
And, taking Into com1lderntion the time
intervening before any pnson left the
buu11e to send for a doctor, the time they
were gone when they did go, and the dill·
tance traveled. In connection with the testimony of the ph.\•11iclan that he was called
at 9 o'clock, started to Knox's Hi mlnutea
thereafter, and arrived there at about 10
o'clock, or a few minutes later, would seem
to ver,\· clearly indlcute that the assault
might h11.ve heen rommltted some time
befol""l k o'clock. Some of the persons had
just risen from the supper tuble, and Knox
.and bis wUe were Htlll at tile table when

statement. of the time than thatit was

about 8 o’clock. N0 data is iurnisin-<1

from which that conclusion is reached.

And, taking into consideration the time

intervening before any person left the

house to send for a doctor, the time they

were gone when they did go, and the dis-

tance traveled. in connection with the tes-
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the a1:111a11lt occurred. On the one side,
tl1011e wltneEIHCB who ee<-med to have
looked 11.t time pieces place the arrlrnl at
the 1:1ture 'fn Bloomfield later than 8
o'clock; while on the other no one pretends to bn\'e known the exact time or the
a11eaul t. It le very clear that a half hour,
or even 1P88, would ha\•e sufficed for the
commission of the offen11e, and the arrival
or the plaintll'111 In error at the store in
Dloomfteld. We cannot say. In view of
this evltlenre, and the cfrcnm11ta11cea
proved, that there was necessarily such
lnablllty for th•~ plaintiffs In error to commit the ol'feni-e as would create a reasonable doubt of their guilt.
It is obJectt>d the court erred In not permlttiu11; the plalntltf in error to show, by
th~ wltne1111 Gould, thRt the witness Hunter offered him $:>0 to te11tlfy to certain
facts. after Bunter was Informed that the
supposed facts were not true. N•)foun1latlon bad b..en laid In the examination of
Hunter, who waea witness for the Jll'ople,
and the evidence was therefore lmp1·uper,
and the court properly ex,clmled It. For
the same retu1on. like qnestlone asked of
the witnf'RS Du<lley, and others, were held
to be lm11roper, and objection thereto eustll.lned. In like manner, the pl11.lntlffH In
error produced Mr. Jody, who was foreman of the gr11nd Jury, nnd he wue aHkecl
If Hamnel Knox dhl not testify before the
grand jury, In respect of ·certuln material
matter11. in a particular way; thnt le, as
to whether or not be did nut then state
that he did not know, and could not recognize, either of the men makfoir the aeeault, etc. No foundation whatever was
fold, In the teNthnon.v of Kuox, for the lntro1luction of this testimony. Ant.I prech1ely the same IB true In rPRpect of the
offered testimony of the wltne11e Percell
and others. Nu good purpose con hf' 11uhserverl by noticing these objections In
detatl; they all rest upon the same bnsl11,
anrl the r1llln1r of the court waEI for the
ea.me reason proper. Jt le not proper to
call wltn~sse11 to contra•llct or Impeach a
vt'ltnell8 ln respect to matters occurring out
of court, 011 by showing that he bas made
some statement out of court lncom1l11tent
with bl11 testimony, m1le11e the att1mtlnn
of the wltneeM le ftretcalled to tile time and
place of the alleged 11tatt'ment or declaration, and be le afforded au opportunity
for explanation In respect thereof. 'J'his
rule le so famlllor as to requlro the citation of no uuthorltles in its llupport.
Nnmerou11 othl'r obje<~tlons are made In
respect of the rullnJl,8 of the court on the
l11t1·oductlon of testimony, some ol whiclJ
may properly be con1ddered. The rlPfend11.ntK produced n larjte 11umbProfwitneHi;e11,
who tl·etifl<.'rl to the previous guoil character of the defE:nlla11te,-some to oil, and
otbern to one or more of them.-or who111
the 11t11.te'e attorney inquired if tlwy bud
not beard of au assault by A11tmry Aneule,
who It will be renwmbert><l was also on
trial, upon one Slgsby; and whether they
had not heard of his being accused of
poleonl11g Sigslly'e horses. Some of these
witneHHesstated the,v had beard of the KUJ>poeed asHault on Higi;by, and otherR that
they had seen the occurrence. The1·eupon. counsel for defendWltB lnelJJted upon
481
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he had no ill feeling towards any of the

their right to have the wltneeSPS state
what dlil occur between Ane:ils a1J1l Slb"t!·
by, to whil'h the ('ourt euHtnl,ned an objection, anil, we think. properly so. 'fo
have permitted the witnesHei;i to detail
what occ11r1-ed at that time woulrt have
nece11Rltated a trial of a purely collateral
questlou. TrlalH woukt become Interminable. It m!ly safely be stated that the1·e Is
neither reason nor authority for the IJOeltlon or counHel. Some of the wltneeeeR
said they had heard or the charge of poisonlnir. after the a88aolt In this cnee; that
It wns first publlshet.I In a newspaper ln
Quin<'y after the arrest of the defendant.
The defendants tht.>n offered to prove that
lt was 11ubllshed at the Instigation of the
wltn<>eot Hunter, to which objection was
made, and objection sustained. No foundation had been laid In the examination of
Hunter for this character of proof. Moreover, the lrstimony In respect of both the
assault and poisoning related only to the
defendant Asbury Aneale. In nlJ way was
the defendant Wllllum A11eah1 or l:Hormer
connlleted with elthtir of said matters, or
the rumors in respectthereof. In no event
would It beerror of which theycould complalu. We are of opinion that tt would
have heen proper to have permitted the
defendant Asbury Aneale to answer 8R to
wht>ther he 1md the wltnee11 Altenhelm
were on friendly or speaklnK terms at the
time referred to hy Altenhelm, when he
says Aneale said that Knox would never
serve as assessor. a11 tending to show the
prohabllltyor lmprobablllty of hie having
made theetatement Imputed. But the de·
fend ante reccl ve<l the full benefit of Asbury
Aneule' dfnlul or the statement attributed
to him, and hie testimony could not have
been made stronger by this ucldltional
etat.ement. It Is lmpueslble that the defendants could have been prejudiced by
this ruling.
It 19 urgl'd with great pertinacity that
the defendantll shoolcl hu ve he~n pt'rmlt ted
to show as a suhstanth•e fact tlrnt the
wltneee Hunter had Ill feellnl( and hatred
towards the defendants, and wall 1tctuated by corr1111t motive
The witness
Hunter admitted on crose·examlnatlon
that a reward of $1,000 harl been offerrd
for the arrest and convktlon of the assailants, and he waR then asked," IR it nnt
a feet that your interest in It was of the
money rew1u·d which was oUered?" and
he answered, "Of course, if I get the right
parties. If I get the right partleR I expect
to get the reward." He then testified that
he bad no ill feeling towards any of the
defendants, that he had not talked slightingly or bitterly about them, had not
callerl them names, or used <>xpres1.1iom1 of
that kind. He was a11ked If he had not
made such statements to Mr. Colburn, and
be Hald, "~o." As to matters pur~ y collateral, whel'e the party culls them nut on
cru1.1s-ex1uni11utio11, he Is bounil by the aneweruf the wltnesw, bot not110 In rei;pectof
matters relevant and nmterlal to the Issue bPlng tril'1L The feelinic und dls11ueltlon of the witneRs towards the party le
held to be relevant nnd material; a.ad, on
cro1<11-examl1111 ti on. It. le compl'ten t to test
the wltne11s In respect or his feeling, and
If he has not done acts, or used expres-

defendants, that he had not talked slight-

4l'!'~
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their right to have the witnesses state

what did occur between Aneals and Sigu-

by. to which the court sustained an ob-

jection, and, we think,pi-operly so. 'l‘0

have permitted the witnesses to detail

what; occurred at that time would have

necessitated a. trial of a purely collateral

question. Trials would become intermina-

ble. It may safely be stated that there is

neither reason nor authority for the posi-

tion of counsel. Some of the witnesses

said they had heard of the charge of poi-

soning, after the assault in this case; that

it was ﬁrst published in a. newspaper in

Quincy after the arrest of the defendant.

The defendants then offered to prove that

it was published at the instigation of the

witness Hunter, to which objection was

made, and objection sustained. No foun-
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dation had beenlald in the examination of

Hunter for this character of proof. .\1ore-

over. the testimony in respect of both the

assault and poisoning related only to the

defendant Asbury Aneals. In no way was

the defendant William Aneals or Stunner

connected with either of said matters, or

the rumors in respect thereof. ln noevent

would it beerror of which they could com-

plain. We are of opinion that it would

have been proper to have permitted the

defendant Asbury Aneals to answer as to

whether he and the witness Aitenheini

were on friendly or speaking terms at the

time referred to by Altenheim, when he

says Aneals said that Knox would never

serve as assessor. as tending to show the

probability or improba bllity of his having

made thestatement imputed. But the de-

fendants received the iull beneﬁt ofAsbnry

Aneuls' denial of the statement attributed

to him, and his testimony could not have

been made stronger by this additional

statement. It is impossible that the de-

fendants could have been prejudiced by

this ruling.

It is urged with great pertinacity that

the defendautsshouid have been permitted

to show as a substantive fact that the

witness Hunter had ill feeling and hatred

towards the defendants, and was actu-

ated by corrupt motive The witness

Hunter admitted on cross-examination

that a reward of $1,000 had been offered

for the arrest and conviction of the as-

sailants,and he was then asked, “Is it not

a fact that your interest in it was of the

money reward which was offered ? ” and

he answered, "Oi course, if I get the right

parties. If I get the right parties I expect;

to get the reward." Hethen testiﬂed that

ingly or bitterly about them, had not;

called them names. or used expressions of

that kind. He was asked if he had not

made such statements to Mr.Colburn, and

he said, “No." As to matters purt y col-

lateral, where the party culls them out on

slons, showing hatred or ill will &Ka Inst
the party against whom be Is testifying,
and if he denies these.me, tolutrodnce contradictory evidence by way of lm(leachment. J Green!. Ev. § 450; Phenix v. l'aRtner, 1U8 Ill. 207, and authorltleeclted. But
the rule In respect of the contradiction of
the wltuese In 1-1uch matters le the same M
In reA(>ect to any other matturs material
and rele\•ant to the Issue. Before wltnesKes can be called to show that etatementg
have bt'(.'n made out of court, inconsistent
with those teetlfltld to at the trial, It is
ne<"asHary, as befol'e Raid, to lay the )Jroper
foundation by calling hie attention to the
time, place, sud person Involved In the
supposed contradiction. Then. If he denies having made the declaration, or done
the act Imputed, the contradictory e\·ldence becomes proper. Thie we understand to be the uniform practice, and t(>
which we nre not aware of any exception.
1 Greenl. Ev.§ 462; The Queen's Case, 2
Brod. & B. :il3; Conrad v.GrUfey, 16 Huw.
38. As before stated, as l't'Rpects the witness Peref'll uni} others, eo In respect to the
witnesses Colborn and Gould, no proper
foundation le laid for the olfered testimony, ultbouirh the attention or counRel
was called, during the examination of
Hunter, to the necessity therefor, by th~
court, and of which thPy now complain.
In \'lew of the fact that the court called
the attention of counsel to the omiRBlun,
and the many Interrogatories pnt to Hunter upon the subject of hie feeling. we cannot say that It was an abuse of the dillcretlon lodged In the court to refuse to
permit Hunter to be recalled for the purpose of laying the foundation for the Introduction of other and dlllerent mattere.
or statements alleged to b<> mude at other
times and plare11. Hunter had been 1tske<I
respecting a statement at Colburn & Baker's store, and If he had not used certain
language. The witness tet1tlfted that h••
hod not u11e<l that hmgoaate; hut, In acun\'erHa tlon before Urban's saloon, eotnt'thlng had been said by Hunter. Upon obj('('tlon heing sustained, defendants asked
to recall Hunter to lay the foundatlm. for
the convere11 tlon ut Urban's saloon, which
the court refnHed to r1ermit. Ordinarily.
the dh1cretlon should, undc)llhtedly, haveheen exercised: tmt, aR before said. a reaeonnhle limit had hP.en allowed. the attention of counsel bad been called to the rule.
wl1lch they seemed to regnrd as au unjustifiable interference on the part of tht>
court. and we <'annot say that there was
an.v abuse of discretion.
We have thus carefully gone through the
e\'ldeuce, and the muny objectlon11 urJred.
for the reason that the case 111 cloHe, In
some reHpects; and 1f any error had Intervened prejndlclnl to plulntllfs iu error, or
that mlarht have unduly prejmllced thrm
before the jury, however eligh ti~·, we
ishonhl have been diHpo11ed tu reYerse the
Jodgmen t. The chartlcter of plain ti Ifs In
error, previous to this charge, was 1d1own
by a greater 01· leeR number of witne1<sM
to have bt>en good; and su·~h evldPnce wall
cumpl'teut to he taken Into comll<lerutlun
hy the Jury In detr,rmlnlng their guilt ur
lnnot'l'nce. Theprohutlve force or such e\'ldence in each caeemuet always depl'ntl up-
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on the nature and character of the incul-

patory evidence; and it may. and no

doubt often does, of itself properly create

such a reasonabledoubt in the mind of the

jury as will justify an acquittal. But it is

to be remembered that the weight to be

given to the evidence is peculiarly within

the province of the jury; and, unless we

can say that the ﬁnding is palpabiy

wrong, we ought not to intericre upon

the facts alone. This we cannot say in

this case. Not only may the jury consid-

er the evidence of good character upon the

question of guilt, but, if they feel con-

strained to ﬁnd the defendant guilty, it is

proper to consider the same in Inltiza tion

of punishment. And it would seem that

the jury have done so in this case.

The jury were fairly and fully instructed
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as to the law of the case, to which there

is no material objection urged. Objection,

however, is made to the instructions giv-

en for the people, printed on page 65 of

the abstract. The objection is “ that the

reasonable doubt in each of them ought

to be as to the guilt of the defendants.”

The criticism is not warranted. The in-

structions relate to the question of alibi.

Thejury must believe beyond a reasonin-

ble doubt, from a consideration of all the

evidence. that the defendants are guilty

before they would be justified in so ﬁnd-

ing. But these instructions did not relate

to the question of guiltor innocence strict-

ly. By them the jury were told, in effect,

that if, after considering all the factsand

circumstances in proof, they had no rea-

* that such could have been the effect.

sonable doubt of the presence of the plain-

tiffs in error at the house of Knox at the

time oi’ the assault, then the defense of

alibi had not been made out, and was un-

availing. The instructions were entirely

proper, and not in conﬂict with the rule

stated.

It is also objected that one of the peo-

ple's instructions was marked “ For de-

fendants, " and it is urged that some infer-

ence might be drawn therefrom by the

jury different from what would have been

drawn had it been properly marked “For

the people.” The contention is without

merit. The practice of marking: instruc-

tions for the one side or the other is per-

nicious, and should not be tolerated. ii’

thereby inferences are to be drawn by the

jury. The instructions should go to the

jury as the instructions of the court, and

the better practice is to have nothing ap-

pearing on the instructions showing at

whose instance they are given. But there

is nothing here that in any way indicates

that any inference prejudicial to the plain-

tiffs in error was drawn by the juryimlzr

'.‘ e

instruction itself relates to what was

proper for the jury to take into considera-

tion, in considering of their verdict. and

on the nA.ture and character of the lnculpatory evltlence; ond It ma)'. and no
doubt often dueH, of Itself properly create
such a reasonable doubt In the 111hul of the
jury a11 will Justify an acquittal. But It Is
tu be remembere!l that the weight to be
given to the evidence i11 peculia1·ly within
the province of the Jury; and, unless we
can 11ay that the finding le palpably
wrong, we ought not to Interfere upon
the facts alone. Thie we cannot say In
thlM e1tse. Not only may the Jury consider the evhleuce of good cbara1~ter upon tbe
question of ,,:ullt, but, If they feel constrained to find the dPfeudant guilty, it la
proper to consider the Kame In mitigation
of punishment. And it would seem that
the Jory have done so In this case.
The Jury wrre fairly and folly ln11tructed
aa to the law of the ca11e, to which theret
le no material objection urged. Objection,
however, 111 made to the instructions given for the people, printed on pa&"e 115 of
the abstract. The objection Is "that the
reasonable doubt In each of them ought
to be as to the guilt of the defendnntll."
The criticism Is not warranted. The lnHtrnctfons relate to the question of nlibl.
The Jury must belleve beyond a rl•aHcmnble doubt, from a consideration of all the
evidence, that the defendantR are guilty
before they would be Ju11tttlecl In so finding. But these lnstructioufl did not relate
to the queRtlon of guilt. or lnnoc>ence strictly. By them the Jury were told, lo enect,
that If, afte1· considering all the facts.and
circumstances In proof, they bad DO rea-

snoable cloubt of the preAence of the plnlntlffs In error at the bom•e of Knox at the
time of the aHsnnlt, then the clefense of
alibi had not heeu molle out, and waK unavallln&'. Thet instructions were entirely
pro1>er, and not In conflict with the rule
statf>d.
It Is also objected that one of the people's Instructions was markell "1''or defendants,'' nnd It Is urged that some inference might be rlrawn therefrom by tlu•
jury different from whnt would h&Ye bren
drawn bud It be«>n pro11erly mnrked "For
tbe people." The content.ion b1 without •
merit. 'l'he practice of marking h1stl'llct101111 for the one slcle or the other IR pernicious, and should not be tolerated. If
t herehy lnferencl!R are to be drawn by the
Jury. The lnstructlor.s should go to the
Jury as the lnRtructlonH of the (~ourt, and
the better practice ls to huve nothln" nr>pearlng on the inHtrurtlons showing at
whose h111tance they An> gh·en. But there
IH nothing here that In ony way fndlcutrs
that any Inference prejudicial to tbr plalntlrfs In error was drawn by the jury. or
th11 t such conld have been the effect. 'l'ht»
Instruction ltRelf relates to what was
proper for the jury t<> take Into conslderntioo, In comdderlng of their verdict. und
was eminently proper to hu.ve been given
at the Instance of either party, or by the
court Itself on ltd owu motion. We are of
opinion that Do substantial error has Intervened, appearing 01>00 this record.
The Judgment of the circuit court muat
be affirmed.
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(10 Sup. Ct. 116, 132 U. S. 394.)
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1889.

In error to the circuit court of the United
Sta tee for the northern district of Texas.
W. E. Earle, for plaintiffs In error. W.
Hallett Phillips, for defendant In error.

In error to the circuit court of the United

States for the northern district of Texas.

W. E. Earle, for plaintiffs in error. W’.

Hallett Phillips, for defendant in error.

MILLER, J. This is an action of eject-

ment brought by Watson, the original

plaintiff, in the district court for the coun-

ty of Bell, in the state of Texas, and after-

wards removed into the circuit court of the

United States for the northern district of

that state. It was twice tried before a

jury, which failed in each of these trials to

~ come to an agreement. It was tried a third

time, which resulted in a verdict and judg-

ment for the plaintiff. A writ of error was
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taken to that judgment, by which it was

brought to this court and reversed. The

case is reported as Ayers v. Watson, 113 U.

S. 694, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 641. It was thereup-

on remanded to the circuit court for a new

trial, where a verdict was again had for

the plaintiff, and the judgment rendered on

that verdict is before us for review. The

details of the controversy may be found in

the report of the case above mentioned.

While it was pending in the district court

of Bell county the following agreement be-

tween the parties was made, which simpli-

ﬁes the case very much: “ A. E. Watson v.

Frank Ayers et al. It is agreed and ad-

mitted by the defendants, for the purpose

of this trial, at this term of the court, that

A. E. Watson, plaintiff in this cause, is en-

titled to all the right, title, and interest

granted by the state of Texas to the heirs

of Waiter W. Daws on September 16, A. D.

1850. said land patented being one-third of

a league, described in said patent No. 542,

vol. 8. and which said land is described in

plaintiff's petition; but defendants say

that said one-third of a league of land so

patented as aforesaid to the heirs of Walter

W. Dawsis covered by the grant of the gov-

ernment of Coahuila and Texas to Maximo

Moreno of eleven leagues of land, as set

forth more fully in defendants’ petition;

which said eleven-league grant is an older

and superior title to that of plaintiff's, and

the title to which is in the defendants in

this cause. X. B. SAUNDI-IRE, W. T. Ruck-

1-zn, F. H. Sm-:1~:m:u, and A. M. MONTEITH,

Attys for Defendants."

By this agreement it will be seen that

the sole question at issue was whether the

land in controversy was covered by the 11-

league grant to Maximo Moreno. A plat

of that survey is found in the bill of excep-

tions. On the trial, which resulted in the

judgment which we are now called to re-

consider, and which. as we understand it,

was the fourth time the case had been tried

by a jury, the defendant introduced the dep-

osition of F. W. Johnson, the surveyor

who had made the survey under the Moreno

•

MILLER, J. This IB an action of ejc>etment brought by WatBon, the original
platntlft, In the district court for the county of Bell, In the state of Texas, a.nd a.tt.erw a.rdK removed Into the circuit court of the
United 8tates for the northern district of
. that state. It was twice tried before a
Jury, which failed to each of these trials to
cometoan agreement. Itwastrleda third
timt>, which resulted In a verdict and judg.
ment for the plaintiff. A writ of error WM
taken to that judgment, by which tt wa.a
brought to this court and revereed. The
cMe is reported as Ayers v. Watson, 113 U.
8. 594, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 641. It was therenPon remanded to the circuit court for a new
trial, where a verdict was again had for
the J>lalntlff. and the Judgment rendered on
that verdict ls before us for review. The
detaJls of the controversy m";r be found tn
the report of the cMe above mentioned.
While It WM pending In the district court
of Bell county the following agreement between the parties wu made, which simplifies the case very much: "A. E. Wat.eon v.
Frank Ayers et al. It ls agreed and admitted by the defendants, for the purpose
of this trial, at this term of the court, tJ;lat
A. E . Watson, plalntift In this cause, ls entitled to all the right, title, and Interest
granted by the state of Texas to the heirs
of Walter W. Daws on September 16, A. D.
1850. said land patented being one-third of
a league, described In said patent No. 542,
vol. 8, and which said land ls described In
plaintiff's petition; but defendants say
that said one-third of a league of land so
patented as aforesaid to the heirs of Walter
W.Dawslscovered by the grant of the government of Coahulla and Texas to Maximo
Moreno of eleven leagues of land, M set
forth more fully In defendants' petition;
which said eleven-league grant 111 f~n older
and superior title to that of plalutlft's, and
the title to which ls In the defendants In
thiff co.uRe. X. B. l:J.&UND~~as. W. T. RucxKR, F. H. SI.EErtrn, and A. M . Mo!'ITEJTB,
Attys for DE'fendants."
By this agreement It wlll be seen that
the Mole question at ls1me was whether the
Jantl In controversy WM covered by the 11league grant to Maximo Moreno. A plat
of that 1mrvey le found lu the blll of exceptions. On the trial, which resulted In the
Judgment which we are now called to reconHlder, and which, M we understand it,
was the fourth time the ca11e had been tried
by a jury, the defendant lntrouuced the deposition of F. W. Johnson, the surveyor
who had madethesurveyundertheMoreno
grant. It seems that hi11 deposition had
been taken twice In thi11 action, and, though
the details of thoRe trials o.re not before us,
It had no doubt been used In them. But
prior to the trial which we are now revlew48'

Ing he had died. It appears from the bill
of exceptions that 1L these depoettlons he
had bE'(>n cro~xamlned by plalntlft's coun8111.. Plalnttn. In rebuttal tQ this testimony
of.lohnson,oftered In evidence a dep0&ltton
of the said Johnson taken In 1800, In a suit
between other parties, In which his testimony with regard to the matters to whlcb
he t.estifted In the depoaitlons offered by defendant varied materlallyfrom tht'fle lo.tt4'.r
4epo&ttlons. To the Introduction ot this
deposition of 1860 the defendants objected,
and, their objection being overruled, took
t.bltt exception. As we think the Judgment
of the court below must be reversed on ae>
count of this ruling, all that relat.es to It In
the bill of exceptions la here reproduced:
"It was admitted by both parties that th€'
upper and lower cornen on the river of the
Maximo Moreno 11-league grant are exta.nt
as called for In the original grant to Maximo Moreno, and their corners are not In
dlapute. The dPfendant read In evidence
the depositions of F. W. Johnson, taken ID
1878 and 1880, In which he testified that he
wa.Aprlnclpal surveyorfor Austin's colony.
• • • The ftl'Rt survey made waa the
Maximo Moreno 11-leaguesurvey. ThlsRUrvey was commenced at the point opposite
the mouth of the Lampasas river, as called
for In the field-notes of the grant, and a
Uite WM run thence on the course called
for In the grant, the distance called for, the
chain being used to measure the distance.
The north-west or second comer called for
In the grant wM thuR established by him,
tile distance giving out In the prairie. 'ID
running the west llne I made an offset to
avoid crossing the Leon river, which was
about 50 or 60 vnras wide. This onset was
made soon after leaving the beginning corner, there being a peculiar bend in the rh·er
at that point. From the north-west corner thus establtshed the second line wns
run the course and distance called for In
the grant. Several streams were croll8ed
on this line at distances not now recollected, and the north-east corner established on two small hackberrles In Cow
Creek bottom. From the north-east or
third comer so established a line was run
In the course called for In the grant to Sun
Andres river. This last Une was marked,
but not meMured, because It was not usual
or necessary to measuret!.te closing line.' It
was admitted bythedefendant thatthedfstance as measured on the ground from the
north-e8.llt cornertoacreek called forln the
grant was some four thousand vartUJ more
than the dl~tance called for.-that ls, the
~l11tanccls7,500, ln'ltead of 8,500 varas; and
on croHH-ex11.mlnation, being aHketl to account for thedl~repancy,salu thedlRtancee
called on that line were not meMured, but
guessed at. No part of the eMt line was
measured. ThP. exterior lines were marked
with blazes. The corner trees and bearing
trees, where thflre were such, w<'re marked
with blazes, with two hackK above and two
below. In anRwer to a question. on crofl&examtnatlon, he said that he did not b('Jtln
the sur\'ey at the south-eMt corner, but he
began at the south-we11tcorner, at thl' three
forks, at the mouth of the LampMwi, and
actually traced the lines In the ordE'r set
forth in the field-note@. 'The field-book containing the same, which I kept, I examined,
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which I don't remember to examine until a

month

The plaintiff. in rebuttal to J ohnson’stesti-

mony, as above set forth, it appearing t-hat

said Johnson died in]8S4, offered to read in

evidence a deposition of said J ohnson, taken

inl8(i0,in a certain suit then pendingin Bell

county, '.l‘ex., wherein David Ayers was

plaintiff and Lancaster was defendant, in

which he stated, in answer to a question

therein propounded, that he ‘began the

Moreno survey at the south-east corner,

and ran thence northerly. The north line

was then run westwardly, and the third,if

run at all, was run southwardly to the riv-

er. I am of the opinion that no western

line was run, but was left open; but the

eastern and northern lines were run and

measured. It was not usual to measure
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the closing line.‘ To the reading of which

last-mentioned deposition, proven to be in

the handwriting of Johnson, taken in 1860.

the defendants objected, upon the ground

that the deposition had been taken in an-

other and different cause, between other

parties, before the institution of this suit;

and, the same witness having testiﬂed in

answer to interrogatories and cr0ss-intcr-

rogatories propounded herein in 1877 and

1850, respectively, it was not competent as

original evidence, nor admissible to contra-

dict or impeach the testimony of the wit-

ness Johnson, as given in his deposition

read by the defendants, notwithstanding

the death of Johnson; which objection the

court overruled, and admitted the testi-

mony so objected to; to which ruling of the

courtthe defendants then and there except-

ed, and stillexcept, and the same is allowed

as exception No. 1.”

A very earnest and able argument is pre

sented to us to sustain this ruling, upon

the generalground of the liberality of courts

in admitting what would be otherwise

called “ hearsay evidence” in regard to

boundaries, such as tradition, general un-

derstanding in the neighborhood, declara-

tions of persons familiar with the hound-

aries and with the objects on the lines of the

survey, and others ofsimilarcharacter. An

opinion of Mr. Justice FIELD, delivered in

the supreme court of California in 1800, in

the case oi’ Morton v. Folger, 15 Cal. 277, is

much relied on in this case, and it is also

said that the courts of the state of Texas

have established the same principle, which

has thus become a. rule oi property in that

state, which should be followedinthiscase.

If the principles stated in the decision of the

California court, and in the decisions of the

supreme court of the state of Texas, were

indeed applicable to the case before us, we

would hesitate very much in reversing the

judgment on this ground, and, indeed,

should be inclined, on the weight of those

authorities, and in the belief that in the

main they are sound, to overrule the ex-

ception. But the objection in the present

which I don't remember to examine until a
month ago, wid as bereinbefore stu.ted.' '
The plaintiff. in rebuttal to Johnson'stestlmony, 88 above set forth, it 11.ppearing that
said J ohnHon dierl in 1884, offered to read in
evillence a de}JOR!tion of said Johnson, ta.ks ·
in 1800, in a certain suit then pending in Bell
county, 'l'ex., wherein David Ayers waa ·
plaintiff and Lancaster was defendant, In
which he stated, in answer to a question
therein propounded, that he 'began the
Moreno survey at the south-east comer,
and ran thence northerly. The north line
was thea run westwardly, and t.he third,U
run at all, was run southwardlyto the river. I am or the opinion that no western
line was nm, but was left open; but the
eMtern and northeni lineH were run and
measured. It wu~ not usual to measure
the cldslng line.· To the reading of which
last-mentioned deposition, proven to be in
the handwriting of Johnson, ta.ken in 1860,
the defendants objected, upon the ground
that the deposition bad been taken in another and different cause, between other
parties, before the institution of this suii;
and, the same witness having testified ill
ani,:wer to interrogatories and cross-interro11;atoriee propounded herein in 1877 and
1880, respectively, It was not competent as
original evidence,noraumlsslble to contr•
diet or Impeach the testimony of the wttr
ness Johm1on, as given in his depoHition
read by the defendants, notwithstan<ling
the death of Johnson; which objection the
court overruled, and admitted the testimony so objected to; to which rullng of. the
court the defendant.a then and there excepted, and still except, and the same is allowed
as exception No. l."
A very earnest and able argument Is pr&aented to us to sustain tWs ruling, upon
the gcneralground of the liberality of courts
in admitting what would be otherwise
called "hearsay evidence" In regard to
boundaries, such as tradition, general undei·l!ttt.ndlng in the neighborhood, declarations of persons familiar with the boundariee and with the object.Bon the lines of the
1mrvey,and otht>rs of&imilarcharacter. AD
opinion of Mt-. Justice FIELD, delivered in
the supreme court of California. in 1860, in
the caHe of Morton v. Folger, 15 Cal. 'm, is
much relied on In this case, and it is also
said that the courts of the state of 'l'exas
have establh1h£'d the same principle, which
bas thtu1 become a rule of property in that
state, which should be followed In thlecase.
If theprlnclplee stated In thedecislonof the
California court, and In the decisions of the
supreme court of the state of Texas, were
indeed applicable to the case before us, we
would hesitate very much in reversing the
judgment on this ground, and, indeed,
should be inclined, on the weight of those
authorities, and in the belief that in the
me.In they are sound, to overrule the exception. But the objection in the present
case to the deposition of Johnson, taken, In
1860, does not rest upon the ground that it
is hearsay testimony, or that It does not
come within the general principle which
admits declarations of persons made during their life-time of matters Important to
the location of surveys and object.B showing the line of those surveys. Johnson's
deposition of 1860, H It stood alone and

WM Introduced upon the trial of this cMe
for the first time as independent t.estimony
in favor of plaintiffs, might be admlsRible.
)t Is not necessary to decide that question
because such is not the character of the circumstances under which the testimony was
admitted. Ae we have already said there
bad been three trials of this action, during
which Johnson was alive and was a. competent wttne&B for either party. All his testimony was 11.'iven by way of deposition.
'l'hls only renaer11 the manner of taking It
more deliberate, and U It was to be contradicted by anything he had said on former
occasions, made It the more ea11y and reasonable that plaintiff should ha.vecalll'd his
attention to the former statements which
they proposed to use. It will be observed
that tJ1e plaintiffs did not introduce, or
offer to Introduce, this deposition of Johnson of 1860 a.a a part of their cruie, when It
was their duty to introduce their testimony. They, therefore, did not rely on it
as independent testimony in their favor.
But after Johnson's deposition had been
given in the case itseU, and he had been
crosi;-examined by the plaintiffs in that deposition In regard to his testimony, and after he was dead and could give no explnn~
tion of his previous testimony of 1860,
which might; show a mistake in that deposition, or give some satisfactory account of
it consistent with his testimony in the principal case, this old deposition Is for the first
time brought forward to contradict the
most important pa.rt of his testimony given on the present trial. The importance of
this matter, as itwe.s presented to thejury,
will be readily understood when we revert
to the fa.ct that the two southern corners
of the survey a.re established without question, and are found on the San Andres
riYer, and the controversy concerns the
question whether the ea.st line and the west
line of that survey, which are straight lines
almost due north . extend eo far north that
the northern line between tbeee lines le so
far north as to Include the survey of Daws,
under which plaintift claims. In the principal deposition of Johnson, as we ha\'"e seen
by the bill of exceptions, he states that this
survey commenced at the southwestern
corner on the San Andres river, and W8.8
run northward the distance called for in
the grant, and actually merumred by ·the
chain. Tbe north-west or second corner
CRlled for in the grant was efltablished by
him, the distance giving out in the prairie.
From the north-west cornt'r thus e8tabllshed, the second, the line was nm for the
course and distance called for In the grant,
and the north-east corner established on
two email hackberrles on Cow Creek bottom. From the north-east or third corner
thus established the course W88 run to the
San Andres river. This last line was nmrked,
but not measured, because It was not nece&&ary to measure the closing line. In answer to questions on cr0Rt1-0xamlnatlon,
he said he did not begin at the south-east
corner, but he began at the south-west corner, and actually traced the lfneg in the order set forth In the field-notes. He said the
field-book, containing these notes, "I kept
and examined, which I do not remember to
have examined till a month ago, aa hereinbefore stated." The deposition offered by
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plaintiff states distinctly that he began the

Moreno survey at the south-east corner,

and ran t-hence northerly. The north line

was then run westwardly, and the third,

if run at all, was run southward to the riv-

-er. And he further says: “ Iam of the opin-

ion that no western line was run, but was

left open, but the eastern and northern

lines were run and measured. It was not

usual to measure the closing line.” It was

admitted that the distance as measured on

the ground from the north-east corner to a

creek called forin the grant was some 4,000

val-as more than the distance called for,

and the witness on cross-examinations in

the principal depositions read by the defend-

ant in this case, being asked to account for

this discrepancy, said: “The distances

called on that line were not measured, but
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guessed at. No part oi’ the east line was

measured.” The discrepancy between these

two depositions is manifest, and that dis-

crepancy is in a matter which relates direct-

ly to the question whether the Moreno

grant as it was surveyed included the land

embraced within the Daws grant, under

which plaintiff asserts claim. If the jury

believed in the truth of the deposit-ions of

Johnson taken by the defendant in this

case, at which he was cross-examined by

the plaintiff, it affords the strongest evi-

dence that the Daws claim was included in

the lines of the Moreno survey. This dep-

osition is supported by the ﬁeld-notes and

by the reference of Johnson himself to those

-ﬁeld-notes a very little while before he gave

his deposition. If, on the contrary, the

-eastern line was the one which was actual-

ly run and measured, beginning at the

south-east corner of the survey on the San

Andres river, then the fact that that line

was actually run and measured would

probably have a very great inﬂuence in

the mind of the jury on the question in is-

sue. And, whether this was so or not, the

contradictory statements of Johnson un-

der oath might destroy the value of his tes-

timony before the jury.

The circumstanca under which the for-'

mer statements of a witness in 1'cp;a1'd to

the subject-matter of his testimony, when

examined in the principal case, can be in- I

troduced to contradict or impeach his tes-

timony, are well settled, and are the same

whether his testimony in the principal case

is given orally in court before the jury, or

is taken by deposition afterwards read to

them. In all such cases, even where the

matter occurs on the spur of the moment

in a trial before a jury, and where the ob-

jectionable testimony may then come for

the ﬁrst time to the knowledge of the op-

posite party, it is the rule that, before those

former declarations can be used to impeach

-or contradict the witness, his attention

must be called to what may be brought

forward for that purpose, and this must

be done with great particularityas to time
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pla.fnttn states distinctly that he began the and place and circumstances, so that he can
Moreno survey at the south-east corner, deny it, or make any explanation tntend.and ran thence northerly. The north line lng to reconcile what he formerly said with
was then run westwardly, and the third, what he is nowteRtlfylng. Whllethecourts
if run at all, was run southward to the rivhave been somewhat liberal in giving the
-er. And be further says: "I am of the opin- opposing party an opportunity to present
ion that no western line was run, but was to the witness the matter In which they
left open, but the eastern and northern propose to contradict him, even going so
llnM were run and measured. It was not far as to permit him to be recalled and
uHual to meruiure tile closing Jtne." It was croes-examloed on that subject after he has
admitted that the distance as merumred on left the stand, ft is believed that in no ca11e
the ground from the north-east comer to a hu any court deliberately held that after
creek called forln the grant was some 4,000 the witness' testimony has been taken,
varas more than the distance called for, co1nmltted to writing, and used. in the
and the witness on croSB-examloatlons in court, and by his death heis placed beyond
the principal depositions read by the defend- the reach of any power of explanation,
ant In this case, being asked to account for then In another trial such contradictory
this discrepancy, said: "The distances declarations, whether by deposit.ton or othcalled on that line were not measured, but erwise, can be used to impeach his testiguesRed at. No part of the east line was mony. Least of all would this seem to be
measured." The discrepancy between these admissible in the present case, where three
two depoRltlons is manifest, and that dis- trials had been had lJefore a jury, In each
crepancy ls in a matterwhlchrelatesdlrect- ofwhlcb the same testimony of the witness
ly to the question whether the Moreno Johnson had been Introduced and relied on,
grant WI it was surveyed Included the lantl and In each of which he had been cross-exembraced within the Daws grant, under amlned, and no reference made to his forwhich plaintiff asserts claim. If the Jury mer deposition, nor any attempt to call hil!
believed in the truth of the depositions of attention to It. This principle of thf' rule
Johnson taken by the defendant in this of evidence Is so well understood that aucase, at which he was cross-examined by thorities are not necessary to be cited. It
the plalnttn, It affords the strongest evi- Is so well stated with its quallftcations and
dence that the Daws claim was Included In the reasons for It, by Mr. Greenleaf In his
the lines of the Moreno survey. This dep- work on Evidence, (volume 1, §§ 462-464, In-0sltlon is supported by the field-notes and clusive,) that nothing need be added to It
byt.be reference of Johnson himself to those here except a reference tothedeclslonsclted
field-notes a very little while before he gave In his notes to those sections. See, also,
his deposition. If, on the contrnry, the Weir v. McGee, 25 Tex.Supp. 32. It will
eastern line was the one which was actual- thus be seen that the principle on which
ly run and measured, beginning at the counsPI for plaintiff in error objected to this
:11outh-enst comer of the survey on the San depoRltlon ofJohnsonls notlnconflictwith
Andres river, then the fact that that line the case of Morton v. Folger, 15 Cal. 277, nor
was actually run and measured would with any case to which w~ are cited, decided
prollably have a very great influence In by the supreme court of Texas. That
the mind of the Jury on the question in Is- ground, 1U1 stated in the blll of exceptions. ts
sue. And, whether this was so or not, the "that the deposition had been taken in an-contradictory statements of Johnson un- other and different cause, 8etween other
der oath might destroy the value of hie tes- parties, before the Institution of this suit;
timony before the jury.
Md the same witness having testified In anThe circumstances under which the for-· swer to Interrogatories and cross-Interrogmer statement.sofa witness in regard to atories propounded herein in 1877 and 1880,
the subject-matter of his testimony, when- respectively, It was not competent as origexamined In the principal case, can be In- inal evidence, nor admissible to contradict
troduced to contradict or Impeach his tes- or impeR.Ch the testimony of the witness
timony, are well settled, and are the same Johnson, as given In his deposition read by
whether his testimony in the principal r.ase the defendant, notwithstanding the death
1s givPn orally lo court before thP Jury, or of Johnson."
ts taken by deposition afterwards read to
We are very clear that the deposition of
them. In all such cases, even where the 1860 was improperly admitted, and tt;s Immatter ocrurs on the spur of the moment portant relation to the issue tried by tht'
:In a trial before a jury, and where the ob- Jury was such that the judgment rendered
jectlonaule testimony may then come for on it must be reversed, and the verdict set
the first time to the knowledge of the op- aside, and a new trial granted. There are
posite party, it is the rule that, before those other assignments of error, the consldern...
former declarations can be used to lmoeaeb tionofwhlchls notnecetiHary in the dedslou
<lr contradict the witness, his attention of the cat1e before UR, which, with dtJt' atmust he called to what may be brought tention to w Ila t we decf!letl w heu the ca11e
forward for that purpose, and tl!ls must was here before, to which we still adhere,
be done with great particularity as to time may not arise In another trial.
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BECKER et al. v. KOCH, Sheriﬁ, etc.

(10 N. E. 701, 10-1 N. Y. 394.)

Court of Appeals of New York. March 1, 1887.

Charles B. Wheeler, for appellant. Baker

BECKER et al. v. KOCH, Sherilf, etc.
(10 N. E. 701, 104 N. Y. 394.)
Court of Appeals of New York. March 1, 1887.
Charles B. Wheeler, for appellant. Baker
& Schwartz, for respondents.

& Schwartz, for respondents.

PECKHAM, J. This action was brought

by the plaintiffs, as assignees for the beneﬁt

of creditors of one Exstein, to recover from

the defendant the possession of some per-

sonal property, amounting in value to about

$4,000, or, in default thereof, to recover such

value. The defendant justified the taking of

the property by virtue of a writ of attach-

ment issued to him as sheriff of Erie county

in an action in which Victor and others '

were plaintiffs, and Exstein was defendant,

and under which writ the sheriff had levied

upon this property as belonging to the said

Exstein. The assignment to plaintiffs was
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made on the seventeenth of October, 1883,

and included the property in question. The

attachment was, on the fourteenth of No-

vember, levied on the property, and, after

the plaintiffs in the attachment suit recov-

ered Judgment against Exstein, the property

was sold on an execution issued thereunder

to the defendant. The answer in this ac-

tion set up these facts, and alleged that the

assignment to the plaintiffs was made with

the intent, on the part of Exstein, to hinder,

delay, and defraud his creditors. The action

came on for trial in the superior court of

Buffalo, and, after the evidence was all in,

the court directed a verdict for the plaintiffs

fora return of the property to them,or for the

value thereof, assessing the same at $3,800.

A stay of proceedings was granted, and the

defendant's exceptions were ordered to be

heard at the general term in the ﬁrst in-

stance.

The general term, after argument of such

exceptions, overruled the same, and directed

judgment for the plaintiffs on the verdict.

Thereupon an order was entered which in

form treated the defendant as having made

a motion for a new trial on the exceptions

ordered to be heard in the ﬁrst instance at

general term, and, after reciting such fact,

continued thus: "Ordered, that such motion

be, and the same hereby is, denied, with

costs; that the said exceptions be, and the

same hereby are. overruled, and judgment

for the plaintiffs on the verdict is hereby or-

dered.” Judgment in accordance with the

order was subsequently entered. The de

fendant then appealed from the order above

mentioned to this court, and also from the

judgment entered upon such order.

The plaintiffs now make the claim that the

appeal from the order should be dismissed,

and that the appeal from the judgment

brings up nothing for review but the ques-

tion whether the judgment appealed from is

in accordance with the order of the general

term, as there was no statement in the ap-

peal from the judgment that the appellant

intended to bring up for review any inter-

mediate order, as pointed out by sections

PECKHAM, J. This action Wll8 brought
by the plalnti1fs, as aSBlgnees for the benefit
()f creditors of one Exsteln, to recover from
the defendant the possession of some personal property, amounting In value to about
$4,000, or, in default thereof, to recover such
value. The defendant justified the taking of
the property by virtue of a writ of attachment IBBUed to him as sheriff of Erle county
in an action in which Victor and otl.Jei·s
were plaintiffs, and Exsteln was defendant,
and under which writ the sheriff had levied
upon this property as belonging to tl!e said
J<;xstein. The assignment to plaintiffs was
ma<le on the .seventeenth of October, 1883,
and Included the property in question. The
attachment was, on the fourteenth of November, levied on the property, and, after
the plaintltrs In the attachment suit recovered judgment against Exsteln, the property
was sold on an execution IBSued thereunder
to the defendant. The answer In this action set up these facts, and alleged that the
assignment to the plalntltrs was made with
Ute Intent, on the part of Exsteln, to hinder,
delay, and defraud his creditors. The action
came on for trial ln the superior court of
Butrnlo, and, after the evidence was all In,
the court directed a verdict for the plaintiffs
for a return of the property to them, or for the
value thereof, assessing the same at $3,800.
A 11tay of proceedings was granted, and the
defendant's exceptions were ordered to be
heard at the general term ln the first Instance.
The general term, after argument of such
exceptions, overruled the same, and directed
judgment for the plalntUTs on the verdict.
Thereupon an order was entered which In
form treated the defendant as having made
a motion for a new trial on the exceptions
ordered to be heard ln the first Instance at
general term, and, after reciting such fact,
continued thus: "Ordered, that such motion
be, and the same hereby Is, denied, with
costs; that the said exceptions be, and the
same hereby are. overruled, and judgment
for the plaintltrs on the verdict ls hereby ordered." Judgment In accordance with the
()rder was subsequently entered. The defendant then appealed from the order above
mentioned to this court, and also from the
judgment entered upon such order.
The plaintiffs now make the claim that the
appeal from the order should be dismissed,
and that the appeal from the judgment
brings up nothing for review but the question whether the judgment appealed from ls
In accordance with the order of the general
term, as there was no statement In the appeal from the judgment that the appella.ut

(Case No. lli4

Intended to bring up for review a.uy inter·
mediate order, as pointed out by sectlom
1301 and 1316 or the New Code. There ls no
foundation for the claim. The exceptions of
the appellant were ordered by the trial court
to be heard, In the first instance, at the general term, and it was pursuant to such di·
rection that the argument of such exceptions
was then had, and the decision of the court
upon such argument was made In the form
of .an order, and that order was simply a
written authority upon which to enter the
judgment, and was not such an Intermediate
order as is referred to In section 1301 or
1316, and no appeal would lie from It to this
court. But, after the entry of judgment, an
appeal from such judgment brings up for review the exceptions taken by defendant upon the trial. The appeal taken by defendant from the order, as well as from the judgment, was usele88, but evidently taken from
more abundant caution; and, If that were
the only appeal In the case, It would have to
be dismissed as uoauthorlz~; and yet, as It
Is taken In connection with the appeal from
the judgment, which brings up all the exceptions for review, there is no necessity to
formally dlsmlu the appeal from the order.
But upon the merits ot the appeal quite an
Important question arises ln relation to the
law of evidence. The court directed a ver·
diet for the plalntltrs; and If, therefore,
there was evidence enough to authorize a
submlBSlon of the question of fraud to the
jury, the judgment must be reversed. We
think there was, and, had It not been for
the rule of law adopted by the court below,
we suppose that court would have been of
the same opinion. That role wa11 that, as
the defendant called a witness by whom he
attempted to prove the fraud, and as that
witness denied It, the defendant was bound
by that denial, In the absence of contradiction by some other witness, even though the
jury might think some parts of the evidence
of the witness clearly showed Its existence.
To show exactly how the question arose, and
what was decided by the court, some refer·
ence must be made to the testimony, although It will be unneceBSary to allude to It
all.

The assignor, Exsteln, Wll8 a merchant engaged In a large lluslne88 In Butralo. He
kept regular books of account In hlfl busineBS, which were produced upon the trial,
and he was called as a witness for the defendant, and gave evidence In relation to the
books, and upon other matters. BIB 1188lgnment was made on the seventeenth of October, and on the sixteenth of that month he
wade entries In several accounts which he
kept, crediting quite large sums of money to
the different persons named In such accounts, the result of which entries was to
cause It to appear by the books that the as·
signor was In their debt to a somewhat
large amount, while If the ~ntrles as of the
sixteenth of October were stricken out It
487
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would then appear that the parties, instead | plaintiifs without delivering any written

of being creditors, were in reality debtors,

of the assignor. \Vhen on the stand, he sub-

stantially stated that, if those entries were

stricken out, the state of affairs between

himself and those persons would be as repre-

sented in the books; or, in other words,

that, excluding those entries and the circum-

stances upon which they rested, some of

these persons would be his debtors. He also

said that these entries did not in fact repre-

sent any actual transaction occurring at the

time when they were made, and that no val-

uable or other consideration passed between

him and those parties at such time. Stop-

ping with these facts, it would appear, then,

that credits were given these persons the

day before the assignment, upon which some

of them drew out moneys from him, and up-
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on the basis of which one was made a pre-

ferred creditor in the assignment, and yet

such entries represented no actual, present

transactions happening at the time when

they were made. Unexplained, it would ap-

pear that as a result Exstein had provided

for the payment of large sums of money, or

had already, and in view of his assignment,

paid such sums to persons whom he did not

owe; or, in other words, he had paid, and

also made provision in his assignment for

the payment of, ﬁctitious debts.

The defendant, however, proceeded with

his examination of this witness, and asked

for an explanation of these entries, and the

facts or circumstances upon which they were

based, and the witness proceeded to give it.

The explanation was, if true, sutlicient in

law, and showed that he did owe the per-

sons the amounts he claimed to, with the pos-

sible exception of one or two eases in which

the defendant claims that, even on the basis

of the general truth of the explanation, the

witness had charged himself in reality with

more than he owed. The defendant then

rested, and the plaintiffs, with the evidence

in this state. asked for a verdict in their fa-

vor by the direction of the court, and ob-

tained it.

The court held, in substance, that the books

of the witness Exstein showed a prima facie

case of an indebtedness of the witness in the

amounts therein appearing, and to the per-

sons therein mentioned, and the witness said

they were correct. He then stated what has

already been alluded to as to those entries

made on the sixteenth of October, and con-

tinued by explaining the facts upon which

they were based. This explanation the court

said was totally uncontradicted -by any other

witness, and defendant was therefore bound

by what Exstein said on that subject, for

the reason that he could not discredit or im-

peach him, and must take what he said as,

under the circumstances of the case, true.

If that were the true rule, the court was cor-

rect in directing a verdict. The general term,

it must be presumed, also took the same view

of the case in directing judgment for the

PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

would then appear that the parties, instead
of being creditors, were In reallty debtors,
of the 11Bslgnor. When on the stand, he substantially stated that, 1! those entJ1es were
stricken out, the state of al'falrs between
himself and those persons would be as represented In the books; or, In other words,
that, excluding those entries and the circumstances upon which they rested, some of
these persons would be his debtors. He also
said that these entries did not In fact represent any actual tmnsactlon occurring at the
time when they were made, and that no valuable or other conskleratlon passed between
him and those parties at such time. Stopping with these facts, it woold appear, then,
that credits were given these persons the
day betore the assignment, upon which some
of them drew out moneys from him, and upon the basis of which one was made a preferred creditor In the assignment, and yet
such entries represented no actual, present
transactions happening at the time when
they were made. UnexplaJned, It would appear that as a result Exsteln had provided
tor the payment ot large sums of money, or
had already, and In view of bis assignment,
paid such sums to persons whom he did not
owe; or, in other words, be bad paid, and
also made provision in his assignment for
the payment of, flctltlous debt&
The defendant, however, proceeded with
his examination of this witness, and asked
tor an explanation of these entries, and the
facts or circumstances upon which they were
based, and the witness proceeded to give It.
The explanation was, If true, suftklent In
law, and showed that be did owe the persons the amounts he claimed to, with the possible exception of one or two cases In which
the defendant claims that, even on the basis
of the general truth of the explanation, the
witness had charged himself In reallty with
more than he owed. The defendant then
rested, and the plaintil'fs, with the evidence
in this state, asked tor a verdict in their favor by the direction of the court, and obtained It.
The court held, In substance, that the books
of the witness Exstein showed a prima facle
case of an Indebtedness of the witness In the
amounts therein appearing, and to the persons therein mentioned, and the witness said
they were correct. He then stated what has
already been alluded to as to those entries
made on the sixteenth of October, and continued by explaining the facts upon which
they were based. This explanation the court
said was totally uncontradlcted ·by any other
witness, and defendant was therefore bound
by what Exsteln said on that subject, for
the reason that he could not discredit or Impeach him, and must take what he said as,
under the circumstances of the case, true.
It t.hat were the true rule, the court wns correct In directing a verdict. The general term,
It must be presumed, also took the Mme view
of the case in dll'ectlng judgment for the
488

plaintiffs without delivering any written
opinion.
'l'he general rule prohibiting the impeachment or discrediting of a witness by the party calling him was extended too far in this
case. Here was an Issue of traud In the
making of an assignment by the assignor;
and the defendant, in order to prove its existence, called the very man as a witnCSI!
whom be alleged was guilty of the fraud. He
might well be regarded, therefore, as an
adverse witness, whom the party, by the exigencies of his case, was obliged to call.
With regard to strcb witnesses It ls well settled that all the rules appllcable to the examination of other witnesses do not in their
strictness apply. An adverse witness may
be cross-examined, and leading question&
may be put to him by the party calling him,
for the very sensible aml sufficient reason
that be Is adverse. and that the danger arising from such a mode of examination by the
party calling a friendly or unbiased witness
does not exist.
What favorable facts the party calllng him
obtained from such a witness may be justly
regarded as wrung from a reluctant and unwilling man, while those which are unfavorable may be treated by the Jury with just
that degree of bellef which they may think
ls deserved, considering their nature and the
other circumstances of the case. Starkie,
one of the ablest and most philosophical ot
English writers on this branch of the law,
In speaking of a reluctant or adverse witness, us~s almost the prel'lse language above
stated, and which has been substantln.lly
quoted from him. Starkie, Ev. (9th Ed.)
marg. p. 248.
Sometimes rather loose language has been
Indulged In, to the general el'fect that a party
cannot lmpen.ch his own witness; but, when
an examination Is made as to the limits of
the rule, the result will be iound to be that
It only prohibits this Impeachment tn three
cases, viz.: (1) The calling of witnesses to
Impeach the genernl C'haracter of the witness; and (2) the proof of prior contradictory
statements by him; and (3) a contradiction
of the witness by another, when the only effect Is to !mpelch, nnd not to give any
material evidence upon any Issue In the case.
Lawrence v. Barker, 5 Wend. 301-300;·
People v. Satrord, 5 Denio, 112; Thompson
v. Blanchard, 4 N. Y. 303-311; Coulter v.
Express Co., 56 N. Y. 585; 2 Starkie, Ev.
(9th Am. Ed.) marg. pp. 244-250; 2 Phil. Ev.
(C. & N. & Ed. notes) mnrg. pp. 981-983, and
note 602; 1 Green!. Ev. t 442.
In regard to the first class, the rule has
been stated to rest upon the theory that,
when a party calls a witness, be presents
him to the jury as worthy of belief, and to
allow him to call witnesses thereafter to Impeach his general t•hnracter as o. man would
be to permit an experiment to be made upon
the Jury by producing a person as worthy
of belief, wltom he knows, and has wltneSBeS

l.MPEACH.ME~·r.
IMPEACHMENT.

[Case No. 164;

to prove, to be the contrary, and, if his evi-

dence be favorable, to get the benefit of it,

and, if the reverse, to overwhelm it by the im-

peaching witnesses. in such a case as this,

however, there is no deception. The defend-

ant calls the very man he accuses of the

fraud as a witness to prove it, and says in

effect to the jury that such evidence as the

witness gives, which tends to show the per-

petration of the fraud alleged, is forced from

hlm by the exigencies of the case, and the

surrounding facts which cannot be denied,

while that which he gives which looks to-

wards au explanation of the fraud the jury

shall give such faith to as, under all the

facts in the case, they may think it entitled

to.

As to the second class in which an impeach-

ment is forbidden, the authorities in England
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were in conﬂict, many of the judges think-

ing it allowable to prove prior contradictory

statements by a witness; but the weight of

authority was against it, thereby creating

the occasion for an interference by the leg-

islature with the law of evidence, which

passed an act permitting just such evidence

under certain restrictions. See common law

procedure act of 185-l (17 & 18 Vict. c. 125, §

22). The non-admissibility of such evidence

in the courts of this state is, of course, not

open to discussion. It is alluded to only

to show the opinion of the English parlia-

ment (in matters of this nature almost ex-

clusively guided by lawyers) upon this ques-

tion of impeaching one's own witness, and

the readiness of that body to alter the law of

evidence in the direction of what seemed to

it greater opportunity of ascertaining and

administering that for which all courts are

instituted, viz., truth and justice.

The third of above classes where no im-

peachment is allowed, is plainly set forth in

several of the cases and text-books above

cited. It is not admissible, even in the case

of a witness called by the other side, to im-

peach him by proof of prior contradictory

statements on immaterial or collateral is-

sues; and there is not much difference in the

two cases, and therefore no reason why it

should be allowed with reference to one‘s

own witness. But all the cases concur in

the right of a party to contradict his own

witness by calling witnesses to prove a fact

material to the issue to be otherwise than as

sworn to by him, even when the necessary

effect is to impeach him.

Why should not the right exist to show

that a. portion of the evidence of your own

witness is untrue, by comparing it with an-

other portion of the evidence of the same

witness? The courts below say in effect

that, although a portion of I~ixstein’s evi-

dence shows that he provided for payment

in his assignment for ﬁctitious debts, yet the

other portion of his evidence, if believed,

shows that such debts were not ﬁctitious;

and, although the defendant was at liberty

to call other witnesses to prove that the ex-

[Cue No. !64:

to prove, to be the contrary, and, If his evl· planatlon was false. yet, as be did not do
deuce be favorable, to get the benefit ot It, so, the explanation must stand as matter ot
nod, 1t the revel'Be, to overwhelm it by the Im· law, and he cannot be beard to contend thl\t
peadllng witnesses. In such a case as this. It ls proved false by its own absolute and'
however, there ls no deception. The defend· inherent lmprobabUlty. We do not believe,
ant calla the very man he accuses ot the at least In such a case ss this, that the rule
fraud as a witness to prove it, and says in goes to any such length.
etrect to the jury that such evidence as the
The plalntllfs cite the case of Bmnch v.
witness gives, which tends to show the per- Levy, 46 N. Y. Super. Ct. Rep. 428, as uppetration ot the traud alleged, Is torced trom holding the l'ule laid down by the trial court.
him by the exigencies ot the case, and the The plalnturs there brought an action to remrrounding tacts which cannot be denied, coYer damages from defendants tor the nonwhile that which he gives which looks to- delivery of coupons bought from the defend·
wards an explanation ot the traud the jury ants' agent, as plaintiffs claimed; but deshall give such faith to as, under all the fendants denied the agency, and alleged they
tacts In the case, they may think It entitled had sold the coupons to the person who
to.
plalntltrs alleged was their agent, and had no
As to the second cla88 In which an impeach· liability tor his subsequent acts. On the triment Is forbidcleu, the authorities In England al the plalntltrs sustained their claim prime.
were In contHct, many ot the judges think- tacle by certain letters and ctrcmnstances
ing It allowable to prove prior contradictory wWch, as the court said, In the absence o!
statements by a witness; but the weight ot explanation by defendants, made a question
authority was against it, thereby creating tor the jury. The plaintltrs then, tor some
the occasion tor an lnterterence by the leg- Inexplicable reason, called one of the defendislature with the law ot evidence, which ants, who swore th.tt the person selling the
passed an act permitting just such evidence bonds to the plalntltrs was not the agent o!
under certain restrictions. See common law the defendants, but they had simply sold
procedure act of 1854 (17 & 18 Viet. c. 1.2j, I him the bonds. The court held the plalnturs
22). The non-admissibility ot such evidence concluded by this evidence, and that they
in the courts of this state ls, ot course, not must take It as wholly credible; that credibilopen to discussion. It Is alluded to only ity could not be divided; and that It was atto show the opinion ot the English parlia- tach(·d to the moral character. That case
ment (In matters ot this nature almost ex- comes very. near the one under discussion,
clusively guided by lawyers) upon this ques- and it Is hard to see why the plalntltrs should
tion ot impeaching one's own wltnellS, and not have been allowed to go to the jury upthe readiness ot that body to alter the law ot ·on the whole of their case,-letters, docuevidence In the direction ot what seemed to ments, and explanatlon,-and why they
it greater opportunity ot ascertaining and should not haYe been allowed to ask the
administering that tor which all courts are jury to belleve the documents and letters,
and reject the explanation as In their judg·
Instituted, viz., truth and justice.
The third ot above classes where no Im- ruent untrue. •ro say that credibility le a
peachment Is allowed, ls plainly set torth 1n part of the moral character, and lndivlslbl~.
several of the cases and text-books above ls to run counter to the well-established rule
cited. It Is not admissible, even In the case as to adverse witnesses above referred to,
ot a witness called by the other side, to Im· whose testimony you may ask a jury to be·
peach him by proot ot prior contradictory lleve In part, and to dlsllelleve the residue.
statements on Immaterial or collateral Is- The case ought not to be followed. It Is a
sues; and the1·e Is not much difference In the good general rule that the credibility ot a
two <·ases, and therefore no reason why It witness ls matter tor the jury, and the fewer
should be allowed with reference to one's technical obstructions there are to the prac,
own wltne88. But all the cases concur In tical operation of that rule the better.
We think that the whole evidence ot Ex·
the right ot a party to contradict his own
witness by calllng witnesses to prove a tact uteln In this cnse should have been submitmaterial to the Issue to be otherwise than ae ted to the jury tor them to P888 upon Its
sworn to by him, even when the necessary credibility, and that they were at liberty to
believe that pot'tlon which tended to show
etrect ls to Impeach him.
Why should not the right exist to show the debts to be fictitious, and to dlsbellen~
that a portion ot the evidence ot your own the explanation, or that they might regard
witness ls untrue, by comparing It with an- It as sumclent,-just as In their judgment,
other portion of the evidence of the same intelligently and honestly exercised, they
witness? The courts below say In etred might determine. Of course, we do not mean
that, although a portion ot l'lxsteln's evl· by this decision to give any Intimation as to
deuce shows that he provided tor imyment which view should be taken by the jury.
In his assignment tor fictitious debts, yet the We only decide that It was a question tor
other portion ot his evidence, It believed, them, and not the court.
The judgment should be reveJ'lled, and a
shows that such debts were not fictitious;
and, although the defendant wns at liberty new trial granted; costs to abide the event.
All concur.
to call other witnesses to prove that the ex-

Cue No. 165)
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SEI,OVER et al. v. BRYANT.

PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

(56 N. W. 58, 54 Minn. 434.)
SELOVER et al. v. BRYANT.

(56 N. VV. 58, 54 Minn. 434.)

Supreme Court of Minnesota. Aug. 21, 1893.

Appeal from municipal court of Minneapo-

lis; l-Elliott, Judge.

Action by George H. Selover and another,

copartners as Selover & Gould, against John

W. Bryant, administrator of the estate of

George M. Bryant, deceased, to recover for

professional services as attorneys. Plaintiffs

had judgment, and from an order denying a

new trial defendant appeals. Afﬁrmcd.

George R. Robinson, for appellant. Board-

man & Boutelle, for respondents.

DICKINSON, J. The plaintiffs, as attor

neys at law, prosecuted an action for a. di-

vorce against the defendant and in behalf of

his wife. The action was settled between

the parties, and dismissed. The plaintiffs
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prosecute this action to recover for their

legal services in behalf of the defendant's

wife, claiming that in the settlement of the

former suit the defendant agreed with his

wife to pay for such services. The defend-

ant denies that agreement. After a verdict

for the plaintiffs upon that issue, and the

refusal to grant a. new trial, the defendant

appealed.

The plaintiffs called the defendant's wife as

a. witness in their behalf. Her testimony

tended to refute the claim of the plaintiffs

as to the alleged agreement. After a pre-

liminary examination of the witness, as to

former contradictory statements made by her.

the plaintiffs were allowed to show that she

had made a statement of the fact to one of

the plaintlﬂs materially different from her

testimony. The case justitied the conclusion

of the court that the plaintiffs were surprised

by the adverse testimony. It is one of the

controverted questions in the law of evidence

whether a party calling a witness, and who is

surprised by his adverse testimony, may be

permitted to show that he had made previ-

ous statements contrary to his testimony. A

learned writer has said that the weight of

authority seems to be in favor of admitting

such proof. 1 Greenl. Ev. 5 444. We arc in

doubt whether the weight of authority is not

the other way; but we feel confident that

well-recognized reasons and principles of the

law of evidence support the proposition that,

at least hi the discretion of the trial court,

such evidence is admissible. It is perfectly

well settled, and upon satisfactory reasons,

that if the defendant had called the witness

to the stand, and she had testiﬂed as she did

as to the fact in issue, the plaintiffs, after

proper preliminary proof, would have been

allowed to show by other witnesses that she

had made statements contrary to her testi-

mony. This rule, now everywhere recog-

nized, rests upon the obvious propriety and

necessity of informing the jury of circum-

stances so directly bearing upon the credi-

bility of the witness and the value of his

testimony as do contradictory statements by

him of the controverted facts concerning

Supreme Court of Minnesota. Aug. 21, 1893.
Appeal from municipal court of MlnneapoJ.ls; mnott, Judge.
Action by George H. Selover and another,
<:opartners a'J Selover & Gould, against John
W. Bryant, admlnlstrator of the estate ot
George M. Bryant, deceased, to recover tor
profrsslonnl services 88 attorneys. Plalntlfra
bad Judgment, and from an order denying a
new trial detendnnt appeals. Atllrmed.
George R. Robinson, for appellant. Boardman & Boutelle, for respondents.
DICKJSSON, J. The plnlntltrs, aa attor
neys at law, prosecuted an action for a divorce aga.lnst the defendant and in behalf of
bis wife. The action was settled between
the pnrtles, and dlamiased. The plalntifra
prosecute this action to recover for their
legal services in behalf of the defendant's
wife, claiming that in the settlement of the
former suit the defendant agreed with his
wife t.o pay for such services. The defendant denies tbnt agreement. After a verdict
for the plalntlfrs upon that issue, and the
refusal to grant a new trial, the defendant
appealed.
The plalntlfrs called the defendant's wife 88
a witness in their behalf. Her testlmony
tended to refute the clnlm of the plaintl1fs
as to the alleged agreement. After a prellmln:iry examination of the witness, as to
former contradictory statements made by her,
the plnlntl1fs were o.llowed to show thnt she
bad made a statement of the taet to one of
the plalnt:Ufs materially dlfrerent from her
testimony. The case justltll'd the conclusion
of the court that the plnlntitrs were surprised
by the adverse testimony. It ls one of the
oontroverted questions in the law of evidence
whether a p~rty caDlng a wltnest1, and who 1.8
8Urprisl'd by his adverse testimony, may be
pcm1ltted to show that he had made prevlo0us statements contrary to his testimony. A
learned writer has said that the weight of
authority seems to be ln favor of admitting
.such proof. 1 Greeol Ev. t 444. We are in
doubt whether the weight of authority ls not
the other way; but we feel confident that
well-recognized re&BOD8 and principles of the
law of evidence support the proposition that,
at least in the discretion of the trial court,
such evidence ls admissible. It ls perfectly
W(•Jl settled, and upon satisfactory reasons,
thnt if the defendant had caDed the wltnees
to the stnnd, and she had testlfted as she did
as to the fact in Issue, the plaintltrs, after
proper prelhninary proof, would have been
all,)wed to show by other witnesses thnt she
bad made .statements contrary to her testimony. This rule, now everywhere recognized, rests upon the ob\1ous propriety and
necessity of informing the jury of clrcum·
stances so directly bearing upon the credibility of the witness and the value of hi.a
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tE'Stlmony as do contradictory statements by
him of the controverted tacts concerntng
which he testlftes, and whlch the Jury must
d('ter.111ne. But this controlling reason for
allowing such dlacrl'dltlng evidence exl8ts.
and with pr-:l<'lsely the same force, whether
the wltnC'SS has been caDed to the stnnd by
the opPo11ite party or by the pnrty who offers
the impeaching proof; and If the witness
may be thus discredited by the party who
did not call him, but may not be discredited
by the pnrty who called him, the reason must
be that by calling the witness to the stand
the pnrty holds him forth as being worthy
of credit, and henoe he ahould not be allowed afterwards to Impeach his credlbllit;y.
And this ls the propoeltlon which, in one
form or another, la generally aAAined as the
reason of the rule dtsallowllljr Ml'C-b Impeachment wherever that rule has prevailed. This
rule and the reason for it has been so generally accepted and applied with reference to
an impeachment by a pnrty of the general
reputl.tlon of a wltneu whom he has called
thn.t it ls perhaps not now to be questlf'ned;
but, as respects the particular disa(:dit.1ng
proof which we are considering, the pra-.,tice
baa been less uniform, and the excluding of
the dl&lredltlng proof hns been more strenuously opposed by the best authorities. The
reason upon which it rests la, we think, plalnly fallacious. 'l'he fault in tbe reason llee
in the premise that, by calling the wltneai,
the party presents him as being worthy of
c1·edit, or, in nny sense, vouches for his trathfulneSti. In some sense and measure this
mny be true; but laying aslde the subject of
genersl Impeachment, and directing our attention only to the question of allowing
proof of statements contrary to the testimony
by which a party ls surprised at the trial the
n.bove-stated reason ls of no controlling force.
except n.s it includee and implles such a degree of reeponslblllty for the credit of the
wltness--euch a personal voucher of his trathfulnes&-that lt would be bad faith. double
dealing, trUling with the court, or something
r.kin thereto, for the party to a.fterwanla
throw discredit upon his testimony. The
premise ls not tenable. A party la not to be
held to have assumed any such responslblllty
as to the trathfulneBS of a witness, and ordinnrily, at least, there can be no imputation
of bnd faith, or anything like it, when, the
party being surprised by his own witness testifying directly in favor of the adverse party,
he otters to show his preliminary statemCDts
to the contrary, as impeaching his credibility. One has not all the world from which
to choose the witnesses by whose testiWOllT
he must prove his case. He h88 not the
freedom of choice that one h88 in the selection of an agent. He can only call thoee
who are supposed to know the facts In lt!lme.
He ls entitled to have their testimony pla('(_>(l
before the jury, not as the statements of his
agents or representatives by which he ls to be
concluded, but as the testimony of wltnessea
whose credlblllty he oannot be expected to

IMPEACHMENT.
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vouch for, but which the jury are to deter-

mine. It is everywliere admitted that a

party whose witness testiiies against him is

not concluded thereby. He may prove the

fact to be contrary to such testimony, al-

though that does discredit a witness whom he

has called. We deny that, by calling a. wit-

ness to the stand, a party becomes responsi-

ble for his credibility in any such sense that

he is absolutely precluded, when su.rprised

by adverse testimony, from showing that the

witness had made statements of the facts

contrary to his testimony. It is at least with-

in the discretion of the court to allow this.

It has been suggested that this affords an

opportunity 10 fraudulently get before the

Jury the unsworn statement of a witness

which the j1n'y may accept as evidence of the

fact. But the same objection may be urged
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in opposition to allowing a party to discredit

in this way a. witness calleii by the adverse

party; yet this is always allowed. The di-

rect, certain, and obvious effect of such evi-

dence, in enabling the jury to rightly weigh

the testimony, should prevail over the far

more remote, improbable, and collateral con-

siderations that opporttmity may be thus af-

forded to a dishonest party to collude with a

dishonest witness to make a. false statement

of facts, which the witness would not swear

to, in order that, after the witness shall have

testiﬂed to the truth, the false unsworn state

ment to the contrary may be shown. There

are so many contingencies in the way of such

barely possible results that the remote possi-

bility is not of much weight, as against the

plain practical considerations opposed to it.

While, perhaps, the weight of authority is in

favor of excluding such evidence, we feel

that, in holding it to be within the discretion

of the court to receive it, we are justified,

not only by reason, but by a suﬁicient array

of authority. In the English courts both

views have been sanctioned. A strong pres-

entation of the rule allowing such proof was

made by Lord Chief Justice Dennian in

ivright v. Beckett, 1 Moody & R. 414.

This view is preferred in Starkie, Ev. (Shara-

wood's Ed.) 245; 2 Phil. Ev. marg. pp. 985-

995; 1 Greenl. Ev. 44-1; Cowden v. Reynolds,

12 Serg. & R. 281, 288; Bank v. Davis, 6

\Vatts & S. 285; Smith v. Briscoe, 65 Md.

561, 5 Atl. Rep. 334; Campbell v. State, 23

Ala. 44, 76; Hemingway v. Garth. 51 Ala.

530; Moore v. Railroad Co., 59 Miss. 243;

and see Johnson v. Leggett, 28 Kan. 590, 606.

See, also, a. discussion of this subject in 11

Am. Law Rev. 261. It may be added, as in-

dicating what it has been considered the rule

ought to be, that in England and in several

of our states statutes have been enacted al-

lowing such proof to be made. Our conclu-

sion on this point is that the court did not

err in receiving the evidence.

The only other assignments of error which

we deem worthy of speciﬁc mention are those

relating to the charge of the court that the

value of the services (of the plaintiif) “to

•ouch for, but which the jury are to determine. It ls eve17where admittf'd that a
parcy whose wltneae testules agalDBt him ls
not concluded thereby. He may prove the
fact to be contrary to IOch otestlmony, although that does discredit a witness whom he
has called. We deny that, by calllDg a witness to the at.and, a party becomes responsible for his credlbWty In any such sense that
be ls \bsolutely precluded, when surprised
by adverse testimony, trom showing that the
witness had made statements of the facta
oontrary to bis testimony. It ls at least wlthm the discretion of the court to allow this.
It bas been auggestf'd that this affords an
opportunity to fm.udulently get before the
Jury the uDBworn stntement ot a wltneaa
which the JU17 may accept aa evidence of the
fact. But the same obJt'Ctlon may be urgf'd
1n opposition to allowing a vnrty to discredit
1n this way a witness calleat Dy the adverse
pa."ty; yet this la always allowed. The direct, certain, and obvious effect of such evidence, In enabling the ju17 to rightly weigh
the testimony, should prevail over the far
more remot1", Improbable, and collateral con·
tddernttona that opportunity may be thus at:torded to a dishonest party to collude with a
dishonest witness to make a false statement
of facts, which the wltneae would not swear
to. In order that, atter the wltneaa shall have
teatl1led to the truth, the false unswom statement to the contrary may be shown. There
are 80 many contingencies In the way ot such
bnrely polllible results that the remote pOSRtblllty Is not ot much weight, as against the
plain practtcal consldernttons opposed to It.
While, perhnps, the weight ot authority ls In
favor ot excluding such evldf'nce, we feel
that, In holding It to be within the discretion
-ot the court to receive It, we are justified,
not only by reoson, but by a lltlfticlent array
ot authority. In the English courts both
views have been sanctioned. A strong preeeitatlon ot the rnle allowing such proof was
made b7 Lord Chief .Justice Denman In
Wright v. Beckett, 1 Moody & B. '14. I

I

I

This view ls preferred In Starkie, Ev. (Sbanwood'a Ed.) 245; 2 Phil. Ev. marg. pp. 985995; 1 Greenl. Ev. 44-1; Cowc.len v. Reynolds,
12 Berg. & B. 281, 283; BanJt v. l>-clvls, 6
Watts & S. 285; Smith v. Briscoe, 60 Md.
561, 5 Atl. Rep. 384; Campbell v. Stnte, 23
A.la. 44, 76; Hemingway v. Garth, 51 Ala.
630; Moore v. Rallrood Co., i>D Ylss. 243;
and see Johnson v. Leggett, 28 Kan. 500, 600.
See, also, a discussion of this subject In 11
.Am. Law Rev. :?<."1. It may be added, na Indicating what it bas been considered the rule
ought to be, that In England and In several
of our states statutes have been enacted allowing such proof to be made. our conclusion on this point ls that the court did not
err In ree.elvlng the evidence.
The only other assignments ot error which
we de<>m worthy of speclfl.c mention are those
relating to the cbal"ge of the court that the
value of tha servl<'M (of the plalntltr) "to
Mrs. Bryant" should be considered by the
jU17. There was no error In this. The court
did not any that thnt oonslderatlon alone
should be taken as the measure of value.
The value of the services of an attorney ls
neces.<mrlly to be determined by many oonslderatlona besides the mere Ume vlalbly employed In the conduct of a BUit. Among
other things, the Importance and results of
the case are to be constdered. 'Ille lm}>Ol"tance of the cause to the client affords to
some f'xtent a measure of the Bldll, care, responsi.pWty, anxiety, and effort demanded ot
and to be borne by the attorney, and should
not be disregarded In their bearing upon the
queatlon ot the value of such services.
Eggleston v. Boardman, 87 Mich. 14.
The seventh assignment of erro~that the
court erred In overrnllng tne motion for a
new trial-ls too general to be available.
Order a.1ftrJDed.
Gll,FILI,AN, 0. 1. On the point of the
admlt!lllbillty ot thP evidence ot oonb;adlctory
statements made by the wltneaa B17ant, I
dissent.

Cue No. 166)
Case No. 166]

PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

GERTZ v. FITCHBURG R. CO. I

(137 Mass. 77.)

Supreme,Judicial Court of Massacliusetts. Suf-

folk. March 19, 1384.

PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

GERTZ "· FITCHBURG R. CO.
(137 Ma88. 77.)
Supreme1 Judlcial Court of Massachusetts. Suffolk. March 19, 1884.
J. J. Myers, for plalntUI.'. C. A. Welch, for
defendant.

J. J’. Myers, for plaintiff. C. A. Welch, for

defendant.

HOLMES. J. In this case, the plaintiff

having testiﬁed as a witness, the defendant

put in evidence the record of his conviction,

in 1876, in the United States district court,

of the crime of falsely personating a Unit-

ed States revenue oﬁicer. The plaintiff then

offered evidence of his character and pres-

ent reputation for veracity, which was ex-

cluded, subject to his exception.

We think that the evidence of his reputa-

tion for truth should have been admitted,

and that the exception must be sustained.

There is a clear distinction between this
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case and those in which such evidence has

been held inadmissible; for instance, to rebut

evidence of contradictory statements (Russell

v. Coﬂin, 8 Pick. 143; Brown v. Mooers, 6

Gray, 451), or where the witness is directly

contradicted as to the principal fact by other

witnesses (Atwood v. Dearborn, 1 Allen, 483).

In such cases, it is true that the result

sought to be reached is the same as in the

present,—to induce the jury to disbelicve

the witness. But the mode of reaching the

result is different; for, while contradiction

or proof of contradictory statements may

very well have the incidental effect of im-

peaching the character for truth of the con-

tradicted witness in the minds of the jury,

the proof is not directed to that point. The

purpose and only direct effect of the evi-

dence are to show that the witness is not

to be believed in this instance. But the rea-

son why he is not to be believed i left un-

touched. That may be found in forgetful-

ness on the part of the witness, or in his

having been deceived, or in any other possi-

ble cause. The disbelief sought to be pro-

duced is perfectly consistent with an ad-

mission of his general good character for

truth, as well as for the other virtues; and

until the character of a witness is assailed,

it cannot be fortiﬁed by evidence.

On the other hand, when it is proved that

a witness has been convicted of a crime, the

only ground for disbelieving him which such

proof affords is the general readiness to do

evil which the conviction may be supposed

to show. It is from that general disposition

alone that the jury is asked to infer a readi-

ness to lie in the particular case, and thence

that he has lied in fact. The evidence has

no tendency to prove that he was mistaken,

but only that he has perjured himself, and

it reaches that conclusion solely through the

general proposition that he is of bad char-

acter and unworthy of credit. 1 Gilb. Ev.

(6th Ed.) 126.

The conviction in the United States dis-

trict court was for a felony punishable with

imprisonment (St. U. S. March 2, 1867, § 28)‘,

and, assuming that it stands on the same

HOLMES, J. In this case, the plalntiiT
having testified as a witness, the defendant
put In evidence the record of bis conviction,
in 1876, in the United States district court,
of the crime of falsely personatlng a United States revenue olfl.cer. The plalntltf tllen
ottered evidence of his character and Pl'eSent reputation for veracity, which was excluded, subject to bis exception.
We think that the evidence of his reputation for truth should have been admitted,
and that the exception must be sustained.
There ls a clear distinction between this
case and those In which such evidence has
been held Inadmissible; for Instance, to rebut
evidence of contradictory statements (Ruesell
v. Colfl.n, 8 Pick. 143; Brown v. Mooers, 6
Gray, 451), or where the witness ts directly
contradicted as to the principal fact by other
witnesses (Atwood v. Dearborn, 1 Allen, 483).
In such cases, it is true that the result
sought to be reached la the same as in the
present,-to Induce the jury to disbelieve
the witness. But the mode of reaching the
result ls ditrerent; for, while contradiction
or proof of contrndlctory statemen~ may
very well have the Incidental effect of Impeaching the character for truth of the contrndlcted witness In the minds of the jury,
the proof ls not directed to that point. The
purpose and only direct etrect of the evidence are to show that the witness ls not
to be believed In this instance. But the reason why he ls not to be believed ls left untouched. That may be found In forgetfulness on the part of the witness, or In bis
having been deceived, or In any other possible eause. The disbelief sought to be produced is perfectly consistent with an admission of his geneml good character for
truth, as well as for the other virtues; and
until the character of a witness Is assalled,
It cannot be fortifted by evidence.
On the other hand, when It ls proved that
a witness has been convicted of a crime, the
only ground for disbelieving him which such
proof atrords Is the general readiness to do
evil which the conviction may be supposed
to show. It Is from that general disposition
alone that the jury ls asked to Infer a readiness to Ile In the particular case, and thence
that he has lled in fact. '.rhe evidence has
no tendency to prove that he was mistaken,
but only that he has perjured himself, and
It reaeh~s that conclusion solely through the
general proposition that he ls of bad charn<'ter and unworthy of credit. 1 Gllb. Ev.
(6th Ed.) 126.
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The conviction In the United States district court was for a. felony punishable with
imprisonment (St. U.S. March 2, 1867, I 28);
and, assuming that it stands on the same
footing as a conviction In another state, it
would have been admissible, aerording to
the dicta In our cases, · independently o!
statute, not to exclude the witness, but to
Impeach his credit. Com. v. Green, 11' Mass.
515, 541; Com. v. Knapp, 9 Pick. 41l6, 511;
Utley v. Merrick, 11 Mete. (Maes.) 302. See
Rev. St. c. 9!, I 56. And ·when a conviction
ls admitted for that purpose, It always may
be rebutted by evidence of good character
for truth. Com. v. Green, ubl supra; Russell v. Cotnn, 8 Pick. 143, 154; Rex v. Clarke,
2 Starkie, 241; Webb v. State, 29 Ohio St.
351.
It la true that a doubt ls thrown upon this
doctrine In Harrington v. Lincoln, 4 Gray,
563, 508; but that case was deelded on !he
ground that the cross-examination which
showed that the witness had been charged
with a crime also showed that he had been
acquitted, and cannot be regarded as an
authority against our decision, whether the
ratio decidendl adopted be reconcilable with
later cases or not. Com. v. Ingraham, 1
Gray, 46.
The appllcablllty of the foregoing reasoning is made clear by the language of our
statutes. By Pub. St. c. 169, I 19, the _o nly
purpose for which conviction of a crime
may be shown in any case ls to atrect credibility. Even if the conviction proved here
would have excluded the witness but for
the statute cutting down its e1Tect, it could
not be malntalned that evidence of reputation for truth remained inadmissible IJecause 1t would have been so when the witness was excluded. The statute puts all
convictions of crime on the same footlng,those which formerly excluded, those which
always have gone only to credibility, and,
it would seem, those which formerly would
not have been admissible at all. We assume that the words "a crime" In Pub. St.
c. 169, § 19, mean the same as "any crime"
In St. 1870, c. 393, § 3; Gen. St. c. 131, I
13; St. 1852, c 312, § 60; St. 1851, c. 233, t
97; Com. v. Hall, 4 Allen, 305. And therefore any evidence which was admissible to
rebut a conviction that only dlscrecllted before the statute must now be admissible to
rebut all convictions that may be put In evidence. Whether any dltrerent rule would
apply when the fact ls only brought out on
cross-exnmlnntlon we need not consider.
The exception to the exclusion of e,·lclence
that the witness was innocent of the offence
of which he was convicted, and explaining
why he was convicted, Is not much pl't'ssed,
and ls oven-uled. Com. v. Gallagher, 126
Mass. 54.
Exceptions sustained.

IMPEACHMENT.

[Case No. 167

IMPEACHMENT.

[Case No. 167

PEOPLE v. BROOKS.

PEOPLE v. BROOKS.
(30 N. E. 189, 131 N. Y. 321.)

(30 N. E. 189, 131 N. Y. 321.)

Court of Appeals of New York. March 1, 1892.

Appeal from supreme court, general term,

Fourth department.

Indictment of Rachel Brooks for arson.

Defendant was convicted, and the general

term aﬂirmed the sentence. Defendant ap-

peals. Afﬁrmed.

Louis Marshall, for appellant. T. E. Han-

cock, Dist. Atty., and B. J. Shove, Asst. Dist.

.Atty., for the People.

Court of Appeals of New York. March 1, 1892.
Appeal from supreme court, general term,
Fourth department.
Indictment of Rachel Brooks for arson.
Defendant was convicted, and the general
term affi.nned the sentence. Defendant appeals. Amrmed.
Louis Marshall, tor appellant. T. E. Haneock, Dist. Atty., and B. J. Shove, A.sat.. DlBt..
.Atty., tor the People.

EARL, C. J. The defendant was indicted

for setting ﬁre to the store occupied by her

in the city of Syracuse on the 27th day of

October, 1890. She was brought to trial in

the court of sessions of Onondaga county in

February, 1891, and was convicted of arson

in the ﬁrst degree, and was sentenced to the
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Onondaga penitentiary for the term of 15

years. Her conviction having been aﬂirmed

by the general term of the supreme court,

she then appealed to this court.

The learned counsel for the defendant has

brought to our attention three grounds upon

which he claims the judgment should be re-

versed. Upon the trial the principal evidence

adduced against the defendant to show her

guilt was that of Charlotte Brooks, the

daughter of her husband by a former wife,

who was about 18 years old. She testiﬁed

that, three or four day before the ﬁre, the

defendant required her to take an oath, by

kissing the Jewish Bible, that she would not

tell to any one what she was about to say to

her: and that. after she had taken the oath

and promised that she would not tell, she

said to her that she had bills for goods to set-

tie, and that there was a judgment against

her, and she was going to make a bonﬁre of

the goods in the store, and burn them up;

and that, after she had taken the oath, the

defendant told her, if she did tell what she

had said to her, she would be sent to prison

for 20 years for perjury. There was other

evidence pointing to the guilt of the defend-

ant, and corroborating the story related by

the witness Charlotte. The defendant was

called as a witness on her own behalf, and

these questions were put to her by her coun-

-sel: “Now state whether or not Charlotte

was friendly to you or unfriendly.” “Did

you and Charlotte have frequent difficulties

during that time?" (Meaning the time pre-

vious to the ﬁre.) “Did Charlotte assault you

on other occasions previous to the ﬁre ?” All

these questions were objected to on the part

of the prosecution as incompetent, because

Charlotte had not been examined as to the

particular matters inquired of on behalf of

the defendant. The trial judge sustained the

objection, and excluded the evidence, because

Charlotte had not been examined as to the

same matters, and her attention had not been

called to the particular matters inquired of.

In making the ruling the trial judge said:

“You have the witness here, and can ask

anything you wish of her that she has not

EARL, C. J. The defendant was indicted
tor setting tire to the store occupied by her
in the city ot Syracuse on the 27th day ot
October, 1890. She was brought to trial In
the court ot sessions of Onondaga county In
February, 1891, and was convicted of arson
in the tlrst degree, and was sentenced to the
Onondaga penitentiary for the term of 15
_years.. Her conviction having been amrmed
by the general term of the supreme court,
she then appealed to this court.
The learned counsel for the defendant has
brought to our attention three grounds upon
which he claims the judgment should be revereed. Upon the trial the principal evidence
adduced against the defendant to show her
guilt was that ot Oharlotte Brooks, the
daughter of her husband by a former wife,
who was about 18 years old. She testltl.ed
that, three or four day11 before the fire, the
<lefendant required her to take nn oath, by
kissing the Jewish Bible, that she would not
tell to any one what she was about to say t.o
her: and that, after she bad taken the oath
and promised that ahe would not tell, she
aid to her that she bad bills for goods to set·
tie, and that there was a judgment against
her, and she was going to make a bonfire of
the goods In the store, and burn them up;
.and that, after she bad taken the oath, the
-defendant told her, If she did tell what she
had said to her, she would be sent to prison
for 20 years tor perjury. There was other
-evidence pointing to the guilt of the defend·
ant, and corroborating the story related by
the wltneBB Charlotte. The defendant was
-called as a witness on her own behalf, and
these questions were put to her by her coun11el: "Now state whether or not Charlotte
wrui friendly to you or unfriendly." "Did
_you and Charlotte have frequent dlmcultles
<luring that time?" (Menning the time previous to the ti.re.) "Did Charlotte assault you
-00 other occasions previous to the fire?"
All
these questions were objected to on the part
-0f the prosecution as Incompetent, because
Charlotte had not been examined as to the
particular matters Inquired of on behalf of
the defendant. The trial judge sustulned the
-objection, and excluded the evidence, because
<Jhnrlotte bad not been examined as to the
same matters, and her attention had not been
-called to the particular mattera Inquired of.

In making the ruling the trtal judge said:
"You have the witness here, and cnn ask
anything you wish of her that she has not
testified to, and, if you think 11be bas not told
the truth, you can ask the witness about It;
and I think that Is as far as you can go. I
think the rule 18 this: that a wltneBB may be
cross-examined as to his or her attitude of
mind In regard to the defendant, and his attention must be called to each and all the
transactions upon which the counsel for the
defendant desires to give evidence. If the
witness admits the acts and declarations that
the defendant claims w.ere made and done,
that Is the end of it. If the witness denies,
then I think It ls competent to caU other wltnesse8 to contradict those matte1'8; but to let
a witness go off the stand, not having queetloned the witness as to the particulars, Rod
then calling third parties to prove Independent transactions showing the attitude of the
mind ot the witness towards the party, I
think ls not the rule. So I have allowed and
do allow this witness to testify as to any
transactions bearing upon that point In regard to which the witness Charlotte was examined." And the judge said, further: "I
should say that the witness referred to ls In
court now. so that there Is no loss to the defendant by the application of the rule as I
understand lt.." But the counsel Insisted upon his right to~ examine the defendant, for
the purpose of proving Charlotte's hostility
towards her, without Orst examining Charlotte In reference to the same watter. '"e
think the rule of law laid down by the trlu:
judge was erroneous. The hostility of a wltneBB towards a party against whom he ls
called may be proved ·by any competent evl·
deuce. It may be shown by cross-exmnlnatlon of the witness, or witnesses may be
called who can swear to facts showing It..
There can be no reason for holding that the
wltneBB mW!t tl.rst be examined as to bis boatlllty, and that then, and not tlll then, witnesses may be called t.o contradict him, because it ls not a case where the party against
whom the witness la called Is seeking to discredit him by contradicting htm. He Is simply seeking to discredit him by showing bis
hostlllty and malice; and, as that may be
proved by any competent evidence, we see no
reason for holding that he must ti.rat be examined llB to his hostlllty. And such we
think is the drift of the decisions In this
state and elsewhere. Hotchkiss v. Insurance
Co., 5 Hun, 00; Starr v. Cragin, 2-l Hun, 177;
People v. Moore, 15 Wend. 419; People v.
Thompson, 41 N. Y. 6; Schult,; v. Rnllroad
Co., 89 N. Y. 242; Ware v. Ware, 8 Green!.
42, U3; 'l'ucker v. Welsh, 17 Mass. 160; Day
v. Stickney, 14 Allen, 255; Martin v. Barnes,
7 Wis. 239; Robinson v. Hutchinson, 31 Vt.
443; New Portland v. Kingfield, r>-'> Me. 172;
Hedge v. Clapp, 22 Conn. 2fl2: Cook v.
Brown, 34 N. H. 4-00. So we think the trial
judge laid down an erl'Oneous rule of lnw.
But we are sUll of opinion that no harm
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was done to the defendant. The extent to

which an examination may go for the pur-

pose of proving the hostility of a witness

must be, to some extent at least, within the

discretion of the trial judge. We said about

it, in Schultz v. Railroad Co., supra, that

“the evidence to show the hostile feeling of a

witness, when it is alleged to exist, should be

'direct and positive, and not very remote and

uncertain, for the reason that the trial of the

main issue in the case cannot be properly

suspended to make out the case of hostile

feeling by mere circumstantial evidence from

which such hostility or malice may or may

not be inferred." Before these questions

were excluded, the defendant's counsel, on

the examination of Charlotte. proved by her

that she and the defendant had had frequent

alter-cations; that the defendant “used to
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whip her lots of times;" that on a certain oc-

casion when she was impudent to the de-

fendant, not long before the ﬁre. the defend-

ant threw her down; that on that occasion

the defendant assaulted her, and bit her and

pushed and knocked he1' down on the ﬂoor,

and when she got up she said to the defend-

ant, “You will be sorry. What did I do to

you? My mother would not knock me down;"

and that her troubles with her step-mother

were frequent; that they had trouble on ev-

ery rainy day; that “she was disagreeable to

her on rainy days." And the defendant. be-

fore these questions were excluded, testified

that a few days before the ﬁre she and Char-

lotte had an altercation, and that “Charlotte

got mad, and pulled her down and slapped

her in the face, and pounded her on her back"

so that she fell down, and came near fainting

away. We think there was ample evidence

to show the state of feeling between the de-

fendant and Charlotte, and, if the examina-

tion of the defendant upon that subject had

been much further prolonged, it could not

have added any weight to the evidence al-

ready given on that subject. Suiticient evi-

dence for every purpose of the trial had been

given to show difiiculties and hostilities be-

tween the defendant and Charlotte, and

therefore it is clear that the defendant was

not harmed by the exclusion of further evi-

dence on that subject. Besides, the jury ut-

terly disregarded the defendant‘ evidence.

She denied under oath all the evidence tend-

ing to implicate her in the crime, and ex-

plicitly denied that she had stated to Char-

lotte her intention to burn the goods in the

building, and gave some evidence tending to

cast suspicion upon Charlotte as the author

of the crime.

the rule laid down in section 542 of the Code

of Criminal Procedure should be applied.

'i‘hat section provides as follows: “After

hearing the appeal, the court must give judg-

ment without regard to technical errors or

dcfccts, or to exceptions which do not affect

the substantial rights of the parties."

lt is also claimed by the defendant's coun-

sel that the judge erred in his charge to the

was done to the defendant. The extent to 1 jury. Upon the trial of the action the dewhich an examination may go tor the pur- fendant called several witnesses who testipose of p1'0ving the hostlllty ot a witness fied to her good character. After fairly charmust be, to some extent at least, within the ging the- jury on the queetton of reasonable
discretion of the trial judge. We said about doubt and the effect of good character, he
It, In Schultz v. Railroad Co., supra, that used this language: "And In the trial of the
''the evidence to show the hostile feeling of a case, If that reputation has been shown to ~
witness, when it is alleged to exist, should be good, yet If the evidence on the trial Indi·direct lll)d positive, and not nry remote and cates corruptness, fraudulent practice, bad
uncertain, for the reason that the trial of the heart, dishonesty, fraud, it rebuts, so far as
wain Issue In the case cannot be properly lt gOetJ, the reputation for good character;.
suspended to make out the case of hostile that Is to say. po~~ltlve testimony of the comfeeling by me1-e cll'cumstantlal evidence from , mission of a crime extinguishes It altogether.
which such hostility or mallce may or may lf you believe tile testimony." After he had
not be Inferred." Before these questions 11.nlshed his charge, the counsel for the dewere excluded, the defendant's counsel, on fendant said: ''The charge ls very satlsf&<."the examination of Charlotte, proved by her tory, and I do not rise to ftnd any fault with
that she and the defendant bad had frequent It. Your honor has charged that If the jury
altercations; that the defendant "used to ftnd that there ls reasonable doubt that they
whip her lots of times;" that on a certain oc- must acquit. Now, I ask your honor U>
casion when she was Impudent to the de- charge that good charaC'ter may be sumclent
fendant, not long before the fire, the defend- to raise that reasonable doubt which requlretJ
ant threw her down; that on that occasion the jury to acquit." And the judge so charthe defendant assaulted her, and bit her and ged. Then the counsel for the defendant furpushed and knocked her down on the fioor, ther said: "Your honor charged that If, oa
and when she got up she said to the defend- the trial of a case, It ls shown that the perant, "You wlll be sorry. What did I do to son has been corrupt and guilty of fraudulent
you? My mother would not knock me down;" practices, It rebuts the evidence, and the Imand that her troubles with her step-mother portance attached to lt, of good character.were frequent; that they had trouble on ev- ls an answer to It. I do not give your honery rainy day; that "she was disagreeable to or's precise language, but that ls the subher on rainy days." And the defendant, be- stance, and what your honor did charge upon
fore these questions were excluded, testified that question, and all, I take exception; and,
that a few days before the fire she and Char- turthermore, I ask your honor to charge that
lotte bad an altercation, and that "Charlotte these remarks are not appllcable to this
got mali. and pulled her down and slapped case." The judge refused to so charge. We
her In the face, and pounded her on her back" do not think the11e exc~eptlons to the charge
so that she fell down, and came near fainting were well taken. The judge had In bis
away. We think there was ample evidence charge given the defendant the full benefit
to show the state ot feellng between the de- of the evidence as to her good character. He
fendant and Charlotte, and, If the examina- did not charge that the evidence of good
tion of the defendant upon that subject had character was not to be taken Into &<'COunt
been much further prolonged, It could not with all the other evidence upon the queshave added any weight to the evidence al- tion of her guilt or Innocence. He did Inready given on that subject. Sum<'lent evi- struct them that, If there was positive testidence for every pmpose of the trial had been mony of the commission of the crime by her
given to show difficulties and hostilities be- which the jury believe, It extinguished the
tween the defendant and Charlotte, and evidence of good character altogether. That
therefore It ls clear that the defendant was ls literally true. If the jury upon any trlat
not harmed by tile exclusion of further evi- ftnd positive evidence, which they believe~
dence on tllat subject. Besides, tbe jury ut- that the defendant committed the crime charterly disregarded the defendant's evidence. ged, It must utterly overwhelm or destroy
She denied under oath all tile evidence tend- the etTect of the evidence as to good <'harac-ing to Implicate her In the crime, and ex- ter. It the judge had charged that the Jury
plicitly denied that she had stated to Char- had no right to take into a<'count the good
lotte her lntt>ntion to bum the goods In the character of the defendant In the cnse of posbuilding, and gave some evidence tending to itive evidence of her guilt, It would undoubtc·a11t suspicion upon ('barlotte as the author 1 edly have been erroneous. If he had charged
of the crime. This Is therefore a ease where thew that they should not weigh the evlthe rule laid down In 11ectlon 54:? of the Code den<'e as to the defendant's <'hara<'ter with
or Criminal Prll<'edure should be llPJ>lled. all the other evhlence, howen•r st1·ong an<f
That section provides as follows: "After positive, It would have been erroneous. Thtlu'llrlng the appeal, the court must give judg- evlden<'C of character may, however stroni:ment without regard to technical en·ors or the other e\·lllen<'e Is. raise n tloubt In th~
dt>(('<'tA, or to eX<·eptlonA whlc'b do not affect minds of the jury which the tll•ft>nd:rnt 111 enthe substantial rights of the parties."
titled to have the benefit of. It the lnstnl('It ls also claimed by the defendant's coun- ttons of the judge upon the question of charsel that tile judge erred In his charge to the acter were not 11umelently explicit, the de·~
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fondant should have requested a further

charge calling attention to further instruc-

tions which he desired the jury to have.

After the judge had laid down the law quite

plainly pertaining to evidence of good char-

acter, and had at the request of the defend-

ant's counsel instructed the jury that good

character might be sutiicient to raise a rea-

sonable doubt which required the jury to ac-

quit, if the detendant’s counsel thought any

further instructions were needed to protect

his client he should have asked tor them.

So, we ﬂnd no error in the charge to the

jury.

We are also asked to reverse the judgment

on account of intemperate language used by

the district attorney in his address to the

jury, to which no exception whatever was

taken. It is a suﬂicient answer to this claim
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to say that this court has no jurisdiction to

grant a new trial in such a case as this, un-

less exceptions appear in the record which

present questions oi.’ law. The supreme court,

under section 527 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, could, in the exercise of its dis-

cretion, have granted :1 new trial in this case.

In the early part of that section provision is

made for a stay ot the execution of a judg-

ment in a criminal case upon an appeal to»

the supreme court, and in the last clause of

the section it is provided as follows: “The

appellate court may order a new trial if it be

satisﬁed that the verdict against the prisoner

was against the weight of evidence or against

law, or that justice requires a new trial,

whether any exception shall have been taken

or not in the court below.” That clause has

reference only, as we have held, to appeals to

the supreme court. People v. Hovey, 92 N.

'. I3-'3-l; People v. Guidici, 100 N. Y. 503, 3 N.

E. 493: People v. Donovan. 101 N. Y. 632, 4

N. E. 181. We see no reason to doubt that

this conviction was justiiied by the evidence,

and, ﬁnding no error of law prejutlicial to

the defendant, it should be aﬂirmed. All con-

cur.
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fendant should bnve requested a further
charge call1ng attention to further lnetructlone which be desired the jury to have.
After the judge bad laid down the Jaw quite
plainly pertaining to evidence of good character, and had at the request of the defendant"& counsel Instructed the jury that good
character might be eutftclent to raise a reasonable doubt which required the jury to acquit, lf tbe defendant's counsel thought any
further lnetruct1ons were needed to protect
his client be should have asked for them.
So, we find no error In the charge to the

!ury.
We are also asked to re'\"erse the judgment
OD account of Intemperate lan.:nage used by
the district attorney in bis addreBB to the
Jury, to which no exception whatever wae
token. It le a euftlcleut answer to this claim
to l!lly that this court bas DO Jurisdiction to
grant a new trial In such a case as this, unless exceptions appear In the record which
present questloDB of law. The supreme court,

under seetlon i>27 1>f the Code of Criminal
Procedure, could, In the exercise of lt:B discretion, have ,.,'l"anted a new trial In this case.
In the early part of that section provision ls
made for a stay of the execution of a judgment in a criminal case upon an appeal t<>
the supreme court, and In the last clause of
the section It la provided as follows: ''The
appellate court may order a new trial If It besatlsfted that the verdict against the prleoner
was against the weight of evidence or against
Jaw, or that Justice requires a new trial,
whether any exception 11\lall have been taken
or not In the court below." That clause has
reference only, as we have held, to appeals t&
the supreme court. People v. Hovey, 92 N_
Y. ;;;;.i; People v. Guldlel, 100 N. Y. 503, 3 N.
E. 493: People v. Donovan. 101 N. Y. 632, 4
N. I<.:. 181. We Set' no reaM<in to doubt that
this conviction was ju.,;tlfted by the evidence~
and, ftndlDg no error of law prejudlc·lal to·
the defendant, It should be amrmed. All con-

cur.
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DAVIS v. COMMONWEALTH.

(23 s. w. ass. 95 Ky. 19.)

dourt of Appeals of Kentucky. Oct. 12, 1893.

Appeal from circuit court, Lawrence coun-

fl‘.-

Samuel Davis was convicted of murder,

and appeals. Aﬂirmed.

R. '1‘. Burns and Stewart 8: Stewart, for

appellant. W. J. Hendrick, for the Com-

PUODUCTIO~ .A~D

EFl'ECT OF EVIDENCE.

DAVIS v. COllMONWEALTH.
(23 S. W. 585, 9~ Ky. 19.)
Court of Appenls of Kentucky. Oct. 12, 1893.
Appeal from clrcult court, Lawrence cpun-

tJ.:

'

S::unuel Davis was convicted of murder,
an~ appeuls.
Affirmed.

R. T. Burns and Stewnrt & Stewart, for
appellnnt. W. J, Hendrick, for the Commonwealth.

monweaith.

BENNETT, 0.1. The appellant having

been convicted of the crime of murdering

Viance Tack, in the Lawrence circuit court,

he appeals, and complains as follows:

First. That the court erred in not allow-

ing him to prove by G. W. Miller that Gran-

ville Pearl confessed to him on his death-

bed that he, Pearl, killed Viance Tack. It

seems to us that admissions and confes-
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sions, as to competency, stand upon the same

footing. Admissions cannot be used in evi-

dence except against the person making

them in an issue between him and another

person, wherein the truth of the admission

is involved. or against his privies claiming

through him; and confessions are incompe-

tent evidence except against a person charged

with crime, or, in a proper state of case,

against his eonfederates. Nor is the pro-

posed evidence competent as a dying declara-

tion, because such evidence is oniy- com-

petent when it comes from a declarant whose

496

personal injuries by another have resulted

in death, and the declarations must be con-

ﬁned to the manner and circumstances of

the injury and to the person that did it.

Second. In allowing evidence to go to the

jury impeaching witnesses who had testified

for the appellant, but who had not testi-

ﬁed to any material fact for the appellant;

the material fact which the appellant de-

sired to prove by them having been exclud-

ed by the court. It seems to us that the

fact that the witness is sworn and testiﬁes

entitles the adversary to impeach his gen-

eral reputation for truth, without reference

to the materiality of his evidence; other-

wise there would be constant strife and liti-

gation over the question as to the material-

ity of the witness’ evidence, in order to de-

termine whether or not the impeaching evi-

dence was admissible.

Third. It is contended that evidence of

the bad character of a witness sought to be

impeached, two years before the time that

he testiﬂed, is incompetent. It is true that

the character of a witness at the time he

testiiies is in issue before the court or jury,

but it is equally true that his reputation be-

fore then may be inquired into, in order to

throw light upon his reputation at the time

he testiﬁes. There is no doubt that Viance

Tack was assassinated, and we think that

the evidence authorized the jury to believe

beyond a reasonable doubt that the appel-

iaut was the guilty party. The court com-

mitted no error. The judgment is aﬂirmed.

BENNETT, C. J. The appellant hnvlng
been convicted of the crime of murdering
Vlance Tack, lo the Lnwrence circuit court,
be appeals, and complains as follows:
First That the court erred In not allowing him to prove by G. W. Mllle1· that Granville Pearl coni'essed to him on his deathbed that he, Pearl, killed Viance Tack. It
:Seems to us that admissions and confessions, llB to competency, stand upon the same
tooting. Admissions cannot be used in evidence except against the person making
th<'m In an Issue between him and another
person, wherein the truth ot the admission
ts Involved, or ngnlnst his privies claiming
through hiru; and confessions are Incompetent evidence except against a person charged
with crime, or, In a proper state of. case,
against bbl confederntes. Nor is the prcr
posed evidence competent as a dying declarntlon, because suoh evidence is only. competent when lt comes from a declarant whose
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personal Injuries by another have resulted
ln death, and the declarations must be confined to the manner and circumstances of
the Injury and to the person that did It.
Second. In allowing evidence to go to the
jury Impeaching witnesses who had testified
for the appellant, but who had not testified to any material fact for the appellant;
the material fact which the appellant desired to prove by them having been excluded by tbe court. It seems to us that the
fact that the witness ls sworn and testifies
entitles the advel'!!ary to lm1>each his general reputation tor trutb, without reference
to the materlnllty of bls evidence; otherwise there would be constnnt stt;fe and lltlgntlon over the question as to the materiality of the witness' evidence, in order to determine whether or not the Impeaching evld~nce was admissible.
Third. It ls contended tbnt evidence of
the bad character of a witness sought to be
Impeached, two years before the time that
he testified, ls Incompetent It ls true that
the eharncter ot a witness at the time he
testifies Is in Issue before the oourt or jury,
but It ls equally true that his reputntlon before then may be Inquired Into, In order to
throw light upon his reputation at the tlnw
he testifies. There ls no doubt that Vlnnce
Tack wu aSSflsslnnted, and we think that
the evidence authorized the jury to believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was the guilty party. The court committed no error. The judgment ls alftrmed.

CHAUACTEU FOR VER.\CaTY.
CHARACTER FOR VERACITY.

XEL~O~

v. STATE.

[Case No. 169

NELSON v. STATE.

(13 South. 361, 32 Fla. 244.)

(13 South. 361, 32 Fla. 244.)
Suprt>me Court of Florida. July

1~,

1893.

Supreme Court of Florida. July 15, 1893.

Error to circuit court, Mari-on county;

Jesse J . Finley, Judge.

John Nelson, .'Ir., was convicted of murder

in the ﬁrst degree, and brings error. ite-

F:rror to circuit rourt, Marlon county;
J~ J. Finley, Judge.
John .l'leleon, J'r., was convicted of murder
In the first degree, and brings error. Ueversed.

versed.

Miller & Spencer, for plaintiff in error.

William B. Lamar, Atty. Gen., for the State.

Miller & Spe-neet", for plalntUr ln error.
Wllllam B. Lamar, Atty. Gen., tor the State.

TAYLOR, J’. The plaintiff in error was in-

dicted and tried at the fall term, 1892, of the

circuit court for Marion county, for murder

in the ﬁrst degree of one Charles Davis, the

trial resulting in the following general ver-

dict, viz.: “We, the jury, ﬁnd the defendant

guilty." Upon the refusal of the court be-

low to grant his motion for a new trial, the

defendant was sentenced to die, and brings
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his case here by writ of error.

The insufficiency of the verdict in not

specifying the degree of murder of which it

ﬁnds the defendant guilty is assigned as error.

This court, at its last term. in the cases of

Hall v. State, 31 Fla. 176. 12 South, Rep. 449;

Lovett v. State, 31 Fla. iii-1, 12 South. Rep.

452; and Murphy v. State. 31 Fla. 166,

12 South. Rep. 453,—he1d that under the pro-

visions of section ‘.1333, Rev. St., such a ver-

dict is a nullity, and that no judgment or

sentence could legally be pronounced thereon.

This error is fatal to the judgment and sen-

tence appeaied from, and necessitates its re-

versal.

At the trial the defendant introduced sev-

eral witnesses for the purpose of impeaching

the character for truth and veracity of one

of the witnesses for tue'state, hy proof that

such witness’ reputation for truth and verac-

ity in the community in which he lived was

bad, and that no credence would be given to

his evidence under oath. After the defend-

ant’s witnesses, introduced for this purpose,

had testiﬂed that they knew the state’s wit-

ness, and knew his general reputation in the

neighborhood in which he lived for truth and

veracity, the court, over the rh-fendant’s ob-

jection, permittcd the state attorney to break

into the examination in chief by a c1'oss-ex-

amination as to the sources and extent of

the knowledge of the parties as to the repu-

tation and character of the witness to be

impeached, which ruling of the court was

excepted to, and is assigned as error. The

case of Robinson v. State, 16 Fla. 835, settles

the practice in such cases. When the im-
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poaching witnesses had answered that they

knew the party to be impeached, and knew

his general reputation for truth and veracity

in the community where he lived, the founda-

tion for proving what that reputation was

had been sutiicicntly laid, and the court

should not, at this juncture, have permitted

the state attorney to interfere with the ex-

aminatlon in chief by a cross-examination as

to the sources and extent of their knowledge

and information as to such reputation, but

TAYLOR, J'. The plalnttl'r In error was Indicted and tried at thP tnll term, 189'.?, ot the
clrcult court tor llarlon county, for murder
ln the flrst degree ot one Charlt.>8 Davts, the
trial re8Ulttng ln the following gl•nernl verdict, vlll.: "We, the jury, flnd the defpndant
guilty." Upon the refusal of the court below to grant bJB motion for a new trial, the
defendant was sentenced to die, and brings
hls case here by writ of error.
The lnsu11lclency of the verdict ln not
specltylng the degree of murdl'r of which 1t
finds the defendant guilty ts al!l(lgned as error.
This court, at Its lllllt term. In the cnllE'!l of
Hall v. State, 31 Fla. 176, 12 South, Rep. 449;
Lovett v. State, 31 Fla. 164, 12 Nouth. Rep.
4.;2; and Murphy v. State, 31 Fla. 166,
12 South. Rep. 45.'-l,-held that under the provisions of IM'<'tion 2:i.-ia, ltE>v. St., such a verdict ls a nullity, and that no judgment or
sentence could legally be pronounced thereon.
This error ls fatul to the judgmE'llt and sentence appooled from, and necessitates lt8 rever&al
At the trial the defendant Introduced several witnesses for the pUrpOfle of lmpenchlng
the character for truth and veracity ot one
of the wltn1~s.<1es for tne ·state, by proof that
such wltneu' reputntlon for truth and veracity ln the community In which he lived was
bacl, and that no credence would be given to
his evidence under oath. After the defendant's witnesses, Introduced for this purpose,
had testified that they knew the state's wltnem, and knew bJB gl•nernl r ...putatton In the
neighborhood In which be lived for truth and
veracity, the court. over the d1•ft•ndant's objection, permitted the eta.te attorney to break
Into the examination In chief by a cro1111-examlnatlon as to the sources und extent of
the knowledge of the parties as to the reputation and character of the wltneRS to be
Impeached, which ruling of the cow·t was
excepted to, and ls a&<1lgned as error. The
case of RoblDBon v. State, 16 Fla. 83.;, settles
the practice In such casea. When the tmWILGUB,BV. -82
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peaching wltnt'!!..'le& bad answered that the,'
knew the party to be impeached, and knew
bis genera.I reputation for truth and veracity
ln the communJty where he lived, the foundation for proving what that reputation was
had been · suftlclPntly laid, and the court
should not, at this juncture, have permitted
the state attomey to Interfere with the exnmlnatlon ln chief by a cross-examination as
to the sources and extent of their knowledge
and Information ae to such reputation, but
should have permitted the defendant to proceed with bJB examination ln chief, and should
have allowed the wltnt!H!lf's to state what that
reputation was, and whether from that i·eputatlon they would believe the party under
oath. When turned over tor genernl ~
examination In regttlar order, at the close
of the exnmlnntion In chief, tht state attorney could then, by cro11.~ex.umlnatlon, test
the extent of the Information of the witnesses
and the eo11.ret-s of thf'lr knowledge. This
departure, however, from the proper practice
ln such cases, we do not now decide to be
revel""ll.ble error, as the court below neceeea.rlly hue a wide discretion ln all matters touching the order In whlch evidence l!ball be admitted.

On the cr088-{'X8mln11tlon of one of the defendant's wltm'88e8, by whom the general
reputation and character of the defendant
as a peaceful and law-abiding citizen had
been put ln proof, the state attorney wns
permitted by till' court, over the defen.d nnt's
objection, to put the following question to
the wltnel!B: "Did you not hl'nr or know,
about one week or ten days before the shooting of whlch the defendant ls now chnrged,
that he was t'harged In your neighborhood
with shooting Into a house with a lot of
woanen In It, and that the pistol was taken
away from him?" .Io~xceptlon was taken,
and this ruling Wll8 ll881gned as error. The
court erred ln permitting this question.
When character tor pencefulnPllll or torbu·
lence Is pnt In l88UP In such cases, the genera.I
rule ls that the proof therPof must be made
by evidence of the g<>nPrnl reputation of the
party In the community for such character,
and not by evidence of epeclflc acts or conduct. on particular occasions, (Gamer v. State,
28 Fla. 113, 9 South. Rep. 8:tJ;) and, when
e1wh <•haracter le put ln Issue, tht' proof interposed ln rebuttal muet be con1lned also
to gPUPral reputntlon, and not allowed to go
Into speclflc acts or conduct on particular
occasions.
For the error ln the verdict rendered, the
judgment and sPntence of the court below
are reversed, and a new trlal ordered.
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GRIFFIN v. STATE.

(9 S. \\'. 459, 26 Tex. App. 157.)

Court of Appeals of Texas. Oct. 13, 1888.

Appeal from district court, Polk county;

Edwin Hobby, Judge.

Crosson & Holshousen, for appellant. Asst.

Atty. Gen. Davidson, for the State.

HURT, J. This conviction is for murder

in the second degree, the punishment being

ﬁxed at continement in the penitentiary for

ﬁve years. The record contains the follow-

ing bill of exceptions: “The state p;aced up-

on the stand Frank Waters, win testilied

that a short while before the killing of Van

Chambers the defendant told him, as he [the

defendant] was on his way to attend a party

that night, that he wa going to the party,

expecting to ﬁnd the deceased there, and, if

he could get him, the said Chambers, out
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thereupon introduced 18 or 20 witnesses to

impeach the said Waters, by showing that

the general reputation of the said Waters

for truth and veracity in the neighborhood

where he lives was bad, and from that repu-

tation the said Waters was not entitled to

be believed under oath. The state then in-

troduced some 10 or more witnesses to sustain

the reputation of said Waters; among otlieis,

Dave Ballow, Polk Snow, D. S. Chandler, T.

J. Epperson, W. J. Wakeﬁeld, and L. F. Ger-

lock, of whom the state asked this question:

‘Do you know the witness Frank Waters?’

They said, ‘Yes.’ ‘Are you acquainted with

his reputation for truth?’ They said, ‘Yes,’

and that it was good. On cross-examination,

they were asked by defense: ‘Did you ever

hear his reputation discussed?’ They sad,

‘Never, until yesterday.’ The state then

asked each of said witnesses: ‘Have you

ever heard the reputation of said Waters for

truth and veracity impeached or impugned

before this?’ to which defendant, by counsel,

objected, because the question was improper,

and not conﬁned to the knowledge of said

witnesses as to the general reputation of the

said Waters in the neighborhood or commu-

nlty where he lived. The state then asked

each of the following seven witneses. (nam-

ing them:) ‘Are you acquainted with the

reputation of the witness Waters for truth

and veracity?’ which being answered in the

aiﬂrmative, they were fuither asked if it was

good or bad, which being answered, ‘Good.’

they were further asked if he. the said

Waters, was entitled to be believed under

oath,—to each and all of which said ques-

tions the defendant excepted because they

were not proper in determining the general

reputation of said witness in the neighbor-
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hood where he lives for truth and veracity,

and were permitting the witnesses to testify,

not as to the general reputation of Waters

for truth and veracity, but as to their own

opinion and belief, which objection was over-

ruled by the court, and to which defendant

excepts.”

EF~,EC'r

GRIFFIN v. STATE.
(9 S. W. 459, 26 Tex. App. 157.)
Court of Appeals of Texas. Oct. 13, 1888.
Appeal from dlstrlct court, Polk county;
Edwin Hobby, Judge.
Crosson & Holshousen, for appellant. Asst.
Atty. Gen. Davidson. for the ~tate.
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by himself, he would kill him. Defendant
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HURT, J. This <.'Onvictlon Is for wm'lle1·
In the second degree, the punishment being
tixt'd ut confinement In the penlteutial'y for
five years. The record contains tlll' following bill of exceptions: "The state p:a<·ed upon the stand 1''rank Waters, wh.1 testified
that a short while before the killing or Van
Chambers the defendant told him, as he [the
defendant] was on his way to attend a party
that night, that he was going to the party,
expecting to tlnd the deceased there, and, If
he could get him, the said Chambers, out
by himself, he would klll him. Defendant
thereupon introduced 18 or 20 wltuesses to
Impeach the Aid Waters, by showing that
the general reputation ot thl:l said Waters
for truth und veracity in the neighborhood
where he lives was bad, and from that r1>putatlon the Nnid Waters was not entitled to
be believed under oath. The state then Introduced some 10 or morewltnesses to sustain
the reputation of said \Vaters; among others,
Dave Ballow, Polk Snow, D.S. Chandler, T.
J. Epperson, W. J. Wakefield, and L. I<'. Gerlock, ot whom the state asked this question:
'Do you know the witness Frank Waters'/'
They said, 'Yes.' 'Are you acquainted with
his reputation for truth?' They said, 'Yes,'
and that it was good. On cross-examination,
they wel'e asked by defense: 'Did you ever
hear hls reputation discussed?' They sa.d,
'Never, untll yesterday.' The state then
asked each of said witnesses: 'Have you
ever hearo the reputation of said \Vatel's for
truth and veracity Impeached or Impugned
before this?' to which defendant, by counsel,
objected, because the question was lmpro11er,
and not confined to the knowledge of said
witnesses as to the general reputation of the
said Waters In the neighborhood or community where he lived. The state then asked
each ot the following seven wltneses, (naming them:) 'Are you acquainted with the
reputation of the witness Waters for truth
and veracity?' which being answered In the
amrmative, they were fu1 ther asked If it wnR
good or bad, which being answered, 'Good,'
they were further asked If he, the said
Waters, was entttled to be believed under
oath,-to each and all of which said questions the defendant excepted because they
were not proper In determining the general
reputation of said witness In the nelghbor498
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hood where he lives tor truth and veracity,
and were permitting the witnesses to testify,
not as to the general reputation of Waters
for truth and veracity, but as to their own
opinion and bellef, which objection was overruled by the court, and to which defendant
excepts."
Two objections are made to the questions
and answers: (1) That the witnesses did not
state that they were acquainted with Waters' general reputation In the neighborhood
In which he lived. (2) 'l'hat the wltncs!le&
were Induced to, and did, state their opinions as to whether he was entitled to credit,
-not from his · general reputation for truth,
but from their own knowledge or opinion of
the witness.. This question Is very elaborately discussed by Justice Bell In the case ot
Boon v. Weathered, :!3 Tex. 670. lie siates
the rule to be that "the inquiry should be
pructlcally restricted to the general character
ot the impeached witness for truth. • • •
It the impeaching witness states that he ls
acquainted with the general reputation ot
the impeached witness for truth 1n the community where he lives, he way then properly be asked whether that general rt>putatlon
Is such as to entitle the witness to credit on
oath. • • • Any other form of words may
be used, which does not Involve a violation
ot the cardinal principles that the inquiry
must be restricted to the general reputation
of the Impeached witness for truth in the
community where he lives or ls best known,
and that the lmpenchlng witness must speak
from general reputation, and not from his
own private opinion." "'e are of cplnlon
that the questions propounded to the Impeaching witnesses were not calculated to,
nor did they elicit the proper answers; that
the questions and ahswers were violative of
the cardinal principles governing this subject: (1) The Inquiry must be restricted to
the general character of the party sought to
be impeached. (2) The impeaching wltneSBes must speak from general reputatlun, and
not from their private opinions as to whether the character of the impeached wltness Is
good or bad tor truth, or as to whether the
general reputation of the Impeached witness
ls such as to entitle him to eredlt on oath.
Venue Is not proved either by direct or circumstantial evidence.
We call attention of the learned trial jud~e
to the fact thn t malice ls not defint>d to the
jury. As to the neeesslty of defining malice,
see Jones v. State, 5 Tex. App. 39i; Tooney
v. State, Id. 163; Pharr v. State, 7 Tex. App.
4i2; Hnrrls v. Stnte, 8 Tex. App. 90; McKinney v. Stnte, Id. 6'20; Hayes v. State, 14 TeL
App. 3.10. The judgment Is reversed, and
the cause rem1tnded.
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McQUIGAN v. DELAVVARE. L. & W. R. C0.

McQUIGAN v. DELAWARE, L. & W. R. CO.
(29 N. E. 235, 129 N. Y. 50.)

(29 N. E. 235, 129 N. Y. 60.)

Court of Appeals of New York. Dec.

1~

1891.

Court of Appeals of New York. Dec. 1,. 1891.

Appeal from supreme court, general

term, fourth department.

Action by Michael McQuigan against the

Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Rail-

road Company. Defendant appeals from

an order refusing to compel plaintiff to

submit to a physical examination Af-

ﬁrmed.

AJ>peal from supreme court, general
tA!rm, fourth department.
Action by Michael McQulgan against the
Delaware, Lackuwanna & Westeru Railroad Compauy. Defendant ap11eals from
au order refusing to compel phtlntlff to
BUbmlt tu 1t phy11lcal uamlnatlon Affirmed.
Lo11/11 Marshall, for ap1>ellant. Andrew Hamilton, for respondent.

Louis Marshall, for appellant. An-

dnsw Hamilton, for respondent.

Ai\'DRE\VS. J. The sole question pre-

sented by this record is whether the‘su-

preme court has power, in advance of the

trial of an action for a personal and phys-

ical iuiury, to compel the plaintiff, on an

application made in behalf of the defend-
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ant. to submit to a surgical examination

of his person by surgeons appointed by

the court. with a view of enabling them

to testify on the trial as to the existence

and extent of the alleged injury. The

question is not new in the courts. al-

though. so far as we know, it was ﬁrst

presented in 1868, before a judge of the

New York superior court at spccial term,

in the case of Walsh v. Sayre, 52 How. Pr.

334, who affirmed the existence of the

power. The contrary was held by the

general term of the third depnrtinentin

Roberts v. Railroad Co., 29 Hun, 1.1-i. in

1877 the supreme court oi Iowa. in the case

of Schroeder v. Railway Co., 47 iowa. 375,

sustained the doctrine that the court had

an inherent jurisdiction to grant a com-

pulsory order that the plaintiff submit to

such examination, and this decision has

been followed by the courts of several of

the western and southern states. and in

others the power has been denied. The

samequestion wasconsidered in the United

States supreme court in the recent case

of Railway Co. v. Botsiord. 141 U. S. 250,

ll Sup. Ct. Rep. 1000, decided in May, 1891,

and the court (two judges dissenting) de-

cided adversely to the claim that thecourt

had power to compel such examination.

The opinions of the several courts which

have passed upon the question present

very fully the considers tions bearing upon

it. We concur in the view taken by the

supreme court of the state and the su-

preme courtof the United States, and we

can add very little to the full discussion

to be found in theopinionsof thosecourts.

The powers of courts are either statutory

orthose which appertain to thcm by force

of the common law, or they are partly

statutory and partly derived from imme-

niorial usage, which lattcr constitutes

their inherent jurisdiction. They are or-

ganized for the protection of public and

private rlzh ts and the enforcement of rem-

edies. Prcsumptlvely, therefore, wha.t-

everjudicial procedure is essential toen-

able courts to exercise their function is au-

ANDREWS. J. The sole question presented by this record Is whether thti su-

preme court has J>ower, In advance of the
trial of an action for a personal and phy11ical lnJnry, tu compel th" plaintiff, on an
appllcatlou mnde In behalf of the defendant, to submit to a surgical examination
of hie pen1on l!y surgeons appointed hy
the r.ourt, with a view of enabling them
to testify on thA trial as to the existence
and extent or the alleged Injury. The
question le not new 111 the courts, althuugh. so far ae we know, It was tlret
.prest>ntftd In 186R, before a juflice of the
New York superior court at 11peelal tl'rm,
In the case of Wah1h v. Sayre, 62 How. Pr.
834, who affirme<l the P:xlstl'nce or the
power. The contrary Wl\B lleld by the
general term of the third dPportmeut lo
Roberts v. Railroad Co., 2U Hun, 154. Jn
18i7thP. supreme court or Iowa, In the case
of &hroeder v. Railway Co., 47 Iowa, 375,
snHtalned the clnctrlne that the court bad
an Inherent Jurisdiction to Krnnt a compulsory order that the plaintiff 11ubmlt to
such examination, aud this decision has
been rullowed by the courts ur sevl'ral of
the western and southern 11tates, and In
others th" powAr hue been denied. ThA
same question was considered In the United
State11 1tupreme conrt In the recent case
of Hallway Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. M. 250,
11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1000, decided In May, 1891,
and the conrt (two JudJ(es dlssentinjl') decided adversely to the ch•lm that the court
bad power to compel such t>xamlnation.
Thl'I opinions or the Revera) courts which
have passed upon the qut>11tlun preHeot
Vf'ry fully the cum1ldera t10011 benrlnJi: upon
tt. We co11cur In the view token by the
suvremc court of the state and the Huprt'we court.of the United Stat011, and we
can add very little to the full dlscm~sloo
to be found In the opinions of thosecourt11.
The power11 of courts are either srntutory
orth1111e which appertain to tllC'm by foree
of tht> common law, or they are purtly
statutory and pnrtly derh·ed trom Immemorial usai:e, which latter constitutes
thf'lr Inherent Jurlsdlctl"n. 1'hey are orll:'Hulze•I for the protectluo of 1mhllc and
prh'ate rl~hb• and the eofm•cement of rem·
edlea. Presumptively, therefore, whatever Judl•·lal proced11re is t>s11entlal to enable courts tu exerch1e tlJPlr fnuctloo Is authorized. 1'he maxim thnt there Is no
rlJ,t"ht without n. remerly jnHtiHefl the
cuurts, In the earlier perlulle ol the common 111 w, in lnvl'11tlmr wrlt11 and morlt>s or
procedure adupted to prt.'Hcnt for tHlJudlcatlou lo proper form every quest10n of

J1111lrlul r.ognlznnee. The powers nncl jurl1111lctlun or thf' l'ourts or cum moo law
111111 chuucery In Eui.cland are tu he found
tu the Engllsli statutes, and In the rules,
precedents, decisions, and proceliure of
the courts. The po~er which tht> courts
actually e:r.erclsed,suppll'mented by statutory powers, constltntes In a general sen11e
their juri1ullctlon. Upon the organization
here of the focleral and state go\"l'rnmentH.
courts \Vf're constituted, and lu this Rtt1 te
they 1rncceeried to the powers theretofore
exercised hy the courts of law and chancery In Englancl, so far as they were applicn ble to our Rltua ti on. It Is a 11lgn1Hcont fact that not a trace can bA fonnd In
t "q derlsionK of the common-In w r.onrts or
El...~hmd, either before or since the Revolutiou, oft he exercise of a power to Cf)mpt>l
a party to a personul action to auhmlt
hb1 r1erson to examlnntlon at tile Instance
of the other 11arty. If the power existed,
It ls difficult to 11uppoea that It would
not have been frequently Invoked. Actions for assault nnd battery, for Injuries
orlslnar from uegllgenr.e, and generally for
pe;sonal torts, were among t:he most
common known to the law, and yet. eo
far as we can dlKCover, In no c11se was It
supposed or claimed that the court wae
armed with this jurh1dlctlon. Thi' non·
exercise or a power Is not concl1111lve
aJralnst Its f'Xh1tenee, but It la tnconcl'lvable that, If the power In question extstf'd,
It should have bet>n unused for ef"nturles,
and never have hl'f'n coiled Into activity.
In two cnses cited by J nstlce GRA v In his
opinion In Hall \'\"BY l'o. v. Botsford, supra, the court ur common bench In England refused an order for the lnept>cllon or
a building, on the opplicatlon of the plalutln In an m·tlon for work and labor per·
formed by him thereon, on the ground ur
want or power. Nt>wham v. Tete, 1 Arn.
~; Turquand v. Strand L'nlon, 8 Dow,
201. 'I'hese cases tend to negative the exb.tence or the power In the EnJ1:ll11h conrts,
clalml'd for our courts In the ca11e nt bar.
The only authority lu the Eni;:llsh l'ommon-law courts In any degree Rnal0Jr1JOS
Is found In the power which thP conrts of
England have ocraslunully, tho1111.h r11rely,
exf'rch.'led,-to hurne, on the appllcntlon of
apparent heirs, the writ de ventre suspJclendo, to compel a widow claiming to be
1 with r.hlld hy her derea11ed hm1baod to
her person to examination. The
I 11ohmlt
practice In EnKland Is s11l lf{'ner/11, and has
never been adopted here. It may bu ve
originated In the peculiar favor shown to
heirs by the law of EnJClaud, bot, whatever Its origin, It seemH repul{nant to common right, ti.nd tile fact thut In thlH lnetam·e only htt.ve the courts or F.ngland
exP.rcl11ed the p~wer to comp~l the exttmlnatlon of the person In a civil proreedlng
tend11 to show that the power Is not there
re11;arded as JCeueral, but special and pl•cullnr, and llmlted to the particular ca..e.
1'he doctrine uf the cast.'8 In chancery,
(Briggs v. MorKan, 2 Hagg. Const. 3:U;
Dev1mbagh v. Hevanbegh, 6 Paige, 004;
Newell v. Ne~ell, 9 Paige, 25,) that In an
action tu prtK'ure a decrt'e of nulllt.y or
mvrrlage on thto grounrl or lmt utrnce or
sexuul iucnpuclty the ehancellur may comf>l'l the dt>ft!ndunt to s111>mlt to a 1rnrgical
exumloation, Is a graft frorn the civil and
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•
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common luw, and.as has becn said, “rests

upon the interest which the public. as well

as the parties, have in the question oi up-

holding or dissolving the marriage state,

and upon the necessity oi such evidence to

enable the court to exercise its jurisdic-

tion.” GRAY, J., in Railway Co. v. Bots-

iord, supra.

When we examine the history oi the

power oi common-law courts to compel

the production and inspection oi books

and papers in possession oi’ the opposite

party in a civil action, we ﬁnd that

originally the courts disciaimed any

powerin the matter, and the remedy by

bill oi discovery was the only resource oi

the party desiring such discovery. Finally

the common-law courts assumed a limited

equitable jurisdiction over the subject,
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and, in addition to the rule that a party

pleading a deed should make iorielt oi

the instrument which enabled the other

party to demand oyer, the courts by order

compelled a party who in his pleading re-

lied upon a written instrument, not a

deed, to give inspection to the other party

iirequircd, and so in other special cases.

The courts in this state. prior to any

statute,exerclsed a limited equitable ju-

risdiction oi the same character. Law-

rence v. Insurance Co., 11 Johns. 245;

Denslow v. Fowler.2 Cow. 592, note. But

this limited jurisdiction was exercised

sparingly and with hesitation, and it

was not until statutes were enacted in

England and in this state, conferring up-

' on common-law courts the same power

to compel the discovery and inspection oi

books and papers which was exercised

by courts oi chancery on bills oi dis-

covery, that courts oi common law

claimed or exercised iuli power over the

subject. St. 14 & l5 Vict. c. 99; St.1T &

18 Vict. c. 125; Rev. St. p. l99.§ 21. The

limited jurisdiction exercised by these

courts beiore the statute was in the nat-

ure oi a usurpation, and, so iar as we can

discover, it was never considered that

they possessed an inherent power in aid

oi justice to grant reiiei in cases outside oi

the narrow limit mentioned. 'l‘he power

to compel an inspection oi books and

papers relevant to the controversy, in

possession oi either party, is oi a similar

nature to thatinvoked in the present case,

and, ii the inherent power oi the court did

not extend to the one case,it is difficult

to suppose that it embraced the other.

The power to compel a. party to submit

to an examination oi his person has never

been conierred by any statute. The pro-

visions of the Revised Statutes authoriz-

ing the court to compel the production oi

books or papers have been re-enacted

in the Codes oi Procedure. The statutes

500

i in a limited sense.

also contain speciﬁc provisions ior the

•

common luw,and.ns hns been 11nld, "rPsb1
upon the Interest which the puhlie, ue well
a11 the parties, have In tbe question of upholding or db1eulvlng the marriage state,
and upon the necl'l!t!lt,v of 11uch evidence to
enable the court to exercise Its Jurisdiction." 0RAY, J., In Railway Co. v. Botsford, supra.
When we examine the hh1tory of the
power of common-law courts to compPl
the production and lnsper.tlon or books
and papel'H lu 1iosee1-111lon of the oppo11lte
party In a civil action, we Hnd that
originally the courlM dlHclalmed an.v
power In the matter, and the remedy b.v
bill of dlecov£-ry was the only resource of
the party de1drl11~ such discovery. Finally
the common-law courts l:ls11umed a limited
equitable JurlHdlctlon ovn the subject,
and, In 11ddltlon to the rule that a party
1>learllng a deed 11bould m11ke forfeit of
the lnetrnment which en11hled the other
party to demand oyer, the court11 by order
compelled a party who In his pleading relied upon a written Instrument, not a
deed, to give Inspection to the other party
If required, and so In other e1>eclal cases.
The courts In this 11tate, prior to any
etatutP., exercised a limited ec1ultable Jurisdiction of thP. same chru·al·ter. Lawrence v. Insurance Co., 11 J ohne. 215;
Oent!low v. Fowler.2 Cow. 592, note. But
this limited jurisdiction wat1 exercised
&JJ&rlngly and with hesitation, and It
was not until statutes were enacted In
England and In thl11 state, conferring upon common-law conrts the 11ame power
to compel the discovery and Inspection of
books 11rul papere wblcb wa11 Pxerdsed
by courtH uf chancery ou bills of rlh1covery, that courts or common law
clalmed or exeJ'('IHerl fnll power over the
RUhJert. St. 14 & 15 Viet. c. SIU; St. ] j &
18 Viet. c. 12':>; Rev. St. p. 199. § 21. The
limited Jurlslllctlon exercised by these
courtH before the Htatnte was in the nature of a us1irpatlon, and, so far ae we can
discover, It wne never considered that
they possessed an Inherent power In ~Id
or justice to grant relief In cases outside of
the narrow limit mentioned. 'l'he power
to compel an ln11pectlon of bonktt and
pa11el'!4 rele\•ant to th<> c11ntrover11y, In
possession of either party. ls of a similar
nature to that Invoked lu the pre11entcai;ae,
anc1, If tho Inherent power of the court <lid
not extend to the one case, It le difficult
to 11uppose that it embraced the other.
The power to compel a party to submit
to un examination of Ills person b11s never
been conferred by auy Htatute. The 11ro{ ftdonR of the RevlBed 8tatute11 authorizing the court to com1>el the production of
book11 or paper11 have been re-eouctt'd
In the Codes of Procedure. The 1:1tatutes
000

ahm contain specific 11rovlslone for the
examination of a varty on oath hl•foro
trial, at the Instance of the other pnrty.
The omleslon In these etatutett or any rererencl' to the power not underronslderation
le quite slgnlHcant. We cannot l!ay that
the exercise of the powerclai11'ed might not
In eomti cael'B promote tile cause of j ustlro,
and prel'ent the con111rn1mation of fraud.
On the other hand. nnlee11 CHl"dully
guarded, It would he subject to erave ohJectlons. But we ha t'e to deal only with
the question of the power of the courts In
th" abst>nce of any leghdotion. It is ver.v
clear tlutt the power h1 not a part of tile
reco~nized an1I customary Jurh.dlctlon of
court1:1 of law or equity. The doctrine
that courts hove an Inherent jurisdiction
to mould the proceedlng11 to meet new
conditions and exla-encles le true, but
In a lhnlt~d sense. They cannot:, under
cover of procedure or to accom(Jllsh justice lo a partlc11lar case, In,. ade recoltnlzell
rights or penion or pru1>erty. No court,
we 1rnppo11e, can abrogute on establl11hed
r11le of et'lclence, ae, for example, the rule
thnt hearsay e\•ldeuce Ill lnarlmls1dble. or
the rule or the common law that parties
eholl not be wltnes.n•R, or that Interest
dh1q nallflee. They nrny llpply exl11th11r
rulet1 to new clreumstant·eM. Nor Is It, we
conceive, within the power of tho l"Ourt
to crea le remedies unknown to the common law. or Institute a procedure not
according to the course or the common
law. It ls most Important that courts
should proceed under the sanction of nn
or<lerls and regnlated Jurisdiction, and
that u11 little as po111dhle should be left to
the di<icretlon of a jndge. The eicerclire by
the court of the power now Invoked, ae
has been shown, le not 11anctloued hy any
usage In the courts of Enghtn<l or of thht
state. Its existence le not indispensable
to the due administration of Justice. ltll
exercise, depending on the discretion of
the Judge, would be subject to irn-at
abu1:1e. We think the a11Mumptlon by the
court of this Jnrisdlctlon, In the ubsence
ohta tuteauthorlty, would he an arbltrury
extenHlon of lt11 powers. 1t 11:1 a jm1t Inference that an alleged power which baa
lain dormunt during the whflle period of
E11~l111h JnrlsprudencP, and never attempted to beexerch1ed In Ame11ra until within a
vei·y recent period, never In fact bad any
existence. We have purpo11ely omitted to
repent the views nnd authorltleR upon
thh~ question set forth In the opinions lo
Hoberts v. Railroad Co .. and In Railway
Co.'"· Bot,iford, and we refer to those opinions for a fuller dlecnHi-loo of the gronndR
upon which the clPnlnl of the power
cl11 hued prort>ede. The orde1· Hhoultl be
amrmed. All concur.
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ARNOLD v. PA\\"I‘l'.\'E'[‘ VAL. \\'A'i‘ ER

C0.

(26 Ati. Supreme Court of Rhode Island. Feb. 4, 1893.

' Assumpsit by John J. Arnold against the

Pawtuxet Valley Water Company. Plain-

tiff moves for an order requiring defendant

to produce a book containing the record of

its transactions. Motion granted.

George T. Brown, i:‘or plaintiff. Dexter

B. Potter, for defendant.

'1‘ILLIl\'(lIIAST, J. This is an applica-

tion under Pub St. R. I. c. 214. 5 -i-'1. -for an

order on the defendant to produce a cer-

tain document alleged to be in its posses-

sion, to be used by the plaintiﬁf in the

preparation of his case for trial. The plain-

til! sets out in said application that he is

informed and believes that the defendant

is in the possession and control of a certain
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document, to wit, the book containing a

record of the transaction and proceedings

of the association in the piaintiifs declara-

tion mentioned, prior to its incorporation,

and also containing a record of the transac-

tions and proceedings of said defendant cor-

poration since its incorporation and organi-

zation. The plaintiff further represents

that it is necessary for hlm to examine the

records contained in said book, in order to

prepare said case for trial, and to furnish

the bill of particulars asked for by the de-

fendant. He therefore prays the court to

order said defendant, or the treasurer, or

some other oiiicer, thereof, to answer on

oath as to what documents it has in its con-

trol relating to the matter in dispute be-

tween said parties. and what it knows re-

lating to the custody of any such documents,

and, if any such documents be in its posses-

sion or control, whether it objects to the

production of the same. and the grounds of

such objection. In response to an order to

show cause, the president and secretary of

the defendant corporation have ﬁled an an-

swer under oath to said application. in

which they say “that said company is in

possession and control of the ‘book contain-

ing a record of the transactions and proceed-

ings of the association in the plaintiff's dec-

laration mentioned prior to its incorpora-

tion,’ which book also contains ‘a record of

the transactions and proceedings of said _

defendant corporation since its incorporation

and organiz:1tion;‘ that said hook is the pri-

vate property of said defendant, in which

its records are kept. and in which

kept the records of said association;

plaintiif is not entitled to the same.”

defendant therefore objects to the produc-

tion of said book upon the ground that it is

not a ‘document,’ in the language of the

statute, and that the plaintiff is not entitled

to the same.“ The plaintiff's declaration.

which is refcrentiaily made a part of said

were .

that .

said hook is not a ‘document,’ and that the =

“The '

ARXOLD v.

PAWTl'X1'~T

appllcatlon, sets out that the plalntllT, who
ts an attorney at law. rendered and performed divers lPgal servkes for the defendant,
(2G A ti. :i5.)
both before and since its incorporation, and
Supreme Court of RhoJe Island. Frb. 4, 1893.
that It was agreed and stipulated that, upon
· Assump11lt by John J. Arnold against the said association becoming Incorporated, It
Pawtuxet Valley \Ynter Company. Plaln- should assume and take upon Itself the paytlrr moves for an order requiring defendant ment and fulftllment of all debts, contracts,
to produce a book containing the record of obligations, and undertakings contracted,
its transnctlons. Motion granted.
entered Into, and undertaken by Mid assoGeorge T. Brown. for plalntur. Dexter ciation prior to the organization of said corporation; and that, In pursuance of said
B. Potter, tor detendnnt.
agreement and stipulation, the said corporaTILLINGHAST, J. This Is nn applil'n- tion, after Its organization, did assume upon
tion under PulJ St. R. I. c. 214. § 4;-;, .for an Itself and promise to pay the plaintiff for
01·der on the defernlant to prmht<'P a C'er- his services 80 rendered to said association
tnln document alleged to be In Its posses- as aforrsald. At a former hearing of said
sion, to be used by the nlalutlf[ In the a1>pllcntlon, before a single justice In champreparation of his case for trial. The t>laln- bers, it was held that the plalntllT was entititr sets out In said npplkntlon that he Is tled to the production ot said record book
informed and believes that the defendant for the purposes mentioned In said applleaIs lu the po8l!et0111lon and l'Ontrol of a ce11aln tlon, and an order was made accordingly,
document, to wit, the book containing a whereupon. the defendant, upon petition, obrecord of the tran1111ctlons and proceedings tained leave to reargue said question before
of the association In the plnlntltr's declam- the full court, which has since been done.
tlon mentioned, prior to Its Incorporation,
The defendant contends that the record
and also containing a record of the transac- book of the defendant corporation Is not a
tions u1111 proceedings of said defendant cor- "document," within the meaning of said
poration sin<-e Its Incorporation and organi- statute, and hence that the court bas no auzation. The plalntllT further rP11rest>11ts thority thereunder to grant the application.
that it le nef'N!sary for him to rxumlne the We do not think that said statute should rerecords contained in said book, In ordPr to ceive so narrow and purely technical a conp1·epare said case tor trial, and to furnish 11tructlon as this. Indeed, to 80 hold would
the bill of pa1'tlculars asked for by the de- be to render it largely useless and lnoperafendant. He therefore prays the court to tlvP, tor it is a matter of common knowlorder flUld drft>ndant, or the treasurer, or edge that a very large proportion of the
;;ome other otttrer, thereof, to answer on written transactions of both public and prioath as to what documents It bas In Its con- vate corporations, as well as those of private
trol rf'll\ ting to the mattf'r In dl1111ute be- lndlvillu11l11. nre either kPpt In book form In
tween said pnrtlPR, and whut It knows re- the ftr:-1t ln11tance, or nre afterwards stitched
lating to the custody of any such doeuments, or bound together In sueh form, for preserand, It any such documents be In Its posses- vation nnd convenience. Suppose that o. .
sion or control, whether It ob,ll'<"ts to the dozen title deeds should thus be put togethpro<lul'tlon of tlle same. nml the grounds of er in book form, would the book be any the
1mch objection. In rPsponse to an ordPr to lPSs a "document" thnn was each lndlvldunl
show l'Ut111e, the preshlPnt and sel'retury of deed before being thus brought together?
the dPfendant corporation have filed an an- We think not. In the Revised Statutes of
swer under oath to said application. In the United States (section 8G9) the following
which they sny "that snld compan~· Is in language Is used. viz:.: "And to lll'lng with
possession and control of the 'book contnln- him. nrnl 11rrnh1t·1• to ,.;:ll'h commii;:slonc1·, any
lng a record of the trnnsnl'tlonK and procet!d- ' paper or wi·ltlng or written Instrument, or
ings of the association In the plulntllr's dec- book, or other document," etc.; thus classlaration mentioned prior to Its Incorpora- ing a book as n document. In the case In
tion,' which book al110 rontnlns 'a re<>ocd of Re Shephard. 3 Frd. 12, documentary e\·lthe transactlon11 nnd Jll'O<"eetllngs of said dem·e Is held to include "books, papers. acdefendant co11mrntlon Rlll!'E' lt11 lneorpomtlon 1·01mts, and the like." In .Johnson 8tPel
and orgnnlzntlon;' that Rnltl hook Is the prJ- 8tr1.•t>t-IW.ll Co. v . North Bmnch Steel ('o,,
Ynte property of suM <l<'f<'mlant, In whkh 48 Fed. 191, l!l4, the definition of the term
Its rel'ord11 nrr kept. nnd In whlf'h were "doC'um<'nt" as given by Mr. \Vhnrtou In his
kept the re1·ord8 of 11nid nsiiodutlon; that Ln w of Evidence <volume 1, p. 614) was
snld book Is not n 'document,' nnd that the ndopt<'d. Said definition ls as follows: "A
plnintilr Is not <'ntitled to the same." "The 'document' Is an Instrument on which Is rede fendnnt therefore objE'<'tlil to the produc- corded, by means of letters, figures, or
tion of said book upon the ground thnt It Is marks, mnrter which mny be e\•irientlully
not a 'document,' In the lnngunge of the used. In thl11 sense the term 'document' apstatute, and thnt the plnintllf Is not entltle1l plies to writings, to words printed, llthoto the same." The pluintilf'11 dPC'lnmtion. graplwd, or photographed, to s1!11ls, plates,
which ls referentially made 11 part of said or stones on which Inscriptions are cut or

co.
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Pl{Ol)UU'l‘lON AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

engraved, to photographs and pictures, to

maps and plans." “So far as concerns ad-

missibility, it makes no difference what is

the thing on which the words or signs of-

fered may be recorded. They may be

" " * on stone or gems or on wood as

well as on paper or parchment.” In Mer-

rick v. Wakley, 8 Adol. & E. 170, 172, Lord

Denman, C. J., refers to a book which was I

kept by the plaintiff as a medical oﬁicer, g

and contained entries of professional visits, ‘

as a “document.” Mr. Stephen (Ev. 2, 3)

deﬁnes a “document" as “any matter ex-

pressed or described upon any substance '

by means of letters, ﬁgures, or marks. or by

more than one of these means, intended to

be used, or which may be used, for the

purpose of recording that matter." in the

statute 1~i & 15 Vict. c. 99, entitled “An act
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to amend the law of evidence,” pased in

1851, it is provided that “whenever any

book or other document is of such a public

nature as to be admissible in evidence,

" " * a. copy thereof or extract therefrom

shall be admissible." See, also, Starkie, Ev.

(9th Ed.) 273, 274. The oftleial publications

of the state and national governments, al-

though generally in book form, are denomi-

nated “Public Documents." the term being

generally abbreviated “Pub. Doc.” We

therefore decide that a book is a “docu-

ment," within the meaning of the statute

now under consideration.

The defendant further contends that the

applicant has not shown that he is “enti-

tled” to said book within the meaning of

said statute, it not appearing that he has

any property interest or title therein. We

do not think it is necesary, in order to

warrant the court to order the production

of a document under said statute, that the

applicant should show a property title

therein, but that it is enough for him to

show that he is justly entitled thereto by

way of evidence in the preparation and trial

of his case, and that such evidence is neces-

sary to enable him i'ully to prosecute or de-

fend the same. It is not necessary, how-

ever, to aver or show that, \vithout the dis-

covery sought, the plaintiff will be unable

to prove his case. 2 Story, Eq. Jur. (12th

Ed.) § 1-183; Peck v. Ashley, 12 Metc. Glass.)

478.

The ﬁnal and principal contention of the

defendant is that, as the plaintiff has not

shown that it is absolutely necessary for

him to have access to said book in order

to prepare his case for trial, his applica-

tion should be denied. We do not assent to

so strict a requirement. See Marsh v. Da-

vison, 9 Paige, 580, If, as alleged by

the plaintiff, the defendant corporation as-

sumed the debts of the association contract-

ed prior to the organization of said corpora-

tion, aud if, as is also alleged, the piaintiﬂf

was a creditor of said association at the

time of said organization. and is now also a

creditor of said corporation by reason of

PRODUOTION AND EFFECT OF

engraved, to photographs and pictures, to
mape and plane." "So far aa concerns admlsslblllty, It makes no difference what Is
the thing on which the words or signs offered may be recorded. They may be
• • • on stone or gems or on wood as
well as on paper or parchment." In Merrick v. Wakley, 8 Adol. & E. 170, li2, Lord
Denman, C. J., refers to a book which was
kept by the plalntltr as a medical officer,
and contained entries of professional visits,
as a "document." Mr. Stephen (Ev. 2, 3)
deftnes a "document" as "any matter expre11sed or described upon any substance
by means of letters, figures, or marks. or by
more than one of these means, Intended to
be used, or which may be used, for the
purp08e of recording that matter." lo the
statute 14 & lS Viet. c. 00, entitled "An act
to amend the law of evldenCt'," passed In
1851, It Is provided that "whenever any
book or other document le of such a public
nature as to be admissible lo evidence,
• • • a copy thereof or extract therefrom
shall be admissible." See, also, Starkie, Ev.
(9th Ed.) 273, 274. The otHclal publications
of the state and national governments, although generally In book form. are denomlnated "Public Documents," the term being
genernlly abbreviated "Pub. Doc." We
tberefore decide that a book Is a "document," within the met\nlng Qf the statute
now under comd<leratlon.
The defendant further contends that the
, applicant has not shown that be Is "entltied" to said book within the meaning of
said statute, It not appearing that he bas
any property Interest or title therein. We
do not think It ls necessary, in order to
warrant the court to order the production
of a document under said statute, that the
appllcant should show a property title
therein, but that It ls enough for him to
show that be Is justly entitled thereto by
way of evidence in the prt•paratlon and trial
of hie case, and that such evidence Is neceseary to enable him fully to prosecute or defend the same. It le not necessary, however, to aver or show that, without the discovery sought, the plalntltr wlll be unable
to 1>rove his case. 2 Stoey, Eq. Jui-. (12th
Ed.) f 1483; Peck v. Ashley, 12 Mete. (:\lase.)
478.
The final and principal contention of the
defendant ls that, as the plaintiff has not
sbown that lt Is absolutely necessacy for
blm to have access to said book In order
to prepare bis case for trial, bis appllcatlon should be denied. We do not assent to
so strict a requirement. See Marsh v. Davlson, U Paige, 580, 584. If, as alleged by
the plaintiff, the defendant corporation assumed the debts of the aeeoclatlon contracted prior to the organization of snld corporatlon, and If, as le also alleged, the plaintiff
was a creditor of said association at the
time of said organization, and le now also a
credltor of said corporation by reason of
502
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services rendered to It since Its organJzatton,
then, and lo encb case, we think be Is falrly "entitled" to the production of the said
record book, which presumably contains the
doings of said corporation in the preml.Bee,
for the purpose of enabling him properly to
prepare \tis caae for trial under the pleadIn.gs therein. Indeed, we do not well see
j bow be Clln establish the fact of the aesumptlon by the defendant corporation of the
debts of said association In any other wa7.
The appllcat1on provided for by said statute (which statute le merely declaratory of
the common law upon the eubject,-Ely v.
, llowry, 12 R. I. 570, S72) le evidently lntended as a substitute for the more ancient
and cumbersome method of a bill of dls<.'Overy for the accomplishing of the same resuit; and therefore, whenever the appll<.'8·
tlon shows a case which would entitle the
plaintiff to relief under such a blll, be may
j have such relief under the statute. 1 Pom.
Eq.•Tur. f 194. Thus, in Georgia, under the
judiciary act of 1799, the superior and in·
ferlor courts have power to require "either
, party to produce books and other wrltlngs
' In hie, her, or their po8Besslon, power. or
custody, which shall contain evidence pertinent to the cause in question, under clreumstances where either party might be oompelled to produce the same by the ordinary
rules of proceeding In equity." In construIng this act in Faircloth v. Jordan, 15 Ga.
511, 513, the court adopted the n1le laid
down by Adams, in bis Doctrine of Equity,
which Is as follows: "A defendant ls also
bound, If required by the plalntUl', to set
forth a list of all documents in hie poseeeelon, from which discovery of the matters
1 1n question can be obtained; and If the poeeeBBlon of such documents, and their cbaracter. as flt subjects of discovery, can be
shown from the answer, be must permit the
plalntlll' to Inspect or copy them." In Cllfford v. Taylor, 1 Taunt. 167, the 4efendant,
on application, was allowed to take out a
summons requiring the production of the letters and papers mentioned In bis a11ldavlt,
Mansfield, C. J., etnttnir In bis opinion that
"this practice of compelllng the delivery of
copies Is very convenient, for it eaves the
delay and expense of a blll In equity." In
Gould v. McCarty, 11 N. Y. 575, It was held
that,. under a statute similar to the one
now under consideration in so far as the object sought to be accomplished le concerned,
the court was authorized to compel a defendant to make discovery of books, papers,
and documents In his POBSeBBlon 01· power
relating to the merits thereof, and which
are neet'seary to the plaintiff to enable him
to prepare for the trial. See, also, Goldecbmldt v. Marcyat, 1 Camp. 559, 562; HJll
v. Railway <;o., 10 C. B. (N. S.) 148. In
Townsend v. Lawrence, 9 \Yend. 4:'>8, In
which the facts were quite shnllar to thoee
in the case at bar, the court said: "AccordIng to the principle and practice of the court
1·

1

i

I

I
I
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of chanccry. a bill called a ‘bill of discovery’

may be ﬁlcd for the discovery of facts in the

knowledge of the adverse party, or of deeds

or writings or other things in his custody or

power; and is usually employed to enable

the complainant to prosecute or defend an

action. 1 Madd. Pr. 160; Lord Montague

v. Dudman, 2 Ves. Sr. 398. And if deeds,

letters, or other writings are referred to in

an answer. the same will, on the plaintiff's

motion, be ordered to be left with an oﬂicer

of the court for the inspection of the com-

plainant or his counsel. 2 Madd. Pr. 299;

Bettison v. Farringdon, 3 P. Wms. 364; Tay-

lor v. Mllner, 11 Ves. -i2; Atkyns v. Wright,

14 Ves. 214." The court further said: “The

object of the statute was to substitute the

rule of court in the place of a bill of discov-

ery where the evidence of which a discov-
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ery is sought is of a documentary nature;

and the remedy is not conﬁned to cases

where the evidence in itself constitutes a

cause of action, but extends to all books,

papers, and documents relating to the mer-

its of the suit or defense.” See, also, Post

v. Railroad Co., 144 Mass. 3-i1, 11 N. E. 540;

Nieury v. O'Hara, 1 Barb. 484. Had the

plaintiﬁf in the case at bar ﬁled a bill of dis-

covery to obtain the production of the rec-

ord book in question for the purpose set out

in his application. we think he would have

been clearly entitled to the relief thus

sought. See 2 Story, Eq. Jur. (12th Ed.) §§

14834501. And as, under the statute'be-

fore us for consideration, the application

therein provided for was intended to take

the place of a bill of discovery, as we have

already seen, we see no reason why the

plaintiff is not entitled to the same relief.

The cases cited by the defendant's coun-

sel do not controvert, in the main, the gen-

eral doctrine above enunciated, but princi-

pally have to do with what it is necessary

to show in the bill or application, in order

to warrant the granting thereof, and also

are to the effect that courts will not permit

parties to merely “ﬁsh for evidence" by such

a proceeding. This doctrine meets with our

entire approval. An application of this sort,

as said by this court in Ely v. Mowry, su-

pra, "should set forth particularly the rea-

sons which render it essential to the prepa-

ration of the defense, that the order asked

for should be made, so that the court may

determine whether or not the necessity ex-

ists.” If the application shows that it i

merely an attempt to “fish for evidence,” or

to “draw the ﬁre” of the opposite party, for

the purpose of either making a case or of

“cooking up" a defense, or, to state it neg-

atively, if it does not show that the appli-

cant is fairly entitled to the evidence sought,

in order to enable him to properly prepare

and try his case, it should be denied. The

case of Woods v. De Figaniere, 25 How.

Pi-ac. S322, which is much relied on by the

defendant's counsel, was one in which the

facts were very different from those in the

of chancery, a bill called a 'bill of discovery'
may be filed for tbe discovery of facts In the
knowledge of the adverse party, or of deeds
or wrltlDM:B or other things In bis custody or
power; and ls usually employed to enable
the complainant to prosecute or defend an
action. 1 Madd. Pr. 160; Lord Montague
v. Dudman, 2 Vea. Sr. 398. And If deeds,
letters, or other writings are ref~rred to in
an answer. the same will, on the plulntlll"s
motion, be ordered to be left with an omcer
of the court for the Inspection of the complainant or his counsel. 2 Madd. Pr. 299;
Bettlson v. Farringdon, 3 P. Wms. 364; Taylor v. Milner, 11 Ves. 42; Atkyns v. Wright,
14 Vee. 214." The court further said: "The
object of the statute was to substitute the
rule of court in the place ot a bill of discovery where the evidence of which a discovery ls sought ls of a documentary nature;
and the remedy is not confined to cases
where the evidence in itself constitutes a
cause of action, but extends to all books,
papers, and documents relating to the mer·
Its of the suit or defense.'' See, also, Post
v. Rallroad Co., 144 :Mass. 341, 11 N. E. 540;
Nleury v. O'Hara, 1 Bnrb. 484. Hild the
plaintlft' In the case at bar filed a bill of dis·
covery to obtain the prOlluctlon of the record book In question for the purpose set out
in bis application, we think he would have
been clearly entitled to the relief thus
sought. See 2 Story, Eq. Jur. (12th Ed.) H
1483-UiOl. And as. under the 11tatute · before us tor consideration, the aJlpllcatlon
therein provided tor was intended to take
the place of a bill of discovery, as we have
already seen, we see no reason why the
plalntift' is nc;>t entitled to the same relief.
The cases cited by the defendant's counsel do not controvert, lo the main, the gen·
eral doctrine above enunciated, but principally have to do with what It ls necessary
to show In the blll 01· application, in order
to warrant the granting thereof, and also
are to the eft'ect that courts will not permit
parties to merely "fl.sh for evidence" by such
a proceeding. This doctrine meets with our
entire approval. An nppllcatlon of this sort,
as said by this court in Ely v. :Mowry, supra, "should set forth particularly the reasons which render lt essential to the preparation of the defense, that the order asked
for should be made, so that the court may
determine whether or not the necessity exists." If the application shows that It is
merely an attempt to "fish for evidenee," or
to "draw the fire" ot the opposite party, for
the purpose of either making 11 case or of
"cooking up" a defense, or, to state It negatively, If It does not show that the applicant ls fairly entitled to the evidence sought,

EVIDE~CE.

[Case No. 172

!
1

in order to enable him to properly prepare
and try his case, it should be denied. The
case of \Voods v. De Flganiere, 25 How.
Prnl'. :;22, whkh Is much relied on by the
defendant's counsel, was one In which the
tacts were very dlll'erent from those in the
case at bar. In that C'ase the entries sought
tor were not shown to be evldenee, but only
to contain Information by which evidence
might be obtained. It was not Rlleged that
they were in the defendant's handwriting,
or that he was in any way privy to them.
"PoBSlbly, by Inspection," said the court,
"the plaintiffs may discover in whose handwriting they are, and obtain their author as
a witness to prove the facts contained in
them. • • • I apprehend the power of
dlscO\·erlng the content.a of a written document wlll hardly be stretched to cover those
which only furnish information to enable
the applicant to ferret out evidence or witnesses, or where it is not shown"that witnesses cannot establish the same tads without the aid of such entries." It is true
that the court in that case luld down the
rule now c..ontended for by the defendant,
-that a discovery "ls not permitted lo equity merely to enable a party to prepare for
trial or preYent surprise," but that "It must
furnish eYldem·e to be used on the trial."
This l!ltatement, however, was not necessary
to the decision of the case, nor do the authorities cited In support thereof sustain the
position taken. Moreover, the superior court
of the city of New York, In the case of
Gould v. McCarty, supra, had long before
decided that a defendant might be compelled to make discovery of books, pa11l'rs, and
documents which were necessary to the
plalntlll' to enable him to prepare tor trial;
and this decision had been amrmed by the
court of appeals. See 11 N. Y. 575. In Ely
v. Mowry, supra, the discovery was sought
to aid In the preparation of the defense.
In Congdon v. Aylsworth, 16 R. I. 281, 18
Atl. 247, the discovery was asked in order to
enable the complainant "to prepare his case
for trial." The discovery of the evidence
sought in every case must necessarily precede the trial of the case In aid of which It
ls sought, and If, therefore, a party Is entitled to the evidence to be used at the
trial, we see no reason why he Is not equally entitled to it to enable him to prepare
for the trial. It compelled to wait for the
production thereof until the trial should actually begin, more or less delay and incon·
venlence would necessarily result therefrom.
We think the plalntilr shows a case tor relief under said statute, and we wlll therefore grant an order for the production of
said book.
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PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

_Circuit Court, \V. D. Pennsylvania.

.'I()H.\'SON STEEL STltl*IET-RAIL CO.

v. NORTH BRANCH STEEL (TO.

(-18 Fed. 191.)

Nov. 12,

1891.

In equity. Bill by the Johnson Steel

Street-Rail Company against the North

Branch Steel Company for infringement of

a patent. Heard upon a rule for attachment

of John Fulton for contempt in refusing to

obey a subpoena duces tecum.

John R. Bennett, for rule.

ing and P. C. Knox, opposed.

Geo. J . Hard-

REED, J. A bill in equity for infringe-

ment of certain letters patent having been

ﬁled in the circuit court for the Eastern dis-

trict of Pennsylvania, and the defendant
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having answered, Samuel Bell. Esq.. was ap-

pointed by that court as a special examiner,

upon the‘ application of the defendant, to

take testimony in this district. .lolm Ful-

ton, who is the general manager of the (‘am-

bria Iron Company, a corporation. not a

party to the suit, was duly served with a

subptena duces tecum, directing him to pro-

duce at the hearing before the examiner cer-

tain drawings and templates. .\lr. Fulton

refused to produce them, although appearing

at the hearing in person in obedience to the

ﬁlll)]lll‘ll2l. Upon the argument of the rule

taken by the defendant's counsel to show

cause why an attachment for contempt

should not issue, counsel for Mr. Fulton ap-

peared, and the several positions taken in

opposition to the rule will be considered.

It was argued that the subpoena had im-

properly issued.from the clerk's oﬂiee; that

a subpccua duces tecum, in such a case as

the present, could only be issued by order of

court, upon petition or application of one

of the parties. A circuit court in one dis-

trict has power, under the 67th rule in equi-

ty, to appoint a special examiner to take

testimony in another district (Railroad Co. -

v. Drew, 3 Woods. tiill, Fed. Gas. No. 17,-

43-1; In re Steward, 29 Fed. 813); and the

court in the latter district has power to is-

sue a subpoena commanding a person living

in its district to appear and testify before

an examiner or master who has been ap-

pointed by the court of the former district,

and who is discharging the duties of his

appointment in the latter district: and such

court also has power. under the 73th rule in

equity, to punish such person for refusing

to obey such subpmna (In re Steward,

supra). Nor do I think it necessary that, in

such a case. an application must be made to

the latter court for an order directing the

I-llli)])tl‘Ilﬂ. duces tecum to issue. but such a

subpo-na may issue in the usual manner

from the clerk's otiice, as in ordinary cases.

“if documents, the production of which is

desired, are in the possession of onc not a

party to the suit. he ma_v be compelled by a

subpoena duces tecum to produce them, and

PRODUCTIO:S

A~D

EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

3'0HXSOX STEEL STRl<~ET-RAIL CO.
v. NORTH BRANCH RTEKJ, CO.
(48 Fed. 191.)
, Circuit Court, W. D. Pennsylv:rniu. Xov. 12,
1891.
In equity. Bill by the Johnson Steel
Street-nan Company against tht• North
Bran<·h Steel Company for Infringement of
a 11at<>nt. Heard upon a rule for attuchment
ot John Fulton for contempt in refwilng to
obey a subprena du<'es t.ecum.
John R. Bennett, for rule. Geo. J. Harding and P. C. Knox, 011posed.

If the subpama Is not obeyed be will be pun·
lsb<>d for contempt, on proof by nftl.davlt
that thP documents are In his custody." 3
Greenl. Ev. I :«15. And such a subprena Is
In ordinary antl gPnernl use, and ls of compulsory obligation and Pll'ect, ID courts of
law (Amey v. Long, 9 1'~ast, 473; RuBBell v.
:McLellan, 3 Woodb. & M. 157, Fed. Cas. No.
12,1;}8), and also In rourts of equity (1 DanIE'll. Cb. Pree. 900; U. S. v. Bab<'<K'k, 3 Dill.
:-1UU, I•'ed. Cas. No. 14,~); and, by the 18th
rulP In equity, sub1><Pnas may be Issued by
the elerk In blank, and filled up by the commissioner, master, or examiner, requiring
the attendan<.-e of the witness at the time
UEED, J. A bill ID equity for Infringe- and plac>e specified, and this applies as well
nwnt of <'t'rtaln letters patent having ht!en to subprenas ducee tecum. Section 869 of
filed In the circuit court for the Eastern dis· the Revls<>d Statutes, providing for au order
trkt of PeDDSylvanla, and the dt•ft-udaut of <·ourt, upon which the sub1><Fna dUCf>S
having answered, Samuel Bell. J~sq .. was ap- te<'um shall Issue, applies to <'8ses• where
polntP<l by that court as a spedal Pxamlner, depositions de bene esse are taken under the
upon the" applk'lltlon of the dt>fPudaot, to provisions of section 863, or ID perpetuam rel
take testimony lo thta dlstrl<·t. John lt'ul- memoriam and under a dedlmus potestatem,
ton, who Is the general manager of the ('am- under M'<'tlon 866. Ex parte lt'lsk, 113 U.
hrla Iron Company, a corporation, not a S. 713, a Sup. Ct. 724. It dol'tl not n1>11ly
11arty to the suit, was duly served with a to testimony taken, as ID the present ease,
HUbI>cPna duce& tecum, directing him to pro- under the general powers of a court of ec.1ulduce at the hearing before the examiner cer- ty, and In the mode prescribed by the equity
taln drawings and templates. Yr. lt'ulton rules. Ao examination of the act of JanureCused to produce them, although appearing ary 24, urn (4 Stat. 197), the second section
at the he.arlng In person In obedience to the of whlc•h was re-ena<•ted as seetlon 869 of
subpu•na. Upon the argument of tbe rule the Revlf«'d Statutes, shows that It was not
taken by the defendant's counsel to show lntentlt-d to npply to all c11ses.
<'ft.use "·hy an attachment tor contempt
The subPQ.'na having properly Issued, the
should not Issue, counsel for Mr. lt'urton ap- remaining question le as to the validity of
peal't'<l, and the several positions taken ID th~ reasons given In support of the refusal
oppo1dtlon to the rule will be considered.
of the wltneAS to obey the subprena. The
It was arguetl that the subp!Fna had Im- amclavlt of Cyrus Elder, Esq., attorney for
properly lSBued,from the clerk's oftl.c>e; that the Cambria Iron Company, ~hlch, It was
a subprena dncee tecum, In such a <.'BBe as undl'n1tood at the argument, should be creatthe prt>sent, could only be Issued by order of Pd n11 though It were the answt>r of llr. J.<'ulcourt, upon petition or applleatlon of one ton. 88ys that be Instructed the witness not
of the pnrtlt>s. A <'irc•ult rourt In one dis- to 11roduce the articles <.'ftlled tor by the subtrlct h88 power, under the 67tb rule In equl- JKPIUl, and bis Instructions were lntt>ndP<l
ty, to appoint a special examiner to take 11ol<'ly to prevent the dlsl'losure of valunble
testimony In another dlstrl<'t (Railroad Co... business He<'rets ot said Cambria Iron <'omv. Drew, 3 Woods. (\Ul, l•'ed. Coe. No. 17,- 1 pany. and that the disclosures of the wlt434; In re Steward, 29 l<'ed. Sta); and the nes11es called tor, and whi<'h the wltnes11es
<'()Urt In the latter dlstrl<'t has power to
were required to answer and produce, re11ue a 1mb11<Pna commanding a person lh·lng lated to a m<'thod of manufacturing a rail.
In Its district to appear and testify lx•fore J whkh mPtbod has been developed by the
an examiner or master who bas bt><>n a!>- Cambria Iron C'ompany with great labor and
polntf'd hy the court of the former district, i <'Xpeuse. an1l that It le said company's valuand who ls dlsc·barjtlng the duties ot his i able prlnlte property. In the case of Bull
ap11<>tnh11Pnt in the latter dlstrll•t: and slwh v. Loveland, 10 Pick. 9, the supreme rourt
«'()Urt also bas power, under the 7Sth rull• In of :MaSRn<•lmsetts dlscuss<>d tbl• question.
•'<JUlty, to punish su<'l1 Jll~rson for refusing and held that the witness was bound to an·
to obey such suhpmna (In re Steward. swer a question pertinent to the issue, Whl•1"
11upra). Nor do I think It neeessnry thnt, In his answer will not expose him to criminal
llU<'h a case, an appll<•atlon must lw mnde to procet•dlngs, or tend to subject him to a
the latter eourt tor an order directing the penalty or forfeiture, although It may oth1•r11ub111l'na duN•s tc>ctm1 to li:111w, but sul'b a 1 wise advl'rsely affect his pecuniary lnter11uh1lfPna may Issue In tlw usual manner ests, and said: ''There seems to be no lllfferfrom the <'lerk's offi<'e, as In ordinary c·nsl'11: c>n<'e In prhwlple hetwe<>n compelling n wit·
"If documl•nts, the produl'tlon of which Is ll<'SS to 11roduce a document In his 11ossN1d1•slred, nre In the pos1w11slou of one not a 11lon, under a subprena duce& tt>1·um, In a
party to the suit. h<' mny be com11elled by a <'11."1e whl'l't' the party calllnp; the wltu.-ss ha11
1111bprena duces tecum to produce them, and a right to the use of such document, and
004
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COMPULSORY PRODUCTION OF EVJDEYCE.

(Case :No. 173

COMPULSORY PRODUCTION EVIDENCE.

[Case No. 173

1-ompelliu,<.: him to give testimony when the

facts lie in his own knowledge. It has been

decided, thou;.'h it was formerly doubted,

that a subpwna duces tecum is a writ of

compulsor_\' obligation. which the court has

power to issue, and which the witness is

bound to obey, and which will be enforced

b_v proper process to compel the production

of the paper, when the witness has no law-

ful or reasonable excuse for withholding it

(Amey v. Long, 9 East, 473; Corsen v. Du-

bols, 1 Holt, N. P. 239): but of such lawful

or reasonable excuse the court at nisi prius,

and not the witness. is the jud,-:e."

In Baird v. (‘ochran. 4 Serg. & R. 396, the

supreme court of l‘elms_\'lvani-a held that a

witness in a civil suit ma_v be compelled to

give evidence which may aifect his interest,

provided it does not tend to convict him of
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a crime. or subject him to a penalty, saying:

“With these exceptions, every man may be

compelled, on a bill ﬁled against him in

equity. to declare the truth, although it

affect his interest. Why. then, should he

not be compelled at law, except where he is

a party to the suit? [Parties could not then

under the laws of Pennsylvania testify or

be called to tcstify.] The court in which he

is examined will take care to protect him

from questions put through impertinent

curiosity, and conﬁne his evidence to those

points which are really material to the ques-

tion in litigation. So far, his neighbor has

an interest in his testimony, and no further

ought he to be questioned."

In Ex parte Judson. 3 Blatchf. 89, Fed.

Pas. No. 7,561, the witnes objected to testi-

fying, for the reason that the suit was an

amicable and ﬁctitious suit. got up to enable

the parties to examine the witness, to obtain

evidence from him to be used.not in tnat suit,

but in other cases, then pending, in which

the witness was interested. and in which

such evidence might be used to his preju-

dice; but the court held that the evidence

inight be material. that it was bound to as-

sume that the ease which, as in this case,

was pending in another court. must be pre-

sumed to be genuine litigation. and that the

witness must answer. in Wertheim v. Rail-

way, etc., Co., 15 Fed. 716. Jmlgze Wallace

held that a corporation, not a party to the

suit. might be compelled to produce its books

and papers in evidence, which might be nec-

essary and vital to the rights of litigants,

and that considerations of inconvenience

must give wa_v to the paramount rights of

parties to the litigation.

c·ompPllln;.: him to jil'I\"(' tl'Rthnony whE'n the Iron, the contour of whlcl.t <'Orresponds to
tbe o)lenlng twtwPen the rolls. It was held
fll~ts lie In blR own knowlE'd"E'. It bas b~n
dp1•idE'11. thou:.:-h It wns formerly doubted, ln th<' ('11M1• of l"h<'phurd, 3 I<'ed. 1'.!, thnt a
tl111t 11 Kuh1111•1m d1we11 t('('lllll Is 11 writ of subpu•nu dUl'PN tP<·nm 1·1111 only be usPd to
compel the prochl<'tlou of written ln11truc·o111pnl:-1or~· ohllgntlon, whleh the court bas
JIOWt>r to h•sne, uml whkb the wltneM ls ments, PllJ>Pl't'I, books, or dol'umentM, und
hound to obey, nm! whleh will be t>uforced thut patterns for stove caBting-s WPre not the
hy 11ro1wr proC('RK to <'OIUJ>Pl the production subject of 1111<.'h a writ. I think thnt the
<>f the pn]K"r, wtwn the wltnl'BB has no law- subpu•na cannot be enforced us to the temful or 1·1·11Row1blP PXl'UBl' tor withholding It platt'S. A document, howen•r, Is definPd us
(Amey Y. I.ong, II Emit, 473; l'orsen v. Du- "au Instrument upon wlllcb is rPPorded, by
bois, 1 Holt, N. P. :!:m1; but of such lawful means of letters, figures, or mnrks, mutter
or rP111101111hle eX<'US(' tlw court nt nlsl prlus, wbil'b may evidentially be used. In this sense
and not th!' wltuPss, Is thP jud:,.:-e."
the tt>rm applies to writings; to words printIn Baird Y. Co<"hrnn, 4 ~prg. & R. 3Hll, the ed, lithographed, or photogmphell: to seals,
11uprl'mP 1·011rt of l'NmKylnrnlu held that a plates, or stonPs on which lnscrlp1lons are
wltnPi;K In a civil 1rnlt may be eompPllPd to cut or en~'Tllved; to photographs and plc~lv1• l'\"l•ll'l1Pe whl<'h may af'l'ect bis Interest,
tlll't>R; to maps and plan11. :-<o fnr ns con11roviclt-1I It dol'R not tend to convict him of e1!r1111 admissibility, It makt•s no 1Uf'l'erence
n erlnw. or subje<·t him to a p1•nalty, saying: what 111 the thing on wl.tldt tlw words or
\\'lth thPKP l'Xl'PJ1tiom1, everr mun may be signs of'l'er1·d may bt> l'P1·or1l1'tl. They may
<·ompdlc•cl, on a hill filf'd against him in he on stonl'K, or gpms. or on wood, as well
t!qulty. to llP<.'lare the truth, although It as on papt>r or parc·hment." 1 \\'hart. Ev. I
ntrect hiK l11tn1·11t. \Vh;\-, then, should he G14. So far as matP1111l, then, the drawings
not lw <·011111l'lled at law, except whl't'e he Is 1•nlled tor hy the suhprena should be pron party to tht> suit? [Partlel' eould not then dueed, and the final question ls bow far th<'Y
under thP laws of Pem1sylnrnl11 testify or are materlul.
he callt>d to tPstlfy.] The court In whlt-h he
'I'hP hill In this case Is based upon an
Is examined will tnk<> <'Rrl' to protf'<·t him 1tllPgatlon of lnfrlngemPnt of a patent grantfrom <1uestlons put through lmpPt'tlnent t>d }larch 2D, 1887. Defense Is made that the
<·urlosity, and confine bis evidence to those patent Is void tor lnsumclency of Invention,
11olnt11 whi<·h 1n·p really material to the ques- In view of the prior state of the al't, and
tion In lithmtlon. So fur, his neighbor hRs al!~o that the invention claimed bas b<>Pn In
nn lnterPst ln bls testimony, and no further public use for more tbnn two years prior to
<night he to be questioned."
the date of the application, whl<'h wnB made
In Ex 11arte Judson, 3 Blat<•hf. 89, Fed. August 12, 188!l. It appears In testimony
•'us. No. 7,:iGl, the witness objPctt>d to testi- that rails of the general character of that
fying, for the reason that the suit w1111 an covered by the patent ln controvt>rlly were
nmieabl<' and fictltlom1 suit, got up to Plllthle rolled by the Cambria Iron Company, under
the parties to examine the witnPss, to ohtnin 1111 urrangement with the plnintift' company,
evhh•ncP from him to beusE'd. not ln t1111t Hult, for the latter compnn;\·, In 1882. u.nd from
hut in oth<'I' <'UMPS, th<>n llPndlng, In whlc.-h thnt time down to the dnte of the patent. It
the wltnPMR was lntt>l'f'l'lted, nnd ln whkh would seem to lw mntPrlnl nnd pertinent,
zmch evldPtll'P might be UBt>d to bis Jll'l'ju- therefore, to the lssui>, to Inquire into this
dlce; but the <'1mrt held that the M'hh•n<--e matter, and the defendant Is t>utitled to the
tuil.:'ht lw mntl'rlal, that It w1111 bound to a11- production of such drawing-s ns will show
tiume that thP ease:• whleh, as In thiK e1u1e, the form of rolls usPd for tlmt purpose,
was pending In anothn court, muRt be pre- down to the date of the pat!'ltt. The form
Mumed to be genuhw lltlgntlon, and that the of rolls u11Pd slnl'e bas not lleeu shown to be
witness must answl't'. In WPrtheim v. Hnll- mntPrlal to the issue. My con.cluslon upon
way, etc., Co., 15 Fed. 716..Tt11Jg-p \V11lln1·e this 1111\IJe<'t lK based upon the presentation
held that a corporation, not a 1mrt;\' to the of the case by counsel, upon only u. part of
Hult, might be co1111wl1Ptl to prod net• itM hooks the t1>11timony, nnd is not Intended to, In any
and papers In evldPncP, which might be nec- mtmnPr, anti<'lpate or lnfiuem·e the d!'chdon
essary and vital to the rights of litigants, by the circuit court tor the Eastern district
and that com1ldcr11tlo11s of lnconvPnlence of the matP11ullt:r or relevanl'y of the testimust give war to the paramount rlgl.tts of mony, of which It alone must finally judge.
p:trt les to tlw litigation.
\Vlwn the wltnPAS }lrodll<'PS the dmwlngs
It was turtlwr contended by counRPl for c;11lled for by the subp<Pnn, In al'eordunce
the wltnPss that the artldPs callPd for by with this opinion, nnd pays the cost!! of this
the sub11u•na wPrP not such as could be the 11p11li<'ation, the rule will be disclmrged, It
t1uhjf'1•t of a Ruhp<ena dU<'E'B ti><·nm. The UJIJIPUl'lng that no dlsobedlPll<'P of the sub11uhpH•na reqnire!l the pro!lul'tion of certain JICPlla was lntt>ndecl; but this mode was
drawings and h•mplates. A template. aK tnken by counsel to test the questions Instnted upon the argument, Is a piece of shl'et volved.
•

0

It was further contended by counsel for

505

the witness that the articles called for by

the subpoena were not such as could be the

subject of a Slllllliﬁnll duces tecum. The

subptt-na required the production of certain

drawings and templates. A template. as

stated upon the argument, is a piece of sheet

iron, the contour of which corresponds to

the opening between the rolls. It was held

in the (‘use of Shephard. 3 Fed. 12, that a

•
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INDEX.

A

Account books (Cases 44, 45, 59, 60-62).

Acconipliccs, evidence of (Case 147).

Admissions (Cases 12, 15, 28-35, 45, 90, 91,

INDEX.

163).

by agents (Cases 28, 32, 35).

by attorneys (Case 28).

by failing to deny statements (Cases 15,

28). ,

C'orporatlon, books of (Oases 44 and 45).
Corroboration of witnesses (Cases 19, 144147).
Course of business (Cases 16, 19, 59, 60, and

A

by offer of compromise (Case 34).

by person in possession (Case 29).

by person not in possession (Case 30).

by referee (Case 33).

in cases of fraud (Case 31).

in pleadings (Cases ‘J0 and 91).

Affidavits (Case 134).

Agent, admissions of (Cases %, 32, 35).

declarations of (Case 11).

Almanac, judicial notice of (Case 76).

Ambiguity, parol evidence to remove (Case
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120).

Ancient documents (Cases 41, 104).

Attorney, admissions of (Case 28). '

communications to (Cases 135, 137-140).

B

Best evidence (Case 78).

Bill oi’ exceptions as evidence (Case 113).'

Books. account (Cases 59-62).

corporation (Cases 44, 45).

medical and scientiﬁc (Case 73).

Burden of proof (Cases 6, 83, 122-127, and

157).

C

Character (Cases 24, 25, 162, 166, 168-170).

Children as witnesses (Case 129).

Circumstantial evidence (Case 6).

Collateral facts (Cases 2, 7, 8, and 161).

Compulsory physical examination (Case 171).

Communications, privileged (Cases 135-142).

to attorneys (Cases 135, 137 -140).

to husband or wife (Cases 130-132).

to public oﬂicers (Cases 135, 136). I

Account books (Cases 44, 45, 59, ~.
Accomplices, evidence of (Case 14i).
Admissions (Cases 12, 15, 28-35, 45, 90, 91,

62).

Cross-examination (Cases 57, 72, 77, 155-161,

163).

107).
by agents (Cases 28, 32, 35).
by attorneys (Case 2S).
Custom, evidence of (Case 146).
by falling to deny statements (Cases la,
28).

D
by offer of compromise (Case 34).
by person in possession (Cn::<e :.?ll).
Declarations, agent's (Case 11).
by JM'TBOn not in possession (Case 30).
against Interest (Cases n:~. 140).
by referee (Case 33).
dying (cases 57, 58, 134).
1n cases of fraud (Ca1-1e 31).
former (Case 163).
in ple1ullngs (Cases 00 and 91).
public rights (Case 65).
Affidavits (Case 134).
showing state of mind (Case 15).
Agent, admissions of (Cases 28, 32, 35).
self-serving (Case 9).
declarations of (Case 11).
stranger's (Case 12).
Ahnanac, judicial notice of (Case i6).
testator's (Case G4).
Ambiguity, parol evidence to remove (Case Deeds, ancient (Cases 41, 104).
120).
oral evidence concerning (Cases 41, 102,
Andent documents (Cases 41, 104).
121).
Attorney, admissions of (Case 28).
Depositions (Ca11es 24, 102, 122. 149, 150).
communications to (Cases 13i:i, 137-140).
Direct evidence (Case 6).
Discovery (cases 171-173).
Documents, ancient (Cases 41, 104).
B
public (Cases 41, 97, 98, 105-107. See
writings).
Best evl<lence (Case i8).
Inspection
of (CaSE>11 72, 98).
Btll of exceptions as evidence (Ca11e 113).
proof of (Cases 101-103).
Books, arcount (Cases 59-62).
Doubt, reasonable (Cases G, a8).
corporation (Cases 44, 45).
Dying
declarations (Cases 57, 58, 134).
medical and sC'lentitlc (Cuse i3).
Burden of proof (Cases 6, 83, 122-127, and
15i).
E

Confessions (Cases 14, 18, 36, 37, 39, 40, 11:8).

0

before grand jury (Case 39).

facts obtained by (Case 38).

inducements to (Case 37).

Conspiracy (Cases 13, 17).

Contracts, parol evidence as to (Cases 114-

121).

Copies. certiﬁed (Cases 97, 105, 106).

deeds (Case 102).

letterpress (Cases 110-112).

WILGUB, E V.

Corporation, books oi.‘ (Cases 44 and 45).

Corroboration of witnesses (Cases 19, 144-

147).

Course ot business (Cases 16, 19, 59, 60, and

62).

Cross-examination (Cases 57, 72, 77, 155-161,

167).

Custom, evidence ot (Case 146).

D

Declarations, agent's (Case 11).

against interest (Cases 63. 140).

dying (Cases 57, 58, 134).

former (Case 163).

public rights (Case 65).

showing state of mind (Case 15).

self-serving (Case 9).

Character (Cases 24, 25, 162, 166, rnS-170).
Children as witnesses (Case 129).
Circumstantial evidence (Case 6).
Collateral facts (Cases 2, 7, 8, and 161).
Compulsory physical examination (Case 1711.
Communications, privileged (f'a11P11 lHa--14::!).
to attorneys (Cases 133, 137-HO).
to husband or wife (CaRes 130- 1:12).
to public officers (Cu!les 13i:i, 13fi).
Confessions (Cases 14, 18, 36, 37, 39, 40, rn."l.
before grand jury (C'ntce 3!l).
fucts obtained by (Cm;e 38).
lnducement11 to (Case 3i).
C'onspiracy (Coses 13, 17).
Contracts, pnrol evidence as to (Cases 114121).
Cople!'I, certified (C1111es 97, 103, 106).
deeds (Case 102).
letterpress (Cases 11(}-112).
WILGUS, EV.

I

Equity, answer In (CaRe 145).
dlscoYery in (Case 172).
E!'ltoppel (Case 127).
Evidence, best (Case 78).
circumstantial (Cuse H).
corroborative (Cn!'les 11), 144-147).
direct (Case 6).
lneompetent (Cuse 11).
Indirect (Case 6).
prlma facle (Ca11e lG).
primary (Cases 78, 97-100, 108, 109).
secondary (CuseM lOS--113).
Exnmlnutlon of witnesses, chief (Coses 151l:H).
cross (C1111es 155-lGl).
re-examination (Cases 30, 162, lG.1).
EX<•eptlons (Cases 33. 68, 113, 137. HO, 158).
blll of, authentication (Case 132).
as evidence (Case 113).
Experts (Cm;ps 13, 24, 72- 75, 156).
Explanatory facts (Cases 20, 21).

(6()'1)

INDEX.

508
505 INDEX.

F Juror as witness (Case 134).

Jury to decide on evidence produced (Case 1).

Facts. collateral (Cases 2. 7. 8, and 161).

explanatory (Cases 20, 21). I

in issue (Cases 4. 5. 122). _ '

possibly connected with issue (Case 23). Laws Q1’ another state (Cases 80, 81, 107),

8110\\'iI1tI fo1"serv (Case-Q 2. 17. 18)- conﬂict between state and federal (Case

fraud (Cases 19, 77). 130).

plan, etc. (Case 3). Letter, mailing, presumption of delivery (Case

probable cause, etc. (Cases 14, 15, 57). 16).

tending to criminate (Cases 1-ii-143). press copies of (Cases 110-112).

Forgery, facts showing (Cases 2. 17, 18). Life tables as evidence (Case -12).

Former suit, evidence in (Case 51;).

Fraud. facts showing (Cases 1%), 31). M

Function of judge (Cases 3, 15, 133, 110).

Maps as evidence (Cases -13. 86).

‘ Money, judicial notice of (Case T9).

(' Motive. facts showing (Case 57).

Geographical facts, judicial notice of (Case MunMpa1_c°rp°mﬂ°ns’ evidence of ads or

F

Facts, collateral (Cases 2, 7, 8, and 101).
explanatory (Oases 20, 21).
1~
In IKMue (<.'nses 4. ;;. 122).
pOf!Rlbly connected with Issue (CnRe 23).
Laws of another state (Cases 80, 81, 107).
showlng forgPl"Y (CaseR 2, 17, 18).
contllct between state and federal (CaRe
fraud (Cases 10, 7i).
130).
plan, etc. (CaRe 3).
Letter, malllng, presumption of delh·ery (Ca111e
probable cause, etc. (Case11 14. 15, 57).
16).
tending to crlmllltlte (('allt'M Ht--14:-l).
press copies of (Cases 110-112).
Forgery, facts showing (l'aHt!!! 2. 17, 18).
Life tables as evldenc.oe (Ca1W 42).
Former suit. evlden<'e In (C'a11e :ill).
Fraul'.l, facts showing (Callt's 111, 31).
M
Function of judge (Cm1ee 3, 1:;, 133, 14Q),
Maps as evidence (Cases 43. 8m.
Money, judicial notice of (Case 79).
0
Motive, facts showing (Case ai).
Geographical facts, judldal notke of (Cases Municipal corporations, evidence of acts ot
(Case 100).
86, 87).
Govemor, cowmunleatlone to (Case 136).
N

86’ 8.” (Case 150).
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Governor, communications to (Case 13(5). N

Natural history, judicial notice of facts of

H (Cases 86-89).

Notice to produce documents (Cases 172, 173).

Handwriting (Cases 17, T6. 77, 89).

Hearsay (Cases 6, 26, 27, 36).

Hostile witness (Case 167). O

Husband and wife as witnesses (Cases 130- Oath, requirement of (Case 143)_

132)- Objections to evidence, time of (Case 68).

Hyllﬂtlleiiciil questions (C1189 72)- Oﬂicers, public, judicial notice (Case 82).

Open and close, right to (Cases 123-127).

I Opinions (Cases 2-1. (SS--73).

of experts (Cases 72, 73).

Impeachment of witnesses (Cases 11' 159, Oral evidence in connection with writings

of one's own witness (Cases 164, 165). Owner’ admisslons by (Cases 29' 3”)‘

Indirect evidence (Case ti).

Infant as witness (Case 129). P

Insane person as witness (Case 128).

Inspection of documents (Case 98).

of injured limb (Case 72).

Parol evidence, in connection with writings

(Cases -iii, 97-100, 114-121).

_ , __ ., . - ancient deeds, etc. (Cases 41, 104).

I“1"T"1‘1*,‘, t° sh"“ ‘L“‘“S " 3" 14’ 1“' copies (Cases 97, 102, 105, 100, 110-112).

’ ' deeds (Cases -11, 102, 104).

J duplicates (Case 100).

public documents (Cases 41, 105-107).

Judge. function of (Cases 3, 15. 133. 1+0, 1-11). Pedigree (Cases 55, 66, GT).

discretion of (Case 15). Perjury (Cases 19, 1-1-1).

as witness (Case 133). P110i.O2‘i‘8])l1S (Case 43).

Judgments (Cases -l. ~11‘.-53. 55. S0, 113). Physicians, statements to (Case 72).

in criminal prom-c¢iin;:s (Case .32). Plan, facts sliowing (Case 3).

in ejectment (Case 5:2). Plats, etc. (Case 97).

in personam (Cases 50, 53). Possessor, admissions by (Cases 29, 30).

in rem (Cases 50, 51.). Preparation, facts showing (Case 3).

Judicial notice (Cases 74, 76. 79-89, 97). P1-esumptions (Cases 16, 92-96, 105),

almanac (Case 76). Primary evidence (Cases 78, 97-100, 108. 109,

appellate pro<~cedin,~:s ((‘ase S1). 158).

changes in oiiice (Case S2). Privileged communications (Cases 135-140).

character of 1-i\'cr(Casc >56). to attorneys (Cases 135, 137-1~i0).

coincidence of days of week and month to husband or wife (Cases 130-132).

(Case H9). to public oﬁiccrs (Cases 135, 13(3).

laws of other st-ltv-= (Cases so and S1). l'rooi', burden of (Cases 6, S3, 12".:-12". 157).

location of places (Cases S3. NT). Public documents, records, etc. (Cases 41, 98,

seals. etc. (Cases HR. N4). 105-107, 101)).

seasons, etc. (Case SS). otiicers, judicial notice (Cases 82, 83).

signatures of officers, etc. (Case S3). communications to (Cases 135, iilti).

United States money (Case TU). rights, declarations as to (Case 65).

Juror as witness (Case 134).
Jury to decide on evhlen<'e produced (Case 1).

H

Natural history, judicial notice of facts of
(Cases 86-89).
Notice to produce documents (Cases 172, 173).

Handwriting (Cases 17, 76, 77, 89).
Hearsay (Cases 6, 26, ZT, 36).
0
H011tile witness (Case 1G7).
Husband and wife as witnesses (Cases 130- Oath, requirement of (Case 148).
132).
Objections to evidence, time of (Case 68).
Hypothetical questions (Case 72).
Oftlcers, public, judicial notice (Case 82).
Open and clOl!e, right to (C'ases 123--127).
Opinions (Cases 24, «.~7:l).
I
of experts \Cases i2, 73).
Oral
evidence In connection with writings
Impeachment of wltnPSses (Ca11ee 11, 159,
(Cases 46, 97-100, lH-121).
161--165, 168-170).
Owner, admissions by (Cases 29, 30).
of one's own witness (Cases 164, 165).
Indirect evidence (Case 6).
p
Infant as witness (Case 129).
Insane person as witness (Case 128).
Parol evidence, In <'Otmectlon with wrltlngs
Inspection of document!! (Case 98).
t<.'llses 4U, 97-100, 114--121).
of Injured limb (Case 72).
ancient dePds, etc. (Cases 41, 104).
Intent, evidence to show (Cases 2, 3, 14, l:l,
copies (Cases 97, 102, 105, 106, 110-112).
17--W, 3.~. rii).
deeds (Cases 41, 102, 104).
duplicates (Case 100).
J
public documents (Cases 41, 105--107).
Judge. function of (Case11 3, 15. l:l.'t 140, 141). Pedigree (Cases :>5, 66, 67).
Perjury (Case11 19, 144).
discretion of (Ca11e U)J.
Photographs (('nse 43).
a11 witness (Cu11e ma).
Physicians, stntt>mPnts to (Case 72).
JudA"mPnts (Cases 4. 4u--:.:~. ii:i, 80, 113).
Plan, facts showing (Case 3).
In criminal 11ro<'(•edlnJ.,"8 (CnRe u2).
In ejectment (Cnse :i2).
Plats, etc. (Case 'J7).
Possessor, admissions by (Cases 29, 30).
In personam (Cases 00, J3).
ln rem (Cases ao, ;)1).
Preparation, facts showing (Case 3).
Judl<'ial notice (Cases H, 76. 79--l~n. !17).
Presumptions (Cases 16, 92--UU, lOSJ.
almanac (Case 7tl).
Primary evidence (Cases 78, 97--100, 108, 109.
aP11ellate pro<•eedhlJ:R (( 'n11e 81).
tri8).
changes In oftke (('ase 82).
Privileged eommunlcatlons (Cases 13;'>-140).
to attorneys (Cases 13;), 137-140).
chm·n<'ter of rln•r (('a11e 8ti).
colnddenct• of days of wet•k nnd month
to husband or wife (Cnses 130-t:l2).
to public officers (Cnses 135, 136).
(('tlst~ Sil).
Proof, burden of (Cases U, 8.'l, 12'.!--127. 1::>7).
lawM of otlwr Mh1t<>s (Cas\'8 so nn<l 81).
1'11hli1• docmnents, record11, etc. (CHR<'S 41, 98,
loc·ntlon of 11h11·l•K (( ·a~s X:i, M7J.
Kt•nls. t't<'. (( 'llKl'K S:I, 141.
10!">--lOi, 109).
officers, judicial notice (CnRes 82, 83).
11enR01111, etc. (( 'n11e 8-~l.
rowmunlcatlons to CC'1t!'eR 135, 130).
slgnutureM of offi<.'!'rs, etc. (Cn11c 83).
rlg!Jts, !leclaratlonlil as to \Case o:i).
l.'nltecl States money (Cn11e W).

INDEX.
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lI\' DEX. 50';

Q

Q

Questions, hypothetical (Cases T2, 75).

leading (Case 153).

Questions, hypothE>tlenl (Cases 72, 75).
leading (Case 153).

rsage, e,·ld<>nee of (Cu!ilc 14G).

R.

Reasonable doubt (Cases 6, 38).

v

R"

Recitals in public documents (Cases 41, 54).

Records, public (Cases 41, 98, 105-107, 109).

custody of (Case 105).

inspection of (Case 98).

Re-examination of witness (Cases 30, 162,

163).

Referee, admissions of (Case 33).

Relevancy (Cases 2, 43).

Reputation (Cases 24, 25, 54, 55, 162, 166).

Res gestaa (Cases 6, 9, 10-12, 137).

Res inter allos (Cases 22, 113).

Right to open and close (Cases 12-'>-127).

Rights, public, declarations as to (Case 65).

S

H.easonable doubt (Coses 6, 38).
Uecltnls ln public documents (Cose11 41, 54).
Uecords, public (Cases 41, 08, 10;)-107, 109).
custody of (Case 100).
Inspection of (Case 98).
Re-exrunlnatlon of witness (Cases 30, 162,
163).
Referee, admissions of (Case 33).
Relevancy (Cases 2, 43).
Reputation (Cases 24, 25, 54, 55, 162, Hl6).
Res gestre (Cases 6, 9, 10-12, 137).
Res Inter allOR (Cases 22, 113).
Right to open and close (Cases 12:'">--127).
Rights, public, declarations as to (< ~1111e u:i).

Scientiﬁc books, etc. (Case 73).
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Seals, etc., judicial notice of ((‘ases 83. 84).

Secondary evidence (Cases 108, 109, 113).

degrees of (Cases 110-112).

Signature of officers. judicial notice (Case 83).

Similar facts, occurrences, etc. (Cases 2, 3, 14,

15, 17-19, 77. 128).

State secrets (Case 136).

State's evidence. turning (Case 1-ii‘).

Stockholders and stock books of ('0i'porali<|n.\'

(Cases 44, 45).

Subpoena duces tecum (Case 173).

T

Telegrams, what is original (Case 158).

Telephone communications (Case 27).

Testator, declarations as to contents of will

(Case 64).

'U

Vsage. evidence of (Case 146).

‘T

B
Sclentlftc books, etc. (Case 73).
8eal8, etc., ·judicial notice of (( 'ases 83, 84).
Secondary evidence (Cases 108, 109, 113).
degrees of (Cases 110-112).
Signature of omcers. judicial not!C'e (Case S:-l).
Similar facts, occurrences, etc. (Cases 2, 3, 14,
15, 17-19, 77. 128).
State secrets (Case 136).
State's evidence, turning (CasE> 14i).
Stockholders and stoek book11 of 1·or11111·11tlous
(Cases 44, 45).
Rubprena duces tecum (Case 173).

Value, evidence of (('11st>s 22. liiii).
Variance (Cases 5, 68).
VPraclty, evldpm•e of reputation (Cases 168170).
Verdict, against evidence (Case 1).

w
Wltnes.'!, absent or <leceased (Case r>G).
aJ.'l'eemeut to turn eta te's evltlE>n<"e (Case
147).
character of (Cases 24, 2;-,, 162, rnH, 16S170).
corn1J('tP11ey of husband or wife (Oases
130, 131).
l11funt11 f('m1<' 12!)).
Insane (Case 128).
judge (Cose 133).
juror (Case 134).
· compulsory physical examination of (Ca11e
171).

cross-examination of (Cases 57, 72, 77,
15:>--161).
examination In chief (Cases rn1-1;-,;>).
hostile (Case 167).
lmpea<>hlug (Cases 11, 159. 161-170).
one's own witness (Cai;es 164, lfli>).
number of, ln particular cases 1C11Res 144147).
prlYlli>J'e not to crlmlnate himself (('uNeH
T
141-143).
re-examination of (Cases lfl2, Hl3).
Telegrams, what Is original (Ca!ile ff•'I).
'Y1·lt1ni:11 (~!'l' dol'Ulllt!11t11, pul.lllc ret'tH'<lH, conTelephone communications (Case 27).
tru<'tll, lleedR, l't<:.).
Testator, declarations as to contents of will
(Case 64).
Cases 41. 46, 97-121).

Value, evidence of (Cases 22. 156).

Variance (Cases 5, 68).

Veracity, evidence of reputation (Cases 169-

170).

Verdlet, against evidence (Case 1).

W

Witness, absent or deceased (Case 56).

agreement to turn state‘s evidence (Case

147).

character of (Cases 24, 25, 1 '2. 166, 168-

170).

competency of husband or wife (Cases

130, 131).

infants (Case 129).

insane (Case 128).

judge (Case 133).

juror (Case 134).

- compulsory physical examination of (Case

171).

cross-examination of (Cases 57, 72, 77,

155-161).

examination in chief (Cases 151-155).

hostile (Case 167).

inipeaching (Cases 11, 159. 161-170).

one’s own witness (Cases 16-i, 165).

number of, in particular cases (Cases 144-

147).

privilege not to criminate himself (Cases

141-143).

re-examination of (Cases 162, 163).
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